SUB-COMMITTEE ON SOUTHERN RHOOESIA ' 6<

1-m.SANDYS: May I first of all wlcome you and sq how glad. we are of this opportunity to meet you and say that we are very glad. once again to aooM.e to the sugsestion ~e to you by your Comittee that the Delegation shoul.t visit Lond.on to discuss &D1' aatters in i'lhicll you are interested, and to put any questions to us which concern you. I wish, of course, to emphasizethat our reaciiness to receive your clelegation, which we do with pleasure, does not of course signif.y ~ ch~e in our attituae towaraa the relationship between the United. Nations an4 Southem ¥ od.es:La which we still regaN. as being a matter with which we are concerned. on11' insofar as external. a.ttaira are concerned. But, the reception of your Delegation does emphasize once again our desire to be as cooperative as possible with the working of your CODDittee and t he OR iD general.

With regard to proced.ure, I suggest that we adopt the same procedure as on the previous occasions, l'lhicb is that we talk quite treely1 an

AMB. COULIB!LY: Said that he agreed with this procedure. Introduced the members ot the Sub-Committee, explained the mandate given by the Special Counittee anti said that he would like first to bear the statement by' the Mi.niBter.

MR.SANDYS: Firat o:r all, just let me say that I am glad you have, Mr.Presid.ent, ma.ae it clear that you do not wish to go over ill the back history. I think we have all exchanged views on this question sutf'icientq, and. understand. one another's positions. I think it vUl be enough for me to rem.ind you just that Southern is in a very special position constitutionally in its relationship with Britaino They have been !ul.J¥ sell-governing now for over 40 years. They have the potler to amend their own Constitution, ,.rh!ch no other British depentiency possesses. They have control over their own defence forces which no other British deper..dency possesses, and they haw wide discretion to conduct relations with other countries. They have, for example, the riFt to appoint High Coumissioners, which are equivalent to Ambassadors, to a.uy C0111110DW88l.th country; also to South Africa; and they also have the right to send consular representatives to any country in the world which wishes to exchange consular representatives with them. So the,y are practically independent. There are certain slight restrictions which still remainJ but they are in an altogether peculiar position with relation to Britain. We have no other dependency which enjoys .that status. Consequently, over the years, we have accepted what I think -page t1t0 - most constitutional law.yers would consider reasonable. We have accepted the convention that the British Governm.eut - the British Parliament - does not intervene or legislate in matters lttlich are within the legislative and executive- competence of the Government and Parliament of . And I must ask you to accept that this is the constitut.ior.al position as we understand it, and it is in accordance with that principle that we sha:U act. You say, Mr.Chairman, that there is tension in Southern Rhodesia. I would entirely agt:ee with you that this is correct, but I would not agree with you that the situation is such as to constitllte a threat to international peace. Tha.t is quite a different. matter9 '!here is a great deal of tension in ma.n;r countries today; in soma places, much greater than ill Southern Rhodesia., but it is not regarded very often in the UN as a threat to international peace. I am quite sure that nobody in Southern Rhodesia, of whatevep race or party, has the slightest desire to be a threat to international. peace. The only threat would be if someone else were to intervene in their internal affairs, and that we have no wish to doo The other point which you have made is regarding the arrest of certain people inside Southern Rhodesia. It is not for ~~e British Government to express an opinion as to the wi-sdom or rightness of actions that are in our view the responsibility of the Government of Southern Rhodesia. You said tbat there was a,n absence of liberty i:lside Southern Rhodesia. I would agree that the cond.itiona of liberty there are not what the;y are here in Britain, but I would say to you with greatest respect and sincerity that there are countries which are only too r~ to point an accusing finger at Southern Rhodesia, where there is far far less regard for justice than anything ever suggested in Southam Rhodesia, even by its strongest critics. Therefore, I do hope tha.~ this issue will be looked at in its true perspective, and when people talk about ma4ority rule and democracy, and all these things which we hold very dear in Britain., I would say that we were to a large extent the originators of Jll&l'I1 of these ideas and principles, and we believe as sincerely in them as we ever did in the past. We like to see these principles and standaras adopted by other countries. But again, I must aSk you to bear in mind that there are IDa.ey co'Ulltiries which have much less claim for them.sel ves the credit or majority rule or real democratic decision or their peopll~ Southern Rhodesia. or course, the franchise there is very restricted, but there are countries 1mere it

scarcely exists at all, and some of these countries are the ones which are o~ too ready to criticise the position in Southern Rhodesia.

Having said tbat, I am not for one moment accepting the position that a very limited franchise is the right answer; we have never said so, and nor have the Earllament of Southern Rhodesia associated themselves with that idea,. It is not m;y business to condemn or to justify the system of government or of franchise inside Southam Rhodesia. Our position is perfectly clear - that it is a matter Which, tor better or for worse., bas been entrusted to the Government of Southern Rhodesia., and the;y will have to work it out for themselves, no doubt with regard to the feelings of the cou.."'ltries of the rest of the world, as no country can live in isolation. - page three ..

I would sa;y that the effect of the expressions of opinion in the United Nations and elsewhere is not likely to influence Southern Rhodesia t.o achieve the ooDditions \ihich you want. There is the psychological aspect of this. A certain amount or f~lendly advice and pressure may have a good effect and influence things in the direction you

vm.nt 1 but if you go beyond a certain l)oint 1 then it has the opposite eff'ect. 'lbere is no doubt in my l1liD:i that anyone i'iho studies the position in Southern Rhodesia will see that the effect of' much of what has been said in the UN about Southern Rhodesia, and also by other African Governments., has been to strengthen the power and influence in Southern Rhodesia. of those who are least sympathetic to the aims which you w.l.sh to advance. This is a fact; this is not an opinion.

You spoke about the threat of unilateral independence. ! think I would not be betraying any confidence as between the Government of Southern Rhodesia and between the British Government if I were to make it clear that we have eJq>lained to the Government of Southern Rhodesia in no uncertain terms that we would be total.l;y averse to a unilateral declarati~n of independence~

~ You have talked about. the need for majority rule in Southern Rhodesia.. We have made our position clear there. You will remember that on previous occasions you had been worried about the possibility of' the British Gove~ent giving independence to Southern Rhodesia on the basis of her present limited .franchise. Now., since then, I think we have made our position in public, and still more in private as between ourselves and the Goverm.1ent of Southern Rhodesia, absolut.e4" a.nd unmistakably clearo We have made it absolutely clear tbat we are prepared to giva to Southern Rhodesia. independence on the same conditions as we have given independence to other independent countries, and in saying that, we have emphasized that one of the matters which we would give attention to wuld be the necessity for the widening of the franchiseo So there is no equivocation, no doUbt a.bout.

our position.. The world knows 1 the Government of Southern Rhodesia knows tha.t we want to give them imependeuce., that we have no wish to prolong our colonial connection 1dth

Southern Rhodesia. a day longer than is necessaey-1 but in all cases we have set certain standards and principles - that there should be a proper representation of the people of ·t.hs country before ind.epemence is granted.o That is a principle which we have ¥lied to other territories and we have made it clear t,hat we sba.ll apply this to Southern Rhodesia. The fact that you did not emphasize this point today leads me to believe that you are satisfied ~ your earlier anxieties about the granting of' independence to Southern Rhodesia. with the present franchise are no longer a cause for anxiety to you.

Now, having satisfied yourselves on tha.t point., you have now moved to another issue which iB the question of a conference. I 1·ra.s ~self' the Chairman or the Conterence on Southern Rhodesia held in 1961, at which we ,..rorked out the present consti tution. 'lhe Conference at which this constitution was l«:>rked out was attemed by just the sort of people who o~~t to ~ttend the Conference you have in mind. It was represented by all the parties in the Parliament, and the opposition parties and their representatives - -page four -

I Nkomo, SUundika. - all those figures who are the leaders of the African Nationalist movement - sat around the table when we drew up the Constitution ~..n 1961.

It is true that they subsequent~ repudiated their agreement to that Constitution because they were not supported by their followers, but that is the sort of conference which I think you ha.ve in mind. If Imy go back: It is genera.l.q' recognised, certa.:LW.y if' not by the leaders themselves, it is by' other African Governments, that it is a great misfortune that the African parties did not try and operate that Oonstitution. Many' of' the troubles which we are now suffering from are due to the bo;ycott of the .:\trican Party at the elections Which took place atterwarcls • .And it is tor that reason that the Nationalist Party is not represented at the present Parliament. Be tba. t as it Jll&y', when the GoverDIIleDt of Southern Rhodesia asbd

for independence about. a year &F1 we said to theta that we would be prepared to give them independence on the same terms as other British dependencies, &n1 in the same circums6ances. Ani we made it olear at the same time that a part of this normal procedure would be to hold an irdep8Ddent conterence at Which such matter• as the Constitution and the franchise -wul.d haTe to be considered. In fact, before any suuestion came fl'OJIL the UN, we did make this proposal to the Government. ot Soutbern Rhodesia. The Government ot Southen:a Rhodesia, Who are perfectly within their rights in doing eo, deoided that they did not want a Oonterence to dis~uss their Constitution. They consider that, having the right to amend their own Constitution, it was a matter for them ani not tor us or for an;yboq else to convene a Conference. They made it clear that thq did not wi.Bh us to comrene such a Conference, and tint they did not. wish to attend oneo It would be useless to have a Conference at wbiah the Government ot Southera Rhodesia tid not att.end. It is not just a qaestion of having an idea.; one must have the opportuzrl..ty ot rea.lisin& ito

At our earlier meetings, I did suggest to you that tbsre would be some advantage in trying to fini some middle course on which agreeraent could be reacbed. I said to you then - I sq to you again DOW- that this problem will DOt be solved b;r force, and 11' there is to be more rapid progess, as you desire, tor the African popal.a­ t1on polltioal.J.y in Southern Rhoclesia, it 1llUSt be by agreement aDd pernaaioa. That does mean that there has to be some reconcUiation of views between those Vbo want one man-one vote tonight, and those who are prepared to leave tbe Constitution to work itself out. and eventua.l.J.J' produce an African majority in lS years' time. It is between these t-wo extreaea that a compromise mu.st be toUDd.. I believe that compromise is not impossible. It does mean that all those who wish to see aome settlement reaeh84l ' muat approach it in a spirit ot sympatb;y and umerstancUns from the points or view of both coDDUnities in Southern Rhodesia, and. a desire to bring them together in 811 ataosphere of confidence. I tbiDk yoll Dl11st bear 1D lliDd that tbe oontid.enoe of the European population L>t Soutbem Rhodesia which has not on4" the political power but the pbpical power - their confidence in an African majority {I am talking absoJ.ut;eJ.y frankl.y) has not been increased by the events of recent months in East Atrica and elsewhere. They have not been given greater contidance in transfel"ring power to an African majorit1• 1ibat has happened in other countries has made a deep impression -page five- .• upon th-.·

I 911 sure tbat all ot ~· wbo c.a.re about the w ll-beixtg ot Southem llhodeaia nov and in the future JIIUS't try- to work con~ru.ct.iftl,y for such a compromise 8M such a settlemszm. Yoll 11&7 know that I have SlJig&sted that tome ot t.he other oo,.mtries ot the CoDID.onwealth, both African and European, lll1&hto be able to pla;r IIODI8 part in brizrsinl about some suoh solutioa, an4 it is still rq belief tbat this 11&7 be oue ot the best W8J'8 o! approachin& this question. But I have not so far made DlUCh proareas with that idea, b~ I still believe that it otters SO!D8 possibility ot advance.

Sometimes yolt get a good solution by b~iDs the tle sidu toptber round a table by themselves; on other occasions, 10U make more progress by bringin& tbell together with others to tr,y through their good otticea to produce a sa.tisfaotot"J' solutionJ in other cases, it is better tor the two sides not to be pres.t. at all. and tor others who have their interests at heart to attempt, to tim a mut~ aodeptable solution. I do not know what is the best wa;r or what will proye ri~ But I do emphasize to you that w are as anxious as you to see a bappT, peaoetal. 8lld stable Southern Rhodesia which ,.,.....ll go forward, 111. th the I!Podwill aDCl the cooperation ot all its peoples• towards prosperit7. It ia a country with great possibUities. ~1~ want to see thea go forward in unity and prosperit7 as JllUch a.s alJl'ODe el.se and I do susgest to you tha.t Sf those who wish for that result and 'Who are genuinely mxious for the well-being o?Tthe peoples or Southern Rbcxlesia• should tey to use their energlae DOt either to d:vocate some extrema and obvioual,y lJD1"ealiaail.e solution, not to

aonceut;ta\e on critioisin&. one party or anotherJrib\lt.d to t17 constructin~ to briu« be1ill aides together, and I do think that the UN in particular your Comnittee, OlD help ia creatina the right atmosphere in which some agreUI8nt mi&ht pro-nt possible.

AMB. COULIBALY: I wish to thank you tor your statement. I believe ley' colleagues and lQ'S< need a certain time to stud;}" your statement. We made it clear that our objective j...3 to help. the British Government am f'iOO a solution to this probl-. At the nen meetings, we will limit ourselves strict.l7 to Southera R.."lodesia.. l'le lla.ve a great respect tor what you said and that is why we will avoid as nmch as possible stariii:Jg a discussion with you cone erniDg the conception ot liberty 1:n the various systEms ot goven~J~Snt or such and s-..1ch a coUIIt:.r.y. t'le will speak on Southern R"'todesia because ...,oe consider it as a colofzy' am not iniependent. That is why we T..r.tll talk about 1~at is hap:peni.ng there. '~ have no intention or speaking about \Gat is taking place in oountries anjo;vi.Dg complete iDlepeDdence. You have yourself acknowledged that the freedom in Southern Rhodesia is not as complete a.s it should be. You also said that the situation there is tense but does not seriou~ constitut,e a. threat to l'tOrld ~ace,

but tensions oan at any time tum into contlicts and du.rinll m~ n,..o,P"~ ...... - ---"'"' --- l 1 4 YOU we bad " "'-""" -- • - :page fix - I care~ read your statement, to present you with certain suggestions to enable ua to tird. a solution to the s:ttua.tion in Southern Rhodesia..

AMB. TESFAYE: May I sq how glad I am to be in your country, and I hope that at the end of our a~ we will ba.ve made some progress. I t.hiok it is clear that we came this year beca.uso it was made known to us tha.t you desired to discuss the problema ot Soutbern Rhodesia, and you were willin& to t17 to find lf

MR. SANDYS: May I just correct one poiut;: we have been very ready to receive your Committee, but the initiative tor this visit came from you and not from us. But we are very happy to receive you and to discuss with you and to give you arq information which you may need.

AMB TESFAYB: I do not know if there is much difference. However, we will tr,y to .find out. what the sit'lation is and what you will do. We ldll study your statement most

MR.SANDYS: I understand you intend to adjourn now.

AMB .COULIBALY: Yes Sir. We intend to propose an adjournment to examine your statement and we think that, as in past years, you will envisage one or more meetings with USo Whatever side has taken the initiative of this visit to London, one thing is certain - our trip here must be interpreted as being the wish of the UN, and in particuJ.ar, that of the Special Committee of 24o V'le hope there "r.i.ll be some possibility of having other meetings to aJ.low us to give our comments and suggestions. We are not in a position to negotiate with you a solution for Southern Rhodesia. The solution is in your hands as administering pol'ler, and in that of the people of Southern Rhodesia. · For us, the is still the administering power.

MR. SANDYS: Thank you. We shall adjourn now. Perhaps we can make contact through our - page seven - respective Secretaries to meet again tomorrow, if that is agreeable to you.

A!.ffi o COULIBALY: Yes, our Secretariat ldll stay in touch l·dth you. If it is possible, we would like to meet with you again tomorrow afternoon.

MRo SANDYS: I think we can hold another meeting tomorrow afternoon, if that is agreeable to you.

AMB. COULIBALY: Yes, that l'«>uld be fine.

NRoSANDYS: The press will want some statement. I suggest that we make the briefest possible statement saying that we will be meeting again tomorrow; but no backgro'Wld. statement, either formal or informalo

AMB .COULIBALY: Yes, I agree. No comments to the press for the time being.

(Meeting ended at 3.50 p~)

* * * * * I - ~CR.l3 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

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DATE: FROM: 12 Aug. •63 ! G.K.J. Amachree GKJA/mn

,.

(C AN EVALUATION OF THE ROYAL RHODESIAN AIR FORCE

Sept 1963 Prepared by Aviation Studies (International) Limited &laaex House. Park aide, li•bledon, !'niland AN EVALUATtON OF THE · RO~AL RHODEStAN AfR FORCE The Federation of Rhodesia is one of the few countries in the world with a balancet.l offensive and defensive air force. Out of 100 countries analysed for instance or:ly 26 have medium range offensive capability. The Rhodesian Air Force has four pillars of strength (i) a vigorous reequipment policy including powerful modern designs ( ii) a sophisticated training scheme tased on the RAP's Provost-Vampire sequence (iii) its strategic outlook fostered by long association with the RAF .Arabian Peninsular Corr;rr;and and ( i v) a tight central leadership formed in the wake of the pioneering efforts of .Air Con:modore Jacklin who always saw the role of the .Air Force as extending within and beyond the Federation and as a military pivot in Central Africa. The .Air Force is almost entirely Southern Rhodesian in conception >in operation and in disposition. It is planned as follows - Fighters/Interdicters Bombers/Patrollers Transports Trainers/ SUpport 12 FGA-9 18 SAC Canberra B-4 4 Canadair Argonaut 8 N· AIDer. T-6 Texan 2 Vickers Spitfire 22 2 DH-89A Rapide 12 DH Vampire T-11 14 DH Vampire FB-9 2 19 30 BAC Provost T-53 10 Douglas C-47 Dakota 6 DH Tiger Moth 4 Hunting Pembroke 2 Airspeed Oxford T-2 C1 (C•47S from NATO Helicopters pool) 8 Sud Alouett e 3 Other types Auster AOP-6 Auster Autocrat I 1 Prestwick Pioneer CC-1 2 Fighter bomber sqdns 2 sqdns bombers 3 sqdns. Reconnaissance and J l'l'llo rnh ill) ('lhornhill) AOP elements For comtat interdiction purposes the most significent i terns of inventory are the Hunters, Vampires and Provosts. The Hunters are the latest type cmbining both interception ~nJ ground attock roles anJ these are about the most powerful single engined aircraft on the African continent. T1iey could for instr.dce operate with two external fuel tanks, two heavy bombs and the full rur,mur;i tior;. Th ey couU for ins t :::nce fly '500 statute miles, deliver two tOOO 1 b. Genernl PurpoEe tor:;Ls, Ond fire a>o rounds of 30 mm ., and return. The Van1pire crm also take t\'io external tnuks and deliver 500 lb. bom bs and or 8 x 60lb. rockets, and fire. f.OO roun,~s of 20 mm.explosi ve amn:uni tion. 0 T~e Frovosts are suited to close support with light bombs and rockets. [ For

much smaller 1 less significant weapon. The following is a survey of the load-carrying capability of the most powerful elements of the .Air Force - Canberra B-4 3 x 1000 lb.GP bombs, or 3 x 2000 lb .GP " or 2 x 250 Imp. gal. tip tanks, + 3 x 1000 lb. GP or Napalm or Fuel+ bombs+ napalsn. Hunter FGA-9 4 x .Aden 30 mm. guns+ 480 rounds. + 4 x 230 Imp. gal. tanks or 4 x .P·..S-30 air-ground missiles or 4 x Bullpup " n " or 2 x Fireflash, or 2 x 1000 lb.MC bombs+ 24 x 3u rockets, or 2 x 37 x 2u rockets . or Napalm t-bombs+·rockets. Provost T- 53 2 x .303'' Cal.+1200 rounds, + 8 x 25 lb. bombs+ 6 x 3. 25" rockets. vampire F'B-9 4 x 20 mm. guns +-600 rockets. + 2 X 1000 lb. GP OOil'lbS or 2 x 500 1 b. ..., or 8 x 60 lb. rockets The .Air Force is equipped also to work wi tb the Army with reconnaissance and air observation post aircraft. These train with the regular force of 4 battalions officered by Europeans but with warrant officers and n.c.o.'s found from both Europeans and .Africans. The .Army is trained along European lines and the Special .Air Service , formed in 1960, is now operational. CONCLUSJON The Rhodesian .Air Force, like the .Army, is a well- knit, formidable, well planned fighting force, maintained adequately and kept up to date with reinforcements. It is trained on modern lines, and has strategic and tactical missions. Its four combat squadrons at Thornhill contain among the most effective aircraft in .Africa, the Canberras and Hunters being similar to those which are still the backbone of the RAP in overseas theatres and indeed until only very recently were deployed in the most critical sector of 2nd TAP on the NATO Central Front. They are therefore able to inflict severe punishment at short notice and present a situation to which neighbours have necessarily had to adjust themselves. 24 Oot.ober 196.3

cor of non-part.ioi tion by a ele tion in r oll- call vot

1. ~ 7 Octob r 196.3 , the FO\D'th C t t a a t t er or jriorit 7 a dr f't sol uti on on outhern eaia. 2. Th R he dJ' t r a 1utian t h t uld n vote. Dur.1. th roll-o 1 vot t "not t ioipat ~ . In the fourth 0 l.y ( / 556J..), tb tollo g t ragr re ina rt in t his oonnexioru "12. The r e):l"esct tin or th Un1ted l d or d Northam Ir .t. ted b f o th Tot t h t parti ci • 1n t he vote d did not ao tloi te.

The ort of the Fourt t e waa oanaide d by t h Gen.ral •-~ lJ. October. . m th dr eo1ut1o r a ed b;r: the C~tt ee w a t o t 'TOte bJ,: roll-aall, t b United lingdo F- atmt tiTa •aid "not ci t :bl! •

S. In t h proviai of t he et (A/PV . ].241) 1 t he dca or Gr. :t. d orthem • r es t tive or G to

Procedure or t he Gtaer Aaa 11'1 t ted t th t t he noo- perti 1 i on b;r t aa inoon ist t with w t took p oe in the 1- ln "~ to r e

"In Ti ot v•""aua' I ah to ot Clh orii!Joi-A'...... '-J obj eti on l"tioipat 1n th TOte, I wish to point out th t , eap1te the wording or Jtul.e 89 of th Rul es or pr , i t 1a an a oept. usa in t his Aea 1;r. a r as t he oount or t vot.ea is con med, it i con l!lid t t s h a dele ation it t." <•

- 2-

8. em ct r 1963, t Fourt.h C tt. vot on \ lutio concern ode roll-c 11 vo on I ;u~,~,~... s d., a• on th p-41Yio I not, hovev , er t yote. I.#-UIIII~tt e (A/0.4/L. 'nS/ Ad.d.l), the ppol"t t Unit ~ record or t ( /C.4/ .1452) "Pr!unt

10. t th U.55th eting on 23 Ootob rr 1963, t hi d ld po t. port r

te.". 11. 1n dele time object tot h ythe ft di d not "to pre a the dit ion, whil in t • 12. In th• oourae ot t.h1a, ieo eicrt, at tmtion to t t bcwe at t f the P :t th e ). H then t t hi • cord. tt • t ed tb t would r1 the t r

ot the P G .,._,~ wit & vi w t o arriv at an acce 14. ie t hi t t •s l unch CR.l3 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

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J The Secretary-General --- APPROVAL I YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER 7 AS REQUESTED I YOUR SIGNATURE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE

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FROM: Godfrey K.J. Amachree Excerpt f'rom "Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) House of Commons Official Report" - Vol. 684 No.1, 12th November 1963.

Mr-. H. Wilson: What about Southern Rhodesia? The Prime Minister: So far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned and, indeed, my own attitude to these problems perhaps, as the right hon. Gentleman has reminded me, I might - £"Interruption.:] I did not get the relevance of that interruption. There are two short passages which I should like to read to the right hon. Gentleman as a prelude to arzything I might say on Southern Rhodesia, because it explains what is our attitude towards decolonisation in Africa and elsewhere. I said in a speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society:

wi believe that the greatest danger ahead of us in the world t~ is that the world might be divided on racial lines. I see no other danger, not even the nuclear bomb, which would be so catastrophic as that. There is no doubt that racialism is rearing its ugly head in many places, and I hope the Commonwealth will watch this and guard against it." Then again, I said in the United Nations Assembly:

"We have accepted the principle of self-determination without qualification; we have accepted that the majority should rule. We insist, as far as we are able to do before independence, that minorities must be protected because" - and I will paraphrase - this is the very essence of democracy. So, when we came to the question of Southern Rhodesia - and let me remind the right hon. Gentleman that we are not there yet, we have yet to complete the dissolution of the Federation - these questions will guide us in any decisions we may have to take in respect of the rights of the majority -

Mr-. George Wigg (Dudley): That is dodging.

The Prime Minister: I see no dodging in this at all. It is perfectly clear.

• • • 2 ( - 2 -

Mr. H. Wilson: I think that the House will be grateful fo the right han. Gentleman f'or taking up this question of' Southern Rhodesia and f'or what he has just said. He said there must be protection f'or the rights of' minorities. Will he make clear that in Southern Rhodesia there will be protection f'or the rights of' majorities as well as minorities - J:.Hon. Members: "He said so.':] He did not say that. Will the right han. Gentleman now give a pledge that there will not be independence until there is a democratic Constitution?

The Prime Minister: I thought that implicit in what I said. In fact, I did say that we accept the principle that majorities should rule.

The second principle which I was enunciating was that it is the very essence of true democrac,y that minorities, whether black or white, should be protected. Therefore, as we proceed to consider the question of' the independence of and Northern and Southern Rhodesia those principles will apply.

I trust that I have reviewed, in answer to the right hon. Gentleman, our home domestic polic:ie s and some of the wide field of foreign affairs and that the House will feel that these policies and the Gracious Speech represent a complete policy f'or the nation. CONFIDENTI.iU.

UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

I NT~ROFFIC~ M~MORAN DUM

TO: The Secretar,y-General ~ ~· Date: November 27, 1 963 y~·v' , FILE NO.:---'------THROUGH: ~ ~r ~~,·

FROM: Godfrey K, J. Amachree, Under-Secretary ~ Department of Trusteeship and Information from ~ ~ Non-Self-Governing Territories r SUBJECT: Question of Southern Rhodesia

I suggest that you read the attached memorandum addressed to me

by Mr. Chacko in conjunction with my memorandum to you on Southern Rhodesia. UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

INTtRO~~ICt MtMORANDUM

Mr. Godfrey K. J. Am.achree, Under-Secretary TO: Department of Trusteeship and Information oate:_2...;;..7...... ::N..:..::o:....;.v....:::e=mb=-=-er=--=1::..!9~6;.::;3__ _ from Non-Self-Governing Territories FILE NO.:_~-~~-----

FROM: M. E. Chacko _ . ,_A.}r ~~

SUBJECT:

Operative paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 1889(XVIII) of 6 November 1963 on the question of Southern Rhodesia "requests the Secretary-General to continue to lend his good offices to promote

conciliation in the Territory, as stated in p~.ragraph 4 of resolution 1760(XVII), and to report both to the General Assembly during the eighteenth session and to the Special Committee on the results of his efforts". Paragraph 4 of resolution 1760(XVII) requested the Secretary­ General "to lend his good offices to promote conciliation among the various sections of the population of Southern Rhodesia by initiating prompt discussions with the United Kingdom Government and other parties concemed with a view to achieving the objectives set out in this and all the other resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Southern Rhodesia ... By letter dated 8 November 1963, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom the text of resolution 1889(XVIII) and drew his attention in particular to operative paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of that resolution. As far as I am aware, no reply to this letter has been received from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. In view of the fact that the Secretary-General has to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly during the current session, and since no reply to the Secretary-General's letter has yet been received, the Secretary-General may wish to consider the desirability of discussing the question with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom. The report to the General Asseni>ly could then be drawn up on the basis of such a discussion. ~\\ UNITED NATIONS ~mJ NATIONS UNIES ~ NEW YORK

CABLE ACCRE•a • UNATICNS NEWYCRK • ACRr::aS E TELEGRAPHIQ"E

F"ILE NO.:

Suggested Agenda ~or Meeting with African Foreign Ministers

1. Report by Ministers on their consultations with their colleagues in regard to Afro-Portuguese talks.

2. Decision as to whether talks should be continued i~ so when, and wbat role the Secretacy-General should play.

3. Security Council Meeting on Apartheid - suggestions by Foreign Ministers as to action to be taken.

4. Security Council Meeting on Portuguese Territories - course of action l'oreign Ministers propose to take.

5. Southern Rhodesia. (See my memorandUil of ;resterda1. ) UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

CONFIDENTIAL INTEROFFICE M7RA~DUM __ TO: The Secretary-General / (Y"; ,; oat•= ~~2...:..7_N_o_v_emb e_r_l_,9,_6-=~'-----

tr-aM FILE NO.: ------~I ~· ~ THROUGH: v. d.i-J:f:-_:;::;---~· ~ FROM: G.K.J • .AMchree ~

suBJECT: Southern Rhodesia

I have had under examination the question of the implementation of paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 1889 (XVIII) which "requests the Secretary-General to continue to lend hie good offices to promote conciliation in the Territory, as stated in paragraph 4 of resolution 176o (XVII), and to report both to the General Assembly during the eighteenth session and to the Special Colllllittee on the results of his efforts". Paragraph 4 of resolution 176o (XVII) defines this task as "conciliation among the various sections of the population of Southern Rhodesia by initiating prompt discussions with the United Kingdom Government and other parties concerned with a view to achieving the objectives set out in this and all the other resolutions of the General Assembly on the question of Southern Rhodesia".

~ informal contacts with delegations and other interested parties (including such Southern Rhodesian officials as the Minister of Education and Health, the Chief Justice, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition and the Minister in Washington) , lead me to conclude that if aey further efforts in the sense desired by the General Assembly are to be effective, the ground must first be

prepared by reconciling the ~can Rationalist leaders and their followers. As far as the European political leaders are concerned, there is little prospect that they would consider embarking On any talks with the African leaders, since, as is likely in present circumstances, participation in such talks by one African leader would provoke charges of capitulation or betrayal by the other. Equally, for fear of undermining his political position, neither of the African leaders appears for the time being eager to initiate such talks. - 2 -

In aey event, it such talks should be possible in the f'uture, the at.osphere would be propitious to the extent the participants were assured that all interested parties were represented and that the outcome would not

be subJect to repudiation by a~ ot them. Further, i:t the obJective stated in paragraph 6 o:t General .Asseabl.y resolution 1889 (XVIII) is to be attained - umely, constitutional arrangaerrts tor independence on the basis ot universal adult sut:trage including the fixing ot the earliest possible date tor independence - then it is essential tbat the bargaining position ot the African •Jority should be strengthened prior to ~ discussions. I recommend, there:tor,e, that advantage should be taken o:t the preaeDCe in lw York ot the African Foreign Ministers in order to suggest to th• the desirability ot urging the Orpnisation ot African Unity to give consideration to this matter. Such consideration might well lead to a decision to request the Co-ordinating COIIIIIittee o:t that Organisation {which is respouible tor harmonizing assistance troa African states to African national liberation movements) or some other subsidiary body' to UDdertake this task o:t reconci l i a- tion. In this connexion it may be noted that paragraph 10 o:t the .Addis Ababa Conference resolution on decolonization "earnestly invites all national l iberation movements to co-ordinate their efforts by establishing common action :trorrts wherever necessar,r so as to strengthen the et:tectiveness ot their struggle ••• ". Thill step vill not ot course preJudice the making ot further approaches to the Un1 ted Kingdom GoTermaent on other aapects ot paragraph 8 ot General Assembly resolution 1889 {XVIII) or such other intl.uence, related perhaps t o the terms on which Southern Rhodesia would be admitted to the eo.mouwe<h, as Commonwealth Governments, in compliance with paragraph 7 ot that resolution, -.y bring to bear on the Government ot the United Kingdom or the Southern Rhodesia authorities. In conclusion, I suggest that the Permanent RepresentatiTe ot t he UDited Kingdom be informed of such action as you J111J.Y wish to take so as to enable hi• to find out the r•ction ot his government and the government ot Southern Rhodesia. -

Ful 1 tan of a. special. "EnabJ.i!!s" Bill introduced in the Howse of Commons toda,y t o riD the British Government more pq!l!r to daaJ. with the seizure of iD:lepe!!lence bx Rhodesia A BILL 1.'0 MAKE FURl'HER PROVISION \\'ITH RESPECT '1'0 SOUTHERN RHODESIA

~.Jjw~~ by the Queen 1s most excellent Majesty, b7 and wit h the advice aDd. COlUient of the I.o:nls Spiritual and Temporal, and Canmns, in t his present Parliament assembled, and by the authorlt7 of the same, as tol.l.owa:-

lo It i s here~ decl.ared that Southern Rhodesia eonti.Dues to be part. ot Her Majestyi8n;DinianS,~&iii that t he Government and Parliament o! t he United KingdCIIl have responsibility- and jurisdiction sa heretofore for and 1n respect of ito

2o (i) Her Majesty 11187 by' Orde:r-in-t',ouncu make such provision in relation to Sout ham RhodesiA, or persons or t hings in an:r ~ belong1 ng to or connected with Southam Rhodesia ~ as appears t o her to be necessar,y or expedient in consequence of arq lUlcomstitutional action taken t hereino (11) Without prejudice to the generalit y of sub-section (i ) ot this section, an 01der-in-Counc11 t hereUDder m&7 make such provision -

(a ) f or suspending, amending, revoldng or adding to 8D7 ot t he provisions ot t he Q:matitution ot Soutbem Rhodesia l96l.;

(b t or' od.if)'inga extendi ng or suspending-the operation o.t arq enactment or instrument in relation to Southern Bhodeaia, or persona or things in an,;r tl81" belonging to or connected 'With Southern Rhodesia;

(c) for imposing prohibitions, restrictions or obligations in respect· ot transacti ons relating to Southam Rhodesia or &lV · such persons or t hiDge, ae appears to Her Majest7 to be necessaey or expedient as atoreeaid; ·

and IUl1' pro'Yision made b)" or Wiler such an Order 'IIJiq a~ to things done or Clld.t ted. outside as well as within the United K.ingdam or other countr,y or t erritoey to which the Ord r ext.endao

\111) An Ol"der-1n-counc11 UDder thie secti on 'M7 make or authorise tbe maJdng of eucb incidental., supplemeutal aDi consequeutial. prov.l.sions as appear to Her Majest y to be expedient tor the purposes of t he Order, and aey provision made b)" or UDier such an Order ma7 be made t o haw effect ! rom any date not earlier than llth Ncm!mber 1965o

(i ?) An Ordel"-111-Counell under this section D11q be revoked or varied by a subsequent Order-in-Council thereunder"'

( Y) An Order-in-Council UD:ier this Section ehall be laid beto re Parliament er being made and shall expire at t he cmd of the period of twenty-eight (28) ~ beginning with t he dq on which it was made unless during that period it is approved by resolution ot each House of Parliament o The axpintion of an Order in pursuance of this sub-section shall. •

of this sub-eection shall not affect the operation of the Order as respects things previously' done or anitted to be done or the power to m&ke a new Order; and in calculating the period a.toresaid no account shall be taken of &DT t ime during which Parliament i s dissolved or prorogued or during which both Hou es are dissol'nld for more than tour (4) dq8. 3a (i) Subject to the fol.l.ow1ng provisions of this section, section 2 ot this Act sball cont inue in force tor the period of one (1) year beg1md.ng with the date of the passing of this Act and shall t hen exp1..re unless it is continued in force in accordance with sub-section (11) ot this section. (11) Her Majesty 1/JIJ.y tram time to t ime by Order-in-Council provide t hat section 2 ot this Act slall CODtinue 1n force for a period of one (1) ;year beyoD1 the date on which it would otherwise exp:lreJ but no recCIIII1endat1on shall be ade to Her Majesty-in-Council t o make an oroer under this subsection unless a draft of the Order baa been laid before Parliament and approvad by resolution ot each House of Parliamento

(iii) The e.xpiration ot secticm 2 ot this Act shall not atfect - (a) the operation of that section as respects thiDgs prertoua:Qr done or omitted to be done; or (b) t he Constitution ot Southern Rhodesia 1961 as 1n force iDDediateq before the expiration of that sectiono

4o (i) Thia Act my be cited as "The Southern Rhodesia Act 1965"o

(11) This Act u.tenda to Southern Rhodesia, the Channel Ial.arlda, the Isle ot Man, an,y col.oJJ1' or Protectorate within the J!Mning of t he British Nationality Act 1948, and (to the extent of Her Majesty's jur1ediction t herein) to llJ1' foreign cOUDtr;y or territor,v 1n which t or the t ime being Her Majesty baa juriadiction prpvided tbat no Ol'de~iD-CooncU under section 2 or thia Act shall uteo:i to 8.111" place other t han the United T(1ngdom or Southam Rhodesia's part of t he l.av of that place 1 except so far as it Ekes prov:l.aion with respect to ships or aircraft to which thia section appl.ies 1 or affects the operation ot arq Act ot Parliament. which baa effect in that place, with or without moditications, as part. of ita law11 or ot &117 1neti'UJII.8IIt in f orce UDder ~ such Acto (1.11) Tbis aeot1aa applies to British ahipa registered in the United UDgdca or &IV" other COQD'tr;y or place to which thia Act a:tends aDd to aircraft so rsg1atel'8Clo 11 •II

l . · 1 r I TIO. l tNT ROJ:FICt M[MORANDUM

TO ...... F L ,- OM - ry J[N u J T ( t

r

I

'ITfl>, TI01 TJO . I INT£ROHIC •

TO

/Av P'l NO TtHIO G>i )?"' & ,1

, OM r

SU J CT

• • • • • •

••• •

• - DRAFT NOTE VERBALE -

TR 412/2

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of •••••••••••••• to the United Nations and has the honour to inform him that the Special Committee on the situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples LCstablished under General Assembly resolutions 1654 (XVI), 1810 (XVII) and 1956 (XVIII)_/ will meet at United

Nations Headqua,rters in New York on Tuesday, 25 February 1964, at 3.00 p.m. The Secretary-General would appreciate receiving as soon as possible the names of the members of the delegation of ••••••••••• to the Special Committee.

17 February 1964. - DRAFT -

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF

INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND P1D PLES: 219th meeting to be held on 25 February 1964 at 3.00 p.m.

(Conference Room to be announced in the Journal).

AGENDA

1. Opening of the session by the Secretar,y-General. 2. Election of Officers. 3. Organization of work (A/AC.l09/L.96 and 97). CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMO~D~.

TO: The Secretary-General ~c-A/ ~ . oate: _.;;::.26.::...... :F::....;e::..:b::..:rua=-=::..::cy...__=l"'9..:.64=----

{\ tJ/0 ,p\../ FIL.E NO.: ------THROUGH : -~·? ~- r 1. -/::;~ FROM: Godfrey K. J. Amachree, Under-Secretary (__.j '!-Gl Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories SUBJECT:

I regret very much the embarrassment and inconvenience caused

I to you yesterday at the meeting of the Special Committee of 24.

I enclose, for your information, a copy of a memorandum

concerning this matter which I have addressed to Mr. Jiri Nosek,

Under-Secretary for Conferences Services. Hr. Jlri loaek, Uader-Seent&17 Otfioe of Ocmtenaoe S.m••

OedtN7 I. J • All&tmi'M 1 1Jader-Se•ret&17 Departaent ot Tra•t••ip and on-a.lt-GenftliD& Terri.tori••

I f•l it ia '87 dad.7 to brina to 1WJ" at.tentioo what oeaurr.d at ,-.atei'Cla7 att.el'IHMa'• ••tiDe ot the Spuial a-itt.. aa the •ituation with rep:rd to iapl...atation ot t. Decalaration on the gnnting ot in4epe~Mlaee to ool•ial ooUDt.ri• md peopl.••. •• 10\l an awre, thia wa the tint ...tin& of the a-it.t.ee'• •••ion t-or 1964 u4 ._. to be OJ*led b7 the entar;r-Qceral. .

Tbe ••t.iD& wa •ehe4ulecl tor 3 p.a. ud at S ainut.M put tbe hour the Seent.a17-Gtn•ral ...U.d the ..tina to order. It then be-. appannt that. there • re no illt.e:rpret.en ill the booth•. !he lNBeh t ranalat or arriwd at 3.8 p.a. tar.. lliDutu atter the ••tin& had 'been deol.arecl OJ*I• 'the openin& ot the ...tiD& then had t o be clelqed • ._. ten aiD tea untU i.Dterpreten OCNld be tolllld. I n.ecl hardl7 ·t~·· that. thi• -· part.inlarq tabarru•iDa in n ew ot the pre•en•• ot the Sevet.~:ral aDd a m.ber ot PeJW&Dent. pn•ent.ati'VU ldlo w re requind to be in the· Se.uit7 Ceunoil b7 3 •.30 p.a. &Dd who wen amd.ou that the prooee41n& ot the Speeial a-ittee alacNld •tart oa tiM. Untort.u.Dat.W, thia ,.. not. all. Wherl the PerwaDeat a.pn•entat1Te ot the Iw17 Cout att..pted to ll&ke a propeAl ecHI"DiD& the eleetion of ottiee-bearen i t-.. to\IDCl that uither h.1a aienphae aor, inUed., vq of the llierophone• CD t.be table at lllh1 he wu •1ttift&, wu llmotion1q. A.p1n t he ••tin& wu held up til the treMble •• 14•tit1ed. !be MlbuN4or had to • • to uether tabLe 1a or4er t.e &ddnae the ...tiD& .

I •hould not. neecl to •trMa • d1tt1CIIllt. pcn1t1oa in whit the Seereta~nl. ud, 1nd8e4, the Seenta:riat ae a vbol.e ._. plaoed. beeau•• fll the•• tlel&78 on •• illportant an oaeuion. I aa aun that ~u will take matewr aetion ;rou fHl ne.. ••a17 to enau.re that the hijb • rda we hav. acae to expeet fl"'OI tM Ottioe of CGiltennoe s.m.... an 11&1Dta.1ned. I .. aendin& a oop7 ot this a.-or~ to t.he Seereta17-0ener&l..

c.c. The Secretary-General . t~~ UNITED NATIONS U} NATIONS U_NIES ~ ~

JIRI NOSEK

To The Secretary-General:

For your information.

27 February 1964. ••

... , .. •laM ...... , ... - sac of tiM QIIMWU. -­ -..!Ill ... Sa,... -----· of J181itGI.., --~-.. "' ... ,.. ' ftHt a.~t...... lllrft_, ...... •• l\ • 1t. artSMI7 ~--. J: ..... &JOl.v-..­ ...... I

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OGI •• hl... l llr. 1iUillaliJE1D M

CR.l3 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

Comments for the record should not be written on this 4 . slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.l08 should be used instead.

APPROVAL v YOUR INFORMATION MAY WE CONFER 1 _AS REQUESTED

YOUR SIGNA n.JRE FOR ACTION NOTE AND FILE REPLY FOR MY SIGNATI.JRE

,NOTE AND RETI.JRN, PREPARE DRAFT YOUR COMMENTS ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

I

~'\<) ,. ,..,., ~

j

I DATE: FROM: '-f/3 c;. 11-.-- A ~ \ .. •. Diatr .. LIMITED A/AC.l09/L•99 4 March 1964

ORIGINAL 1 ENGLISH

SPECIAL COJ4MlT'l'EE ON THE SITUATION VIITH REGARD 'ro THE lPLEMEl1TATIO OF '7lrE DECLARATION ON 'l'liE GRANTING OF lliDEPENDENCE ro COLONIAL COUNTRIES AND "PEOPLES

QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHOD~IA

Wor :ing papa~ prepared by the Secretariat

Ao ACTION '!~KEN BY THE SPE~IAL COUKI'l'l'EE IN 1963: BY T l SECtilUTY. COUNCIL AND BY THE GENERAL ASSE. m.LY DURING XTS EIGHTEENTH SE SION

lo Following the adoption by the General Assembly at ::. s sevon·teenth

s ession ot resolution 1760 (XVII) on 31 October 1962, the Speoial Co •tt e

again considered the question of Southern Rhodesia at ita meetings in 1963.

At the conclusion of the general debat~ the pecial Comm·ttoe daeided to set

up a Sub-Committee to visit London and unde:rwta.ke conversations lith the

Oovermnent o-r th , United K ngdom conce.rning Southern Rhod s:..a ..

2 , e Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia, compoaed of r p:..-esentatives of

11ali, Uruguay, Syria, Sierra Leon , Tanr;anyika a.ud Tunisi~, vis.:. ted London trom 20 to 26 April and unanimously adopted its raport!l on 8 ~ 1963. The Sub-Committee gained the impression that the United Kinedom Government

intended to seek, through persuasion, a compromise solu-'· .on aimed at · daning

the franch;.;.se but not in a way desired by Africans nor ucoo.1.ding to the t erms

l/ A/AC.l09/L.53. ....

2-

ot General Assembly resolutions. The Sub-Conllllittee :~a · o. the opinion,

~ alia, that the Urlited l:in~om, conoistent ilith i~s obligations c.o

protect the inter sts of the majority of the Terri.·;;ory's inh bi · nts,

should ta a e. nore direct and po itive p si·~ion em earning ~ui;.t! c action.

It believed that there woulC!. oe serious epeJ:cu.saiona if ,ne ~·~Bent -talo-

mate was a loied to oo·tinu Thero:f'ore in the ab· once of a 'avourable

devolopmen s in the illll edia future, it. :recommended that .,be Special Com-

mittee should conside ways ·1.1!d means of dealing wi.th the q osticn on an

urgent baaiao It beliovad t t ~uch means might inoluda. ftonsiderat:on of

t he question ~t a special session of the General Aosembl- ; the

situation to the atten·;ion of the Security Couucilf 11nd requesting th19

Secretary-Gene al to draw t he attention of the Uni .ed ~i~: . dom to the

seriousness of the situation at~ to continu to lend hie GQOd of_ices in

accordance \'lit the mandate lrl.ve11 to him by the General A~aembly .. n reuolu-

tion 1760 (Xlll )

3. On 5 June, the Se ret a .. -General aubmi tted to t f: s,, ci 1 i::ormn.i tt & a further revor~ in ac .ordan.e \vith paragra~h 4 of Genera Acsembly reoolu-

tion 1760 (JCV:L) by wh~:::h ho vm.s req"..leated to lend his good offices to

promote conciliation a.oone the various sections \) tt•e pol ulation of Southe-rn

Rhodesia by initiati g prompt. di;:;cussions with the Unite I'ingdom Government

and othc:r p'lrti~;s concerned with a view to achieving the # j<1oti~res sa, out in

t his an ail the other resolutions of t e General thG qucs ion of

Sout h,.rn Rhodesi , and to r e rl to the Assembly a··, its I·- sent session as

~ A/ AC . l09/33/Add.l. . .. '

- 3-

ell as to the Special Committee. This report contained J.atte~s exchanged

between the Secratar,y-Gene~al and the Permanent Representative of the

United Kinr,dom to the United N·ltiona. In his latter d:tted 26 February 1963

·t e Secretary-General enquired once again about the view of the Government

of the United Kiilgdom in connexion with paragraph 4 of the esolution in

order that he Qight take them fUlly into account before considering any

turther action in implementation of that paragraph. In lis reply dated 21

~ 1963, the Permanent Representative of the United Kin~om stated that aa

a result of nrevious exchanges between his Government on the one hand, and

t he Sub-Committee of the Special Committee and the Secret. ~-General on the

other, his Oovernment 1 s attitude towards that resolution should be abundantly

clear. He also stated his Government •a belie tha the Scc. . etar-.f-General

would understand thf! difficulties which 1~ in the wa.y of its contemplating

compl iance with that re~olution.

4. After considering the report of the Sub-Committee on Soutbe~n Rhodesia, t he Special Committee, on 20 June 1963, adopted a resolut~o1~ which called

upon the United ~ingdom Government to abro~te t he 1961 Ccnstitution, to hol d

without delay a cons itutior-al conference in which repres tativ~s of all

political parties of Southern Rhodesia would taka part w :~ a view to making

constitutional arran ·aments for independence on the basis of uni-.,ersal uffraga

including the fixing of the earliest date fo~ independonca, and to declare

unequivocally thr:>;t it iVOuld not transfer the owers and , i tributes of

sov•·reignty to any gow,rmnent constituted under the 1961 Gonstitution. It

~commended that~ if developments necessitated and circum tances ~~nted;

a special session of the General Assembly shoul d be convened to consider the

s ituation in ·the Ts:1!Titorn and tho.t in any event, the question oi· Southern

Rhodesia should "be pleced on the agenda of the eiRhteenth regu.l··r session ot the

J/ A/AC.l09/45• r '

-4-

General Assembly as a t'ter o~ hidl priorit,.- ncy. J'imlly, 1 t

drew the attention o£ the Securit,y Council to th deterioration of the e~

ploeive situation which -prevailed in Southem desia.

5. The text o this resolution was ~ranamit d on 21 June 1963 to the

United Kingdom Oovornmont, the President ot the Security Counc:ll and ths

President of the fourth. special session of' the 0 neral Assembly. On 26 June 1963, the Chairman of the Special Committee trau mitted to the President of t he Security Council the Special Commdttee•s report on South~rn Rhodeaia.JI

6. On 2 Augus 1963 the representatives of Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the

United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council a co~ municatioa2/ drawing attention to the refusal o~ the United Kingdom to comply with General Assembly decisions on Sout ern Rhodesia and protesting the

proposed transfer to t he Government of that Terr1tor,r of extensive po era,

includinr, the control of substantial military forces recruited on a racial basis. According to this communication these circumstances posed an immediate

and grave danger to the -peace and security of the African continent. A eting

of the Security Council sho~ld therefore be coavaned in order to take appropriate

measures. This request was subsequently e~doraed by the representatives o~ 28 other African states .~ 7. The 5ecu.rity Council considered this matter at its 1064th to 1069th meeti D88 between 9 and 13 September 1963. On 13 September 1963 the Council faile to

adopt, because of the negative vote of a Permanent Kember~ a d aft resolution

co-sponsored by Ghana, l4orocco and tile Philippines which \'10uld have invited

the United Kinr,dom not to tr~sfer any po era and attributes of sovereignt,y to

AI s/5378. s1 53 82. ~ S/5409. .r

-5-

athern Rhodesia until a :tW.lz _,..,...,_,

11 hed. The d.raf't re olution soh lari ..t t he United Kin8fo

0 rnment not to tr-.t. ~er to ta d forces and aircraft

aa envisaged by the Central A:t'r1

was 8 1n favour to 1 ag~-linst ( ittHI IC1ru:,lo11) nth 2 abstentions (France and

Utdted St tea).

8. At its eighteenth session, General ~bly, on the recommendation

of the Fourth CotrJDittee, adopted wo resolut on the question of Southern

Rhodesia. On 14 October 1963, 1~ pted re lution 1883 (XVIII), which was

similar to th,lt which .failed o£ adoption in t Security Council ..

9. During its consideration of t QuestioD ot Southern Rhodesia, the

Fourth Co111111 ttee in October 1963 ard state nte by Mr. Robert Mugabe,

Secretary-General or the African National Union :J.nd Mr. George

Silundika., SeortJta.ry of Publicity, Zimbabwe At'rican People's Un on.JJ

10. On 16 October, i n response to a requet:>t concerning the action taken by

the Secretary-General in the matt :r of Southern Bhodesia since his last

report and on the action envisagec! in the future, the Under-secretary for

Trusteeship and Information f rom on-Sel f-GoYarDing Territ ories made a state-

ment to the Fourth Coii'IDittee. In this state he recall ed tl'> e two report

ot the Seoretar,r General on the · lementatio of operative paragraph 4 ot

Gea.eral Assembly resol ution 1760 (lVII) and 1Dto:rmed the Committee that in

vi of the terllJS of the reply received from ~he Perman n·t Representative ot

the United Kingdom, and having re to the pacial Committee's own exami na- tion of the reports of the Sub-C ttee and of ihe Secretary-General, weU

as t o the subsequent discussions 1D the Securt Council, it had no been

1/ See A/C.4/SR. l442 and A/ C.4/ .1449. -6-

po ible to take addition te a 1 \ion or pnrat:r&:ph 4 of t hat elution. The Secretary had, nta.ined continuous

oont with the Permanent Rep ed Kingdom. 'l'heUnd :z--

Se ar,y al&o referred to a sta.t t tle~, then Minister

poneible for Central African At , in t u 1ed Kingdom House oi' c on 16 July l96J. In this • emont • ler had told the House of Commona th::1t while tha matter ot he inde nc.e of Southam Rhodesia "a

open, the United Kingdom Governmen not got fUrther than the suggestion

t t it ould look to tha Southurn Rhodesia 0~ nt to submit propoaals

for:' acy amendments of the Constitution which \f0ul4 result in broadening the

1a of representation of the Le effect as aoo1 as praot1~bl• •

11. On 6 November 1963, the Gens Assembly opted resolution 1889 (XVIII)

mmended to it by the Fourth Co ttee on tbi• question. The operative paragraphs of this resolution were follows&

n1. Avprovee the report of the S~acl 1 Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementa*lon of the claration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Coun es and Peopl s, particularly its conclu­ sions and recom~end~ticns, ani ~rasaes appreciation for its ~rkJ 112. Reaffirms the inali ble rir.ht ot the people of Soathern Rhodesia to self-daterminatio!l and independ cer "3. .!xpreeses 1 ts ap_ereoi tioa to tb.e Secretary-General for his efforts in connenon with the estion of S thern Rhodesia; "4. ExpNsses deep ro~~::H:t t hat the IJo !I'lliD9nt of the United Kingdom ot Great Britain and Northern:freland has not implemsnted t e various resolutions of the General Aaacably on Sout rn Rhodesia.J "5. Calla upon the Gov nt of the United K ngdom not to accede to the request of the present nority g rnment of Southern Rhodesia tor independence until majorit7 rule based on universal adult suffrage is established in the Territo f "6. Once more invites the Oovernmen' o~ the United Kingdom to hold without del~ a const~~utional conference n which 1~presenta~ives of all political parties of the Territor, will part :th a view to making oonstitutional arrangements fo independence, on the basis of universal adult suffrage, including t.he xing of the earliest possible data for 1ndependencef "7. oloa at relat1ona th81r influence to the u or the legitimte 8 iroti

8. Regueata tbe Sec::tmJ~IooOlli:lfiilft. n inue to lend hia g od ottices to protilOtG ooncili .~ ...- ....- ...... , as stated in ~a- graph 4 of rasolution 1760 both to the General Assembly during the eigbte i e Spacial Commit ee on the results of his effo

"9. Decides to keep th stion o ern Rhodeaie. on the agenda of its eighteenth se:aollorl."

12. Cn 11 December 1963, the Se ... "'~1/W.L·tted to tha .AGsombly a

repo~ on the implementation of o rative lMl.l'"di''"~P 8 of this resolution. In hi report, the Secretary-Gen h had submitted the text

ot resolution 1889 (XVIII) to the P nent R 9ntative of the United

Kingdom on 8 November 1963 and sub ~uently di aed the question with him.

On 10 December 1963 the Seoreta.ry-G ral recei in reply a letter from the

Permanent Representative of the Uni d Kinedo calling +.he diffioulties in

the w~ of his Government's compli with t United Jln.tious resoluUon on

Southem Rhodesia. His Government nowledge he hones·!; concern ehovm by

~ Members of the United Nations bout the tu or Southam Rhodesia and

thought it rip,ht to inform the Uni N'Ltions of' its policy regarding Southern

Rhodesta•s constitutional st tua. a OovermuetEt1 s intention as to work towrl.X'

a solution to the proble which t d the Torrltor,y in a manner best calculated

to nchieye such a solution. In co usion, th report sta·iied that bearing in

nd the mandate given by the Gene Assembly• theS eoret~ry-General had also undertaken conversations ¥dth rep ntatives frioan countries in the hope t t the Organisation ot African U t1 might t in p:roparing the ground for

initiating discussions with the ot parties ncerned.

9 J./5664. B.

1 13. Information on the co d iu the Special

Co ttee's first re~ortl/ ode s considered by

the resumed sixteenth easa ot , and in i~a I ports

to the seventeentb and ei nt nerel Assembly ..w

Supplementar,y information re velopme 1 et out below.

Status of the Territory

14. On 11 February 1964, 1 repq o n questiou oonoorning a reported

d o1 ion that the United. Kt~:~gdom 0 nt ul henceforth refrain from

officially referring to S ern Rhcdesia as a Colon;r. the Common alth

Relations and Colonial So ar,r ~e the follo reply•

11 We usually try to ble the use of the word "Colony" hen ret 1ng w T rr1 toriee hlch hav<=- Nached an advanced stage of internal lt-gove There is no constitutional signifloance. • b'ield m.w at ... ention to the t ot that we bad on so occ ons depn d from tbia practice in respect of Southern Rhodesia. I aas d him that if that as so, it was ttnintentio • Political developments

The question of indep~nden 15. Following the visit, tioned in the Spec 1 Committee's last report ot Mr. R.A. Butler, the Un1 d Ki m Uinister aponsible for Central

Atrican Affairs, t Central Africa in Janu11.r,y 1963, he had discus ions with raprescnta.tivas o~ the Federal Government and of the CJovarn-

manta o£ Northn'tl and South rn Rhoda ia with t object o finding a basis on which a conference on th fUture usooiation tTieen tho Territories might be held. In the light of tm e 'P~esaed 1n these diacussions, the

~ A/5124. JS/ A/5238 Chapt r II and A/5446/A44. ). -

ULL...... ILil v•-~odom Oovel'lllll9 inciple that

icb. so wished eow.a. lt!Af'!ftllr.

1 Oovel"DID9nt ot Southern Bb~~:.a tha principle ~

•ttl'tft'll~eion but made an 1mmad · ata the granting of i_.. ,_._ence on the first late oa .. u....-... a othPr TerritorieS)

rn Rhodesia, or Nyasaland, ede or obi;ained i te

ndence. Tbe Southern Rhode o declared bat th­ ou\ an undertaking to this e feet, auld no end the proposed con- fe ()e.

17 The United Kingdom Oovernmen1 lied that although it accepted in pr1 ciple that Southern Rhodesia, 1 the ot ~rritorias, ould proc ed th tho norm 1 processes to in& ndance, i uld not be possible to

Southern Rhodesia a fUlly ind ndent coun r,r whilst it rem~ined in t deration, \Yhl.oh ~~as not i tse ind.epend_, • Discu.ssions bout the bro lines of a future ralationahi bet en ~rritories we therefore n ;..ary before Southern Rhodesia d be in constitutional position to e to full independence. Wh reaohed, th~ United King­

Government would expect to co n ... -."' ...... to diocu.su financial, aer, noa, constitutional and nth~r ~era prio to independence.

18. '1'b Southern Rhodesian Gove'T"nzr~"'t wa.s unab e to aecet>t this view and re ted its request in &pril 1963. d1tl eions between the 't' rritori n future tionship, it insiataCl on tl! pl'ior rocognition ·of its right indepe It cou.ld not accept th id of a subsequent conference to scuss f oial, defencG, constitutional

other matters before independ b an entirely responaible t its own financial affaire ~nd ence befl ~le Federation came into be , a.nd since., with regard to titutio tters, the United Kingdom's - 10 -

reserve powers had been eli • ted under tm 1961 Conati ution.

19. The Unitnd Kingdom Government' ply in s.y 1963 thnt there ero

ma.tt r of mutual interest, including t amrcise ot tlle powors ~o am.e -

ing Southern Rhodesia' cons tut1on, icb bad to be d1

fer of sovereignty on the grant or independence was to be effected in an

orderly mnnner. Further, none of the members or the Fe o tion ould b coma

independent while the F de ation ned in oxistence and th Federation

could be brought to an end only by United KiDgdom legisl tion. If t e

Southam .Rhodesian Govern nt ould co-operate in diseuosing matters vhich

must be resolved befo~~ independence could b gran~ed, the United Kinr.dom

Government would unde~take to enter into ne~tiationa with Southern Rhodesia

on the subject ot imependence not 1 tsr than the data on which similar

negotiations re initl ted th eithc.r of the other Territories.

20. The response ot the South: rn odeoia Gover nt to o.sk thnt Southern Rhodesia ba glven full inde11ecdenoe not lat . .r tha_n the date ot

take place nnd nt ~~d n ~11 requi botoro

the confe.cence on clisaolution. Th Ulli tod Kinr.d Oov rnmen-; thon prapo 4 that diacuasiona on Sout rn Rhod 1A • s indepoDden. a ould begin in London without de~ rmd t t 11t th e ti , invitations b lesu d to t OoverD­ ments oonce~ to ttend oon.t nc on 1 ord rly ella olution c · ~ t

Fed ration and on future l1 n the rritori a.

21. Diacuasions accordirJBly took lace in London at the 6Dd of 1963 between 11r. :Sutlor nnd • Field, h Pri Jlini er of' Southern Hhodeei , but agre ment as not reach.Dd on th is for the gr nt of ind.apendoncG.

In a subsequent age to Ill'. :Butler, • Pield stat d th.~t the ter S\J8W' - 11 -

gested b~ tbe Onite a b is

to the Southern Rhode ian Goverzll'llCnt nd. invited hi to diseuse the que tion

tu.rth r, in Scat rn Rhod! ai • Mr. Butler a d to t Mr. Field a.t

Victoria Falls prior to th conf'arenc on 41 solution. ech duled to st

there on 28 June 196.3, and on the understanding tha , at this rnoeting,

disaueeion would be resumed ot the q ation of broadeui the baaia ot :rep

aentation in the ·southern RhodeoiBD Logisl ture of fUture develo nt

of polia,r on non-discrimi tion.

22. In a speech to the Southern Rhod sian Parliament on 18 June, Yr. Pield.

re-stated the reaeons for Southern Rhodesia's demand for indepen nee. Re

recalled that during his disousaions with the United Xingdo Oovern!DSnt, be

bad encountered little opposition on the lidity of Southern Rhod si •a

claim to independence but tb Unit d llagdom Gove nt d rojected a suggee-

tioa t t the Bill en bli e die olution ot th de tion should include

powers to grant ~11 the T' nitoriee indepond. nee at the tima. The Uni tad

nrlgdom had al o stipulated th<~: oertllin conetUutional ch .• be made hich

uld le~ to re nt, sting co ti-

tution had been negotiated b7 the Unit d Kingdom Oo a.rnnmnt 'for this '1!7

pu'pOSB and acoept d au • Be bad b en into d that there 1'laf) oppo 1t1on

to indepondence for Sou\hcm Rhodaei W1der the pN ant Conatitution f'rom

hers of t Comma al h 1 partiaulnrlT SOIDI ot the DCJ mbGrs. The older

CODIDDnwealth countries, A t:ralia, Canada, and. , had also express d to him the hope th~t Southern Rhodesia would mo towards a franchise wh eb.f the African would have the r:l.filt• ropetm. His Govel'll.ll:!ent, for ita put, was prepared to co idor ch.&Dgas in th lJ roll franchise, to aimplU)'

1 t so that the system of voting gbt 'ba UDd r tood b7 all. - 12-

23. At the Victoria Fa.ll Conterence, ch a.s ttended by representatives

of the Federal Govern nt, the Go,VD~""'"... nte ot orthern " d Southem Rhode 1&

and observe:rs from saland, gene 1

menta should be ~ for the orderly and ape t ter ot hdoral re pon-

sibilitie to the TorritorieB, and that where praotieable, the tran or ot

parti cula.r services should ba etta~ in advance o£ tho dissolution ot he

Federation. The Conte nee established t o main Co itt a, hioh, ru; inter­

governmental negotiatinr. bodie , would study and recomDBnd solution to the

comple% problems involved. The Conference w also able to reach agreemant

on guide-lines or these Committee on a number or ttors. Among thea

was the revers:!Jon o! the control of th.e d to.reee to the pre-19' deration

position when the dissolution took effect, with th to accruing to

to Southam Rbod oia, well · ar.rangemonta to permt lbera ot the

foro s to opt in hicb r.ritor;y 1ihe7 wished to ern.

24. In a speech to t of Co DS on 11 J~ 1963

that the JO•iticm w1 th r. to iDd ndenc for Sout rn Bbodesia hA4 D

lett op n, toll .'loiU4~ ot 1 t te do aribod • So f

the UDi ted Xiagdom OoverDDlent co mea, the still o tor t\.ariher consideration. Th Bo. s also intor th t the convar t io

vhiah took pl11ce with Mr. 11 ld nt iotor1a lls :rami nation

or pl dges b7 • Dltler.

25. Addressine the onnunl eongre of tho Rhode i n Front on 20 Septemb 1"

1963, • Field at.f1 d th t though the Unit d Kingdo b 1ng unco-operative 1n tbe matter, the i ue of Southern Rhode 1a1 ind.pen-.uoo5-"" had not be n

dropped but that it was necea az.v f'uat to co let the exercise of dis olvi»g tba led ration. ~ oongre a unani110usly adopt re olution expressing

support for the ViDia in hia determi tion to s independence o thorn Rhodosi p vided ohed and the 1961

cot t1tutioa remained ltered. 6 s pt 1963 following th9

announcement of the da e for NY1Wlla.n41a illda nee, Mr. F-leld re­

iter ted th~t if indepandence ten·ito ry, it 3hould

be accorded to all on the break- ion.

26. At the annual congr ss of the esia National Party on 4 October

1963, Sir E~ Whiteh ad, Leader th Opposition, expressed himself

in favour of a negotiated indeparua!n~m within tbe Commonwoalth. P.s also said that an African majority ROVe nt not c·tlled fol' as the countr.v was not ready for this, b t that tb Africans must be given greater repre­ sentation in Parliament. 27. On 25 October 1963, before t parture for London of Mr. I.,n Smith, the Southern Rhodesia Minister of Treasur.y» tor talks .itb tb~ United

Kingdom Government , Mr. Field decl that Southern Rhodesia ~.ou l d request t'w.-ther urgent diacussiune with the United K::l.ngdom on independence, and nd.ght have to make firm proposals i ael! if' noth.iiJg definite e l:!lsrgad. He would continue to negotiat , but no 'to the extent of' hand.in& over authorl.'iy' to those as yet unfitted and untrai for it.

28. Commenting on his talks with UD:lted Kinedom lliniste:rat Mr. Sm:lth s id on 1 November 1963 that the United ngdom Government had not yet opened a~ line of advance to ards Southo Rhodesia's independence. If this was not settled before Nyasaland'e inde ndenoe, ·Southern Rhodesian electorate nd.fJJ,t turn a~ainst the Government. On 12 November 1963, i·he Prima llinister of the United Kin -~om told the House of Commons, in repl~ t o questions about

Southern Rhodesia, that his Oove nt accepted the principle tha·G the majorit should rule but th~t minor iee should be protectedJ this principle would appq if the question of ind Ddence for Southern Rho esia came up for idoration aftor the d1ssolu

29. On 15 November 1963 the Corac,mn:ta and Colonial Secret stated in a sp5eoh to the House at ns United Kingdom Oovc:rn-

nt .B prepared to grant ind.':11}11;Ju\lw to 1"11 Rhodesia in the san!S ch-cu.mstances as it bad granted 1D terri~orios. In p:lrtioular, the United Kingdom Oo·v"','""'ll'IADt loo tor a vlidoning of the franchise so as to give sreator re sentation to the Africans who constitut d nine-tenths of the population but less than a quarter of the seats in

Parliament. He further explainod that in order not to cause injUJ-7 ho the un1t7 of the Common\lealth, ita rs would h to be consulted as to the terms on whicb independence within the Common alth ould be gt'

30. Bo eve , replying to a question in the Southern Rhodesia Pnrliaman on 21 November 1963, Mr. Field de ed that tho question o~ Southern Rhodesia's independence was one for Cowmonweal h consultation. Asked \vhat changes be wouLd be prepared to make to the Constitution before independence he sai

'that certain changes to th~ "B" roll wore being proposed end that his

Government was conaid,.:ril'l€ ev<; ry approach.

31. Opening a parliamentary deba.t on the Sou~hern Rhodesia independence question on 26 November 1963, Mr. Smith remar d he had gained the impres­ sion trom his discussiono in London that ihe United Kingdom Go 1 erv~nt s thinking in terms o-f African majorit;r rule in tiTe yea.re. In hie Govern­ ment's opinion, however, independence under the present eonsti tution "as essential for political stability ~ the ~covar,v of economic confidence.

He urY,ed that, in view of t e Unitecl Kingdo 's 1'ocord of broken pledges,

Southern Rhodesia should stand up for its ght • Mr .. Field, in his turn, -15-

Southern Rhodosi IJ1'8.Pl d t o continue

discws ions wi tll the Uni tet1 Kin£11 t ted settlement before the general elections in t ted KiDglllom would b not hing but

a h&ndovar to African nationalism at t · rn Rhcdeaia el~ ct ions .

Al so addressing the House, Sir Ed~ tehead d that i~ the Government

took illegal tnd unconstitutional ac 1 n to ao i nd0pendenea, Southern

Rhod i a ould crash within six mont • A long rm solution in h:?.s via 1 muet rest with all the people and no th one action of ·the community.

32. On 3 December 1963 in the Unite l]ngdom lious of Commons, the Prime llinister, Sir Alec Douglas-Home stat , i n answor to questiono, t ~.t t he

Com':lDmrealtb Relations end Colonial Secretary WllB in touch mth the Common-

ealth Prime Mini3ters on the questlon. On 19 December 1963 5 he explained i n reply to another question th"'lt whELt lv1. d been uggest ed · :lS not ,;lln.t ot er

Commonwealth countr ies shoul d share in a decision conoernin no Southern

Rhodesia but that thay mi t be able to hel~ to s a. aolu·Hon.

33. The dissolution of the Federatto came into effect on 1 Janue.:cy- 19643

Nyaaaland will becone i ndependent on 6 July 1964 and lTorthcrn Rho(}.eaie. i s alao expect · d to attain independence duri ng the year., AceoL"ding to an announcement praviously made by the deral Miniotr,r of Do£onco, the agree­ ment s reached between the Territories and the United Kingd.om Oover,1m~nt provided f or t he ol lowing disposition of the Federation•~ al~d forces to t ake e~fe ct from the dat.e of di ssolution. The Royal RhodGsi~n Ai Force, s lightly reduced in s t rength to abo'" 75 aircraft, would r~\rert to Southam

Rhodesian cont:rol. In addition~ Soathern Rhodesia wot.~ ld , . e a ::1ouadron of t he Special Air Servioes Re insnt, comprising a out 1.50 :ful:..y trained para.­ cbut e oo~~ndos. The Sel ous Scouts armed car squ~n would bs disbanded and its membors would be offered positions in o her units. The agular aruw -

oul eoMi omp41sing e rogular i bato.J.licm nd an rn total at h ot egulnr fJ1¥ l'l'ould be o.bout n, o just urtder ono- o! tho Fedoral Ragular army.

. o. Nat Year broadcast, : • the f_ne.ncit!.l coats of

41 lution and rcfer.rod to hie p~"-r:L

ormal talks "th tho Opposition o t e ~ue of indGpendenca. afEirmed that hie Governm~nt muat tempt ou...... a a n ~ til".tad sot ~1enJ nt of the question but if this was not oasible, ould .r.-ve ~..o -~ dok age.i •

35. On 10 January 1964, Sir Edgar tehead 111 warned t at a unilateral doolaration of Southam Rhodesian i spandonc uld o:ting (:0 ·pJ.eto diSf·St '!:!

that the outeida world would recognise he reglmG founded upou it.

H c~ticised the Government fo ng to ne tiato i · ~openae&ce withouv b nein« in outside parties. la, • S th, no; oputy Pritro l.linister

inister for the Treasur.y, 1a uoted as ng that if Sout e . n Rhodes:.a

olnred its independence, there d be DO lt-tight~ning. Indeed ~he d o~ belt-tightening would be and the ttende.nt m:citement in finan­

1 circles ~ould be ahortlived. United K"nGdom Government

d or did wuld not make tba sli test diff nee to ,.. outhn:n Hhodcoia 1 a i~ention to get independence.

36. On 18 Janua.cy 1964, Mr. Joa Nkomo, ant of Ita Pocple'a CnrQ- t r Council, declared th!J. ~ be •.10\ll neve:r all the granti11t:; o~ ind.openc'.encs to the minority Govarnmant of ld an d tha:~ 311 . fricn.ns ce pr pared to l"'sist e. 'Qni.J.atoral d ration o independerce by t;le p:r oant ma . '• -

• 24 .T8llu&r.y 19&4, h • .IOU.I.I...-'14 /CiYOft'QOt MM'II'IliLr'f' of th Zimba

Arll"lCtDD Ba11onal Union, wa:rned if the Southern

WMJCIIICiian Europeans seised. indeJ)Ql=G.IJDGe 1onally, the A icans

W'GII~ ~i:e it as an act of war ..... ,,.,.._17 nga,~ in unconsti tu-

modes of atruggl that at

llr. Field visited London on - uaey f. few ys in order t

d.ieGwJa w1 t h the United C,ngdom Oonlftiiioont hi el'DD!ent 0 s demand or

i~ndence. No official communi ~ iss but according to reports ,

Mr. ftel cl bad i ndicat ed that, in vi r of certai n e l emen·ts in

~ ~ty ~or a unil at eral declaration o inde ence, be ~ould find i t

~ftault to c . ntinue s.s Prime Mi r· unless h ob:tained a clear stat

maat r:4 the United Kingdom policy 1D t he rratt e:r. It has been r eported

t hat Mr. F:lel d 1 s proposals, i n keeJ)113g Yith hia pledge t o make no constitu-

t i changes during the l ife of t present Parli ament, did not include

81JF wbstantial changes i n the "A" 11 f r anoh1 , which affact a 50 per

ot t he 65 seats in t he Legi s ~ nor i n t Land Apportionment Act

ww~gg provides for racial restrict on t he ship of land. According

\o reporta tl e Uni t d Kingdom nt on th other hand continued to

ilai that Commonwealth acquiesc was import t for any grant of i nde-

ence to Southern Rhodesia. I n cader to obtain this~ ·the f r anchi se

BbDuld be i dened sufficient ly to gt a polit1 1 voice to the majority,

R.Zd to provi de f or maj or1t y rule iD about 5 y 1 rather than in 12 or 15

wbl ~e Sout hern Rhodesia Oove thinks ld applY under present

t razaahiae qualif ications. The Uni Kingdom 0 e.rnment was also reported

to clesi re ·the removal of di crim1 Hr;y claus· ill the Lan Apportionmant An. These talks f ailed to resol the deadl o --

,. a -press cord'erenc o ra1bl'f'ft on 2 l'lll~ar.r 1?64, !h-. field t he would negotlat• with K'11!Wlklll Government up to the

ere nc further nagoti t1o possibll the point where it

bear no fruther truittul re • That ~~, 111 hie view, had not JWt en reac ed.

40. llr. Kenneth Kaunda, the Prim ster ~ hem Rhodesia pledged on 5 P'ab:ruary 1964 that his Oove1"'DD..rlt~ h1ng within its power to lp the United Kingdom Governma cont rol 1Luation th~t might ar1 in Southern Rhodesia sbould latte ~~~ itself independent wall terally. In that event there ld be chi ar in the Territ o17 and b1a GoYernment would sever all relaUons with thern Rhodesia irrespecti ve ot the economic sacrifices involv&d. 41• ])Qr1118 the middle or FebruJtry, • lPleld v.l ited Sm. ·h Africa for talks with the Oovemnent of the Republic. On that oat:.sion, a South African rwt~W~a:per sympathetic to the Oove t sugges' that prec~ pitat action

1Q" thern Rhodes ia would merely i ease its .fticulties w~. th t he United

'CDidom A.nd the Afri can nat ionalit: and that statesmanlib. thing was to pars1st in oe~ tiations :or a peaoetul settle • It has been ~ ported that

Mr. lield1 a visit did not yield a117 pledgee of pport from Dr. Vei..'\YOerd t or a wdlatera.l declar·.;.tion of indepe ceo

42. On 20 Februa ry 1964, Sir Aleo gl~s-Ho tol d the Boase of Commons,

1 arunre.r to questions, t hat t he (Jc)vernment was t rying to rtMCh agzoeement with the parties rned on e next step to be t aken, and e aed the hope that there woul 'be no quea'tion of unconstitutional action

~ Bomibern Rhodesia.

4). llaanwhile the belief seems t~ growing 118 the colle es and npporiera of Mr. Field th~ t furt ~ nego·Uati w1 th the United Kingdom - 19 ft p1'0Clu.oe nothiDg 8C pta.ble to th end &Cuu•.--..a.u.:.q the prdssurea OD h1 to take action, pret'erably be:tore th UnU ~m ganer£~ elections,

~ a unilateral declaration o:t indapandenco aN asing. Yr, John Gaunt, the lliDi tEn" ot Mines, has bean qaotad ae say1 that it was the duty o'f

Soutbern Rhodesia to t a whatever aoiion was n ssar,y before ti\e U1U ted nn..•m Government destro7ed the country.. lfr. s th has baen l'eJIOrted s.s

&rgulJI& :tor a swift decision though ocording to him a.ll the conrtitutional anmaes mu.~t be explored before the 'broader field is oon.rrl.dersd. J.fr . Will iam

Jlqrpar, the ~finister of Transport and Power, i also a d to be advocating aotion independently of the United mgdom, withou.t an;y provoca·;ive declare.- tiona.

44. On 25 February 1964 Sir HumphNJ' Gibbs, the Qovemort sail'. in t h

Speeoh from the Throne at the openin.tJ of Parliament 1

"J.f.y Primo !linister had the opportunitJ' last mo t'1 o1 having personal and prlvato discussions lrl.th the B:r!.tish Pr:iu3 lli ister aad the Secretary of State for ~ommonwealtb !&lations on nde­ pendance f or Sou then Rhodesia. It is now plain that t.1e :~ri tish GovermDEmt are not prepared to be brought to any conclmi on except on the mos·t extravagant termsJ not because o~ misgiving~ about rrq Oovarnment•s competence or abillty to goverD in the int ·.?."aatn of t bs country or the log:l.c and ricflt ness ot 11Q' Jlin1eters • eas but 'because they wish to placate at all coats those members t f t he Com­ .,mrealih who have declared openly their hodility to ~ tOVernment and country. "JV Ministe oonsid,,r t hq have done Uleir utmost anci therG is ao obligation upon them to tiate fUrther discus ions. 1

45. In the ensuing debate, Sir Edgar Whitehead said, inter ali~, \hat be oolll.d not sympathise with Bn3 nationalist mol/ nt at all and th\t t he

ot solving the country's pres problems aannot be done by eit'ler zoaoe alone. The trican nationali t had DO polio;r other than to obta 1.n coDtz-ol of the Government and had DO polioy tor future development if t.w

.,... achieved that cont~l. Rsferr1Dg to tb outfiow of Europeans from -20-

Southam Rhodesia, he said there was nothing in the Sp eeh :f'rom the 'l'h.rone

to changa the mind of anyone planning to loa·te the country or to influence

anyone leaning towards nationalise to seek something bettor.

46. In a speech t>.t the same meeting, • Field sta'ted tha.t for the first

time he really knew what the United Kingdom Govern ant's point of view was and that it was thoroughly ~ng. He pointed out that the c~~ntr,y waa no

longer the self-governing "Colon:- of South rn Rhodesia" but just "Southern

Rhodeeia". Referring to Commonwealth susoaptibili ties about Scuthern

Rhodesia:. attaining independence under the present Constitution, he said that Southern Rhodesian membership of the Commonwealth t:ID..•st go by the bom:d it t his impedes its progress to independence. His Government did not recog­ nise the riGht of a.eyone to interfere in the affairs of Southern Rhodesia nor would i t tolerate ElJV such interference. Thenceforth, ·tho Government would pursue i ts own course within the framework of the Southern Rh deeian

Consti tution, and act as a Gover.nment owing all9giance to th3 Crown and not to any particulnr United Kingdom Oo~ernment . Furth r, his Government reg·;rded aa l•Jgally binding on the United I

47. A Government rae ber of Parliament, llr. D. W. L., :rd.ne -Burke gave notice -21- on 'Z7 Febl"\la27 1964 th~t he would i ntroduce a motion on 11 March 1964 hich would in effect seek legislatiYG _ecognition for the convention ··hat the

United Kingdom P~liament does not legislate f'or Southern Rhoder.ia except with the

Southern Rhodesian Oovernmentos consent~

48. At a pres eonfe.rance outside Salisbury the same day, • ikotno said that the Africans ere 'British ci · izens and members o£ t o •T!lOmvaalth and i ntended to remain so. If Mr. Fieldea Government dec ded to achieve independ­ ence by leaving the Commonwealth, the Africans oould fight dde by side with

United Kingdom troops to restore lf,gal government in the cr t tcy and enter into negotiations to b ing about majority rule and indepen ...nee therea:ftero

49. At the same time, commenting c.n Mr. Field s speec , ··a Rev. Si thole olaimed th;~. t Mr. Field was merely trying ·to avoid serioU"' hargee of rebellio oonduot. -22-

SO. Ch 9 J'ul1' 1963.1t wae nport d fl"CCl Dar-e that seven memb.-a ot the twel: executive of the barmecl Z abNe African People• s Union had d cided to depose Hr. Joshua Nkomo as party- le d and had ehet.ed Rev. Hdabaningi Sithole ae

1nter1m president until a party congress could be held. Dissatisfaction with Mr.

Nkcao's leadership was g1 en as the ason tor tbie decision. Rev. Sithole has taken a 1eading part. 1n the organisati-on o all three A.!'rican nationalist parties

StlCOnsiveq banned 1n Southern Rhodesia. A member ot his group stated that the change ot leadership 1r0uld mean a !DON militant approach to independence and that it Jdght be necessary to use methode other than constitutional ones. The .tollowing da;y, hovwer, it was announced trom ZAPU headquarters in Da~es-salaam that

Bn-o Sithole and three other members of the part7 executive associated with him had been euapended by Mr. NkOJr.O, who rtma1n party leader.

Sl. On 8 August 1963, it was annolD'la t hat Rev. 5ithole had formed a new party, the Zimbabwe A.fl"ican National Union of whi

had invited these leaders to a coderenoe for discuss ons. They, however, declined to a'tt8hd and urged their toll.ower to bOJCOtt the conterenceo Subsequent attempts to bring about a reconciliation have~ with little succes~.

S2. In a polic;,r statement issued Oil 21. August 1963, Rev. Sithole announced plans for t 'U1'!11Dg Southern Rhodesia into a. Republic ot Zimbabwe within the fraterni t:r ot

Atr1aan States and the Commomtealth. He urged that in tuture Southern Rhodeei matitutiona must refiect the will or the Africans, while Tespecting the rights and aeplrations or minority groups. A ZAW G

Orpnisati m e Act, the Law and Order (Maintenano ) Act, and all other repressive and diaor:l.miDator,y legislation, and would. eatabllsh a retroactive Bill or Rights. A strcmg - ua~YU~~a.~. ~ would b formed to ~II;UI~ 14l'l.-,.Jtt1on ot Af'rica froa uv.~~......

S3. ~ S Sept.ember 1963, Mr. ctd ... ..,4riU'It.1on of the ' Peo~' •

(Jar'etaker Council" , of wh1cb he Pl'e ..-- ~·· ·• :t.h a trl.xteen-man cab local. colllllitteea. HS.s choic to be due to his pledge•

ZAPU was banned in Sept.ember 19621 to to party 54. 'nle Secretary-General or z at the end of' Sept.embAr 1963. In er he 'lVI'lN!d to the lfin1ster, z.uru protest. the United Kingdom GoTe • s laok concern for the iuterests ot t

Atr1cans, as exemplified by its d.-.-..· ...._ ...... vhen the milltar:y positiOD o the

South I'D Rhodesian GoYemment on d1 lution. letter demanded that the Ubi ltmgdcm should impose a new Conatit. on m kMp1Jlg with the wishas of the 11ajor'lt7 betore d1ssolutian and that meanwtdl.e the Unit. lingd.om should withhold all. t!Dano1al aid, as ltell aa control

55. There bsve been reports or c arable d1: gence o:r views in )iro Pield'•

Rbodesim Front between those who f; ur an ear~ unilateral declaration of

!n4 ~dence under the present Co :tution an those "'ho see the need for na 1ated

~, with or without Atric rticipat Similar develoJIJI.ents aN to baYe t.aken place within Sir Ed 1 Rhodes! National Part7. The aeeut.ins of one party branch ,.1 rted. to have resi gned 1D prot.& a.saSnst Sir Bdgar Whitehead 1 s ad'lf._.•• .,..,.. acial policies and hie teDdenta:7 to ~e African nationalism. hints of. the formation or a oentre part.7 and report.e of' the po le return to polit_cal life or Sir Bo7

Wi leaelq• the retired Prime M1nist of the d1 lnd P'ederat iono

Bamt L!rJ.slatiop 56. The proposed amendment to th and 0 (Maintenance) Act, 1961, to retenace is made 1n paragraph 28 the last port of ·he Special Camd.tt.ee, waa passed through i ts final sta by- the So m Rhodesian Parliament on 20 - Mm~ L963. This amllM!iell't, •..ttea:LOQ t Order (Maint. anc )

1\I!UIDamsn; BU1 provided• .a.:;.;;a. -.;;;;;~~­ a N~n.o,ry d t.b sen~enee £or off ces, 1nclud-"'.ng the thrO'fd.ne trol bombs, as

alties for other offences. It made ~man.et the existing tempo

QD ~he holding or public meetings aya public holldaya ..

57. 011 the same d~v, the South 1 :u..mnt pa.:ssed the U~'i'ul

Org ieationa ~Amendment) Bill, h e Governor to order fo leaders or banned organis.'!ltione to 1gn !: er orgarrl.sations, gave the 11ae

greater powers of search and a i a, and made it an otfenee to be

iD possession of documents or ins~~ relat to an unlaw.fUl orga.nisationo

58 The Preserration or Constitut RJ. Gove t Bill l~S also passed on 20

March 1963. It provided for sent s of up to 20 years imprisonment !or per 1

convie~ed or organising• either -.u;a-..<.v or out the count,ry, bodies whose is to overthrow the Government by Ul14:ons1dtut-lo.&. means It also extended tho pl"'risions of the Law and Order ( tenance) so that the penalties ror ee·'OPL'.... " ot~ es under that Act, such as strikes, mak:1ng subveraiYe statements, publishing talse news threaten violence ''sill app]J 1en Sout m lllodeaian residents conm1t them o e the c ry. The Bill also provided ! s.ntences up to five ;rears for pe • convicted ot setting up bodies in Southe

Rhodesia which aim at the unconsti 1onal ove brow of an.v Stat.eo S9o In a Speech from the Throne to rliament 25 P'ebruary 1964, the Govern stated that the split in the ranks African 1onalists had resulted ill mcreased crime' particular~ in t African T..,.ftt•hips and indicated that the

Ganrnnmt would seek renewal or t l'reventi antion Act and the Unlawful

Organisations Act, both of which c:AL.Ii.L&~ on l4 ~1ay 1964. Both lllea

WJ"8 introduced five ;rears agoo • 25-

60. On l April 1963, Hr. NJc(lllo waa tenced 1D Ru pe to six months imprie

iavolved vnmgthl.l.y and ~ a~t:tng, sisting or obstructing police

oftlaen in the execution of thei duty. On 19 ~ this conviction and se11.t.ence

were quashed in an appeal heru"ing and he was found guilty1 cautio ed and d1 charpel

oa an altemative charge of assault hiob the Court desci'ibed as t ivial. 'l'w

other associates convicted along wit.b him s1m11 ar~ won their appeals.

61. On 28 October 1963, Mr. Nk:omo vas sentenced. at Gwelo to nine tbs iapriscmment,

wit.h fiye months suspended if the otfence was not repeated ldthin 3 years, !or

1IIBk1ng a subversive statement in Aueust. His otfence related to a statemaut.

attributed to him that Ge:rmans and Italians had been given land from lfhi.oh Africans

had been evicted after t he first world war and that the Govemment desired the

nationalists to form another politic party so that it could be bazmed and i ta

assets sold. Having appealed, he liU y,ranted bail provided he di not e the oountr'7. 62. On 7 November 1963, the Southem Rhodesian Government prohibited Mr. NkCIIID

&c. attendine or addressing public ptherings other than religious services tor

three months IUld his People' s Caret::sker CouncU vas barred floom conven1n8 such

11188t1ngs for a similar period. Mr. Clifford W. Dupont, J.anister of Justice, stated

thnt he considered t his action necessary for the maintenance of lm'l and order.

63. On 20 December 1963. J.rr. Nkom.o was again sentenced at Bula\'rayo to 9 months

2m]r1 otunent, with six JIDlths suspended it be liaS not comricted of ottence W'lder th Law and Order (Maintenance) Act within 3 years, f or publishing a subversive atater.aent.. This statement was that the violence complained of bl" t.he Southem

Rhodesian Government was a direct natural react. ian against the country• s llasiet

Fascist regime. He was grAnted bail, pending an appealo 64. On 2 January 1964, Mr. NkoiDo a bUlned b.r the Broadcasting Corporation :fl"'O1

appearing on a. television personnlit;r progranme on which Mr. Field and Sir Ro7

W lensky had previously been featured. The groUD.ds given ,.,ere that Mr. HkODLo was

current]3' under a ban !rom making public appearances.

65. On 2A January 1964, lfr. Nkorno was sentenced at Umtali to six months

imprisaunent, with three months suspended for three years, for holding the police

to contempt or diseste during a apeeoh in Oetobe~. He was granted bail pending

an appeal. While in court he was served with an order banning him indefinite~

from entering an,;y tribal trust lands in Southam Rhodesia., He was also reported to have been benned f going wit hiD 15 mil.es of Salisbury f or three monthso

On ).g February 196.4 he was arrested and charged 1n Salisbury wit h contravening the order banning him f'rom tribal trust l and. He ras rP-l eased on bail.

66. On 2S July 1963, the Rev. Si t hole was arrested and charged \·rit n distr butitlg a subversive document. He was remanded on bail. On 6 September 1963, his bail was torteited for failing t o comp~ with its condi tions. Mr. Robert Mugabe, the

~eral or ZANU, was also arrested on 19 December 1963 and charp;ed m der the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act on three count s related t o alleged:cy subversive statements made outside Southern RbocSesia. Bail was refused.

67. Actions involv~ other African politi cal personalities include a sentence of one ;rear' a imprlsamn.ent for writ ing a. subversive statement, imposed on • Kddyson

Sambo, a leader of the Zimbab\'19 National Party on 1 July 1963; the holding t or t riAl ot Mro Patrick Ma.tilnba, president or that party from 2 July 196.3, on oharges or inciting others to ham peopl e and to set fire to homes with petrol or

1nfiaJ!mable liquid; the conviction OD 23 October 963 and imprisonment for 12 months ot Mr. Phineas F. Sithole for possession or alleged subv'ersive document; and the imprisonment o l.fr stephen Nkamo, brother of l.fr. Joshua Nkano, fer 4 months tbr ille~ possessing a pistol. ,.

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68o Since J~ 1963 there have been clashes between the sup!'Ol-ters of 1-lr. Nkca.o

and Rev. Sit.hole and other outbreaks related to the tr12ls of nat.. onalist leaders.

It is estimated that between January and December 1963, hero have be~n about 50

cases of arson and similar offences punishabla und r the La\r and Order (M tenance)

Act. Between November 1963 and January 1964 serious disturbances. ma.inl,y ill the

A.triean townships, which have bad to be dispersed by the pollc , sometimes with

the use of teargas and vomitgas1 have b0come more treouen ; on such disturbance

1n Sallsbucy on 28 January led to the shooting of two Africans and the wounding of

several by the police and the arrest o~ 68p Ther were 16 incidents J.nvolving.

expl sives, thought to be caaea of sabotage, in November and Decmtber. The most

serious or these was t.he blowing up of part of a railway line near BulaWBlOJ most

of t he other targets have been public buildings and installat.ione. There huve

also been a tew cases of bomb-throtdng at policemen. It has beoo reported that

during Februa , hundreds of Africans wore arrested in surprise raids., The

arrested persons according t o Mro Clifford Dupont,, have h en placed under restriction,

1n accordance with the security la.l'tS pennitting BUJilln.al"Y' detention, 11in order to

proteat Africana from intimidati on and robbery by terrorist~ and nooligans''"

Qt;her due1omen·~s

69" On 11 Feb ary 1964, ·~.~he Southern Rhodesia Constitutional Council, ich was

set up to examine ond report on any Act that is inconsistent i h the declar ation

of rights in the Constitution, reported that its vie\• the Land Apportionment

Act is an Act whic:h, in express terms and 'tdth penal ctions, forces racial

diserim:!nn.tiono The Council questioned th~ value o ""he declaration of rights eo

lone as one or these riehts, the rip,ht to f reedom from discrimi..TI~.tion in regard

to ownership and occupation of lan , was speeificaJ.l3 denied by the Act. Such .. · ...... -28- d1scrim:1nat1on, 1n the CouncU' e op1niOD1 was ca an imputation ot interior stAtus tp one race1 fhich WBB su.fticient t.o imrit.e a confiiet. Further• the implementAtion or the Act had oaused actual material prejudice in the Nnanoial sanae to all rAces in Southern Rhodesia.

70. The Government is not obliged, however, to tnke a.ny action on any la·rs tbua criticised by the Council which wen passed before the Constitution came int.o effect in 1961. The Land Apportionment Act falls within this CEltegory. ·.

The Prime Minister: I wo uld l ike to add rrq congratulations to the bono JOOver a.nd the eeconder of the DDtion.. I have listened to a. number of uoh speeches and I think these were quite outstanding in one partieular respect, a l'"e apect one rarely cogs across in this or aJJ¥ other Parliament, and that is brevity. I do congratulate themo I think the;r WN a.beoltlte:cy first-class .. The Leader of +.he Opposition I toought started on a. very pleasant nlte indeed because he said he was represented by an hon.. member on this side of the House ., l'lhen he did not complain at all one can only assume he is perfectly satisfied with his representation. I know fUll well he has no need to be otherwise. The Leader of the Opposition ranged over a. large field in regard to the points that he made, am o.l.though he asked me to repl;y to all of thorn

thore was an injunction that I should n(tt steal the thund~r of' my colleagueao 0! course, I wo11ld not. attempt to do that.. I would not succeed if' I tried, but I will answer those points that I can, and I hope he will forgive me - I Jmow he has no option but to forgive me if I do not answer them all, but they will all be answered in due course ..,

~he first matter on Nbich he touched was the matter of Kxternal Atf'aire and our policy.. and be expressed regret that we had remvad our Consular

Representative in Beira~ I can assure the Leader of the Opposition that it we find it necessary to replace th&t of'ticer, we shall do aoo Ot course, ve still have trade representation down at Beira which can, I think, look arter out general inte!"eats thereo This House will appreciate. I am au:re, that i t is a matter of finance, and for us to be represented in all V&rious coWltries in which the Federal Government was represented is impossible \/e just cannot do ito I regret having to curtaU this representation just as much as an,ybocly' e se wt ....re have no optiono There is mthing significant at all about the tact that we have had to curtail cel'"tain representation in the North although we have continued it in the Southo In fact, we have curtailed it ewrywhere so !ar as numbers are concerned; we have had no option. I i'IOuld like him to understand t hat there is nothing significant in that wbatsoevaro Maybe he was not s uggesting it but it did sound rather like it to meo ·•

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He then went on to refer to the neaaaaity for this country to look to other

African countries tor market a. O.t course, I entirel.J' agree, we do o I can assure thia House that I bought ganrunts JD1llelt in Tanganyika and in fto1218 not t.oo long ago - about 18 JB)ntha &§) - that are made 1n this oowttey. The oon. member will also know that certain small. agricultural impleiiBnts that are made in this country are exported not just to the countries i.Jmnediatel.y to the North ot us lna.t to East Africa and other parts aa wll. · Ot course, rq colleague will reply to this in detail, but we are setting up a bcdy- to deal with thi.B particul.a.r aspect. There has nttver been one that hae roal.ly worked betors o I know the Federal Government bad such a body, but it did not real.l.y operate.. This u going to work, it will work well.o I have no doubt about it whatsoever.

The next. ma.tter that wu raised waa making ouraelves better knoND by radio o M¥ colleague, the Mi.ni.at.er of Ju tice, vbo is in charge of radio and television, will deal with thi.B in due course, but I can assure tfl,e Leader or the Opposition that wa have already" diacl.lsssd tbia ami we haw things in hando He then went on to t.alk ot Atrican eo-operatiws in the rural areaso 1 myselt. ever since I took ottice, bave toliNd the rural al"e&s and I have been

trying to put over this idea or African co-ops, both tor the fort:Uizers8 which i a extremely important. - in other MOrds both trom a b1¢ng and. ael.ling point ot v19Wo I believe it ldl..l l«:Jrko 'l'he oon. member knows just as well as 1 do that farmers a.ll onr the HIOrld, whatever colour they JDB¥ be, are an e.xt.rBMly conservative people - not stupid, bT no maana, but conaervative - and 1t takes quite a long t:iJne to get. a new id.ea accepted, but I beliew it w1ll be aaceptedc He then expreasect the hope that t he t.hree territories will come together agai.no I assume be IIB8Jlt polltiaall.y$ beaauao I believe that economioalq w hava reaJ..l.y achieved qllite a lot in this clirection aJ.ready, particularly in 110 far as aoltiiDn services are concerned. I know there were tears expressed in this Chamber and 1n others that we woal.d bave pra.cticall.Y no ties with t.b:l territories to the North of us at. allo I am del ighted to sa;y, and that you shollld all lmow now, t.ha.t e have tieso He f'urther sugge ted am, ot course, 1 could not agree with aDT expression

ot opinion DDre than I do ldth this one~ that only we can solve our own problems o I ~e comptetelr. - 3 -

then went on to euggost t at ve no policy to take care of what he r !erred to as tbe exploaiw growth in our populationo Well, ot aourlSe I do oot agree with th t at allo Our pol1c does take care of t.h.i • - (AN • MI!MBJ!:d.: InaUdible inter.1eotion.) - I am just abo11t to tell tbat bon. mber llfb) interrupted e - you kmw you do mt g1ve a.nybod,y very 1111Ch t to get, on with the even no or his tasko 1'he policy that e a.rG adopting of channelling all Government expenditure, aU the m::>ney that we can raise into

~ productive ant rpriees which, ln thair tarn. will give nore !lo t and 110 xpand. our local et. for our a cond industrial goode, ia 1ncli t1ye ot tbe pollcy that wa &rB following. We are not going to be deterred trom t.hia be use it we di aipate the r eeources that we have, the mone7s that can raiee in various 11.ttle projaote ot injeotioll8 into this industry an4 injections into that industry, then event.uall,y e shall have used a.ll OUI" reeour a and produc d pract1oallT nothiag. I would refer here, of oourse. to the developuent or the high veldJ the 1ncro 1n tanning activity or about 10 per cent. 1n this particular seaaon, and also the veey rapid devalopnent in tho low veld, which 1 am tu.l.ly a was started before we took ott:l.ce .. l ..,uld, bowewr, refer to tbe .tact that in another place I pressed tor this d V'eloJDJnt, year attar year, f:om the daJ' that I entered Parliament, and it is a great pity that it NU not tackled then. I do not belleve that wa W)uld be experiencing tbeee troubles or unemplo nt, aru1 in some casas wondering .cbat are 8)ing to do With our ung people bad that pol1o7 been put into operation at the tiJDB when it soould have be n, which is soma seven or eight

,.ears o In regard to the using in towns and so on, I hall not touch on this at all.o lt ha.s seemed to that all the 18.7 t.brough his speech, t Leader ot the Oppold.tion was reaJ.l7 maJd.ng ua an otter in general plarming and help, dewlopllCUlt and so on, and co-operationo Ii' that is 'What he was doing, tb8n I wsl ito He clid not uactl,y 88.1 so but that is how it appe d to • lt I am llll"'ng he onlJ" to shak bis head. - (MN.o PALMlilt..OWElh Iii might shake it. ott.) In regard to our oftl'&ll pl.ann1Dg the bon .. member did mention the fact t.bat had one of hie late colleagues u Chairman or what I mpe will beaome iD a abort tine, as soon as we have ironed out all the various cinkl.ee there are to be iroDid out, our local. developuant authorit7 tor Sabi/Limpopo - w 8P turtber tha.n the Lundi - authority. well, of course, we picked people t o ISUit a job, -4-

I 'l'k:>uld remind the Leader of the Opposition that also a very prominent member of tha.t Committee is o.n ex-opponent of his, who was at one time the Leader of the Opposition of this House and a. man to whorl\ this whole country owas a very great debt of gratitude, Ur. day Stockill .. These men and their colleagues, being the type of people they are would, o£ course, engage in inquirjng of the people in the variou~ areas as to wbat it is they want down thel"'8 1 how they think developmant o to go, and we have already" instituted these inquiries in the Sabi Valley, we have &lread,y been carrying these out. I know the Chairman of what is now the Advisory Comznittee on lowveld development bas himself been down there again and again, and as he was at one time Hiniater of Native Affairs he should know his tasko lf hs does not, that is not ow- fault; it may be the fatll.t, perhaps, of the pt-evious Govern~~ent. Of course, this type of develop:n.ent and taking care of our population does run us into certain practical difficulties of which I am quite sure he w1l.l be aware, and that is again the conservatism of the rural dwellero In OUt' efforts we hope we shall be indulging in intensive develoJDBnt scherres to all peoples in the lowveld, irrigation schemes in particular, the growing ot oll the various crops again by all people of all races. \4e ran up againBt a problem pa ticularl.y so far a.s the Af rican tanner is concerned, that he does not like to change. we have coma across this in other parte of the countr,- al..ready and I know the Leader of the Opposition did when he was in Government because certain schemes were started by that GoverDmBnt, and this is going to be one of' our major problems. lie shall overcome it but certain economic pressures may have to help uso .~e shall overcome it. rou cannot force anyone to take up irrigation farming n say, ten acres, when t he7 are u~~ad to operating on 100 acres ot grazing, and so on, and prater that t ype of life o •ie will overcome tha.t but I entirely agree that considerable prepara- t.ion will ba ve to take place in this direction.. In tact, it is al..ready taking place. I can give the Leader of the Opposition t hat assurance. I am going to disagree with him when he said we must DBke arrangemants for many' rural dwellers, young people, to come into our to1ms. I assume t hat the Leade of the Opposition means our existing towns .. mainly, I suppose, Salisbury and Bulawayoo I do not agree l'lith him at all. As developnent takes place in the rural a~, processing plant must be set up on the spot , and t hat Mana that rct.rious services w:Ul be required of all types, and that is where the people - 5 ~

shoUld f!P o They sb:>uld not just ru.n into the towns nor should We attempt to ·l:ring them into the towns purely for the aake of coming to the towns because the,- like towno There will be other towns started, and that is where they will go!i and I can see quite considerable centres being developed inevitably when the rapid growth of our sugar production is increased again and agai n, and t hat in its tu.cn leading to a rapid increase in the production or beef because tha two go together., There is a tremendoU~ .f'u.ture in cotton here. I know alread,- of people coming hare trom South Africa to grow cotton under irrigation because the,- a.re a\i'are or the fact that in this country cot.ton has an enol'JIDUB potnntialc r/e know wu are getting 4,000 lbo weight· of eeed cotton

per acre in ':;he lo~-1 veld year after year under ir-rigation, and all this, I hope, will lead to development in other parts of the countey rather than mrdaa of young men flocking into town and our having to provide tor them.

He th~n touched on the matter of giving preference to indi89noue workers. Of course, I am entirely' in favour or this and. only qlrlte recently when I opened the Annua.l Congress of the Jihodeeia Tobacco A:lsocia.tion I urged them to do this o o • (HONo Mbl~: Hear, hear .. ) - ., • ., the)" should, in all casasg as indeed we do ourselves" give preference to indigenous labour, and I only .hope and BJr. quite sure that it will have some effecto l do not agree ent rel;J" with foreign labouro I do not think it is necessary ~ when I say this I expe t tbat I will get 'lJfl' head chopped off in the course of' time -- !or any .tarm to be run entirel1 on recruited labolll" .from outside our bordero This does not o111¥ apply' to farms .. It applies to those mines run entirely' on recruited labouro 1 would ear that. a lot ot the responsibility for this lies on t ha shoulders o! our indigenous people for not being prepared to work at plaoea like the liankie Colliery where conditions are absolutely first class, ani on other mines as well .. The Leader of the Opposition mentioned JJIJnetary affairs.. 1 am not going to repl.T to thoseo I shall leave those to Jlf1' colleague tbe Minister ot the Treaaur,ro He then touched purely in a personal wq on the matter o.f defence, and made certain suggestions and said - and 1 was rather eurprieed at this - t hat we will roost probably want - if I am misquoting l am aorry, but i t di d mean thi s, that we woUld met probably A~ant larger def ence forces than we have todq. I do not think soo I do not think it i s necessary under our present system. ·-.·

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However, I sha.ll oerta.inl..y discuss this with the chief's or starr and the suggestions made by the Leader of the Oppo.sition \'lhich involve an extended period and scope of compulsor,y training over a certain standardo I can pic up the actual wording in Hansard later on.

He t en asked me if 1 co d give a review of the economic posit iono .~11,

I cannot; not in detailG 1 shall l eave that to t he ~tlnister who is in charge of these affairs; but tlds I can say, and 1 say i t in all sincerity, that 1 arn optimistic beoause there iu only really one ~e c t,or of ur economy which ie in t he doldrums, that i s in t hu building and allied industrieso I have gone into the reason f or this bef.rulol and I do not propo t o go . into it againo It is, as we all know, a fact 1;hat t her was a.n e cess of building, a rush r building to the head, so to sptak, tooK place hen Sal isbury became t he Federal capitalo Also t•ecause certain speculative building took place for which t here was r eally no cal 1 and money wa:1 poured into buildj ngs which were not really necessarily going to help a.nybcdy it was spe cul1 ~tive. riather that money should have been ,10urec into p.~: oductive sohemea and then t he building would have followedo Of course t he lass by erniqration ie a matter Hhich worries us all but I believe it is coming to an end and I was given some fi es o f .bat is happening at Bei t Bridge whivi I must che,'). on from official :1ources before 1 quote ..

Thaae made me verJ much more op ~ imistic. 'fh re is a.tr ea.dy a begilming of a r eturn of some of those who had letto There ar~ !ew,, r going out. Ot course we have had to i s.ce the dissoluti 9n exercise, apart frwn _a :rery big exodus both south and no tt of people from t he build:.Jlg trade j and l t is from buildi ng and i ts allied tn ies they have gone. If a very car.oful s1uvey was made, the House would f i nd t b t Hi so. but in achlition we have had a surplus, although a. temporary ora, of r'ederal civil servants. Last month quite a large number of t hose went Jouth. Some are coming back. Some went down Sl.'uth, some ent 11 11 what thoy call home 1 t o England.. Home to me and to the rea·:·, of us is here, 1 hope, ' ut I believe some of those will come to their real ho.\le when they find t hings 1 re not quite as pleasant as they thought it might be ir. spite of the weltarr statea 1 can only say in general terms that in r egard to our general econa ~ in spite of our current difficulties which az of course apparent to us ¥.1, I am optimistico I know full well that q 'te considerable ums of rtD1.:;7 have been drawn from the Post Office ~l8.vings Bank by young Rhodesians ·.

~ 7-

because they a expanding their activities in this country. Particularly Js this so in the a.gricllltural industry, which is our main industry, and I think ulthough it may cause our Minister of the Treasury some anxiety as to where he is going to find this money from time to ti'lle, I think it is indicative of the

.~.eeling of the real populatioll of this country. There is among those who are

here to-day, and ~hen I say 11 herc 11 I do not mean in this House but in tb

country tocad~ - a feeling of expansion a.nd optimism and sheer determination to get on -with the jobo (Mrl. CHlr,OGO: i'/here will you be tomrrow?) - (AN HON. MEMB.:itt: Here still~) ·~ I do not kno\<1 what you are talkin.~ about, :-. am sorry" - (AN HON. llJ~~t: He does not either.)

I ver,y much doubt, or perhaps I am entirely wrong, as to ~hether what I am going to say now will satisfy tho Opposition, but I do \!la.1lt to take this opportunity of reporting, in so far as I can, on that part of the Gracious

Speeoh which dealt ~th the isaue ~ independence and to say what the position J.s and to set at rest the fears and worrles again so far as I can, of hose who b.ave been foolishly and irresponsibly ba.ndy"ing about such words as "rebels",. "rebellionn and so ono I do not want anyone to read any mre or to try and oal'e anything srore out of what 1 am going to say then what I actually do 837• I would have liked to have given this House and the country a detailed report

of all talks I have had with members of a~r MajeetyQ s Government as I have pt.irsonally" nothing at all to hide... But as you know such talks are conlidential and they did cover a very wide range of affairso It may appear that the

rast\lt ltJB.S absolutely nil, but this i a not so because for the first time I

really kll0\1 wha-t the Hritish Government' point of view really is a I t hink it. a thoroughly wrong one, but at l east I kno\"J wba.t it is and they know what our position is. ~~ (AN HON. MEtilllli: Tell us.)

Furthe - you kno 1, I do not really need this prompting that I am getti ng frora over there; it is just hat I am about to do - further Southern rl.hodesia

:a no longer a Colo~; it is no lonfler the self-governing Colony of Southern

II 1thodesia, but just "Southern liliodesia" o or .f'ar too long hae this tenn "Colo given certain people to think that Britain can and should interfere in our affaira and this change should be signifi cant in that respecto Also I was aule to persuade the British Government to convene a meeting -­ and this is one of the points raised by the Leader of the Opposition -- to t r,y t;, work out the future of the University.., I think it is very important indeed h· ~ sy :-ould r. o thL, and GO .J p! • · ~eo this is not just lt. n (:>a.r;~ol. an in titut Oll ·J.on > b t on · ha.t. can pro'1tide f'a.cilit: G3 10 · r.tl

the bound · e of So th.J"Il 1tho • :·.a «-= and I hope it ·,.: ll., I J.

is m .i g t at +,hr~y are to ~onv;~~lf:; ill be h6ld sho.rt]y" and me

mecti.nno to an~:Ltr tllli:'· the Un.iver~Ji. ty- can see the; - ro

I am a \. that.. he is.Juo of :>ur :L"lY. pendence has d.ra.g,_~ed on and lln e.r1~ also · he.t t . e e a ·e those 1lho have sa.ir re mll t ha e indepen1 nee a·.,

t and be pr pnr d u gi. e .:..n on ;llJ. points in order to find su t5. ~ient g1"0 .d i th the Bri i h Gove"·zment. that tha... G:>ve:m.ment would ag .. u ·

or.. al.ly' to o · inde ·e1~der ce. 'fhi3 Pe hate refused to dof ·recogni."'ing t. i2.t at . at stage ... onl:'; terms cceptable t.. t.i e Br:itish Government t-~Sre unaccapta.· :..a

::.o s 1ie bcliev d. t !a·.. such -cti n 1 ·:·.ad J.ee1 ~o the ;>ass· n,g of Gove . 1 ent

3.Ut ) . · ty f m eoponsiblo ands tc• ttt..oae rot yet trained or r- ponsibl;!

and 30 to a lo1~e1 ~ g of sta.n.da.rds in all \'alks of · fe a.. ard .... ica, caily discipline: freedom., ,he 1 wering of 3·l:.anda in t :lions • apart, fl'Om a death bl v· to 041' econonsy ..

· .e ha r ) o£ ·oursa 1 baen prov d t. be ight ~ It · s iclle to atte:n · t

"' tha.t has happened · n other pa. ts of "'rica ·=~ both west a; d ea. " .....

· hi nk t hat. tb~.; toubles in -.:.h:Jae ter •ito · es are y-et OViJ • t

y to roova in Briti• .lh Jops; it · s going to be ar rrore dii' ~icul w

1u o11t - c nd ~ ' ~a , ha.pp~;;_, t enJ beca sa a. precedent has been set, , n:i

hi<> w 't tror."Jns ruay e inv· te . il nexl# ~ a very strained sit.ua:t.ion indeed

r-iti h tro s - ~e wd into a.n inuependani.. country to keep goveQnmenta

sr ' hich cannot sust~d.u thems~l ves o . · t what i s t He pos:i tio regard:.ne ou inde p mdence'? It i e recog;:1:..."'ed b ... i tain that th1:.1 transition .f' :'Om Col a1. Office rule the so--call:Jd

1a1 o P-r of powe1" ha.s been fa..~ too rapid in a. number of countrleso I ~ · nk t i · cognized 'n oth r parts o t' .e «>rld a s 'WelL t. is r-acognizerl that

Ie in Southern l:t.hodesia ·~-4n d be qtrl te Wl'Ong to en ,age in a similar e:xerc: sa • d ·'-at ue are l:"':_ _,nt, 'to instst on e.volutio "' y processes, ather ·ha nJ.:t.ow as in other parts. ~ ( ONo l·llil.ffiECLS: Hear, hea.ro) ~,- Here I .nuld ··o .... th the Leader of the Opposj.tion in expl"essing my regret tha.t tho things

houl.u. ha\'e happened; it gives us nc jo~ but we illllBt take cognia& cs of i1:.c. •.

9

Al1 t1d.s 1 admit.t.ed now bu . when t a to • qu 1.0n or ow- formal

illiependen.ce the ans r s~ 11We know you. ha rig on your aide~ that yo wnsnt.e are logical but e canmt a.gre o it be u.ae it nught upse moers or the Gorrm:>nwea.l th and they Dll.ght l a h n ' t is pointed out

forcetully that oothing short oi" 11one man one w e 11 IQ 1 sat.tst:r au h

memb~rs am the results of th:ta can be sean all over Afric· ; one .. party

dictatorships~ lJlter!eren e with justice arut so on, th iuts omea ba k:

"Ies11 we ow all this; know it is wrong but d :Jot ups t the Co11100n wealth- lt one coWltry lertp others might go" and so the 1.ntermi.nable argument

goes on. Tn ~he light or this 1o10uld like to exanun hat he Comnnnwealt.h really auvunts to~ what is it and w-hat does it a.n to us i! anyt.hing 1n fact? It conaisto of t.he o der members such as o 'Selves, woo support tho d811Dcl"'atic system of government and OpposJ.tion and willingly al' loyal to the Crown, Then there are the new Asian D3m.bersj or the no1 r Asian members -

some ®publics - and now there are the ne ~ t African 1t1omb-er3 African

states mainly republics With their varying degrees of one-~rty dictatorships;

some just nirti."'lg With communism., some obviousl.,y in ~o w1 th communism if not already marrloo. to it; states who will only belong t the Common oalth just so long as it pays them - countries that will o-nly buy from l.irit.ain just so long aa they get s alled loans from that co\Ultry w-lth which to pay Already

we haw seen the hand of conmuniam in eom:~ of these tar itori' s ~ it Will develop -- and are the countries to continue to be members of the Commonwealth? It would appaar that they are., 'rhen the qul3stion arises: do we wish to be members of such a CoJ!lDIOnwea.lth'? Is it necessary for our well being, because tha. st be the tinal arbiter; s ttw clesir"l to rewain a member o · such a Co111!10n al. th going to delay oW" natural pl'\lgress to independen 1 .lelljl Sir, I sey re ining a member or the Common­

\oiiSaltb mast go uy the. board if this impedes our progtea to indopendence 0 - ( HON .. Ml:J.W~: Hear, bear..,) . What we do wish to retai ~ and 1 know there are dit!icultiee on this being I"a.ised on evert side what we do wish to retain is our special relationships with Britain and 1 bt!lie· this l.a possible., Ot oou.ree, I for one, bei.J18 a Conaarva.tive,~ ~uld rcgre · the end of our ties w1 h the older members ot the Comtll)nwealths although these have become a ·- "':'- 10-

little frayed of re ant years due to the rather 11Hol,r Joe" attitude or some ot themo l:n any case I cannot see the present Coramom11ealth continuing - some of its members have so little in common; there does not appear to be a si.ugle commoo denominator to-day. Holiever, __n spite of all this, our invitation to cert,ain Commonwea.l.th countries to send a Uinister or senior represent.ati·.re to our co . try has oo n

renewed and 1 hope that they will take a.dvanta&t:: of itu ~le have already had visits l"r strango to me tha.t these count1 ies should oo so f ropa.re ·to juds-e us

and yet not be prepared to come here and collect the 13 , • :ienco on which to make tba'Jj jU.df100nto At the same time I want t.o make it quite clear ttat I h.avr,; not departed one iota !rom t.he view that our independence ie not a matter .for any other

country bu.t Britain and 01 selves and I thinlc that. this is now accepted. I have again made it clear t.hat we are not prepared to attend a meeting ot

Commonwealth ~1iniaters or Prime Ministers to abate this issue and ·.,his a.lso ia accepted now., Thio suggastion, ineidenta.lly, o£ the Seer tB.!"'J of >tate fo Colll1!1Dnwealth Llelationa might have eaused him embarraa n · rod we ccapted» as one o£ the countries ba !'DiJ.:1 have had in mind was undo btsdly Tanganyika.,

No\11 I lllll not going to pretend other than tha.l. I am bitterly disappointed

at. tho failure, up to datl3, or our ei'£oi"ts to bring to a ~ccassful cone us. on our mal"a.thon diaclUlsions w'ith the British Gov rnment a.nri \'Ja soe no uao:f'ul purpose in continuing !:.hem, but in saying this I also want to stc.t th !'allowing - and.

ma.y l say I ba'/e said this before in thl.s House in di. fferent 1~a.y-s on difterent occaeiona and I shall rete· to them. 1-\,y Government af,.irm3 t: t it does not

recognize the rig..'J.t of a.eyone to intuthern Rhode..,ia1 nor will it tolercte aqJ such interference and from no onward5 ro shull pursue our course within the framework of the Southern ahodesian Constitution -- 1

~ant to emphas:l,ze that -- and act in all respects as a G vtJ ru ~ t o ing a.llcgiane

to the Crown, and I want again to stress t.ha:~ our alle6:w.m: is to the Cro n and t to any part.icul .liritisb Government~.~ - (HON., ME:-'Jl~d.S.; Hee.r, hear.. )

I wuld. ~mind this Houae that 1 made a similar ata.temsnt :l.n reply to question from . he bono member for Hillside (I.fxoao Watson) ~ d 1 would like, S::r to quote the fo-llouing extract from Hansard. 15th Nareh 1963: 11MRSo WATS N ...

·ll-

( Private Notice) ed tbe Pn. r he is awa.ra of tat o.t lrt.l¥ made over the British Broadcrut1ng Corpo tion bT lb-. Rarol

aware or .:1 statement made recentl.Y by Mr . Harolt'. dils·~n as contained in the

questio•a and I will make it quite clear while in ~·nndor 1 tha.t any change made witho•.&t the agreement of the t"'lOuthern 1lhodesiul Go\rernn.ent will not be recog­

nis,A.11 The question went on: "Wll.l the Prim3 Milds~tr make it quite clear t/J lh-. WUson and al\Y'One else who m:\gbt be concerned, t he nature of the consequences that would arise in ti'.is countcy wore any- British Government to

impose a unilateral revision on thJ Constitution?" ~ reply was, that l had nothing to add, that I reaJ.ly' tho':.lght that l bad covere t fm¥ supplemantaries that might be asked. Now, what does this mean e:.r ctly? It ens that 19 want all and sundry to know that we look upon t he cJnvention t t 110boc:ly can amend our Constitution without our consent aa being lr:gal.ly binding on ai\Y Brlt: ab Gove:rnmBnt which

IIB.y happen to be i n power and de do not consider aJV" Brit. :Jh Government has

the legal right to interfere. It. means e~y tha.to Now, w.bJ' is t his indepeude eo essential to us? 1 know l have stat ed the reasons before but I feel it necessar,y to do so here ag~ino Perhaps the DDst important. !actor is tb&.t t here are peo e in this country

who think that they can run ovur to JSnglancl ~e they will ~ind a sympathetic superior at1thorit7 to the South'!lro Hb:ldesia. Go er1l!llent. who will admonish us and tell us what we can and can10t doo \le know tl!B.t certain members of the Co111110nwsalth constantly" c on the British Governmeilt to ini:.E!"fere in our •t.ta.irs in spite of assurances .i"rom that Gov81'1l111Snt tllat t hei' cannot do aoa We know that this also occurs at. the United 1 :tiona in 3pite or Sir Patrick Dean's ott repeated statement that his Governaant i s pc:merlefs in t his mat ter. We believe that much of our unpleasant polit.i al activity atE!!S from the belie!

t hat it ou.!'ficient disturbances ara made then tne llritish Gov~rnment will be •' '• -12-

ntJM!IId to intervena and. o t this i.s nonsense and 5111"'8 tbq cb - bat I want this cl iY d•atl'l~ In t abseuc of'

actual Act of lnd.ependenco11 I that ' l ve said here to a7 doe1 cleDDnetrate the JQSi~ion and -·-• wbo think that tnoy can their political ends by nonsenai behaviour will re&lize tb&t

the onlJ' way by which they can ~-...... _._.1pate ill government at all levels is t, con&titu.tional way. If the7 r riotous behaviour, I nuet

wa.m tbam now that the bone period is o • l t is our task to keep ~~~.. P and we shall do eo. .-/e shall all tbe J'5 we have, and if' necessary, take more to stamp out the la ganga t t &nt attempting to intim:l..dat. the political or a.r.r;y ot.her ap 1 know public will welcome this. But to return to our reaso tor requiring u.r indepen1ence now - and n

l say 11 now" I do not necessarilJ' an 1nmed1 tely. ~ie were led to be ew that the 1961. Constitution ga 1t to us, and. ma.n.y voted tor ta. Constitu.tioll beC&USe ot this and because ot a only.. Hare I wuld quote what tbe Leadtlr ot the Opposition sa.i.d 1n t his anexion before the .rte!erendum and also after the 'break-up of the Federation. I believe spoke in good faith. I ha.n no c:loubt about tbatu This is t be said iD an extract from The tUlodesia Herald of t h0 14th June, 1961: Sir ~gar !'d.tehead, the Southern i:Ulod.esiu Prime Minister, told a Press co erence last night that the White Paper oD tbe Conatitation meant independ for t he Colol\Y"o Extract from Hanaa.rd ot the 20th JlUle, 1961, column , St.ate by Sir Edgar Whitehead: nr woul.d say to all hon.. members t over tho t 18 months I have devoted a verr substantial part of rq time t.rying to ~ independence for Soatbem lUlodesia

before it is too late 1 and I be w that \4 ve achieved precise~ what Wilt set ou.t to do", &ctract from ,...... ;;;.;oo;--.:;o,;:;;:;;...... ,.,.r.,.a;;::ld-. o£ the 4t AprU. 1963:

"Sir J::dga.r \'lhi.tehead, .I.ead.e1- of in Sou.thorn 1Ulodesia • ~. 11 - be bad changed his position b,y t hU t i me - 11 • • said last night that when his Government had· negotiated the present Conat1tution it had done eo ·in the beliat that 1 tha Federati on b • up Soutt.Jn rthadesia "l«>uld have complete 1Jidependence1'y I believe that t Leader c. the Opposition made all those statements in perfectly good .f'aitb and l onl.T wish to goodness he be.d been right;, but he was noto .. ...

13

Apa.rt. f'rom al1 those conaid• t.ions vernsd ourse.l & tor __,,.-, we have paid oau- -.y, ba otemlecl our lws, or WJultJ ha dOD8 d we bad to - we have cort.&i.nl¥ t.aiam t defence o! the fioee 'Or and we bava pride. 'rle knov ta 1'ulJ'1U All the requireumte . . clown by' Sir Alee Lbuglaa fbma :ln hla telev:leio interview the other aven1ng. I ve told you alre~ that it 1a dmitted t t have reason and logic o

our aids o So all that. is ho up the !1Dal act is the desi. to appe. c l"tain members of the Commonw th and so bD the CoDl!TI)nwealtlt together,

they Communist or otherwise o But I Jmow that our time come, and I uld ask people to atop be defeatist, to stop tal.lting and ting to t Press of the dire things that

be ~one to us shoulcl we not .,.ys ~attention to the United Nations

should we resist outside interft n e in our fairs, 11hich \lie shall. do o These people perform a grave diaaervice ind to their country. One suspe tbat some ol them do not look upon Southern asia as their col.Ultry. we do and al.ways w:il.lo Apparently we be.w to re-at:tirm again gain that we are here t.o star t.hat there will be resp:>nsible rnment, t t standards lill be mlint.ained. that the rule of law llli.1l conti • l give these underta.ld.ngs again that

t.hertt Will be freedom of speech thought and personal liberty o We have made our p>sition • I kaow ve are going to be proved right • This bas already been proved. Apart from the issue of indepandence on ch we have failed to III)V8 t British Government and so reach ement, t are many other tasks we .taca

The main one is that of unemplo o I tbink '119 hav~ sho•m clearly what O\U' policy is and we shall pursue tbi8. \'le shal.l. not dissipate our rasourceeo

They must be used in productive nterprises wbich in turn generate furthe~ employment • more business. Al..reacly' there ar. improvements to be sean. there are mre developnents in sight aud we sba.ll &noo\Ulcing these from time to tins in the coming year, and the will have a anow"ba.ll.ing eftecto Please let no-one think that. have accepted defeat on the independenoa issue - we have not - but e do realize t t. there is so much to be done ill other directions, and we call on aDi expect all sections of the people of

Southern dhodesia to \!Ork together t o achie a really strong econom,y o UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

Date: 18 March 1964 TO: The Secretary-General~~~

FILE NO. : ------~----

THROUGH:

FROM: Godfrey K.J. Amachree Under-Secretary

SUBJECT: Question of Southern Rhodesia

'f<; tc_,,!o.y I was informed by Mr. Jacklingj..tha.t he will be making a statement today at the meeting of the Committee of Twenty-Four in which he will indicate that ~ts Government will be prepared to receiv~ in Londo~ a delegation of members of the Committee to discuss Southern Rhodesia with Her Majesty's Government.

It seems to me that the main reason for the proposed statement is to forestall the adoption or a resolution at the conclusion of the debate on Southern Rhodesia. It is felt by the British delegation that a resolution may do more harm than good and it is perhaps better that the Committee should be afforded the opportunity to have direct discussions with the British Government.

As at present advised, the offer by the British Government will be accepted, and it is very likely that six members of the Comrndttee will be appointed to go to London at the earliest possible date. UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES INTEROHICE MEMORANDUM

Date:_..;;.li~.:...:Ma_r=...c.:...:Ja=-....;:;;1..::;964....;...____ _ TO:

FILE NO.:------

THROUGH: COIO'IDDTIAL

FROM: Godfrey K.J. .Amachree Under-Secretary suBJECT: Question oi' Southern Rhodesia

The lJDited Kingdom made a st&tement,aloD& the lines suggested in my- memorandum to you this 11ornins, at this afternoon's meeting of the Committee of TWenty-Four. After the statement had been made the meeting was adjourned for the Atro-Asian group to consider the advisability of a viait to London by a sUb-committee. I have been informed that the Afro-Asian group has reJected· the idea and will be tabling a resolution, the contents of which have not yet been coDIIIlUilicated to me~ ; I gather, however, that the draft resolution will be used for bargaining purposes with the Un1 ted Kingdom delegation, in that if the United Kingdom give• certain assurances, which are as yet undefined, the resolution will be withdrawn aad perhaps the Committee Will give serious conaideration to sending a sub-committee to visit Lolidon. The strar:~ge thing about the reJection of the United Killldom offer to receive a sub.-c011111 ttee is the tact that those deleptiou who had sugsested the idea and favoured it are now suspicious of the aotives of the United Kingdom Government. c '

& ..U..I.U...... ~ ~liiiW-...... ,_~111111

-Qiw..L.. _.. ..., ...... -- Oo4tre7 L J. ~~" r-leereti&J7 tor fiat p &114 loa-lelf-~ '!vritOJ1.u MOlutiaM a40Jt. 011 ICNtMnlJbo4Nia ~the .,.ial. ea-lttH 11 tM lit :tiOD Witb Jalpr4 ~ tt.. ~...-.ttoa of tM Dlelu&ti CD 'tla. ar.Billl ot ~· to Coloaial. \011111'1111Rr1t.. aid l!opl!!

••••• I • at hi tor \II' • _.. two 1trtten t t1ae hJ~-• rHeatatiYe of tM UliW 11..,,. t.I'UaittiDI tlae tat of two re.olutiou 011 ia 1t7 tile i al. ec.s.tte of tv~Dt)·.. J1 23 24 b 1964. ot toftU' 1a MiDI ••••• truaitW to all W r tc ftat• -.r • YeJ'Mle, a c of wldcb ia attacW.

a. I abou1.4 UU t o v.r att ic.a to OJ»er&ti 8 ot tlle rHolutioa Olltaiaed. iD A/M:.ltJ9/61 wtdcla ta nt&rJ'- to n1Dtea1fT ld.• effort wltb .. n• to 'Uw 1-.1 t i ot tM -...te to b1a lq t OeDual ia 1 ta reaol 1760 (nu).• tld.a ret.. t 1a a,nue4 1a • :t RJ'ODIU' tena ~ wa tM cue ia ClaMn.1 AH.-q 1 1889 (DIU) ot 6 Jlowszhr 1963 ret.. w .- leentaq-CIIMral. •to a 1maa t.o l alll ld.a .,a4 om. to ooaoU1at.iae 1a '&lie ~1'1'1t.o17, u na"' ta Jl&ftCI'&JI)a 4 ot zwol.tioa 176o ( mi).• I Uo\11.4 l1H u t7 to tlala t --'1 Wi~ at .,atJr OOIIftlahlfiiiH

---- CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED NATIONS • NATIONS UNIES

INT~ROFFIC~ M~MORANDUM

TO: The Secretary-Ceneral _ / };-~ , Date: 27 Ma reb l 9611

~l· f \, c ~\\~ FILE NO.:------THROUGH: ~ ~,~ ~- ~

The Committee of 24 has adopted another resolution on Southern Rhodesia. The Resolution contains nothing new. The Committee has given no consideration whatsoever to the possible solutions to this rather involved problem. The only Delegation which came out with any concrete proposal was the United States Delegation. They suggested a conference of all the parties interested in the Southern Rhodesian question "in order to have a meeting of the minds".

Since the Committee appears reluctant to make concrete proposals as to how the problems of Southern Rhodesia can be peacefully resolved, the initiative, in this regard, should come from you as Secretary-General. I therefore make the follo,.ling suggestions for your consideration:

1. You should summon the Chairman of the Committee of 24 and ask him to indicate to you what the Committee has in mind in requesting you, as they have done in operative paragraph 8 of the Resolution, "to intensify11 your efforts vlith a view to the implementation of the mandate entrusted to you by the General Assembly. I can alrr~st predict that you will receive no assistance from the Chairman of the Committee, but it would be advisable to discuss the matter with him so as to place it on record that you consulted him.

2. You may wish to find out from the acting Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) whether his organization has made any efforts to reconcile Hessrs. Nkomo and Sithole. I am sure you will be informed that no progress has been made.

3. Since the Committee has refused to send a Sub-Committee to Britain to discuss Southern Rhodesia, you may wish to give some thought to sending a small delegation to London to carry out such discussions. The members of the delegation may well be the four African Foreign JJdnisters who have been given a mandate by the OAU to deal with all questions pertaining to Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories; or a few members of the Committee of 24, appointed by you in consultation, of course, with the Chairman of the Committee. The Committee, if one is appointed, should go to London to discuss and report to you: .. ..

-2-

(a) the situation in Southern Rhodesia in order to receive at first hand the British Government's policy on the matter;

(b) to request the British Government to use its good offices to secure permission from the Southern Rhodesian Government for J.l.iessrs. Nkomo and Sithole and their principal advisers to visit New York to enable yoti and the Committee of 24 to try to reconcile the two African leaders; alternatively,

(c) for the United Kingdom Government to get the Southern Rhodesian Government to agree to a delegation, appointed by you, to visit Southern Rhodesia and talk to the African leaders and to discuss the question of Southern Rhodesia with the Field Government.

I understand that one reason why the Committee of 24 did not send a Sub-Committee to London was the fact that those of them who did so last year, including Mr. Coulibaly, felt that they were not well treated by the British Government. On the other hand, people who know what happened in London infonn me that the Sub-Committee went to London without any plans whatsoever. They had no specific proposals or suggestions to make. They just talked.

I shall elaborate on these points when I meet you this afternoon. ROUTING SLIP

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DATE: FROM: 28 April 196 G.K.J. Amachree ,- ...... - \ "'T ROUTING SLIP I II Commems for the record should not be written on this slip. REFERRAL SHEET PT.l08 should be used instead. TO: The ~ecretary-General

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I

DATE: FROM: 22 ay 19tA • K. J. Amachree

.. MEC/a

'l'.l:t 300 SORH

Sir,

On behalf ot the Seeretary-General, I have the honour to transmit ..... herewith the text ot a re.olution (A/AC.l09/68) on the question ot Southern .lihodeeia, adopted by the Special Co.U.ttee on the situation with reprcl to the iaple•ntation or the Declaration on the crantinc ot independence to colonial countries and peoples at its 249th meetifll on Z7 AprU 1964. Operative paragraph 4 or this resolution requests the Secretary­ General to oo-unioate the text or the resolution to the Govenuaent ot the United Kin&do• and to report to the Special Comaittee at the latest on 4 May 1964. I should therefore be cratetul to receive any infol"'ll&tion

your Government ~ be in a position to furnish concerninc the imple­ mention or this resolution.

Accept, Sir, the assuranoes or ~ hichest consideration.

Gocltrey K. J. Aaachree Under Secretary !or Tr.steeship and Non-Sel!-Governinc Territories

H.E. Sir Patrick Dean, G.C.M.G. Permanent Representative o! the United Kin«dom to the United Nations 845 Third. Ave nue l~ew York 22, N.Y. UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

...... """""~~;;;;;····· ...... V ~-~· .~- t .. ..~

To a The Secretary-General, United Nations ~~~~·~ From a Godfrey K.J. Amachree, Under-Secretary for ~·~ Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories London, 2 June 1964

Subjecta Question of Southern Rhodesia COilFIDENTIAL

..... 1. As promised in ~ cable to you yesterd~, I enclose copies of the minutes of meetings held last Sunday by members of the Sub­ Committee, as well as minutes of the first meeting held yesterday with the British Government. Mr. Duncan Sandys presided. I under­ stand from those who attended last year's discussions with the British that the British attitude this year was a little more conciliatory. I can confirm that Mr. Sandys was extremely courteous to members of the Sub-Committee. It is as yet early to give you any assessment of the possible outcome of the talks.

2. Members of the Sub-committee propose to reply to the points raised by Mr. Sandys at our next meeting with him today. You will, in due course, receive copies of the minutes of the next meeting.

3. I will not, unless I find it absolutely necessary1 send you any coded message. SUB-cOJOO:TTEB ON SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Second meeting, 10 a.m., 31 Key 1964

Bearing of Jlr. Kyandoro and Jlr. Sflundika

1. At its second meeting held on on 31 ~ 1964 the Sub-Committee on Southern Rhodesia heard statements from Jlr.G.P. Nyandoro, Secretary-

General, and Jlr. Robert Silundika, PublioitT Secretary, of the Zimbabwe A.frioan Peoples• Union {ZAPU) concerning recent developments in the Territory. In their statements they described the conditions in which

Jlr. Joshua lk.omo and fourteen other .African nationalist leaders were being in the Gonakudzingwa area held at a detention camp/200 yards from the Mozambique border and 15 miles from the South African border. Jlr. Nkcmo and his colleagues were housed in a number of small uncomfortable huts situated in a clearing surrounded on three sides by thick forest and on the fourth by an access road along which was a police encampment. As the surrounding forest was a game reserve, it was infested with lions, elephants and other wild animals and therefore, for safety's sake, the detainees had to sleep four or more to one hut at nights and use open tin cans for sanitary purposes in order to avoid going out into the open. Though allowed to receive visitors, the detainees were not permitted to speak to them and such visitors were liable to subsequent arrest and detention. 2. Jlr. Jlyandoro and Jlr. Silundika also expressed their opposition to the presence of a representative of the Southern Rhodesia Government as Observer at the forthcoming talks between the Sub-committee and United Kingdom Ministers. They asserted that the Sub-Committee's mandate was to hold discussions only with the United Kingdom Government on the implementation of the various General Assembly and Special Committee resolutions on Southern Rhodesia and that it would be improper for the minority regime of Southern

Rhodesia to be represented at these talks unless Kr. Jkomo was also present - 2-

in person. 3. In answer to questions, they expressed agreement with the two principal objectiTes of the Sub-committee as outlined to them by the Chairman, namely,

the release of Mr. Nkomo and all other political prisoners and the holding of a constitutional conference on the basis called for qy the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. It was their understanding, they added, that the release of Mr. Nkomo and all other political prisoners

would be accompanied by the establishment of conditions of complete political freedom and the repeal of all repressive and discriminatory legislation.

4. In response to a question whether and to what extent ZAPU would be prepared to compromise in the event of a constitutional conference, they affirmed that there was no question of compromise as regards the basic principle of one man one vote. They might, however, be willing to accept majority rule without immediate independence, together with safeguards and

protection for the European minority, in the expectation of independence at the earliest possible time.

The ~uestion of a Southern Rhodesian Observer 5· The Sub-committee a. discussed the question of the presence at the talks of a representative of the Southern Rhodesian Government in the capacity of Observer. It decided to authorize the Chairman to indicate to Mr. Cecil King, the United Kingdom Minister for Trusteeship Affairs at the United

Nations, that while the United Kingdom was of Dourse at liberty to include whomever it wished in its delegation to the talks, the Sub-committee was opposed to the presence of such a representative with the status of Observer. In reaching this decision, the Sub-committee took account of the fact that this time, unlike the previous occasion last year, the Sub-committee had been informed in advance of the proposed inclusion of an Observer on behalf - 3 - of the Southern Rhodeaia Government. The Sub-committee also had X.. in mind the circumstances in which the resolution defining its mandate was adopted, and the need to do nothing whioh would expose it to criticism in the Special Committee or from the African nationalist leaders. 6. The Sub-committee further decided that if, in spite of this indication to Mr. King, the United Kingdom Government proceeded to include a Southern Rhodesia Obaerver at the first meeting, the Chairman should expressly reserve the Sub-committee's position in this matter and that it would give consideration after the meeting to what further action would be appropriate. ..

SUB-cOMMITTEE ON SOUTHEBN RHODESU Third meeting, 6 p.m., 31 M!Y 1964

1. The Sub-committee on Southern Rhodesia discussed the procedure texfW it would follow for its discussions with the United Kingdom Ministers on 1 June. It decided that on this oooasion the Chairman, after the

preliminary formalities, would make a brief general statement setting forth

the mandate and objectives of the Sub-Committee. The Chairman would then explain that since on this occasion the talks were taking plaoe at

the invitation of the United Kingdom Government, it was the presumption of the Sub-Committee that the United Kingdom intended to provide informa­ tion reaarding the steps it had taken or proposed to take for the

implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special

Committee on the question of Southern Rhodesia. Be would therefore welcome suoh information.

2. The Sub-Committee further decided that after any statements that ~ be made by the United Kingdom Ministers, it would request an adjournment

until the following d~ in order to enable it to study these statements and prepare its position. The Sub-Committee agreed that in formulating its own proposals for the next meeting it would take into consideration

the working paper ~istributed to it by the Under-Secretary. From Mr. Godfrey K.J. Amachree

URGENT 27 October 19'4

NOTES ON mESS BRIEFING tP AFRICAN GROUP

Andre Wright (Niger) 1 the Cllairman of the A.t'rican Group, met corres­ pondents at 3:30 p.m. today to give them the text of a conmunique agreed. upon at a meeting of the Group earlier today. (Text in French onl.7- one COPT.)

In the communique 1 the Group expressed. grave concern about the reportecl intention of the "racist minority gOV"emment" in Southern Bhoaesia to make a unilateral 4eclaration of independence. The cOJmm.mique d.escribed. as 11a mock con­ sultation" at the level of tribal chiefs the meeting now going on in that country and notecl that the Unitei KingdODa, as administering authority, had declared the consultation as illegal. The Group said that it considerM. that "the policy ot folly" being carried. on by the &OVemment - of the territory was increasing ten­ sion and creating a serious threat to peace and security. The Group appeale to the United Kingdom to take urgent measures to carry out tae United Nations reso­ lutions on Southern Rhodesia and expressed hope that tae ciecolonization committee . would re-examine the question of Southern Rhodesia as a matter of urgency and make new contacts with the United Kingdom regarcling the problea.

In response to questions, Mr. Wright said that the Organization of African Unity had asked two ministers -- Senegal and Algeria -- to follow the situation. If they determined. that it was 41esirable to go to the Security Council, it would. be up to them to ask for a meeting, he said.

Asked what action the United Kingdom could take in the matter, he said that it was for the United Kingdom to decide.

He was also asked it the Group planned. to bring the matter to ., ' the attention il of the Secretary-General with a view to its being discussed. at to­ 1 night s meeting with Patrick Gordon Walker 1 he sai41 that the 3ecretary-p General lmew about the communique. ~.~. IT~~ KINGDOM MISSION TO THE UNI);Eq, ~rtg~s. D"'LIV-.•·= 'RY HOLD FOR DE .1..1IV.ti.uY THIRD AVEN vHECIC ~ GATNST .w w , 845 UE, NEW YORK, N.Y.

ST.ATI;M:CNT BY ER. C.Z. KING 7 C. M.G. in THE co:JMITT:c:;E OF T·'.'ENTY-FOUR on TUESDAY OCTOB;ER 27, 1964.

S OUTI-mRN RHODESIA

The following statement was issued by No. 10 Downing Street this morning~ "The Prime Minister is deeply concerned :J. bout future relations between Southern Rhodesia and Britain, and particula rly about any possibility of a unilateral declar­ ation of independence on the part of the Southern Rhodesia Governm.ent. He therefore invited Mr. IDn Smith, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, to come to London for discussions early this week. Mr. Smith replied that he could not come at that time. "The British Govermaent would not like there to be any misundersta nding tha t in their view the inevitnble consequences of a unila teral declaration of independence would be very serious indeed. The previous Administration made this clea r earlier in t he year to Mr. Field and L '! ter repeated the warning to Mr. Smith. On Sunday 25th October the British Government communicated to the Government of Southern Rhodesia the text of a statement which they would feel obliged to iss ue a t a very e ~ rly date unless they received from th0t Government a n assurance th~ t no attempt at a unilateral declaration of independence would be made. The Prime .i\fiinister would h::; ve preferred to put the points in the statement to Mr. Smith privately and in person ~ he still hopes that an ea rly opportunity will be found for him to ha.ve discussions with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodes i a before any irrevocable steps are t 2ken. Since however the assurance sought was not forthcoming the British Government a re now publishing t his s t ~ tement." The following is the text of the sta tement by the British Government on a Un i l at eral Decla r a tion of Independence in Southern Rhodes i a: "The BI·i tish Government look f orwa rd to the d."'t Y whe n Southern Rhod esia can t a ke her pla ce as an independent s overeign St CJ. te within the Commonwea lth. The decis ion to gra nt independence rests entirely with the British Government a nd Parliament a nd they have a solemn duty to be sat isfied that bef ore gr a nting independenve it would be a ccept able to the people of the country as a whole. Indeed , the pr esent Govern­ ment of Southern Rhodesi =< ha ve already recognised that i nd epen­ dence must be ba sed on general consent and thJ. t the British Government a r e entitled to be satisfied a bout this. /The British • 'Ihe l~r i tish Gov ernment trus t thcrefo:cc:: ;:;h ,::~ t l:ih8 ;; ..>.'~) 2:rc ::::: s of So uth~ rn Rhodesi2 will proceed on constitutional lin2~. Never-

theless 1 in view of reports tha.t t here i:n.ight be a r2r-:,o:r-G co a unil t0r8l decla ration of independence they find it nea8 Esary to decl are wha t serious conse qu en~es would flow from sue~ ~n act. The J3.c :i.. tis h Government ca nnot believe tho. t once the cc'.se:q_uGnces ha v e b e en m.~d cle,?.. r t h e Government and p eople of :3ov.t h::: rn Rhod&si - w1. J.l-take a n i rr evoc~ble step cf this kind .

n !ne re declarntion of independence would hnve no _onstitu- tiona -~ e ffe ct. The on:_y way Southern Rhodesin c o.rl become a sov e :~ i gn i nde pendent s t a te i s by an act of the Brit ish Pa rliament. A d ~- l ,rut ion of independence would be e n open ac ~ of d ~~ia nce and rebel-i on and it would be tre ~ sonable to take s t eps to give effect LO i t .

~ - n the fi n c.. l communique of the meeting of Co rrJ·J. om',-~8, 1 t h Prink: M1ni stcrs in July it was rfL'. de cle ,~ r tln t no C ornra ..-;n l.v e ~ l th Gov srnu:e ~1 t w ulcl be able to recognise a unila,teral declar ation. There ~ ould t hen b e no prospect of Southern Rhodesio becomi ng a meabe of t he Commonwea lth with all the economic consequences tho t woulrl t hen ensue .

':'he Br:i. tish Governrnent would be bound to sever r~ :. 3.tions with t hos_ r 2spansible f or such a declarati on. It wo ul 6 n ~t be possi ble f or Southern Rhodesia to esta blish a new an specjal re l a t i o~sh i p with the Cr own or with Britain. The Bri tish Govern- ment 1ould not be prepared to advise Her Ma j est y to a c cede to any r e 0._Lte:l t th8. t s h e s hould become a sepnrGte Sovereign of a terri­ tory 'vihlch ha s rebelled . The ul tim:J.te result H01..:t l d ir.ev i t et bly be tc:::.-<; Sout hern Rhodos i n ns would cease to b e British .::; ubjects .

Th~ r eactions of f or eign Govcrrunent s would likewhle b e sharp a nd im.ill.Cd i o. te . 'iii th one or two exce -;J t ions t h ey OJ. re :'. il-;ely to r efu. t:~ to recognise S outhern Rhodesia ' s independenc e c::r to enter l n "'l: · .:r: c lc?l.t ions vvi th he r . i'.b ny of them. ::ti ght recogni e a Gov -9rn- me n ~ i n exil e if as seems pr bable one we re est ~b li sh e d .

'l1hG ec anomie e ffects ·would be d i s:J s trous to the )r,Jsperi ty a nd ~ ~ospcct8 of the people of Southern Rhodesia . ~ ll f ina ncia l a nd tr~n e r2l a t i ons b et~e en Brita in a nd Sout hern Rhojesi a would b e j:O! Tpard ·.sed . Any further a id or o.ny f ur ther '". CC e3~ to the London JL.d.rk et wo uld b e ou of the question. Indeed , .wst s erious con ::;r:: ·_J.e .ccs wo uld be i n·.,rolved for a nyone in t he Uni t2d Kingd om whc 2::crded a id fina nci0l or oth e rwise t o the il log~ l Government. So u th0r ~ Rhodesi a ' s external trade would be disruft ed ,

.Ir. shor t e: n illegal declars. tion of independence j t: Sout hern Rh ~de ~-~ w2 ul d bring t o a n end r elation s hips b etween ~ ar a nd Brit ::- in , would c ut her off from the res t of the Com,;non ,'les. l th, fron ::~c 3 t f or 2ign Government s a nd f rom international cT ga. nisations, wou lt~ 2nf l i ~"u disastrous e conomic d,l.ma g e u p on her a n J \IO Uld leG.ve h er i ~a l~ted and virtua l l y f riendlPss i n ~ l a r gely hos tile c o nt 1:·1or-~t . .i

Last : ec1>: he Com..n• onw ec:t l ~ h Sec retary, I.:.i.~ . Bot tomley, J.tl .J n effort to come t'J c.. gJ::·e om ·nt with the Southern RhodesL'< Goverm'e:1"t , .:1t1cgested that h e s} cu..Ld , a fter a t t endi n g the i ndependence celebl"2 tj 'JL1S in Lusaka , go on to :--. l i s bu.ry to me e t I(.r , Smith. In putting for'Nilrd ]·is pr op osal f or a rn ~et1ng wi t h Mr . Smith t he Co~n onw eal th Secretary a8kea if arrangem~nts c oul d be m~ de f or him to · meet a croQs-se 8~i o ~ 0f opinion in South,;:c'1 Rh 0d ~~ sia . In -oarticula-r he s<:1 id that he wo:A..LJ like to see Nkomo a nd Sithole as ac~no wle dgcd leadnrs of Afric a n n~ t iJ nnl ists .

2 /f1lr , Sml th

r;; ·• Mr. Smith h8s rei-lied to the Commonwealth Secl~et a ry' s initiative by saying that he is unable to a gree to this condition and it has therefore not been possible to arrange for the Commonweo.lth Secretary to visit Salisbury.

The aim'.of British Gove~nment ·:~ policy is to proceed to a peaceful transition to Africcm majority rule. The :British Government look forward to the negotiation of a new Constitution but they must be satisfied_ that the terms on which independence will be granted are acceptable to the people of the country as a whole. .Althouc;h it has now been reported that Chiefs and Headflen have come out in favour of independence under the present Constitution, their consultation does not, in the opinion of the British Goverrunent, provide conclusive evidence that this is the case.

3 • .• 13 (4-59) ROUTING SLIP

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DATE: FROM: 10 Nov. 1964 G. K. J. Amachree CONFIDENTIAL

The economic implications of e. unilateral dec~r&tion of independence by Southern Rhodesia and the scope of possible preventive and .. emedial a.c·t.ion

The im lications of a unilateral declaration of jJndependence by the Southern Rhodesia GovernJ!!ant have hitherto been discussed mainly in terms of' the virtual political isolation which would follo\'1 t l&t act; ~rlth one or two exceptions, foreign Governments would not recognise 3Uch a dec a.!'a.tion of ~ndependence or enter into relati ons with Southe !U~d9sia; rurthert me.r.ty of. ·hem might11 in addition to other meas es, recognise an .t'1.~ican nat· ona1·· st government-in-exile, if as seems probabl e , one :rora estab ishe • tlewr'the_ess, in order to determine the tull scope ot possible pra'IS tivll and remedial action ,~~ it i s important that attention be given to the economic

~actors bearing on tha present crisiso

Vuln ra le areas i n Southern H.hodeaia a econom.y

In recent years" economic dev lopnent in So t hern Rhodesia. M.s en morl!l r apid than in most other African countries., Howevar.\l the econoDzy" ha.s not yet­ attained t he degree or self".... sui'ficienc:r curren'·ly enjoyed by t South At · c m econoll\Y on the one band, o on the othe , by the largely subsistence econo ie of eome othe African countries" Exports eccotmt. for about a third of the

Territo Q 8 gr as do~stic producto Furt herll alt lOUgh agriculture io the most important single source (accounting tor over 20 per cent) ot the gros

omestie product.~~ the subsistence sector is smallv as compa. d with Euro~a comm .rcial production, of which tobac-co accounts f or alx>ut 70 per cent·o

Thus whera the agricultural sector is concerned, Southern rl.hodesia. exhi ite a high degr e of dependence on commercial product ion, espocially' of tobacco tor exporto I ndeed tobacco exports accounted for £3B millionu out or total o.xports val ued a.t £82 mUlion in l96.3 o On the ability of Southern Rhodesia tobacco growers to expand production on a.n economic ba.s:Ls depends very largely the Territ or,ya s capacity to retain and expand it export marke~so ugar exports a.munting t.o nearly £2 m:Ulion per annum are much leGS signif icant,

In the manufacturing sector, which !a responsible for sorB::! 15 per ce t or t.he gross domestic product, the increasEK! confide 9 generated by t e formation or the Federation resulted in a l evel of develor:ment which was in advance of shor t=term prospective demando he dieso ution o:t" t e Federat ion =2=

as t herefore exposed t his over-developed sector to the possibility of a r estriction of its hit her-t.o assured narkets in Mal awi and Zambia t~Jhich used to absorb over 25 per cent or the manufacturing o tput of South rn .H.ho e siao

In this conne.xion, it is to be not ed that the economic po Licies of t he Govern~ mente of these t wo countries are aimed a.t c:" lversification · d the development of secondary indust ry, and this will entail a reduction of their dependence on manufactur.ed products from ~K>uthern RhcY..esia; in fact, ;';ambia. has already put up some tariffs to p1~tect its o inf~t indus t riese

The occupaM.onal distribution o! t ho ,t!;uropean popu.latbn is anot her factor aff ecting tho viabilitY' of t he Southern i.hodes;l econoicy"o Sever1ty per cent ot the tntal l!:uropean populati on live iZJ the main urban a.reto and are engaged in t e commercial services, and manufac4.uring aectors which, as not ed, are over --developed in relation to t he nark 1::. and are consequent !.:· wlne ble. Less t han 10 per cent are empl oyed in I he generally prosperou" areas of agri= culture and mining. Sl¥>uld t he curro 1t depr ession in the co1··t ruction - indur~try and the difficult conditions facing JIJ rr.y other sectors of indu.rt ry and comerce persist, t he continuing f low of emig'' ~nts from f'outhern lfu::xiesiJ, • unting to 1,000 per Jlk>nth, will no doubt :i.ncro:.se. Such a devel opne t is bound to lead to serious loss of mora e among the~ EuroJ)I)an populc..tion and impai.!' t he confidence ot oversea investor s in t he Territc ry, to \ihich the ~ , ut hem 1thodeo.'a Gover nment itself attaches t he greatest impo:.' _;anceo

It is estimated t hat t he Ter1i to:cya s balance of payme :-~t s on currc.·t account will s how a favourable balance of bet ween £.355 million and «f._, million thi.s 'PJRro However, the inadequacy of this t 3.~ca is reflected by- the re"ent subste1.. •tial increases made by the Government in i ndir ect taxation, l :i.q or, c: garettea r,·ld a sales tax ~, in addition to t/e imposition of school .f'eeso ReC.. lmpt ion a:~, interest charges, estimated t ; :.11., 5 million per annum, on its shart. of the federal public debt, constitute an additional heavy burden on the Gov~ \~nt' a exchequer a The cost of livii7I has gone up a.nd unemployment among the • ricant: 1'-.as been increasingo The Gov-r mment does not seem to ha.ve established a definite economic polic7 to ~~tore confi dence and combat unemploymento

On capital account, the o.rl;.l ook is l ess f'aw urableo ~lo the Souther11 dhodes;la. Government ie in a. por. i.tion to r estrain an undue l eakage of funds, H is doubtful whether in present ,,ircumstances the ini'lotz of capi tal car. be maL tainad at a level adequate to meet the chronic shortage or investment capit fo L,duatr.ro Locally generated investment in industry is not mere~ i nsufficient but it may lfloll be di scouraged by the tighter control measures i nit iated by ths Government. At the same ti.mB, unless Southern rthodesia is able t o r aiee substant ial loans on its own credit, and i n part).cular to obtain funds f rom or under-writ ten by the Unit ed Kingdom Gov rnment, the Government will b .. able to undertake little d~velopment expendi ture (except, _perhaps , by me s o defioit financing to the extent determined by its balance of pay100nts posi tion ).

Direct on of Southern Uhodesia's t fact ors

The United. Kingdom is Southern 1thodesia 0s major t rading partner. In 196.3, it absorbed exports worth nearly halt o! t he Territ ory 0 s total. t is the lar gest single importer of Sout ham rl.bod sia t obacco, and in recant ye s, it has purchased about two-fifths o:t t 1e Territory as annual tobacco production.

It al oo supplies one-third of the Territor;r~s imports.

Under the Ottawa Agreemnt or 1932, t he United Ki ngdom accords preferen­ tial -c.rea.tment to certain a~P"icultural and mineral. items of Southe Rhodesia origin:l including t obaccoo As regards tobacco, in particular, this amounts to a rebate, on tt:te duty c:ha.rga to the British manufacturer, of abo t 2 per

cent of the ice., 1-Urther, under the london J greement of 1947, the United Kingdo unde ook to absorb at least 46 million pounds £ tobacco from SoUtbe 1ihodesi a every yearo In practice British manufacturing concarns have i n recent years oought much more t han (in fact nea ly t wice) t his amount; this trend has been encourage by t he f act t hat the financi al interests of British

manufacturing concerns aJ."e j.nterlocked 'dth t ho e of t he tobacc industry in

the Terri toeyo

Similar agreements providi ng for most favoured nation treatment or f or

negotiated quotas of t obacco pUrchases exist between Southsrn dhode~ia Australia, Canada, Portuga and Sout h Africa, which also absorb considerable

quantit ies of Southern ~hodesia t obaccoo Othe important markets are t he Federal Republic of Germany, t he Net herlands, and Belgiumo

Zambia and, to a lesser extent, Halawi abaorb exports from Southam db:xlesia to the tune or over £25 million comprising manufactured goods and sugaro ~bia g a = 4 -

shar amounts to a quarter of Southern Rhodes· a.•s manufa.ct l.llg outputo Under t he pcesent structure of Cant~ Afri can tariffs, Southern rlhodesi a aa members hip of GATT gives it an important trad:ing advantage in rel ati on to t hese marketso Ita geographical proximity to these countri es also g:i.we i t an o dge, in t erms of transport costs, over its competitors.

Exports of sugar, est imated at £2 milJ..ion per annwn in 1962, also benefit frorn Comroonwealth pt'eference and f rom the alloca.ti n to Southern .dhod.esia of annua.l quota of eome 45j)OOO tons in the United Kingdom mar ket. This uota is lu .. gh enough to absorb most of the Territory0 s eJqX>rtnble surplus of sugar~ but given tho present state of t world sugar market and the genera.ll.y l ower prices, t hese benefits are rot decisive. In practi ce, a. consi de able proportion of t he surplus is exported to other Coi!IllOnwealth countries, including Canada and ~bia , which bas recently announced plans to grow and process its own e"Qgaro

Immedi ate consequences o a unilateral decl aration

From t he statement by t he United Kingdom Government on 27 October 1964, it is clear t hat t he consequences of a unilateral. declarati on will include t he s spension by- t he United Kingdo of all f inancial aid to Southem .Lthodesia and. its exclusion .f'rom access to t e London money mar keto The suspension ot f inancial aid might mean (though t his remains to be s pelt out) t hat the usual guarant ees provided b)" the United Kingdom Government fo l oans made to or des· ed by t he Southern Hhodesia. Government from internation&l. agencies or f rom any- world capital market would no longer oo availableo SimilarJ.7, finan .. ial and other aid to the Territ oq f rom non~go ~rnmental sources in the

United Kingdom would be prohibited; this prohibition might 'h'ell cowr the pay~ mant of taxes b7 British companies operating ill Southern nhodesiao As regards exclu:3ion from tr.e London JOOney- market, it may- be noted that, the state of opinion in London f inancial circles is such t hat disoouragamsnt by t he United Kingdom Government would be necessary to effect such exclusiono

Howewr , having also said t hat all financial and trade r elations with Southern dhodesia would be jeopardised in t he event of a unilateral declaration, the United Kingdom statement failed to specif.r whether this j eopardy- would leads f o instance, to the freezing of South r n rl.hode ia assets in London or to the sus pensi on of normal t rade lations. llor was it cl .:e.r that it wo d entail a -wit hdrawal of Commonwealth preference and a cancellation ·of t he agreed quotas for Southern ~hodesia agricultural product in the United Kingdom market"

The steps contemplated b7 the Unit ed Kingdom Government in r esponse to a un · ataral decl arati on of independence woul d certainly cause diatul·bance to t he e conoJey"" of Southern ltbod.asia.. However, they- wou.l d .fall s hor t of being irmuediately decisive measures$ particul ar:Q' if South Africa, i n th hope ot bringing Southern dbodesia wit hin its spheX'G of i nfiuence, were willing to buttress that country0 a econom,y .. Similarly t he wi thdrawal of

Cornmon~~alt h preference and t he cancellation of t he agr eed quota system ~uld not necessarily result i n a ~ignificant reduction of t he demand for ~out hern rl.hode sian products in the United Kingdomo lbwever, the lower prices that

Southern ~hode sian producers would r eceive might force certain marginal producers out of production o In any ca.ee , t he preference on Sout hern rlblde~ sian tobacco exports this year has mainly benefit ted Briti sh i.mport e ;;-s rather t han Jouthorn H.hodeeian farmer s, because ove~"<""pro duction has brought d Ol'l!l ths price by almost the exact amount o.f t he preference.

Mo si gnificant JDBasures would include the f roezing of Southern 1\hod.esian asse ts in London, the severance ot tp:"ade rel ati ons, and the withd!'a.'bal or guarantees for loans made to am desired by Southem Rhodesia. It is to be noted, as regards the s ever ance of trade relations, t a.t for the Unite Kingdom, alternative sources of tobacco imports would available.. The United States, which has been concerned at the loss of some of its t raditio 1 markets to f.10uthern d.hodesia, would no doubt be glad to lh"1l.oad some of i t growing stockpile o

Measures open to other ggvernments

Another important f actor woul d be t he extent to hich the governments of Mal&\d a:mi Zambia. took action against Sout hern rl.hodesiao Thsse governments have given no indicati on how t hey would rea ct, but it i s clee.r t hat t he severance ot t r ade relations would disrupt the Southern li.hodesis.n manufacturing i ndustry, which as noted is the most vulnerable sector of South~z~ rlhodesia 's econo~ ; it 1muld seriously upset Southern rthodesia's balance of· trade, lead to widespread unemployment and industrial unrest .. •

However, J.falawi vs .freedom of' action Would be linrl.ted by t he fact t hat

a. rge number of migrant ·~rkers from that country- f l nd employm.ent in Southern iti"'.odesia and their annual remittances of nearly a. million are of soma importance to the home countr,r. Further, Malawi receives fiscal assi stance from Southern dhodesia.

Where Zambia is concerned, difficulties would arise from the fact t hat

the bulk of its imports and exports have to travel thro~«h Southern dhodesia to V.ozambique ports; although it could inst ead use t he Bsnguela railway through Angola to Lobito, the tpedwill of Portugal would be required, which is unlike]Jr to be forthcoming in the event of action against Southern Uhodeeia. It al r elies to a significant extent on importa of power, coal, and food !rom Southern dhodeaia . In anr event, the loss of membership in GATT which would .follow a unilateral declaration and the consequent political i solation, would remove an impor tant trading advantage which Southern dhcdesia has in relation to t heaa coWltrieso

Finall.y, there is the question how much assistance Portugal and South Africa might extend., it the Southern dhodesia Government f orced the independence

issue. Portugal~s own economic position makes it an unl1 el.7 source of material assistance in such circWDStances. It could, however » help by continuing to permit the use ot Mozambique ports by Southern tthodesia and by affording transit facilities to keep open the oil pipe line f'l"om Beira to the new refineey at Umtalio

As regards South Africa, it would not be surprj_sing if for political

reasons i~ expressed readinaes to provide 1oans and other financial assistance. Although South Africa is not believed to have entered into any fiscal. col'llllit ments, it i s in a position to finance, from its record £ore1gn reserves, l arge-seale capital transfers to Southern dhodesia.

At the same ti.rne, South Afr1ca 0 s rapidly expanding domest i c market could probablT absorb, without disruption, at least part of the current output of Southern ithodesian industry. I ndeed South Africa might decide t hat, in view of

the liberal.isation of its import ~licy wlbi Ch has followed t he recent boom, there were advantages in encouraging imports of manufactured goods, eapeci&llJ' clothing and footwear, f rom Southern Rl»deeia.. ~tlhether the Southem .tthodesian .. ..

-7 -

manufacturing concerns, which are either subsidiaries of South African companiee or of il itish companies operating in South Africa, would welcon:e such a de lop- . ment is a different mat ter; they obviously would not view t he .future of their Southern Rhodesia operations in iaolation, but would take into account the

pos sibility of rationalising production in favour of South Af rica ~f economic conditions in Southern lthoclesia deteriorated furthero Ao regards tobacco, it i s to be noted that since South Africa is nearly" self- sufficient, it would be unable to absorb more t han a fraction of the Southern Rhodesian crop.

Conclusions

The doubts denonstrated above as to the decisivaness of the measures envisaged b,y the United Kingdom Government and as to the likelihood of other governments apJll7ing eff'ect i ve economic pressures do not imply that Southern rthodesia would survive Without damage the consequences of a. unilateral. decl ara­ tiono 1-'or the economic difficulties plaguing Southern Rhodesia ....,uld be aggravated, particularly by t he ldthdra: or financial support by the United Kingdom, the attendant w-lthdrawU. of the private-investment support which hal!l been a major factor in the Territory0 s developnent, and by an inevitable I worsening of commercial relations with Zambia a:nd l4al :wi..,

lbwever, there is scope for measures of a mra significant character. As i ndicated above, a threat by the United Kingdom or the severance of commercial relations and the freezing ot Southern Rhodesia as11ets in London as \'1811 aa the withdrawal of guarant ees tor loans to Southern Lthodesia woUld constitute a mo re eff ective deterrent to a unilat eral decl arationu ThoUgh South Africa would lxt 1n a position to buttress the econ.omy .for a l imited period if' these steps were taken, its readiness to do ao would depend on how tar it felt it could alienate the United Kingdom on which it has hitherto relied heavily for international pctlltical supporto

Wortb1' or consideration alao is the possibility of military intervention as the ultimate deterrent. Though t he United Kingdom Gover nment has denied that contingencY' plane for military intervention were being considered at the

moment 9 it would appear that this possibility is not entirely ruled out; this impression is supported b7 the presence ot the Chief or Start at t he recent Cabinet meeting specially convened to consi der t t.e crisis. vlbare l ogistics are concerned, the expedition with which arrangements were made by the United Kingdom to airlift troops, equipment and supplies from KeJV"& to Swaziland during ...... " I

... g ...

t he disturbances of June, 196.3~ suggests that the problems are not insoluble.

As r egards political and constitutional difficulties, precedents are available for United Kingdom militar,r intervention in Terr itories posaessins a comparable measure of autonotey" in order to implement deci sions oppoeed either b7 their Governments or by marJ7 of their responsible political l eader • Hecent examples are the militar,y interventions in British Guiana and Adeno Further, it seems clear that whatever constitutional relationship may in normal circumst ances inhibit the Unit ed Kingdom from considering litaey action, such a relationship would ceaee to have any- validity if Southern Rhodesia.

proceed to make a unilateral declaration of independence~ In any case, it is the responsi"'o:L1ity- of the United Kingdom to take the necessary- measures,

including the use of force, to protect the African ~\jority who would otherwise be left at the marcy of what the United Kingdom itself would r egard as a rebel governmento

At the same time, it is not clear that Southern .H.hodesia could expect military assistance from Jouth Africa and Portugal with .,,hom it is r umoured to have concluded mi.lita.ey agreements; these agreements are thought to be

hed~d in b.1 so ~ qualifications as to leave the question of assistance to the political judgment of the Governments of these two countrieso