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HYBRID REGIMES IN MODERN TIMES: Between and

Dr. Inna Melnykovska Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Central European University Email: [email protected] Winter semester 2021 (4 credits, 8 ECTS credits) Class meetings: tbc

Office hours: tbc Please make an appointment by e-mail!

Introduction to the issue Hybrid regimes that alloy democratic rules with authoritarian governance are the most widespread political systems in the world at the beginning of the 21st century. Conventional accounts describe them as defective or competitive authoritarian regimes. Alternative views point to the genuine features and functions of these regimes that cannot be reduced to those of half-democracies or half-. In fact, hybrid regimes are puzzling in several ways: (1) their establishment and sustainability have been unexpected either by the school of /transitology or by the school of (new) ; (2) neither democratic institutions (e.g. ) nor autocratic institutions (e.g. dominant parties) function in a conventional way there; and (3) contrary to the expectations of stability, hybrid regimes have demonstrated a variety of (within-type) dynamics.

Topics In this course, we will seek to unpack the category of hybrid regimes and explore the following questions:

 What are the origins of hybrid regimes?  What are the specifics of their institutional functionality in comparison with democracies and/or autocracies?  What determines their stability and dynamic nature?

We will review the major research approaches that analyze the political regimes in the ‘grey zone’ between democracy and autocracy and further link these approaches to the broader literature on statehood, economic development and social order. We will identify ‘who

1 governs’ in hybrid regimes and by which means (coercion, patronage, ideology, control of the Internet, among others) the power is exercised and maintained. We will look at how governments interact with elites and citizens, as well as with their regional neighbors and international community. Also, the strategies and the activities of opposition and civil society in the hybrid regimes will be studied. Finally, we will identify the ways the study of hybrid regimes can inform contemporary policies and practices in the democratization processes.

Regional focus This course offers an opportunity to study the current landscape of hybrid regimes in Eastern Europe and Eurasia in depth and with a worldwide comparative perspective. Most of our focus will be on the post-Soviet area, where some of the most obvious examples of hybrid regimes may be found. In addition, hybrid regimes from , Africa and Southeast Asia will be included in comparison. Each participant will take the role of a “country-expert”: assign to a preferred case of and represent this case in our discussion, group work exercises and presentations.

Approach to teaching and learning Although our readings will include empirical material from different countries and regions, our seminar sessions will be thematic, dealing with one or another puzzling feature of hybrid regimes. A session will usually consist of three parts: first, we will critically review main conceptual and theoretical approaches and debates; second, we will deal with and explain the working of relevant empirical cases of hybrid regimes, and finally we will have a policy-relevant discussion or exercise on contemporary word-based problems related to the hybrid regimes.

The course will build on the techniques of collaborative and peer-to peer learning. In other words, students will learn from and with each other. Our sessions will include brainstorming exercise, team presentations, group work and discussions. Also, the course integrates exercises of a simulation game and role playing in order to let students experience real-life political processes in hybrid regimes and expose them to contemporary challenges of promoting democracy and good governance in the 21st century.

The instructor will overtake the functions of a coach and a moderator by generating discussion topics, raising questions, and developing collaborative exercises. She will make short inputs to the sessions. However, no lecturing should be expected. It means in this course student will learn by doing, not pure listening.

Pre-conditions No prior knowledge is assumed. Some basic skills of qualitative research design and methodology is desired. On methodological issues I recommend to study the following readings to prepare for the course:

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Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). Diana Panke. Research Design and Method Selection: Making Good Choices in the Social Sciences. (Sage, 2018). Goertz, G. and J. Mahoney (2012). A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences, Princeton University Press. King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Learning outcomes At the end of the course, you will

 gain the understanding of the differences between hybrid, democratic and authoritarian regimes;  become familiar with the major research schools dealing with hybrid regimes, their (normative) premises as well as their strengths and weaknesses;  accumulate the knowledge about the actors, institutions and processes responsible for establishment, functioning, and dynamics of hybrid regimes;  understand the interaction mechanisms between actors and structures as well as the links between global and local in hybrid regimes;  know specifics of East European and Eurasian hybrid regimes relative to the hybrid regimes in other world regions;  learn how to identify empirical puzzles and how to address them with theoretical knowledge and methodological tools;  be skilled in ‘translation’ of research findings into practical policy recommendations.

Course requirements and assessment Regular attendance is required. Students are expected to be present at all seminars and to come prepared. If you are unable to attend class, you should notify me via e-mail prior to the session.

The grading follows the standard scale adopted by the Department of Political Science: A: 100- 94; A-: 93-87; B+: 86-80; B: 79-73; B-: 72-66; C+: 65-59; F: 58-0

The final grade will be composed as follows:  Active participation, including contributions as an expert on selected hybrid regime – 20%  One presentation – 30%  Presentation of research design – 15%

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 Final paper – 35%

Active class participation is expected and graded. Students are required to read the assigned material, and participate in the discussions and working groups regularly. Students’ contributions should be informed by the readings, focused on the main analytical points, formulated clearly, refer to other contributions in discussions, and demonstrate critical engagement. Note that the quality of your contributions would count more than their quantity. In addition to class participation, students have the opportunity to contribute online by commenting on the readings, writing op-eds or recording podcasts (individually or in team) on the online discussion platform. Online discussions will follow the topics of our sessions. The online discussion will open on Sunday in the week before the sessions and close on Saturday after the sessions.

Each student does a presentation on the topics of our weekly seminars. The task is to check the validity of theoretical approaches against the background of the puzzling empirical developments in the selected hybrid regimes of student’s interest (more details on the content will be provided in the first session and in the how to handout). The presentation should be done in teams of 2-3 students. The grade will be distributed between individual and group performance: 10% to 10% for each presentation. The presentation should be no longer than 20 minutes and will be followed by a 10-min Q&A. The presentation slides should be submitted to the instructor prior to the session. The preparations for the presentations should include additional literature to the required readings. The presentation will be usually scheduled on Thursdays.

Each student will design a research project dealing with a specific puzzle and question related to hybrid regimes. Against the background of contemporary research students are asked to formulate 2 hypotheses and with reference to methodological rules select the cases of hybrid regimes, either within a region or across the world or across the time, to test these hypotheses. The aim is to get first-hand experience with the research on hybrid regimes. The research project can be done on one of the (sub-)topics the presentation was done. The research project will be presented as a PowerPoint presentation of max 15 minutes (plus 10-15 minutes of the follow-up Q&A). The guidelines for the research design will be introduced in the first session of the first week. The presentations will be scheduled two times: in the mid-term (week 7) and to the end of the semester (week 12). Students should receive the approval of the instructor on their chosen topic for the research design by 01.03. This approval is mandatory.

The final paper will contain the final version of the research design, applied and tested empirically for the selected cases of hybrid regimes. It should be no less than 4000 words long and more than 5000 words long (without references, but including possible appendices). Details will be introduced in the first session of the first week.

Please note that for all assessments, late submission, and violation of the word or time limit will result in a lower grade. Plagiarism is not acceptable and will be punished according to the departmental rules.

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Deadlines: 1. Choose the seminars you are going to present and country you take the role of an expert for – by 14.01 2. Get the approval of the (sub-)topic for the presentation – one week prior to the session in which you are going to present 3. Submit the presentation the day before the presentation is done at the latest. 4. Get the approval of the topic for the presentation of a research design – by 01.03 5. Submit the final paper – by 08.04

Reading material All the course material is available in electronic form. The syllabus only contains the required (marked with*) and recommended readings. Suggestions for further reading will be made in class and consultations via email or office hours.

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COURSE SCHEDULE

PART I: CONCEPTS AND MEASURES In weeks 1-2 we will review approaches to conceptualize and measure hybrid regimes. Democracy-rooted approached will be contrasted with autocracy-rooted approaches. Furthermore, approaches that handle these regimes as a genuine regime type will be considered.

Week 1 – Introduction: topics, requirements and organizational issues The sessions in the first week introduces students to the topics of the course, explains course requirements and clarifies all organizational issues. In these sessions we will refresh the rules of concept building and start to explore the conceptual question: what hybrid regimes are (and aren’t).

Readings:

*Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2020). The New Competitive Authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy, (1), 51-65.

*Morlino, Leonardo (2009). "Are there hybrid regimes? Or are they just an optical illusion?" European Political Science Review 1(02): 273-296.

Carothers, Thomas (2002). "The end of the transition paradigm." Journal of Democracy 13(1): 5- 21.

Diamond, Larry (2002). "Thinking about hybrid regimes." Journal of Democracy 13(2): 21-35.

Week 2 – What is hybrid regime? Democratic and authoritarian paradigms. Genuine perspectives Sessions in week 2 will be devoted to the approaches to hybrid regimes that are rooted in the concepts of democracy and/or autocracy. Also, we will discuss weaknesses and strengths of the democratic and authoritarian perspectives on hybrid regimes and explore novel approaches to deal with these regimes as a genuine regime type.

Readings:

*Cassani, A. (2014). "Hybrid what? Partial consensus and persistent divergences in the analysis of hybrid regimes." International Political Science Review 35(5): 542-558.

*Levitsky, S. and L. A. Way (2002). "The rise of competitive authoritarianism." Journal of Democracy 13(2): 51-65.

*Merkel, Wolfgang (2004). “Embedded and Defective Democracies.” Democratization 11, 5: 33- 58.

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Bogaards, M. (2009). "How to classify hybrid regimes? and electoral authoritarianism." Democratization 16(2): 399-423.

Bogaards, Matthijs (2018) De-democratization in : diffusely defective democracy, Democratization, 25:8, 1481-1499, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2018.1485015

Collier, David and (1997). “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research.” World 49 (10): 430-451.

Lührmann, Anna & Staffan I. Lindberg (2019) A third wave of autocratization is here: what is new about it?, Democratization, 26:7, 1095-1113, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2019.1582029

Magyar, Bálint. Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary. NED - New edition, 1 ed., Central European University Press, 2016. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7829/j.ctt19z391g. Ch. 4 and 5.

Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry L. Karl. 1991. “What Democracy Is... and Is Not.” Journal of Democracy 2(3): 75–88.

PART II: FUNCTIONING AND IN-/STABILITY In weeks 3-11 we will analyze the specifics in functioning of hybrid regimes that make these regimes endure or fail.

Week 3 – Why do some hybrid regimes survive while the other collapse? Conditions of revolutionary breakdowns and stability In week 3 we will address the puzzle of stability and breakdown of hybrid regimes. In particular, we will elaborate debates between so called diffusion-centered and structural explanations.

Readings:

*Bunce, V. J. and S. L. Wolchik (2010). "Defeating . Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." World Politics 62(1): 43-86.

*Way, L. A. (2008). "The real causes of the color revolutions." Journal of Democracy 19(3): 55- 69.

Gerschewski, J. (2013). "The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes." Democratization 20(1): 13-38.

Gerschewski, Johannes, and Christoph Stefes, eds. (2018) “Crisis in Autocratic Regimes”. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Way, L. A. & Casey, A. (2018) The structural sources of postcommunist regime trajectories, Post-Soviet Affairs, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2018.1494959

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Week 4 – Why do autocrats need formal democratic institutions? Elections, Legislatives, Constitutions and authoritarian practices In week 5 we will deal with interactions of formal democratic institutions and authoritarian practices. We will look at some examples how elections, legislatives and contribute to the stability of hybrid regimes.

Readings:

*Magaloni, Beatriz (2006) for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in . New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Selected Chapters 7 and 8.

* Smyth, Regina (2020) Elections, Protest, and Authoritarian Regime Stability 2008–2020. Cambridge University Press. Selected chapters.

Gandhi, J. and E. Lust-Okar (2009). "Elections Under Authoritarianism." Annual Review of Political Science 12(1): 403-422.

Gel'man, V. (2008). "Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy." Europe-Asia Studies 60(6): 913-930.

Hale, H. E. (2011). "Formal Constitutions in Informal Politics: Institutions and Democratization in Post-Soviet Eurasia." World Politics 63(4): 581-617.

Week 5 – Sources and mechanisms of patronage In week 6 we will deal with sources and mechanisms of patronage the incumbent rulers in hybrid regimes use to coopt their clients.

Readings:

*Magaloni, Beatriz. (2008) Credible Power Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule, Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4 (2008): 715–741. doi: 10.1177/0010414007313124

*Hale, H. E. (2014). Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Ch. 1.

Andrews, Sarah & Lauren Honig (2019) Elite defection and under competitive authoritarianism: evidence from Burkina Faso, Democratization, 26:4.

Franke, A., et al. (2009). " and Azerbaijan as Post-Soviet Rentier States: Resource Incomes and Autocracy as a Double 'Curse'in Post-Soviet Regimes." Europe-Asia Studies 61(1): 109-140.

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Gould, John and Sickner, Carl, Lee (2008) Making Market Democracies? The Contingent Loyalties of Post-Privatization Elites in Azerbaijan, Georgia and , Review of International Political Economy 15(5), pp. 740-769, DOI: 10.1080/09692290802408923

Junisbai, Barbara (2012) Improbable but Potentially Pivotal Oppositions: Privatization, Capitalists, and Political Contestation in the Post-Soviet Autocracies, Perspectives on Politics, Volume 10, Issue 4, pp. 891-916, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759271200285X

Kendall-Taylor, Andrea (2012) Purchasing Power: Oil, Elections and Regime Durability in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:4, 737-760, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2012.671567

Kopecký, P. and M. Spirova (2011). "‘Jobs for the Boys’? Patterns of Party Patronage in Post- Communist Europe." West European Politics 34(5): 897-921.

Mahdavi, P. (2020). Power Grab: Political Survival through Extractive Resource Nationalization (Business and Public Policy). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108781350

Svolik, M.W. (2009), Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes. American Journal of Political Science, 53: 477-494. doi:10.1111/j.1540- 5907.2009.00382.x

Radnitz, Scott (2010) The color of money: Privatization, economic dispersion, and the post- soviet “revolutions”, Comparative Politics 42 (2), 127-146

Reuter, John and Gandhi, Jennifer (January 2011) Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic, Parties, British Journal of Political Science, Volume 41, Issue 1, 83-110

Ross, Michael (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53, 325–361

Week 6– Repress or not repress? Coercion and civil society Sessions in week 7 discuss the benefits and pitfalls of repression politics in hybrid regimes and the ways non-democratic incumbent rulers learned to manage civil society. In addition, we will also review the protest strategies of opposition and civil society in hybrid regimes.

Readings:

*Gel'man, Vladimir. 2015. "The politics of fear: how the Russian regime confronts its opponents." Russian Politics & Law 53(5-6): 6-26.

*Rogov, K (2018) The Art of Coercion: Repressions and Repressiveness in Putin’s Russia, Russian Politics 3, 151-174.

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*Way, L. A. and S. Levitsky (2006). "The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the ." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39(3): 387-410.

Davenport, Christian. 2007. "State repression and political order." Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 10: 1- 23.

Davenport, C. and M. Inman (2012). "The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s." Terrorism and Political Violence 24(4): 619-634.

De Jaegher, Kris, and Britta Hoyer. 2019. "Preemptive repression: deterrence, backfiring, iron fists, and velvet gloves." Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(2): 502-527.

Earl, Jennifer. 2011. "Political repression: Iron fists, velvet gloves, and diffuse control." Annual review of sociology 37: 261-284.

Frantz, Erica, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. 2014. "A ’s toolkit: Understanding how co- optation affects repression in autocracies." Journal of Peace Research 51(3): 332-346.

Gilbert, L. and P. Mohseni (2018). "Disabling dissent: the colour revolutions, autocratic linkages, and civil society regulations in hybrid regimes." Contemporary Politics 24(4): 454-480.

Olar, Roman-Gabriel. 2019. "Do they know something we don’t? Diffusion of repression in authoritarian regimes." Journal of Peace Research: 0022343318822718.

Ritter, Emily Hencken, and Courtenay R. Conrad. 2016. "Preventing and responding to dissent: The observational challenges of explaining strategic repression." American Political Science Review 110(1): 85-99.

Robertson, Graeme B. 2009. “Managing society: protest, civil society, and regime in Putin's Russia.” Slavic Review, 68(3): 528-547.

Schneider, Carsten Q., and Seraphine F. Maerz. 2017. "Legitimation, cooptation, and repression and the survival of electoral autocracies." Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 11(2): 213-235.

Bilek, J. (2017). "Authoritarian Repressive Strategies and Electoral Competitiveness." Sociologia 49(4): 343-368.

Week 7 – Center and Regions. Subnational Political Regimes In week 7, we will deal with the power dynamics in the relationships between the center and the regions, which result in the variety of political regimes at the subnational level. Also, we will trace the consequences of these power dynamics on regime in-/stability.

Readings:

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*Libman, A. and M. Rochlitz (2019). in China and Russia, Edward Elgar Publishing. Chapter 5.

Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz. 2010. “Subnational Governance in Russia: How Putin Changed the Contract with His Agents and the Problems It Created for Medvedev.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism 40: 4: 672–96. https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjp036.

Turovskii, Rostislav F. 2010. “Regional Political Regimes in Russia.” Russian Politics & Law 48 (2): 27–49. https://doi.org/10.2753/RUP1061-1940480202

Gelman, V. (2010). "The Dynamics of Subnational Authoritarianism." Russian Politics & Law 48(2): 7-26.

Golosov, G. V. (2011). "The Regional Roots of Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia." Europe-Asia Studies 63(4): 623-639.

Ross, C. (2011). "Regional Elections and Electoral Authoritarianism in Russia." Europe-Asia Studies 63(4): 641-661.

Week 8 – Powers of media, symbols and ideas? Internal sources of legitimation Sessions in week 8 explore how media propaganda and ideologies contribute to stability of hybrid regimes.

Readings:

*Gerschewski, Johannes (2018). “ in Autocracies. Oxymoron or Essential Feature?” Perspectives on Politics, 16, 3, 652-665.

*von Soest, Christian and Grauvogel, Julia (2017), Identity, Procedures and Performance: How Authoritarian Regimes Legitimize their Rule, in: Contemporary Politics, online first, 1-19

Dukalskis, Alexander, and Johannes Gerschewski. “Adapting or Freezing? Ideological Reactions of Communist Regimes in a Post-Communist World.” Government & Opposition.

Matveeva, A. (2009). "Legitimising Central Asian Authoritarianism: Political Manipulation and Symbolic Power." Europe-Asia Studies 61(7): 1095-1121.

Weßels, Bernhard. 2016. “Democratic Legitimacy. Concepts, Measures, Outcome.”In How Europeans View and Evaluate Democracy, ed. Monica Ferrín and Hanspeter Kriesi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Yan, H. T. (2017). "Comparing democratic performance of semi-presidential regimes in the post- communist region: Omnipotent presidents and media control." Communist and Post- Communist Studies 50(4): 263-275.

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Week 9 – External Environment and Actors In week 9 we will overview the external factors that contribute to or undermine the legitimacy, patronage and coercion of incumbents in hybrid regimes.

Readings:

* Escribà-Folch, A. and J. Wright (2015). Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival, OUP Oxford. Chapter 3.

*Yakouchyk, K. (2019). "Beyond Autocracy Promotion: A Review." Political Studies Review 17(2): 147-160.

*Kneuer, M., et al. (2019). "Playing the regional card: why and how authoritarian gravity centres exploit regional organisations." Third World Quarterly 40(3): 451-470.

Schmotz, A. and O. Tansey (2018). "Regional autocratic linkage and regime survival." European Journal of Political Research 57(3): 662-686.

Börzel, T. A. (2015). "The noble west and the dirty rest? Western democracy promoters and illiberal regional powers." Democratization 22(3): 519-535.

Hartmann, C. (2016). "Leverage and linkage: how regionalism shapes regime dynamics in Africa." Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 10: 79-98.

Jackson, N. J. (2010). "The role of external factors in advancing non-liberal democratic forms of political rule: a case study of Russia's influence on Central Asian regimes." Contemporary Politics 16(1): 101-118.

Stoddard, E. (2017). "Authoritarian regimes in democratic regional organisations? Exploring regional dimensions of authoritarianism in an increasingly democratic ." Journal of Contemporary African Studies 35(4): 469-486.

Wong, M. Y. H. (2019). "Chinese influence, US linkages, or neither? Comparing regime changes in Myanmar and ." Democratization 26(3): 359-381.

Week 10 – Authoritarian modernization mission impossible? Sources of bad governance and mechanism of policy-making In week 10, we will deal with policy-making, bad governance and modernization attempts in hybrid regimes. Readings:

*Gel’man, Vladimir (2017): Political foundations of bad governance in post-Soviet Eurasia: towards a research agenda, East European Politics, DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2017.1348350

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*Petrov, N., et al. (2013). "Three dilemmas of hybrid regime governance: Russia from Putin to Putin." Post-Soviet Affairs 30(1): 1-26.

Boda, Z. and V. Patkós (2018). "Driven by politics: agenda setting and policy-making in Hungary 2010–2014." Policy Studies 39(4): 402-421.

Melville, A. and M. Mironyuk (2016). "“Bad enough governance”: state capacity and quality of institutions in post-Soviet autocracies." Post-Soviet Affairs 32(2): 132-151.

Sebok, M. (2019). The Comparative Agendas of Hybrid Regimes - A Research Agenda. Budapest: Hungarian Policy Agendas Project

Week 11 – Civil Society and Opposition: Strategies and Successes Stories In week 10, we will review factors and strategies of civil society and opposition in hybrid regimes which help them to survive and sometimes come to power.

Readings:

*Ekiert, G. and R. Foa (2011). "From Myth to Reality: Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe." Civil Szemle 8(1-2): 90-+.

*Gorokhovskaia, Y. (2019). "What it takes to win when the game is rigged: the evolution of opposition electoral strategies in Moscow, 2012-2017." Democratization 26(6): 975-992.

Esen, B. and S. Gumuscu (2019). "Killing Competitive Authoritarianism Softly: The 2019 Local Elections in ." South European Society and Politics 24(3): 317-342.

Evans, A. B., Jr. (2012). "Protests and civil society in Russia: The struggle for the Khimki Forest." Communist and Post-Communist Studies 45(3-4): 233-242.

Aasland, A. and O. Lyska (2016). "Local democracy in Ukrainian cities: civic participation and responsiveness of local authorities." Post-Soviet Affairs 32(2): 152-175.

Antonakis-Nashif, A. (2015). "Contested transformation: mobilized publics in between compliance and protest." Mediterranean Politics: 1-22.

Chebankova, E. (2013). Civil society in Putin’s Russia.

Sullivan, Christopher M. 2016. "Undermining resistance: Mobilization, repression, and the enforcement of political order." Journal of Conflict Resolution 60(7): 1163-1190.

Yang, G. "Online Activism." Journal of Democracy, vol. 20 no. 3, 2009, pp. 33-36.

Aburamoto, M. (2019). "The Politics of Anti-Corruption Campaigns in Putin’s Russia: Power, Opposition, and the All-Russia People’s Front." Europe-Asia Studies 71(3): 408-425.

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Frantz, E. (2018). "Voter turnout and opposition performance in competitive authoritarian elections." Electoral Studies 54: 218-225.

Sozen, Y. (2019). "Competition in a Populist Authoritarian Regime: The June 2018 Dual Elections in Turkey." South European Society and Politics 24(3): 287-315.

Gonzalez, F. and M. Prem (2018). "Can television bring down a dictator? Evidence from Chile's "No" campaign." Journal of Comparative Economics 46(1): 349-361.

Beardsworth, N. (2016). "Challenging dominance: the opposition, the coalition and the 2016 in ." Journal of Eastern African Studies 10(4): 749-768.

Ng, H. Y. (2016). "What Drives Young People Into Opposition Parties Under Hybrid Regimes? A Comparison of and ." Asian Politics & Policy 8(3): 436-455.

Wahman, M. (2011). "Offices and policies - Why do oppositional parties form pre-electoral coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes?" Electoral Studies 30(4): 642-657.

Wahman, M. (2013). "Opposition Coalitions and Democratization by Election." Government and Opposition 48(1): 3-+.

Gandhi, J. and E. Ong (2019). "Committed or Conditional Democrats? Opposition Dynamics in Electoral Autocracies." American Journal of Political Science 63(4): 948-963.

Ostwald, K. and S. Oliver (2020) "Four arenas: 's 2018 election, reform, and democratization." Democratization.

Week 12 – Students’ Presentations, Open Questions, Topics of Students’ Interest

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