CURRENT HISTORY October 2008

“Moscow’s ambitions… directly undermine the entire European project of peace, freedom, and prosperity.” War in , Jitters All Around Sv a n t e E. Co r n e l l

ear midnight on August 8, a column of fully to ’s attack. Why did this small war in several hundred Russian tanks rolled the happen, and who started it? What Nthrough the Roki Tunnel, which con- implications will it have for the South Caucasus, nects Russia to Georgia’s breakaway province of for the former more broadly, and for . This action represented Russia’s Europe as a whole? first military attack on another state since the So- viet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979—hence, it Ca u c a s i a n empowerment was an event whose significance extended far be- In recent years, the nations of the South Cau- yond the South Caucasus. Indeed, while the hu- casus have made some of the most remarkable manitarian consequences of the war that ensued progress that has been seen anywhere in the post- in Georgia do not compare with what transpired Soviet space. This comes in stark contrast to these in Chechnya (or Bosnia) in the 1990s, the conflict countries’ first decade of independence, during the arguably marked the most significant challenge 1990s, when debilitating ethnic wars, political in- to Europe’s security architecture since the end of stability, and economic collapse made a shambles the cold war. of the region. In that era Armenia and Azerbaijan Within 10 days, Russian troops had taken fought a vicious war, and Georgia was torn apart control of South Ossetia and started a second as the two northern autonomous regions effective- front in Georgia’s other separatist region, Abk- ly seceded with Russian help. Afterwards, these hazia. And they had also intruded deep into non- conflicts remained unresolved, and the West ig- contested Georgia, moving on the towns of Gori, nored them despite the peril in doing so. , , and . Military and civilian The war and destruction of the 1990s make the infrastructure had been bombed across Georgia, progress of recent years all the more remarkable. as had the railway connecting the eastern and The region’s states have hardly become model de- western parts of the country. Even the prized mocracies. They remain afflicted by widespread - National Park was in flames corruption and by a constant tug-of-war between on account of Russian firebombing. authoritarian and democratic forces that are fight- Russia’s invasion was a surprise—but only in ing for influence both in government and in oppo- terms of its scope and brutality. For months if not sition groups. But the region’s three countries— years, Russia had been pressuring Georgia in vari- Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—have, in fact, ous ways, singling it out among countries in the become real states. region for particularly aggressive treatment. This Of the three, Georgia has achieved the most spring, several analysts predicted a war would impressive transformation. At the start of the cur- take place, some even timing it to August. Yet rent decade the central government—controlled Western leaders were caught unaware, and ap- by aging former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard peared unable or unwilling to respond meaning- Shevardnadze—had failed to gain real control over territories outside the capital’s immediate Sv a n t e E. Co r n e l l is research director of the Central Asia– vicinity, let alone the breakaway regions. Geor- Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a joint gia was known as a failing state. But in 2003, the center affiliated with the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and the Stockholm-based “young reformers” whom Shevardnadze had cul- Institute for Security and Development Policy. tivated turned into an opposition and carried out

307 308 • CURRENT HISTORY • October 2008 the peaceful “Rose Revolution.” With a reformist Armenia, which lacks Azerbaijan’s oil fields zeal previously seen nowhere in the former Soviet and has not experienced a revolution like Geor- Union except the Baltic States, a government led gia’s, lost almost half its population to emigration by President Mikheil Saakashvili turned Georgia in the 1990s. Moreover, most regional infrastruc- around. Petty corruption was effectively eliminat- tural projects bypassed Armenia because of its ed; Soviet-era practices were thrown out and insti- war with Azerbaijan, which lasted from 1988 to tutions revamped; and the tax system was rebuilt. 1994. Thanks to serious reforms, Armenia has Georgia’s budget quadrupled and the country be- managed to make its economy a success story, came solvent again. with double-digit growth rates characterizing the But the state’s newfound successes ruffled past decade. Yet the country’s political system has feathers in Georgia. The flamboyant Saakash- remained sclerotic. It is dominated by a crop of vili’s government sometimes appeared arrogant, politicians whose fortunes were linked to the war and lacked sensitivity regarding the adverse ef- over the ethnic enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in fects of its policies. In November 2007, street pro- southwestern Azerbaijan, from which Armenia’s tests organized by opposition groups funded by current leaders hail. a shady oligarch, along with a subsequent crack- All three countries, in short, have their prob- down, harmed the government’s legitimacy. But lems, the largest of which are unresolved ter- the government survived this crisis. Most of the ritorial conflicts. But the past decade has seen legitimacy was restored, moreover, when early the nations evolve into functioning states with elections were held, and were judged by interna- a capacity to formulate and implement policies. tional observers mostly free and fair. Saakashvili Paradoxically, this strengthening of statehood is was reelected with 52 percent of the vote, more what has caused the region’s unresolved conflicts than double the share of his closest opponent, to reemerge on the world agenda. The leaders and in parliamentary elections the ruling party of Azerbaijan and Georgia, with their renewed maintained control. While Georgia still has much strength and capacities, resolved to reverse the work ahead of it in terms of building institutions, humiliating defeats and losses of territory that the rule of law, and a fully democratic political their countries suffered in the 1990s, thus reject- culture, one struggles to identify a country any- ing a status quo to which the international com- where that has experienced as rapid a turnaround munity had grown accustomed. as Georgia has in the past decade. Azerbaijan and Armenia have also experienced St a t u s q u o n o l o n g e r some success, though it has occurred along dif- Indeed, Baku and became anti–status ferent trajectories from Georgia’s. In Azerbaijan, quo powers, calling into question weak inter- the astute diplomacy of Heydar Aliyev, the coun- national mechanisms for conflict resolution and try’s returned Soviet-era leader, brought billions investing a substantial share of their growing of dollars of investment in the country’s rich national wealth in their military budgets. This Caspian oilfields in the 1990s, along with sta- explains some of the recent bewilderment of Eu- bility. Aliyev also succeeded in securing a West- ropean powers that were suddenly asked, despite ern export route for the country’s oil—the US- their having to juggle dozens of other concerns, supported Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which to address conflicts in a distant neighborhood that was completed in 2005. they understood poorly. But most of all, it explains In 2003, Aliyev handed power to his son, Il- Russia’s increasingly assertive interference in the ham. The latter, a progressive man with an acute conflicts—especially those in Georgia. understanding of market economics, presides over When Saakashvili came to power in Georgia a stable and rapidly growing country. But he has in early 2004, he immediately raised the Coun- had to deal with the first signs of “Dutch disease” cil of Europe’s flag beside Georgia’s in front of the (a decline in other economic sectors correspond- national parliament. Of course, the Council of ing with the dominance of energy exports) and a Europe’s flag is identical to that of the European government run to a large extent by the oligarchs Union—12 stars on a deep blue background—so of his father’s tenure. They, whose positions in flying it was a powerful statement of Georgia’s Eu- power are entrenched enough to bring to mind ropean aspirations. Not long afterwards, Saakash- feudal barons, limit his scope of action and his vili declared Georgia’s intention to seek NATO ability to reform the country. membership. Shevardnadze before him had ex- War in Georgia, Jitters All Around • 309 pressed such desires; but because of Saakashvili’s From Moscow’s vantage point, Georgia’s as- furious pace of reform, this was a bid for mem- sertiveness and success were the chief regional bership that could not simply be laughed away. threats to the emerging “Putin doctrine”—accord- Saakashvili saw his country following in the foot- ing to which Russia would resume its domination steps of Central and Eastern European countries and control over the states of the former Soviet that were, just as he gained power, being admitted Union. Indeed, the Kremlin saw Georgia’s revolu- to NATO and the EU. tion as having inspired the Ukrainian revolution Europe, however, was developing a serious the next year and potentially beginning a wave of case of enlargement fatigue—and with EU efforts democratic revolutions that would bring Western- to reform an ungovernable union of 27 members oriented leaders to power throughout the post- already foundering, it was developing internal Soviet world. This would clearly be an obstacle to difficulties as well. More ominously than this, Putin’s ambitions of restoring Moscow’s empire, the Russia of 2005 was not the Russia of 1995. and eventually a threat to the power of the authori- No longer dependent on Western loans, Russia tarian kleptocracy in the Kremlin. was now buoyed by an oil windfall and was in the midst of a self-aggrandizing effort to restore Peacekeeping r u s s i a n -s t y l e its great power status. Moscow’s response to Georgia’s actions was The country’s president, Vladimir Putin, was gradual but strong, and included a set of instru- determined to roll back the “color revolutions” ments to which no other former Soviet state had that had brought pro-Western leaders to power been exposed. First, Russia undermined Geor- in Tbilisi and Kiev, and which had put Georgia gia’s statehood and independence by intervening and Ukraine on a trajectory toward NATO mem- more boldly than before in the unresolved civil bership. Putin saw these wars that Moscow itself trends as a direct result of had helped instigate. Even Moscow’s weakness in the before Saakashvili came 1990s, and he thought dis- As during Soviet times, Russia to power, Russia had im- plays of Russian strength has failed to become a force of posed a discriminatory were needed. Nowhere has attraction and can only dominate visa regime on Georgia, re- Moscow’s readiness to flex its neighbors through intimidation. quiring visas of Georgians its muscles been clearer but exempting residents of than in Georgia. and South Osse- Initially, Moscow was tia. Subsequently, Moscow put on the defensive by Georgia’s increasingly as- began to distribute Russian passports en masse to sertive steps to achieve progress regarding its un- the populations of these two regions, in violation resolved territorial conflicts. Georgia’s efforts in of international law. 2004 to curtail widespread smuggling of drugs, This was followed by a claim that Russia had a untaxed cigarettes, and other contraband across right to defend its citizens abroad, through mili- South Ossetia led to a serious skirmish with the tary means if necessary—which turned out to be separatists. In 2006, Georgia took control of the exactly the pretext Russia used when it invaded mountainous Kodori Gorge in upper Abkhazia, Georgia. Not stopping at this, Russia’s political which had been dominated by a local warlord. leadership began floating the possibility of an- These measures were seen as militaristic, but nexing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Meanwhile, Tbilisi also made a series of political and eco- Moscow staunchly resisted all efforts to interna- nomic proposals to the separatist leaderships, tionalize mediation, negotiation, and peacekeep- and sought greater international participation ing in the conflict zones. in the processes of conflict resolution. Georgia Facing little international reaction to these reversed its earlier policies of isolating the un- aggressive moves, Moscow by 2004 essentially recognized republics, seeking instead to engage dropped any pretense of neutrality in the Geor- them economically and win their hearts by pre- gian conflicts. It began appointing Russian of- senting a renewed association with Georgia as a ficials to the military and security services of path to Europe. Thus, Tbilisi’s policies included the breakaway regions’ self-styled governments. a mix of carrots and sticks. This mix, however, Hence Russian general Sultan Sosnaliev served as never gained coherence. Abkhazia’s defense minister. Likewise, South Os- 310 • CURRENT HISTORY • October 2008 setia’s defense minister, Major General Vasily Lu- well as heavy artillery into Abkhazia—according nev (former commander of the Siberian military to Moscow, as part of its peacekeeping operation. district), and its security chief, Anatoly Barankev- Utilizing troops to repair the railroad linking Rus- ich, were among several Russian military officers sia and Abkhazia may have seemed an oddity, but in that breakaway republic’s government. repairs were completed on July 30. Thousands of These moves made a mockery of Russia’s claim Russian troops and hundreds of tanks sped down to playing a peacekeeping and mediation role in the line 10 days later, opening an entirely unpro- the conflicts, as well as of any pretense that the voked second front to the war that had just started separatist governments operated independently in South Ossetia. from Moscow. Yet these blatant interventions within Georgian territory were at most obliquely Raising t h e h a m m e r criticized by Western leaders, who did nothing to By August 7, 2008, days of escalating shelling seek a transformation of the negotiation mecha- of Georgian posts and villages by Russia’s South nisms, let alone of the peacekeeping forces. Ossetian proxies in the South Ossetian conflict Moscow also exercised economic instruments zone had led the Georgian army to increase its of policy. In 2006, coinciding with the Russian- deployment of troops there. What happened next Ukrainian energy crisis, energy supplies from Rus- is a matter of dispute. Russia claims its invasion sia to Georgia were cut off after mysterious explo- began after Georgia indiscriminately shelled sions on Russian territory destroyed the pipelines , the South Ossetian capital; Geor- and power lines that carried gas and electricity to gia says it began an attack only after a Russian Georgia. Only months lat- tank column had already er, Russia imposed a total crossed the Roki Tunnel ban on imports of Georgian While Moscow’s invasion of its into Georgian territory. and Moldovan wine, citing The way the war began bogus quality concerns southern neighbor is a sign of might, provides key insights about (Russia consumed about 80 it is not necessarily a sign of strength. Russian motivations, and percent of both countries’ therefore also about the wine exports). In Septem- war’s broader implications. ber 2006, after Georgia arrested several alleged The prevailing Western view is that Russia may Russian spies, a full embargo was imposed—all have provoked Georgia, but that Saakashvili fool- transport, trade, and postage links with Georgia ishly gave Moscow a pretext for intervention when were ended. Georgians living in Russia were sys- he sent Georgian troops into Tskhinvali. While tematically harassed. Westerners agree that Moscow’s opportunistic In 2007, Moscow escalated its policies to in- invasion widely exceeded any legitimate right to clude military provocation. In March of that year, action that Moscow may have had, there is also Russian attack helicopters shelled administrative a sense that Saakashvili has himself to blame for buildings in the Kodori Gorge, while on August starting a war with Russia. But closer analysis in- 6—a year to the day before the descent to war dicates that this explanation is at best simplistic. in 2008—a Russian aircraft attacked a Georgian A growing body of evidence suggests that Russia radar station near South Ossetia. When a bomb was determined in any event to wage war with that was dropped failed to explode, international Georgia this summer. investigators were able to prove its Russian origin. During the spring and early summer of 2008 But Western leaders, mostly on summer vacation, it was Abkhazia, not South Ossetia, that was the took days to formulate a response, and when it scene of rising tensions—and in fact it is likely came it turned out to be soft-spoken. By 2008, Pu- that Moscow planned to begin its war there. In the tin had explicitly linked the conflicts in Georgia spring, statements by Russian and Abkhaz leaders to the forthcoming Western recognition of Koso- regarding the Kodori Gorge grew increasingly bel- vo’s independence. ligerent, involving veiled threats to take control of On April 16, 2008, Putin signed a decree in- this Georgian-administered region by force unless structing his government agencies to open direct Georgia withdrew. Moreover, when Georgia sent trade, transportation, and political ties to Georgia’s unarmed drones over Abkhazia to monitor Rus- separatist republics, and to open offices there. He sian troop movements, the Russian air force shot then dispatched several hundred paratroopers as them down. One such incident was dramatically War in Georgia, Jitters All Around • 311

captured on camera. In late June, a leading Rus- territory, tensions escalated. South Ossetian forc- sian military analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, said the es started shelling Georgian posts and villages, Russian leadership had in April made the political which elicited fire from Georgian forces. Russian decision to attack Georgia by August. jets also conducted overflights of South Ossetia, All these developments contributed to a grow- and unlike on previous occasions, did not bother ing sense of panic in Tbilisi. For years, Western to deny these violations of Georgian airspace. partners had told the young Georgian leadership Across the mountains in the North Cauca- to stay calm in the face of escalating Russian as- sus, Russia used the summer months to finalize sertiveness, and to stick to existing peacekeeping an impressive military buildup. Starting on July structures in spite of any flaws. The term “exercise 15, Russia conducted a major military exercise restraint,” so dear to Western leaders, became a dubbed “Kavkaz-2008.” When the exercise ended standing joke in Tbilisi. on August 2, the troops involved did not return to Indeed, the West’s lame response to Putin’s their barracks—though some of them had come April 16 decree and the from posts in faraway August 6 missile attack Pskov and Novorossi- led Georgians to con- ysk. They remained on clude that no one would alert in North Ossetia, check Moscow’s now just across the border overt territorial claims, from Georgia. The Black and that Abkhazia and Sea fleet, based in Sev- South Ossetia were like- astopol, was meanwhile ly being lost, perhaps ir- made ready for military reversibly. Seeing this, action. the more hawkish mem- bers of Saakashvili’s en- Striking t h e b l o w tourage contemplated a There is little dispute military option. Yet the that on the late evening president himself and of August 7 Georgian the majority of his gov- forces began an attack on ernment saw the futility Tskhinvali. Russia claims of military action, in- it sent “additional forces” stead accelerating efforts into South Ossetia only to encourage a stronger on the afternoon of Au- Western diplomatic re- gust 8. But the Georgian sponse. forces, which had taken In late July, tensions control of most of the city suddenly shifted to South overnight, were pushed Ossetia, which differs in back at noon of that day two important respects by Russian artillery and from Abkhazia. Whereas Remember us? air attacks. To carry out in Abkhazia a clear front Russia reintroduces itself to Georgia such an offensive by line along the Inguri Riv- mid-day, Russian forces er separated Georgian from Abkhaz forces, South would have had to begin moving from their bases Ossetia was a patchwork of Georgian and Osse- in North Ossetia on the evening of the previous tian villages under the respective control of the day, at the very latest. In other words, whether the Georgian government and the Russian-backed Russian tank column reached Georgian territory separatists, with each side controlling about half before or after the Georgian forces began their at- of the territory. Second, while Abkhazia’s elite tack on Tskhinvali, the order to send troops across maintained a modicum of distance from Russia, the border must have been given before Georgia the South Ossetian leaders answered to Moscow began its attack. rather than to their own people. That Moscow’s invasion of Georgia was pre- Following a July 3 attempt on the life of Dmitry meditated is also borne out by the extremely Sanakoyev, a leading pro-Georgian official in the rapid and coordinated deployment to Georgia’s AFP Photo/Peter Parks Photo/Peter AFP 312 • CURRENT HISTORY • October 2008

Black Sea coast of the fleet and by air Moscow’s refusal to withdraw from Georgia, force bombardments of Georgia’s interior; as well and its establishment of occupation zones deep in as by the fact that a second front in Abkhazia Georgian territory that threaten key transporta- was opened the very next day, followed by the tion arteries, all indicate that the purpose of the landing in Abkhazia of over 6,000 troops by sea invasion was to negate Georgia’s independence and railroad. and to reduce the country to a pliant satellite. The Saakashvili can certainly be blamed for the war was also obviously aimed at killing Georgia’s limited shelling of civilian areas that the Geor- integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. It capi- gian military apparently committed (which even talized on the assumption that European states Saakashvili’s supporters strongly deplore). Yet it is would never seek to integrate a country that is also clear that Russia intentionally inflated that as- partly occupied by Russian forces. sault’s magnitude, claiming that more than 2,000 On a regional level, the war served to restore civilians had been killed though only about 100 Moscow’s control over the South Caucasus—a geo- deaths could be independently confirmed. In fact, politically crucial region with a unique position most of the destruction in Tskhinvali was caused between Russia and Iran, and one that links the by Russia’s air attack on Georgian positions. Be- Black and Caspian seas. The Caucasian isthmus yond that, the only thing Saakashvili might be forms the access route between the West and Cen- blamed for is falling into a trap that Russia had tral Asia, enabling the transportation of Caspian prepared for months. oil to the West and providing NATO with a logisti- If, however, one accepts the premise that the cal link from Europe to its operations in Afghani- Georgian advance took place against the immi- stan (practically all flights between NATO territory nent threat of a Russian army column moving and Afghanistan cross Georgian and Azerbaijani toward the region, a compelling military logic airspace). As such, the war indirectly targeted justifies taking Tskhinvali. The city sits like a Azerbaijan’s independence as much as Georgia’s. cork in a bottle: Had Russian troops been able to While oil-rich Azerbaijan has sought to main- continue down the mountain roads to Tskhinvali, tain working relations with both Moscow and they could easily have moved from there toward Tehran, there has been no doubt that the coun- Gori and even Tbilisi in a matter of hours, if that try’s economic and strategic orientation has been was their intention. By forcing Moscow to fight for toward the West. Indeed, Azerbaijan and Georgia Tskhinvali, the Georgian army—albeit at a dev- are tightly connected—to the extent that they astating price—probably slowed the invasion by have come to be understood as a tandem that ei- 48 hours. This gave Europe and America time to ther stands or falls together. Without access to the wake up, and perhaps saved the country’s capital West through Georgia, Azerbaijan loses its outlet from occupation. for oil exports, and is also separated from Turkey, its closest ally. And without Azerbaijan, Georgia’s Wh a t m o s c o w w a n t s strategic importance would be much reduced. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in any case had lit- The weak Western response to Russia’s invasion tle to do with South Ossetia. The aims were larger of Georgia puts Azerbaijan in a quandary. While and strategic, and they reached well beyond Geor- Moscow’s actions undermine all that Baku has gia. But as far as Georgia was concerned, Russia’s been working for in the past decade, the country invasion sought to punish Saakashvili’s govern- cannot speak out too loudly, for fear it might be ment for its Western orientation and its obstinate next to experience Moscow’s wrath. refusal to yield to Russian pressure. The Krem- Moscow’s war has broader significance, too, lin’s ambition was in all likelihood to ensure the for the Caspian energy game. Moscow resented downfall of a president whom Putin is known to the building of twin oil and gas pipelines from hate viscerally. Azerbaijan to Turkey across Georgia. While Rus- While that ambition was not met, at least in sia has not yet directly attacked these pipelines, the short term, Moscow succeeded in crippling it has certainly sought to increase prohibitively Georgia’s military capacity and in dealing a dev- the political risk of building any further pipe- astating blow to the country’s economy and in- lines along the same route—most specifically, frastructure. Indeed, the war was a disaster for the EU-championed Nabucco project, which an economy largely dependent on growing West- would connect Turkmen or Kazakh reserves to ern investment. Europe via the South Caucasus energy corridor. War in Georgia, Jitters All Around • 313

Moscow has thus dealt a further blow to Europe’s freedom, and prosperity as embodied by the Euro- attempts to diversify its energy imports and may pean Union. And it is unclear at this juncture how have effectively ended any notions that Central far Moscow’s ambitions extend: Does Russia wish Asian leaders had entertained about a Western to dominate even the Baltic states and Poland, de- export option. spite their membership in NATO and the EU? But the country most on Moscow’s mind when it invaded Georgia, other than Georgia itself, Mi g h t , m i g h t n o t was probably Ukraine. Like Georgia, Ukraine is Whether Russia will succeed in its ambitions— a candidate for NATO membership, but Russian in terms of achieving domination over Georgia, the elites see Ukraine as a historic part of Russia and South Caucasus, and the broader post-Soviet world, not a separate nation. At NATO’s April 2008 Bu- as well as in terms of changing the character of Eu- charest summit, Putin even warned US President ropean security—will depend to a great degree on George W. Bush that if Ukraine entered NATO it the West’s ability to react correctly to the challenge. would be dismembered. Unfortunately, the West’s response in the weeks Also ominously, Russia since the spring of this following the invasion was not encouraging, as year has been making more emphatic claims to Western leaders seemed taken aback by events and the Crimean peninsula—not coincidentally home unable to find instruments to confront them. to Russia’s Black Sea fleet. As it had in Georgia’s French President Nicolas Sarkozy, serving also breakaway regions, Russia has begun massive dis- as EU president, did react rapidly to secure a cease- tributions of Russian passports to residents of the fire. But rather than mustering unity within the Crimea, many of whom are ethnic Russians. And EU and seeing the agreement through to imple- territorial claims by leading official and semi- mentation, Sarkozy simply congratulated himself official Russian figures on on a mission accomplished the peninsula have grown when, in fact, Russia had significantly. It is little sur- The only thing Saakashvili might showed little if any inclina- prise that Ukrainian lead- tion to respect its commit- be blamed for is falling into a trap ers fear they will now have ments. NATO was similarly to choose between accept- that Russia had prepared for months. muted, managing to gather ing a role as a Russian sat- only enough courage to say ellite or pressing on with that “business as usual” a Western-oriented foreign policy—at the risk of with Russia would not be possible under these cir- meeting a fate similar to Georgia’s. cumstances. European states in the EU and NATO Finally, Russia’s aggression against Georgia sent remained divided on whether to move more as- a strong message to the West: that the South Cau- sertively to punish Russia, with eastern members casus and the entire former Soviet Union are parts strongly supporting such plans and southern ones of Moscow’s exclusive sphere of influence, and the displaying more reluctance. West should stay out. As such, Russia clearly indi- In the United States, which had invested tre- cated its desire to return to a cold war–style divi- mendous prestige and political capital in Georgia, sion of Europe into spheres of influence. Russia the Bush administration took several days to real- thus is mounting the largest challenge since the ize the magnitude of the crisis and to formulate end of the cold war to the norms and principles of a response—which primarily consisted of tough European security. rhetoric. America did act by rapidly airlifting If Russia achieves its aims, Europe will become Georgian soldiers home from Iraq, where they a place where whole nations are denied their sov- had represented the third-largest foreign contin- ereign right to run their own affairs and are in- gent of troops—a remarkable fact for a country stead subjugated to Russian control, regardless of of less than 5 million people. Washington also their own national interests. Democracy would promised aid amounting to 1 billion dollars. But be impossible to maintain in areas under Rus- the initial Western reaction failed to attach any sian domination because, as during Soviet times, concrete cost to Russia’s aggressive behavior— Russia has failed to become a force of attraction just as the West had offered only verbal, not sub- and can only dominate its neighbors through in- stantive, reactions on the other occasions in re- timidation. Moscow’s ambitions therefore directly cent years when Russia had acted provocatively undermine the entire European project of peace, against its neighbors. 314 • CURRENT HISTORY • October 2008

With Europe divided and America overcommit- Third, it is likely that Moscow has mobilized in- ted around the world, will Russia succeed in its ternational forces that will be difficult to contain. effort to reestablish dominance in the post-Soviet Russia’s actions have cemented an alliance among space? This is by no means certain. In fact, while the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine that is likely Russian success in this project is an entirely plau- to develop further. This alliance will form a pow- sible outcome, so is failure. While Moscow’s inva- erful force for action within the EU and NATO. And sion of its southern neighbor is a sign of might, it in Western Europe and North America, the war is not necessarily a sign of strength. Indeed, it ex- helped many people make up their minds about poses several ways in which Russia may be weak. the nature of the regime in the Kremlin. First, Russia’s invasion proved that Moscow had Given Europe’s divisions, much of the burden failed to accomplish its political objectives in the of containing Russia will inevitably fall to the South Caucasus without recourse to the ultimate United States. As indicated by the strong reac- instrument of power, war. The war, moreover, de- tion to the war by both US presidential candi- stroyed much of what remained of Western illu- dates and by leading lawmakers from both par- sions about Russia. ties, Georgia is a bipartisan issue in Washington. Second, the fact that Russia’s first foreign mili- No matter who wins November’s election, the tary adventure since 1979 took place at a time of next American president is unlikely to spend murky “cohabitation” between now–Prime Minis- much time debating whether or not Russia is ter Putin and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev an ally, and will probably—unlike other recent may not be a coincidence. Russia’s military adven- presidents—pursue a much more forceful policy tures in its borderlands have often been related to toward Russia and the post-Soviet space. In this domestic politics—indeed, the 1999 war in Chech- sense, international reaction to Russia’s military nya was what brought Putin to power. Was the war adventurism may prove to resemble a tsunami— in Georgia intended to secure Putin’s control over slow, but massive in the end. Whether Western Russia’s foreign and security policies? If so, Russia action will come in time to secure Georgia’s free- is less stable than generally understood. dom is another question. ■

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