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Dezinformatsiya in Lithuania a Seemingly Charming Fairy Tale with Elves and Trolls

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Dezinformatsiya in Bouwmeester Lithuania BOUWMEESTER Dezinformatsiya in Lithuania A seemingly charming fairy tale with elves and trolls Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in the southeast region of Ukraine, NATO deployed four battlegroups to Poland and the Baltic States. The Netherlands contributes troops to the battlegroup in Lithuania, which considers itself a ‘front state’ against the Russian Federation. Lithuania is a desirable target for Russian disinformation campaigns. How is the country targeted by Russia, and how does Lithuania protect itself? This article provides an explanation for Russian disinformation, or dezinformatsiya, its history, and how it is related to other known terms, such as active measures. It is paramount for societies, including the Dutch, to be well aware of the likelyhood of being targeted by Russian dezinformatsiya campaigns. Colonel Han Bouwmeester* ou cannot fight lies with lies’, says Ričardas ‘YSavukynas, a Lithuanian elf, ‘when I see there are propaganda movements which are directed at the preparation of war, I need to do something!’1 Savukynas’ concern shows the kind of conflict nations are involved in today. It also depicts the tense atmosphere between the Baltic states and the Russian Federation over the past six years. The Baltics are seriously targeted by Russian influence campaigns, since Mother Russia still feels responsible for the safety of the ethnic-Russians and Russian speakers in the Baltics.2 In Estonia and Latvia more * Colonel Han Bouwmeester is an Associate Professor of Military Strategy and Land Operations at the Netherlands Defence Academy. Colonel Bouwmeester is currently finalising his PhD-research on modern Russian deception warfare and this article is a sneak preview of his dissertation. 1 NATO, ‘Elves vs Trolls – Fighting Disinformation in Lithuania’, YouTube, 3 May 2017. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KDsrwSX7piw. 2 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire (New Haven, CT (USA), Yale University Press, 2016) 136; Ofer Fridman, Russian Hybrid Warfare: Resurgence and Politicisation (London (UK), Hurst & Company, 2018) 171. 442 Sprekende kopregel Auteur DEZINFORMATSIYA IN LITHUANIA than a quarter of the popula tion is ethnic- Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 Russian, although in Lithuania it is only about and the conflict in the Donbas, the southeast five per cent.3 Lithuania is, in a different way, a region of Ukraine, member-states at NATO’s desirable target for Russian disinfor mation; it borders on the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and contains, together with Poland, the so-called 3 Jörg Noll et al, ‘De Baltische Staten, de Russische Minderheden en de Verdediging van Suwalki corridor: flat terrain between Belarus de NAVO’, in: Militaire Spectator 186 (2017) (4) 173. and Kaliningrad that may function as a perfect 4 Viljar Veelen, ‘Why It Would Be Strategically Rational for Russia to Escalate in link-up passage for Russian troops if necessary.4 Kaliningrad and the Suwalki Corridor’, in: Comparative Strategy 38 (2019) (3) 182-197. Dutch F-16s in Lithuania participate in NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission PHOTO MCD, HILLE HILLINGA Sprekende kopregel Auteur BOUWMEESTER 2016 Warsaw summit agreed to forward deploy because the Netherlands can easily get involved, four multinational battlegroups to the Baltics this article will concentrate on the following and Poland.5 In 2017, the Netherlands armed question: How are Russian disinformation forces largely contributed to the security of the campaigns used against Lithuania? Baltic states. It deployed four Dutch F-16s participating in the Baltic Air Policing task, one To answer this question, this article will provide raiding squadron of marines for the Very High an explanation for Russian disinformation, or Readiness Joint Task Force, two ships and a dezinformatsiya, its history and how it is related submarine to the Standing Naval Forces and one to other known terms, such as active measures, infantry company as part of the German-led propaganda and kompromat. It also shows battlegroup in Lithuania.6 Today, 270 Dutch present-day appearances of dezinformatsiya and military personnel are still attached to the details how Russian authorities are currently battlegroup and stationed in Rukla, Lithuania, as harassing Lithuania, and how Lithuania is ‘reassurance measures’ for eastern European protecting itself. Allies in NATO.7 The Netherlands makes a significant contribution to the protection of NATO territory in the Baltics, and should A description of dezinformatsiya therefore be aware of potential threats. In 2018, Christian Kamphuis warned in his Militaire To determine what kind of disinformation Spectator article that Dutch troops in Lithuania the Russian Federation uses against Lithuania, are a likely potential target for Russian smear the concept of dezinformatsiya must be campaigns. Kamphuis described an incident in scrutinised first. Van den Herik, Molendijk and which Dutch soldiers, based in Lithuania, were Bouwmeester already made a distinction in their falsely accused of being publicly drunk and article between mis-, dis- and malinformation.9 disorderly.8 In other words, Russia’s disinfor- Disinformation is a carefully crafted message to mation campaigns targeted against the Baltics mislead the decision-making elite or the public, are also of interest to the Netherlands. If only with every message at least partially conforming to generally accepted beliefs. Without a consi- derable degree of plausible information, it is difficult to gain the victim’s confidence.10 5 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Factsheet ‘NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence’, Otherwise the disinformation will not be May 2017. See: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/ accepted by its target audience.11 Today the pdf_2017_05/1705-factsheet-efp.pdf. concept of dezinformatsiya is still used by 6 Anne Bakker, ‘Dutch Perspectives on the Security of the Baltic States’, Clingendael Spectator, 20 December 2017. See: https://spectator.clingendael.org/nl/publicatie/ Russian authorities and is reframed by Western dutch-perspectives-security-baltic-states. experts as ‘Kremlin’s Weaponization of 7 Netherlands Ministry of Defence, ‘Current Missions’, 8 June 2020. See: https://english. Information’.12 Russian authorities use two defensie.nl/topics/missions-abroad/current-missions. different types of disinformation. The first 8 Christian Kamphuis, ‘Reflexive Control: The Relevance of a 50-year-old Russian Theory category is offensive disinformation used to Regarding Perception Control’, in: Militaire Spectator 187 (2018) (6) 337. 9 Bo van den Herik, Tine Molendijk and Han Bouwmeester, ‘Zeg me dat het niet waar influence foreign decision-makers and public is…? Een zoektocht naar Nederlands beleid en de rol van de krijgsmacht tegen opinion abroad. The second category includes desinformatie’, in: Militaire Spectator 189 (2020) (9) 418-429. defensive disinformation, which Russian 10 Ladislav Bittman, The KGB and Soviet Disinformation: An Insider’s View (McLean, VA authorities employ to influence their own (USA), Pergamont-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, 1984) 49. citizens.13 This form of disinformation is 11 Ladislav Bittman, The Deception Game: Czechoslovak Intelligence in Soviet Political Warfare, Syracuse University Research Corporation (New York, NY (USA), Ballantine primarily intended to combat the interference Books/Random House, 1972) 20. of the West in Russian society. Chief of Staff of 12 Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss, The Menace of Unreality: How the Kremlin the Russian armed forces Valery Gerasimov Weaponizes Information, Culture and Money, A special report presented by The stated that the West, especially the United Interpreter, Institute of Modern Russia, November 2014. States, is using ‘weapons of mass disorganiza- 13 Jon White, Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian Disinformation, Policy Brief, Issue 2016/13, (Brussels (BEL), Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Jean tion’, such as cyber, media, intelligence services Monnet Centre for Excellence, Institute for European Studies, 2016). and diplomacy, to upset Russian society. 444 MILITAIRE SPECTATOR JAARGANG 189 NUMMER 9 – 2020 Sprekende kopregel Auteur DEZINFORMATSIYA IN LITHUANIA Gerasimov considered these new conflict Germany, Poland, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and methods as a modern Trojan Horse.14 the Netherlands, had another view on the origin of dezinformatsiya, dating it back to the First World War. The German armed forces History of dezinformatsiya established a General Staff’s Disinformation Service to disseminate improper information The origin of dezinformatsiya is still debatable. and news in order to confuse their adversaries. Some experts are convinced that Joseph Stalin The first Soviet secret service adopted the term decided that disinformation should look as if and the underlying techniques and used it for its it were originally French. He organized an own purposes. It translated the term into information campaign in which the word dezinformatsiya. 16 dezinformatsiya seemed to be derived from the French language, being a portmanteau of the words ‘des’ and ‘information’. It was a mean- ingless expression, but another form of Russian 14 Frans van Nijnatten, ‘Het antwoord van Gerasimov op het Paard van Troje’ ruse. Stalin made believe that dezinformatsiya in: Militaire Spectator 188 (2019) (7/8) 394. was a French ‘capitalist’ tool targeted against the 15 Ion Mihai Pacepa,
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