2 June 2019

Chapter Six: Waiting for Light: The Story of Rural Electrification

“The abundant supply of electrical power will bring light to thousands of homes in the

countryside where darkness now prevails.” Kwame Nkrumah 1

“Who believes that the electrical companies have no archives, no records of consumption, no charts of the enlargement of their networks? The truth is that historians

until now have simply neglected to question these documents.” Marc Bloch2

In 1967, Queenmother Anomesi of Golokwati wrote “on behalf of the women’s folk” a letter of appreciation to General Joseph Ankrah, chairman of the National

Liberation Council. The NLC was the military regime that had ousted President Nkrumah and his government the previous year. At Golokwati, the people were celebrating, since their village had been selected as a site for a diesel generating plant, which was to supply electricity to the towns of Kpandu, Hohoe, and Jasikan in the Volta Region. Ghana had an abundance of idle diesel generators since the completion of the hydroelectric

Akosombo Dam in 1965. Akosombo fed the new power grid that connected the southern population centers and mining areas. The queenmother seeking to flatter referred to the

NLC chairman as a “good father” who had the ability to achieve progress. The people of

Golokwati were not only convinced to enter “the dawn of a brighter era” but also confident that they would soon have “completely recovered from the slough of

1 Kwame Nkrumah, “Volta River Project: To the National Assembly, 25 March 1963,” in in Selected Speeches by Kwame Nkrumah, vol. 5, ed. S. Obeng (Accra: Afram Publications, 1997), 22. 2 Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft: Reflections on the Nature and Uses of History and the Techniques and Methods of Those Who Write It, translated by Peter Putnam (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953), 66-67. 2 depression” left by Nkrumah. The queenmother assured Ankrah that the elders of

Golokwati had reserved a large field, “free of charge and free from all litigation,” for the installation of the generating plant. Queenmother Anomesi expressed the hope that the

NLC would launch development programs in the Volta Region, which had been neglected by the “contemptible fortune hunters” of the “old regime.”3 This letter stands for many petitions addressed to the government in the 1960s, as it conveys a desire for electricity, while placating the big men of Ghana’s revolving civil and military regimes.

In another 1967 petition, Nana Awua III, the Benkumhene of Begoro, an mountainous town in the Eastern Region, wrote on behalf of his people to the Electricity

Department and asked for an extension of the transmission lines from the nearby substation at Tafo. Explaining his request, Nana Awua noted that Begoro was the “old

Capital” of the Benkum division of Akim Abuakwa “with a very large population.”

Begoro had several educational institutions including a training college, a women’s vocational school, and four middle schools, two of which were boarding schools. The

Salvation Army operated a clinic at Begoro. “All these establishments and the people,”

Nana Akwua added, “need[ed] electricity.” The “lack of electricity,” he deplored, was a

“great handicap” for the town’s development.4 This petition, unlike the previous ones, did not ask for a diesel generator but for a connection to the country’s new grid powered by

Akosombo. Electricity generated by local diesel plants was a more costly and prone to breakdowns. Access to the grid, though dependent on a higher investment, was in the

3 Archive of the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG-A) Box 47, 565/vol. 9, no. 132, G. A. Anomesi II, Queenmother-Golokwati to NLC Chairman, 21 June 1967. 4 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, no. 74, Nana Antwi Awua III, Benkumhene Akim Abuakwa, Begoro, to Chief Electrical Engineer (CEE), 7 Jan. 1967. Begoro had about 5,000 inhabitants. A subsequent report established that approximately 1,202 consumers would benefit from a connection to the grid, see ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol. 9, no 144, Electricity Division, Koforidua to MD, 19 Sept. 1967. Akim Abuakwa, like other precolonial Akan kingdoms, was organized into divisions; the chief of Begoro, as the Benkumhene, was the “left wing” leader of the kingdom’s military. 3 long run cheaper, more reliable, and more desirable. Availability of electricity, provided by Ghana’s most modern infrastructure, became a key marker of full citizenship.

Ghana experienced an electricity fever, when Nkrumah inaugurated the

Akosombo Dam in January 1966, one month prior to the coup. After witnessing the construction of this enormous dam, the country was ready for cheap power that would mitigate the economic crisis left by Nkrumah. Initially, Akosombo’s hydroelectric plant had an installed capacity of 528 megawatts that fueled the smelter of the Volta Aluminum

Company (VALCO) and powered a 500 mile grid of 161 kilovolts lines with seventeen transmission substations (Fig. 6.1). Although there were no immediate plans to provide electricity to rural areas beyond the grid, official statements and press reporting had created expectations that the whole country would benefit from the wonders of

Akosombo. Nkrumah’s metaphor of turning darkness into light, quoted in the epigraph, had become a powerful vision that rallied support for the project. Exhibits touring the country, poems celebrating Akosombo, and press reporting contained references of how electricity would overcome darkness. Ghanaians expected that the state would provide them with electricity.

Thanks to Akosombo, Ghana became one of the few sub-Saharan countries with a large hydroelectric plant and a power grid. Although VALCO was to consume over 50 percent of the electricity generated at Akosombo, Ghana had a large electricity surplus until it began exporting to neighboring countries in 1972.5 This chapter traces the popular

5 For a brief overview of the history of electrification in Africa, see Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, “Electricity Networks in Africa: A Comparative Study, or How to Write Social History from Economic Sources,” in Sources and Methods in African History, ed. T. Falola and C. Jennings, (Rochester: University of Rochester Press 2003), 346-60. For East Africa, addressing the politics of infrastructure and electricity, see Christopher D. Gore, Electricity in Africa: The Politics of Transformation in Uganda (Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey, 2017), 31-63. For a compelling study of how the arrival of electricity changed a rural community in Zanzibar, see Tanja Winther, The Impact of Electricity: Development, Desires, and 4 expectations and technopolitics around electricity in Ghana until the early 1980s.

Drawing on the underused archive of the Electricity Corporation, it examines petitions and government initiatives for rural electrification. The discussion explores how rural

Ghanaians struggled to gain access to electricity as a claim of citizenship, and how they challenged changing governments, civil and military, to deliver on their promises.6 The availability of electricity became a yard stick of how ordinary Ghanaians measured their inclusion into the promise of modernity and modernization.7

Ghana experienced three civilian governments with different constitutions (three republics) and five successful coups and military regimes from 1960 to the early 1980s.8

These various governments relied on the technologies of electricity generation, transmission, and distribution to pursue their political goals. Such technopolitics, as

Gabrielle Hecht has argued, were closely linked to nation building and shaping of a national identity.9 Multiple state agencies took part in the articulation and deployment of

Dilemmas (New York: Berghahn, 2008). For current debates on the politics of electrification, see David A. McDonald, ed., Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the Power Grid (London: Earthscan, 2009). 6 For a similar argument about the state providing electricity as a right to democratic citizenship, see Lauren M. MacLean, Christopher Gore, Jennifer N. Brass, and Elizabeth Baldwin, “Expectations of Power: The Politics of State-Building and Access to Electricity Politics in Ghana and Uganda,” Journal of African Political Economy and Development 1 (2016): 103-34. While Mac Lauren et al. rightfully situate the origin of this expectation with Nkrumah’s nation building, they ignore how the connection between citizenship and electricity evolved from 1966 to the early 1980s. For a brief overview of rural electrification efforts in the late 1960s and 1970s, see also Naaborle Sackeyfio, Energy Politics and Rural Development in Sub- Saharan Africa: The Case of Ghana (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 100-1. 7 For the expectations of and disillusionment with modernity, see James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths, Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) and J. Ferguson, Global Shadow: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), especially chap. 7. For a discussion about the aspirations associated with modernization, see Peter Bloom, Stephan F. Miescher, and Takyiwaa Manuh (eds.), Modernization as Spectacle in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014). 8 The First Republic with Nkrumah as president (1960-66), the military-police National Liberation Council (1966-69), the Second Republic with A. K. Busia as prime minister (1969-72), the military National Redemption Council (1972-75) replaced by the Supreme Military Council (1975-78) under Colonel (later General) I. K. Acheampong, the Military Supreme Council II under General F. W. K. Akuffo, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council under Flight Lieutenant J. J. Rawling (1979), the Third Republic with Hilla Limann as president (1979-81), and the Provisional National Defense Council under Rawlings (1981-93). 9 See her study on the nuclear industry in France, Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power 5 the technopolitics of electricity, among them the Volta River Authority that generated power at Akosombo and operated the main transmission lines, the Electricity Department and later the Electricity Corporation in charge of distribution to domestic and commercial consumers, and other government offices. Moreover chiefs, development committees, youth organizations, members of parliament (MPs), and senior officers of the armed forces (under military regimes) lobbied on behalf of their constituents for electricity.

These multiple actors, operating on local, regional, and national levels, expressed demands, dealt with petitions, and issued promises for electrification. During a period of economic decline, Ghana had insufficient resources to expand the grid across the country and instead implemented limited rural electrification through local diesel generation and some extension of the transmission lines. By 1983, only about 2 percent of Ghanaians had access to electricity, most of whom lived in cities.10

Electric Power Generation, Transmission, and Distribution

In Africa, prior to the Second World War, electric power generation served places with European settler populations, such as Tunisia in North Africa and towns across

Southern Africa. Initially, like in North America and Europe, electric generating stations were located in urban centers close to consumers. They operated on low-voltage direct current, which did not permit long-distance transmission. Later, the replacement of direct with alternate current allowed for high-voltage transmission that was more economic. At transmission substations, transformers stepped down the high-voltage power into low

and National Identity after World War II, rev. ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009). For elaboration on the term, “technopolitcs,” see G. Hecht (ed.), Entangled Geographies: Empire and Technopolitics in the Global Cold War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011), 3. 10 Electricity Corporation of Ghana, Annual Report 16 (1983), 40. ECG listed 223,089 consumers, an estimated population of 12,087,771, and consumer per capita as 1.9 percent. 6 voltage for distribution to consumers.11 In Southern Rhodesia, electric power arrived in

Bulawayo in 1897, where municipal electrification enabled industrialization and lit streets, homes, and public spaces. This racially-based project, as Mhoze Chikowero has argued, benefitted the European settler community and became part of policing African townspeople.12 South Africa introduced electricity at its industrial centers during the final decades of nineteenth century and then developed, in the 1920s, an alternate current grid that provided thermal electricity to its mines, industries, railways, and European settlers.13 In West Africa, Nigeria was the only place where the use of electricity was moderately widespread in cities for the benefit of colonial officials and African elites.

Power was generated from coal mined in southeastern Nigeria.14 Elsewhere in West

Africa, power generation relied on diesel to provide electricity for urban areas.

In colonial Ghana, the first government-sponsored electricity supply was launched in 1914, when the Gold Coast Railway generated power at its terminus of Sekondi. In

Accra, the Department of Public Works started generating electricity with a small direct current plant in 1916 but switched to alternating current in 1924. Other urban centers in received generating plants with limited power supply for government offices during the

1920s and early 1930s.15 After the Second World War, a few southern towns and the

11 For the history of electric power grids in North America and Europe, see Thomas P. Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930 (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983) For the technological inventions that led to a shift from direct to alternate current, see ibid, 83-105. 12 Mhoze Chikowero, “Subalternating Currents: Electrification and Power Politics in Bulawayo, Colonial Zimbabwe, 1894-1939,” Journal of Southern African Studies 33, no. 2 (2007): 287-306. For Tunisia see the work by Habib Belaid cited by Coquery-Vidrovitch, “Electricity Networks in Africa,” 350. 13 Leonard Gentle, “Escom to Eskom: From Racial Kenynesian Capitalism to Neo-Liberalism (1910- 1994),” in Electric Capitalism: Recolonising Africa on the Power Grid, ed. D. A. McDonald (London: Earhscan, 2009), 50-72; Renfrew Christie, Electricity, Industry, and Class in South Africa (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984). 14 Coquery-Vidrovitch, “Electricity Networks,” 350-1. For coal mining see Carolyn Brown, “We Were All Slaves”: African Miners, Culture, and Resistance at the Enugu Government Colliery (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2003). 15 The regionals capitals of Koforidua in 1925, Kumasi in 1926, Takoradi in 1928, and Cape Coast in 1932. 7 northern regional centers of Tamale and Bolgatanga established their own generation stations. The Electricity Division, initially a wing of the Public Works Department, came under the Ministry of Works and Housing in the 1950s. Across the Gold Coast, these diesel plants distributed electric power, first by 3.3 kilovolt and then by 11 kilovolt lines.16 By 1954, 62.5 percent of houses of Accra’s urban wards were served with electricity, mainly used for light. While government residences, occupied by Europeans, had electric fans, water heaters, cooking stoves, and refrigerators, such modern amenities were rare in African homes. Only refrigerators were common in elite African homes.17 At independence in 1957, Accra had a powerhouse with a series of generators that amounted to a capacity of 14 megawatts. When the thirty-megawatt plant opened at Tema in 1961, it was the largest diesel power station in sub-Saharan Africa. The 161 kilovolt transmission line that connected Tema with Accra became the original segment of

Ghana’s national grid. In 1960, the domestic load, excluding mines, had a demand of 20 megawatt. By 1967, the load had quadrupled to 84 megawatt.18

The inclusion of a power grid was from certain in the planning of the Volta River

Project. The Halcrow proposal, which the government of the Convention People’s Party

(CPP) popularized in 1952, included a power grid connecting the hydroelectric plant at

Ajena with coastal cities, Kumasi, and the mining areas. The Halcrow consultants anticipated that the government might require up to 50 megawatts for domestic and

16 ECG-A Box 49, 565/vol. 23, nos. 24-10, Y. N. Opong, “Electricity and National Development” (1985), 6-7 (hereafter: Opong, “Electricity and National Development”). See Ioné Acquah, Accra Survey: A Social Survey of the Capital Accra, formerly called the Gold Coast, undertaken for the West African Institute of Social Research, 1953-1956 (London: University of London Press, 1958), 25n. 17 Acquah, Accra Survey, 61-62. 18 Opong, “Electricity and National Development,” 6-7. From 1960 to 1967, the units of energy used increased from 100 to 400 gigawatt hours. For the Tema power station, see also Ghana, Second Development Plan, 1959-64 (Accra: Government Printer, 1959), 27. 8 commercial users.19 The Preparatory Commission dropped the grid in its 1955 report.

Four years later, Kaiser Engineers’ reassessment of the project reincorporated the grid with 161 kilovolts lines forming a loop from the dam site to Tema, Accra, Sekondi-

Takoradi, to Kumasi, and then via Tafo back to Akosomobo. Initially the World Bank, for cost reasons, opposed the grid and only agreed to its inclusion after the gold and diamond mines at Tarkwa, Obuasi, and Akwatia were willing to forego their own electricity generation and purchase Volta power (Fig 6.1).20

The Volta River scheme’s planners did not feature any provisions of how the new grid should be extended to the rural areas.21 To address this lack, the Second

Development Plan, 1959-64 envisioned rural electrification through local generation.

Local authorities could apply for a diesel generator provided that they showed “sufficient users” would be forthcoming “to cover the running costs” and that local authorities contributed half of the installation costs.22 In 1960, the CPP government commissioned the British firm Engineering Projects Limited to conduct a survey for a large-scale rural electrification program. The following year, its report recommended the placing of diesel generating plants in 53 population centers that would remain outside the Volta grid. Since the government had other priorities, and also due to the steep cost of 3.5 million pounds

19 Gold Coast, Development of the Volta Basin (Accra: Government Printing Press, 1951), 3. For this paragraph, see above chapter one. 20 In Ghana high tension lines of 33, 69, and 161 kilovolts (after the completion of the intertie with La Côte d’Ivoire also 225 kilovolts) were used for long-distance transmission. High tension lines of 11 kilovolts were used for local distribution and for bulk purchasers like industries, big office buildings, educational centers, as well as for small towns, villages, and neighborhoods. Low tension lines of 230 volts are for single-phase connections (400 volts for three-phase connections) like individual residential connections (domestic users), and small shops, offices, guest houses, and cinemas (commercial users). 21 The 1952 government statement noted: “The consultants [Halcrow and Partners] did not propose that electricity should be supplied to other places on the Gold Coast presumably in view of the great costs of transformers and the relative smallness of the population.” Gold Coast, Development, 3. 22 Ghana, Second Development Plan, 27. 9

($9.8 million), these recommendations were not implemented.23

The Volta River Authority (VRA), established as a statutory public utility company in 1961, was placed in charge of the generation and transmission of electricity for the grid.24 The VRA was to provide bulk supplies of electricity to VALCO, the mines, and the Electricity Division. The World Bank recommended that the Electricity Division should be reorganized as an autonomous corporation, charged with distributing power to domestic and commercial users. This corporation was to “to secure recoveries of revenue promptly, effectively and impartially from all consumers.”25 German engineer Carlos

Schroeder, who studied the Electricity Department in 1960/61, noted that its distribution networks were not prepared to deal with the expected load increase. He was concerned that the revenue from the smelter would not be sufficient to pay for the capital cost of

Akosombo. Hence, it was urgent for the Electricity Department to acquire more consumers.26 VRA chief executive Frank Dobson, echoing this concern, offered for the

VRA to pay for updating the distribution network. Dobson reminded the Cabinet that over 200 megawatts of electricity would be available once Akosombo went online and that “economic success of the Volta Project [was] predicated on both the sale of electricity to the smelter and the Electricity Division.”27 Yet again, no plans were made to expand distribution beyond the towns with access to the grid. The Seven-Year

23 This report is cited in: ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 10, nos. 4-6, Managing Director (MD) to Principal Secretary (PS) Ministry of Works and Housing, 10 Oct. 1967. All 53 towns had a population of under 10,000, with the exception of Berekum (11,148), Suhum (10,193), Agogo (10,356), Bawku (12,719), Wa (14,342), Wenchi (10,672), and Yendi (16,096). 24 Volta River Development Act, 1961, (Act 46). 25 VRA-Library, N. G. Abhyankar (VRA chief financial officer), “The Regional Planning of the Volta Basin” (1963), 9. The corporation’s principal function would be “the enforcement of electricity rates and the collection of revenue.” 26 ECG-A Box 132/vol. 3, nos. 391-97, Report of Dr. Carlos Schroeder, Adviser in the Electricity Department, 6 Jan. 1961. 27 ECG-A Box 132/vol. 3, nos. 489-90, Dobson to principal secretary, Ministry of Construction and Communications, 16 March 1962. 10

Development Plan, 1963/64-1969/70, Nkrumah’s grand blueprint of modernization, anticipated that load demand in towns and villages would grow to 266 megawatts by

1976. The plan announced “far advanced” studies for the “possible extension of the transmission system to the Northern and Upper Regions and the South Eastern corner of

Ghana,” as well the possibilities “for the export of power to neighboring countries.” How to accomplish these tasks was far from certain.28

Electric Desires

For the Ghanaian public, Nkrumah outlined the Volta River Project’s potential in

1961, while seeking the National Assembly’s approval of the Master Agreement with

VALCO. Although noting that a “large block of electricity” would be sold to the smelter, the Electricity Division would extend its distribution system in urban centers connected to the Volta grid.29 The following year, he announced a ten-year electrification scheme for which the government would build capacity until “the smallest nook and corner of

Ghana [could] obtain electric supply readily and cheap to facilitated activity.”30 And in

1963, as noted, he promised that electrical power would “bring light to thousands of homes in the countryside where darkness now prevails.”31 During dam construction, press reporting and promotional campaigns created expectations of affordable electricity for the entire country. When the VRA began erecting the 500 mile grid at a cost of 5.32

28 Ghana, Seven-Year Development Plan, 1963//64 to 1969/70 (Accra: Office of the Planning Commission, 1964), 204-5. By 1976, the actual maximum load demand was only 183 megawatt, Electricity Corporation of Ghana, Annual Report 9 (1976), 5. 29 Kwame Nkrumah, “The Volta River Project: National Assembly, 21 February 1961,” in Selected Speeches by Kwame Nkrumah, vol. 2, ed. S. Obeng (Accra: Afram Publications, 1997), 37-38. 30 Kwame Nkrumah, “The Eleventh Party Congress, Kumasi, 28 July 1962,” in Selected Speeches by Kwame Nkrumah, vol. 3, ed. S. Obeng (Accra: Afram Publications, 1997), 130. 31 Nkrumah, “Volta River Project,” 22. This speech was widely circulated and reprinted in the press, see: “Volta River Project: Big Progress Made,” Ghanaian Times (GT), 26 March 1963. 11 million dollars, its deputy secretary A. B. Futa promised that the high tension lines would provide “cheap electricity from the Volta Dam at Akosombo” to the country’s major towns and industries on a single double-circuit system carrying 161 kilovolts of current.

The Electricity Division, to be turned into a corporation, would be responsible for the distribution of power to towns and villages. Chief executive Dobson added that the VRA was exploring the possibility of building a transmission line from Kumasi to the northern cities of Tamale and Bolgatanga.32 An editorial picked up the metaphor of light overcoming darkness by promising that Ghanaians would “sleep well during the night soon,” since “city, village, and country-side [would be] lit up by Akosombo.”33 One headline even announced, “Power for the factories, power for all homes…”34 Although no immediate plans existed to extend access to the Volta grid beyond the grid, such statements created expectation of a swift, country-wide electrification.

When Akosombo was in its final year of construction, the Electricity Division received numerous requests for power, triggered by press reporting on the dam’s completion and announcement of electricity production.35 Communities expressed their desire to be connected to the grid. For example, when the minister of Local Government visited Essakyir, a district center east of Cape Coast, its local council “expressed the urgent need for radio and electricity” and petitioned the government for the supply of

32 “500-Mile Electric Scheme Starts Soon,” GT, 13 Nov. 1962, 1. The Volta grid initially connected the following southern cities: Akosombo, Tema, Accra, Winneba, Saltpond, Cape Coast, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tarkwa, Dunkwa, Obuasi, Kumasi, Konongo, Nkawkaw, Tafo, and Koforidua. The promise of “cheaper electricity to towns and villages” was frequently repeated, see “Jack Chats with Kaiser,” GT, 19 Jan. 1963. 33 “Editorial: The Giant Monument rises,” GT, 21 Feb. 1963, 2. 34 “Power for the factories, power for all homes…,” Evening News (EN), 23 March 1963, 35 “Great Volta Dam is Now Complete: Electricity will start ‘flowing’ in September,” GT, 8 Feb. 1965, 1; the article reported about the ongoing work on the transmission lines with substations. Another article announced that by September the first generator would supply the country with 128,000 kilowatts of electricity, “The Volta River Dam Completed,” Daily Graphic (DG), 9 Feb. 1965, 1. MPs visiting Akosombo learned from resident town manager A. B. Futa that the four generators would produce nine times the amount now generated in the country: “Volta: Cheap power in September,” GT, 24 Feb. 1965, 1. 12

“these modern amenities.”36 In response, the Electricity Division sent out an engineer who learned that Essakyir was a small town of 180 houses with population of 1,800.

Essakyir lacked significant commercial activity, since its residents worked as farmers and fishermen. Its chief operated a six-kilowatt generator that furnished power to a few houses and street slights. The engineer estimated the cost of extending electricity to

16,000 Ghana pounds ($18,500). Since small towns like Essakyir lacked sufficient demand, it was uneconomic to supply them with a high tension line of 11 kilovolts.37

Press reporting created vast expectations, amply documented in the files of the

Electricity Corporation. A small celebration marked the beginning of power production at

Akosombo in September 1965. Readers of the Ghanaian Times learned that Ghana

“made a great landmark in her industrialization programme as Osagyefo the President turned on a switch” and that the “power house began sending the country’s first hydro- electricity to Tema, Accra and other parts of southern Ghana.”38 Five days later, the coastal town Senya Beraku inquired whether the transmission lines could be extended.39

Similarly, Eddie Ampah, CPP MP of Asebu, felt an entitlement for his hometown Moree east of Cape Coast to be connected. The MP boasted of having conveyed to his electorate

“Osagyefo’s dream” of generating “abundant flow of electricity for use throughout every dwelling place in Ghana.” Since this dream had become reality, it was “imperative” for the Electricity Division to “strive tooth and nail” and provide Moree with power. The

36 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 8, no. 13, Ministry of Local Government to PS Ministry of Works, 31 March 1965. 37 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 8, nos. 21, 28, Electricity Division, Ministry of Construction and Communications, to CEE, Accra, May 11, 1965, and CEE to PS Ministry of Works, June 3, 1965. 38 “Kwame Sees his Dream Become Reality,” GT, 18 Sept 1965, p. 3; “Kwame Turns On Volta Power,” DG, 18 Sept. 1965, 1, 3. 39 ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol.8, no. 67, Traditional Council’s Office to PS, Ministry of Works, 22 Sept. 1965. 13

Asebu local council was prepared to contribute “hard cash and communal labor.”40 None of these requests led to a connection to the Volta grid.

The Evening News, the CPP organ, spelled out the opportunities of the electric grid that would power the new industrial center in Tema, aid hospitals, schools, and factories. These benefits would be extended to “many towns and villages.” Bringing electricity to rural areas would lead to new industries, which would “check the drifts to town by school leavers and others in search of work.”41 Akosombo was to mitigate the rural to urban migration, a great concern of policy makers.42 A widely circulated VRA publication featured visuals of transmission lines and pylons, accompanied by the caption

“Power is the key to progress in Ghana.” It promised plenty of electricity for the more prosperous south, covered by the grid, “and in due course for the rest of Ghana too.”43

The coup that swept Nkrumah from power in February 1966 did not end the popular quest for electricity. In spite of regime change, government agencies continued nourishing hopes. Addressing students at the Accra Local Government Training School,

P. Boi-Amporful, VRA public relations officer, declared that “the full benefit” of the

Akosombo scheme could only be realized “when electric power reache[d] every home in

Ghana.”44

The NLC staged in 1967 two public exhibits that triggered additional desires for electricity: the First International Trade Fair in February and the Ideal Home Exhibition

40 ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol.8, no. 68, Eddi B. K. Ampah Jr., MP, to Electrical Engineer, Cape Coast, 13 Oct. 1965. Osagyefo (Redeemer) was one of Nkrumah’s honorary titles. 41 A Nationalist, “Volta River Project: What it Stands for,” EN, 13 Dec. 1965, 2. 42 For a scholar’s response, hoping for the “success of plans of industrialization” that will “greatly change the nature of life in Ghana’s towns,” see J. C. Caldwell, “Migration and Urbanization,” in A Study of Contemporary Ghana, vol. 2, ed. W. Birmingham, I. Neustadt, and E. N. Omaboe (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967), 146. 43 Keith Jopp, The Story of Ghana’s Volta River Project (Accra: Volta River Authority, 1965), 59. 44 “VRA power should reach all homes,” DG, March 19, 1966, 1. 14 in November.45 The former had been conceived by the CPP government, originally scheduled for February 1965, but then postponed. The VRA and the Electricity

Department had planned a joint pavilion in the “Made in Ghana” section to display the

“new electric age.”46 The Trade Fair, opened by the NLC, was smaller than Nkrumah’s original vision, excluded communist countries, and instead highlighted Ghana’s realignment within a business friendly and pro-Western Cold War context. The fair became a tremendous success attracting over 950,000 visitors, who flocked to popular sites like fashion shows, music performances, and the “ultramodern kitchen and bathroom” displayed by Ghana National Trading Company (GNTC).47 VRA told the story of the Volta project in its pavilion visited by 40,000 people, who were “made up of businessmen, tourists, charitable organizations, student bodies.”48 GNTC contributed to the VRA’s display of electric appliances including water heaters, fans, large and small refrigerators, two stoves, as well as a floor polisher, washing machine, a television set, and other electrical gadgets.49 Nine months later, several participating companies showed their consumer goods at the smaller Ideal Home Exhibition, which took place at Accra’s

Community Centre and welcomed 50,000 visitors. Unlike the Trade Fair that had erased women from its narrative, the Ideal Home Exhibition explicitly targeted a female

45 Bianca Murillo, “Ideal Homes and the Gender Politics of Consumerism in Postcolonial Ghana, 1966-70,” Gender and History 21, no. 3 (2009), 560-75; B. Murillo, Market Encounters: Consumer Cultures in Twentieth-Century Ghana (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017), 115-36. 46 VRA-A SD-R/62, R. H. C. Hammond, PS Ministry of Trade to CEE Electricity Department and VRA chief executive, 7 April 1964. For the Trade Fair’s postponement, see VRA-A SD-R/62, VRA Board Minutes excerpts, 28 Aug. 1964, and Statement by A. J. Dowuona-Hammond, Chairman of Cabinet Committee on Ghana International Trade Fair, 9 Sept. 1964. 47 Murillo, Market Encounters, 115, 123-24. See “Exhibitors Claim Success at Ghana Trade Fair,” Financial Times, 13 Feb. 1967, quoted by Murillo, Market Encounters, 196n. For local reporting see, Mike Adjei, “Trade Fair Opens Today,” DG, 1 Feb. 1967; “Ideal Home Exhibition at Trade Fair,” DG, 12 Feb. 1967 (cited by Murillo, “Ideal Homes,” 573n). 48 VRA Annual Report (AR) 6 (1967), 26. 49 VRA-A SD-R/62, CE F. J. Dobson to PS Ministry of Foreign Trade, 20 June 1966, and S. N. Patrinos, GNTC Technical Department, to Exhibition Builders & Decorators, Accra, 8 Sept. 1966. 15 audience, as Bianca Murillo has argued.50 Similarly, the following year Anowuo

Educational Publications staged another Ideal Home Show Exhibition that reached out to housewives and “the man who is practical and domesticated.”51 In the 1970s, the

Electricity Corporation participated in other trade fairs to promote the sale of power by displaying household electrical appliances.52 These public spectacles celebrated conspicuous consumption of luxury goods, which was a departure from the limited availability of consumer goods during the final years of Nkrumah’s rule. Moreover, they introduced over a million Ghanaians to the wonders of electricity and fueled desires for appliances fitting the new electric age.

The redundant generating plants in cities now connected to the grid created additional expectations. The Daily Graphic announced in 1965 that some of the smaller generators with their technical staff were to be moved to parts of the country that did not benefit from Akosombo.53 The image of idle diesel units led to further jockeying for the possibility of generating electricity in one’s own town. Yet running diesel generators was expensive, since their electricity was not allowed to cost more than Akosombo power.

Rural electrification, based on local generation, would never pay for itself.

Typical was the request of the paramount chief and chairman of the town development committee of Duayaw-Nkwanta, Brong Ahafo Region, for two redundant generators of 200 kilowatt from Kumasi. The chief highlighted that his cocoa town of

8,000 inhabitants had seven primary schools, three middle schools, a women’s training

50 Murillo, “Ideal Homes,” 565, and Market Encounters, 133-4. 51 “The Ideal Home Show Exhibition,” Mirror, 22 Sept. 1968, 5. The article called on Ghanaians who had been unable to visit the 1967 exhibition to see “for the first the latest in everything that look[s] great.” 52 For example at the 1974 Agricultural Show and Trade Fair, the Electricity Corporation of Ghana (ECG) displayed household electrical appliances available on the market. ECG, Annual Report 7 (1974), 13. 53 The article “New Body to Sell Volta Power” (DG, 25 Nov. 1965) mentioned idle generators at Accra, Cape Coast, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Swedru, Tafo, and Tema. The generating plants in Accra and Tema, with a capacity of 14,710 and 33,348 kilowatts respectively, were too large to be moved. 16 college, a new polytechnic, as well as offices of the Ghana Commercial Bank, police station, and the Cocoa Marketing Board. The existing plant, established through voluntary contributions and a cocoa surtax in 1958, had powered lights and provided a limited supply that was inadequate for the “increasing population.” He promised communal labor to assist in wiring and mounting the poles.54 The petition led to an investigation about the size of the existing generation plant, a list of the present and prospective consumers, and estimated costs.55 Yet, Duayaw-Nkwanta had to wait several years for a larger power source.56

The Electricity Division, supported by a foreign loan, sought to extend the Volta grid to increase its revenues. A Daily Graphic announcement that eleven towns were to receive Volta power triggered more requests.57 There was confusion about the reach of

Akosombo power. The regional office in Ho complained about misleading press reports.

The office missed instructions of how to reply “to the numerous requests from communities in the [Volta] Region for the supply of electricity.” Frustrated, the officer pressed for a national plan and quipped that “both the rural communities and the Regional

Office” were left “in the dark on this subject.”58

There were two reasons why regional offices were inundated by requests from rural communities in the years after the coup. First, Nkrumah and the CPP government

54 ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol. 9, nos. 37-39, Omanhene’s Office, Duaya-Nkwanta to CEE, 24 Oct. 1966, and cover letter, Office of Regional Commissioner, Sunyani, to CEE, 4 Nov. 1966. 55 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, nos. 54-64, Electricity Division, Ministry of Works, Sunyani to CEE, Accra, 9 Jan. 1967. 56 Cf. ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 10, no. 82, PS Ministry of Works and Housing to Managing Director (MD), 26 March 1968. 57 See the request from Fomena, Adansi (Ashanti Region) referring to the Daily Graphic (15 March 1967) that the Obuasi mining area would receive Volta power: ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, no. 85, Fomena Improvement Assocation to Managing Director (MD), ECG, 16 March 1967. 58 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, no. 111, Regional Office, Ho, V/R, to PS, Ministry of Works and Housing, 30 June 1967. 17 had made numerous promises that every town and village would receive electricity after the completion of Akosombo. Second, Ghanaians in small towns beyond the grid had learned that the extension of Akosombo power to southern cities had resulted in obsolete diesel generators. These idle plants became available to towns and villages without electricity, many of whom started making voluntary contributions towards a local electrification scheme. The Kumasi office, flooded with such petitions, had not received any guidance about government assistance for “these rural enterprising people.” Kumasi asked whether the Electricity Division had any concrete plans “for supplying power from

Akosombo or from redundant generators to the remote parts of the country.”59 Coming up with a consistent policy of how to expand access to electricity especially in rural areas proved to be challenging for the NLC and subsequent governments.

The Electricity Corporation and Rural Electrification Policies

The NLC established the Electricity Corporation of Ghana (ECG) as the successor of the Electricity Division in 1967.60 The ECG was expected to conduct its affair on sound commercial lines. At the inauguration, Issifu Ali, the NLC commissioner for the

Ministry of Works and Housing, mentioned a plan of rural electrification that included

Ashanti Mampong, Bawku, and Half Assini. The NLC had to decide on a policy. The principal secretary of the Ministry of Works and Housing requested from the ECG managing director E. Q. H. Acquah a detailed plan, as there was “considerable pressure from all angles” for the supply of electricity to rural communities. Acquah responded

59 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, no. 124, Region Office, Kumasi, to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 23 March 1967. 60 ECG-A Box 524, Electricity Corporation of Ghana (ECG), First Report and Statement of Accounts 1967/68, 1. NLC Decree 125, 20 Jan. 1967 established the ECG; Executive Instrument 59, 29 June 1967, transferred all assets and liabilities of the former Electricity Division to the ECG, as of 1 July 1967. 18 with a frank assessment. Laying out the history of rural electrification, he recalled the

1961 report that had recommended the creation of 53 generation plants in towns beyond the grid. For “financial reasons,” this proposal had been shelved. Under the assumption that 70 percent of the original cost represented investment in imported material, and considering inflation and exchange rates, the project would cost now 11.5 million cedis

($16.1 million).61 Acquah explained that most of the bigger generating units, like those from Kumasi, were too large to be transferred to small centers. Whenever possible, they should be sold. The smaller generating stations would operate at a loss due to the high diesel cost and limited revenue. He considered “rural electrification even a medium scale

… not sound economics.”62

The ECG lacked the means to launch a program of rural electrification. Should the government wish to take such a step, as Acquah noted, it would have to create a special fund.63 The Ministry of Works and Housing identified a group of medium to small size generators to be relocated to sixteen towns, which included the above mentioned generating plant at Golokwati that would feed a small network in the Volta

Region.64 Per decree, the NLC exempted the ECG from import taxes and duties of “plant and materials for generating and standby stations and for the transmission and distribution system.” The NLC promised funds for the ECG construction program, including a subvention to cover ECG losses on uneconomic stations brought into

61 The original cost had been 3.5 million pounds ($9.8 million). 62 ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol. 10, nos. 4-6, MD to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 10 Oct. 1967. 63 Ibid. 64 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 10, nos. 10-13, PS Ministry of Works and Housing to Regional Office, Kumasi, 25 Oct 1967. In addition to Golokwati (for Kpandu-Hohoe-Jasikan), the schedule of plant transfers included Bolgatanga, Denu, Ho, Bawku, Sunyani, Tamale, Saltpond, Konongo, Half Assini, Axim, Kibi, Suhum, Mampong Ashanti, as well as Komenda and Akuse, the latter two for irrigation. 19 operations “for social or other reasons.”65

Despite high costs for rural electrification, the NLC recognized the political necessity and public expectation to launch at least a moderate rural electrification program. In this case of technopolitics, rural electrification acquired national priority. By

June 1968, the ECG decided to provide power to eleven additional towns.66 The ECG secured a loan in the amount of ten million cedis ($9.8 million) from the International

Development Agency (IDA) “to maximize the use of the Volta power in its distribution system and thereby secure a reasonably sound basis for the future viability of its operations.”67 The loan was granted under the condition that the government would provide the capital and “meet the operating losses of any loss-making generating system” which it deemed necessary “as a matter of national or other policies.”68

The NLC had difficulties in coping with expectations, especially from the disadvantaged north.69 People in in the northern regions, hundreds of miles from the

Volta grid, felt overlooked. When the electrical engineer in Tamale inquired about plans to extend power to the towns of Damango, Salaga, and Yendi, the Accra chief engineer, replied that there had been a “country-wide clamour for the provision of electric supply” since Nkrumah’s downfall. Because of budgetary constraints and the need to invest state funds “solely in enterprise of definite economic value,” it was premature to extend electric power to these northern towns. Only Bawku had been included in the planned

65 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 10, no. 50, NLC Office to PS Ministry of Economic Affairs, 22 Jan. 1968. 66 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 10, no. 108, MD to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 14 June 1968. The towns included (some on the previous list): Hohoe, Bechem, Suhum, Wiawso, Apam, Bawku, Wa, Wenchi, Yendi, Anloga, and Somanya. 67 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 10, nos. 117-19, Commissioner for Ministry of Works and Housing, Memorandum on Rural Electrification, 25 June 1968. 68 ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol. 10, no. 87, MD to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 5 June 1968. 69 Ghana’s north, less developed than the south, served as the labor reservoir during the colonial period. For a history of labor migration in the northwestern Lawra District, see Carola Lentz, Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 138-52. 20 rural electrification scheme.70 The Association of Northern Students Overseas, referring to the 80,000 people who had lost their land and homes in the Volta Basin, observed that the entire country had made sacrifices for Akosombo. Yet to the students’ “amazement,” the north had not benefited from the dam at all. The chief engineer responded that it was neither technically nor economically feasible to extend the Volta transmission lines to the north due to the small demand.71

The Sunyani regional office reported about being “bombarded by chiefs and leaders of villages and towns and Development Committees asking why the Brong Ahafo

Region was conspicuously omitted.” Sunyani stressed the economic importance of Brong

Ahafo where most the country’s cocoa, timber, and foodstuff was produced. The regional office reminded the NLC about the “embarrassing” end of the Bui Dam and suggested releasing some of the fourteen generating plants sitting idle in Kumasi.72 Bui had been part of Nkrumah’s Cold War strategy of straddling both superpowers. Against VRA advice, he had invited the Soviets to design a second large dam at Bui to electrify the north. By 1966, Soviets engineers had initiated preconstruction, yet Bui was abandoned after the coup.73 The Bolgatanga office urged the NLC to prevent a situation in which the people of the Upper Region would continue walking “in darkness” and not seeing “the great light from Akosombo or any other source.” The ECG should either move generators

70 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, nos. 7, 8, Electricity Division Tamale to CEE, Accra, 11 July 1966, and CEE to Tamale, 20 July 1966. 71 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 10, nos. 53-54, Association of Northern Students Overseas, London to the NLC chairman, 26 Sept. 1967; ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 10, no. 65, CE to PS, Ministry of Works and Housing, 9 Feb. 1968. For the hardship endured by the resettled population, see above chapter four. 72 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, no. 117, Office of the Regional Committee of Administration, Sunyani, to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 8 July 1967. 73 Stephan F. Miescher and Ddzodzi Tsikata, “Hydro-Power and the Promise of Modernization and Development in Ghana: Comparing the Akosombo and Bui Dam Projects, Ghana Studies 12/13 (2009/2010), 15-53. See also above chapter one. 21 north or make more effective use of plants operated by other government agencies.74

The implementation of the NLC policy for rural electrification was slow. The government allocated funds in 1968 to establish small diesel generating plants in Bechem and Wenchi (Brong Ahafo), Suhum (Eastern Region), Wiawso (Western Region), Yendi

(Northern Region), and Wa (Upper Region).75 This list was the outcome of tense negotiations and requests by influential members of government. Wenchi was included, because K. A. Busia as chairman of the National Advisory Committee had lobbied for his hometown.76 These six towns constituted the first phase of the rural electrification program. In addition, the ECG sought to extend the Volta grid to the Akuapem towns of

Mampong, Akropong, Larteh, and Adukrom (Fig. 6.2). Lack of money delayed the beginning of the latter project.77

In August 1969, as Ghana was preparing for elections that led to the Second

Republic, the Joint Houses of Chiefs entered the debate. Congratulating the NLC on the establishment of a Ministry for Rural Development, the chiefs requested health services, feeder roads, and electrification. They recalled the assurance of “the old regime” that the completion of the Volta project would not only bring electrification for the “whole country” but “cheaper electricity supply for all.” Yet since the start of power generation at Akosombo, only “commercial towns and mining areas” had received electricity.

74 At Navrongo, the Department of Community Development and Social Welfare had an electric plant that could supply the whole town, as this department only used “an infinitesimal fraction” of the generated power. ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol. 9, nos. 118-19, Upper Regional Office, Bolgatanga, to PS Ministry of Works & Housing, 24 July 1967. 75 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 11, no. 15, PS Ministry of Works and Housing to MD, 2 Dec. 1968. The costs for these projects were: Bechem, 81,000 cedis; Suhum, 125,000 cedis; Wiawso, 66,000 cedis; Wa, 178,000 cedis, with a total of 450,000 cedis ($441,000). The costs for Wenchi would be 130,000 and for Yendi 150,000 cedis ($127,00 and $147,000 respectively). 76 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 11, no. 11, K. A. Busia to Commissioner, Ministry of Works and Housing, 15 Oct. 1968. 77 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 11, no. 61, PS, Ministry of Works and Housing to PS, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 30 May 1969. Adukrom was only added after Air Vice Marshall M. A. Otu lobbied for his hometown: ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, no. 125, Otu to MD, 21 June 1967. 22

Addressing the fate of the resettlement communities, the chiefs commented that “even in certain areas where the inhabitants [had] terribly suffered as a result of the Akosombo

Dam,” no provision had been made for “essential amenities to compensate the people for their great sacrifice.” Recently there had been an announcement about an agreement between the Ghanaian and the Canadian governments to extend the power lines from

Akosombo to the neighboring countries of Togo and Dahomey (Benin). As “fathers” of the people, the chiefs critiqued the “injustice” committed towards Ghanaians. According to the saying “Charity begins at home,” electrification should first happen in Ghana.78

Following Nkrumah’s promise the chiefs still expected cheap power. Nobody had ever explained to them that Ghana sought to export power for hard currency revenues.

The chiefs addressed rural to urban migration. While they welcomed the government’s decision to invest into agriculture, they felt that, without rural electrification, people who had “drifted” from villages to towns, would “never return to help in the implementation of this laudable scheme.” Initiatives by “businessmen in establishing industries in their indigenous rural areas” would be hampered without electricity. The chiefs recommended for the government “to raise a loan for the electrification of the whole of Ghana.” Ghanaians were frustrated since they expected lower electricity rates, as promised with Akosombo. Current rates contributed to the

“high cost of living.” The chiefs urged reducing them, especially for low income people, and expressed surprise that “certain foreign firms,” meaning VALCO, paid less for

78 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol.11, nos. 85-88, Resolutions by Joint Houses of Chiefs, 1 Aug. 1969. VRA began negotiation about a connection with Togo and Dahomey in 1967; an agreement was signed in August 1969, which allowed for both countries to draw up to 50 megawatts of power for a period of 15 years. The Canadian government financed the project. See VRA AR 6 (1967), 1; VRA AR 8 (1969), 1. For the planning, see VRA-A MSD/4, Minutes of meeting between VRA chief executive and Togo and Dahomey delegations, 9 Aug. 1967. 23 electricity.79 As the NLC relinquished power to a civilian government, Akosombo’s high hopes had not been fulfilled. Most Ghanaians were still waiting for light. Would the incoming Progress Party, committed to rural development in lieu of industrialization, be more successful with rural electrification?

The Second Republic brought Busia, Nkrumah’s old nemesis, to power in 1969.

As prime minister, Busia accelerated NLC economic policies by granting loans to farmers and constructing feeder roads. He pursued a rigid Ghanaianization through the

Aliens Compliance Order, expelling 150,000 people from other West Africans countries.80 With a renewed government focus on the well-being of the country’s rural areas, the ECG was accused of neglect. The regional manager of the Western Region explained how the ECG had studied the cost of providing electricity to the five towns of

Esiama, Kikam, Axim, Half Assini, and Sefwi Wiawso. But the NLC had failed to release funds. He noted: “If you do not see E.C.G. lighting up our towns and villages it is not because of lack of interest or an improper sense of responsibility as you accuse us of.

. . . We have done the preliminary survey and produced the estimates. We cannot do any more until we receive the required funds.”81 The NLC government was blamed for the slow implementation of rural electrification.

Seeking an end to this funding shortage, managing director Acquah suggested a concrete solution. On behalf of ECG, the NLC government had entered into two loan agreements: one with the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KFW) in 1966 for DM

79 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol.11, nos. 85-88, Resolutions by Joint Houses of Chiefs, 1 Aug. 1969. For VALCO’s low power rate of 2.625 mills per kilowatt hour, see above chapter two. 80 See John D. Esseks, “Economic Policies,” in Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966-1972, ed. D Austin and R. Luckham (London: Frank Cass, 1975), 37-61. Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in Ghana, second edition (London: Routledge, 2010), 340-2. 81 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 11, no. 89, Regional Manager, Takoradi, to Regional Chief Executive, Sekondi, 13 Sept. 1969. 24

20 million ($5 million) to finance the reconstruction and extension of the distribution network in Accra; the other, the above mentioned 1968 loan with IDA in the amount of

10 million dollars, to secure additional consumers for the Volta grid. Yet as sub- borrower, ECG paid the principal to the government over a shorter period of time than the latter’s obligation towards its lenders. ECG calculated that the government, which benefited from the interest rate differential between borrower and sub-borrower, had accrued a profit on these loans of 250,000 cedis ($264,600). Acquah urged the Ministry of Public Works to put this money into a rural electrification.82 He welcomed Busia’s personal interest and hoped that his government would provide the necessary funding.83

Progress Party MPs used their new political power to lobby for the extension of power to their districts. Isaac Amissah-Aidoo, the deputy speaker, made a case for improvements in Assin Foso, Central Region, which include road tarring, water, a post office, health facilities, latrines, a radio rediffusion station, and electricity. He suggested to extend Volta power, available 36 miles to the south, to establish local industries like a sawmill complex.84 The IDA credit enabled a Volta grid extension to select towns. The

Eastern Region was the main beneficiary: from the Tafo substation to Koforidua, from

Mampong (Akuapem) to Akropong and Larteh, and from Nkawkaw to the Kwawu ridge.

The Juapong textile factory, at the border between Eastern and Volta Regions, received

82 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol.11, nos. 123-25, MD to PS, Ministry Public Works, 6 Dec. 1969.82 For the KFW loan, the interest differential was 3 percent and 5 percent; for the IDA loan, 0 percent and 6.25 percent! 83 ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol.11, nos. 147, Regional Administrative Office, Western Region to MD, ECG, 28 Dec. 1969; see ECG’s detailed plan for centralized generation at Golokwati and transmission to Kpandu, Hohoe, and Jasikan in the Volta Region: ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol.11, 126-27, MD to PS, Ministry of Works, 9 Dec. 1969. 84 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 12, nos. 96-93, MP Isaac Amissah-Aidoo to Ministry of Rural Development, 18 Feb. 1970. For other petitions, see ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 12, nos. 102-99, MP William Ofori Atta to Ministry of Social and Rural Development and other ministries, 23 Dec 1969, requesting electricity and other infrastructural investments for the Akatia constituency; see also ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 14, nos. 24- 23, MP Benson B. Ofori to MD, 17 Sept. 1971, requesting electricity, as part of Kwawu electrification, for Aduamoa, the “twin” town of Nkwatia. A minute (19 Sept. 1971) assured Aduamoa’s inclusion. 25

Volta power, and in Ashanti, towns like Ejisu and Konongo along the lines to Kumasi were connected.85 Chiefs were willing to forego compensation for cutting cocoa trees for power lines, as J. A. Kufuor, then an MP and deputy foreign minister, assured the ECG.

Kufuor, later Ghana’s president, hoped his intervention would bring locally generated power to the towns of Barikese and Offinso in his district.86

During the planning of the Volta Project, Busia had been one of the few who expressed strong reservations. In 1953, when the Legislative Assembly debated the establishment of the Preparatory Commission to investigate the project’s feasibility,

Busia questioned the project’s scale and warned about its “sociological implications,” particularly the “movement of populations” and “submergence of old towns.”87 Busia recalled in 1971 with some vindication that he had argued for a “smaller generating facility requiring less investment,” which would “have served the needs of the country more efficiently.” He criticized Akosombo for providing cheap power mainly to VALCO and addressed the fate of the resettlement communities and lake side dwellers.88

When the regional chief executive visited the Anum-Boso area east of Akosombo, the traditional council secretary echoed Busia’s critique. In his welcome address, the secretary remarked: “[It] is a pity that our people [who] have sacrificed much land, much time, much labor and much good wishes to make the building of the Volta Dam a

85 See the overview of ECG projects undertaken 1968-70, ECG-A, Box 47 565/vol. 12, nos. 141-136, CE to PS, Works and Housing, 20 May 1970. 86 ECG-A Box 47, 565/14, no. 10, J. A. Kufuor, Foreign Affairs, to CE, 22 July 1971. For a similar missive with the assurance that cocoa farmers would not demand compensation, see ECG-A Box 47, 565/14, no. 9, Omanhene of Offinso to regional manager, Kumasi, 19 July 1971. 87 23 Feb. 1953, Gold Coast Legislative Assembly Debates, Session 1953, Issue no. 1 (vol.1) (Accra: Government Printing Department, 1953), 496, 498. For a discussion of this crucial debate, see above chapter one, and David Apter, Ghana in Transition, 2nd and rev. edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 236-37. 88 Archive of the Volta River Authority (VRA-A) SD-R/60, Speech by Prime Minister K. A. Busia at the inauguration of the re-constituted VRA, 21 Oct. 1971. 26 success, do see the lights at night but do not enjoy the lights. We are therefore asking that we should be considered as a matter of urgency when the Government is implementing here a rural electrification scheme.”89 The ECG replied with its standard response that

Anum-Boso was not included in the current program but would be considered in the next phase.90 Although Busia’s government expressed its commitment to rural development including electrification, it was not in power long enough to implement most of its policies.

Nkrumah’s Rehabilitation, Pan-Africanism, and Rural Electrification

In January 1972, Colonel I. K. Acheampong ousted Busia in a military coup. The new government, called National Redemption Council (NRC), reversed many of Busia’s policies, most prominently the devaluation of the cedi. The NRC, adopting a moral and revolutionary tone, embraced the socialist outlook of the Nkrumah era by distancing itself from Western powers, repudiating Ghana’s foreign debt, and nationalizing foreign-owned industries of mining, timber, and oil. The NRC revived a pan-African orientation, by advocating for the Trans-African Highway Project, signing trade agreements with surrounding countries, and working towards the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).91 In April 1972, Nkrumah died in a Bucharest hospital. After a state funeral in Conakry, Guinea, where Nkrumah had lived in exile, his body was returned to Accra in July. Acheampong gave Nkrumah another state funeral

89 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 14, no. 67, Office of Regional Administration, Koforidua, to Sub-Regional Manager, ECG, Koforidua, 30 Nov. 1971. 90 ECG-A, Box 47, 565/vol. 14, no. 69, CE to Regional Administrative Office, Koforidua, 22 Jan. 1971. 91 For the Pan-African Highway and trade agreements, see Jennifer Hart, “‘Nifa, Nifa’: Technopolitics, Mobile Workers, and the Ambivalence of Decline in Acheampong’s Ghana,” African Economic History 44 (2016): 181-201, particularly 184, 187. For other NRC policies, see Killick, Development Economics in Action, 347-48. For NRC’s consumer politics, see Murillo, Market Encounters, 137-56. 27 before his body was interred in Nkroful, his birthplace in the Western Region.92

Acheampong not only rehabilitated Nkrumah but altered the government’s attitude towards his electric “baby.” Unlike Busia, Acheampong welcomed any opportunity to celebrate the Volta River Project. The state press reported extensively about Akosombo’s eighth anniversary, when Acheampong styled himself as Nkrumah’s successor.93

There were continuities in rural policies from Busia to Acheampong. Similar to the Progress Party, the NRC supported private farmers seeking to increase domestic food production through its campaign Operation Feed Yourself, and pursued agricultural initiatives like the fledging rural electrification scheme. This continued to be a difficult and under-funded endeavor.94 Government officials remained aware of penned up frustration about the lack of electrical power for about 95 percent of Ghanaians.95 The regional office in Tamale reported that the electrification program, started by the “ousted

Progress Party,” had severely neglected the Northern Region, with the exception of Yendi where a generating plant had been installed. The officer warned: “Unless prompt action is taken to remedy the situation, we shall be blamed for not bringing this unfortunate state of affairs to the notice of the Government.”96 Addressing this issue, the regional office requested from the commissioner of Works to implement a plan that would supply

92 June Milne, Kwame Nkrumah: A Biography (London: Panaf, 1999), 262-6. 93 See supplement to the GT, 22 Jan 1974, 5-12. 94 By December 1974, the ECG had a total of 138,184 consumers, among them 102,166 domestic users. These figures include a total of 3,116 rural electrification consumers, among them 2,150 domestic users. See ECG, Annual Report 1974 (vol. 7), Appendix VIII. For Operation Feed Yourself, see Gwendolyn Mikell, Cocoa and Chaos in Ghana (New York: Paragon, 1989), 198-201; Alice Wiemers, “A ‘Time of Agric’: Rethinking the ‘Failure’ of Agricultural Programs in 1970s Ghana,” World Development 66 (2015): 104-17; Hart, “‘Nifa, Nifa’,” 186. 95 This figure is based on an estimated population in 1974 of 9.7 million and on 102,166 reported domestic users, and on an assumed household size of 5 people. ECG, Annual Report 7 (1974), 46. 96 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, no. 25, Regional Administrative Office, Tamale, to Regional Manager, 17 Jan. 1973. 28 electricity to major towns in the region over the next three years.97

Town development committees continued petitioning the government for access to electricity. The one of Fomasu, outside Kumasi with a railway station, complained that the transmission lines were in the immediate vicinity without any benefit.98 The one of

Juaso, seven miles from the Konongo substation, repeatedly stated that this district administration center required access to the grid. The Juaso committee expressed its

“genuine concern” that a circuit judge had to work at night with a hurricane lamp.99 Frank

Essien, head of the development committee of Anomabu, a coastal town in the Central

Region, came up with an original argument. He mentioned Anomabu’s frequent “funeral ceremonies” in need of power and stressed that the local “Pensioners” were familiar with electricity. As they had been accustomed to using “electric pressing Irons, Frigidaire,

T.V. and Wireless sets,” they could no longer enjoy their lives supported by these modern amenities, since “without electricity nothing can be done.”100 Essien’s petition reveals an important pressure group of retired civil servants, seeking access to electricity to maintain their urban lifestyle after having returned to their rural hometowns. For them, citizenship was closely connected with electrification.

In December 1972, Acheampong inaugurated the Akosombo expansion program that included two additional generators with a maximum capacity of 162 megawatts each,

97 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, no. 81, Regional Office Tamale to Commissioner, Works and Housing, 19 March 1973. Under the suggested program, Salaga was supposed to receive a generating plant in 1972/73, Damongo and Bole in 1973/74, Gamgaba and Savelugu in 1974/75, and Bimbilla in 1975/76. 98 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, no. 1, Fomasu Town Development Committee to MD, Sept. 1972. 99 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 16, no. 84, Juaso Town Development Committee to MD, 5 Nov. 1973 (quoted), and further requests: ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 16, nos. 89, 107, Juaso Town Development Committee to MD, 18 Dec. 1973 and 12 Feb. 1974. Earlier requests included: ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 12, no. 67, Juaso Town Development Committee to Regional Manager, 19 Feb. 1970; ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, no. 7 and no. 50, District Administration Officer to Regional Manger, 23 Nov. 1972, and Juaso Town Development Committee to MD, 13 Oct. 1973. 100 ECG-A Box 48 ,vol. 565/vol. 15, no. 3, Frank A. S. Essien, Anomabu, to CE, 27 Sept. 1972. 29 and a new transmission line that supplied Togo and Dahomey with Akosombo power. In

Ghana, the main beneficiary of this additional power supply was VALCO which opened its fourth potline, increasing its maximum power demand from 240 to 300 megawatts.

The press marked the occasion as the “total completion” of the Volta River Project.101

When Ghana finally realized Nkrumah’s vision of exporting electricity, the pan-African rhetoric resurfaced. Acheampong presented the lines to Togo and Dahomey as a “tangible example of the kind of international economic co-operation which must be encouraged among African States.”102 A Graphic editorial celebrated the event as a “significant milestone” and the “beginning of concrete intercourse between African states” launching development projects for the benefit of their “people who [had] suffered deprivation for too long.” The editorial critiqued attempts to keep Anglophone and Francophone African countries apart as a continuation of “divide-and-rule,” the colonial era’s “political and economic subjection.” Without “regional co-operation” – as exemplified by exporting

Akosombo power – “all talk of African Unity and brotherhood” were “mere theorizing and empty wish.” The Volta project would remain “another white elephant if its power and other amenities” were not used for the “benefit of the people of Africa.” As long as

Ghana had ample electricity, there was no need for “other African countries” to build expensive hydroelectric dams. The editorial praised VRA and Akosombo’s planners for their “courage to tackle this gigantic project” and applauded those who had realized the vision of sharing electric power with Ghana’s neighbors.103 Unlike the Graphic, VRA

101 “Power plant is fully completed …at Akosombo,” DG, 21 Dec. 1972, 10. See VRA AR 11 (1972), vii, 1. The total cost of the Akosombo expansion and the Togo-Dahomey transmission were 22.60 million cedis ($14.69 million), with over half provided by an interest-free loan from the Canadian government. 102 “Power for Togo, Dahomey…. Example of Co-Operation: Acheampong,” DG, 22 Dec. 1972, 1, 3. For VALCO, see above chapter two. 103 “Graphic View: Towards African Unity,” DG, 22 Dec. 1973, 2. 30 chief executive Quartey did not frame the export of Akosombo power as part of the pan-

African vision but emphasized the notion of selling surplus electricity to “consumers” in neighboring countries. Exporting electricity became a source of revenue, as Togo and

Dahomey paid in hard currency.104

One year later, the press celebrated the anniversary of energizing the lines to Togo and Dahomey. The Daily Graphic not only saluted Nkrumah for his call to “sharing surplus power from the Volta Project with neighboring countries” and Acheampong for his commitment to pan-African cooperation but acknowledged the Ghanaian people’s

“sacrifices” to transform the “lofty ideal” of African unity “into a concrete reality.”105 Yet not all Ghanaians welcomed the transmission of Volta power to Togo and Dahomey. One

Philip-Hector Agbeko questioned the decision made by the previous military regime to export electricity. In fairness, Agbeko noted, “Volta Power must necessarily be given first to the Volta Region in compensation to the many mishaps which befell during the construction of the dam.” Accusing the government of “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” he deplored that Volta power was sold, resulting in the use of expensive diesel generators in rural towns. Evoking the project of nation building, he urged Acheampong to “supply the

Volta Power for the people of the Volta Region,” as they had “demonstrated [their] unflinching support to the N.R.C., a regime now giving every Ghanaian the desires of dutifulness and patriotism.”106 The NRC, conscious of its popular standing, requested from government agencies progress reports for it first anniversary brochure. The ECG

104 VRA-A SD-R/60, Speech by E. L. Quartey, VRA chief executive, at commissioning ceremony of Akosombo expansion project, 21 Dec. 1972. In 1974, the Communauté Eléctrique de Benin had an annual peak demand of 25 megawatts, and generated 1.248 million cedis ($812,000) in revenue for the VRA (VRA AR 1975: 14, 32); by 1981, the annual peak demand was 77.5 megawatts and the revenue 18.642 million cedis (c. $2,071 million) (VR AR 1981: 20, 63). 105 “Ghana-Togo-Dahomey Project is One Year Old,” DG, 21 Dec. 1973, 10-11. 106 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 14, nos. 119-118, Philip-Hector Agbeko to NRC Chairman, 27 July 1972. 31 complied by listing the completions of overhead lines, improved substations, and the modest gains of rural electrification.107

The ECG offered a detailed assessment on Ghana’s electrification to the Ministry of Works and Housing in 1973. Although Akosombo now had an installed capacity of

912 megawatts, this enormous power potential was still not fully used, due to a lack of load demand and due to the high equipment and construction cost hindering grid expansion. As long as most of Ghana remained beyond the grid, demand would not increase. Only aggressive infrastructural investment could create new electricity consumers. The whole country, with the exception of VALCO, was merely using about

128 megawatts, equal to the power output of one older turbine at Akosombo. ECG, in addition to purchasing the bulk of its power from the VRA, operated twenty diesel generating stations in towns beyond the grid. These stations were “not viable” and were all “operating at a loss,” with the exception of Tamale which was breaking even.”108 The report admitted: “The very high hopes generated around the country during the construction of the Akosombo Dam, that abundant and cheap electric power would soon be available to light up our cities, towns, villages, and hamlets [had] not materialized, much to the anguish and frustration of many, especially, those living in the rural areas.”109 Still, the ECG assessment emphasized the “importance of electric power in the industrial, commercial and social development of a nation.” Previous governments had

107 ECG-A Box 57, 565/vol. 14, nos. 146-45 and 148-47, Ministry of Housing to MD, 26 Oct. 1972 and CE to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 13 Nov. 1972. The following towns had received power as part of the rural electrification program by 1972: Bekwai, Suhum, Sefwi-Wiawso, Nsuta, Somanya, Apam, Krobo- Odumasi, Hohoe, Anloga, Offinso, and Wa. 108 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, nos. 87-85 and 100-88, CE to PS, Ministry Works and Housing (with Appendixes I-V), 11 April 1973. The losses were a frequent concern: the government had provided no payments towards these losses up to December 1972: ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, nos. 33-29, Facts on Rural Electrification (Phase I), Jan. 1973. 109 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, nos. 87-85, CE to PS, Ministry Works and Housing, 11 April 1973. 32 tried, “with some measure of success,” to realize a rural electrification program, which had been hampered by the country’s unfavorable financial position. The Progress Party government had appointed a “high-powered” committee that produced a policy document in 1971. It recommended the establishment of a separate Rural Electrification Department within ECG and indicated funding sources, such as annual government allocation, ECG profits, interests on two government loans, portion of VRA operating surplus, and foreign aid, for the acquisition of generating plants. The implementation of these recommendations was “over-taken by events,” meaning the 1972 coup.110

This sobering report showed the difficulties in extending electricity to the vast majority of Ghanaians, and the utmost failure to realize the promises made by Nkrumah and others during the construction of Akosombo. The report observed that the “per capital consumption of electric power [remained] a veritable index of a Country’s status of industrial, commercial and social development.” ECG, with limited funds provided by previous governments, had completed Phase I of its program and, relying on its own funds, had electrified a number of towns. Yet rural generating stations had accrued estimated deficits of 795,000 cedi ($516,750) by June 1973.111 Finally, the report listed the accomplishments of Phase I and Phase II for the country’s electrification, established a list of criteria for towns and villages to be considered, and suggested a joint rural electrification scheme with the Water and Sewage Department.112 Still, it is striking how

110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. The 1,250 kilowatt diesel generator, originally part of the Kumasi power station and then moved to Hohoe, consumed about 1,176 imperial gallons (5,350 liters) in 24 hours; see ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, nos. 117-15, CE to PS Works and Housing, 8 May 1973. 112 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, nos. 87-85, CE to PS, Ministry Works and Housing, 11 April 1973. The criteria for inclusion in Phase II were: district administrative centers; population size of one thousand and above; economic potential of the area; nearness to existing generating station, public, private, or VRA substation; and the presence of Water & Sewage generating plant. For an earlier formulation of these criteria, see ECG-A, Box 48, 565/vol. 15, no. 55, CE to Regional Manager Kumasi, 15 Feb. 1973. 33 successive governments, aware of political pressure, expressed their commitment to a rural electrification program even if they achieved only few results.

The ECG faced an increasing amount of debts, because it was not in a position to absorb the losses created by diesel generation in rural areas. Since the government had decided to operate these uneconomic stations for “social and other reasons,” as the chief accountant opined, it was up to government to cover these losses. In 1972, ECG accumulated a deficit of 474,177 cedis ($322,440); it estimated a deficit of 180,000 cedis

($117,000) for the first six months in 1973, and one of 600,000 cedis ($390,000) annually for subsequent years.113 By March 1974, ECG was still waiting for any government contribution towards its losses.114

Acheampong oversaw the expansion of Akosombo, launched power exports to

Togo and Dahomey, and revived Nkrumah’s pan-African rhetoric. Yet many Ghanaians were not pleased that they stilled lived in darkness. The hopes of a swift, country-wide electrification, triggered by the promise of Akosombo, had not materialized. Aware of such penned up frustrations, the NRC continued the existing rural electrification program, although ECG technocrats had concluded that local diesel generation was not sustainable.

The complicated technopolitics around rural electrification required further action, since the NRC regime, like its predecessors, faced increasing expectations from its constituents to provide access to electricity as part of citizenship.

Akwamufie

Rural electrification remained very political, in spite of a clear set of criteria

113 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 16, no. 39, Chief Accountant to Director of Planning, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 9 Oct. 1973. 114 ECG-A Box, 565/vol. 16, nos. 105-104, CE to PS Works and Housing, 21 March 1974. 34 stipulated by the government.115 Which town would receive electricity, and how fast, depended on political connections and the lobbying ability of officials, or high ranking chiefs, who had access to the inner of circles of government. The case of the small town of Akwamufie, located across the Volta River from Akosombo, provides insight into the workings of technopolitics. Since the completion of the dam, the Akwamu traditional council had made numerous attempts to secure electricity for Akwamufie, the seat of the

Akwamu paramount chief, and other towns like Senchi, Boso, and Anum.

In a 1967 petition to the NLC regime, paramount chief and council president

Nana Kwafo Akoto II, along with 29 elders, emphasized “the sacrifices made by the people of Akwamu,” who had lost vast areas of stool lands because of Akosombo. Their loss was “coupled with other disadvantages such as pollution of drinking water, [and] abundant breeding of mosquitos.” Since the government was planning to extend the transmission lines to Ho, the regional capital of the Volta Region, the Akwamu towns along the main road and the resettlement towns of Anyansu and Mpakadan should be included. The petitioners requested that New Ajena, the resettlement town north of

Akosombo, and nearby villages were to benefit from Volta power, too. The petitioners called on the VRA to deliver on its promise of bringing electricity to Akwamufie. This could be easily accomplished, since Akwamufie was just across the river, less than one mile, from the electric connection of the Akosombo Textiles factory.116 VRA chief executive Quartey, who had been in communication with Nana Akoto about supplying

115 The criteria included: being a district capital, a population size of at least one thousand, economic potential, and nearness to an existing power station or VRA substation. 116 ECG-A Box 47, 565/vol. 9, nos. 136-38, Akwamu traditional council to commissioner of Works and Housing, 23 Aug 1967. For a history of the ATL factory, see Stephan F. Miescher, “‘Bringing Fabrics to Life’: Akosombo Textiles Limited of Ghana,” in African-Print Fashion Now!: A Story of Taste, Globalization, and Style, ed. Suzanne Gott et al. (Los Angeles: Fowler Museum, 2017), 87-95. 35 electricity to Akwamufie, rejected the petition. The former felt a sense of betrayal in regard of his efforts. Since Nana Akoto had now approached the NLC, Quartey considered it “prudent to await the Government’s decision and directions” and “deferred any further action.”117 Yet Nana Akoto had run out of patience.

The growing tension between Akwamufie and VRA came to the fore in the course of the investigations conducted by the Committee of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Volta

River Authority, appointed by Prime Minister Busia. Nana Akoto used the opportunity to express Akwamu’s grievances towards the VRA. At the committee’s 29th sitting in March

1970, Nana Akoto “lamented the fact that although Akwamufie was just a stone’s throw from the Dam that generated power” for the country, his area despite its sacrifices had been treated “with absolute contempt.” He claimed that the VRA chief executive had promised a grid extension to Akwamufie. Since most official visitors to the dam paid

“courtesy calls on him,” it was “ridiculous to watch lights at Akosombo but [to have] none at Akwamufie.”118 Quartey replied that providing electricity to places like

Akwamufie was the responsibility of the ECG, because VRA had only a statutory obligation for bulk supply of at least 11 kilovolts and in quantities of at least 48,000 kilowatt hours over a 24 hour period. Akwamufie and the surrounding villages merely needed 400 volts. Under cross examination, Quartey explained that he had promised at a send-off party for his predecessor, hosted by Nana Akoto in 1966, to use his influence for

Akwamufie to receive power. As a member of the ECG board Quartey discussed with managing director Acquah the plan for VRA to fund a connection to Akwamufie, when

117 ECG-A Box 47 565/vol. 9, no. 140, VRA chief executive to Akwamu traditional council, 31 Aug. 1967. 118 Public Records and Archives Administration Department, Accra (PRAAD) RG 8/2/413, “Interim and Final Reports of the Committee of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Volta River Authority,” 30 March 1971, 185-86. 36 the Volta grid would be extended to the Juapong textile factory. Nana Akoto’s petition to the NLC undercut these efforts, since the NLC ruled that the issue was “outside

[Quartey’s] province and [his] jurisdiction.” The committee concurred with Quartey that the VRA had no legal authority to provide electricity to small consumers like

Akwamufie. Instead it urged Nana Akoto to approach other government agencies like the

VRA and the Ministry of Youth and Rural Development “in a more diplomatic way.”119

The committee’s intervention had consequences. Acquah and Quartey informally agreed in December 1970 to share the capital costs for extending power to Akwamufie.120

Busia appointed Nana Akoto to serve on the VRA board, an office he occupied from

1971 to 1973. Despite this high-level endorsement, the power lines to Akwamufie were further delayed. With personnel changes in the ECG leadership after the 1972 coup, institutional memory of the agreement was lost.121

By July 1973, enough political pressure had built up for the NRC executive council and the regional commissioners to decide that Akwamufie should be provided with electricity. The following December, the Ministry of Works and Housing approved the construction of a line from Akosombo to Akwamufie.122 The implementation of the scheme remained unclear. The ECG chief engineer reported that Akwamufie would not qualify for inclusion in its rural electrification scheme, since it was “neither a District

Center not [had] it any Economic Potential.” Although historically an important town, once the capital of the pre-colonial Akwamu kingdom, Akwamufie had now a village size

119 Ibid., 186-90. 120 See the later correspondence between Quartey and the ECG managing director: ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 17, no. 142, E. L. Quartey to MD, 16 April 1975. 121 In 1972, O. S. Abaka-Wood replaced E. Q. H. Acquah as managing director. K.A. Dukar succeeded in Abaka-Wood in 1975. 122 See ECG-A, Box 48, 565/vol. 17, no. 107, PS Ministry of Works and Housing to MD, 8 Jan. 1974. 37 population of 1,377, a fraction of neighboring Akosombo Township.123 The ECG began the project by hiring ten laborers to manufacture the cement poles for the distribution of electricity in Akwamufie.124

There was another wrinkle. In a letter, phrased more diplomatically than past correspondence, Nana Akoto expressed the Akwamufie people’s gratitude, while noting his dismay that electricity would be provided by a generator, which would involve

“colossal costs” for fuel and maintenance.125 Akwamufie, Nana Akoto emphasized, was only two miles away from Akosombo, “the source of the country wide supply of power.”

Akwamu had sacrificed more land for the dam, Akosombo Township, and resettlements towns than any other traditional area. While Akosombo power had reached “even countries outside of Ghana,” Akwamufie remained without lights. Should the dam collapse, he warned, Akwamu faced the highest risk of loss to people and property.

Hoping that the ECG and VRA would make a joint effort to extend the power lines from

Kpong or Akosombo, he assured that forty Akwamufie landlords had applied for connection. A new health center with ten nurses would benefit from the grid as well.126

The ECG calculated that extending an 11 kilovolt line terminated by a pole- mounted transformer in Akwamufie would cost 40,000 cedis ($26,000). With an estimated demand of 15 kilowatt and annual consumption of 65,700 kilowatt hours, the

123 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 16, no. 109, CE to PS Works and Housing, 22 March 1974. For the population figure, see ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 16, nos. 77-76, Regional Administrative Office, Koforidua, to MD, 5 Dec. 1973. By the early 1970s, Akosombo Township had about 8,000 inhabitants. See above chapter five. 124 ECG-A, Box 48, 565/vol. 17, nos. 1 and 11, CE to Regional Manager, Tema, 31 May 1974 and CE to PS Works and Housing, 13 June 1974. By June, 17 poles had been planted, 40 remained to be manufactured. 125 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 17, nos. 62-61, Akwamu Traditional Council to MD, 13 Aug. 1974. The generator would also power a treatment plant operated by the Water and Sewage Company; see ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 17, no. 143, MD to Quartey, 4 June 1975. 126 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 17, nos. 62-61, Akwamu Traditional Council to MD, 13 Aug. 1974. 38 revenue would amount to 723 cedis ($470), a return of 1.8 percent.127 It would take the

ECG over 55 years to recoup the expenditure. Yet this colossal discrepancy between infrastructural investment and revenue was warranted, since Nana Akoto was an influential chief and his town’s neglect had become too prominent. Technopolitical considerations trumped financial imperatives, although the ECG had a statutory obligation to conduct its affairs on sound economic grounds.

The project stalled due to shortage of cement and uncertain funding. By February

1975, only 27 of the 56 poles had been manufactured. Chief engineer A. K. Blay saw two solutions: either to extend the 11 kilovolt line over three miles from the Adomi Bridge to

Akwamufie at the cost of 60,000 cedis ($39,000), or to install a small generator despite

Nana Akoto’s resistance. The first solution was feasible if government provided the money.128 Since ECG faced an unfunded mandate to extend electricity to Akwamufie, the chief engineer requested to use rural electrification funds.129 J. E. Pessey, principal secretary in the Ministry of Housing and Works, urged caution. Allocating earmarked funds “for the purpose of taking care of the Akwamufie case seem[ed] a bit dangerous, politically,” because regional commissioners and chiefs had a clear understanding of the rural electrification budget. Instead Pessey suggested to approach the Ministry of Finance to release the necessary funds.130 Even under an authoritarian military government, civil servants remained committed to follow bureaucratic procedure.

In this situation of confusion, Quartey offered clarification. He informed K. A.

Duker, the new ECG managing director, about the agreement he had made with Acquah

127 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 17, no. 63, Internal memo, electricity supply to Akwamufie, 28 Aug. 1974. 128 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol.17, nos. 108-107, CE to MD, 24 Feb. 1975. 129 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 17, no. 109, CE/MD to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 12 March 1975. 130 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 18, no. 74, PS Works and Housing to MD, 31 March 1975. 39 to share the capital cost of extending power to Akwamufie. Quartey suggested requesting the VRA board to finance half of the estimated cost.131 Duker replied that since Nana

Akoto was “vehemently opposed to the installation of any diesel plant,” the scheme had to construct an 11 kilovolt line from the Adomi Bridge.132 Once the financing for this line and the distribution network was in place, the project had to be surveyed.133 An ECG senior work superintendent organized a construction crew of four linemen, two skilled laborers, two apprentices, and a driver from Accra. The superintended hired 25 local laborers.134 Work on extending the Volta grid through a six-mile high tension line to

Akwamufie began in December 1975 and was completed the following November. The project included a local substation, low-voltage distribution, and street lighting.135

Akwamufie was exceptional in its ability of making a convincing technopolitical case about its symbolic importance and its sacrifices in relation to Akosombo. Thanks to its unique position, Akwamufie received a waiver from established policy and then the desired connection to the Volta grid. For most other rural towns, the promised electricity did not arrive for decades after the completion of Akosombo.

Problems with Rural Electrification and Volta Grid Expansion

Rural electrification executed through installing diesel-powered generation units

131 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 17, no. 142, E. L. Quartey to MD, 16 April 1975. 132 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 17, no. 143, MD to E. L. Quartey, VRA chief executive, 4 June 1975. See also internal memo restating the agreement with the VRA, ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 18, no. 80, CE to MD, 23 June 1975. 133 Initially, the surveyor requested 450 cedis per mile, but the MD requested to “bargain” for a lower price: ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 18 nos. 1, 2, and 5, Felix Abruquah to MD, 22 July 1975 and 28 July 1975, and CE to Felix Abruquah, 28 July 1975. 134 ECG-A, Box 48, 565/vol. 18, nos. 36 and 37, CE to MD, 11 Aug. 1975 and CE to regional manager, Accra, 12 Aug. 1975. For written instructions and list of staff members, see ECG Box 48, 565/vol. 18, no. 47, Regional Manager to S. C. Dodd, 26 Aug. 1975. 135 For the completion of the Akwamufie project, see VRA-A SD-R/637a, CE Quartey to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 12 Jan. 1977; ECG, Annual Report 9 (1976), 8 40 proved to be slow and costly endeavor. ECG accumulated an enormous amount of debt, due to high fuel cost, in running these small plants. The cumulative losses on rural electrification projects stood at 2,802,801 cedis ($1.82 million) by December 1975.

Although government had pledged to reimburse ECG, which had been a condition for a

World Bank loan, this did not happen. Moreover, municipal councils failed to pay their electricity bills for the country’s urban centers.136 Since most of these debts were incurred by street lighting, ECG was reluctant to disconnect service. Rather, ECG expected the

Ministry of Finance to pay for these arrears of 538,000 cedi ($350,000).137

There was an increasing disillusionment about rural electrification across the country. A letter by a sub-chief of Ahamansu, Volta Region, reflected the sentiment of an unfulfilled promise. The Ahamansu chief reported that his people, after learning about receiving power at the cost of 63,000 cedis ($40,950), had been “thrown into suspense” whether they would see “their environment luminous with Electric light.” When the ECG erected cement manufactured poles and installed electric wires, they began

“daydreaming” about such “wonder and mystery.” Yet workers sold the wires to

“unscrupulous dealers,” while some poles broke and, “posing obliquely,” became “traps.”

An erroneous announcement about the arrival of street lighting made matters worse. This

“cruel treatment” triggered an “illusion” among his townspeople who remained deprived from their rightful “social enjoyment and prestige.”138 Making an argument about citizenship, the chief noted that his people were “regular taxpayers” who wondered why

136 The culprits were: Accra, Tema, Kumasi, Takoradi, Cape Coast, Sunyani, Tamale, Wenchi, Berekum, Koforidua, and Swedru-Winneba 137 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 18, no. 176, MD to Special Assistant to Commissioner, Ministry of Finance, 10 Aug. 1976. After years of loss, in 1976 the ECG made a small profit due to higher tariffs, see ECG, Annual Report 9 (1976), 1. 138 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 18, no. 131, Krontihene Ahamansu to Commissioner for Labor, Social Welfare and Community Development, 16 March 1976. 41 the government did not treat them better. For the people of Ahamansu, state provided electricity had become a right for all citizens.

The worsening economic crisis of the 1970s created numerous hurdles for rural electrification. Although the Ada district at the mouth of the Volta River had been promised access to electricity in 1971, two years later, power had not arrived. In a petition to the NRC government, the Ada Youth Association urged the inclusion of their

“neglected” district when the grid would be extended to the Volta Region. A regular supply of electricity would permit the building of a “Cold Store” (refrigeration unit), reduce the imports of fish and other food items, and save foreign exchange. Volta power would encourage the opening of factories by private entrepreneurs and the government to

“alleviate” unemployment.139 The town of Pepease, located on the Kwawu ridge at the end of a newly erected line, requested the completion of its electrification project.

Although the high tension line had arrived, the distribution to individual houses did not happen. According to the Pepease development committee, the townspeople were eager

“to assist in the digging of holes for the poles.” The chief engineer replied that ECG had been unable to start with the low-tension network because of its inability to obtain the cement to make poles.140

In 1974, the NRC executive council decided to make a major push in rural electrification and extend the power grid to the Volta Region by tapping into the

Akosombo-Togo-Dahomey line. Making a public announcement, the NRC generated expectations that electricity would arrive soon. This did not happen. Planning began for two routes with anticipated Canadian assistance: a 161 kilovolt line from Asiekpe, along

139 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 15, no. 155, Ada Youth Association to Secretary NRC, 25 May 1973. 140 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 16, nos. 11 and 13, Pepease Town Development Committee to MD, 25 July 1973 and CE to Pepease Town Development Committee, 14 Aug. 1973. 42 the Akosombo-Togo line, to the regional capital of Ho and further north; the other, a short 20 kilovolts feedback line from the Lome substation (in Togo’s capital) to the

Ghanaian border town of Aflao. Two new substations were to distribute power: one in

Asiekpe to Sogakope and Akatsi in the Lower Volta, the other in Ho to Kpeve, Kpandu,

Hohoe, and Jasikan. Cost estimates amounted to 5,253,000 Canadian dollars (1,596,000 cedis).141 The following year, Acheampong, now chairman of the Supreme Military

Council, told a gathering of Volta Region chiefs that the “vicious circle of ‘no industry because there is no electricity and no electricity because there are no industries’” would be broken.142 Securing the funding proved to be difficult; it took another two years until construction began. The German government provided the necessary support.143 Due to these delays, ECG procured diesel generation for the Aflao area until the VRA could complete the lines from Lome.144 Transmission lines reached Aflao in 1982; the Volta grid finally connected Ho in 1983 (Fig. 6.3). By that time, Acheampong was dead, killed by a firing squad in the days after J. J. Rawlings’s first coup in June 1979.145 It fell onto

Rawlings’s second military regime to inaugurate the extension of Akosombo power to the

Volta Region.

Hilla Limann became president of Ghana’s short-lived Third Republic in

September 1979. He followed seven years of military regimes that had made numerous

141 VRA-A, SD-R/637a, CE Quartey to PS, Ministry of Economic Planning, 16 May 1974. See VRA-A, SD-R/637a, Regional Administrative Office, Ho, to Commissioner for Works and Housing, 21 Jan. 1974, CE to Regional Commissioner, Ho, 30 Jan. 1974. The feedback line to Aflao was the least expensive part: 395,000 Canadian dollars (165,000 cedis). The grid extension to Ho was executed as a 69 kilovolt line. 142 VRA-A SD-R/637a, Extract of speech by the chairman of the Supreme Military Council at the meeting of the members of the Volta Regional House of Chiefs, 23 Dec. 1975. 143 See the plan of work, VRA-A SD-R/637a, CE VRA to MD ECG, 20 Aug. 1976; and for a report of the preliminary work, ECG, Annual Report 10 (1977), 3. 144 VRA-A SD-R/637a, CE VRA to PS Ministry of Works and Housing, 12 Jan. 1977. 145 ECG, Annual Report 10 (1983), 9. For the first Rawlings coup of 1979 and the execution of several military officers, among them three former head of states (A. A. Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo), see Kevin Shillington, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 44-55. 43 announcements about imminent rural electrification. Projects, however, were realized at a slow pace and often only, if a town had a close connection to the regime’s inner circle.

Limann’s elected government sought to formulate a comprehensive rural electrification plan. Promoting its program, the Limann government emphasized familiar arguments.

Electricity would improve the living standards of rural people and facilitate the establishment of local industries. “Rural folks,” like residents of urban areas, were to enjoy “domestic amenities,” such as fridges, televisions, and other appliances in addition to light. Electrification would “reduce, if not stop entirely,” rural to urban migration of

“able bodied people.”146 The last argument was a major concern, because the cocoa economy, once Ghana’s most important export commodity, had collapsed. Since the mid-

1970s, about 200,000 Ghanaians were leaving the country every year.147 Rural electrification as a remedy for outmigration had staying power, although questioned by social scientists. A World Bank study, whose executive summary found its way into the

ECG archive, found “no evidence” that electrification played any role in reducing rural to urban migration.148 The country’s financial woes only allowed for a few modest steps.

Limann’s rural electrification policy stipulated that towns to be connected to the grid had to fulfill one of three criteria: being a district capital, having a large population, or being near an existing source of power. Since electricity produced by diesel generators

146 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, CE to PS Finance and Economic Planning, 16 June 1981. Petitioners used the same argumentation: When K. Y. Asante, MP of Asiakwa-Kwabeng (Eastern Region), requested extension of the Volta grid to his constituency, he argued that providing electricity and good drinking water would “encourage the rural folks to stay in their constituencies and check population flow to urban areas.” See, ECG-A Box 565/vol. 21, nos. 127-26, K. Y. Asante to Chief Engineer, 10 June 1980. 147 Mikell, Cocoa and Chaos, 204-6. About two million Ghanaians left for Nigeria and La Côte d’Ivoire from 1974 to 1981. See John Anarfi and Stephen Kwankye with Ofuso-Mensah Ababio and Richmond Tiemoko, “Migration from and to Ghana: A Background Paper,” Working Paper C4, issued by the Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (Brighton, 2003), 7. 148 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol 18, nos. 115-114, World Bank, “Rural Electrification Paper,” 7 Nov. 1975. For the full report, see World Bank, Rural Electrification (Washington: World Bank, 1975). 44 was about four times as expensive as power supplied by the grid, the government stopped the operation of smaller plants and prohibited the construction of new ones, with a few exceptions.149 Other towns could receive electricity only through the extension of 11 kilovolt lines, either from the Volta grid or from an existing generating plant. Most of these places had been earmarked for several years but had not been connected due to shortage of materials and equipment. Since the 1981/82 budget allocated 10 million cedis

($666,000), 40 percent of it in foreign exchange, for the VRA to import supplies, chief engineer Y. N. Opong hoped to “achieve a major break-through.”150 The ECG announced that twenty towns located in eight regions would receive electricity by the end of 1982.151

Limann, as the first northern president, was attentive about the unevenness in the allocation of Akosombo power. His government proposed an ambitious five-year plan to electrify annually two towns in every region. By 1986, each of the country’s nine regions would have ten additional towns to benefit from electricity, which were to make a “great impact on the social and economic life of people living in the rural areas.” The three criteria noted above applied. There was one caveat: the plan could only materialize “if funds and materials [became] available.” 152 As part of a World Bank initiative, the ECG expected to complete a rural electrification project in the Ashanti Region by extending a

33 kilovolt line from Kumasi to Nsuta and Kumawu.153 This Bank project, financed by a loan of 18 million dollars and launched in 1976, extended the Volta grid to industrial

149 Smaller generation plants were stopped at Kibi, Suhum, Asamankese, Bekwai, and Kpong-Tamale. The exceptions for new plants included Salaga, Bechem, Kete Krachi, and Ansankragua. 150 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, nos. 9-8, Chief engineer to PS Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 16 June 1981. 151 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, nos. 54-53, MD to PS Ministry of Fuel and Power, 12 Oct. 1981. As noted above, the Volta Region had its own electrification program. 152 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, nos. 18-17, Chief Engineer to Ministry of Fuel and Power, 29 June 1981. 153 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, nos. 54-53, MD to PS Ministry of Fuel and Power, 12 Oct. 1981. Other towns along this line included: Fawodie, Mampongten, Jamasi, Agona, Asamang, and Oyoko Asante. 45 areas in the Western Region: lines from Tarkwa to the Aboso glass factory and the Nsuta manganese mines, as well as lines from Dunkwa to the Awaso bauxite mines, the Bibiani wood and metal industries, and the gold mines and factories around Sefwi-Wiaso. The project included a 33 kilovolt line from Weija, west of Accra, to Tokuse, which would benefit an irrigation project, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, and farms around

Kasoa and Awutu.154 Rawlings “second coming,” the 31st December 1981 coup, prevented Limann’s government from implementing its electrification plan.

New Rural Electrification Policies and Economic Crisis

The Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), chaired by Rawlings, launched a revolution from above in early 1982. The PNDC encouraged farmers and workers to form People’s and Workers’ Defense Committees (P/WDC).155 In rural towns,

PDCs made pleas for electrification. A good example is the petition from the PDC of

Juapong, a town a few miles from the Adomi Bridge on the road to regional capital of

Ho. Juapong had a textile factory, run by the state-owned Ghana National Textile

Company (GTNC), with about 2,500 employees. Whereas the factory had been connected to the grid, the town with its 6,000 inhabitants had been left out. The Juapong petitioners were appalled that their town had been “deprived of the benefits” of the Volta project, while more distant regions and Greater Accra had been connected to the grid. They stated: “We have been cheated too long!!” The townspeople were willing to make financial contributions towards buying poles and cables and eager to offer communal

154 Ibid. This World Bank project was the third phase of extension from the Volta grid. For its beginnings, see ECG, Annual Report 9 (1976), 1, 9. 155See Paul Nugent, Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden of History, 1982-1994 (London: Pinter, 1995), 44. 46 labor. In the “interest of the revolution,” they expected “ACTION NOW!!!”156

Indicating the PNDC’s interest to assess the current situation, the Information

Services Department gathered material for a publication in its Ghana Review. The article

“Power to Rural People” was to examine the accomplishments and problems of rural electrification.157 In response to a questionnaire, ECG listed 121 rural towns that had been provided with electricity but revealed a vast discrepancy: only five towns in the

Northern and Upper Regions had received power.158 The ECG kept pursuing the plan of electrifying two towns per region each year, as proposed by the Limann government.

Although former regimes had been interested in rural electrification, they never allocated sufficient foreign exchange to import the necessary materials. Electricity should be used for domestic and street lighting, pumping water, bakeries, and for small industries like corn-and sawmills and welding plants. New employment opportunities would reduce the

“tendency for the people to drift to the cities.” Reviewing the projects undertaken over the last decade, the ECG managing director observed that it would require outside assistance to advance the scheme. The electrification of the Volta Region, which was

“just about to take off,” had received German sponsorship.159

Kwaku Ankomah, the new PNDC secretary for Rural Development and Co- operatives, used a durbar in May 1982 to present some ideas of how the PNDC would

156 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, no. 124, Peoples’ Defense Committee Juapong to MD, 4 April 1982. Similar requests included a petition from Sefwi Amafie embracing “the current revolution,” to extend Akosombo power from Sefwi Wiaso, Western Region; the response was negative: ECG Box 48, 565/vol. 21, nos. 131, 134 and 134, Sefwi Awiaso Town Development Committee to MD, 23 June 1982, and MD to PS Ministry of Rural Development and Co-Operatives, 8 July 1982. 157 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, nos. 111-110, Acting Director Information Services Department, to PS Ministry of Fuel and Power, 17 Feb. 1982. 158 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, nos. 117-116, MD to PS Ministry of Fuel and Power, 6 April 1982. These towns were located in Greater Accra (19), Easter Region (29), Ashanti (25), Central Region (21), Western Region (10), Brong Ahafo (7), Volta Region (5), Upper Region (4), and Northern Region (1). 159 Ibid. 47 break from past practices. The occasion was the commencement of work for the mini- hydro project at Likpe-Kukurantumi in the Volta Region. Since independence, Ankomah noted, Ghana had pursued an “urban-biased” development, whereas rural areas received only “isolated social amenities,” including community centers, water supplies, health and educational facilities, and roads. Rural populations were not consulted about their needs, nor did they receive training on how to use and maintain these amenities. This approach caused a general disaffection especially among the youth, triggered migration to urban areas and neighboring countries, and led to declining agricultural output. The PNDC sought to develop with community participation policies that benefited rural areas, where

70 percent of Ghanaians lived and most economic production happened. The PNDC,

Ankomah added, considered rural development as a “precondition for the resuscitation of

[Ghana’s] shattered economy.” Committed to improve the lives of workers, farmers, and fishers, the PNDC identified electricity and water as the most basic requirements for a strong development infrastructure.160

The PNDC secretary highlighted Ghana’s potential for small-scale hydroelectric power generation. Ankomah introduced the Likpe pilot scheme, a small dam less than 15 feet high across the Dayi River at Kukurantumi. The dam would provide sufficient electricity for lighting and promised other benefits such as piped water, fisheries, and recreation. The project was to be built with “local technology, local materials and local financial resources.” Only the generating equipment would have to be imported.

Ankomah envisioned a series of small dams along the Dayi River, the largest 30 feet high at Wegbe with a 500 kilowatt plant, and smaller dams with power stations along the

160 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, Address by Kwaku Amankwa, PNDC Secretary for Rural Development & Cooperatives at durbar marking the commencement of construction on the Mini Hydro Project at Likpe- Kukurantumi, 7 May 1982. 48

Konsu River. The new Dayi-Konsu grid would create a sixty-mile line from Hohoe to

Jasikan, Kwamikrom, Alvanya and back to Hohoe. The available electricity would power cottage industries including saw- and paper mills, cocoa, as well as other food processing plants. The Kukurantumi Dam was to transform the Likpe district into a “modern community” with “adequate job openings,” boosting agriculture, fisheries, and various agro industries. Ankomah highlighted that local people had agreed to support the project through community labor and with a contribution of 50,000 cedis ($1,667). An Indian loan guaranteed the financing. This mini-hydro project, the first in the country, promised to become a “shining example.”161 Two months later, at the inauguration of the Kpong

Dam, Ghana’s second large hydroelectric dam, Rawlings also noted that 70 percent of the rural population lived without electricity. He suggested to develop mini-hydro schemes to provide “greater access to electricity and water supply for consumption and irrigation” at lower cost. Rawlings stated his commitment to replace the “inefficient” diesel generating plants that provided electricity to urban areas beyond the Volta grid with hydro power.162

The Likpe-Konkurantumi Dam was never completed. The People’s Daily Graphic reported in July 1985 that the “coffer dam and some parts of the left-bank core and training walls” had been erected. Equipment, such as turbines, generators, penstocks, transformers, cranes, conductors, and other electrical appliances, were scheduled to arrive with the help of an Indian credit of 300,000 dollars. The Graphic anticipated the scheme’s completion within one year.163 This did not happen, and nor did other mini-

161 Ibid. For the Indian government loan of $1.5 million for rural electrification, administered by a new National Planning Committee, which included the Ministries of Fuel and Power and Local Government, ECG, and VRA, see ECG-A Box 49, 565/vol. 22, no. 18, Technical Director, Ministry of Fuel an Power to PS Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 18 Aug. 1982. 162 VRA-A SD-R/1497, Speech of Flt.-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, chairman of the PNDC, at the inauguration of the Kpong hydro-electric project, 1 July 1982. 163 Fautina Ashirifie, “Items for Likpe-Kukurantumi hydro-power project in soon,” People’s Daily Graphic 49 hydro projects make it beyond the drawing board.164 Instead the PNDC looked for ways to expand the Volta grid and, as a last resort, kept running diesel plants. It allocated the

Indian loan to complete existing ECG projects, which included putting up high tension lines to Techiman and Wenchi, Brong Ahafo, and extending power generated locally in

Salaga, Northern Region, and in Papa, Navrongo, Bawku, and Wa, Upper Region.165

The severe economic crisis of 1982 affected the supply of parts and fuel. In

Breman-Esikuma, Western Region, the desperate situation caused the paramount chief to appeal directly to the ECG managing director. Chiefs had initiated local power generation, which was taken over by the ECG. Yet Esikuma never received the promised replacement generator but had to deal with equipment “abandoned or standing idle at other stations,” a situation that did not “augur well” for running its power station. Since the once reliable generator, which Esikuma had received from the University of Cape

Coast, had broken down, the town used a smaller machine without sufficient capacity.

The chronic shortage of fuel made the situation worse. Townspeople who owned electric appliances, the chief added, “complained bitterly” because their devices had become

“faulty due to constant breakdowns and low voltage.” Citizens, “desirous to establish small cottage industries,” had abandoned their endeavors. The ECG’s internal response was sobering. Chief engineer Opong admitted that “because of the general economic

(PDG), 18 July 1985, 8; see Humphrey Tokro, “Mini-Hydro Projects—Dr Asamoah Explains,” PDG, 28 Jan. 1985, 1. 164 Sven Dernedde and A. K. Ofosu-Ahenkorah, “Mini Hydo Power in Ghana: Prospects and Challenges,” Accra, Energy Foundation (2002), 11-16. According to Dernedde and Ofosu-Ahenkorah, the Likpe- Kukurantumi project was abandoned for “unexplained reasons.” When visiting the site, they encountered Indian equipment that was “almost rotten” (“Mini Hydro,” 3, 4). 165 ECG-A Box 49, 565/vol. 22, nos. 18 and 17, Technical Director, Ministry of Fuel & Power to PS Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, 18 Aug. 1982 and PS Ministry of Fuel & Power to MD, 7 Sept. 1983, with an urgent reminder to spent funds from the Indian credit line till the end of the year. For a list of the projects, see ECG-A Box 49, 565/vol. 22, nos. 20-19, MD to Technical Director, Ministry of Fuel and Power, 19 Sept. 1983. 50 situation,” ECG could neither purchase a new generator nor guarantee a regular supply of diesel.166 In its official reply, the ECG offered to survey the town for a future electrification scheme that would bring the Volta grid. It indicated a potential arrangements with Tema Steel Works to allocate iron rods for the fabrication of transmission poles. A time-frame of when to expect access to the grid was included.167

Other areas faced problems with maintenance, low voltage, blackouts, and slow construction. The extension of lines from Konongo to Juaso and Obogu experienced ongoing delays due to the contractor’s “most unsatisfactory” performance and high inflation, which increased costs for labor and material since awarding the contract in

1978.168 Rarely is there any indication in the ECG archive of how quickly, if at all, problems were fixed. One letter from Biriwa, a village nestled along the coast between

Saltpond and Cape Coast, is the exception. Walter Kleinebudde, managing director of the

Biriwa Beach Hotel, wrote on behalf of his community to express their gratitude for ECG officers’ “untiring efforts” in finding a new transformer for their substation. Opong was so surprised by this sign of appreciation that he replied with poetic flourish. Receiving this letter was “like an oasis to a lonely traveler in the desert.”169

In light of the fuel crisis, rural electrification based on local generation had become unsustainable. ECG stopped replacing faulty diesel generators. Only a national electrification policy that expanded the Volta grid could provide a solution. The PNDC decided that ECG should “be requested to embark on a programme to extend electricity

166 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, no. 152-51, Omanhene Nana Aomakwa Badu, Breman Traditional Council to MD, 4 Aug. 1982. The CE’s frank comments appears in the margins. 167 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, no. 156, Ag. Director of Engineering to Nana Aomakwa Badu, Breman Esikuma, 28 Sept. 1982. 168 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, no. 12, Regional Manager, Kumasi to MD, 20 July 1983. 169 ECG-A Box 49, 565/vol. 22, nos. 3 and 5, Walter Kleinebudde to MD, 21 April 1983 and Director of Engineering to Kleinebudde, 5 May 1983. 51 to all towns and villages along the main power lines that have unjustifiably been denied this facility while catering for big towns and projects.” This led to applications from communities that qualified.170 How to finance this extension was not revealed.

Conclusion

The construction of the Akosombo Dam in the early 1960s created expectations that soon the entire country would benefit from an ample supply of cheap electricity. This did not happen. Addressing such unfulfilled promises, successive governments, military and civil, were compelled to pronounce their intention of extending electricity to the country’s rural areas and the northern regions, which had remained beyond the grid. One response was installing diesel generating plants that operated at great financial cost.

The archive of the Electricity Corporation of Ghana has allowed a reconstruction of government policies that were formulated, discussed, and implemented by mid-level bureaucrats and engineers. These civil servants sought to carry out electricity policies, with limited resources, and followed bureaucratic procedure in spite of authoritarian military regimes. A close examination of their actions shows that the state did not cease to function during the “era of decline,” as political scientists have dubbed the 1970s in

Ghana. Rather ECG technocrats maintained a commitment of bringing electricity to domestic consumers, even if their endeavors were slow and the outcome uneven.171

170 ECG-A Box 48, 565/vol. 21, nos. 168-67, Office of the PNDC to PS Ministry of Fuel and Power, 15 Nov. 1982. See the application from Town Development Committees of Adomfe, Krofa, Wankyi, and Bompata, an area of 7,000 people close to the Konongo-Agogo high-tension line: ECG-A Box 49 565/vol. 22, no. 22, Electrification Committee, Bompata to MD, 17 Aug. 1983. 171 See here Jennifer Hart’s re-assessment of the Acheamong years, arguing for an alternative narrative of postcolonial politics and labor culture. Hart; “‘Nifa, Nifa’.” For the narrative of post-colonial decline, as articulated by social scientists, see Deborah Pellow and Naomi Chazan, Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 47; Naomi Chazan, An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982 (London: Macmillan, 1983). 52

The ECG archive also reveals how chiefs, town development committees, and other community leaders made their case when they expressed their desire for electricity.

They linked access to electric power with hopes for economic development and for stemming the rural to urban migration of their youth. With remarkable continuity, they framed their requests in terms of nation building and citizenship. They only considered themselves full citizen of the fledging nation of Ghana, if the wonders of Akosombo, or at least a supplement generated by diesel, would be extended to their towns. The quest of electricity became a technopolitics deployed by government engineers, as well as shaped by community leaders through their stream of requests for Akosombo power.

Looking for a buyer for its electricity surplus, VRA began exporting power to

Togo and Dahomey with the Akosombo expansion in 1972. Acheampong used the opportunity to revive Nkrumah’s pan-African rhetoric and presented the power export as economic co-operation in the sub-region and symbol of African unity. This was a risky strategy, given the new link between electricity and citizenship. Many Ghanaians were not happy about these power exports. Rather, as the ECG archive reveals, they demanded investments in rural electrification. This opposition remained muted. Government- controlled media did not provide an outlet for such a sentiment.

In the late 1970s, Ghana entered into discussion with La Côte d’Ivoire to establish an intertie between the countries. The intertie was to reduce the breakdown risk in Ghana due to a system failure at Akosombo’s generating station, since the Ivorian power capacity of 200 megawatts, created by Kossou Dam, could serve as a stand-by for Ghana.

Furthermore, the intertie would allowed for storing Ivorian surplus water in Volta Lake 53 because of its larger size.172 The two governments inaugurated a Joint Interconnection

Committee for the supervision of the project’s implementation in April 1980 at a

“colorful ceremony” in Accra. VRA chief executive Quartey and Konan Lambert, the director general of Enérgie Eléctrique de la Côte d’Ivoire, presided over this committee.

The project cost 31.4 million dollars, enabled by loans from the European Investment

Bank and the African Development Bank.173 Foreign expertise was needed for this infrastructural investment. An Italian construction company won the contract for erecting the 225 kilovolt transmission lines of 45 miles between Elubo in La Côte d’Ivoire and

Prestea in Ghana; a French firm supplied the transformers.174 Ghana completed its part of the project in 1983; the two networks were fully synchronized the following June (Fig.

6.3).175

By 1983, Ghana faced a series of crises. In addition to economic and political challenges, the Sahel drought lowered the water level at Akosombo and drastically reduced power generation. For the first time, the country encountered an acute shortage of electricity leading to the shutdown of VALCO and blackouts for domestic consumers.

Akosombo, which had been hailed for two decades as the source of ample power, suddenly became the focus of anxiety and concern. This was not the modernization

172 La Côte d’Ivoire completed the Kossou Dam in 1972; see Abou Bamba, African Miracle, African Mirage: The Politics and the Paradox of Modernization in Ivory Coast (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2016), 69-115. Kossou and other hydro facilities in La Côte d’Ivoire have low heads (dams) with little storage capacity. Without the intertie, Ivorian surplus water would have to be spilled. The stored energy could be used by La Côte d’Ivoire in later years, or exported to Togo, Benin, and possibly Nigeria; see VRA-A MSD/716, Technical Appraisal of the Ghana/Ivory Coast Power Interconnection, 17 June 1978. 173 VRA AR 19 (1980), 1, 8. VRA-A SD-R/1497, E. L. Quartey speech at the inauguration of the Joint Committee of the Ghana/Ivory Coast Intertie Electrical System Project, 24 April 1980. VRA-A MSD/257, Inauguration of Joint Interconnection Committee Programme, 23-26 April 1980. 174 VRA AR 20 (1981), 1, 7. A transmission line of 225 kilovolts had half the losses than the standard 161 kilovolt line in Ghana, with only about 7 percent higher costs. See VRA-A MSD/716, African Development Bank, Ghana/Ivory Coast Intertie, minutes of meetings 23-25 Feb. 1977, 3; Choice of Voltage Level for the Ghana/Ivory Coast Electrical Connection, n.d. 175 VRA AR 22 (1983), 12-13, and VRA AR 23 (1984), 12. 54 promised by the Volta project’s planners.

Fig. 6. 1. Volta grid of 161 kilovolt lines with transmission substations in 1969. Map by

Ebers Garcia. 55

Fig. 6.2. Volta grid (powered by the hydroelectric plant at Akosombo) with primary substations underlined and local diesel generating stations in 1969. Map by Ebers Garcia. 56

Fig. 6.3. The Volta River Authority’s transmission network (Volta grid) with the new extension to the Volta Region, export line to Togo/Dahomey, intertie with La Côte d’Ivoire, and the planned northern extension, 1983. Map by Ebers Garcia.