‘Case Study on ‘Fire onboard MV Daniela off the Coast of Harbour’

By Rear Admiral MMH Gamage, RSP, VSV,USP, psc The Director General Personnel, Navy

INTRODUCTION onboard, the limited crew onboard will not befires. able In tothe manage event of the a major situation distress by their situation own serious and dangerous for mariners, materials and the coordinated support of every possible 1.onboard A fireand onboardthe ship aitself. ship The at sea ship’s is always crew individual is essential to manage the situation and any external assistance dispatched to before it gets into a disastrous situation. Hence, assist with the situation must take rapid and making the decision to call for the assistance, appropriate steps to extinguish or limit the the readiness of the organizations involve in coordinating disasters and the timely decision making are very crucial in handling such concernfire with decisions available about resources. when In to themuster event any of situations. passengersan extensive on ship the ship fire, at the its greatest rescue stations, challenges or 3. In addition, deriving lessons learnt measures are carried out before the ship must be from the incidents already happened would eithereven evacuate partly or them, even andcompletely how long extinguished. firefighting undoubtedly help the maritime fraternity to Taking the ship to a port or place of refuge also implement necessary precautionary measures involves great challenges for decision makers. to void similar incidents in the future.

2. There is a limited number of crew container ship MSC Daniela in the available onboard most of the vessels in the atTherefore, 120 nautical fire brokemiles outoff Colombo onboard port very in large Sri modern era. However, the size of the vessels is Lanka on 04th April 2017 and the coordinated getting bigger and bigger day by day and the amount and the value of cargo carrying onboard Coordinating Centre (MRCC) were taken into are also on the rise. Therefore, the limited thefirefighting study in mechanism order to derive of the lessons Maritime learnt Rescue and number of crew onboard face a greater challenge to make recommendations for the maritime in safeguarding their own lives, ships and the fraternity to avoid similar incidents in the cargo onboard, especially against onboard future.

GALLE DIALOGUE 93 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 201993 THE INCIDENT 8. Meanwhile, the Sri Lanka Air Force also had joined hands, providing a ‘Bell 4. MSC Daniela had been on her passage 212’ helicopter augmenting the combined from Singapore to Suez Canal, when containers further had extended its assistance, providing thefirefighting ‘Chetak’ helicopter efforts. The to the Indian distress Coast response Guard however,on the main had deck been in unableaft part to had get inflamed. control over The efforts. The dousing operations had continued crew had tried to attack and extinguish the fire, with the unprecedented assistance of the , Sri Lanka Air Force, Sri Lanka Thethe firecrew during had thechanged first minutes the course and thetowards thick Ports Authority, Indian Navy and Indian Coast Colombotoxic smoke and hadhad hampered sent a distress the firefighting. signal to Guard personnel. the local authorities, requesting immediate assistance. MRCC Colombo together with other stakeholder agencies9. The had fire made existed their over maximum 10 days efforts and the to a container vessel, MSC ‘Daniela’ the Maritime Rescue5. Upon Coordinating receiving Centre a fire (MRCC),distress Colombocall from SLPA had taken the vessel inside the Colombo had dispatched the Offshore Patrol Vessel portextinguish and thehad onboard unloaded fire. cargo Subsequently, operational the Sagara on patrol and two Fast Attack Craft terminal. The representatives from the (FAC) of the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) on scene for Maritime Environment Protection Authority the assistance. (MEPA), Cargo Owners, Fire Experts and Harbour Master of the Colombo harbour had 6. Two tugs of the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA), Rawana and Maha Wewa had visited onboard MV Daniela time to time duringwitnessed the operation. the firefighting operations and the initial efforts had also gone in vein due to had also joined firefighting efforts; however, Particulars of the Vessel Involved assistancethe intensity from of thethe flames.Indian HighIn the Commission, eventuality 10. Basic ship particulars of the vessel asof spreadthere had of fire, been Sri a Lanka Coast NavyGuard had vessel requested (ICGS involved in the incident are as follows. ‘Shoor’) that had been on a goodwill visit a. Name of the Vessel -MSC Daniela berthed in the Colombo harbour. The Indian High Commission had promptly replied to the b. Company name -DANIELA request made by the Sri Lanka Navy dispatching NAVIERA CO SA c. IMO Company Number - 4111836 onboard the distressed vessel. (1) Company address - Chemin, ICGS ‘Shoor’ to assist in extinguishing fire Geneva, Switzerland (2) Country of registration- Panama joined by the SLNS ‘Sagara’ patrolling in the (3) Company status - Active Southern7. The Seas. firefighting Both ‘Shoor’ mission and ‘Sagara’ had alsoare

d. IMO No - 9399002 onboard.equipped In with addition, firefighting the Indian equipment Navy had also and e. Flag - Panama [PA] directedhave had two specialized of their ships firefighting INS ‘Darshak’ personnel and f. AIS Vessel Type- Cargo - Hazard A (Major) INS ‘Garriel’ to the location. In the similar vein, g. Gross Tonnage - 151559 three more SLN FAC had dispatched on scene h. Deadweight - 162867 t for the evacuation of 21 crew members in a j. Length Overall - 366.07m k. Breadth Extreme - 51.24m the safety and life of the crew. l. Year Built - 2008 situation of the fire spreading, endangering 94 GALLE DIALOGUE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 201994 CASE STUDY Maritime Rescue Coordinating Centre (MRCC) 11. The study was carried out keeping 15. Maritime search and Rescue (SAR) operations involve saving and safeguarding thetwo second objectives was to in identify mind. The the lapses first objective and the people in distress and danger at sea. Maritime shortcomingswas to identify ofthe the cause stakeholder of fire onboard agencies and SAR can be considered to include many kinds involved in the entire process of extinguishing of tasks, such as assisting ships and boats in maritime distress, preventing accidents, local agent. searching for persons and vessels lost at sea, fire onboard, including the ship’s crew and the consultation with physicians and medical 12. This case study, takes a closer look transportation from ships to shore. had been supplemented with external help 16. The SLN has been vested with the SAR at some the firefighting stage of the efforts extinguishing of the crew, operation. which responsibility over the Sri Lanka’s Search and Accordingly, the case analysis section examines Rescue Region (SRR). The Sri Lanka’s SRR expands over 1.7 million square kilometers during the course of the incident with a view and it is approximately 25 times of the Sri toand answering analyses thethe followingsignificance questions: of external help Lanka’s land mass. However, the number of units available with the SLN for the SAR a. How was external help used and operations are very limited in numbers. how did it affect the progress of the situation. Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA)

b. What were the ‘lessons learnt’ 17. The SLPA is the state-owned operator for the future development of combined of major commercial ports in Sri Lanka. Founded in 1979, and the SLPA currently operates ports in Colombo, Galle, , 13. firefightingThe analysis operations? draws not only on incident , Oluvil, and statistics, but also conducted interviews Trincomalee. with experts from different stakeholder agencies involved in the incident. The report 18. Fire and rescue services engage in largely focuses on the operating principles maritime operations function under the SLPA of stakeholder agencies responsible for based on their ordinary day-to-day capabilities to operate on water. Fire and rescue services as cooperation among the MRCC Colombo, SLPA, a rule, engage in such operations in their own Localthe providingAgent, MEPA, firefighting Sri Lanka assistanceNavy (SLN), and Sri area of operations. The scope of operations Lanka Air Force (SLAF) and the distressed depends largely on a risk analysis of the area vessel. in question and the available resources. The basics of operations and the coordination and KEY STAKEHOLDER AGENCIES INVOLVED IN command structure are determined by the THE FIREFIGHTING OPERATIONS SLPA management.

The Marine Environment Protection can be brought under control with the help Authority (MEPA) of14. many In differentthe event actorsof a ship and fire, functions. the situation The major stakeholder agencies involved in this 19. The MEPA is the apex body established particular incident and their responsibilities by the Government of Sri Lanka, under the are discussed below:

GALLE DIALOGUE 95 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 201995 Marine Pollution Prevention Act No. 35 of a. Start and alert phase 2008, with the sole responsibility to prevent, b. Operations on scene control, and manage the pollution of Sri c. Subsequent actions Lanka's Marine Environment.

ANALYSIS / OBSERVATIONS 22. Furthermore, these three phases have been examined from the perspectives of following actors: incident occurred onboard MSC Daniala on a. The vessel in distress 04th20. AprilThis 2017, section with analyses a particular the shipfocus fireon b. The Maritime Rescue evaluating whether external help was useful in Coordination Centre minimizing the consequences of the incident and how cooperation among stakeholders c. The Sri Lanka Ports Authority could be developed in the future. d. Marine Environment Protection Authority 21. The analyzed incident and the rescue e. Local Agent/ Shipping Agent measures employed have been divided into three phases: 23. The table below illustrates the roles of different actors in each phase of the incident.

Unit Start and alert phase Operations on Scene Subsequent Actions MSC Fire Alarm > Assess Situation > Berthed Alongside and Daniela Distress Message cargo clearance MRCC > Receiving Distress Message ControlFirefighting and Coordinating units Continuous monitoring > Alerting Units SLPA Receiving Distress Message Preparations> Dispatch FF Assist Cargo Clearance units MEPA Receiving Distress Message > Prepare suitable refuge> Be ready with pollution preven- tion measures Agent Receiving Distress Message> Assist Cargo Clearance Support MRCC with details

Start and Alert Phase b. The distress vessel has had 24. Operations of the Vessel. Following STCW-compliant operating models for observations were revealed during the analysis. of a vessel designate a separate person or a. The analysis made on the crew personsdealing with to be fires. responsible The fire for control tasks plans such list and the interview conducted with the local agent revealed that the vessel system in the engine room, the closing of ventilationas the use hatches of the CO2and smoke fire smothering diving. with the STCW Convention. The IMO’s STCWand the Convention crew qualifications is an international complied c. On the basis of the analyzed ship agreement on the minimum

watchkeeping for seafarers. fire, it can be noted that operations and standards of training, certification and systemsdrills on hadthe beenship’s functioning firefighting properly. plan had been conducted regularly. The fire alarm 96 GALLE DIALOGUE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 201996 d. Human factors, the training completed by the crew and drills play a information the MRCC Colombo had decisive role in the success of the initial respondedd. However, swiftly on and verification had coordinated of the measures. The Master of the ship had the event effectively. not appreciated the situation correctly and had not informed the incident to e. The MRCC’s decisions to alert the appropriate authorities at the right time. rapidly and clearly. At the time of the alert,the fire the and MRCC rescue Colombo services hadhad donebeen e. A vessel must be aware that managed by an adequate number of it has to request external help early operators and one as a Search and control immediately or if there is a delay Rescuestaff, with Mission four Coordinator persons classified (SMC). as enough if it cannot get the fire under f. Adding personnel from the SLN whenbefore requesting the fire is external detected. help; Situational if the had enabled the MRCC Colombo to awareness is particularly significant known, it is best to be on the side of lightened the workload of the SMC caution.extent of the fire is not accurately anddivide the tasks core staff efficiently, at the whichcontrol in centre turn while dealing with the situation. 25. Operations of the MRCC. Following observations were revealed during the analysis g. The representatives of cooperating parties had provided a. It was revealed that the vessel the MRCC Colombo with specialist had not sent its distressed message in accordance with the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). h.expertise The in theirMRCC own fields.Colombo is The initial information received at the supported by the National SAR MRCC Colombo was from a resident coordinating Committee. The National living in Colombo. After making SAR coordinating Committee consist numerous attempts the MRCC had been of key representatives of almost all the able to obtain the correct information agencies dealing with maritime affairs. on the incident. 26. Operations of the SLPA. b. According to GMDSS, a vessel Following observations were revealed during the analysis. message on Channel 70 using VHF- DSC.should After first sendthis, outthe a distress digital distressvessel a. Fire and rescue services functions should tune to VHF Channel 16 to under the SLPA and operates in liaison report on the situation onboard and with the MRCC. The general operational request assistance. VHF distress principles are to operate the Fire Liaison communications are then automatically Officer at the MRCC under the SMC or carried out on Channel 16. supports him. The liaison Officer can be

invited to the MRCC solely to consult c. Had the MSC Daniala followed the and assess the situation without alerting correct procedures it would have been firefighting teams or other Fire and rescue easy for the MRCC Colombo to locate service units to the task or even if there is the ship and coordinate and provide no intention to use such teams and units. immediate assistance to mitigate the situation.

GALLE DIALOGUE 97 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 201997 b. In this particular incident, the SLPA over spread and the situation had become Fire Liaison Officer had been alerted by more severe. This incident highlights the the MRCC Colombo through the Harbour importance of correct decision making. Master to be prepared to handle the task. Operating models for receiving and using However, physically the SLPA Fire Liaison external help is a crucial factor in fighting Officer had not been called to the MRCC in a dipterous situation and therefore it for the assistance. This had posed a great is important for the Master of the ship to challenge to the appropriate coordination know how to make efficient use of external of the SAR situation. help in firefighting.

c. However, the SLPA fire services b. However, during the event the had been kept standby for immediate captain and the crew had cooperated well deployment by the Fire Liaison Officer with the MRCC Colombo and the rescue on receipt of the alert from the MRCC units facilitating them to engage in effective Colombo. firefighting. The crew of the vessel had operated in an exemplary manner and had d. Most of the MRCCs maintains carried out initial firefighting measures on their own Maritime Incident Rescue Group their own. (MIRG) consisted with the experts of all the fields to provide a swift response to the c. At one point of time the Master incidents. However, the MRCC Colombo of the ship had not concurred to employ has not yet formulated its own MIRGs to a firefighting unit without approval of the assist a situation. operator due to the high cost involved. However, later the Local Agent had e. Establishing accurate situational given the consent to use the particular awareness helps the MRCC to make firefighting unit for the operation. the right decisions and operating plans. However, the master of the vessel and the d. The MRCC Colombo had Local agent had been delayed to provide requested the type of cargo onboard from cargo information to the MRCC on time. the local agent and the Master of the Ship and it has taken a quite long time for them f. Rapid and professional response to provide the required details. Had this can often provide sufficient additional information been provided to the MRCC support, in accordance with the basic on time the planning and conduct of the concept of MIRG operations, for the crew firefighting operation would have been of a distress vessel dealing with a ship fire. much easier for the MRCC, Colombo. Operations on Scene e. During the firefighting operations, 27. Actions of the Vessel during the fire. the Master of the Ship heaved her Following observations were revealed during the anchor and had started moving seaward. analysis. Subsequently, the Master had indicated his reluctance to anchor the ship once a. The Master of the ship had initially again sine the ship’s company had advised refused the assistance of the other vessels the master to avoid doing so. The MRCC and Sri Lanka Naval Ship Sagara stating Colombo had instructed the Master to that the fire is under control and could be anchor the vessel since the firefighting managed with the ship’s crew themselves. operations are difficult whilst underway. Due to this action of the captain, the initial firefighting measures had been somehow delayed, and consequently the fire had

98 GALLE DIALOGUE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 201998 28. SAR Operations. Following d. Having obtained the required observations were revealed during the analysis. information, the MRCC had coordinated following agencies and their assets to a. According to the maritime law, effectively manage the situation. the master of the vessel has absolute authority on the vessel while it is at sea. (1) The Sri Lanka Ports The SMC coordinates the rescue of human Authority (SLPA) lives at sea and the operations of other (2) The Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) authorities and parties participating in (3) Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) the rescue operations as agreed nationally. Accordingly, when the vessel is at sea, (4) Indian Navy (IN) the most important task of the MRCC (5) Indian Coast Guard (ICG) coordinating the situation is to prepare (6) Marine Environment for the continuity of operations and the Protection Authority (MEPA) possible evacuation of those on board in accordance with the decisions of the master e. The SAR assistance obtained from of the vessel. Continuous monitoring of the respective agencies are as follows. the status of the distressed vessel lays a solid foundation for working safely and Sr. Unit Assistance Obtained making the right decisions. 1 SLPA Firefighting Tugs - 07 Dredger - 01 b. A decision had been made by the Firefighting Teams Master of the ship in consultation with Ship Surveyors the ship’s operator and the local agent 2 SLN OPV - 01 to manoeuver the vessel towards the FAC - 06 Colombo Harbour. Generally, bringing a Firefighting Teams vessel to a place of refuge is done by the 3 SLAF Bell 212 Helicopter MRCC in consultation with the relevant 4 IN OPV - 02 stakeholder agencies. In this incident, Onboard Helicopter - 01 firefighting had continued in the Colombo ` ICG OPV - 01 harbour anchorage for a certain period of Onboard Helicopter - 01 time, which is not at all suitable for a place for refuge. 6 MEPA Technical Advice

c. The MRCC Colombo had gathered f. The MRCC had not called the required/ additional information and national SAR coordinating Committee to had updated the threat assessment to get the advice and however, the MRCC had the relevant stakeholders. The MRCC’s coordinated the event very successfully by situational awareness improves decisively its own. when the first unit arrived on scene or 29. SLPA Operations During the Incident. the MIRG unit boarded the distress Following observations were revealed vessel. The deployed FAC had maintained during the analysis. communication with the ship and had provided continuous situational updates a. The amount of response time, to the MRCC. In particular, more detailed largely determined by the geographical information is required on the general location of the incident and the means situation and its escalation, and also on of transportation of the rescue units. how ship firefighting is progressing. The master’s initiative to manoeuver the

GALLE DIALOGUE 99 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 201999 vessel on his own initiative, in other way This incident highlights the importance of facilitated the easy reach of the rescue complying with the provisions of the IMO units. resolutions.

b. The SLPA had taken its 30. MEPA actions During the Incident. every endeavor to maintain a proper The Marine Environment Protection cooperation between the MRCC, Fire Authority had been kept informed by the MRCC and rescue services teams and vessel crew Colombo to be prepared to mitigate anticipated at a good level throughout the operation. environmental hazards and therefore, MEPA In addition, the SLPA had used its every representative had maintained close contact with possible resource for firefighting and to the MRCC and had visited onboard to assess the bring the situation under control. situation.

c. The situation had expanded Subsequent Actions over the 10 days with intermittent fire eruption despite the heavy firefighting 31. Subsequent Actions of the Vessel / arrangement had been put in place. It Operator. Following observations were had been evident that the external help revealed during the analysis. had played a decisive role in assessing a. The Vessel brought in the Colombo the situation and ensuring that the harbour 10 days after the initial incident correct follow-up measures are taken. If and berthed in the Colombo Harbour, the not, the situation could have ended very Master and the crew had assisted the SLPA badly indeed, maybe even in the total to clear the damaged cargo onboard. loss of the distress vessel and extensive environmental damage, if external b. On May 14, the vessel had left the professional help could not have been Colombo harbour for Shanghai, for an dispatched rapidly to the vessel. estimated three-week period of repairs. However, on 08 August 2017 MSC Daniela g. Subsequently the vessel had had left Chinese Shipping Industry’s brought inside the Colombo harbour Changxing yard, continuing her route to by the SLPA even SAR Coordinating Dalian, . Committee and on the sole discretion of the SPLA. Once the vessel has reached c. Fire-damaged and water-damaged the port, the situation is no longer cargo had been inspected and on-carried considered as a SAR mission, but as a Fire where possible. Where it had not been and rescue services or salvage operation. possible to on-carry cargo, cargo remnants The maritime law does not apply to had been sold as distressed cargo. Where saving human lives from a vessel docked no value, cargo remnants had disposed of at a port. In such situation, command is locally. transferred when the vessel was brought to port. 32. Subsequent Actions of the SLPA. Following observations were revealed during the h. According to the facts revealed analysis. by the local agent and the subsequent reports published by the shipping agent a. The SLPA had brought the vessel reveals that, some of the cargo had not to a commercial port operation area whilst been disclosed therefore, the units in the continuing the firefighting operations and firefighting operation could not use the even without completely removing the appropriate type of fighting extinguisher. containers containing dangerous cargo.

100 GALLE DIALOGUE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 2019100 However, few tugs had been kept standby incident. In addition, maintaining a dedicated for immediate assistance. MIRG with very well-trained personnel to engage in maritime disasters had been emerged as an b. The Affected containers and the urgent and essential requirement to mitigate containers with good condition had been similar maritime disasters. unloaded in different locations of the port premises; however, wonder whether the 37. The level of skills and operational SLPA conducted a comprehensive risk capabilities of the crew greatly affects in mitigating analysis before unloading the containers the distress onboard and the crew training are to within the port premises. be conducted in line with STCW requirements. It is mandatory that the master of the ship fully Other Relevant Observations co-operate with the support agencies for efficient extinguishment of onboard fire. 33. International Cargo Handling Coordination Association estimates the annual 38. Cargo classification and declaration is volume as 60 million packed containers with 10% another important area of concern with respect or 6 million as declared dangerous goods. Out of to the fire onboard. The IMDG Code section which 20% is badly packed boxes which means 2.0.0.1 places the responsibility of classification 1.3 million unstable, dangerous goods containers on shipper/consignor ‘The classification shall moving across the oceans. Findings about Cargo be made by the shipper/consignor or by the Incident Notification System (CINS) estimates appropriate competent authority where specified 21% of containers with misdeclared goods. Hapag in IMDG Code’, in order to minimize the hazards Lloyd estimates more than 150,000 containers with and to facilitate appropriate handling. misdeclared dangerous goods moving in the supply chain annually. LESSON LEARNT

34. When a port state observes infringement of 39. On the basis of the analysis, it is the provisions of IMDG Code they will penalize the recommended that the following issues be taken master of the vessel under SOLAS and MARPOL into consideration in handling maritime distress conventions. Port states who observe infringement situation. of IMDG Code can inform such infringements to the competent authority from whose territory the a. Every nation to maintain a well- cargo was originated. Some container lines will start trained MIRG team with light equipment imposing penalties to shippers who misdeclares that can be mobilized rapidly, and whose dangerous goods. primary task is to take initial steps to bring the situation under control or slow CONCLUSION down the spread of damage to the extent that the ship can be brought to a port of 35. On the basis of the analyzed incident, it refuge to save the people on board or can be stated that the MRCC Colombo together evacuated in a controlled manner. with the other agencies had coordinated the incident effectively and efficiently and had been b. The place of refuge process for able to prevent a huge maritime disaster. External the vessel is an integral part of SAR on-scene help had led to gain a better outcome, operations, therefore it is recommended without exception. to demarcate and establish a suitable place for refuge in liaison with the other 36. Even though the MRCC could manage stakeholder agencies. its all the resources, other relevant agencies and their resources and handled the incident without c. Joint co-ordination models a danger, there are a lot of lessons learnt from the

GALLE DIALOGUE 101 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 2019101 and standard operating procedures or operational guidelines should be created to ensure safety and efficiency in joint operations.

d. The close and healthy relationship with the regional SAR services helps to obtain swift assistance.

e. Joint ship fire drills between vessels and MIRG teams should be developed in co-operation with the responsible SAR authority. The plan must be developed in co-operation between the vessel, the company, as defined in SOLAS Regulation IX/1 (owner of the ship), and the SAR services.

f. Education of shipper/consignor or the appropriate competent authority is essential to prevent hazards caused by the misdeclared dangerous goods.

j. The ability of the master to assess fire and to make timely request from the supporting agencies, if he envisages that fire cannot be brought down by the own ships crew.

102 GALLE DIALOGUE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONFERENCE 2019102