Construction of a ‘Globally Competitive City’ and Gentrification: A Case of , the

Submission Date: 1 September 2016 Name: Tsubasa Yuki Student ID: 1541447 MSc International Development (Poverty, Inequality, and Development), International Development Department, School of Government and Society Superviser: Dr. Philip Amis Word Count: 11880 words

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Abstract

This paper examines a case of gentrification in Quezon City, the Phlippines from perspective of comparative urbanism and neoliberal urbanism. Through the analysis of the case, it will be revealed: that a colonial legacy, political and economic reforms in the 1990s have prepared an overall policy environment and socio-economic arrangement, in which the specific case of gentrification takes place; that a development project to construct a ‘globally competitive city’ and the Quezon City Central Business District as its core and market-driven informal settler resettlement strategy depending on revenue from the very project have resulted in the displacement of the informal settlers: and that national and local government and international agencies as the World Bank have played significant roles in formulating a general development goal and strategy, planning and implementing the specific projects of constructing the ‘globally competitive city’ while informal settlers have been effectively excluded from the planning process. Drawing on these findings, this paper indicates that unequal and complicated relations between various agencies are reflected in the process of gentrification and that, while market mechanism per se is not the direct cause of the displacement of the informal settlers and thus the conventional rent gap theory might not be relevant, the market driven development strategy and resettlement project have led to gentrification in Quezon City.

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Contents

Acronymos…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………4

List of Tables and Figures…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..6

1. Introduction ...... 7 2. Concepts, theories, and frameworks of gentrification research ...... 9 2.1 Definitions of gentrification ...... 9 2.2 Globalized gentrification and comparative urbanism ...... 12 2.3 Neoliberal urbanism and urban development ...... 14 2.4 The role of government and transnational agencies and gentrification ...... 16 3. Development of the Quezon City Central Business District and Gentrification ...... 19 4. Participatory Urban Development and Gentrification in Quezon City ...... 28 4.1 Large-scale institutional arrangement: land elites, decentralization and neoliberal turn in the Philippines ...... 28 4.2 Construction of a ‘globally competitive city’ and gentrification ...... 34 4.3 Privatization of urban development and people’s participation ...... 45 5. Concluding Remarks ...... 51 Annex A: Basic Information about Metro and Quezon City ...... 64 Annex B: Methodology ...... 67 Annex C Housing Policies in the Philippines ...... 69 References……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….55

Annexes………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…64

Annex A Basic Information about and Quezon City……………………………………………….64

Annex B Methodology..……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….67

Annex C Housing Policies in the Philippines……..………………………………………………………………………….69

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Acronyms

BOT: Build-Operate-Transfer

CAS: Country Assistance Strategy

CISFA: Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter Finance Act

CLUP: Comprehensive Land Use Plan

CMP: Community Mortgage Program

CSO: Civil Society Organization

DILG: Department of Interior and Local Governance

FDI: Foreign Direct Investment

HUDCC: Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council

ICT: Information and Communications Technology

IFC: International Financing Corporation

IMF: International Monetary Fund

ISF: Informal Settler Family

IT-BPO: Information Technology-Business Process Outsourcing

JICA: Japan International Cooperation Association

LGC: Local Government Code

LGU: Local Government Unit

LRT: Light Rail Transit

MTPDP: Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan

MRT: Metro Rapid Transit

NCC: National Competitiveness Council

NCR: National Capital Region

NEDA: National Economic and Development Authority

NFPP: National Framework for Physical Planning

NHA: National Housing Authority

NUDHF: National Urban Development and Housing Framework

PPP: Public-Private Partnership

QCCBD: Quezon City Central Business District

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QCCLUP: Quezon City Comprehensive Land Use Plan

SAP: Structural Adjustment Program

SRCC-MCHC: Social Resettlement Comprehensive Community-Magic Circle Housing Cooperative

SRCC-NTA: San Roque Community Council-North Triangle Association

UDHA: Urban Development and Housing Act

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

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List of Tables and Figures

Table 1. Description of five districts of the Triangle Park …………………………………………………………………22

Table 2. The number of ISFs relocated from the North Triangle Area (2010-August 2014)……………….25

Table 3. The number of business registered in Quezon City (2005-July 2015)………………………………….43

Table 4. The number of construction permits issued (2008-August 2015)……………………………………….44

Table 5. Median land values in Quezon City and the Triangle Park in 1990, 2000, and 2015……………44

Table A1. Rural, Urban, and Total Population and Proportion (1990-2010)……………………………………..65

Table A2. Growth and distribution of informal settler families from 1991 to 2012………………………….66

Table A3. Informal settlers in Quezon City from 2005-2010…………………………………………………………….66

Table A4. Informal settlers in Metro Manila in 2011 by city…………………………………………………………….66

Table B1. Information about the informants…………………………………………………………………………………..68

Table C1. Housing needs estimated by region, 2011-2016 (in number of households)……………………69

Table C2. Performance of housing policies……………………………………………………………………………………..71

Figure 1. Five economic growth centres in Quezon City…………………………………………………………………..21

Figure 2. CBD-Knowledge Community……………………………………………………………………………………………..21

Figure 3. Five districts of the Triangle Park……………………………………………………………………………………….21

Figure 4. Expert Global Solutions in the East Triangle along EDSA……………………………………………………23

Figure 5. in the North Triangle……………………………………………………………………………………..23

Figure 6. High-rise condominiums in the Vertis North……………………………………………………………………..23

Figure 7. High-rise condominiums in the Vertis North and San Roque Community………………………….23

Figure A1. Map of Metro Manila and business districts in the region ………………………………………………64

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1. Introduction

It is often argued that the term ‘gentrification’ was first coined in 1964 by Ruth Glass as she described changes of built environment in London brought about by the middle class and developers, which resulted in displacement of the working class (Glass 1964). Since then, numerous issues about the concept have been discussed, and now the term is used to describe and analyse much broader range of phenomena than it covered in the initial phase of the study.

One of the most significant differences between gentrification studies at that time and current gentrification research would be that spatial changes in cities in the Global South have become objects of gentrification studies as well as those in the Global North. Indeed, gentrification has become an analytical concept or a theory that is used to study urban spatial changes and their consequences in planetary scale (Lees et.al 2015, Lees et.al 2016). The case of gentrification in Quezon City, Metro Manila, the Philippines addressed in this paper also belongs to the trend of global wide gentrification research, although this contribution focuses particularly on roles of governments at multiple levels, international agencies, the ways various agencies are involved in the process of gentrification in Quezon City, and contradictions of housing/resettlement strategies took by government agencies.

By illustrating how various agencies contribute to shaping the urban spaces in Quezon City, this paper argues that gentrification is caused not simply by market mechanism per se, but is a consequence of development policies supposed to contribute to achieving an overall development goal of the country and to improving livelihood of citizen in Quezon City, and that disparities in socio-economic status and political power among the agencies are expressed in the urban spatial restructuring.

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This paper is composed of five chapters. In chapter 2, concepts and theories of gentrification and a basis of the framework through which the case of gentrification in this paper is analysed will be examined. The chapter 3 describes the development of the Quezon City Central Business District (QCCBD) and its effects on informal settler families (ISFs) living in Sitio San Roque in Quezon City, the Philippines. In the first section of the chapter 4, large- scale institutions and regulatory frameworks that have shaped a policy environment and politico-economic structure of the Philippine society will be addressed. An overall development policy of the Philippines, urban development strategies, and more specific development projects conducted by the national and local governments to realize the vision of ‘globally competitive city’ will be examined in the second section. The third section of the chapter 4 deals with issues related to urban planning and development practices and participation of informal settler families (ISFs), followed by a short conclusion. Finally, the chapter 5 gives concluding remarks and critical reflections on this study.

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2. Concepts, theories, and frameworks of gentrification research

2.1 Definitions of gentrification

As will be discussed below, it has been argued that gentrification, or at least gentrification research has become a global phenomenon. As the concept of gentrification is used to analyse urban processes in varying contexts, it would be inevitable that its definition needs to get looser or more abstract. However, as an analytical concept in social science, the concept of gentrification should be something that helps one to understand certain aspects of spatial change.

Initially, the term gentrification was closely related to class division and conflict as one can see in Neil Smith’s earlier definition of gentrification1 and Glass’s (1964) description of gentrification in London in the 1960s. However, class division would not be an essential element of gentrification. It is too ambitious to discuss difficulties with defining class here, but at least it can be said that informal workers in the informal sector of urban areas in the Global South are not necessarily classified as “working class” even though they are often vulnerable to displacement. Therefore, if one believes that displacement of certain social groups is the vital feature of gentrification, it seems socio-economic disparity which might and might not be called class relations would be relevant concept to gentrification2.

Reinvestment in pre-existing residential areas is another common element of definitions of gentrification. However, while Smith (1982) once argued that gentrification is concerned

1 Smith (1982: 139-140) defined gentrification as “[t]he process by which working class residential neighbourhoods are rehabilitated by middle class homebuyers, landlords, and professional developers…The term gentrification expresses the obvious class character of the process”. 2 One might say that the concept of class division is sometimes identical to economic disparity or difference in social status which can be represented by occupation and levels of educational qualification. However, the concept of class can also mean difference in means of production as in Marxian theories, which would be not relevant to some contemporary societies. The point here is that the concept of gentrification is concerned with some social groups which are relatively vulnerable to displacement happening along with processes of urban restructuring.

9 only with residential areas, he later changed his position so that investment in non- residential area such as commercial area can be relevant to gentrification (Smith 1996). Regarding this point, some researchers argue that there is a certain phenomenon which can be called ‘new-build gentrification’ (Davidson and Lees 2005; 2010; Visser and Kotze 2008). New-build gentrification does not immediately displace relatively poor residents since it reshapes brownfield but not residential areas, which, however, could consequently displace poor residents living in adjacent neighbourhoods (Davidson and Lees 2005). As long as the restructuring of non-residential areas exclusively benefits specific social groups and displace relatively disadvantaged people, investment in non-residential area should not be excluded from gentrification studies3.

Lastly, and probably most importantly, the meaning of displacement is not necessarily clear. There have been debates on whether or not gentrification inevitably causes displacement of the poor, and whether a certain process of urban spatial change is gentrification or not (Slater 2006; 2009; Vigdor et al. 2002; Freeman and Braconi 2004; Wyly et al. 2010). This kind of argument is also relevant to the ‘new-build gentrification’. There has been a controversy over the relationship between alleged new build gentrification and displacement4 in London (Hamnett 2003; Boddy 2007; Davidson and Lees 2005; Watt 2008). Apart from the problem whether there was physical displacement of working class residents, and drawing on Marcuse’s (1985) typology of displacement and Tuan’s (1977) distinction between ‘space’ and ‘place’, Davidson and Lees (2010) argue that the development of Thames riverside wards gives ‘displacement pressure’ on working class and old residents even though they can stay there. They call this perception phenomenological displacement and argue that this phenomenon, which could be in tandem with physical

3 It should be noted that restructuring of urban area does not necessarily include ‘re’investment since some space can be object of investment, which has not been included in land nor housing market as Ghertner (2013) notes. ‘Reinvestment’ might seem essential component of gentrification when it is explained by the rent gap theory proposed by Neil Smith. Nevertheless, the incorporation of urban space into land or housing market, which has not been involved, can also generate incentives for developing the area, leading to displacement of the urban poor. 4 Hamnett (2003) and Boddy (2007) claim that the decline in lower social status population in the development site of Thames River and its adjacent districts was not caused by the development but part of replacement of working class by growing middle class proceeding in the whole London at that time. Watt (2008) argues that such argument is based on classification of ‘economically active’ residents by occupational types and, thus excludes economically non-active residents.

10 displacement, is a ‘case’ of gentrification. This idea of the phenomenological displacement is an important notion since it enables us to analyse how urban space, which is shaped by human agency, can affect individuals’ consciousness or, at least, perception. However, this expansion of the meaning of displacement has gone too far so that the concept of gentrification loses its conceptual utility. It would be imaginable that any significant change of urban space can give the feeling of alienation or exclusion to a certain social group and that it would be hardly possible to differentiate gentrification from other processes of urban spatial change5. Phenomenological displacement is a possible outcome or ‘sign’ of gentrification but not a constitutive element of gentrification.

Given these arguments, this paper adopts a relatively general definition of gentrification proposed by Eric Clarke:

[g]entrification is a process involving a change in the population of land-users such that the new users are of a higher socio-economic status than the previous users, together with an associated change in the built environment through a reinvestment in fixed capital…It does not matter where and it does not matter when (2005: 258).

Thus, as this definition indicates, gentrification is not necessarily related to class and investment in non-residential area can be taken into account6. However, it should be noted that ‘a change in the population’ is here interpreted as an actual move of the residents but not their perception of alienation, etc. because of the reason noted above. Hereafter, gentrification should be understood as this in this paper7.

5 If phenomenological displacement per se is regarded as a constitutive element of gentrification, it can be easily conflated with spatial changes as ‘re-appropriation’ or ‘domination’ of space in Lefebvre’s terms, although these notions are not irrelevant to gentrification (Lefebvre 1991). 6 Although the definition noted above uses the term ‘reinvestment’, it does not necessarily exclude investment in formerly non-commodified spaces because of the reason noted in section 2.4. 7 There is another point to be noted. Since it does not clarify the nature of the association between displacement of those who have lower socio-economic status and changes in physical environment, this is merely a concept of gentrification but not a ‘theory’ of gentrification, which is supposed to have explanatory power.

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One might argue that there is no need to use the term gentrification and that one can use other terms to describe and analyse changes in urban spaces in cities in the Global South. However, this paper keeps using the term gentrification since there are some attractive properties of the concept. As noted above, the term gentrification entails displacement of those who have relatively lower socio-economic status, and thus, as Slater (2006) argues, it highlights a political nature of urban spatial change, which is often eliminated from the words such as urban regeneration and urban redevelopment. Apart from normative arguments on gentrification, its emphasis on the political nature would direct researchers’ attention to social relations that underpin and are expressed in the process of spatial change, especially when the concept is related to an idea of comparative urbanism.

2.2 Globalized gentrification and comparative urbanism

Since the 1990s, some researchers have started arguing that gentrification has become a global phenomenon (Smith 1996; 2002; Hackworth and Smith 2001). Some even argue that “gentrification appears to have migrated centrifugally from the metropoles of North America, Western Europe and Australia” and that globalized gentrification is “a form of new urban colonialism” (Atkinson and Bridge 2005: 2). From this context, comparative study of gentrification in cities across the Global North and the Global South emerged (e.g. Harris 2008). However, the diffusionist view of gentrification has a serious deficit, and gentrification researchers need to address the issue paying attention to context- embeddedness and path-dependency of the phenomenon.

Robinson (2002) criticises the dualism of comparative study, and argues that conventional urban comparative studies has applied urban theories constructed drawing on experiences of cities in the Global North to cities in the Global South. This criticism casts doubt on the idea that urban processes like gentrification have been exported to cities in the Global South from those in the Global North and that those phenomena can be successfully analysed with

12 theories and concepts constructed in the Global North. Given this criticism, ‘new’ comparative urbanism that entails a postcolonial perspective has risen (Robinson 2002; Lees 2012). From this perspective, urban processes do not simply travel around the globe from the North to the South but occur in different contexts having differences as well as similarities to some extent, and therefore urban theories are supposed to be informed by urban studies regardless its location within the globe. This ‘new’ comparative urbanism, “the systematic study of similarity and difference among cities or urban processes” (Nijman 2007: 1), has also been urging urban studies researchers to reconceptualise urban space. Drawing on Hart (2002) and Brenner (2001), Ward (2010) argues that the city is not predefined and fixed space but should be theorized as bundles of social relations and interactions connected to dynamics at regional, national, and international levels. Thus, the new comparative urbanism refuses the universalistic and diffusionist attitude on the one hand, and reconceptualises urban spatial change as relational and historically contextualized process on the other hand.

The perspective of comparative urbanism has also influenced gentrification research. Referring to earlier studies of gentrification that claims globalization of gentrification (Smith 1996; Atkinson and Bridge 2005), Maloutas (2011) argues that it is impossible or unfavourable to generalize gentrification since the phenomenon is strongly attached to specific contexts of cities in the Global North, and that since studies of globalized gentrification tends to ignore heterogeneity of causal mechanisms by emphasising similarities of the outcomes. However, as Lees et al. (2015) argue, the fact that the term gentrification was firstly elaborated based on experiences of cities in the Global North does not mean that it cannot be detached from the context, although each of specific gentrification researches should take respective contexts into account. Secondly, it was a response to the second point of Maloutas’s (2011) criticism8 and to the insights of

8 It should be noted that Lees et al. (2015) also adopt Clarke’s (2005) definition of gentrification which does not entail causal explanation, whereas Maloutas (2011) assumes the term gentrification should have explanatory power in itself. Applicability of the term would also depend on whether one see the term gentrification should have a pre-defined specific causal explanation or not.

13 comparative urbanism that motivated Lees et al. (2015) to edit case studies of gentrification in various cities with respect to specific paths gentrifications in those cities took9.

2.3 Neoliberal urbanism and urban development

Given the increasing attention to globalized gentrification, economic globalization and neoliberalism10 have been frequently used to explain such a phenomenon. As Lees et al. (2016) argue, capital switching from the primary circuit of capital to the secondary circuit of capital, that is fixed properties as build environment (Lefebvre 2003), can take a form of gentrification in urban processes, and, combined with development of IT and communication technology and international institutions for financial transfer, the second circuit of capital has attracted greater interests of investors across national boundaries than ever. Developed capitalism tends to differentiate spaces in order to create further accumulation of wealth while it simultaneously means dispossession for poorer people (Harvey 2007). Related to these points, globalization of gentrification is often explained by the diffusion of neoliberalism and transition of mode of urban governance from managerialism to entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989).

One of the criticisms given by Maloutas (2011) is concerned with the naïve idea that neoliberalism can be used as a framework through which gentrifications in different contexts are analysed. However, in parallel to the rise of ‘new’ comparative urbanism, in urban studies, ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, that is neoliberal restructuring projects

9 For example, according to Tolga and Sakizlioglu (2015), given relatively complicated land and building regulations, recent surge of gentrification in Istanbul, Turkey can be to large extent attributed to the rise of the strong political power: Justice and Development Party (AKP) which can exercise strong political power to radically reform those regulations. 10 Neoliberalism can be generally defined as “a theory of political economic practices proposing that human well-being can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty, unencumbered market, and free trade” (Harvey 2007: 22). However, it should be noted that while neoliberalism saw its rise in the 1970s as a destruction of Keynesian paradigm of economic policy, neoliberalism has been changed from ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism to ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism, which means that neoliberalism is no longer confined to national economic policy but also involves social and penal policies and is oriented to construction of norms and institutions (Peck and Tickell 2002).

14 embedded in local contexts defined by pre-existing institutional frameworks, policy regimes and regulatory practices, has been studied in order to explore the dynamic relationship between urban spaces, broader force of neoliberalism, and local contexts (Brenner and Theodore 2002). ‘Actually existing neoliberalism’ is an evolving project that is driven mainly by the state but bound to legacies of preceding institutional, political and economic conditions (path-dependency) and contested by various social groups having different interests11. From this perspective, neoliberalism is not diffused by specific countries or international institutions as Smith (1996) argue, although they also play significant roles (Brenner and Theodore 2005; Wilson 2004). Nevertheless, while ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ could be a useful framework to analyse economic and social policies, as Parnell and Robinson (2013) warn, researchers need to be cautious not to reduce urban processes to neoliberalism12.

In analysing ‘actually existing neoliberalism’, interactions between governments, external agencies and citizen need to be paid attention. Particularly, effects of democratization and decentralization on urban development policies should not be disregarded. Earlier studies of the relationship between the decentralization and pro-poor policies have been ambivalent (Schneider 2003; von Braun and Grote 2000) and therefore, in terms of urban development studies, researchers have begun to put more emphasis on local political and economic settings, that is urban governance, which are supposed to be strongly related to the consequences of democratization and decentralization (Devas 2001; 2003; Rakodi 2001; 2003; Devas et al. 2004).

11 For example, Chatterjee (2009; 2011) demonstrates that neoliberalism in Ahmedabad, India has been combined with ethnocentric discourse and local politics based on ethnocentrism in order to divide the poor negatively affected by open market policy and development projects by fuelling hostility of poor Hindu against Muslim residents. Thus, neoliberal policy in Ahmedabad takes unique shape and gives locally specific effects on the residents. 12 Drawing on case studies of post-Apartheid South Africa, Parnell and Robinson (2013) argue that design of pro-poor social policies of South African government in the post-Apartheid era were largely influenced by rights based movements by communities. Although their study is not exactly about urban restructuring, it is indicative that non-neoliberal policies were delivered as a consequence of interaction between the state or government and the citizen.

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One of the main features of decentralized urban governance is that it is supposed to open up spaces for heterogeneous agencies to participate in politics and urban planning that affect themselves, although it would also mean that the poor need to contest with higher- income residents or middle class who have more affluent resources than them (Devas et al. 2004; Benjamin 2000; 2004; Zerah 2009). But, it should be noted that no matter how democratization and decentralization might be important, it does not mean that the central government no longer plays significant roles in building urban policies and shaping urban spaces, although, in gentrification studies, this point has been not paid much attention as discussed below.

2.4 The role of government and transnational agencies and gentrification

In terms of agency, it has been argued that gentrification studies has been relatively indifferent to the role of the state or government (Lees et al. 2016). It was the consumer sovereignty thesis that was dominant in explanations of gentrification at the initial phase of gentrification study, which inherits legacies of the Chicago School, neoclassical economics and individualism (Lees et al. 2008). Smith (1996: chapter 3) tries to reject this explanation and emphasises the importance of the state, capital and housing and land market structures. However, while Smith (1996) does not deny the relevance of consumer preferences to gentrification, he underestimates the importance of agency of individuals and certain social groups13 which are primarily discussed in consumption theories of gentrification14.

13 They are particularly related to counterculture, left-liberal political ideologies, gender, and sexuality (see, Caulfield 1989; 1994; Ley 1980; 1986; 1996; Rose 1984; Butler and Hamnett 1994; Lauria and Knopp 1985).

14 Referring to simultaneous occurrence of gentrification in different cities, Smith (1996) argues that the theories dependent on the idea of consumer preferences cannot explain causes of gentrification because they have to presume individual consumer preferences have changed simultaneously around the (First) world. However, most of consumption side theorists of gentrification noted here talk about social actors and changes of their preferences in relation to context-specific reasons such as economic restructuring, increased participation of women in the labour force, left-liberal social movements in the 1960s and 1970s.

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While Smith’s (1979; 1996) argument seems to be structurally deterministic, consumption side theories of gentrification have been indifferent to other actors (Lees et al. 2008). Particularly, roles of the state or government have been understudied in gentrification researches whose primary focus is put on the middle class and their consumption preferences (Lees et al. 2016). However, recent case studies of gentrification in various cities demonstrate more aggressive and wider roles of the state. Ghertner (2013) argues that some Indian cities’ public land on which informal settlements have been living was privatized by the state, and thus it was ‘enclosed’ into the formal property market15. Shin and Kim (2015) argue that major urban development programmes implemented by the developmental state of South Korea have led to new-build gentrification in Seoul since the 1980s.

Among other roles of the state or government, its role in creating economic value of urban spaces is particularly relevant in this paper. Some of Indian cities’ development vision to become ‘global city’, which has been used to justify slum evictions and has contributed to the rise in property values, is a product of the cooperation between the provincial state governments and the emerging middle class (Dupont 2011; Ellis 2012; Srivastava 2009; Bhan 2009). This implies that the state has become more aggressive in creating economic value of cities, or aestheticization of cities which has been conventionally argued in regards to the roles of middle class and certain social groups like artists (Ley 2003; Zukin 1987; 1989; 1998). Furthermore, when one sees gentrification in cities in the Global South, the role of international aid agencies should not be disregarded since, to varying extent, they have engaged in development planning and practice in such cities.

To sum up, there are three particularly important points to be noted here. Firstly, this paper adopts the relatively loose definition of gentrification proposed by Clarke (2005) and the term gentrification is used in this paper to highlight the political nature of processes of urban spatial restructuring, in which socio-economic disparity among people and

15 It would be worth noting that this case does not fit the conventional rent gap theory proposed by Smith (1996) since the formerly public lands did not experience investment before, and thus it was not ‘re’investment, which is a critical element of the theory.

17 interactions between different agencies can be revealed. Secondly, while gentrification can be used in different contexts, the diffusionist notion of global gentrification and neoliberalism should be rejected so that particular contexts in which each city or urban space is located is analysed. Finally, in analysing the process of gentrification, multiple agencies and institutional mechanism through which those agencies interact should be addressed.

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3. Development of the Quezon City Central Business District and Gentrification

In this chapter, the process of developing the Quezon City Central Business District (QCCBD) will be reviewed and it is also demonstrated that this process has led to gentrification. Before that, basic information of Metro Manila and Quezon City should be introduced here (a map of Metro Manila and demographic data of Quezon City are on Annex A). Metro Manila or the National Capital Region (NCR) was established as a special development and administrative region in 1975 by the president Marcos. Quezon City is the largest city in Metro Manila in terms of both geographical scale and population, having an estimated population of 3,085,786 people which counts for 22.3 percent of the total population of Metro Manila and around 3 percent of the national population (Quezon City Government 2015b). Metro Manila has been a central area of the Philippines since the colonial rules and it saw a rapid increase in the population after the Second World War by which Manila City was almost completely destroyed. Although suburb areas have been developed, urbanization of Metro Manila has not stopped (Ortega et al. 2015). As urbanization continues, the number of ISFs has also dramatically increased, which is considered to be a consequence of rising property values and low wages due to neoliberal economic policies (Shatkin 2004).The number of ISFs in Quezon City counts 232,181 and 39.7 percent of the total number of ISFs in the NCR in 2011 (Ballesteros et al. 2015). The following analyses in the chapter 4 should be understood in this context of continuing urbanization and concentration of informal settlements/settlers in Quezon City.

Until the mid-2000s, there was no concrete plan of the QCCBD although, in the Quezon City Comprehensive Land Use Plan (QCCLUP) 2000-2010, the ‘North Triangle Business District’ is seen as a space “where a mix use development incorporating terminal requirements of the MRT Line 3 project with business and residential development is being implemented”

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(Quezon City Council 2000: 17)16,17. In 2002, with the issuance of Executive Order (EO) 106, the North Triangle Development Commission was set up, which is supposed to oversee the development of 37 hectare of land leased by the National Housing Authority (NHA) to Robinsons Land Corporation. Then, with the issuance of EO 620 and 620A, the area was expanded to the current area of 250.6 hectare and the committee was reorganized as the Urban Triangle Development Commission (TriDev Commission) in 2007. Between the two events, the World Bank, together with Japanese urban development consultant ALMEC Corporation, conducted a study for preparation of an overall framework of the Quezon City Central Business District (World Bank and ALMEC Corp. 2006). This study specifies general characteristics of the Triangle Park, principles of land use, and implementation procedures, which are reflected in the master plan18submitted by the commission in 2010, although, as revealed in chapter 4, its strategy to address informal settlers living in the site has changed19. Almost in parallel, the Quezon City Comprehensive Land Use Plan (QCCLUP) 2011-2030 defines five specific areas as prospected growth centres one of which is called CBD-Knowledge Community District (Figure 1 and 2) and the QCCBD is supposed to be a core of the district. As described and summarized in Figure 3 and Table 1, the Triangle Park is planned to have five districts which have particular land uses respectively, although each districts also have multiple functions as residence, office, and recreational space. This design of sub-districts follow the land use principles defined in the study conducted by the World Bank20.

16 The whole Triangle areas which include North, South, East, and West Triangles are indicated to be the only ones defined as ‘Urban Promotion Areas’ (UPA) which are treated “as redevelopment areas where structures and land use could be changed to other suitable activities aligned with the preferred development thrusts”(Quezon City Council 2000: 6). 17 In relation to this ‘North Triangle Business District’, the Memorandum Order 127 in 1986 directed the NHA to bid the area to the private sector in order to commercialize the area and an executive committee to oversee the development was created under the EO 58 in 1993. 18 The masterplan was formulated by the commission with support from CPRM Consultants, Inc. and Transport and Traffic Planners, Inc. 19 The masterplan says that “[t]he framework plan [the study by the World Bank and ALMEC in 2006] which was approved, established the rationale for the establishment of the CBD, formulated the vision which will guide its development, defined the broad urban land use and architecture, and provided recommendations on governance, management and strategies in addressing such issues and informal settlements” (Urban Triangle Development Commission 2010: 5). 20 The study defines five characteristics of the land use district plan: (IT-BPO) office; residence; retail, institutional; and recreational, which correspond to the five sub-districts of the QCCBD.

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Figure 1. Five economic growth centres in Quezon City

Figure 2. CBD-Knowledge Community21

(Quezon City Council 2010a: 23)

Figure 3. Five districts of the Triangle Park

(Urban Triangle Development Commission 2010a: 41)

21 The CBD-Knowledge Community District “embraces the proposed CBD comprising of the North and East Triangle and the Veterans Memorial Medical Center; the vicinity of SM North EDSA; UP Campus including the UP-Ayala Techno Hub; the campuses of Ateneo De Manila and Miriam College; Balara Filtration Plant; and the residential communities of UP Village, Teachers’ Village, , , and Xavierville” (Quezon City Council 2010a: 23)

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Table 1. Description of the five districts of the Triangle Park

District Size Description Triangle Exchange District 62.3 ha “Its commercial (office and retail), residential and other land uses are fully integrated with EDSA’s transit facilities, thus providing the best regional link and commuter access” (53) Emporium 49.5 ha “mixed use medium density district but focused on information technology activities, e- government, public, voluntary, international offices or services along with commercial and residential developments” (56) Downtown Hub District 58.46 ha “a mixed use, medium density district with institutional services and facilities (medical, education, training, science, etc.) integrated with commercial and residential developments” (57) Residential District 13.5 ha “a mixed use community with a residential focus and allows a range of housing types from high rise condominiums to medium and lower density townhomes” (61) Commons District 18.2 ha “mixed-use park with cultural, recreational, entertainment amenity focus but also allowing some residential use” (63) Urban Triangle Development Commission (2010a: 53-63)

The development of the North and East Triangles have begun but stagnated due to the existence of ISFs in that area. Nevertheless, part of the East Triangle has been already developed and international enterprises as Expert Global Solutions, a BPO company, are located in the area (Figure 4). In the North Triangle, a large-scale shopping mall TriNoma owned by Ayala Corporation, one of land elite families formed in the colonial era, opened in 2007 and, in Vertis North next to TriNoma, high-rise buildings like condominiums are now under construction (Figure 5, 6, and 7).

22

Figure 4. Expert Global Solutions in the East Triangle along EDSA (left)

Figure 5. Vertis North in the North Triangle22 (right)

(The picture was taken by the author) High Park Alveo (2016)

Figure 6. High-rise condominiums in the Vertis North (left)

Figure 7. High-rise condominiums in the Vertis North and San Roque Community (right)

(Pictures were taken by the author)

22 Although Vertis North covers the whole area indicated in the figure 5, a large portion of the area, Sitio San Roque, is practically occupied by informal settlers.

23

The vision of the QCCBD held by Quezon City government seems to have two main components. As the Table 1 implies and Quezon City says on its website, the area is envisioned as “a world-class, highly transit-oriented, mixed use community, walkable, vibrant night and day, with easy access to amenities that make urban living comfortable, convenient and ecologically compliant”, and thus the QCCBD is supposed to be a mixed-use community (Quezon City n.d. a). At the same time, in the masterplan, it is articulated that the QCCBD is “intended to establish itself as a globally competitive business location” with particular focuses on ICT outsourcing and health and wellness tourism (Urban Triangle Development Commission 2010a: 5)23.

In the North Triangle area, NHA and Ayala Land Inc. agreed on a joint venture of 65 million Philippines pesos project in 2009. Affected informal settlers in Sitio San Roque, which is located in the North Triangle and next to Vertis North, were first “offered voluntary relocation to Montalban, Rizal, a bag of groceries, and P6,000 cash assistance by the NHA”(Philippine Online Chronicle 23 September 2010). Some of those who opposed to the relocation plan was demolished and before and after the demolition a large number of ISFs in San Roque were ‘voluntarily’ relocated. Ka Inday, who has been living in San Roque says “in 2010, around 100 homes were demolished. The barricade stopped the demolition. But after the 2010 demolition, many voluntarily demolished and went to relocation sites in Montalban and Bulacan”. From 2010 to August 2014, the number of ISFs relocated from the North Triangle counts at least 6458 (see Table 2)24. After a massive relocation was taken place in 2010, Vertis North’s Ground Breaking Ceremony was held in 2012 (Quezon City 2012).

23 One of the goals stated in the economic development plan of the Quezon City Comprehensive Development Plan 2010-2013 is “[t]o develop a vibrant economic climate conductive to doing business both for local and foreign investments, and the development of business centres including the QCCBD is defined as a programme to achieve the goal (Quezon City Council 2010b: 57). 24 Moreover, with a dream of having “100% slum-free communities”, QC-LGU has relocated additional 2415 ISFs to Bistekville relocation site by August 2014 (Quezon City Government 2014: 6).

24

Table 2. The number of ISFs relocated from the North Triangle Area (2010-Aug 2014)

From the CBD Area (North Triangle) 2010 4385 2011 919 2012 704 2013 135 2014 (Jan-Aug 15) 315 Total 6458 Quezon City Government (2014: 35)

As Ortega (2016: 47) points out, NHA has constructed socialized housings in peri-urban areas, and “[t]hese projects serve as relocation sites for evicted informal settlers in the metropolis and are critical in legitimizing displacements and in face-lifting Manila to become informal-settler free and globally-competitive”. However, some refused to be relocated because they think that “they will be transferred to raw houses [sic.] far from their sources of livelihood” (Philippine Online Chronicles 23 September 2010). If they refuse to be relocated to off-city relocation site, they will be forcefully evicted25. Those who relocated are not necessarily satisfied with the off-city relocation sites where employment opportunities and access to basic services are limited or even worsened (John J. Carroll Institute on Church and Social Issues 2015). In some relocation sites, the living condition might be even worse as Demolition Watch (5 August 2013: no page number) reports: “on August 7, 2012, the relocation in Kasiglahan Village, was submerged with flood waters during the monsoon rain. More and more families in these areas are now coming back in Metro Manila and also in their former place in San Roque, North Triangle”. As the precise number of returnee from relocation sites cannot be calculated, the number of informal settlers displaced due to these processes is unclear. However, NHA keeps trying to relocate the remaining informal settlers saying this is part of inclusive growth26.

25 For example, in January 2014, there were conflicts between demolition team and informal settlers and “[a]round seven hours of sporadic clashes between the Quezon City police and illegal settlers on Agham Road [in Sitio San Roque] on Monday left 29 individuals hurt and nine others in police custody”(Dinglasan 27 January 2014). 26 FY 2014 Supplemental Appropriations was enforced in order to relocate 1308 ISFs to a relocation site in City. The Budget Secretary Florencio Abas said "Providing ISFs the opportunity to live a dignified life with a home they can call their own is part of the administration's strategy to create inclusive growth for all Filipinos. But the development of the North Triangle will also help generate more jobs for people with the creation of a new business hub in the area" (NHA 9 April 2015).

25

While forced eviction is justified by the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992 under certain conditions27, and thus forced eviction of informal settlers occupying ‘public spaces’ is in itself not illegal, in some cases residents claim that demolition teams did not satisfy the necessary conditions (International Alliance of Inhabitants 28 January 2014). Particularly, it is pointed out that adequate notice and consultation prior to forced eviction, which are defined as ‘mandatory’ procedures in the UDHA, are often absence (Institute for Popular Democracy and Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines). While there is doubt on the legitimacy of the process of demolition, Quezon City Council has recently passed another ordinance (city ordinance SP2247) which prohibits the renovation and construction of any structure without the consent of the legitimate owner of the land. In San Roque, security guards employed by Development Corporation, an affiliate of Ayala group, monitor the ISFs so that they cannot construct any new structure28.

Is this series of processes justifiably called ‘gentrification’? It seems that these processes fit the definition of gentrification given by Clarke (2005) noted in chapter 2. However, there are a few points to be noted here. Firstly, Lees et al. (2016: 176) argue that gentrification should be distinguished from development-induced-displacement which “occurs as a result of development projects that are supposedly to benefit the entire population”. This paper would agree with Lees et al. (2016) on this point and argues that displacement of ISFs in Metro Manila due to rail projects might not be defined as gentrification although Choi (2016) asserts that it has given adverse effects to the ISFs. In terms of the QCCBD, thousands of ISFs have been already relocated to distant places, and it is implied that the office, recreational facilities, and residential areas are not affordable or accessible for most of the ISFs. In short, these processes would be defined as gentrification since the development project is supposed to benefit exclusively those who have middle- or upper-socio-economic status and relocate ISFs from the area. Secondly, it is worth noting that the displacement of

27 The section 28 of UDHA says as the following: “Eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under the following situations: (a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.” 28 Based on interview with Ms. Ka Inday.

26

ISFs has been mainly driven by relocation programs of NHA and Quezon City and, that forced eviction conducted by the city’s Task Force, the NHA, and the Metro Manila Development Authority but not by housing market mechanism as presumed in a conventional rent gap theory29.

29 In the conventional rent gap theory proposed by Neil Smith, displacement of poorer residents is supposed to be caused by rise in rent price due to reinvestment in the formerly disinvested area, and the reinvestment is incentivized by rent gap, that is “the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use” (Smith 1996: 65). Thus, in short, displacement of resident is brought about primarily by land and housing market mechanisms. However, in Sitio San Roque, displacement of ISFs are primarily due to government intervention, though it seems to be indirectly related to rise in land value as discussed in the chapter 4.

27

4. Participatory Urban Development and Gentrification in Quezon City

As stated in the introduction and chapter 2, from perspectives of comparative urbanism and urban neoliberalism, this paper seeks to reveal the ways multiple agencies including national and local governments and international organizations have contributed to constructing ‘globally competitive city’ and to causing gentrification. For this purpose, an analytical framework elaborated in studies of urban neoliberalism would be useful although it needs to be adjusted so that urban development and gentrification can be analysed through it. Using an idea of ‘neoliberalization’, which is context specific as well as prone to external pressure, path-dependent process of neoliberalism, Peck et al. (2010) propose an analytical framework that has three dimensions to be addressed: specific projects of market-disciplinary governance; institutional mechanism of policy circulations; and large- scale institutional and legal structures. Since the primary focus of this study is on urban development and gentrification, the three dimensions of the framework needs to be adjusted as the following: specific projects of urban governance and development; institutional mechanisms and networks of knowledge sharing through which urban development policies are circulated; and large-scale institutional arrangements, regulatory frameworks, legal systems, and policy relays that provide general frameworks within which specific policies and plans are prepared. The third dimension is examined in the section 4.1 and the first will be examined in the section 4.2 and 4.3, while the second dimension will be addressed where it is relevant (for methodology, see Annex B).

4.1 Large-scale institutional arrangement: land elites, decentralization and neoliberal turn in the Philippines

This section mainly addresses the third dimension of the framework noted above. In short, what characterize the Philippine society and policy/development environment are democratization, decentralization and neoliberal economic reforms. In addition, the formation of land elites in the Philippines is also discussed since it is particularly relevant to gentrification in the Philippines.

28

Since the 16th century to the end of World War Two, the Philippines had been under two colonial rules30 and some of the legacies of the colonial rules have been influencing Philippine society. During the Spanish era, Spanish colonizers used the existing local hierarchy31 in order to infiltrate their rule, and in so doing, they turned the precolonial chiefs and nobles, together with Chinese merchant, into the ‘principalia’ who own lands and accumulate wealth (Quimpo 2009; Simbulan 2005). After the Spanish-American war in 1898, America became a new colonizer instead of Spain and, while racial hierarchy was maintained, provincial and national level democratic rule was installed. Since political suffrage was allowed only to the ruling elites, the democratic reform demarcated a boundary among Filipinos in another aspect, that is, disparity in terms of political right32 (Magno and Parnell 2015). Thus, despite the major change of political structure, the land elites formed during the colonial era maintained their political and economic privileges33.

A further move toward democratization and decentralization occurs shortly after the independence from America. However, while democratic reform proceeded substantially, decentralization in the 1950s and 1960s was stagnated mainly due to struggles between national elites and local (land) elites34. Contestations between national and local elites over urban planning led to failure in implementing city planning in the 1960s and 1970s, which caused frustration about incapacity of governments among businessman, local elites (van Naerssen et al. 1996). As social movements critical to the administration surged, the then

30 There was an invasion by Japanese army during the World War Two, of course. However, it would not be clear whether it was a ‘colonial rule’ and the event is not particularly relevant here, and therefore it is excluded from the analysis in this paper. 31 Before the Spanish colonial era (1521-1898), there were indigenous local chiefs who have personal ties with villagers of respective 32 In this way, non-American elites gained political privilege as well as high economic status and reinforced patron-client relationships with non-elite Filipinos in a form of the trade of votes (Langran 2011). 33 Political suffrage was expanded further after the independence but two major national political parties (Nacionalista and Liberal parties) were dominated by pre-existing elites and patron-client relationship between the elites and non-elite citizen was maintained (Quimpo 2009). 34 Two key laws were also legislated in the 1950s and 1960s, namely, the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 and the Decentralization Act of 1967. While these laws forced the central government to allocate financial resources to local government units, more fundamental fiscal autonomy as independent tax collection and administrative power were not given to local government units because national elites (those have seats in national congress) were afraid of losing control over financial resource and administrative power (van Naerssen et al. 1996).

29 president Marcos declared martial law in 1972. What characterised the authoritarian regime were strong tendency to centralize political and administrative powers and dominance of political offices by cronies, those who have personal relations with Marcos (Quimpo 2009). The dominance of Marcos’s cronies in the political sphere at national level and political centralization meant that conventional elites were excluded from high political position and their opportunities to accumulate wealth were undermined (Hedman and Sidel 2000). The tendency toward centralization of powers also led to concentration of power over urban planning to the president and his cronies35. This centralized urban planning and development was actually supported by international aid agencies as the World Bank and USAID and Filipino citizen who were unsatisfied with the institutional incapacity and failures of urban development in pre-martial law era (van Naerssen et al. 1996).

After the so-called People Power Revolution in 1986 and the fall of the Marcos regime, the Philippines experienced a pivotal moment of decentralization and democratization. The most notable change in this period would be the enactment of the new constitution and legislation of the Local Government Code (LGC) under Corazon Aquino administration. The new constitution articulates the principle of decentralization and the LGC strengthens administrative36 and financial capacity and autonomy of local government units (LGUs) by increasing the amount of internal revenue allocation and by giving mandate to generate own revenue (Langran 2011; Brillantes and Modino 2015). These legislative changes and related policy reforms including the legislation of the UDHA in 1992, have given LGUs a mandate to autonomously plan and implement urban development including zoning and land-use planning (zoning ordinance and Comprehensive Land Use Plan37) and opened up

35 Although Metro Manila Commission established in 1975 was also utilized to give Marcos’s spouse a chance to accumulate wealth, urban development tightly controlled by the central government enabled the government to implement large scale infrastructure projects (van Naerssen et al. 1996). 36 Apart from financial autonomy, the LGC also devolved administrative power to local government units, which includes administrative mandate of providing health and other social services, environmental protection, agricultural policy, and implementing specified public work (Langran 2011; see the Local Government Code for detail). 37 Although it is local government units’ mandate to draft their own Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP), the national government publishes guides for planning CLUP and other general framework such as the Mid-Term Philippine Development Plan (MTPDP), the National Urban Development and Housing Framework (NUDHF), and the National Framework for Physical Planning (NFPP). Local government units’ own CLUP and Comprehensive Development Plan need to be approved by national authorities (NEDA and HUDCC) and thus their discretion over urban development planning has certain limit. However, as Valenzuera (2012) points out,

30 new political spaces in which the urban poor and NGOs as well as elites can participate (Etemadi 2000).

While Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were partially adopted by the Marcos regime38, it was also the 1990s when the Philippines saw a drastic economic reform, which can be called a neoliberal turn in the Philippines. Immediately after the fall of Marcos regime, Corazon Aquino administration attempted to implement SAPs, particularly tax system reform, liberalization of import and privatization of public services. However, these efforts to liberalize Philippine economy did not achieve successful results mainly due to strong opposition from landed and/or industrial elites who were trying to preserve their interests through protective economic policies (Sayson 2006). Nevertheless, the successive Ramos administration established close relationships with non-traditional elite fractions of civil society, and pushed liberalization of the economy further39 (Sayson 2006; Bello 2009). Nevertheless, it should be noted that, despite the Ramos administration’s intention to deconstruct dominant economic power of oligarchies, these privatized and deregulated industries were again captured by a small number of elites (Sayson 2006; Kim 2001).

Along these neoliberal economic policy reforms, there was also a significant change in housing policy in the Philippines. According to Ballesteros (2009), there was a major shift in Philippine housing policies from heavily subsidized approach to a market-oriented approach in the 1990s. Two key laws were enforced in the early 1990s: the UDHA of 1992 and the Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter Finance Act (CISFA) of 1994. The UDHA promotes

considerable proportion of local government units do not draft development plans largely due to lack of capacity to build coherent and complete development plan. 38 Since Marcos kept his political power by feeding his cronies through ‘pork and barrel’, large infrastructure projects, and support for traditional import-substitution sectors, economic policies in this era did not necessarily have affinity with neoliberal economics. But, at the same time, such large infrastructure projects and huge expenditure on elections were dependent on finance from international lending agencies as the World Bank and IMF, and thus the regime was kept in debt bondage, which, combined with economic shock affected by oil shocks, consequently forced the regime to adopt SAPs (Kim 2001).

39 The Ramos administration (1992-1998) removed barriers to foreign investment in order to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), eliminated foreign exchange control by the state, and privatized or deregulated various industries and formerly public services including telecommunications, construction, banking, airlines, oil, and shipbuilding (Kim 2001; TIgalo 1994).

31 strategies such as “localization of housing, public-private sector partnership, and beneficiary-led approach to resettlement” while CISFA is introduced in order to strengthen government housing financial institutions and programmes and, thus to develop the capital market (Ballesteros 2009: 1, for details of housing policy in the Philippines, see Annex C). It should be noted that such shift to ‘beneficiary-led approach’ was possible owing to relatively active CSOs in the Philippines.

Shatkin (2000) asserts that a general trend of decentralization in developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s was in parallel with neoliberal economic reforms40 caused largely due to debt crises and following adoption of SAPs imposed by international financial institutions most notably the World Bank. Given Philippines’ debt crisis in the 1980s and subsequent shift in its economic policy toward neoliberalism, Shatkin’s (2000) claim might seem to be persuasive. Relatedly, Bello (2009) argues that one of the main factors promoted neoliberal economic reform was the existence of technocrats41 who have significant influential powers on policy-making process at a national level. According to Bello (2009) and Sayson (2006), neoliberal ideology was shared by active intellectuals and technocrats who were distinguished from cronies of Marcos in the 1970s and 1980s, and those technocrats and intellectuals who had received higher education of economics and engineering in the United States or the University of Philippines advocated neoliberal economic reforms. Not surprisingly, those technocrats and their advocacy were appraised by international aid agencies as the World Bank (Tadem 2014).

Although international aid agencies and technocrats might have exercised substantial influence over Philippine politics and economy and it can be said that there was a

40 It is often argued that neoliberal economic reforms in developing countries in these era were based on principles of so-called ‘Washington Consensus’, which means fiscal discipline, redirection of public expenditure to areas of high economic returns, tax reform, liberalising interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, liberalization of FDI, privatization of public services and properties, deregulation, and securing property rights (Carroll 2007). 41 Here, ‘technocracy’ means “a rule by experts, a temporary form of rule that sometimes emerges after a period of poor governance. The term implies rule by specialists with expertise in non-political subjects, often economics and engineering” (Tadem 2014: 347)

32 considerable internal acceptance of neoliberal economics within mainstream decision- makers and public42 (Araral 2006)43, this paper would not argue that decentralization and neoliberal economic reforms were simply imposed or forced by external agencies or a fraction of technocrats. Another reason why the Philippine national government took a drastic turn toward decentralization and neoliberalism would be relevant to the trajectory the Philippine politics had traced. Post-martial law administrations tried to exclude Marcos’s cronies from political offices in order to wipe out legacies of the authoritarian regime and gain popular political support (Hedman and Sidel 2000; Quimpo 2009). What pushed the new administrations (especially Aquino and Ramos administrations) to pursue decentralization and what made the reforms successful was a popular countermovement against Marcos’ dictatorship and the dominance of his relatives and cronies in national politics. Similarly, given the popular criticism of centralized and corrupted crony capitalism, deregulation and privatization were done by national political leaders aiming to gain popular political support44 (Kim 2001).

However, as Hedman and Sidel (2000) argue it would be too naïve to think that the People’s Power Revolution of 1986 was brought about by purely democratic motivation or sense of justice and that it contributed to enhanced power of the (urban) poor among other citizen. It should not be disregarded that the urban poor might be able to take advantage of clientelistic relations in order to satisfy their interests such as housing or land tenure and

42 It can be argued that such ‘internal acceptance’ or ‘will’ of domestic policy-makers, technocrats and the public was shaped by external agencies, for example, the technocrats internalized the neoliberal ideology through education they received in universities in the US and the University of Philippines, or in other words their thought was a consequence of power exercised by external agencies as Carroll (2007) indicates. Nevertheless, although it must be noted that neoliberal economic reforms were encouraged by aid agencies, it should also be noted that the specific political climate illustrated here pushed the then administrations to take the strategy. 43 The following is an excerpt from Chavez (1996) cited in Bello (2009), which is a speech of a technocrat who played central roles in the period of the radical turn of economic policies: “[n]o policy reform becomes credible, workable policies unless the people accepted [them]. Yes, there were researchers and economists pushing for that, yes there were donor communities pushing for that...but ultimately it is a question of whether the public accepts that policy” (Bello 2009: 13). 44 As Bello (2009) indicates, one of discourses related to neoliberalism is that it will eliminate corruption by the state and private agencies, and this was a convenient discourse to persuade the population to adopt a series of economic reforms in the post-martial law era.

33 tolerance against street vending (Etemadi 2000; Lange 2010)45. Nonetheless, it is not only the urban poor who gained or reinforced political power but traditional elites also succeeded in restoring their political power46.

To sum up this section, the following few points would be particularly relevant to arguments in the next section. Firstly, there were series of neoliberal economic reforms and decentralization that have prepared economic and policy environment within which specific development policies and plans are designed. Secondly, landed and/or industrial elites who were relatively marginalized by Marcos and his cronies took back political power and possibly even expanded at local level given the rapid decentralization, and at the same time, they also dominated privatized industries, which has consequently preserved a socio- economic disparity and remaining high inequality in the Philippine society.

4.2 Construction of a ‘globally competitive city’ and gentrification

In this section, specific projects of urban development in Quezon City, namely, development of the Quezon City Central Business District (QCCBD) and related development practices are examined. It will analyse Philippine’s overall development goal and strategy, the way urban is incorporated into the strategy, and how the strategy has been implemented at national and local levels, which has consequently led to gentrification in Quezon City. In terms of the development strategy, development policy documents issued by national and local

45 As Kampen and Naerssen (2008) argue, alleged success of urban development in Metro Cebu was not universally shared since it was dependent on specific conditions as the existence of multiple elite families (Etemadi 2000; Lange 2010). 46 For example, at a local level, using a term ‘networked governance’, Porio (2012) argues that within the context of institutional changes along decentralization and democratization, local elites still exercise their political power through fluid cross-sectoral coalitions and networks based on continuing domination of seats of local elected official and strong connection with local government units and private developers.

34 governments and related documents published by the World Bank Group will be used for the analysis47.

As already noted in the previous chapter, the QCCBD is envisioned as a core of a ‘globally competitive city’ with multiple land uses and functions. Furthermore, the economic potential and orientation toward improved economic competitiveness are related to metropolitan scale economy and a national development goal as the QCCLUP 2011-2030 says that “[t]he desire for [an] economy geared towards enhancing the city’s competitiveness as well as creating an enabling environment for investments in the city clearly supports the national goal to ensure access to social and economic opportunities” (Quezon City Council 2010a: 18) and that “the growth centers service not only their immediate surroundings but also the entire city and even the metropolitan population” (Quezon City Council 2010a: 23). As these statements imply, the QCCBD is supposed to be an economic centre of the city and wider region. At the same time, while the QCCBD is planned to be a mixed-use community, it is supposed that IT-BPO industry dominates part of the Central Business District, particularly in the area of Emporium48. Indeed, in the East Triangle and other places nearby the Triangle Park, there are already IT centres identified by the Philippine Economic Zone Authority49. In the following paragraphs, it would be revealed how this vision of the QCCBD is located within the national development goal and strategy, and how its planning and implementation have been influenced by land elites and transnational agencies.

The Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan “serve[s] as the backbone of every political government in the Philippines” which is basically produced every six years so that each

47 These documents include MTPDPs, NUDHF, NFPP, QCCLUP, Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of the World Bank and the World Bank’s study on QCCBD. 48 In the masterplan, it is indicated that Quezon City will try to invite specific industries as the ICT sector by granting tax exemption for them. 49 These IT centres include in the East Triangle, University of Philippines Ayala Land Technohub, Diliman IT Center, Eugenio Lopez Jr. Communication Center, Gateway Tower, Harvester Corporate Center, and SM Cyber West Avenue. It should be noted that there are other IT centres in Quezon City including Eastwood Cyber Park. These IT centres are registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority as of 31 May 2015 (http://www.peza.gov.ph/index.php/economic-zones/list-of-economic-zones/operating-economic-zones retrieved on 25 June 2016).

35

MTPDP represents the then administration’s development vision, and the substantial contents of the plan is prepared by the National Economic and Development Authority in coordination with other government departments (Edwin 2014: 1). The World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is prepared by the working group and is supposed to support the concretization and implementation of the MTPDP. At the same time, “the CAS’s consultation workshops were organized simultaneously with the government’s canvasing of its own plan”, and thus, it is supposed that World Bank’s development strategies are shared with or transferred to the MTPDP (Carroll 2007: 185). Thus, in order to examine the Philippines’ development strategy and policies and influences of the World Bank Group, it would be reasonable to analyse these two types of document and other relevant papers.

According to the MTPDPs and CASs covering from the late-1990s to the 2010s, economic growth with equity or inclusive growth has been the fundamental development goal in the Philippines, even though practical connotations of specific terms like ‘equity’ have been not identical as will be discussed below. Toward this goal, general strategies have been taken by the national government and the World Bank Group: strengthening governance, stabilization of macroeconomic status, improved infrastructure by utilizing public-private partnerships (PPPs) and enabling environment for private sector activity which supposed to attract investment and to create further employment.

In the 1990s, the ‘equity’ of economic growth practically meant regional equity, and thus rural development was a top priority of national development strategy (NEDA 1992; 1997). Indeed, in terms of poverty, until recently, it has been regarded as a predominantly rural phenomenon as the CAS FY2000-2002 says “[r]ural development has become a top national priority in view of rural poverty and concerns about food security” (World Bank Philippines Country Management Unit 1999: 1).

36

While poverty was considered to be a rural phenomenon in earlier stage, since early- 2000s50, urban development has received more attention as urban development is viewed as a necessary factor to improve international competitiveness and economic growth. The CAS FY2003-2005 identifies five pillars of development: macroeconomic stability and sound fiscal management, environmentally sustainable rural development with social equity, comprehensive human development through access to basic social services, good and effective governance, and cross-cutting challenges (World Bank Philippines Country Management Unit 2002). Within this framework, particularly regarding the first and fourth points, improved infrastructure and international competitiveness in urban areas are seen as keys for overall competitiveness and economic growth as it says:

[i]n view of the Philippines' high urbanization, with growth sectors concentrated around urban areas, the efficiency of urban services and the quality of urban life will directly determine the country's investment climate. The deteriorating quality of the urban environment and services in major Philippine cities is hurting the economy's competitiveness (World Bank Philippines Country Management Unit 2002: 21).

This emphasis on urban areas51 in terms of economic growth and international competitiveness is even more strengthened in the CAS FY 2010-2012 as it says “[u]rban centers, cities in particular, have an increasingly important role to play in improving the investment climate and improving competitiveness” (World Bank Philippines Country Management Unit et.al 2009: 20) 52. The improvement of urban (economic) competitiveness is rationalized for the sake of poverty alleviation due to the recognition of urban areas as

50 However, more recently, in the CAS FY2010-2013, rural poverty receives relatively less emphasis and, instead, urban poverty is more emphasised than before. According to the CAS FY2010-2013, “[p]overty remains predominantly a rural phenomenon in the Philippines, but urban poverty is on the rise” (World Bank Philippines Country Management Unit et.al 2009: 7). 51 It should be noted that international or global competitiveness was already emphasised in the MTPDP 1993- 1998 prepared in the early 1990s. However, competitiveness of urban economy was not particularly emphasised at this stage. Rather, improvement of the quality of economic products and liberalization of trade were the central focuses of the MTPDP (Habito 1994). 52This vision is also reflected in the NUDHF 2009-2016. The NUDHF explicitly puts a strong emphasis on the improvement of urban competitiveness of Philippine cities in terms of economic efficiency as it says “[m]uch of the future of the country will depend on the performance of its urban system which, in turn, depends substantially on its overall competitiveness relative to other urban areas of the world” (NEDA 2008: 2).

37 engines of economic growth as it says “urban areas are especially suited to serve as agents of poverty reduction because of the concentration of employment and economic activities in cities” (NEDA 2008: 66). It is in this context that support for IT-BPO sector is recommended by the framework.

It seems that this trend of focusing on urban development, or more particularly urban competitiveness reflects the World Bank’s general agenda of urban development. By the 1990s, the World Bank adopted “a neo-liberal framework of analysis that views the role of cities as engines of globally oriented manufacturing-led economic growth”, which has consequently led to a shift in housing policy for urban areas from site-and-services or slum upgrading to market-oriented programs (see Annex C for details), although, as pointed out below, in the Philippines IT-BPO sector rather than manufacturing has been a major component of urban economy due to geographical location and high proficiency of speaking English (Shatkin 2004: 2476). As the importance of urban economic growth for achieving the national development goal has been recognized and the political and administrative powers in the Philippines have been decentralized, it is also indicated in the CAS that since the mid- 2000s the World Bank Group has been reinforcing more direct support to local level governments to promote local development. In the CAS FY2006-2008, the World Bank Group is supposed to deliver assistance at three levels: national; local; and private platforms53. LGUs’ capacities are supposed to be improved through technical assistance by the World Bank and the national government focusing on revenue mobilization, planning and budgeting, fiduciary control system, and local service delivery. It should be emphasised that the study of framework for development of the QCCBD noted above was also conducted in this period of time.

Toward the goal of inclusive growth or economic growth with equity, participation of the private sector in development planning and practice, more particularly Public-Private Partnership, and infrastructure development have been regarded as indispensable

53 Regarding the private sector platform, the CAS defines four focal points for the aim: lowering the costs of doing business, improving financial intermediation, strengthening regulatory agencies, and financing public- private infrastructure investments in sectors with high growth potential.

38 components of the Philippine development strategy. In the production land use guidelines of the National Framework for Physical Planning 2001-2030, it is recommended to “[e]ncourage the growth of information technology industries as an economic activity by…providing infrastructure support and other appropriate incentives” and, in providing infrastructure and creating business friendly environment, the NFPP 2001-2030 advocates private sector participation and further investment. (NEDA n.d.: 9). Indeed, since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, national and local governments tried to attract FDI, and the IT-BPO sector has been invested by the private sector (Kleibert and Kippers 2016). One example of the private investment in the IT-BPO sector is in Special Economic Zone in Quezon City of which licence was given to run by a Filipino-Chinese land elite family (Kleibert 2015). By the mid-2000s ICT and IT-BPO sector is regarded as the most promising sectors for further economic growth54 (NEDA 2003).

In fact, PPP and in infrastructure development have a relatively long history in the Philippines as it can be said that its origin goes back to the late-1980s and the 1990s when neoliberal turn took place as noted in the last section. Indeed, the importance of private sector as an engine of national development was already articulated in the Section 20, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which says “the State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector as the main engine of national growth”. Especially, participation of the private sector was expected to strengthen infrastructure development which was conceived as a necessary condition for national competitiveness in the global market55. Recently, it is articulated by President Aquino in 2010 that PPP is a key flagship program, and MTPDP 2011-2016 also “envisions PPPs as a key strategy in accelerating infrastructure investments” (Llanto et.al 2015: 33). With the issuance of EO 8, the Build- Operate-Transfer (BOT) Center56 was converted into the PPP Center in 2010 with expected

54 The MTPDP 2004-2010 says “[t]he key growth driver was services, which expanded at an average rate of 5.1 percent over the period 2001-2003 and to a strong 6.9 percent in the first semester of 2004. The continued expansion in this sector is largely owed to the telecommunications sector as telecommunication companies continue to expand outside of Metro Manila. Added to this are the new investments in the call/contact centers, business process outsourcing (BPOs) and software development” (NEDA 2003: 2). 55Republic of the Philippines Public-Private Partnership Center (2014) “Historical Background” (http://ppp.gov.ph/?page_id=44 retrieved on 3 July 2016). 56 Shortly after the enactment of the new constitution, in 1990, the Build-Operate-Transfer Law or BOT Law (Republic Act 6957) passed and the private sector was incorporated to development efforts. A few years later,

39 functions of advisory service to implementing agencies, capacity building support to national and local governments, policy reform advocacy, and monitoring implementation of PPP projects among others57.

Quezon City government sees well-developed transport infrastructure as one of major factors that enables the QCCBD to be a distinctive economic centre. It says

The QC-CBD, called Triangle Park, has one of the most ideal locations, in terms of metropolitan access, with the use of at least 3 mass transit stations, and with a frontage on the main thoroughfare in Metro Manila that is longer than any of the existing major Central Business Districts (Quezon City n.d. b: 1).

Although transport is not the only factor that enhance economic competitiveness and attract investor, “the absence of such facility that equals if not surpasses those of competitive locations will make lack of attractiveness of any city a certainty” (Urban Triangle Development Commission 2010: 21). In the Philippines, the need for development of urban rail system was already recognized in the 1970s (Napalang and Regidor 2015). While urban rail system was initially planned, constructed and managed by national government agencies, the efficiency and importance of public-private partnership for construction and management of urban rail system has been emphasised since the 1990s (Napalang and Regidor 2015)58.

the BOT Law was amended (Republic Act 7718) during the Ramos administration allowing broadened types of contractual arrangements and unsolicited proposals by private enterprises56. With the issuance of EO 144, the BOT Center was established in 2002, which was under jurisdiction of the Department of Trade and Industry. 57 Republic of the Philippines Public-Private Partnership Center (2015) “Legal and Regulatory Frameworks” (http://ppp.gov.ph/?page_id=27634 retrieved on 3 July 2016). 58 For example, according to Napalang and Regidor (2015: 8), the Metro Manila Urban Transportation Integration Study conducted between 1996 and 1999 recommends that “[e]stablishment of an improved basis for private sector participation in MRT projects including termination of unsolicited proposal method, government commitment at least to shoulder the infrastructure component and competitive bidding for the operation component by the private sector”.

40

The operation of LRT 1 began in 1985 and it was developed by national government’s Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) with financial support from Belgian government. The LRT line 1’s capacity and length have been expanded since the 1990s with technical and financial support from IFC and JICA (JICA 2005; IFC n.d.). The extension project has been implemented by Light Rail Manila Consortium59and has been funded mainly by external loan and private sector equity (Navarro and Llanto 2014; IFC n.d.). The LRT line 2 was developed by the LRTA with financial support from Japan’s ODA, and has been also extended to approximately 16.75 km from East to West of Metro Manila (Navarro and Llanto 2014). MRT 3 was supported by Ramos administration who also encouraged private sector participation in infrastructure development60 (World Bank 2004). Indeed, the development project of MRT 3 was bid out under the unsolicited bid provision of the BOT law with equity from four Filipino private developers (Filestate, Ayala Land, Anglo Phil, and Greenfield). What is important here is that the development of urban rail systems, critical facility that compose world class urban environment and business friendly conditions, which was initially implemented by national government with support of bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, have been promoted by the private sector under PPPs. Moreover, the private sector is practically dominated by enterprises ran by elite families some of which are formulated in the colonial eras.

Since the 1990s the national government has been using World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report and its index in order to judge international economic competitiveness of the Philippines. However, since 2004 the national government has been also using Doing Business Report published by the World Bank. It is in the 2000s when the national government, in cooperation with the Wold Bank Group, began to take specific policies other than stabilization of macro-economy and liberalization of the financial sector to improve the business climate. The sub-national Doing Business report is jointly prepared by the national government and IFC. “In May 2008, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the private sector development arm of the World Bank Group, in partnership with the

59 It is composed of conglomerates as Metro Pacific Investments Corp, Ayala Corp, and the Macquarie Group. By 2014, 748. 83 US$ million, which counts almost half of the whole cost, had been funded by private sector. 60 It is also under this administration that BOT law was enacted.

41

Asian Institute of Management Policy Center (APC) and the National Competitiveness Council (NCC) 61, launched the Doing Business in the Philippines study62. This was the first sub-national application of the World Bank Group’s Global Doing Business methodology in the Philippines (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank 2009). The Masterplan of the Triangle Park refers to Doing Business reports and recognizes the need for deregulation of business-related rules63.

An example of remarkable improvement in business environment in Quezon City can be seen in business registration system. Quezon City’s initiative for simplifying business registration procedure started in early-2000s and it began to “classify business into high risk and low risk groups in 2007” (Quezon City Government 2011: 15). To simplify regulations related to starting up business in Quezon City, Quezon City has received support from the World Bank Group reflecting the World Bank’s emphasis on direct intervention with local governments. For instances, Quezon City had cooperated with IFC in implementing the Regulatory Simplification project supported by other bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and domestic institutions64. Consequently, in 2010, Quezon City developed Business One Stop Shop (BOSS) earlier than any city in Metro Manila and, in 2011, the city government

61 The work of the NCC Task Force on ease of doing business is strongly influenced by Doing Business Reports proposed by the World Bank Group. Ten work teams of the Task Force have been organized to improve the business regulatory environment in accordance with ten processes of business registration defined by the Doing Business Report. More specifically, this project has been supported by IFC as it says “[f]ollowing the approval of the Gameplan last September 2012 by the Economic Development Cluster, the NCC has been working closely with IFC Manila and Washington, as well as the Philippine Embassy in Washington, to review Philippine reform initiatives that would deliver results” (National Competitiveness Council Task Force on Ease of Doing Business n.d.).

62 “This study is part of IFC's Advisory Service program in the Philippines, which seeks to support private sector development and sustained economic growth in the Philippines. IFC's Advisory Service programs are consistent with the World Bank Group's Country Assistance Strategy for the Philippines” (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank 2010: forward).

63 In the masterplan, it is said that “doing business or starting a business in the Philippines is relatively difficult than other countries” and the subnational report in 2008 shows “Quezon City as having very modest to poor rankings” (Urban Triangle Development Commission 2010: 15). 64 “IFC partners with Quezon City under the Regulatory Simplification project. The program is supported by the Australian Agency for International Development and the Canadian International Development Agency. It is being piloted in four metro Manila cities with the help of the League of Cities of the Philippines, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of the Interior and Local Government, the National Competitiveness Council, and the Ateneo School of Government. “ (IFC 2010)

42 agreed to simplify the business permit and licensing system (BPLS)65,66. As a consequence, the number of business newly registered and the total number of business registration in Quezon City have increased by approximately 1,000 and 14,000 respectively from 20005 to 2014 as described in the Table 3 and Figure 4, although the statistics cover the whole area of Quezon City not only the QCCBD and the rise in the number cannot be attributed solely to the regulatory reforms.

Table 3 The number of business registered in Quezon City (2005-July 2015)

New Renewed Total 2005 12681 39895 52576 2006 12058 44695 56753 2007 10773 46037 56810 2008 11110 47086 58196 2010* 12487 45401 57888 2011 12560 47594 60154 2012 13075 49297 62372 2013 13417 51098 64515 2014 13679 52965 66644 2015 (Jan- Jul) 8264 54825 63089 Quezon City Government (2008; 2012; 2015). Adjusted by the author.

*Due to lack of relevant material, the numbers in 2009 are not included in the data.

Although in varying rate, the number of construction permits issued in Quezon City has also been increasing as indicated in the Table 4. The number of construction permit increased around by 1,000 in 2010 and that of ancillary permit soared twice in 2010 and 2011 reaching over 20,000. Even though major part of the total number is occupied by ‘ancillary permit’, ‘construction permit’ is also on the increase.

65 “In August 2010, Quezon City developed Business One Stop Shop (BOSS) to provide a single location where applicants can complete registration necessary for setting up business in the city” (National Competitiveness Council 19 March 2012).

66 (Business World Online 22 November 2011).

43

Table 4. The number of construction permits issued (2008-August 2015)

Final Ancillary Year Construction Permit Permit Permit Total 2008 1254 531 904 2689 2009 1568 1344 1199 4111 2010 2561 1199 6800 10560 2011 2597 1208 22503 26308 2012 2346 1153 21537 25036 2013 2396 1183 22383 25962 2014 2582 1085 21267 24934 2015(Jan-Aug) 1156 680 10829 12665 Total 13638 6508 105319 125465

Quezon City Government (2011: 18; 2015a: 8)

Finally, along with these development projects, land values in Quezon City and particularly in the Triangle Park (North and East Triangles) have risen in these two decades (Table 5.). In Quezon City as a whole, land value increased by 8,000 pesos per square meter from 1990 to 2000 and by 7,500 pesos from 2000 to 2015. What is even more noteworthy is that in the Triangle Park, while the land value also rose by 8,000 pesos from 1990 to 2000, it increased more sharply from 2000 to 2015 and reached 21,100 pesos per square meter.

Table 5. Median land values in Quezon City and the Triangle Park in 1990, 2000, and 201567

Zone＼Year 1990 2000 2015

Median Quezon City 2000 10000 17500 Value

Median Triangle Park 2000 10000 21100 Value

The Bureau of Internal Revenue (calculated by the author)

67The median land values are calculated by the author using zonal land values published by the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Philippines (http://www.bir.gov.ph/index.php/zonal-values.html). For median land value in Quezon City, median values in each zone or barangay are calculated and then the median value of those median values is used. For the Triangle Park, the median land value of every properties in Barangay Pag- asa and Barangay Pinyahan is used here. In both cases, data of the nearest years to 1990, 2000, 2015 are used.

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Although it would be too haste to say that this data proves the causal relationship between development policies and the rise in land value, since land value would be affected by multiple reasons, at least it implies that development projects in Quezon City for constructing a ‘globally competitive city’ have contributed to the rise in land value in Quezon City and more specific plan of the development of the QCCBD has led to even more acute rise in the land value in the North and East Triangles. These changes in land value is another important factor that has been causing displacement of the ISFs in the QCCBD as will be discussed in the next section.

To sum up this section, the following three points should be noted. First, the overall development goal and strategy of the Philippines, in which urban areas are regarded as engines of economic growth, have been articulated by the national government along with the CAS paper proposed by the World Bank. And this is reflected in the vision of the QCCBD articulated by the Urban Triangle Development Commission. Secondly, in its implementation, public-private-partnership scheme, in which land elites have been participating, has been used to develop transport infrastructure, and business regulations have been reformed with assistance from international agencies, particularly from the IFC. Thus, given influences and supports from international aid and monetary agencies, Quezon City has been constructed in which the QCCBD dominates a central position. Finally, the land value has been rising in Quezon City and particularly in the Triangle Park along with these development projects, which is relevant to resettlement strategy of the NHA discussed below.

4.3 Privatization of urban development and people’s participation

In this final section of chapter 4, the planning and implementation processes of the QCCBD project and resettlement of the ISFs living in Sitio San Roque are examined with particular emphasis on the participation of the urban poor in those processes. Indeed, as the Quezon

45

City Mayor Herbert Bautista “enunciated the niche of Vertis North as a prime example of an effective Private-Public Partnership” (Quezon City n.d. c) , the development of the Vertis North in the North Triangle is a prime example of private-public partnership development, which has been causing displacement of ISFs. For this development of a 29 hectare land within the QCCBD, Quezon City provides a general development framework, that is, the QCCLUP 2011-2030 which is reflected in the zoning ordinance, while the National Housing Authority offers government land property and is entrusted to relocate the ISFs, and Ayala Land Inc., one of real estate enterprises ran by landed elite families68, plays a main role in developing the area.

As noted above, by the EO 620 and 620A in 2007, the Urban Triangle Development Commission (TriDev Commission) was established, which is one of primary actors planning and implementing the development of the QCCBD. However, residents in the site was not included in the planning process (San Roque Community Council-North Triangle Alliance et al. February 2009). Ms. Tori, the head of the Service and Project Section of the Urban Poor Resource Center in the Philippines also notes that “the urban poor that reside in that area [Sitio San Roque] had no say during the whole planning”. In fact, while the earlier commission under the EO 106 in 2002 included representatives from residents, any civil society organization or representative of residents in Sitio San Roque is not included in the Urban Triangle Development Commission despite its appraisal of participatory governance69.

At this point, it should be noted that there is a significant difference between the framework plan proposed by the World Bank and ALMEC Corporation in 2006 and the masterplan prepared by the Urban Triangle Development Commission in 2010 in terms of resettlement strategy. In fact, the framework plan recommends a combination of on-site medium-rise

68 The construction company engaged with the development of the Vertis North, Makati Development Corporation is also part of Ayala family enterprises. 69 The masterplan says “[t]here is also need for innovative ways for promoting participatory and inclusive governance. Citizens, investors and locators can contribute more substantially to the collective goal of QC-CBD if they participate throughout the decision making process and in specific policies and actions that impact on their businesses” (Urban Triangle Development Commission 2010a: 25).

46 buildings and off-site or near-city relocation in order to remove the ISFs in the North and East Triangles. However, according to the resettlement plan for the QCCBD development, “[p]olicy guidance by the TriDev Commission preferred relocation options for the North and East Triangle ISFs, to be executed by NHA is the Near City Relocation Option” of which emphasis “will focus on using market driven relocation strategies” depending on revenue from the joint venture with Ayala Corporation (Urban Triangle Development Commission 2010b: 1-2). Thus, the resettlement strategy was changed without participation of the residents who are supposed to be adversely affected by the change. Furthermore, its emphasis on market driven relocation strategy corresponds to the shift in housing policy in the Philippines noted in the previous section, which also reflects the change in the World Bank’s strategy to support housing policy from direct housing provision to housing finance assistance occurred in the mid-1980s (Buckley and Kalarickal 2006).

Although there were some consultations between the residents and the NHA and the city government after the resettlement plan was decided, it was only after a violent conflict between the residents and the NHA and the national government that practical consultation processes have started. In 2010, there was a forced eviction of around 100 ISFs in SItio San Roque whereas the ISFs were insisting on on-site development of socialized housing70. Due to the tension between the ISFs and government agencies as the NHA and QC-LGU, the then president Benigno Aquino III ordered a moratorium on demolition and created a Technical Working Group composed of the stakeholders seeking alternative solution, which is facilitated by the then Department of Interior and Local Governance (DILG) secretariat Mr. Robredo (KAMP and Kilos Maralita October 2010).

First, with support from civil organizations, San Roque Community Council-North Triangle Alliance (SRCC-NTA) proposed on-site development project. However, the NHA persisted on off-city relocation and the proposal was rejected. Mr. Villanueva, the program director of the Institute for Popular Democracy (IPD) was also involved in the process. He says:

70 Socialized housing is low-cost housing provided by NHA to low income households. See Annex C for details.

47

I assisted them [ISFs belonging to local communities which are partners of the IPD] in presenting viability of on-site development. The NHA and the [Quezon City] government said that the price of the land is too high for socialized housing so that socialized housing cannot be located in the property [Sitio San Roque].

So, the option of on-site resettlement was rejected for the high value of the land. According to Mr, Santos from the Quezon City Communications Coordination Center,

NHA had a joint venture with Ayala Corporation [on 29 hectare land in the North Triangle] and part of the joint venture was the allocation of the land. So NHA chose to relocate [the ISFs] instead of the option of on-site medium-rise buildings. I think the logic there is that revenue that they earn from the joint venture would provide more [off-site] resettlement housing for more people instead of using a portion of land as on-site resettlement.

Indeed, since part of the NHA’s budget for resettlement of the residents is supposed to be generated from the joint venture with Ayala Corporation, it can be argued that off-site relocation might be able to absorb a larger number of the ISFs.

However, Mr. Villanueva also notes that the increase in land value itself is caused by the plan. He says “the price of the land has skyrocketed because of the plan to establish the QCCBD. It’s your [the government and NHA’s] doing. Because of the plan the price of the land is skyrocketing”. As noted in the last section, land value in Quezon City has been increasing along with its development policies for converting Quezon City into a ‘globally competitive city’, even though they would not fully explain the rise in land value. And especially, the land value in the Triangle Park showed greater growth compared to Quezon City as a whole between 2000 and 2015. This has made it even more difficult to implement

48 on-site relocation resettlement of the ISFs and has made off-city relocation more economically feasible. Thus, the resettlement strategy recommended by the World Bank was rejected by increased land value that was caused by the overall development project in which the resettlement project itself is included.

In this circumstance, some of the residents had to change their strategy. According to Mr. Villanueva,

they were not successful in negotiating for on-site redevelopment…It seems that the Quezon City government and the National Housing Authority [were] both determined to have an entire property developed as a commercial area of the Quezon City Central Business District71…So, the organization called San Roque Community Council-North Triangle Alliance, at a certain point, changed their option and decided that their proposal would be adjusted to in-city relocation.

After they shifted their proposal from on-site development to in-city socialized housing, the SRCC-NTA formed a cooperative for the housing project they proposed. The cooperative split into two different cooperatives in 2014, one of which is called Social Resettlement for Comprehensive Community-Magic Circle Housing Cooperative (SRCC-MCHC). The SRCC- MHCH has been continuing negotiation with the government and NHA and is now implementing socialized housing project at a barangay they chose within Quezon City72.

While the SRCC-MCHC which compromised their demand has reached a final agreement with the NHA and Ayala Corporation, those who stick to demanding on-site development have been excluded from the negotiation process as Mr. Dimayuga says “[f]or Kadamay, we are really not invited [in negotiation processes] because we are against the project. [Some

71 It should be noted that the joint venture between the NHA and Ayala Corporation reached an agreement in 2009 prior to the formulation of the masterplan. 72 According to Mr. Villanueva, the final agreement between the SRCC-MCHC and the NHA and Ayala Corporation was signed to acquire the land and develop the property in early 2016.

49 other organizations are invited because] their demand was in-city relocation. We demand on-site development and we are against the project”. Although it is not that clear whether Kadamay and other organizations are excluded from the negotiation with Quezon City government and NHA because of the character of their demand or not, those organizations and their demand of on-site development has been ignored. Thus, while those who have been able to take part in the negotiation with NHA and Quezon City had to make compromise, those who demand on-site resettlement have been not able to participate in negotiation processes, and thus they keep struggling through informal and confrontational way especially NHA and the national and local governments attempt to demolish them forcefully. Nevertheless, according to Mr. Badion the secretary general of Kadamay, the newly elected president of the Philippines proposed moratorium on demolition of ISFs in Sitio San Roque until relocation site is readied. But he also notes that the demand of the urban poor in Quezon City is that the government gives the land to the informal settlers, although he also says that they cannot be optimistic73.

Before an overall conclusion is drawn, two points should be noted here. While the Urban Triangle Development Commission appraise participatory process of the project, the ISFs who have been adversely affected by the project were not able to have their voice heard during the planning process, and it was only after the violent conflict occurred that some of them could have negotiation with NHA and the government on its resettlement strategy which was already decided by the commission in spite of the fact that the World Bank recommended a combination of on-site and off-site resettlement projects. Secondly, while the NHA’s strategy to relocate ISFs through market-driven housing and to finance the relocation using revenue from the joint venture with Ayala Corporation might be efficient in terms of removing ISFs from the area, on-site resettlement strategy was abandoned due to high land value at the area, which seems to be a consequence of the overall project of constructing ‘a globally competitive city’ and the QCCBD as its core area.

73 From interview with Mr. Badion the secretary general of Kadamay.

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5. Concluding Remarks

From perspectives of comparative urbanism and urban neoliberalism, this paper has shown that various agencies have been engaged in the development of the QCCBD as a core of ‘a globally competitive city’ and that the project has led to the displacement of informal settlers living on the site. In terms of large-scale institutional and regulatory frameworks, the formation of land elites during the colonial era, democratization and decentralization, neoliberal regulatory reforms including the shift in housing policy to market-driven strategy in the 1990s have prepared the policy environment and unequal arrangement of wealth. The overall development goal and strategy were articulated by the national government drawing on supports from international agencies as the World Bank, within which the vision of the QCCBD as a core of ‘globally competitive city’ is defined. Thus, the vision of ‘globally competitive city’ was constructed in the interactions between national and local governments and the World Bank.

In creating business-friendly environment, namely, transport infrastructure development and business rules deregulation, PPP schemes through which land elites have played significant roles have been utilized. These development projects were accompanied by the increase in land value in Quezon City and more particularly in the QCCBD area. Therefore, as the resettlement strategy for the development of the QCCBD is based on market mechanism, reflecting the shift in housing policy in the Philippines and contrary to recommendation by the World Bank, off-city relocation was prioritized by the Urban Triangle Development Commission without participation of the ISFs who have been adversely affected.

In regards to participation and interactions between various agencies, following points should be noted. Land elites formed in the colonial era have preserved their political and economic prestige despite decentralization and economic reforms began in the 1990s, and have played significant roles in creating business-friendly environment and in developing the QCCBD. At phases of the neoliberal turn, housing policy reform, articulation of national

51 development goal and strategy, implementation of specific policies, international agencies as the World Bank and IFC have engaged with national and local governments. While the international agencies have exercised substantial influences in these points, the neoliberal turn in the 1990s and shift in housing policy were facilitated and enabled by domestic political context and active civil society in the Philippines. Furthermore, while the market- driven resettlement strategy was adopted by the Urban Triangle Development Commission, the World Bank’s recommendation was rejected due to the rise in land value caused by the development project in which the resettlement strategy itself is incorporated.

While democratization and decentralization are supposed to enhance opportunities for people to participate in the political sphere, participation was limited and was selective, if not intentionally selected. The ISFs living in Sitio San Roque who have been adversely affected by the development were excluded from the planning of the whole development project and resettlement programme, and had been unable to have practical consultation or negotiation with the local and national government agencies at least until the violent conflict occurred in 2010. However, even after that, while the ISFs and CSOs who made or were forced to compromise and change their demand from on-site resettlement to in-city relocation can have their voices heard, those who oppose the development project and demand on-site resettlement have been excluded from the negotiation table. Thus, despite the trend of decentralization and the Commission’s appraisal of participatory process, participation of the ISFs in Sitio San Roque and CSOs supporting them are limited so that significant changes of the QCCBD development project are precluded.

From these findings, one can draw some theoretical implications. Firstly, although this process of gentrification is not relevant to market mechanism, it is different from the conventional rent gap theory posed by Smith (1979; 1996) since the direct cause of displacement is forced eviction by the national and local governments but not by housing market mechanism. Even though, it should be noted that lack of affordable housing and job opportunities for the urban poor is behind the large number of informal settlers in Quezon City and that the off-city relocation is prioritized because the government adopts market-

52 driven housing policy. Therefore, in a broad sense, disparity in terms of power in the housing market is expressed in this process of gentrification. Secondly, as noted above, it seems that although it might be said that it is land elites who have actually developed infrastructure and the QCCBD area, national and local governments have played significant roles in preparing the framework through which a ‘globally competitive city’, which has made on-site resettlement less unrealistic, has been created. But, thirdly, international agencies as the World Bank and IFC exercised substantial influences on the articulation of the national development goal, housing policy, and the processes of planning and implementation of the QCCBD project. Combined with the second point, this indicates that, at least in the Philippines or in Quezon City, analyses of roles of political bodies as governments at multiple levels and international agencies would be important for better understanding of gentrification, although this does not mean the latter two should be excluded from the analysis.

Finally, some methodological and theoretical limitations should be discussed here. Let me deal with methodological limitations first. Although this paper has used the term ‘international/transnational agencies’, much focus has been put on the World Bank Group. To fully investigate how international agencies have been involved in the process of gentrification in Quezon City, other agencies like bilateral agencies, Asian Development Bank, international enterprises and city planners or architects should be taken into the analysis. In terms of national and local governments, they are by no means homogeneous, and therefore internal conflict and decision-making processes should be addressed as well, if possible. In this paper, semi-structure interview was used to investigate how various agencies are involved in the process of gentrification. However, the range of informants is not exhaustive and the number of them is limited so that one should refrain from regarding each data represents those agencies.

There are at least two major theoretical limitations. Firstly, the middle class citizen who buy high-rise condominiums in the Triangle are not included in the analysis in this paper, and thus this paper can hardly say something about consumption-side theories of gentrification.

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Secondly, and relatedly, while this paper has argued that the QCCBD is defined as a core of a ‘globally competitive city’, it fails to address the ways such representation of Quezon City and the QCCBD has given impact on perceptions of the ISFs and other citizen in Quezon City. This issue has its particular importance especially when one seeks to examine how ISFs are phenomenologically displaced and the way aesceticization of the city has contributed to the increase in and value, which is a primary concern of consumption-side theorists.

Despite these limitations, this paper has shown that governments at multiple levels and international aid agencies have played significant roles in preparing institutional frameworks and constructing a ‘globally competitive city’ within the frameworks, which has consequently led to gentrification, and that gentrification in Quezon City has been not directly caused by market mechanism per se, but rather resulted from the urban development project and deficient resettlement strategy in which market mechanism is embedded and voices of the urban poor are displaced.

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Annexes

Annex A: Basic Information about Metro Manila and Quezon City

Metro Manila or National Capital Region (NCR) is established as a special development and administrative region in 1975 by the then president Marcos. It is composed of 16 cities and 1 municipal74 and they are loosely connected through Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) which takes responsibility for traffic, waste management and flood control (Choi 2016). While Manila City is the capital city and has been the core of economic and political activities of the country, some of offices of the government apparatus were relocated to Quezon City after the World War 2. Quezon City is the largest city in Metro Manila in terms of both geographical scale and population, having an estimated population of 3,085,786 people which counts for 22.3 percent of the total population of Metro Manila and around 3 percent of the national population (Quezon City Government 2015). Quezon City Central Business District (QCCBD), which locates central part of the city, is supposed to be one of the cores of economic activity in the region (Figure A1).

Figure A1. Map of Metro Manila and business districts in the region (Ortega 2016: 39)

74 NCR comprises Caloocan City, Valenzuela City, City, City, Quezon City, City, Manila City, San Juan City, City, City, Makati City, City, City, Paranaque City, Las Pinas City, City, and municipal of .

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(Metro) Manila has been a central area of the Philippines since the colonial rules and it saw rapid population increase after the Second World War by which Manila City was almost completely destroyed. Given recent development of suburb area and the emergence of mega-region expanding outside the administrative boundary of Metro Manila (Ortega et.al 2015), the proportion of the urban population has not been dramatically changed. Even though, as shown in table 1, the number of the urban population has been steadily increasing and, in 2010, it counts around 46 million which reaches almost the half of the total population. While proportion of the urban population to the total population has been increased only by 0.6% between 1995 and 2010, the number of the urban population has rose by 13 million.

Table A1. Rural, Urban, and Total Population and Proportion (1990-2010)

1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 Rural (million) 35.4 40 44.3 48 Rural (%) 51.4% 51.7% 52.0% 51.9% 51.1% Urban (million) 33 36.9 41 46 Urban (%) 48.6% 48.3% 48.0% 48.1% 48.9% Total Population (million) 68.4 76.9 85.4 94 Asian Development Bank 2011 (adjusted by the author)

As urbanization continues, the number of informal settler families (ISFs) has also dramatically increased, which is considered to be a consequence of rising property values and low wages due to neoliberal economic policies (Shatkin 2004). In the whole Philippines, the number of ISFs was around 280,000 people in 1991 while it counts over 700,000 in 2012. Metro Manila, or National Capital Region (NCR) saw an even more rapid increase in ISF population which was around 65,000 in 1991 and reached 286,366 people in 2012 (see Table 2A). The annual percentage growth rate of the ISF population in the NCR during the period records 15.9%, which is more than double of the rate in the Philippines a whole, and over 40% of ISF population is distributed to the NCR in 2012. This means that rapid urbanization in these two decade has contributed to a huge number of ISF in Metro Manila. However, it must be noted that this data is based on FIES a national household survey and thus excludes homeless people. If homeless people are included, the number of ISFs would

65 exceed 580,000 people in Metro Manila alone (Ballesteros et.al 2015). According to other survey conducted jointly by the NHA, LGUs, and DPWH, among other cities, Quezon City has the largest number of ISFs within the NCR. The number of ISFs in Quezon City, which has been increasing, counts 232,181 and 39.7 percent of the total number of ISFs in the NCR in 2011 (see table A3 and A4).

Table A2. Growth and distribution of informal settler families from 1991 to 2012

Growth and Distribution of Informal Settler Families (ISFs) from 1991 to 2012 Annual Number ISF distribution Number ISF distribution percentage of ISFs in by region in of ISFs in by region in growth rate, Region 1991 1991 (%) 2012 2012 1991-2012 NCR 65,865 23.40% 286,336 40.50% 15.90% Philippines 281,000 100.00% 707,258 100.00% 7.20% Source: Ballesteros (et.al 2015: 49 adjusted by the author)

Table A3. Informal settlers in Quezon City from 2005-2010 (left)

Table A4. Informal settlers in Metro Manila in 2011 by city (right)

No. of No. of families structures 2005 201381 166947 2006 211708 170670 2007 218375 175293 2008 219382 176741 2009 231951 186315 2010 232430 188390

Quezon City Government (2011: 28)

(Ballesteros et.al 2015: 50)

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Annex B: Methodology

To operationalize the three-dimensional framework adopted in this paper, several methods need to be used in combination. To examine general frameworks and institutions in the chapter 3, this paper mainly uses literature on Philippine politics and history. In terms of the first and second dimensions, namely particular practices and institutional mechanisms through which policies and knowledge are circulated, various types of policy documents are analysed. These include the Mid-Term Philippine Development Plans and the National Framework for Physical Plan 2001-2030 drafted by the National Economic and Development Authority, the National Urban Development and Housing Framework by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, Quezon City Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Quezon City Comprehensive Development Plan prepared by the Quezon City Government, the masterplan of the Quezon City Central Business District proposed by the TriDev Commission, and Country Assessment Strategy written by the World Bank.

To supplement the document analysis, semi-structure interviews with six informants were conducted during the period of my fieldwork in Quezon City from 14 July 2016 to 3 August 2016. Four of them are from local CSOs supporting informal settlers for slightly different objectives. One is a resident of the site, Sitio San Roque, and at the same time an organizer of the community, who also is a member of Kadamay, one of the CSOs. The last is a Quezon City government official who has knowledge about the QCCBD and the TriDev Commission. Detailed information is given in the Table.B1. The interviews were conducted separately except one with staffs of Kadamay. Each interview took approximately one hour and semi- structured interview questions were used. In the interview with the informal settler, a staff from Kadamay translated from the local language (Tagalog) to English. The names of the informants and CSOs are used when they agreed that the author can use their name, and otherwise their names are anonymized.

Since the number of interviewee is small and the sampling was not based on random sampling method but based on snow-ball method, the interview data would not be

67 representative. Moreover, for one of the interviews was done via a translator, one might need to be cautious about the accuracy of the interview. Nevertheless, this interview data plays a significant role in examining visions and strategies of local residents and civil organizations which are often not expressed in documents published by the Philippine government and the World Bank.

Table B1. Information about the informants

Name Organization and position Notes Mr. Enrique E. Program Director of the The IPD was established in 1986 by participants of Villanueva Institute for Popular the People Power Revolution in the same year. Democracy (IPD) The IPD assists informal setters in preparation of proposals for their housing and in negotiating with government agencies. The interview was taken place in his office in Quezon City. Ms. Ka Inday Informal settler in San She is from Mindanao and after she moved to Roque/one of local Bulacan Province, she settled in San Roque and organizers of Kadamay has been living there for 32 years. The interview was taken place in her home in Sitio San Roque. Mr. Carlito Secretary General of Kadamay was established in 1998 to convey all Badion Kadamay urban poor issues all over the Philippines including job security, tenure security and provision of basic social services. Mr. Badion has been working for Kadamay since 2000. The interview was taken place in his office in Quezon City. Mr. Val Jayson Public Information/Media Mr. Dimayuga took part in the interview with Mr. Dimayuga Liaison Officer Badion. Ms. Tori Head of the Service and UPRCP was established in 2010 just after the Fortuno Project Section of the typhoon Ondoy stroke the Philippines. Its Urban Poor Resource objective first was to provide relief services for Center in the Philippines urban poor communities suffering from the (UPRCP). disaster, but later it was reoriented to support for other demands of the urban poor in the Philippines. The interview was taken place in her office in Quezon City. Mr. Santos An officer of Quezon City Communications Coordination Center is a Communications secretariat to the Urban Triangle Development Coordination Center Committee. The interview was taken place in his office in .

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Annex C Housing Policies in the Philippines

Given the rapid urbanization and increase in ISFs described in Annex A, there is a huge demand for housing all over the Philippines and particularly in urban areas as NCR. According to the updated Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016, the estimated housing need in the Philippines during the period of 2011-2016 is 5,556,463 and that in NCR in the same period is 645,154, which is much smaller than the initial estimation of 1,737,039 (Table C1). Although every region is supposed to experience housing shortage in this period, it is especially serious in NCR, Central Luzon, and CALABARZON total of whose housing need account around one-thirds of the total housing needs.

Table C1. Housing needs estimated by region, 2011-2016 (in number of households)

(National Economic Development Authority 2014: 143)

According to Ballesteros (2009), there was a major shift in Philippine housing policies from heavily subsidized approach to a market-oriented approach in the 1990s. Two key laws were

69 enforced in the early 1990s: the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) of 1992 and the Comprehensive and Integrated Shelter Finance Act (CISFA) of 1994. The UDHA promotes strategies such as “localization of housing, public-private sector partnership, and beneficiary-led approach to resettlement” while CISFA is introduced in order to strengthen government housing financial institutions and programmes and thus develop the capital market (Ballesteros 2009: 1).

Reframed and strengthened by the two legislation noted above, there have been four major housing programmes in the Philippines under the banner program of the National Shelter Program75 (NSP): housing loan provided by the National Housing Authority; the Community Mortgage Program; allocation of public lands through the issuance of Presidential Proclamation; and a social security funds provided by the Home Development Mutual Fund76 (Ballesteros 2009).

First, the National Housing Authority (NHA) is a national state apparatus that provides housing services including acquisition and development of raw land and construction of housing both on-site and off-cite (Coker 2016). The beneficiaries attain housing by borrowing housing loan from NHA and repay the loan with interest rate of 6% for land cost and no interest rate for housing cost77 (Ballesteros 2009). Recently, as articulated in the Philippine Development Plan 2011-2016, NHA has been reinforcing its connection to private developers by giving the private sector incentives as tax exemption (Mabilin 2014). Second, the Community Mortgage Program (CMP), which was initially introduced in 1988 under the mandate of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC), is now managed by the Socialized Housing Finance Corporation (SHFC). It is a mortgage programme through

75 Within this framework, housing is categorized to socialized housing units that are valued less than 300,000 peso and are targeted to households whose income falls under 30th percentile, and economic housing units valued at more than 300,000 peso up to 2,000,000 peso, which are targeted to households whose income falls between 30th and 50th percentile of the total. 76 There are other indirect government housing programmes of which the most important housing provision would be housing loan packages provided by the Home Guarantee Corporation, although the provision is directed more toward middle-income residents than low-income residents (see, National Economic Development Authority 2010). This is partly due to growing concern about the fiscal austerity, which drive the corporation to secure repayment rate. 77 The housing unit cost is partly granted up to 25,000 peso.

70 which the informal settlers can access loans for land purchase and housing construction on- site or other places, although it is available only for those formed community association and thus individual squatters cannot use it. Since there has been a certain criticism that the CMP does not work supposedly due to complicated legal and administrative procedures, Local Community Mortgage Program that requires Local Government Units to devote more commitment in terms of funding and administration, although it is still at its infant stage (Coker 2016). However, it has been argued that the CMP is more responsive to the poor than other housing programmes, it has been failing to reach the poorest of the poor. While at the time of application, most of the applicants are from the poorest segments of the urban poor, a significant proportion of the beneficiaries (ranging 5 to 35%) tend to sell the tenure rights and move out due to incapacity to pay amortization (Porio et.al 2004). Third, through the issuance of Presidential Proclamation, the government can formalize the informal settlers by allocating public lands to the informal settlers who have been living on public lands. And finally, the Home Development Mutual Fund is a social security fund based on mandatory and voluntary contributions from private sector workers and employers, and it has become the primary program that provides low- and middle- income families with housing loans (Ballesteros 2009; 2011).

Table C2. Performance of housing policies

As indicated in the Table C2, the outcomes of the major housing policies showed significant shortfall in relation to their targets in 2012. Given the huge housing needs in the Philippines and particularly in the NCR, it is hardly possible to say these housing policies have succeed in satisfying the growing demand for housing.

(NEDA 2014; 141)

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