Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

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Egypt’s Upcoming Parliamentary Elections WP Weakened Parliament, Weakened Parties

Nadine Sika S

According to the roadmap for political transformation announced in July 2013, ’s parliamentary elections should have taken place six months after the constitutional amendments. Yet, since then, they have been postponed several times. They are now scheduled for March and April 2015. Until recently, the regime has been reluctant to hold parliamentary elections, fearing an unruly parliament not dominated by a regime party, as in the past. In June and December 2014, the government enacted a new elec- toral law and an electoral district law, which will reduce the chances of political parties in general – and political opposition parties in particular – from gaining a substantive number of seats in parliament. By deliberately impeding political parties from playing an important role in parliament, the regime is just adding to its own volatility. There- fore, priority should be given to pushing for the inclusion of all political forces in the electoral process and the strengthening of political parties.

After the ouster of from religious institutions and public figures. power in July 2013, the then Minister of Political parties were granted six seats; the Defense, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, announced Islamist political current was granted two a roadmap for political transformation. (one for the Salafi al-Nour Party and one Three major milestones were sought to for an Islamist thinker who was a previous enhance the legitimacy of the new regime: member of the ). The the rewriting of the 2012 constitution, constitutional referendum took place in followed by a national referendum; parlia- January 2014. A few days later, Mansur mentary elections; and presidential elec- announced a “slight” change in the road- tions. In September 2013 interim president map, with presidential elections to precede Adly Mansur appointed a constitutional parliamentary elections. Presidential elec- committee of 50 individuals, which was tions were held in May 2014, leading to a charged with revising a constitutional draft clear-cut victory for al-Sisi. Parliamentary proposal of a 10-member committee that elections are now scheduled to begin on 21 had also been appointed by Mansur. The March 2015. Yet, the meddling with parlia- committee of 50 was composed of members mentary elections provides the observer from different syndicates, unions, official with mixed messages concerning today’s

Dr. Nadine Sika is a Georg Forster fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation in the project “Elite change and new SWP Comments 1 Social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the January 2015 German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the PhD grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

1 politics in Egypt. Why is the regime not The effects of these two laws will further enthusiastic about parliamentary elections? weaken the already weak political parties Is it due to the irrelevance of these elections for two main reasons. First, the low number or the government’s reluctance in dealing of seats chosen through electoral lists pro- with a parliament that might be host to its vides political parties the chance for com- political opposition? petition beyond just the 120 parliamentary seats. On the other hand, the 420 seats allo- cated to single member districts are more The Legal Framework likely to be won by well-connected individ- Both the 2012 and the 2014 constitutions uals or businessmen who can provide their mirror the uncontested dominance of the constituents with goods and perks in order military in Egyptian politics. The 2014 con- to win their district seats. Second, it was stitution reinforces the 1971 constitutional customary that independent candidates arrangement of a strong executive and a who won parliamentary elections became weak parliament. The parliament does not co-opted into the National Democratic Party have oversight of the military budget, nor (NDP). Thus, political conflicts or rivalries does it have power over the decision to go between different individuals were resolved to war. The main competencies granted to under the party umbrella. Yet, today, with parliament in the constitution concern no dominant party and a weak party sys- the right to approve general economic and tem, individual candidates will most likely social policies, the national budget (barring remain independent without party affilia- the military budget) and de jure oversight tions, further fragmenting parliament of the executive branch. The president along individual interests. has the right to dissolve parliament (Article 137) after acquiring approval through a referendum. The president has the right Earlier Parliaments to appoint the prime minister with the Although the results of parliamentary agreement of a simple majority in par- elections under Husni Mubarak were liament. In case there is no such vote of always known to be in favor of the then- confidence, the article gives the president ruling NDP, elections and parliament also the right to dissolve parliament without served as important conduits for the con- a referendum. testation, cooptation and legitimation of The impediments to a strong parliament the political order. The presence of oppo- are not only found in the constitution, but sition forces in the political process in gen- lie also in the 2014 parliamentary election eral – and in parliament in particular – gave law. This law proposes a mixed electoral Mubarak the internal and international system that has both a candidate list and legitimacy needed to assert his rule. single member district representation. The Though he ensured the presence of oppo- system allows 420 parliamentary seats for sition in various parliaments, Mubarak single member candidates and 120 seats weakened the opposition by ensuring that for closed list candidates. The remaining they would not gain more than 10 percent 27 seats of the 567-seat legislature shall be of parliamentary seats. In 1984 and 1987, appointed by the president. Both the can- when political parties that were aligned didate list and the individual candidates with the Brotherhood won almost 30 per- are elected through a winner-takes-all sys- cent of seats, these parliaments were dis- tem. In addition, the 2014 electoral district solved by the Supreme Constitutional Court law divides the country into 232 districts, on account of being “unconstitutional.” for individual candidacies, and 4 districts The 2010 parliamentary elections were with electoral lists, where the winning list mired in electoral fraud, which led to an takes all allocated seats. unprecedented exclusion of the opposition

SWP Comments 1 January 2015

2 from parliament. Of the 508-seat parliament, The Egyptian Wafd Coalition, which the opposition – both secular parties and mainly consists of the Wafd and the the Brotherhood combined – won only 15 Egyptian Social Democratic Party, is still seats. As a consequence, when political ac- holding together. Also, the Civic Democrat- tivists mobilized for an end to the Mubarak ic Current remains intact, which consists regime in January 2011, opposition parties of new political parties established after quickly joined in. the Mubarak regime, such as the Constitu- After the ouster of Mubarak from office, tion Party, founded in 2010 by Mohamed an electoral law with mixed proportional El Baradei, the former Director-General of representation and single member districts the International Atomic Energy Agency. was enacted. The results of the first post- In December 2014 Abdel Gelil Mustafa, Mubarak parliamentary elections in Novem- the former coordinator of the National ber 2011 and January 2012 showed a marked Association for Change – an association weakness of the secular forces vis-à-vis the established by El Baradei – attempted to Islamists. The two major Islamist blocs, unite these coalitions to put together joint led by the Brotherhood and the Salafists candidate lists for the proportional repre- together, won a majority of more than 70 sentation districts. These lists have strong percent of parliamentary seats. However, on support from the Egyptian Front and its the basis of earlier precedents, the Supreme splinter parties in addition to the Civic Constitutional Court dissolved this parlia- Democratic Current. However, the extent ment as well in the summer of 2012. to which this support would hold is still unclear. These shifting and fragmenting alliances are a reflection of the secular Electoral Coalitions political parties’ weakness. So far, they The leadership’s reluctance to hold par- have shown themselves to be incapable of liamentary elections can be traced to the building a coalition for the four candidate lack of one dominant political party. Unlike lists, which would make up only a third his predecessors, President al-Sisi does not of the upcoming parliament anyhow. have a party that can work as a political At the other end of the spectrum, the machine to guarantee him support for Islamists are also fragmented between presidential policies in parliament. the Brotherhood, the Salafis, the Gamaa Some attempts have been made by pub- Islamiyya and the Islamist political parties lic figures, such as Amr Moussa, former of Misr al-Qawiya and al-Wasat. Against Secretary-General of the League of Arab the background of the imprisonment of all States and former presidential contestant, high-ranking Brotherhood officials, the to build one large coalition to counteract banning of their party and the crackdown the Salafi and Brotherhood’s dominance of on their rank-and-file members, these par- the 2012 parliament. Such a coalition has ties have very few options for mobilizing not materialized, however. Rather, rivalries votes for elections. Moreover, the Brother- and disputes had led to three main secular hood is itself divided, with some supporting coalitions by December 2014. In January participation in parliamentary elections 2015, one of these coalitions split up: the “under cover” and others in favor of a boy- Egyptian Front Coalition, which was com- cott. In addition, the government has been posed of some staunch supporters of the restricting the Salafis’ presence in mosques, military, such as the Congress Party, led by which were important venues for mobiliza- former presidential candidate Amr Moussa. tion during the 2011/2012 parliamentary The backbone of the coalition – the Con- elections. gress Party, the Unionist Progressive Party and the Tomorrow Party – were the major parties to leave.

SWP Comments 1 January 2015

3 Outcomes of the 2015 Elections Parliament and Instability The likely outcome of the upcoming elec- The weaknesses that are bestowed upon the tions is a parliament dominated by fractured legislature and on political parties through secular parties and individuals and busi- the constitution and laws, in addition to nessmen, with a minority of religious par- the political parties’ own internal struggles, ties, mainly the Salafi al-Nour Party. The will be detrimental to the development of a political parties represented in the secular strong parliament. Yet, a strong parliament political camp are likely to include members is an important pillar for any participatory of the Egyptian Front Coalition and its splin- and democratic system, even in terms of ter groups, the Wafd Coalition and the Free authoritarian stabilization, and allows for Egyptians Party, which was one of the new the inclusion of a wide range of political parties established after the ouster of Muba- forces that could voice opinions within the rak and is funded by business tycoon Naguib formal institutional structures. Last but Sawiris. Together, these parties would func- not least, having a strong legislative body

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und tion as al-Sisi’s mouthpiece in parliament. could potentially enhance good govern- Politik, 2015 The January 2015 meeting of President al- ance, through effective oversight of the gov- All rights reserved Sisi with the presidents of these parties is a ernment. State stability and good govern- These Comments reflect clear indication of his preference for such a ance are the basis for economic develop- solely the author’s views. balance in parliament. It is also remarkable ment, which Egypt is in dire need of. Effec- SWP that the only Islamist parties invited to the tive political parties are also essential for Stiftung Wissenschaft und meeting were al-Nour and Misr al-Qawiya. enhancing stability, as they could channel Politik German Institute for The latter, however, did not participate. popular demands into the political sphere. International and The opposition parties would consist In contrast, weak political parties are likely Security Affairs of the Civic Democratic Current, represen- to result in more protest and tumult on the Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 tatives of which were also invited to the streets. 10719 Berlin meeting by the president but were not and its European partners Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 able to attend. In any case, this coalition’s should reassert their commitment to a more www.swp-berlin.org presentation will likely be very weak. In stable Egypt. This can be done by pressing [email protected] the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, a for the inclusion of all political currents in ISSN 1861-1761 similar coalition, called “the Revolution free and fair parliamentary elections and Continues,” was not able to receive more through assistance to all political parties than 3 percent of seats. via joint programs between European and The religious camp will be divided Egyptian political parties. Political dialogues along the Salafi al-Nour Party, the Gamaa should be held by European political par- Islamiyaa’s al Binaa wa-l-Tanmeya Party, and ties and their Egyptian counterparts to the moderate Misr al-Qawiya and al-Wasat exchange political knowledge and skills in parties. Even if the Brotherhood were to not internal democracy and coalition-building opt for a boycott, with the current govern- processes. ment’s crackdown on it and the freezing of its leaders’ financial assets, it would not have the means to mobilize votes. Given all these splits and internal dis- putes among the secular parties preferred by al-Sisi, the Islamists’ fragmentation and weakness, and the weakness of the Civic Democratic Current, the upcoming parlia- ment is likely to be very weak. This will further increase the power of the executive branch, even more than the constitution and the legal framework have provided for.

SWP Comments 1 January 2015

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