Buy Now! The Battle of Home Reconsidered By Arrigo Velicogna

who’d earlier simply run away with his create a scapegoat for the disaster against New Guinea, and the army carriers. The Japanese were thereby singled out the commander who formations in-theater had already able to mass overwhelming force actually had the least responsibility been committed there along with the against what was left behind of the for it. Further, that same investigation, bulk of the air support. In addition, Allied armada but, after sinking the while underscoring the abysmal continuous combat operations over bulk of that remaining surface combat command performance of several New Guinea had eroded air strength. force, their commander stupidly turned officers during the battle, failed to Japanese strategy had also been and steamed away from the decisive take into account the technical reason based on the assumption American victory that was his for the taking. for the defeat, placing the blame on carrier strength had suffered The explanation of the aftermath of persons rather than on systems or severe attrition at Midway: they An artist’s depiction of the northern group taking intense fire from Japanese ships. John Hamilton painting in the U.S. Navy Art Collection. the battle is often also muddled. Some doctrines. The truth about Savo Island believed two carriers had been sunk accounts have it that the US transports is complicated. Only more recently, due there. No major US offensive was Introduction On 7 August, with almost complete moment-by-moment basis. What’s less simply abandoned the Marines on to the research of historians Richard therefore expected until 1943. surprise, the Marines landed. Two easy to understand is how the attacking the island. Another interpretation Frank and John Lundstrom, have we Thus only the four oldest heavy n early the US days later, at dawn on 9 August, the Japanese were able to achieve complete is that the amphibious force com- finally been able to see through the “fog in the Navy stood ready to launch the entire operation seemed on the verge surprise over a force marginally supe- mander, Rear Adm. Richmond Turner, of war” that’s surrounded this battle. (IJN), along with a single modern heavy I first major American offensive of collapsing after four heavy cruisers rior to them and that, in addition, had courageously decided to complete the (Chokai) and a collection of of the whole war. The plan was to had been sunk in the worst defeat control of the air, was supported by bet- unloading without any protection. Prelude and a couple light cruisers, land a Marine division on an almost inflicted on the USN since Pearl Harbor. ter intelligence, and had superior tech- That entire story was mainly cre- none of which had ever previously unknown island called , That “Battle of Savo Island” was one nology available in the form of . ated by Turner, and was subsequently Immediately after receiving operated together, were available for seize the airfield under construction of those defeats in which no one was The problem in answering the accepted into the postwar accounts, confirmation a large Allied force was an immediate counteroffensive. there by the Japanese, and then willing to take direct responsibility for question of responsibility, then, most importantly in the US Naval War operating around Guadalcanal and Even so, the commander of IJN use it as a springboard for a further the outcome. The gunnery and torpedo comes from the fact the story of the College analysis and Adm. Samuel had landed troops there, the Japanese Eighth Fleet, headquartered at , advance toward the big prize in the exchange itself was straightforward battle had been from the first – often Morison’s seminal multi-volume command on Rabaul set in motion a Vice Adm. Mikawa Gunichi, immedi- South Pacific: the sprawling complex and is well documented. We also purposefully – mistakenly reported, and work on US Navy operations in series of countermeasures. The basis ately set about organizing a counterat- of enemy bases around Rabaul. have a wealth of primary documents, several myths have emerged as a result. World War II. Thus the information of Japanese strategy in regard to any tack. The equivalent of an infantry bat- A massive armada – including including ship logs and, thanks to an The commonly offered version available in the original documents enemy initiatives was to stop them and talion was assembled from naval base three fleet carriers, one new fast in-depth US Navy investigation, it’s has been that the amphibious portion has been largely obscured by the then move to regain that initiative. The personnel and boarded in transports. A battleship and a score of cruisers and possible to pinpoint the position of of the USN task force, along with its interpretations generated in those later problem was insufficient forces were search-and-attack mission was planned destroyers – escorted the transports the involved ships and understand surface escorts, had been abandoned official and semi-official histories. available. The main effort in the region using the available land-based air and cargo ships toward the objective. what they were doing on an almost by overly timid Adm. Frank Fletcher, The Navy’s institutional need to for that summer had been directed forces on Rabaul, and a cruiser group

30 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 31 An iconic painting of the Battle of Savo Island. IJN YUBARI opens fire on the American cruisers ASTORIA, QUINCY and VINCENNES, each of which are bathed in Japanese searchlights. A John Hamilton painting in the U.S. Navy Art Collection.

was organized to strike at the enemy ers that, lacking sufficient range, would Turner’s amphibious force flagship, percent of the American fighters naval concentration near Guadalcanal. have to ditch on their return flight USS McCawley, had problems with engaged were lost, and after the That first effort was ineffective. near the Japanese base at Shortland. its communication equipment to second day’s aerial combat the Japanese land-based medium naval Japanese lookouts on Guadalcanal the point of effectively severing overall losses to the on-hand fighter bombers, the famed G4M Type 1 had the US carriers under observation, contact between it and the carriers. component reached 20 percent. “Bettys,” had been readying for a strike but were unable to establish radio Japanese aircraft losses were light, Fuel on the destroyers was also on Milne Bay carrying general-purpose contact with Rabaul. So the bombers, but they failed to score any damage. running low. A scheduled refueling bombs. To save time they weren’t unable to find the carriers, instead More importantly, though, the on 5 and 6 August failed to take place rearmed with anti-ship torpedoes. engaged the transports. Having appearance of the Japanese carrier dive because the two oilers tasked for it Twenty-seven of the bombers and 18 received warning of the incoming bombers prompted a debate within the were late arriving. The near constant fighters took off from Rabaul followed air raid, fighter protection over the US command over the nearby presence activity during the two days of aerial by nine D3A1 “Val” carrier dive bomb- US carriers was reinforced; however, of an enemy carrier, even though all attacks also worked to increase fuel intelligence reports at the time put all consumption beyond the norm. IJN carriers in home island waters. The air attacks had also disrupted The next day that pattern in USN the unloading, but Turner failed to operations – a lack of communication notify Fletcher of that fact. Fletcher between the two force commanders therefore still assumed Turner’s and failure to properly direct fighter original estimate, made before the cover – was repeated. Despite that, operation began, of two days to on 8 August the attacking Japanese complete unloading the main group aircraft were slaughtered by the USN of transports and another 48 hours defense. Of 23 planes that reached for the secondary group, was holding. the Allied force that day, 17 were shot Further complicating matters, down; one crashed on landing and the during the afternoon of 8 August other five were severely damaged. several imprecise aerial reconnais- Even so, the new intelligence sance reports came in about an IJN picture the Americans were building surface force coming down from was bad. Except for the original nine Rabaul. It was in fact Mikawa’s Eighth carrier dive bombers, all Japanese Fleet, with five heavy and two light planes subsequently engaged were cruisers and one ; however, land-based. While those bombers the force as reported was said to had proven easy targets for the USN consist of one seaplane tender and F4F Wildcats, their Zero escorts fared just two heavy cruisers. Further, well against those same fighters. Fifty that same force was variously

32 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 33 Maj. Gen. Vandergrift Vice Adm. Robert Ghormley Fleet Adm. King

Battle Vincennes the commanding officer had Aftermath been informed of gun flashes to the While those officers met to discuss southwest, but he discounted them The end of the action sparked what to do, the Japanese force was on the basis of the fact there had been even more command troubles for the steadily advancing toward Guadalcanal. no radioed alert nor could anyone Americans. Turner had no clear picture The first noteworthy incident took place actually see any illuminated targets. of what had happened until several at 44 minutes past midnight, when Among the three heavy cruisers hours after the Japanese left. In turn, the Japanese entered the theoretical and two destroyers in Northern he didn’t send a meaningful report to radar range of the USS Ralph Talbot. Force, only the USS Astoria opened Fletcher, still his superior, until later That destroyer was sighted by Mikawa’s fire, and that was only done on the in the day. Not until late afternoon lookouts, but the US radar failed to pick initiative of her gunnery officer. Her was Fletcher able to understand the up the Japanese, who were then at a dis- captain quickly ordered a ceasefire. extent of the disaster, and by then tance of 16,000 yards. Mikawa decided Then, in rapid succession, the scout it was too late. His destroyers had not to engage the picket ship once he planes onboard Vincennes and Astoria an average 35 percent fuel, and fuel was sure his column hadn’t been spot- were hit. As they burned they provided levels on the big ships were also ted by it. He continued to move ahead perfect illumination for the Japanese approaching dangerous low levels. His toward the transport anchorage area. gunners. Quickly they and the USS only alternative was to continue to the The Japanese continued to Quincy were gone, while the escorting rendezvous with the oilers and refuel. advance unimpeded until 1:43 a.m., destroyers were also put out of action. That morning he’d also gotten when a sighting report was finally Mikawa then had to make a deci- several coast watcher reports of issued by Southern Force (see map). sion: regroup and engage the suddenly another incoming air raid. Knowing It was too late: at that time Mikawa’s defenseless transports or withdraw his carriers were those planes’ main seaplanes started to drop flares and to safety. Historians and analysts targets, he decided to continue out of his guns opened fire while Long Lance have criticized the Japanese admiral the area, refuel, and then move back. torpedoes starting going into the water. for taking the latter course of action. Those same reports reached reported as both speeding toward and being whittled down and the destroyers for the simultaneous withdrawal of the HMAS Canberra was the first hit. The Yet Mikawa had a scattered force and Turner at 8:40 a.m. He ordered a halt withdrawing from Guadalcanal. needed to refuel. Even more, there part of his force that had completed USS Patterson started a gun duel with only four hours before daylight, and to the unloading and herded the Turner’s assessment of the situation still seemed the real possibility an IJN unloading, then reversed that decision the two Japanese light cruisers, Tenryu he believed USN carriers were nearby. entire remaining naval force into a was the Japanese were intending to carrier force was prowling around. and called a command conference on and Yubari. USS Chicago moved about He only had the reports of the sighting tight air defense formation. When establish a new seaplane base from Taking all that into account, Fletcher his flagship. That meeting included trying to find a target until 1:47 a.m. of the carrier force, not its departure; no strike appeared, he started to which to harass the surface naval determined being caught by the sus- the Marine general in charge of the when a Long Lance found her. Then and he wasn’t privy to the Fletcher, consider withdrawing. Orders from force at Guadalcanal. He passed that pected IJN carrier force while his escorts invasion, Alexander Vandergrift, as well another torpedo slammed in amidships Turner and Ghormley deliberations. Ghormley calling for that course of assessment to Fletcher, and that were low on fuel was simply too risky. At as Rear Adm. Victor Crutchley, the Royal but failed to explode. Chicago was Attacking the transports would’ve action were received at 6:50 p.m., but particular message was indeed received. the same time, there was no immediate Navy officer in charge of the combined still combat-capable, though, and she ultimately meant – according to the Turner had already begun to do so at It was then Fletcher made his Japanese threat and the bulk of the Australian and USN cruisers and engaged the Tenryu, scoring at least one information available to Mikawa – risk- 3:00 p.m. While some supplies and almost universally criticized decision to transports were scheduled to withdraw destroyers protecting the transports. hit. Then she resumed maneuvering ing being hammered by US carrier equipment were moved ashore that withdraw his carriers. His orders from during the evening of 8 August anyway. Because of the timing of the meeting at without reporting the engagement to planes in daylight while his force was day, about 1,400 Marines from 2nd Nimitz, however, were strict: he was Fletcher thus recommended to the over- night, coupled with his ship’s current Crutchley or warning Northern Force still in the closed waters around Regiment were still on the transports. operating under the principle of calcu- all commander of the operation, Vice disposition, Crutchley decided to go or the transports of the situation. Guadalcanal. At the time IJN air defense The recriminations began even as lated risk, and was to accept the chance Adm. Robert Ghormley, to withdraw to the meeting on HMS . That The main target of the Japanese doctrine still relied on individual ship the last transport left the area. Every of damage to the carriers only if there the carriers on the evening of the 8th, left Capt. Howard Bode, commanding then quickly became Northern Force. maneuver rather than massed fire, and commander blamed someone else. was the possibility of inflicting more one day earlier than originally planned. officer of the USS Chicago, in charge (The attack on Southern Force had his cruisers weren’t designed for that. Turner blamed Fletcher for having damage on the enemy. Clearly, though, His recommendation was accepted. of the remaining surface force. been conducted without even slowing.) If his force were caught in daylight still withdrawn the carriers, and he blamed the only target then available for certain That in turn caused problems for Again the Japanese were able to inflict fighting a surface battle, he would sure- Vandergrift because his Marines had was Rabaul, and the carriers had little Turner: with his unloading schedule a combination of gunnery and torpedo ly incur severe losses. Withdrawing was milled about, creating “confusion” chance to inflict severe damage there. delayed, his covering force was about hits on their targets. No Allied ship was indeed the doctrinally correct decision. on the beaches and thus further At the same time, fighter strength was to withdraw. He issued a tentative plan ready for action. On the bridge of USS slowing the unloading. Vandergrift in

34 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 35 AVAILABLE turn blamed the officers in charge of President Roosevelt that sending USS the transport groups. His Assistant Washington, South Dakota and Juneau NOW Chief of Staff, Gen. Merrill B Twining, to the area would more than offset THE DECISION GAMES pointed out that after the air attack those losses – which was then done. on the morning of 8 August little In the end, with the forces at hand, unloading had been performed. Mikawa simply wasn’t in a position Even so, despite the losses on the to achieve anything more than he FOLIO Allied side, the Battle of Savo Island actually did. He swept the area and didn’t settle anything. The famous forced a temporary USN withdrawal, GAME contention made by Morison that but no single surface engagement the overall campaign was delayed at that time could’ve changed the by the debacle is groundless. course of the campaign. There were SERIES Henderson Field remained in limits on what naval forces could American hands. Even though the do against ground troops, and The Folio Game Series provides Marines were temporarily deprived of Mikawa’s ships could do nothing to dozens of games using the same naval gunfire support, the issue wasn’t eliminate those already ashore. eight-page Standard rules overly critical because there was no Thus, as far as the outcome of the th (Musket & Saber for 19 century battles, immediate threat to the US lodgment. overall campaign was concerned, Fire & Movement for WWII and The counter-invasion envisioned by the Battle of Savo Island was Modern battles) with a short Exclusive Mikawa had been turned back when meaningless. The Allies lost several rules sheet for each individual game to the small convoy carrying his assault cruisers and destroyers, the Japanese capture the unique aspects of each battle. force was engaged by submarine S-38 a heavy cruiser and a transport. Each game can be played in about 90 in Saint George Channel and one of the Those losses weren’t sufficient to minutes, allowing for multiple games to transports was sunk. The possibility alter the larger balance of force in be played in an afternoon or evening. of a timely Japanese counteroffensive the theater one way or the other. on the ground was thus zero. GREAT Of course, the departure of the Immediate Consequences GIFT IDEA! carriers also temporarily deprived the US ground force of air cover; however, From a doctrinal and technical South of Savo Island, destroyers tend to HMAS CANBERRA in the morning hours of 9 August 1942. A U.S. Navy photo in the Brent Jones collection below according to the plan the carriers were standpoint, the IJN confirmed its SAIPAN: Conquest of the Marianas to have withdrawn on 9 August anyway. night combat superiority due to and an ignominious Allied rout. Their A realistic estimate of the remaining proved unable to share reports in a 1/10th actual size The other contention, that the better training, optics and flashless approach to the following struggle time needed for unloading would’ve timely manner. Having sustained a battle forced the transports to run powder. The Allied performance was conditioned by that view. undoubtedly prompted Fletcher to defeat, the involved commanders did away, thereby starving the Marines correspondingly demonstrated that, revise his own thinking. When Fletcher reassess coordination and control

SAIPAN WORLD WAR II BATTLES Conquest of the Marianas procedures. The boundary between FOLIO GAME SERIES ashore, is also unfounded. Turner despite superior technology in the Command Problems recommended withdrawing the car- Saipan was a critical objective in the US Navy’s “island hopping” campaign in the Pacifi c; its two airfi elds were suitable for heavy bombers. Hence three US divisions were scheduled to invade Saipan on 15 June 1944, supported by nearly two-dozen battleships that had begun a bombardment two days before. More than 30,000 fanatic Japanese were entrenched on the island, dug into caves and other had already decided to withdraw the form of radar, they were still unable to riers, he did so under the impression Ghormley’s and MacArthur’s areas formidable defensive positions. The battle for Saipan proved to be one of the Saipan fi ercest battles of the Pacifi c War, and the deadliest up to that time for both sides. Conquest of the Marianas Saipan utilizes the new Fire & Movement combat system that’s designed so players can augment their units with “support fi re” during the course of the turn. From naval bombardment to bazookas, units fleet from Guadalcanal at dawn on engage the Japanese on equal terms As mentioned above, immediately Turner was also going to pull out the was redrawn to provide for better can receive support to engage enemy positions and formations, allowing combat to develop at all levels. A single engineer battalion, for example — perhaps supported by fl amethrowers — could be tasked to assault a lone enemy infantry regiment defending a plateau. As its attack gets th underway, however, the engineer battalion may suddenly come under fi re from enemy mortars. More support will be needed to the 9 . The intervening naval disaster at night. There was in fact a definite after the battle the search for a culprit transports as previously agreed. reconnaissance and reporting. take the plateau, but assets are limited.

In Saipan the attritional design of the new Combat Results Table simulates the true nature of the battles in the Pacifi c. Units are typically two-sided formations that can incur casualties, accurately replicating the realities of combat and the high losses sustained by both sides during the actual fi ghting on Saipan. Winning More importantly, Savo also the battle is thus a matter of maneuver, actually moved him to accede to over-reliance on radar, coupled with started. Usually Crutchley and At the strategic level, Savo exposed fi repower and asset management. Game Contents:

• 17 x 22” (43 x 56 cm) terrain map • 80 die-cut counters • One Standard Rules booklet for this series Saipan • One Exclusive Rules booklet for this title Vandergrift request: some further a lack of understanding of its true Fletcher were singled out; the former the fact the entire US command chain forced Nimitz to reassess the island’s PLAYERS 2

LEVEL II III X XX XXX BATTALION HEX SCALE mi (536 m) PLAYING TIME 1-2 hrs unloading was performed that day. capacities. It was looked on more like for his supposedly faulty tactical for the operation was faulty. Given the importance in terms of his own larger Each counter represents an individual historical formation from among the Japanese and US forces COMPLEXITY • • that fought for Saipan, including armor regiments, • • • LOW 1611 marine battalions, engineers, amtracs and more. Minutes to learn. Quick to play. Historically Accurate. SOLITAIRE • • • • • HIGH

A FOLIO SERIES GAME A product of Decision Games, Inc. Copyright © 2010. All Rights Reserved. So, the questions remain: what had a magic black box rather than as a dispositions, and the latter for his larger organization of Allied forces strategy. He had to commit fully to

Copyright © 2010, Decision Games, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Made & Printed in U.S.A. www.decisiongames.com the Japanese actually won, and could complement to existing capabilities. order to withdraw the carriers. The across the area, “on paper” the whole Guadalcanal and drop his previously Mikawa have obtained a bigger victory? The USN’s pre-war doctrinal truth is their culpability was much Guadalcanal operation should’ve ambiguous support for the operation. Undoubtedly, he could’ve faith in the superiority of its gunfire less than that of Turner and Bode. been under MacArthur, the overall US Once he committed himself to the engaged the transports. He was was, at least for the moment, also The latter’s mistakes were tactical. area commander. King and Nimitz idea Guadalcanal was a major opera- unaware, though, that the US carriers shown to be misplaced. The battle His failure to alert anyone after initially insisted, though, on setting up a tion, and not a raid, he rescinded his had left, and his entire operation also exposed a lack of ability on the learning of the attack is staggering, and special Navy command to manage it “calculated risk” directive, allowing a had therefore been conceived on parts of several American officers. his handling of the Chicago was poor. because they couldn’t abide having more aggressive use of the carriers. the assumption his force had to At the same time, though, the At the operational level, Turner was fleet carriers subordinated to an break contact before daylight. engagement demonstrated the the main culprit. Despite his attempts army officer (particularly if that one Doctrines An attack on the transports certainly IJN wasn’t able to operate freely in to focus the blame on Fletcher, it was officer was MacArthur). That worked would’ve been dramatic, but again: daylight in the Solomons area. Their he who mishandled the unloading of to divide what was geographically one Savo was a night battle that the bulk of the Marines had landed reliance on individual ship maneuver, the transports and then continued operational area into two artificial showcased the differences regarding and there was no Japanese ground instead of massed anti-aircraft fire, to provide inaccurate estimates and sectors, each depending on a differ- surface combat in the two opposing counterattack in the offing. Quickly meant being caught by air attack erratic reports to Fletcher. He also ent chain of command and using navies. The IJN undertook extensive replacing the lost transports and the while in narrow waters could spell failed to address the communications different communication systems. training for that type of combat; the supplies they still carried would’ve disaster. So, until American air problems aboard his flagship even The boundary ran almost through US Navy lacked it. There’s no historical been difficult for the Allies in the power was defeated within that area, as it became clear that system was the middle of the Solomon Island chain revisionism that can change that short term, but not impossible. Guadalcanal’s waters were out of breaking down. He played the central (see map), with Rabaul in the Army area fact. The initial inquiry credited the As for the actual losses among bounds for IJN daytime operations. role in the debacle, both because he and Guadalcanal in that of the Navy. poor performance of American and P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 the Allied surface force, back in At the time, the Japanese didn’t failed to anticipate a night naval attack One result was the two commands Australian crews to that lack of training. (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax www.decisiongames.com Washington Adm. Earnest King, draw any new lessons from the battle. and, more importantly, because of his set up different and uncoordinated That finding also can’t be disputed, but overall head of the USN, pointed out to All they saw was their naval victory mishandling of the landing operation. air search operations, which then there were also other factors involved.

36 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012 37 Buy Now! One of the most misunderstood Navy command structure, on par with powerful navy, and one supported by PATTON’S FIRST VICTORY consequences of Savo was that USN its early-war refusal to acknowledge a larger industrial base – the Japanese Home surface combat doctrine was shattered problems with its own torpedoes. also explored different ways to to its foundation. No one fully realized More particularly, in regard to reduce the US material advantage Tunisia it at that moment, because the abysmal surface combat doctrines, before the prior to the decisive encounter. overall performance obscured two key start of the war both the USN and IJN One of those ways was airpower; Patton’s First Victory recreates the 1943 Tunisian technical issues. First, radar proved less had embarked on two different courses. the other was night action by light and Campaign, and can be played in 1-2 hours. Featuring a full order of battle of all the historic divisions, Patton’s First decisive than everyone was expecting. The Americans decided the key to cruiser forces using a combination of Victory also includes “support assets” that can be assigned Poor technical performance of the winning any engagement would be guns and torpedoes. The IJN therefore to divisions to increase their strength. Should the Axis deployed radar sets, coupled with a still long-range accurate gunfire. While they invested heavily in developing a reliable player assign his support assets to his best divisions, or poor understanding of the new technol- developed torpedoes, they considered long-range torpedo, using what all use them to augment his light units? The Allied player must ogy among those using it, reduced the them as only a secondary weapon. other navies had deemed unfeasible: maintain the momentum, fighting for a breakthrough to theoretical night fighting advantage For instance, while they explored the oxygen fuel. The resulting weapon, capture enough of the important Tunisian harbors to win. it might otherwise have provided. concept, they never thought of long- while potentially dangerous to its The Axis player must manage his scant yet potent army to repel the attacking Allies, while watching for opportunities Second, it was shown Japanese range torpedoes using oxygen as fuel users, proved powerful enough to sink to counterattack and throw them back. The Allies possess torpedoes could effectively outrange as realistic. The consensus was, since a medium-sized ship with a single material superiority, but the Axis units are experienced and American gunfire. The US ships had oxygen in concentration is extremely hit while also outranging its guns. are defending in mountainous and constricted terrain. been built on the assumption their flammable, such weapons would be The IJN also began intensive Additionally, Patton’s First Victory (PC), the full computer larger guns would engage the Japanese more dangerous to their users than to training for night combat in which version, administers all rules and game functions, allowing players before their torpedoes could be their targets. Thus the USN placed all its they stressed accuracy of visual to focus on strategy, and includes internet play functionality, CONTENTS SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS brought into effective range. At Savo, hopes in guns and superior fire control. observation, the use of flashless powder interactivity options (mouse and quick-key, turn restarts, autosave, • One 17 x 22 inch terrain map • OS XP/Vista recommended some Japanese torpedoes were in When the USN learned of the and the combined use of guns and etc.), and even an option to modify the victory conditions. The • 114 counters • CPU Pentium 4, 1.2Ghz recommended the water before the Americans were Japanese development of heavy torpedoes. Such night actions were program even provides a statistical analysis of combat results, a strategy guide, automated supply, plus options to turn on/off ZOC, • Rule & Scenario booklet • RAM 256 MB recommended even aware of the presence of enemy destroyers with powerful torpedo in fact to become the mainstay hex control, unit info, casualties, and more. Sound effects (which • Includes CD • AUDIO / VIDEO Windows-compatible Sound ships. The same problem continued to batteries, the answer was, starting in tactic for cruisers and destroyers. can also be turned on or off) will immerse you in the game for the Card / Min. resolution 1024 x 768, 16 bit color hinder USN surface operations until 1933, to design light cruisers of the Those efforts paid off, because full cinematic experience. • STORAGE 100 MB free space $ well into 1943, when the true range Brooklyn-class equipped with 15 rapid- Japanese visual observation proved a 29.95 (+ shipping) • INPUT Windows-compatible keyboard and of Japanese torpedoes came to be fire 6-inch guns. Concurrently, the Navy match for USN surface search radar mouse realized. The refusal to acknowledge also invested in radar technology to for the duration of the war, and the P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax | www.decisiongames.com the capabilities of the Long Lance produce more accurate and speedier combination of flashless powder and was one of the worst errors of the US fire. The rationale was to put massive torpedoes was likewise effective. ✪ “broadsides” on any target sufficient to speedily obliterate it by weight of fire. SELECTED SOURCES The corollary to that reliance on Dyer, Vice Adm. George C. Dyer. The Amphibians Came to NE W Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner. gunnery was – since the main aiming Washington: Department of the Navy, 1969. WAR IN EUROPE method depended on optical range Dull, Paul S. A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy. COMPUTER Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1978. finders and splash observation – gun Evans, David C. & Mark R. Peattie. Kaigun : Strategy, Tactics WINDOWS EDITION battles would be conducted mainly and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887- 1941. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997. GAMES in daylight. Night engagements were Frank, Richard. Guadalcanal. NY: Random House, 1990. only to be affairs involving small, Lundstrom, John B. Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway & Guadalcanal. War in Europe is a computer-moderated simulation of the European Theater AVAILABLE! light vessels. Only as radar became Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006. of Operations in World War II. There’s no computer/AI player in the game; players more available did the USN again Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5, History of United make all the critical decisions. You decide on production schedules, declare war on become interested in night combat. States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: neutral nations, and control the ground, air, sea and strategic forces of the Axis, The IJN started with almost the Little, Brown 1958. O’Hara, Vincent P. The US Navy Against the Axis. Allied and Soviet powers in order to change or recreate the events of the war. The same assumptions: the decisive Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007. game is a division-level simulation, with some brigade and corps-sized ground units. battle would be fought in daylight by Tagaya, Osamu. Mitsubishi Type 1 RIKKO “Betty” Units of World War II. New York: Osprey, 2001. Play takes place on a 159x133 hex map of Europe and North Africa. Naval power long-range gunnery. Yet – due to the Ugaki, Matome (trans. by Masataka Chihaya). Fading and air power are abstracted as points rather than on-map units, including: surface inescapable fact they faced a more Victor. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2008 fleet, U-Boat, transport, amphibious assault, tactical air and strategic bomber points. Battle on three fronts‹War in the West (two-player, Allies versus Axis); War in the East (two- player, Soviets versus Axis); and War in Europe (three-player, Axis $19.95 for 12 months versus Allies & Soviets). Select from 10 scenarios (shorter games focused on a single major offensive), or 16 campaigns (the whole war from a specified date SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS through May Œ45 or the defeat of one side). A unique “tabbed” map display Get full access to all back • OS Windows 2000/XP/Vista/Windows 7 allows each player to define his own set of map views, while also allowing one-click Retail price: issues in PDF format! (XP/Vista recommended) switching between areas of interest. Multiple map overlays show the supply net, Napoleon’s Last Battles $29.95 Currently includes World • CPU Pentium III 800Mhz (Pentium 4, 1.2Ghz territory ownership, air range, and zones of control. Fully integrated PBEM mode, Operation Olympic $24.95 at War #1-16, the first recommended) with autosend, inbox, browse mode and multiple file load/save tracking. Support * Download Only 60 issues of MOVES, • RAM 128 MB (256 MB recommended) for any screen resolution; multiple customizable map sets and customizable and S&T#201 to issue • AUDIO / VIDEO Windows-compatible Sound icons. Fully featured game editor for creation of new scenarios and campaigns; #266. Additional back Card / Min. resolution 1024 x 768, 16 bit color create new units, new setups, and edit the data tables used in the game. Visit Our Store @ issues will be added • STORAGE 50 MB free space $60 (+ shipping) P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 www.strategyandtacticspress.com on a regular basis. • INPUT Windows-compatible keyboard and (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax mouse www.decisiongames.com P.O. Box 21598 | Bakersfield, CA 93390-1598 | (661) 587-9633 phone | (661) 587-5031 fax www.decisiongames.com

38 WORLD at WAR 22 | FEB–MAR 2012