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Distributed Systems Distributed Systems Introduction to Cryptography Paul Krzyzanowski [email protected] Except as otherwise noted, the content of this presentation is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.5 License. Page 1 Ngywioggazhon Pystemp Auesfnsicutiwf & Moiiunocaiwn Piqtoaoyp Page 2 Cryptographic Systems Authentication & Communication Protocols Page 3 cryptography κρυπός γραφία hidden writing A secret manner of writing, … Generally, the art of writing or solving ciphers. — Oxford English Dictionary Page 4 cryptology κρυπός λογια hidden speaking 1967 D. Kahn, Codebreakers p. xvi, Cryptology is the science that embraces cryptography and cryptanalysis, but the term ‘cryptology’ sometimes loosely designates the entire dual field of both rendering signals secure and extracting information from them. — Oxford English Dictionary Page 5 Cryptography Security Cryptography may be a component of a secure system Adding cryptography may not make a system secure Page 6 Terms Plaintext (cleartext), message M encryption, E(M) produces ciphertext, C=E(M) decryption: M=D(C) Cryptographic algorithm, cipher Page 7 Terms: types of ciphers • restricted cipher • symmetric algorithm • public key algorithm Page 8 Restricted cipher Secret algorithm • Leaking • Reverse engineering – HD DVD (Dec 2006) and Blu-Ray (Jan 2007) – RC4 – All digital cellular encryption algorithms – DVD and DIVX video compression – Firewire – Enigma cipher machine – Every NATO and Warsaw Pact algorithm during Cold War Page 9 The key BTW, the above is a bump key. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lock_bumping.Page 10 The key Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pin_tumbler_lock Page 11 The key Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pin_tumbler_lock Page 12 The key • We understand how it works: – Strengths – Weaknesses • Based on this understanding, we can assess how much to trust the key & lock. Source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pin_tumbler_lock Page 13 Symmetric algorithm Secret key C = EK(M ) M = DK(C ) Page 14 Public key algorithm Public and private keys C1 = Epublic(M ) M = Dprivate(C1 ) also: C2 = Eprivate(M ) M = Dpublic(C2 ) Page 15 McCarthy’s puzzle (1958) The setting: • Two countries are at war • One country sends spies to the other country • To return safely, spies must give the border guards a password • Spies can be trusted • Guards chat – information given to them may leak Page 16 McCarthy’s puzzle Challenge How can a guard authenticate a person without knowing the password? Enemies cannot use the guard’s knowledge to introduce their own spies Page 17 Solution to McCarthy’s puzzle Michael Rabin, 1958 Use one-way function, B = f (A) – Guards get B … • Enemy cannot compute A – Spies give A, guards compute f(A) • If the result is B, the password is correct. Example function: Middle squares • Take a 100-digit number (A), and square it • Let B = middle 100 digits of 200-digit result Page 18 One-way functions • Easy to compute in one direction • Difficult to compute in the other Examples: Factoring: pq = N EASY find p,q given N DIFFICULT Discrete Log: ab mod c = N EASY find b given a, c, N DIFFICULT Page 19 McCarthy’s puzzle example Example with an 18 digit number A = 289407349786637777 A2 = 83756614110525308948445338203501729110525308948445338 Middle square, B = 110525308948445338 Given A, it is easy to compute B Given B, it is extremely hard to compute A Page 20 More terms • one-way function – Rabin, 1958: McCarthy’s problem – middle squares, exponentiation, … • [one-way] hash function – message digest, fingerprint, cryptographic checksum, integrity check • encrypted hash – message authentication code – only possessor of key can validate message Page 21 More terms • Stream cipher – Encrypt a message a character at a time • Block cipher – Encrypt a message a chunk at a time Page 22 Yet another term • Digital Signature – Authenticate, not encrypt message – Use pair of keys (private, public) – Owner encrypts message with private key – Sender validates by decrypting with public key – Generally use hash(message). Page 23 Cryptography: what is it good for? • Authentication – determine origin of message • Integrity – verify that message has not been modified • Nonrepudiation – sender should not be able to falsely deny that a message was sent • Confidentiality – others cannot read contents of the message Page 24 Cryptographic toolbox • Symmetric encryption • Public key encryption • One-way hash functions • Random number generators Page 25 Classic Cryptosystems Page 26 Substitution Ciphers Page 27 Cæsar cipher Earliest documented military use of cryptography – Julius Caesar c. 60 BC – shift cipher: simple variant of a substitution cipher – each letter replaced by one n positions away modulo alphabet size n = shift value = key Similar scheme used in India – early Indians also used substitutions based on phonetics similar to pig latin Last seen as ROT13 on Usenet to keep the reader from seeing offensive messages unwillingly Page 28 Cæsar cipher A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z Page 29 Cæsar cipher A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T shift alphabet by n (6) Page 30 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T Page 31 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T G Page 32 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GS Page 33 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSW Page 34 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWU Page 35 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUN Page 36 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNB Page 37 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNBU Page 38 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNBUM Page 39 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNBUMZ Page 40 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNBUMZF Page 41 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNBUMZFY Page 42 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNBUMZFYU Page 43 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNBMUFZYUM Page 44 Cæsar cipher MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z U V WX Y Z A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T GSWUNBMUFZYUM • Convey one piece of information for decryption: shift value • trivially easy to crack (26 possibilities for a 26 character alphabet) Page 45 Ancient Hebrew variant (ATBASH) MY CAT HAS FLEAS A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V WX Y Z Z Y XW V U T S R Q P O N M L K J I H G F E D C B A NBXZGSZHUOVZH • c.
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