The Diluted Role of the Backbencher in Ontario Politics: How Did We Get Here and Does It
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THE DILUTED ROLE OF THE BACKBENCHER IN ONTARIO POLITICS: HOW DID WE GET HERE AND DOES IT NEED FIXING? by Mitchell Davidson MA Political Science, University of Western Ontario Director of Policy and Legislative Affairs Office of the Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition 200 North Wing Queen's Park Toronto, Ontario M7A 1A1 Phone: 416-326-6412 (O) Email: [email protected] Paper presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, Ontario, Tuesday, May 30th, 2017. Draft, Do Not Cite Everyone who runs for office does so because they believe that being a Member of Provincial Parliament (MPP) means they can affect change for the better. Despite this common desire, the ability for individual backbench members to affect policy change is considered weak at best by those who study it. Alison Loat and Michael MacMillan described Canada’s democracy as failing after they interviewed 80 federal politicians about their abilities as parliamentarians.1 Michael Atkinson argued that most parliamentarians are frustrated and unenthusiastic about the prospect of doing legislative work and instead prefer constituency work.2 Kelly Blidook found that the ability for individual members to impact change was quite poor, even titling a chapter of his 2012 book “Does it Matter? Do Members of Parliament Influence Policy?”3 Even as far back as 1987, C.E.S Franks suggested most complaints about parliament stem from party control, the inability to affect policy change through parliamentary institutions, and the lack of influence from individual members.4 The inability for an MPP to affect change may be apparent in the various literature, but nearly all the literature is specific to the Federal Parliament. Though the House of Commons is inherently like Queen’s Park, it is possible that Ontario’s legislators may be more effective. This leads to the question, does the idea that parliamentarians have little impact on policy hold true in Ontario? Has this impact on policy – or lack thereof – fluctuated over time? If so, why has an MPP’s ability to affect change fluctuated? And, lastly, are these changes beneficial for the workings of the provincial legislature? Based on the answers, recommendations for improving the legislature and addressing the ability for MPPs to impact public policy in Ontario can be put forward. Methodology Change is not a metric that can be easily defined. By its definition, policy change can only be evaluated once the debate has entered the public consciousness. Essentially, the Government must change its public position to be noted. For example, if the current Premier did not previously denounce a foreign homebuyers tax before announcing she would implement such a policy measure, we would not have noticed the change. Therefore, if we are assessing an MPP’s ability to impact change, we can only truly quantify this impact through the changes in a Government’s public positions. Secondly, any stakeholder concerned about policy can issue a press release or hold a news conference, but only an MPP can use the legislature to attempt to affect change. Therefore, if we are attempting to evaluate the ability of a parliamentarian to affect change, we are really evaluating the ability of MPPs to use the legislature to their advantage, making the institution and the rules that govern it critically important. It is also important to note that there are private avenues that may be available to an MPP because of their role that are not public, and thus will not be evaluated in this paper. For example, every 1 Alison Loat and Michael MacMillan, Tragedy in the Commons: Former Members of Parliament Speak Out About Canada’s Failing Democracy (Random House Canada, 2014), title page. 2 Michael Atkinson, "Policy Interests of Provincial Backbenchers and the Effects of Political Ambition," Legislative Studies Quarterly (Vol 3, 1978), 630. 3 Kelly Blidook, Constituency Influence in Parliament: Countering the Centre (Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 2012), 96. 4 Loat and MacMillan, Tragedy in the Commons, 7. MPP can converse with Ministers daily. Whether it be the opportunity for an opposition member to access a Minister in private during Question Period, or for a Government member to do so in weekly caucus or cabinet committee meetings, the fact that an MPP can be heard by those who make the decisions is important. John Reid even argued that the “…most important debates that you will have [as a parliamentarian] will be behind the closed doors of caucus.”5 Though there is undoubtedly merit to the idea that closed door conversations with Ministers and their staff are vital for evaluating an MPP’s effectiveness, they are nearly impossible to quantify. Likewise, committee amendments could be considered another tool available to an MPP, but simply evaluating the pass and fail rates of amendments to bills is flawed. The mover of the motion is not necessarily the advocate of the policy change – thus attributing false blame or praise. In addition, the Government amendments are vetted in advance by the executive branch, but must be introduced and passed by backbench members, meaning Government MPPs would appear to control all amendments and have an overwhelmingly large success rate when they attempt to impact policy through committee. Another caveat is the difficulty in evaluating the effectiveness of a single action by an MPP. For example, in 2013 the Government adopted a Private Members’ Bill, brought forward by opposition MPP Bob Bailey, by including the policy in their Local Food Act. This is common knowledge because the Minister responsible directly mentioned Mr. Bailey and gave him credit for bringing forward the idea.6 In that example, the policy influence is easy to evaluate. However, when the same Government reversed course on controversial changes to an autism program, they did not credit an individual MPP despite numerous pleas from both opposition parties. Even though, in the autism example, it is logical to assume the opposition parties helped influence the Government’s decision, that cannot be categorically proven. Therefore, evaluating an MPP’s affect on policy is inherently subjective. Also, since I serve as the Director of Policy and Legislative Affairs for the Official Opposition (Progressive Conservative Party) it must be bluntly stated that this paper will contain observational evidence from myself and through interviews with senior staff from the Legislative Assembly’s Procedural Services branch. In summation, only avenues that are public and available exclusively to MPPs will be evaluated. These avenues include: Question Period, Members’ Statements, Orders of the Day, Order Paper Questions, and Private Members’ Public Business. Question Period The 60 minute back and forth exchange known as Question Period originated as an institution used to gather information from Ministers about Government policies. However, the institution evolved to take on other primary purposes, such as garnering media attention, holding the Government to 5 John Reid, “Democracy in the 21st Century: Advice for Newly Elected Members of Parliament,” Canadian Parliamentary Review (29, No. 1, Spring 2006), 2-3. Reid applied the point to all parliamentarians, but this quote primarily applies to Government members. The ability for an opposition member to influence his party’s future policies is important, but it is not expressly tied to the use of the Legislature thus is outside of this paper’s scope. 6 Hon. Mr. Leal, Legislative Assembly of Ontario Debates (8 June 2016). account, and representing constituent concerns.7 Though it could be argued each of these four objectives of Question Period are - at their core - an attempt to impact policy, the large amount of scholarly work on the topic rarely agrees.8 Despite this lack of focus on policy change, every opposition led question is rooted in some differentiation in policy between themselves and the Government. Franks contends that the questions posed are not intended to change the minds of the Government, but rather change the minds of voters in the next election. He argues that the answers to the questions are inconsequential, implying Question Period is not about achieving policy changes but rather about appearing to advocate for them.9 Franks’ point is driven home by Government backbench questions, which are used not to advocate for policy change but to promote existing Government policies or to discredit opposition policies. The fact that the institution – on both sides – openly promotes and tolerates self- congratulatory or vitriolic questions reinforces the position that Question Period is not a policy focused institution. If there are any policy references, the requests are often phrased sarcastically. For example, how can you evaluate if a question that asks for the Government ‘to start standing up for Ontarians’ or ‘show some compassion for seniors’ achieved its policy goals? Though Question Period was never a policy led institution, it is important to note that the rule changes in April 1986 made it even less policy driven. These changes entrenched the Leader’s role in asking the first questions for each party and gave Leaders more supplementary questions than standard backbenchers. In October of 1986, television cameras entered the legislature for the first time, making it easier to garner media attention.10 Together, these changes focused the media on the beginning of Question Period, leading Graham White to contend that “To a degree probably unique in Canada, Question Period in the Ontario Legislature is dominated by the party leaders.”11 If Question Period was ever an institution for backbench MPPs to affect change, it certainly was not any longer. This rule change brings forward an important trend when evaluating an MPP’s abilities. Though the goal of these changes was to create a more efficient Question Period, the unintended by-product was to entrench a leader centric institution.