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2005 The U.S. Army's 2nd Ranger Battalion: Beyond D-Day Alissa Quistorff

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COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

THE U.S. ARMY’S 2ND RANGER BATTALION : BEYOND D-DAY

By

ALISSA QUISTORFF

A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science

Degree Awarded: Summer Semester, 2005 The members of the Committee approve the Thesis of Alissa Quistorff defended on April 20th, 2005.

Nathan Stoltzfus Professor Directing Thesis

Jonathan Grant Committee Member

Michael Creswell Committee Member

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

ii Dedicated to my family especially Papa, who taught me to love history and Inspired me.

iii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... Page v

1. Introduction ...... Page 1

2. Chapter 1: Pointe du Hoc ...... Page 9

3. Chapter 2: Hurtgen Forest ...... Page 28

4. Chapter 3: Brest and Rhine Crossing ...... Page 42

5. Conclusion ...... Page 56

APPENDIX ...... Page 63

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... Page 66

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... Page 69

iv ABSTRACT

This thesis is a micro-history of how the 2nd Ranger Battalion, during World War II evolved their military doctrine. This work focuses on their training for Operation Overlord and the ensuing battle. After the fight for Pointe du Hoc the Rangers had no stated doctrine to follow for later missions. Given that, the Rangers were deployed in a variety of ways. By examining the Brest campaign, the battles in the Hurtgen Forest, and the crossing of the Rhine River, the Ranger doctrine slowly begins to emerge.

v

INTRODUCTION

Either we shall employ our strength, power, and conscience boldly and righteously in defense of human dignity and freedom or we shall waste these resources for peace and default to the forces that breed new wars.

–General Omar Bradley Memorial Day Address 1948

1 This study attempts to explain how and why the U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion’s military doctrine and their strategic use evolved during the Second World War. Formed to capture Pointe du Hoc as part of Operation Overlord, the 2nd Ranger Battalion’s training as an elite Army unit focused on developing the skills necessary for their assault on the cliff. With the Army designating them an elite fighting unit, they received additional training as a special operations unit. After the Rangers were relieved from Pointe du Hoc after two days (D+2), they faced a serious problem as a unit. They did not have a doctrine to dictate their operational use. The lack of an established doctrine to use resulted in the slow evolution of a unique Ranger doctrine, transforming the Rangers into a light-weight, mobile, special operations force known for going in and quickly capturing its objective. The four major campaigns that the Rangers participated in clearly demonstrate, with their fighting style, how the Rangers established their doctrine after Pointe du Hoc. The assault on Pointe du Hoc was the start of the Rangers’ doctrine, but their next major operation was the Hurtgen Forest, had a direct effect on the Ranger’s doctrine.1 The difference stands out when comparing the Brest campaign (18 August-28 September 1944), which was conducted before Hurtgen Forest (14 November-10 December 1944), and the drive from the Roer River to the Rhine River (22 February-7 March 1945). Both of these campaigns also had a small on Ranger doctrine. This study also examines a secondary issue. Were the Rangers deployed in operations correctly? If Ranger doctrine dictated that they were only to be used as a frontal attack unit, then deploying them as front-line soldiers would have been a misuse. However, the Rangers did not have a doctrine to follow after Pointe du Hoc. They only had training that could guide a commander’s decision as how to use the Rangers in combat. By examining why commanders decided to use the Rangers in place of other units, it is clear that they were not tactically misused. They were deployed where they were needed and could best use their skills. The Rangers’ ability to accomplish any mission that the war called for became part of their doctrine, along with their special skills in executing fast, frontal attacks on the battlefield. The ability to

1In this study doctrine is defined as a written, tactical and the strategic purpose for the Rangers.

2 be successful in the multiple roles they played in the war was not a tactical misuse of the Rangers; instead, it resulted from their lack of doctrine. Examining how and why Ranger doctrine evolved during the Second World War is very important to the overall study of special operation forces. It allows historians to gain an understanding of the overall evolution of special operation forces from 1941-1944. The Second World War was the first time the American military leadership tried to use special operation forces on a large scale. By conducting a micro-study of the 2nd Rangers, it is clear that commanders did not always know what to do with the elite fighting forces. Given that the Army was not always sure how to deploy the Rangers, they were often attached to different units. This dispersal has led to the Rangers’ story becoming lost. Historians have downplayed the Rangers’ history because they worked as attached units in multiple divisions, thus making it difficult to distinguish between what the accomplishments of the and that of their attached division. Historians wanting to study how special operation forces were used in the Second World War found that the U.S. Army Airborne Divisions demonstrated the evolution of special forces better. Therefore, the Rangers are often overshadowed by the history of the Airborne. However, to truly understand how the Second World War shaped the use of special operation forces and their deployment, one must consider both the Airborne and the Rangers. The success of both the Rangers and Airborne during the Second World War led to the use of both these forces today. If they had failed, the Airborne and the Rangers would not be a modern military force still in use today. It is critical to understand how these units were formed and tested on the battlefield. The Second World War was the crucible in which they evolved not only their military doctrine, but also the future for special operations in the modern army. Historians writing about the Rangers have faced three main issues regarding the current literature. First, given that they had been trained and formed for only one kind of operation, their role in Operation Overlord, what role did the Rangers play after Pointe du Hoc? With Operation Overlord a success, the question not only for commanders but also historians was what to do with the Rangers? Were they deployed correctly by those in command? If not, why or why not? Second, did commanders deploy the Rangers appropriately, by taking into account their special training? This study also examines if the Ranger doctrine was evolving or if it was static. Finally, did the Rangers contribute to the overall victory for the Allies? If their role as a special

3 operation force helped to win victory for the Allies, in what capacity did they do so? Current literature on the Rangers is very limited. It becomes even harder to find secondary sources that deal strictly with the 2nd Ranger Battalion. There are, however, a few historians who have made significant contributions to the field of Ranger history. Ronald Lane’s Rudder’s Rangers is considered one of the cornerstones of Ranger history. This study of the 2nd Ranger Battalion did not examine how and why the Rangers were deployed but focused on the story of how Colonel James E. Rudder led the Rangers. Robert Black has completed the other major work done on the Rangers exclusively during the Second World War. His examines all the operations in which the Rangers participated in Rangers in World War II .2 He draws heavily on the oral histories of the men and the after -action reports. Black combines both narrative and a study of the larger picture of the Ranger’s role in World War II. These two books by Lane and Black are the best studies examining how the Rangers were used in the conflict. David Hogan Jr. has written two very detailed and critical studies of the Rangers. His works differ from those mentioned above because he did not limit the books to just the Rangers in the Second World War. His first book The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Rangers 1942-1983, examined the Army’s concept of what operations Rangers could be deployed in.3 This very detailed and well written book evaluates the lack of any strict concept of the Rangers in the army. His second book, U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, does not just study the role of the Rangers, but includes all special operation units, including the Rangers and Airborne forces.4 Hogan examines both theaters of World War II and what contribution special operation forces made during the conflict. Both of the studies examine the larger picture of the Ranger’s role in the Second World War. The second book, while it stays in the time frame of World War II, includes the Rangers with all the special operation forces used during the war.

2Robert Black, Rangers in World War II. (New York: Ivy Book, 1992)

3David Hogan Jr., The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Ranger, 1942-1983. (North Carolina: Duke University Dissertation, 1986)

4David Hogan Jr., U.S. Army’s Special Operations in World War II. (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, Department of the Army)

4 The history of the Rangers is often told by authors who have to include the Rangers along with other units and their history. In histories that cover the entire European theater, such as Stephan Ambrose’s Citizen Soldiers, the Rangers are mentioned only twice.5 He discusses them during Operation Overlord and their involvement in the Hurtgen Forest. He does not discuss them when they are attached to other units during the Brest campaign and the drive from the Roer River to the Rhine. In order to know what the Rangers were doing, one would have to know what units to which they were attached. General Omar Bradley does the same thing in his book A Soldier’s Story.6 He hardly mentions the Rangers except in Operation Overlord. A few other authors, such as Robert Sterling Rush, examine specific operations in which the Rangers were involved. His book, Hell in Hurtgen Forest, studies the entire battle of the Hurtgen Forest and within that study the Rangers.7 The other way authors include the Rangers in their studies is in oral histories of the war. Patrick O’Donnell’s Beyond Valor, symbolizes those narrative books that are very helpful in understanding what the soldiers went through in battle, but do not offer any type of analysis of the role the Rangers played in the war.8 The above list is not comprehensive; huge gaps in the literature remain. The question of whether commanders correctly deployed the Rangers is one of the questions that drives current research. Little research has explored why commanders decided to use the Rangers and for what missions, in particular, how the high command decided to use the Rangers. Another area that has been neglected is if the Ranger’s lack of doctrine had any effect on the operations on which the Rangers were sent. In regards to Ranger doctrine during the Second World War, scholars have not examined how and why their doctrine evolved the way it

5Stephen Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945 ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997)

6Omar Bradley, ( A Soldier’s Story. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951)

7Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Hurtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (Kansas: University Press of Kansas. 2001)

8Patrick O’Donnell, Beyond Valor: World War II’s Ranger and Airborne Veterans Reveal the Heart of Combat. (New York: The Free Press, 2001)

5 did. Historians who have examined the evolution of the Ranger doctrine have always extended their study outside the period of the Second World War. There has also been a recent trend of publishing oral histories of the Rangers. See Patrick O’Donnell’s book Beyond Valor.9 Although helpful in understanding what the soldiers experienced, the books do not tackle any of the issues currently under study involving the Rangers Two main assumptions appear in the work of historians who study the Rangers in Second World War. The first has to do with the role the Rangers played in the war. Because the Rangers lacked an established doctrine, many scholars assume that the Rangers were not deployed in operations suited for them. This assumption is most clear when the Rangers are only studied in isolation in major operations such as Operation Overlord and Castle Hill (in the battle for the Hurtgen Forest). Historians tend not to study when the Rangers were deployed as regular line infantry. If they do examine them in this role, historians such as David Hogan Jr. believe that they were being deployed in operations that ill suited them. This thinking is based on the fact that the Rangers were trained for special operations and were constantly used as regular infantry. The second assumption, which is more rare, is that the Rangers were unnecessary. Writers such as Cornelius Ryan believe that they did not make any significant contribution in the operations in which they were deployed. His book, The Longest Day June 6,1944, discusses the Rangers on Pointe du Hoc and how the German Howitzer’s were moved from their former emplacements.10 He believes that because they were moved where they could not be used to fire down on the beaches, the Rangers did not need to ascend the cliff. However, this assumption does not appear in more current studies. The present study of the Rangers examines the first assumption in greater detail. This study provides the first micro study of the Rangers. It chronicles the 2nd Ranger Battalion from 1943 through 1945 only. It follows the 2nd Rangers from their training in the

9Patrick O’Donnell, Beyond Valor: World War II’s Ranger and Airborne Veterans Reveal the Heart of Combat. (New York: The Free Press, 2001)

10Cornelius Ryan, The Longest Day: June 6, 1944 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959)

6 United States to their crossing of the Rhine River. Second, it is also a micro study of how the Ranger’s have evolved their doctrine. By studying the 2nd Battalion of the Rangers only, it becomes easier to see the small changes in their doctrine. In the larger evaluation of special forces, this study demonstrates that special operation forces were crucial to victory in the Second World War. When the 2nd Battalion is mentioned in Ranger history, it is always combined in the total effect or use of the Rangers. This study demonstrates the important role the 2nd Ranger Battalion had in the overall development of the Ranger concept. This micro history of one battalion in the Second World War should interest a number of audiences. The larger audience for this work is scholars of modern American history. Given that the Rangers are a U.S. Army unit, it helps to understand how Americans viewed the role of special operation forces in the American military. Military historians will also find this study useful in furthering their understanding of the development of special operation forces, in particular the Rangers. This work also speaks to historians of the Second World War. With the period of this work only covering the Second World War, it is important for those historians who are interested in how military doctrine evolved during the conflict. The majority of the collections used in this study are military documents, such as after- action reports and daily battalion journals. In the oral histories the problems of bringing up memories and glorifying one’s actions are a drawback to their use. However, they are needed to humanize the Rangers and help the reader visualize what they experienced on the battlefield. These collections are appropriate for the current study because they give the factual information in great detail about what, where, and how the Rangers were performing during each operation and on a daily basis. They are already established sources, they are not adding anything new to the primary source base. Yet taken together as a whole, not as individual separate operations, a picture emerges about the evolution of the Ranger doctrine. The Army formed in 1943 the 2nd Ranger Battalion to be trained as a special operations unit for the assault on Pointe du Hoc during Operation Overlord. They were volunteers who had to pass a harsh physical testing based on the selection process of the Airborne. However, after their mission on Pointe do Hoc was completed, they were left without any clear concept by the high command of what to do with this elite unit. Rangers established their doctrine through the course of the Second World War. As the they were deployed where commanders believed they

7 could best be used, they established themselves as a light weight, fast moving, attack unit. They were able to perform any role they were called on to perform. This ability to complete a variety of operations also became a part of Ranger doctrine. In order to examine this evolution of Ranger doctrine, this study divides the Rangers deployment in the Second World War into three chapters. The first chapter examines the training that formed the Rangers into a special operations unit. It then follows the Rangers through their mission on Pointe du Hoc. The second chapter highlights the next major evolution in the Ranger doctrine. This was the Battle for the Hurtgen Forest. This operation had two stages. The first was how they had been used by previous commanders: as regular lines forces to prevent the line from collapsing. Then they demonstrated that they could be used to take objectives by frontal assault that other heavier weight forces could not. After this they were used more for their training by attacking and capturing towns in rapid deployment. In chapter three their demonstration of speed becomes clear by comparing the Brest campaign, which proceeded the battle in the Hurtgen Forest and the drive from the Roer River to the Rhine River. How they were used by commanders is different and is better suited for their training. When taken together, it is easy to see that the Rangers during the Second World War were able to take a military doctrine that was not formed and evolve their doctrine to become one of the best special operations forces in the U.S. Army.

8

CHAPTER ONE

Rangers were volunteers, highly trained, superb physical condition with very high esprit. We held when we should have been annihilated–we held when it was impossible–we took objectives that units larger and more heavily armed couldn’t–it was our training–leadership ‘Elan.’

–Kendall McClure, Captain World War II Survey U.S. Army Military History Institute

9 After the December 1941 bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States formed an agreement with its old European allies to fight against the Axis powers. As quickly as U.S. forces were mobilized and recruited, leading American military strategists realized that the United States would need small action units to fight specialized missions. The Army Rangers were just that kind of unit. They were to serve as highly trained, small action forces otherwise known as Special Operation Forces.11 The Army Rangers were an all volunteer unit that received the most rigorous training that the Army had developed. This training focused on preparing them for the mission to capture Pointe du Hoc. Not all the men made it through the initial physical selection; even more dropped out during the continued conditioning the men received. The men who did survive the training developed a deep bond. This tight unit cohesion allowed them to achieve their objectives despite the loss of leaders and adverse conditions. Later, the same bond held them together against the two days of isolated attacks by the Germans. When the first Ranger battalion was established in 1942 and sent overseas to the Mediterranean, it quickly demonstrated how well the Rangers could preform on the battlefield. The 2nd Battalion was formed in 1943, out of volunteers from other units. All possible new recruits had to pass two weeks of rigorous physical testing, because they were all volunteers and were an elite unit. physical testing. Ralph Goranson of Company C explains: To get into the Rangers, you had to volunteer. At any time during training, you could volunteer out, because of physical requirements, mental requirement, or just the fact that you just didn’t fit. We had a high turnover at the beginning, but as we got ready to leave in early September of ‘43, we had a pretty crew put together in each of our Ranger companies.12 Why did men like Ralph Goranson join the Rangers? Many thought that if they were going to

11The term Special Operation Forces has had many meanings. I will be using David Hogan Jr.’s definition of Ranger commando, “...elite light infantry units, organized and trained to conduct raids and long-range reconnaissance and to seize critical points on the battlefield.” U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 1992, 4.

12Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive: The Eisenhower Center for American Studies, University of New Orleans, Ralph Goranson. Hereafter referred to as Kalikow archive.

10 serve in the military, it might as well be the best. Captain William Acancy joined because he, “...wanted to serve with well trained men and officers.”13 For some, the idea of working in a small unit held greater appeal compared to the large divisions that were also forming at the time. The desire for wanting to serve with the superior units arose from, “personal pride at being part of elite unit.”14 James Eikner describes all these feelings well: These units accepted only volunteers and men were selected for their mental and physical stamina and their motivation to get the job done. Sometimes we were called a suicide groups, but not at all we were simply spirited young people who took the view that if you were going to be combat soldier you may as well be the very best. Also we were anxious to get on with the war so as to bring things to a close and get home to our loved ones as soon as possible.15 Once the soldiers made it through the first phase of the selection process, the training and conditioning increased in order to make the men an elite fighting unit.16 The 2nd Battalion was formed in 1943 and was not deployed on their first mission until June 6, 1944. During this time, they were in different camps training for Special Forces missions. From 11 April– 5 July 1943, the Rangers were stationed in “Tent City” about one mile north-east of Camp Forrest in Tennessee. During this period, they focused on developing physical stamina. The men were required to complete a five mile march in one hour and a nine mile march in two hours. The policy mandated that, “If a man fell out on a hike, he would be considered physically unfit for Ranger service and would be transferred from the

13U. S. Army Military History Institute: World War II Survey, William Acaney. [ World War II Survey]

14World War II Survey, Gerorge Kerchler.

15Kalikow Archive, James Eikner.

16The majority of the selection process took place during two weeks of individual combat methods, which was based on the experience of soldiers in North Africa. The men were selected based on the paratrooper requirements. U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collect, box 1, Training record “Tent City”.

11 organization.”17 This policy would remain in force throughout training. The soldiers also started their training in small unit actions. These activities included: scouting, patrolling, village fighting, infiltration, bayonet, hand-to-hand, and “rugged” group games to help create unit cohesion. The weekly cycle of five- nine- and twenty five- mile speed marches also continued at this time. The first week of May, the first cliff ascent was practiced by the Rangers. The cliff was almost completely sheer the first 90 feet and required the use of free ropes perfect training for the upcoming Pointe du Hoc mission. Instruction and field practice followed the physical conditioning. This included: ambushing tanks, booby traps, demolition, blitz courses, sniping, construction and passage of wire entanglements, stream crossings, toggle ropes, and camouflage.18 This training was the first step in making the Rangers an elite fighting force. Both the training and morale increased when Major James E. Rudder took command on 30 June 1943 because he implemented strict Army policy raising the standards at which they operated. The Rangers were transferred back into the barracks at Camp Forrest. From 6 July–28 August 1943, the Rangers continued with their physical conditioning and small unit action training. Under the direction of Major Rudder, the training increased in rigor and the unit exercises in difficulty. The turnover rate during this time was still very high, with men replacing the ones who could not endure the training. This outcome was what Rudder wanted: a high level of unit cohesion and comradery. On 29 August, the soldiers reported for amphibious training at Fort Pierce, Florida. Designed as a fifteen -day course, the Rangers completed it in only eight days. The day was divided into three sections: each started with a lecture, roll call, and then concluded with a practical. There was the “swim and swat” when the men stripped to their shorts for roll call and were allowed to be “eaten” by sand flies. Physical conditioning on the beach was followed by the amphibious instruction that lasted well into the

17U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Training record “Tent City.”

18U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Training record “Reorganization.”

12 night.19 Then on 16 September, the Rangers reported at Fort Dix, New Jersey. They stayed there until they left for Great Britain on 11 November 1944. During this time, they continued with conditioning and small unit maneuvers. By the time they left for England the men were a cohesive fighting unit. They did not realize, however, that their training in England would be even more strenuous and demanding then what they had gone through. That was because they were now training for their mission on Pointe du Hoc. The Rangers arrived in England on December 1st, 1943 after the long trip over on the Queen Mary. Owen Brown describes what was waiting for the men: We arrived at Bude Cornwall on December 2, 1943. 500 rangers were greeted with 500 pairs of boxing gloves and a few miles of rope for our training on the cliffs of Cornwall. We climbed the cliffs along the Cornish coast and hike the hills inland, just for conditioning.20 Bude, Cornwall is located on the West coast of England, just south of the Bristol Channel. The men were divided into small groups and then sent off to find the private homes in which they would stay. During their stay, they continued to work on their physical conditioning and small unit actions (both day and night maneuvers.) The soldiers also trained to distinguish Allied uniforms and weapons from those of the Axis. During this time, they also worked on cliff climbing while a select number of the officers and NCO’s worked with the British Commandos.21 One unusual part of their training in England required them to travel. The men would be given a certain location in England and a date and time to be there. The men would then have to figure out some way to get there on time. Prior to leaving, the men had been receiving pay. The men could use any amount of money they wished to spend renting a vehicle, or buying a bus or train pass. More often, the men would try to hitchhike across either in groups

19U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Training record “Amphibious Training.”

20Kalikow Archive, Owen Brown.

21U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Training record “Private Billets.”

13 or individually.22 These exercises reinforced individual problem solving. Commanders like Rudder knew that in the heat of battle Rangers would have to think for themselves to survive. Finally, in May 1944, while the men were in lock down before the big invasion, they were given their mission. The objectives for Operation Overlord were top secret, thus the men were allowed to know their mission in small groups. Jack Keating explains what happened to him: ...about 2-3 weeks before D-Day, if my recollection is correct, we were called in not on an individual but on a very small unit basis and briefed. We were taken into this room where they had a map or an overlay–it was like a mat that had the beaches outlined, and we were shown exactly where we were going to land, what our job was going to be, and for the first (probably) 4 or 5 days after D-Day, if you survived.23 Owen Brown goes into even more detail about the type of information the Rangers received about their mission: We had miniature plaster layouts of the French coast, giving the location of beaches, cliffs, and the German defenses. They showed us pillboxes, barbed wire, mine fields, underwater obstacles. They even told us the composition of the soldiers. There was supposed to be cadre of Germans with Polish, Russian, and Hungarian men from captured countries working and fighting for the Germans24. The exact mission of the 2nd Rangers was very detailed and was part of the much larger plan of Operation Overlord. The capture of the guns atop Pointe du Hoc was vital to the landings on Normandy. By mid-1942, planning for an invasion of France’s coast had already begun. The American and British military leaders had given the plan the name “Roundup”. As planning proceeded, leaders in America and Britain disputed the best method to stop Hitler. Britain’s

22Kalikow Archive, Owen Brown.

23Kalikow Archive, Jack Keating.

24Kalikow Archive, Owen Brown.

14 Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery favored proceeding up the Italian peninsula and striking at the “soft underbelly” of Europe. They planned to accomplish this goal by launching several series of attritional and diversionary campaigns. American President Franklin Roosevelt and his military leaders, however, thought that an early and decisive drive across France into Germany would win the war.25 This first step for a campaign in France would have to be a cross-channel attack. Yet it was not until 1943 that the Allies decided on the cross-channel attack. Operation Overlord was a compromise between America and Britain. Russia, pushing for relief on the Eastern Front, and thought that an invasion of France was also necessary. The three Allies decided that the best long term strategy would be for the British to still strike at the “soft underbelly” of Europe with the campaigns in Italy. These operations would cause Germany to divide its forces on the Eastern Front and along the coast of France and Italy. America was given the go ahead to plan and execute Operation Roundup, now renamed Operation Overlord. To mount an invasion force that would be successful not only during the initial invasion, but also gain a secure foothold on the continent was crucial. Planing for the cross-channel began in 1943. It would be the largest amphibious attack in history, with involvement of all branches of the military and forces from several countries. To head the allied coalition, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill decided on General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Appointed Supreme Allied Commander, he took over at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and began planning the invasion. The most obvious place to try and launch an invasion force was at Pas de Calais. Unfortunately for the Allies, it was also obvious to Adolf Hitler and his military leaders and was thus the most fortified position along the Atlantic Wall. The next preferred landing area was on the Normandy coast. The proximity to the coast of Britain allowed for troops to be deployed by the navy, bombings of the coast, and the strategic port of Cherbourg, located only 100 miles away, to be used. The city of Caen, a major communications center with highways and rail lines, was also nearby. The major advantage to the Allies was that it was one of the least defended areas of the Atlantic Wall. According to

25Richard Leighton, “Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of American Strategy in the European War, 1942-1944,” American Historical Review, vol. 68, no.4 (July 1963), 919-937.

15 Operation Order N.O. 3-44 of Assault Force “U” dated 15 May 1944 in the Enemy Order of Battle and Capabilities, there were only four infantry divisions on the Cotentin Peninsula and areas inland. Farther inland were one SS Panzer Division, two Panzer Divisions, one Panzer Training Division, and one Infantry Division. The intelligence report goes on to state that of the four infantry divisions, only one was of the field type, meaning completely mobile. That was the 352 Division; the others are the 3, 709, 243, and 716, which were known as limited deployment divisions.26 After the location of the invasion was set, General Eisenhower began organizing his force and assigning them missions. For the assault, Eisenhower planned on using the 21st Army Group that was led by Field Marshall Montgomery. The 21st Army Group was then broken down into the U.S. First Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Omar Bradley and the British Second Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Sir Miles Dempsey. The British Second Army consisted of the British XXX Corps, which contained the Br. 50 Infantry Division and the British I Corps, which had the Canadian Infantry Divisions and the Br. 3rd Infantry Division. The U.S. First Army consisted of the U.S. VII Corps that formed the 4th Infantry Division and the U.S. V Corps that made up the 29th Infantry Division and the 1st Infantry Division. Eisenhower decided that on D-Day, all of these troops would land on the French coast and establish a line of attack over sixty miles long. The assault plan called for the troops to head straight southward towards the coast of Normandy with the Americans on the right flank and the British and the Canadians on the left. The extreme right of the attack was Utah Beach and the city of Quineville. The extreme left flank was Sword Beach by the mouth of the river Orne.27 Within this sixty-mile front, the beaches were divided into sections and given different code names. The British sector contained from right to left Gold, Juno, and Sword. The U.S. sector contained from right to left Utah and Omaha, with Pointe du Hoc located between the two

26Sims Gautheir Collection: The Eisenhower Center for American Studies, University of New Orleans, Intelligence plan. [Sims Gautheir Collection]

27Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948), 243.

16 beachheads.28 It was this area of the U.S. sector that had intelligence worried while planing for D-Day. Pointe du Hoc is located 6,000 meters or 3.7 miles west of the city of Viervilla. To get to the top of the cliff, a person must scale about thirty meters or 100 feet of almost a 90-degree rocky surface.29 Once on top of the cliff, one encountered barbed wire, the observation post, interlocking trenches/dugouts for firing positions for machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, artillery shells that exploded in the face of a cliff climber. Moreover, the Germans had grenades and they could drop them down onto the beach.30 It was on this cliff that the Germans had placed six 155- mm Howitzer guns. Each gun had an estimated firing range of 25,000 yards. At this distance, the guns could fire on landing positions at both Omaha and Utah. They could also hit Port-en- Bessin in the British sector to Taret de Ravenovill.31 For Eisenhower and his staff, one of their most vital concerns was the observation post on top of Pointe du Hoc. The observation post was a large concrete structure on the edge of the cliff. From the post, German soldiers could see the beaches of Omaha and Utah perfectly. To enhance the power of the Howitzer guns and the observation post, the Germans had equipped it with a radio and underground telephone communication line that connected to headquarters.32 These guns caused General Eisenhower to assign a special forces battalion to eliminate them during Operation Overlord. The reason Eisenhower decided that a special forces team was needed to handle the guns on Pointe du Hoc was: If these guns were used against the beaches they would be firing parallel to the shore, causing more destruction to the coastline. The Overlord planners felt that

28Included in the invasion force were three U.S. airborne divisions and a British airborne division. The total force landed in 24 hours would be 150,000.

29David Chandler and James Collins Jr., The D-Day Encyclopedia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 451.

30Robert Black, Rangers in World War II (New York: Ivy Books, 1992), 185.

31Chandler, The D-Day Encyclopedia, 196.

32Ibid, 411.

17 the Pointe du Hoc guns were ‘the most dangerous battery in France.’33 General Eisenhower ordered General Bradley tell Lieutenant Colonel Rudder that it would be his Ranger battalions that would be given this daunting mission of scaling Pointe du Hoc. Bradley later recalled having to tell Rudder his mission for Operation Overlord: No soldier in my command has ever been wished a more difficult task than that which befell the 34-year old commander of this Provisional Ranger Force. Lieutenant Colonel James E. Rudder, a rancher from Brady, Texas, was to take a force of 200 men, land on a shingled shelf under the face of a 100-foot cliff, scale the cliff, and there destroy an enemy battery of coastal guns. ‘First time you mentioned it,’ Rudder recalls, ‘I thought you were trying to scare me.’34 Indeed, Rudder was trusted with planning and executing a very critical mission for Operation Overlord. With all the training the Rangers had completed within the last year both in the United States and in Britain, Rudder knew his men could handle the mission assigned to them. In order for the Rangers to be successful, Rudder divided what the men were to do into very detailed objectives. First, the Rangers had to scale a one hundred foot cliff and proceed inland to capture and disable the six 155-mm Howitzer guns. Second, they were to close the Viervill-Grandcamp road from any advancing German reinforcements and protect their position on Pointe du Hoc from any counter-attacks. Finally, the Rangers were ordered to attack the emplacements at Pointe de la Percee.35 These general missions were then broken down into three separate forces for the different objectives. Force A would be given the main mission of capturing the guns on Pointe du Hoc. This force consisted of Companies D, E, and F of the 2nd Ranger Battalion. Force B, was Company C of the 2nd Ranger Battalion and was to attack a series of mortar emplacements on the cliff at Pointe-et-Raz-de-la-Percee. Force C was to wait off shore for thirty minutes until they received an all clear signal from the Rangers on Pointe du Hoc. If they did not receive that signal, they were to proceed to Omaha Beach, Dog Green sector

33Ibid, 196.

34Omar Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), 269.

35Chandler, The D-Day Encyclopedia, 451.

18 with the 116th Infantry Regiment.36 From there each force was divided by their company objectives and then by their platoon objective. Company E of Force A divided into three sections. The first section was supposed to destroy the number three gun and its casemate. The second section was to set up a defense at the main east-west road. Finally, the third sector had the mission of destroying the concrete observation post. The rest of Force A was separated similarly. Company F was to take the left flank, which had to neutralize the number one and number two gun positions and destroy the anti-aircraft guns. Company D was to take the right flank and destroy the guns positioned there.37 The reason for such detailed breakdown of the mission was to ensure that the Rangers not only knew their job, but the job of the man above. This breakdown also ensured that during the battle there would be no collapse of leadership and unit morale. Ranger training also gave them the ability to successfully complete these demanding missions, but also had some special equipment made to help them. The most recognized of these weapons were the DUKWs, a type of tank that functioned not only as a tank on land, but could also “swim.” For their landing on Pointe du Hoc, the Rangers took four DUKWs. These four tanks were also equipped with extension ladders that were provided by the London Fire Department. This way once the DUKWs landed on the beach, they could extend/lay the ladders on the face of the cliff. Each ladder extended one hundred feet, and on top of each ladder was a pair of Oerlikon machine guns.38 With the guns equipped on top of the ladders, a Ranger could go up the ladder and lay down covering fire to help keep the Germans from firing down on the men who were climbing up the cliff. To help the soldiers scale the face of the cliff, the Rangers also had specially designed ropes. The easiest and most preferred way by the Rangers was to use traditional climbing ropes. For the landing, the ropes would be kept in wooden boxes located in pairs on the bow, amid ship, and the stern. All the ropes were 3/4 inches wide. The favorite climbing rope was the plain

36O’Donnell, Beyond Valor,124.

37Ronald Lane, Rudder’s Rangers (Virginia: Ranger Associates, 1979), 117.

38Black, Rangers in World War II, 189.

19 scaling ones. The Rangers also had “toggle ropes,” which had round pieces of wood throughout the length of the rope to help the men climb faster and easier. They also landed with rope ladders as well. All these ropes were fired through rockets to help them get to the top quicker. The only drawback was that if the ropes became wet, then they would be too heavy to fire, thus posing a serious problem during the landings. The other type of ladder that the Rangers were given was a four-foot tubular steel ladders that weighted four pounds each. These ladders were supposed to be assembled as the men climbed up. One other important part of the pre-invasion preparation to help the Rangers succeed on D-Day was the bombing of the Normandy coast. The guns on Pointe du Hoc were considered the most dangerous, because of this they received the heaviest pre-invasion bombardment. Heavy bombers from the U.S. 8th Air Force and the British Royal Air Force dropped bombs on Pointe du Hoc on April 15, April 25, May 22, and June 4th. A directive titled Air Plan from Operation Order No. 3-44 states the bombing missions to be conducted before D-Day: General priority for the fire support program is given to the neutralization or destruction of Forces. Batteries covering the sea approaches and the beaches are regarded as primary targets for the heavy night and medium Oboe bombers...With the exception of the batteries indicated below, which are specifically selected for neutralization in the assault phase, attacks on batteries will be confined to those in open emplacements or under construction, with a view to harassing rather than destructive effect.39 During the course of this bombardment, it is estimated that the total amount of tonnage dropped on Pointe du Hoc would be equal to more than 10 kilotons of high explosives, equivalent to the bomb dropped on Hiroshima.40 While the bombing was sure to help the Rangers achieve their mission, it would be the combination of their training, weapons, and their morale that would lead to their success on June 6, 1944. The vast navy armada that crossed the English Channel was breathtaking in its size. The

39Sims Gauthier Collection, Air plan document.

40Stephen Ambrose, D-Day: June 6, 1944 The Climatic Battle of World War II (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), 406.

20 fleet totaled over 7,000 vessels. That included 138 warships that would later provide fire support to the landing army. There were 221 escort vessels, 287 minesweepers, and 495 light coastal craft that were protecting the advancing convoy. Over 4,000 landing ships, landing crafts, and other amphibious vessels were needed to land the large infantry force for Operation Overlord. To help carry the majority of the ground force, tanks, ammunition, and other supplies the troops needed to land were 805 cargo ships.41 Amid all this equipment were the 250 Rangers of the 2nd Battalion. They were loaded into their DUKW’s, LCA’s and LST’s around 0200-0300 on June 6th. Shortly afterwards, the gun boats opened fire on the Normandy coast to help soften the Atlantic Wall. Former Ranger James Eikner describes what it was like to cross the channel that morning: Just about day break all hell broke out on the mainland there with the shelling from the big ships and all it looked like a tremendous fourth of July and we were all standing up admiring it really, a sight to see. But then low and behold geysers of water began going up all around us and we thought we were being shelled but we weren’t, these were short rockets that were being fired from rockets boats in toward the land and somebody had the wrong range.42 To make matters worse, the rough waters were causing the waves to crash over the sides of the boats. The problem arose due to the storm that had gone over the English Channel the day before, developing rough seas. Many men were bailing out their boats with their helmets to try and keep them afloat. The Rangers also began throwing over some of their much needed supplies as well. Besides the waves making the trip across the channel dangerous, the rip currents were causing many of the landing crafts to be pushed off course. Luckily, Lt. Col. Rudder realized that the Rangers were heading in the wrong direction and persuaded the coxswain drivers to turn and run parallel to the coast for four kilometers. This change in direction caused the Rangers to be 35-minutes late to Pointe du Hoc. The time delay left the men vulnerable to the Germans firing down on them. To help with covering fire while they landed

41Williamson Murray and Allan Millet, A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 240.

42Kalikow Archive, James Eikner.

21 and scaled the cliff, Rudder called in fire from the USS Satterles and the HMS Talybont.43 Not only did the late-arriving Rangers receive fire from the Germans, they also encountered another problem: the tide was starting to come in. With the water level increasing, the DUKWs became useless, leaving the Rangers one weapon short. Their scaling ropes were also having trouble getting to the top of the cliff. Having been stored on the sides of the landing crafts, all the waves that crashed over the sides had made the ropes soaking wet. Frank South describes another problem with the late landing: As we got in, close to the cliffs, we were not in the planned positions, so that our boats were crowded too closely together. The rockets with the grapnels attached were fired, bringing up the climbing lines and ropes. Many fell short because they were fired too soon, or because the ropes were wet and heavy. The grapnels were designed to go to the top of the cliffs, dig in there, and then we would be able to scale the cliffs, using either rope ladders, which some of them had, or simply straight ropes, which most of us preferred.44 As the men were trying to assemble and scale the cliff, the Germans were firing down on them with everything they had, including “potato mashers,” concussion grenades, and machine gun fire. They were also trying to cut the ropes. Nonetheless, the Germans did not stop the Rangers from quickly getting to work: At the same time that this was happening, I felt a blast over to my left. The other F Company boat was unable to get it’s rockets into position to fire them properly. So, Tech Sergeant Cripps had taken the rockets off, I think two of them as I remember, put them on the beach itself, and hand-fired them while standing only three feet off. In the process of firing the first one, he was partially blinded, with carbon particles embedded deeply in his face. Nevertheless, he went on, and again, in almost direct line of fire from the machine gun, was able to get the second one in position, fired it, again taking a terrible blast. It took extraordinary

43Ambrose, D-Day, 406.

44Kalikow Archive, Frank South.

22 courage, determination and self control.45 As men such as Tech. Sergeant Cripps got his men and himself up the cliff to the top of Pointe du Hoc, the real mission began. Now that the Rangers were up the cliff, they had to quickly find and disable the guns. This task turned out to be harder than planned. The Air Force had dropped so many bombs on the cliff that it created crater after crater. All the bombings before Operation Overlord also caused another major shock for the Rangers. When they finally got to the gun positions on Pointe du Hoc, the guns were not there: We didn’t stop; we played it just like a football game, charging hard and low. We went into the shell craters for protection, because there were snipers around and machine guns firing at us, and we’d wait for a moment, and if the fire lifted, we were out of that crater and into the next one. We ran as fast as we could over to the gun positions-to take the one that we were assigned to. There were no guns in the positions!46 Shortly after reaching the top of Pointe du Hoc, a small group of Rangers found the guns in an apple orchard about 1,200 yards inland. The Rangers also found large quantities of ammunition by the gun sites, though the guns had not been fired.47 After the heavy bombing that Pointe du Hoc received, the Germans had moved them inland to protect them. Very quickly the men set to work disabling the guns: They were under the trees. There were three guns, and we didn’t have too much trouble taking the guns, because they seemed like they were empty–no guards, no troops around there. If there were, they must have taken off. So we put phosphorus grenades in the breech and destroyed all the pile of ammunition. I’d say within an hour, we had everything well taken in and destroyed there.48

45Ibid.

46Kalikow Archive, Leonard Lomell.

47Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, 270.

48Kalikow Archive, Salva Maimone.

23 Once they destroyed the guns, the Rangers’ next mission was to close off the roads leading to the beach. This move would prevent the Germans sending in reinforcements. Of course, this meant the Rangers would be facing the counter-attacking Germans. The German counter-attack came from the 716th Infantry Regiment, commanded by General Wilhelm Richters. The regiment had been stationed in Normandy since May 1941. Allied intelligence did not consider the 716th a top line fighting force, however. There were two main reasons for this. First, the men in the regiment were considered too old to be effective in combat. The second was that by 1944 they had many non-Germans in their ranks.49 The Germans also sent in the 914th Infantry Regiment to help the 716th.50 Throughout the day the Rangers fought against these units, at times being almost pushed back to the cliff, before surging forward again. Finally, around 2100 hours, a few of the Ranger reinforcements from the 5th Ranger Battalion made their way to Pointe du Hoc. This is what was waiting for them: Then we formed up in a straight line where D Company, E Company, and F Company were in a straight line, and it didn’t get dark till 12:00, and that’s when trouble really started. They started attacking, and we were shooting at the enemy tracers. Every time we’d shoot, and every time we would fire, they’d come back with another fire. They could see the bullet tracers, ammunition, and somehow, they’d know where to shoot. They had lots of motor shells going in the position where they thought we were, but we weren’t in there. We took about another 25 or 30 yards in front of their position, and the mortar shell was going over us.51 As D-Day came to a close, the fighting continued. Very quickly the Rangers realized that they had a major problem developing if they did not get relieved soon. They were running out of supplies. Many of the landing crafts had to throw supplies overboard to keep the boats afloat, this caused a serious supply shortage by D+2. Lt. Col. Rudder tried to get two LCVPs to bring them

49Black, Rangers in World War II, 185.

50Chandler, The D-Day Encyclopedia, 451.

51Kalikow Archive, Salva Maimone.

24 supplies and evacuate the most seriously wounded. Due to heavy fire, the LCVPs retrieved only some of the wounded and were not able to drop off the much needed ammunition, food, and medical supplies. The only high point of the day came when the Rangers re-established communication with the naval ships.52 Rudder was finally able to call in the heavy guns to try and repulse some of the attacking Germans. The Rangers did not have ammunition for their own guns, so they began using the guns and ammunition of the dead Germans around them. While this worked to keep them alive during the night and morning of D+2, when the men were about to be relieved, it caused trouble for the Rangers: ...then finally on D+2 when we were being relieved, our Rangers were using German machine guns and there’s a distinctive sound between an American machine gun and a German machine gun. So, when the 5th Rangers in the 116th Infantry were advancing up the road towards us from Omaha Beach, and they heard these German machine guns, they thought, ‘Well, those aren’t Rangers up there. That isn’t Col. Rudder and his Rangers, those are German because they’re firing the German machine gun’. So, they opened up on us with mortars and even a couple of tanks fired on us and killed four men and wounded about six.53 When the Rangers were finally relieved it was on June 8th or D+2. Jack Keating was a Ranger from another unit, who came to relieve the men on Pointe du Hoc. He was amazed that the Rangers had been able to hold out that long. Even more amazing was what he saw on the top of the Pointe: We went out to the cliffs and Pointe du Hoc, and when we got a look of what they had been going through for 3 days, it was a seesaw battle. They’d push inland, and then get pushed back, almost into the sea again off the cliffs, and it was touch and go for the 3 days. Our colonel, Colonel Rudder, Colonel James E. Rudder from Texas, one of the greatest men that ever lived, military, and he was hit twice

52Chandler, The D-Day Encyclopedia, 218-219.

53Kalikow Archive, Louis Lisko.

25 on D-Day and refused to be evacuated.54 In the first two days on Pointe du Hoc, the 2nd Rangers of Companies D, E, and F suffered 77 killed in action, 152 wounded and 70 missing in action. Frank South states it in a more realistic way, “Of the 250 men who had landed on the Pointe, there were less than 95 who could still bear arms.”55 After the battle for the Normandy coast, the Rangers began the task of evaluating their performance during the battle. Two main outcomes stood out for the commanders. First, the Rangers had been able to seize critical points on a battlefield quickly and efficiently despite heavy resistance. The second was that after they achieved their objectives they continued to hold the ground against heavy German counter-attacks. These outcomes were critical for the future of the Rangers. The battalion had been trained and conditioned for the Pointe du Hoc mission. After that there was no standing military doctrine for them to follow. Unlike the paratroopers, who had a strict military doctrine to plan for the next operations, the Rangers did not have such a doctrine. The high command did not know what to do with these elite, highly-trained men. The future of the Rangers and their military doctrine would continue to evolve during the course of the war.

54Kalikow Archive, Jack Keating.

55Kalikow Archive, Frank South.

26

CHAPTER TWO

The Rangers specialty is overnight combat, and they only can create from the battlefield instant tactic and strategy for themselves at multiple sites, as well as for military units in destress. In essence the Rangers became the worlds fore-most authority on creating, sustaining, and projecting combat morale on demand!”

–The Ranger Collection U.S. Army Military History Institute

27 Although the Rangers’ mission at Pointe du Hoc brought them recognition and honor, the fighting in the Hurtgen Forest offered them their deadliest test. It is easy to see why historians have focused on Pointe du Hoc. The imposing cliff they scaled and the fierce fighting that ensued under Lt. Rudder enveloped American soldiers in an idealized image. It was in the forest, however, that the true valor of the Rangers shone. There during the cold, harsh winter the Rangers really began their process of changing from a battalion with no stated purpose to a defined force. According to Sid Salomon, “After the invasion, there was no need for a 2nd Ranger Battalion. We were used as an infantry company, attached to maybe ten different divisions. The people in command did not know what the Rangers were.”56 When the Rangers were originally sent in during November, they were used as line troops. In December, the opportunity to demonstrate and evolve their fighting techniques occurred at Castle Hill. The fighting in the Hurtgen Forest changed the Ranger concept dramatically. After receiving additional training and replacements, the Rangers had finally reached their full fighting strength. By this time, the battle for the Hurtgen Forest had started. By November 1944, the Allied Front was bogged down by bitter winter weather and supply lines that were stretched too far. Eisenhower decided to launch one more big campaign before the winter really set in. He commanded General Hodges of V Corps to lead the big push through the forest to the Roer River for the eventual Rhine River crossing. The attack was to begin on 2 November with the 112 Infantry of the 28 Division leading the way. The windy, snowy weather would make allied air support next to impossible.57 These conditions would make an already difficult mission that much worse. To complicate the mission, the Germans had just arrived in the area to conduct a map exercise led by Field Marshall Walther Modell. After hearing of the attack, he personally took command of the German forces. Before the scheduled exercise, the German 89th Division would be relieved by the German 272nd Volks Grenadier Division. The American attack, however,

56Geraold Astor, The Bloody Forest: Battle for the Huertgen September 1944-January 1945 (California: Presidio Press Incorporated, 2000), 305.

57U.S. Army Military History Institute: JoAnna McDonald Collection box 1, After Action Report.

28 persuaded Modell to rescind the relief order to double his fighting strength. He would later during the course of the campaign also send in SS divisions.58 These forces clearly gave the Germans the upper hand during the attack. Very quickly, the 112th Division got bogged down and was decimated. Brig. General “Dutch” Cota, who was commanding the 28th, sent in the 110th to try and help the 112th, plus two combat engineer battalions. Finally, Cota called in the Rangers on 14 November to relieve the 112th in the Germeter/Vossenach area.59 Why did General Cota decide to call in an elite fighting force for regular line support? Two main reasons lay behind his thinking. The first is that the Rangers were close by conducting training and conditioning exercises. On 3 November, they were stationed at Neudrof Belgium, attached to the 5th Armored Division. They were briefed on the situation and were placed on alert to be sent to Vossenach. Thus, when the situation became desperate on 14 November, they were quickly moved by truck to the area and marched the rest of the way to Germeter and Vossenach. There they were attached to the 28th Division.60 It was not uncommon for the Rangers to be used where lines were collapsing. Other commanders had used the Rangers for this purpose with great success. Their success in using the Rangers leads us to the second reason why General Cota sent them into Germeter/Vossenach. While the assault on Pointe du Hoc demonstrated the Rangers’ skills at achieving specialized objectives, it also demonstrated their ability to save lines that were collapsing. To go from a highly specialized unit, to filling in holes in a line shows that not only did the Rangers lack any specific operational standard like paratroopers; it also shows that commanders did not know how to deploy the Rangers after Pointe du Hoc.61 The Rangers took this in stride, knowing that their ability to hold a line resulted from their training and leadership. After all Rangers were an, “elite light infantry units, organized and trained to conduct raids and long-

58Ibid.

59Ibid.

60U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black 1940s-1990s Collection box 1, Unit History.

61By this time the 101st and the 82nd Airborne Divisions had been deployed on their own mission in conjunction with the British in Operation Market-Garden.

29 range reconnaissance and to seize critical points on the battlefield.”62 Unlike most battalions, all the men in a Ranger company were trained to do the job of the man above him. This flexibility ensured that there was never any breakdown in command in critical times. Giving them an advantage over regular infantry, “It came down to the point that well-trained and disciplined Rangers knew what had to be done and did it. When officers in the various Ranger companies became casualties, leadership at the company and/or platoon level did not suffer...”63 How the Rangers preformed during the Germeter/Vossenach crisis clearly demonstrates how well they worked as an unit. When the Rangers were sent into the Germeter/Vossenach area on 14 November, 1944, they were not only going in facing fierce German resistance, but also harsh weather conditions. The biting cold was made worse by the falling rain and snow. During the day it turned the clay based soil into heavy, slippery mud. At night the mud and pooling water froze. The overcast skies prohibited air support for the allies. As the Rangers marched into the area, they saw the frozen equipment left by the quickly retreating 110th. Within nine hours from the time they were notified of their movement to Germeter/Vossenach, they had taken up their positions in the forest. Even though the Rangers were under the same heavy shelling and mortar fire from the Germans, they did not suffer the high casualties rates of the 112th. The reason for the low casualties were because they had been trained to stay deep in their foxholes during the night surrounding the city they were defending. During the day, when they could be seen, they stayed in the city, sending patrols to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and capture German soldiers.64 The night was the worst time for the Rangers. The Germans would take their turn patrolling the American lines raiding for soldiers. German artillery would rain down shells that broke the huge pine trees, creating additional falling debris. Men were afraid to leave the

62David Hogan Jr., U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II, 4.

63Sidney Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion Germeter-Vossenach-Hurtgen- Bergstein-Hill400 Germany, 14 Nov.-10 Dec. 1944 (Doylestown: Birchwood Books, 1991), 71.

64Charles Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest: The Untold Story of a disastrous Campaign (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), 149.

30 foxholes, which made their situation even worse. One historian describes the horrible conditions the Rangers endured: American soldiers lived in foxholes half full of water that froze during the night. Because of problems sending blankets and sleeping bags forward, many nights soldiers slept shivering in raincoats and whatever else they could find, without blankets or sleeping bags. There were no fires at night, so soldiers sat and shivered waiting for the sun to come up and warm them. Clothes remained wet, and the dampness bred hypothermia and trenchfoot.65 For many soldiers, harsh conditions in the field drive them further from their leaders and their unit, as individual survival becomes the number one concern for many. While Rangers did not believe that this type of line protection was what they were best suited for, it brought the men even closer together. Finally, on the night of 19 November, the Rangers were relieved and placed in an assembly area, once again reattached to a different division. This time it was the 8th Infantry Division. Back in the assembly area the Rangers that were not casualties agreed that: Vossenach was definitely not Ranger work. Rangers attacked, killed, and with drew to wait for another job. The Ranger theory was to hit hard-hit hard and fast and then get out. Here at Vossenach the 2nd Battalion felt like the [man] in the carnival who has to stick his head through a hole and let people try to hit him with baseballs.66 Even if many of the Rangers thought that they had been misused in the forest, that is not the case. Their training allowed them to go in and do the job of holding the ground that others could not. The Ranges’ were still lacking an official military doctrine allowing them to be used for that purpose.67 They had proven successful on Pointe du Hoc in holding the line during heavy counter-attacks. This situation was the same. In a matter of days, the evolution of Ranger

65Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Hurtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 22.

66Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest,149.

67Hogan, U.S. Army Special Operation In World War II, 136,

31 doctrine would take another turn. A chance to prove themselves in a similar objective of taking ground that infantry forces could not, but this time the stakes were high just like at Pointe du Hoc. One of the main problems for the allies advancing in the forest was the accurate and heavy artillery shelling by the Germans. The attacks were made possible because the Germans held the high ground at Bergstein. German forces were able to call in direct hits from the top of Castle Hill, also known as Hill 400. Castle Hill was the main observation post and firing position of the German forces. The height of the hill allowed them to view all U.S. movements and enabled them to use their massive artillery directly on the American troops.68 Given that the Germans could use the hill for accurate and deadly fire power, the Americans had tried numerous times throughout the Hurtgen campaign to seize Castle Hill. At first, regular infantry and armored units tried to capture Castle Hill. One such unit was the 5th Armored Division, which was supposed to take the hill. They assaulted the hill with 3,000 men, tanks, and armored vehicles. They could not take the hill in a course of over a week and finally had to be withdrawn due to heavy casualties.69 Yet commanders General Gerow “Wild Bill” Weaver and General Hodges did not think of the Rangers at first. Even though they had successfully attacked Pointe du Hoc, the missing doctrine of the Rangers caused different generals to view how they could be deployed differently. A serious misconception on the part of the generals was that Rangers were light forces. These generals thought that they should not be used as shock troops or attack forces because they did not have the necessary “weight” behind them to conduct successful frontal assaults.70 This thinking proved to be false. It would become even more so after their frontal assault on Castle Hill. Finally, on December 6th, Gen. Weaver decided to send the Rangers up against Castle Hill. When the Rangers got official word that they would be attacking Castle Hill, they immediately began to develop an attack plan and send out reconnaissance patrols. For the

68Astor, The Bloody Forest, 301.

69Ibid, 305.

70U.S. Army Military History Institute: The Merle T. Cole Collection box 1, “Evolution of the U.S. Army Ranger Concept.”

32 attack, Rudder decided to send D, E, and F Companies up the hill. Company A was to dig in at the bottom of the hill along with Company B. Company C was to set up a roadblock between the hill and the church nearby. They were also to leave a platoon in reserve in town to man the 81mm guns. After it was decided what companies would be going up the hill, they sent out patrols. Unfortunately for the Rangers, the weather had created very hazardous conditions. Dog Company sent out a patrol to Bergstein consisting of one officer and five men. They were to look for the easiest way to attack to the hill, also looking for pillboxes, bunkers, observation posts, and enemy strength. After all the pre-attack planing had been completed, the men set off for their areas. They were tired and wet, and to make matters worse, the enemy was sending down mortars.71 That evening they were to march into Bergstein: It was a miserable march, a column of troops on either side of the road, plodding through the cold mud that oozed around the shoes of the men. Artillery rounds burst near by, artillery flashes temporally lit up the horizon, and not knowing who they were soon to face created a lot of consternation in the minds of the men.72 To make the day even worse for the Rangers, they were just about to get some disheartening news. According to official battalion records of 7 December 1944, Colonel Rudder turned over his battalion to Major Williams.73 Rudder broke the news right before the men were to attack the hill. While the news was personally devastating, it shows just how committed Rangers were to each other and the mission, that they did not falter in completing their next coming mission. The attack on Castle Hill started at 0830. Just before they launched the attack, a veteran of Pointe du Hoc was overheard saying, “Here we go with the old king-of-the-hill game.”74 He was right on the mark. The Rangers once again proved just how effective they were in achieving critical points on the battlefield. By 0835 Company F had reached the top of the hill and were

71Sidney Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 62.

72Ibid, 16.

73Colonel Rudder assumed command of the 109th Regiment of the 28th Division. Taken from the Robert Black Collection box 1. Training record “Tent City.”

74Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 38.

33 digging in. By 0903 Companies D, E, and F were all in their defensive positions.75 In a matter of thirty five minutes, the Rangers had once again reached the top of the hill, a feat that more than 3,000 regular infantry soldiers could not accomplish. For the Rangers, this outcome was not a surprise. As “light” weight troops, many commanders could not understand how they achieved their objective so fast. In order to understand why they were able to achieve such critical objects quickly, it is necessary to not only examine the tactics they used, but how closely bonded the men were that they could take over anyone’s job if need be. The initial plan to attack the Castle Hill was simple. The companies would get into position under the cover of darkness to prevent the Germans from seeing their movement. They were also going to attack without pre-artillery bombardment. During the war this tactic was almost unheard of. Most units liked to “soften” the enemy before trying a frontal assault. The Rangers did not want the bombardment because it would have tipped off the Germans that they were coming. Once the go signal was given, Companies D, E, and F were to fire from their clips at the German positions, who would be forced to take cover, then they were to just reload and keep charging until the hill was taken.76 Sidney Saloman describes the attack on the hill: Heavy small arms and machine gun fire was directed on the rushing Rangers. Casualties on both sides now began to mount, but still the charge continued. The Rangers would not and could not be stopped. They were determined at all costs to take Castle Hill 400 and hold it unit relieved...The enemy continued to offer stiff resistance. Ultimately, the fast unceasing and determined forward momentum of the assaulting D Company Rangers stunned the German defenders...77 This kind of attack was suited for the Rangers, who took very little with them, allowing them to use their speed and agility effectively. Also their ability to advance despite massive casualties

75U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection 1940s-1990s box 1, Unit History.

76Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 156-157.

77Solman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 38-39.

34 was a tribute to their leadership. Moreover, every man knew how to do the job of the men above them. For example, on the advance up the hill before they even reached the base of the hill, both the D Company commander and his runner became casualties. The undaunted Rangers continued advancing, comfortable in knowing that once at the top they would be replaced by the men under them.78 In total, however, Company D suffered only four casualties.79 Their speed and agility had overwhelmed the enemy. When the men reached the top of the hill, they got to work. When the men reached the top of the hill, they eliminated the remnants of the German resistence, and began to dig in. One of the Rangers describes just what his captain did: Captain Massney stumbles into a German pillbox with a swift kick from his boot, he smashes the door open. A grenade flies in. A muffled crunch. A cloud of thick black acrid smoke foams out. Next moment a dozen terrified, black-faced Germans come stumbling out, screaming for mercy.80 They knew that they would need to have defensive positions for the counter-attacks along the crest of the hill right away. There was a slight problem the remaining Rangers had to quickly overcome. The top of Castle Hill was too hard to dig into. The top, after only a few inches of soil, was covered with rock and large heavy tree roots. The best protection they found was under fallen trees from the previous American shelling or the shell holes.81 To make matters worse, the heavy artillery shelling by the Germans began a half-hour after their seizing the top of the hill. The Germans first tried retaking the hill in an aggressive attack often times involving hand-to-hand combat, but these attacks were beaten off. Then the Germans immediately began shelling the hill. If the Rangers had not been a close fighting unit, the extreme shelling would have driven even the most capable infantry from their positions. But they held together, even when they were exposed in the open. A Ranger historian describes what they experienced:

78Astor, The Bloody Forest, 302.

79Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 158.

80Ibid, 157-158.

81Astor, The Bloody Forest, 303.

35 A dozen shells are hitting the hill from three directions every time you draw a breath. The hill is in convulsions and seems to be bursting a part at its rocky seams. Trees, limbs, and rocks are mixed with the dirt and the flying steel fragments. The stench of cordite is everywhere.82 Such heavy bombing produced several Ranger casualties. They radioed down to headquarters back in Bergstein at 1242 that D Company was down to 17 men and F Company was down to 15 men fighting on the hill. The artillery bombardment and fighting continued to get worse and by 1314 they had in total 42 men of fighting strength. They requested air support, but the Germans still kept attacking. Finally, at 1735 the hilltop was silent, but was now down to 25 fighting men.83 Yet it was not quiet for long. With the Germans still trying to shell the hilltop, and the wounded getting evacuated, the night was one of the longest in Ranger history. Around 2140, the rest of E Company was sent up the hill to not only provide much needed reinforcements, but also bring down some of the wounded who were unable to walk down. It was a deadly game for the Rangers on top of the hill to be moving around. They needed to reinforce their defensive positions for the next day’s counter-attacks, and help get the wounded on litters to be brought back down. The problem was that the Germans were continuing to shell the hill, and send up flares to see what they were doing. For the Rangers left on the hill, the night of 7 December was worse than any nightmare: That was the longest night we ever spent: fifteen hours of weird, black nightmare; of flares streaming their hellish glow on the tortured hillside; of mortar shells crumping in a few yards away, beating the breath from our lungs, leaving us gasping and dazed; fifteen tense hours of tense straining to detect the approach of the Hun, who did not come often, for to move on the hill that night meant death, swift and violent.84 For those men who survived the night, it coincided with a new resolution: to ensure that not only

82Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 159.

83U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection box 1, Unit History.

84Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 172.

36 would the Germans not retake Castle Hill, but to survive. The long day began at dawn when allied air forces hit German positions. This air attack brought much needed relief for the Rangers, because the counter-attacks had started early at 0730. After the Rangers repulsed this attack, one platoon of E Company was sent up again to help with defending the hill. The situation continued to worsen. By mid-day the Germans were launching continuous attacks on three sides of the hill.85 Ranger Sidney Soloman describes just how hard the continuous fighting was: Each time a German combat patrol assaulted the top of the hill, they were successfully driven down the hill by the D Company Rangers. But then once again, the horrible and devastating artillery and mortar barrages would resume on the Ranger positions while the Germans reorganized for another counterattack.86 This fighting continued all day on December 8. Not only did the Rangers high intensity training and conditioning allow them to keep the Germans from retaking Castle Hill, but most importantly, the Ranger spirit kept them going when all seemed lost. Even German General Modell admired the cohesive fighting unit of the Rangers. General Modell, Chief of the German General Staff, was so desperate to gain the high ground of Castle Hill that he started offering seven day furloughs and the Iron Cross to each man in the unit that was successful in retaking the hill. Fortunately for the Americans, the Rangers held their ground against all the units Modell sent against the Rangers. One of the units that failed was an elite paratrooper unit that was stationed just to the north of Bergstein.87 Despite the best efforts of the Germans, they could not dislodge the Rangers from Castle Hill. Finally, word came at 2310 that they would be relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 13th Infantry. All the Rangers were relieved by 2338 on December 8, with Company C moving out last.88 Once the Rangers were relieved, they were once again attached to the 28th Infantry

85Ibid,173.

86Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 41.

87Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 72.

88U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection box 1, Unit History.

37 Division and headed into a resting area. When they returned, the total number of casualties was truly devastating. During the battle for Castle Hill alone, there were twenty three killed, four missing in action, and one hundred and six wounded in action.89 This may not seem like a large number, but they had already experienced casualties during their Germeter/Vossenach campaign and the Ranger battalion is at full fighting strength with 250 men. Yet these losses were not nearly as high as those of the men who had attempted to take Castle Hill before the Rangers. In less than a hour, the Rangers accomplished what three infantry divisions and one armored division had been unable to do. Not only did the Rangers complete their mission of taking Castle Hill, they also stopped the allied line in the Germeter/Vossenach area from collapsing.90 Once again, they performed the jobs that the regular infantry could not complete. Their objectives were all accomplished while being at the front line less than a week during a four- week period. The reason why the Rangers executed both missions successfully can be attributed to two main reasons. The first is that their military doctrine had not yet been established. After Pointe du Hoc, there were no clear missions that only Rangers could perform, unlike a paratrooper unit. With the Rangers lacking a defined doctrine, commanders used them where their regular infantry forces could not complete the objective. Rangers were used, much to their dislike, as line forces at first. There they perfected their ability to hold the ground at all costs. From there, as the battle for the Hurtgen Forest demonstrates, they began to take more high stakes objectives. This is only a slight shift in doctrine, because they are still going in only after regular infantry could not take the objective. However, this shift shows that they were not just light weight troops that could only be used to reinforce weak areas on the line. Like paratroopers, they could go in, seize their objective and hold it until they were relieved by reinforcements.91 The second reason the Rangers were successful over the regular infantry has to do with

89Saloman, 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion, 68.

90Ibid, 71.

91The airborne doctrine had them being dropped in behind enemy lines and achieving critical objective for the incoming infantry. Up to this point they had been successful in doing this. The operations were active were Operation Overlord and Operation Market-Garden.

38 their ability to cope under such heavy enemy engagement. While their training gave them the skills to defend themselves against such forces as the German paratroopers, it was their unit morale that got them through. When they had to endure such hellish nights and suffer the loss of so many in their battalion, the Rangers believed that no matter what, you had to keep going. They kept fighting, not for the commanders who had ordered the attack, but to the men who were hurt or dead. With every campaign the Rangers’ ability to hold together and achieve the objective that other infantry forces could not, only strengthened this bond. So when the order came after only six days to move out, there was no hesitation. After the Hurtgen Forest campaign, they were attached to the 78th Infantry and sent to the Simmerath Village for the next attack against the Germans. They stayed in this area training and conditioning until January 2nd 1945.92 For the Rangers, the experience of Hurtgen Forest was not only was a turning point in the concept of how the Rangers could be deployed on the battlefield, but also a personal experience they would never forget. The Rangers, however, were not done doing line support. While the men had demonstrated their ability to achieve critical objectives, their doctrine had not permanently changed to reflect that.

92Whiting, The Battle of Hurtgen Forest, 201-202.

39

CHAPTER THREE

The Ranger leadership is also unique, it is traditional that they give the standing order ‘Follow Me.’ Those who follow are hard-charging and unforgiven, the ultimate objective is to make use of the enemies arsenal to hasten their own demise.

–The Ranger Collection U.S. Army Military History Institute

40 If Pointe du Hoc was the reason for the creation of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, and Hurtgen Forest was the turning point for Ranger doctrine, then the Brest campaign and the Rhine River crossing illustrate why the fighting in the Hurtgen was that turning point. When the Rangers completed their objective of destroying the guns at Pointe du Hoc, and then held the ground in complete isolation for two days against harsh counter-attacks, it proved that despite the Rangers being a light weight force, they could achieve and hold critical objectives during battle. In the months that followed, they had no major objectives until September when they were used by the 29th Infantry for the Brest campaign. This campaign demonstrated just how well the Rangers could be used with regular line infantry. With the Rangers’ help, they were able to quickly achieve their objectives. This success led to their use in the Hurtgen Forest where they demonstrated just the type of warfare they were designed to do, which was to swiftly seize and hold areas of the battlefield until regular infantry could relieve them. After Castle Hill, however, this led commanders to try and use them in a very different ways. The Rangers could operate so fast as a light weight force, that they were attached to the 102nd Cavalry Squadron. They trained with them for months leading up to the Rhine River crossing. From there the Rangers and the 102nd Cavalry were let loose to quickly seize important towns and road crossings for the Allied advance. By comparing the Brest campaign against the dramatically different campaign for the Rhine, it is easy to see that a Ranger doctrine was beginning to emerge. The mission at Pointe du Hoc was completed when they were relieved on D+2. Their next major mission would not begin until 18 August 1944. Between June 8th and the beginning of the Brest campaign, the Rangers were used in a variety of ways. The variety was caused by two main reasons. The first was that the casualties suffered at Pointe du Hoc forced the Rangers to seek replacements, without which they would be severely under strength. They also needed to get the surviving men re-supplied, equipped, and rested. Until that time, the battalion could not operate. The second reason was that the commanders did not know what to do with the new special operations force. The Rangers were like the airborne divisions in the fact that they were both elite highly trained forces for one kind of mission. For the airborne, it was to drop behind enemy lines, seize key objectives, and hold them until the regular infantry could relieve them. For the 2nd Battalion of the Rangers, they had been trained as light forces that could scale and seize Pointe du Hoc. After that, they had no stated doctrine to help determine what their next

41 mission or objective should be. Thus until they could use their ability as a quick light weight force, the Ranges would remain in support positions. They spent many days training and conditioning their new replacements. They were also used to set up defensive positions to not only protect the rear areas, but also guard against German prisoners escaping.93 By mid-August, the allies were ready to breakout of the hedgrows and unleash their best weapon against the Germans, their mobility. To help them quickly take critical cities and roads, VIII Corps wanted the help of the Rangers. By using the Rangers, they hoped to increase their speed of advance when attacking enemy forces. For the Rangers, they officially began the Brest campaign on 18 August. They were given three missions. First, they were to secure the 29th Division’s right flank. The 29th was the main attacking element. Commanders knew that they would have to keep their flanks protected or face possible envelopment. Second, they were to attack and capture the Lochrist C Graf Spee Battery. The third was to mop up any resistance in the Le Conquet Peninsula.94 To help the Rangers and the 29th Infantry Division accomplish their missions, the Rangers were attached to the 29th for command purposes. They were also split into two separate fighting forces. Companies A and C were under the command of Captain Arnold. Companies B, D, E, and F were under the command of Captain Slater.95 The mission would be the first time that the Rangers were separated into two different fighting forces. Yet despite their division, they still were able to successfully achieve all three missions during the Brest campaign. Before examining how and why the Rangers were successful during the campaign, it is necessary to remember how critical their lack of military doctrine was during a campaign. Commanders such as Lt. Rudder knew that an elite fighting force could not just sit around after the invasion of Pointe du Hoc until it was decided what to do with them. Training, conditioning,

93Harold Gunther and James Shalala, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army (Plzen, Czechoslovakia: Vsetisk, 1945), 16.

94U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, declassified “secret” document on missions.

95U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 2, declassified “secret” document on missions.

42 and guard duty for such an highly trained force undermined their morale. When they were attached to the 29th Infantry for the Brest campaign, the men were ready to prove their worth as a fighting unit. At the same time, the Rangers were preparing for regular infantry duty, the airborne forces were preparing and fighting in Operation Market-Garden. The difference between the two special operation forces is that one had an established doctrine and one did not. Since the airborne had a clear doctrine, they could be used in operations that continually demonstrated their strengths. The Rangers did not have this advantage. Instead, they continually evolved their role during the war. Even though their roles varied, it did not mean that they were misused tactically, however. Many commanders like General Hodges tried to use the Rangers wherever possible. They recognized that they were an elite force and were not used in everyday operations. The Rangers then were called in for operations that either regular infantry would have trouble executing as fast as the Rangers or when the infantry failed to capture critical areas on the battlefield. In the Brest campaign they were used for their ability to achieve different objectives with low casualty rates. This ability is easy to see when the campaign is broken down and examined by each of the different objectives. The first objective of securing the right flank of the 29th Division was the longest running of the three objectives. For the Rangers, the mission official began on 18 August, but the fighting began on 22 August. At that time, they were in corps reserve waiting for their orders to move out. By 23 August, both Ranger forces were in supporting position just south of St. Renan.96 The Rangers’ ability to move swiftly won them the mission of securing the flank from the enemy who would be moving from the Le Conquet area to Brest. The best way would be to cut the Brest-Le Conquet Road. The Rangers completed the mission despite heavy enemy fire and with no casualties to the Rangers thanks to their speed.97 During this time, not only were the Rangers quickly advancing through the Le Conquet area in support of the right flank, but they were also capturing cities and prisoners. Force Arnold (Companies A and C) on 28th August were able to encircle an enemy garrison. The Rangers accomplished this with the help of fog.

96U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, The Brest Campaign, Unit/Narrative History.

97Ibid.

43 By the time the Germans knew that they were coming, the Rangers were advancing so fast that the Germans only had enough time to raise the white flag of surrender. This action resulted in ninety-four prisoners being taken without the loss of a single Ranger.98 Throughout the campaign, the Rangers’ speed allowed them to not only capture many prisoners, but also areas that the infantry were having trouble advancing on. One such area was Hill 63. The hill had been attacked previously, but the attacks were repelled due to heavy enemy fire. It would take the Rangers twice to take the hill. The Rangers were able to swiftly surround and seize the hill with a combination of a fast frontal attack and help from artillery fired on the hill.99 This ground was critical because its high elevation allowed the Germans to see advancing allied troops. The first advance was on 1 September, but by 5 September the hill was secure.100 During the attack, the other Ranger force was still advancing on towns and eliminating enemy resistance to keep the right flank secure. On the night of 7 September, the 116th Infantry tied in on the left and the 5th Ranger Battalion meet them on the right. This move finally secured the right flank of the 29th Division. The first of the three Ranger objectives during the Brest campaign was complete.101 Their next objective was to seize the Lochrist (or the Graf Spee) Battery. The Lochrist Battery presented a serious threat to the flank and to the advance of the allies. Located in the Le Conquet Peninsula, it would cause heavy casualties and slow the advance if not taken. In the battery were four 280-mm guns, numerous 88-mm and 20-mm dual purpose anti-aircraft guns and manned by over 800 enemy soldiers.102 It was up to the Rangers to capture this critical battery. Lt. Rudder decided that because the allies did not know with certainty the location of the battery, each company would be assigned a certain zone to cover.

98Ibid.

99Ibid.

100Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army ,30.

101U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black, box 1, The Brest Campaign, Unit/Narrative History.

102Ibid.

44 The attack would take place on 9 September, with a jump off time of 0830. Once again, because the Rangers were a light weight force, they were able to execute the mission with the speed necessary to make the mission successful. By 1212, the battery had surrendered to the approaching Rangers. They would have captured the battery sooner, but were slowed by difficult terrain and a large number of prisoners. The Rangers had advanced so fast through their zones of coverage that the enemy did not have time to mount any attacks. Instead, they surrendered in numbers large enough to have to set up holding cages.103 With the capture of the Lochrist Battery, the Rangers had in one morning completed their second mission. In the process they had captured 1,800 prisoners of war.104 Their final mission was to conduct patrols of the area to make sure that the area was clear of all enemy resistance. The final mission of the Rangers was classified as “mopping up” the Le Conquet Peninsula. With the large Lochrist Battery under allied control, the mission was going to be easier to complete. They started clearing the area of enemy resistance on 10 September. The Rangers once again used their speed to overrun enemy areas. Most of the time the Rangers encountered little resistence because they overran enemy positions so fast. As a result, there were a high number of prisoners captured.105 They continued the mop up mission until 18 September. At that point the Rangers had successfully completed all three of their missions during the Brest campaign. The men then decamped to the Crozon Peninsula to help the 8th Division in capturing the Crozon Garrison.106 With the completion of the Brest campaign on 20 September, the Ninth Army had taken 28,000 prisoners of war. They killed 4,000 Germans, while the allies had only suffered around 2,900 casualties.107 These large numbers were gained with the help of the 2nd Ranger Battalion.

103Ibid.

104Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army, 31.

105U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, The Brest Campaign, Unit/Narrative History.

106Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army, 31.

107U.S. Army Military History Institute: James Moor, box 3, “Quest of Brest” unit narrative.

45 After the Brest campaign the next major operation would not be until the fighting in the Hurtgen Forest. Between September and their deployment in the forest, the Rangers focused on training and conditioning. The men who had lived through Pointe du Hoc and now the Brest campaign were a closely knit unit. For them, Pointe du Hoc had been the climax. The Brest campaign was nothing more than keeping busy. It is clear that the Rangers were lacking doctrine that would give the unit direction in the kind of missions assigned to them. Instead, they used their ability as a highly mobile fighting unit to seize towns and capture prisoners. This was needed at the time by the allies, however. During the allied breakout after their landings in Normandy, speed was vital. The Rangers provided the speed and the skills they needed at the time. It is true that the airborne, the other elite unit in Europe, were planning for operations designed just for their ability. They also had the doctrine that supported such operational planning. The Rangers did not. For the Rangers, the Hurtgen Forest was a turning point in their doctrine during the Second World War. After demonstrating not only their ability to seize critical objectives quickly, but also their fighting spirit, a change in their operations occurred. It was most noticeable during their operations from the Roer River to the Rhine. The campaign from the Roer River to the Rhine took place from 22 February 1945 through 26 March 1945. This campaign is very important in the evolution of the Rangers. After the Hurtgen Forest, the Rangers were sent to the rear for much needed rest and replacements. During January they received their replacements and by February they were conducting patrols around the Schwammanuel Dam.108 These patrols were conducted to help get the new Rangers used to going out and working together to keep the Rangers unit cohesion. The Rangers’ ability to work well together was about to be put to the test. At this time they were attached to the 9th U.S. Army and had resumed training in the Kalterberberg area.109 On 22 February, the Rangers were attached to the 102nd Cavalry Reconnaissance Group for some unique training.110

108Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army, 18.

109U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert W. Black Collection 1940's-1990's, box 1, Unit History.

110U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black, box 3, Declassified Interviews/Narrative “From the Roer to the Rhine.”

46 There were two reasons for the attachment to the cavalry. The first was that Colonel Cyrus Dolph III who commanded the 102nd requested infantry support. Major General Clarence Huebner who commanded V Corps decided to give Col. Dolph III the Rangers.111 To Colonel Huebner, the Rangers were the most adequate force available. The second reason why the Rangers were attached to the cavalry was because they were trained for fast advances. The Rangers’ training and their swift frontal attack on Castle Hill demonstrated their ability to work with a mobile cavalry unit. This ability to work closely and quickly made it a natural attachment to a cavalry unit were speed and communication skills were paramount in order for operations to be a success. Combined training began in Bedenborn Germany on 23 February 1945.112 The Rangers and the cavalry trained from 23 February until 3 March. This was not a long period of training when considering that the two units had never worked as a combined unit. The Rangers were designed and deployed as light weight infantry where their speed and mobility came from their training and unit cohesion. Until Castle Hill they had been used mostly on flanking maneuvers and seizing critical objectives that other infantry could not capture. After they demonstrated that they could operate in frontal attacks with the speed they had used in earlier operations, their military doctrine evolved to allow them to be used in different capacities. By combining the heavy fire power of a cavalry unit and the speed of the Rangers, commanders hoped that they would be able to swiftly capture and eliminate enemy forces. Accordingly, they started unit problems that focused mostly on coordinating the Rangers movement and firing with the cavalry’s attack.113 The exercises focused on finding out the best way to combine the light weapons of the Rangers and the heavy weapons of a cavalry unit. The Rangers soon discovered that the cavalry provided good overhead fire, thereby covering their advance. Once the Rangers were in position, they could open up on the enemy at close range. This kind of advance demonstrated

111Ibid.

112Gunther, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army, 18.

113U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black, box 3, Declassified Interviews/Narrative “From the Roer to the Rhine.”

47 the benefits of combining light and heavy automatic weapons.114 After the Rangers and cavalry worked out the best way to attack in conjunction with each other, they had to find a way to move the Rangers with the tanks. After experimenting with different ways of transporting the Rangers, a loading method was finally established. One platoon would be distributed among the leading elements of the cavalry.115 The formation allowed for the Rangers to have the covering fire as they advanced with the tanks. Once they reached small pockets of resistence the Rangers could then rush the area with their speed. In support of this lead column was a second platoon held in an assembly area in reserve. The two platoons provided a cohesive, ground-fighting unit if the situation demanded.116 The men continued training until 1 March 1945 when they were called in to relieve elements of the 309th Infantry area in the Ruhrberg area.117 It was here that the Rangers and the 102nd Cavalry were ordered across the Roer River. Upon their arrival at Ruhrbeg, Major General Huebner of V Corps called a meeting with the commander of the 102nd Cavalry Colonel Saunders and Ranger commander Major Williams.118 This meeting was to decide how and when the two forces would cross the Roer River. The crossing of the Roer was needed to help the Allies capture critical towns and enemy forces in Germany. The mobility, speed and low casualties at which the combined force operated would allow the enemy no time to conduct a retreat or counter-attacks. The commanders decided that two patrols would cross early in the evening. They were to continue up to the high ground beyond the river which was north-east of Ruherberg. If they met little or

114Ibid.

115Ibid.

116U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1, Declassified “Secret” document Roer River.

117U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 3, Declassified Interviews/Narrative “From the Roer to the Rhine.”

118Ibid.

48 no resistence, then the full company would be sent across.119 On the evening of 1 March, one patrol from each of Company D and E 120 were sent across the Roer. They took approximately one hour to wade across. Their progress was slow because of the extreme caution they were taking. They did not know what awaited them on the other side. After crossing, they met one enemy outpost who fled immediately and two houses with civilians in them. At 0140 they sent word back to headquarters that it was a “go” to cross. As the rest of the company crossed the river, the two patrols continued forward to the high ground and established a defensive position. The men were lucky, though. The German 272nd Infantry Division had been in the area until the 28 February. If they had faced the estimated 240 men in the division, they would not have been able to cross the Roer and conduct the raids that the allies needed to achieve total victory in Germany. One of the first actions that the Rangers had to accomplish was to conduct patrols of the surrounding area. In order for them to operate with the cavalry, they needed to find and locate mines. The Germans had laid under the snow antipersonnel and concrete mines and then had laid out detours that were also heavily mined. Captain Arnold says, “...some artist could have made a good picture of the two [soldiers] lifting their legs carefully and setting them down very slowly as they picked a path through the mine field.”121 The mine field slowed the Rangers and the cavalry in their advance since all the roads to the west were not cleared of the mines. When the engineers finished clearing the roads in their immediate area alone they found over fifty mines.122 Once the Rangers cleared the area, they returned to the 102nd Cavalry Group and began their advance to the Rhine River. Before the Rangers and the cavalry set out for the race to the Rhine, they had laid out formations and tactics that took advantage of each of the unit’s strengths. With the help of the

119Ibid.

120Each patrol consisted of one officer and fourteen men.

121U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 3, Declassified Interviews/Narrative “From the Roer to the Rhine.”

122Ibid.

49 cavalry, the Rangers, who were light weight forces, could move even faster. They also sustained fewer casualties and could pack a heavier hit with the cavalry’s fire power. The operations that the men would be involved in were the capturing of towns and eliminating enemy resistance. To help organize the attack, they were broken down into two attack squads. Companies A, B and C of the Rangers were attached to the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squad, while Companies D, E, and F were attached to the 102nd Cavalry.123 During the campaign, the commanders had a system set up to allow them to figure out just where they would be attacking the next day. Major Williams would call in the squad commanders and would discuss what towns would be captured the next day and what the new boundaries would be. Once it was established where they would be attacking, they would decide if it would be the 38th or the 102nd squad in the frontal position and the other would go in abreast. Once this was decided, Ranger Captains Slater and Arnold were informed of the plan and would proceed to inform the Rangers.124 When the attack started, the Rangers would be taken by trucks to the town and the cavalry would locate the enemy and pin them to the ground with their heavy fire power. Then the Rangers’ with their speed on the ground would enable them to rapidly execute a flanking maneuver and take the objective. This worked well for the Rangers ,who were already known for their speed. When combined with covering fire the cavalry provided for them, they could seize their objectives faster and with fewer casualties. A good example of the attack style they used is the capture of Kommern. They entered the city at approximately 2000 and started a house-to-house search. One platoon took one side of the street another platoon the other side. When they met heavy resistence outside of town they called in the cavalry which were stationed a little outside of the town. The Rangers normally moved so quickly that the artillery was hardly used. Also communication between the men and their support units would have been difficult, but the Rangers had been trained to act independently and knew what the other man was doing.125 After that the rest of the company

123Ibid.

124Ibid.

125Ibid.

50 would enter the town and begin planing for tomorrow’s attack. This kind of attack worked so fast and efficiently that the speed of the Ranger’s advance was truly overwhelming. The Rangers also advanced rapidly because all of the roads headed east were intact. This was a surprise for the advance force. They expected the Germans to try to slow their advance. The Germans, though, seemed to have been surprised by the advancing Rangers. The Rangers believed that once they crossed the Roer and started their advance that the Germans had one idea in mind: getting east of the Rhine.126 The Germans knew from experience that the allies, particularly the Rangers were very quick and lethal in their advance. Accordingly, there was not much delaying action by the Germans. They left practically no delaying force or road blocks. For the Rangers, one of the main problems was getting the supplies they needed up to them fast enough.127 Since the Rangers were moving so swiftly, the commanders decided to break up the advance to keep the men rested. They noticed that the men were becoming tired with how fast they were capturing towns. By 6 March, they had captured at least four towns and were still continuing their advance at that speed. It was decided that the task forces would take turns capturing towns. In essence, they started operating on a leap-frog schedule. For example, Task Force A which contained Companies A, B, and C of the Rangers and the 38th Cavalry would take one town one day while the other task force stayed in their previous positions until they were given the all clear signal.128 By 24 March, they had advanced far enough that they received notice that they were to cross the Rhine. The crossing of the Rhine was a huge moment for the allies and the Rangers. The Rangers were not the first to cross, but ever since they landed at Pointe du Hoc, they had been fighting their way to the river. There was much anticipation in trying to cross, especially since they were still attached to the cavalry units. They continued to work together since they were able to advance and capture critical towns so rapidly. On 26 March Task Force Slater, Companies D, E, and F with the 102nd Cavalry were to depart from Mayschuss and cross the

126Ibid.

127Ibid.

128Ibid.

51 Rhine via the Treadway bridge. They then were to proceed to the Neuweid area.129 According to the after action report about the crossing, “The grim specter of the Rhine crossing had haunted the Ranger mind for many months; actually, the crossing was amazingly easy, proving that V-E Day could not be far off.”130 After the rest of the company crossed the Rhine on 27 March 1945, the campaign from the Roer to the Rhine had ended. For the Rangers, however, they had once again evolved their military doctrine during this vital advance for the allies. After the landings on Pointe du Hoc, the Rangers had no established military doctrine to follow for further operations. The lack of military doctrine caused commanders to try and use the Rangers in different kinds of operations to find out what operations would be the best suited for their ability. The Brest campaign and the drive from the Roer River to the Rhine demonstrates this point. During the Brest campaign, the Rangers were used mostly as flank security. In providing the security the drive required, they also seized critical towns, the Lochrist Battery and mop- up missions. While these missions were not part of the major attacking force, they did provide much needed support and protection. The Rangers were assigned missions that in the current situation were appropriate. The Brest campaign did develop the Rangers’ doctrine further, though. By demonstrating speed and how well they communicated as a unit, they were able to advance faster than other regular infantry units. Achieving objectives quickly and with low casualty rates caused their doctrine to develop as a light weight infantry force. With this development the Rangers were called into the Hurtgen Forest. In the forest the Rangers demonstrated that just because they were a fast moving light weight infantry did not mean that they could not achieve critical points on the battlefield. They also demonstrated that they could successfully attack an objective with a swift and aggressive frontal attack. As a result, they were trained and deployed together with the 102nd and 38th Cavalry Squad. This turn was an important one in Ranger doctrine. They went from operating independently as a light weight special operation force to working in conjunction with heavier

129U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection, box 1,Declassified “secret” document Rehabilitation.

130Ibid.

52 fire power. The switch worked well for the Rangers. They could further enhance their speed with the use of vehicles and tanks. The cavalry also made it easier for the Rangers to assault and capture towns by providing overhead fire as they advanced. The operations during the Roer River to the Rhine River demonstrates that the Rangers could also work as a mobile heavy fighting force. It also demonstrates that the Rangers were constantly evolving their doctrine to provide a fighting force for whatever the war effort needed.

53

CONCLUSION

Sometimes we were called suicide groups, but not at all we were simply spirited young people who took the view that if you were going to be combat soldier you may as well be the very best. Also we were anxious to get on with the war so as to bring things to a close and get home to our loved ones as soon as possible.

–James Eikner

54 For the Rangers during the Second World War, the fighting did not end with the German surrender. Instead, they were once again deployed on 10 May 1945 to Pilsen, Czechoslovakia.131 For a few of the men it had been a long tough two years from their initial organization in 1943 to May 1945. The men had been through the toughest training the Army had devised to become an elite fighting unit. The original men of the 2nd Ranger Battalion had been trained for one purpose only: scaling Pointe du Hoc. From there the Rangers had no established doctrine for them to follow. This lack of doctrine after D-Day led to their evolution as a fighting force. Throughout the war, the Ranger’s military doctrine would be changing. Each of the campaigns that the Rangers were used in led to their development as a light weight, highly mobile, elite fighting force for the Army. It was the Rangers’ performance during the Second World War that led the Army to continue their training and use of special operation forces. The 2nd Ranger Battalion was formed in April 1943 after the success of the 5th Ranger Battalion in Africa and the Mediterranean. The battalion was created out of volunteers who had to pass the physical standards that were required by the paratroopers. After that the men who made it through faced constant physical training and conditioning. The Rangers were training as a light weight, mobile unit that also had training in amphibious and scaling assaults. The reason behind this wide range of training is that they were formed for the assault on Pointe du Hoc during Operation Overlord. They had to land on a narrow strip of beach after crossing the English Channel and then scale a ninety-foot vertical cliff. Then the men had to disable the 150- mm Howitzer guns and set up roadblocks to stop the Germans from sending reinforcements down to the beachheads. After their mission was complete on D+2, the Rangers and commanders faced a dilemma. What to do with the highly trained, elite Rangers? The Rangers posed a problem for commanders. Because they were created for one mission, their doctrine did not reflect any lasting commitment to Ranger operations during the war.132 Given this, the Rangers had a slow evolution in their military doctrine that emerged out

131Harold Gunther and James Shalala, 2nd Ranger Bn Company E, 1943-1945: United States Army (Czechoslovakia: Vsetisk, 1945), 20.

132David Hogan Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), 233.

55 of the various roles that the Rangers played. The Army consistently issued the Rangers objectives that regular infantry were not ready to seize or could not take because of their training.133 During the Brest campaign, they were given three objectives that at first glance would not seem to fit with the Ranger training. However, this thinking is false because it is the type of mission fit for the evolving Ranger doctrine. The Rangers were to secure the flank of the 28th Division, capture a deadly battery and then wipe out resistence that the forward divisions could not eliminate. These objectives carved out just what the Rangers were capable of and became the basis for the evolution of their doctrine. The Rangers were able to use their training to move swiftly and capture not only key towns but also eliminate strong pockets of enemy resistence. The Rangers were able to accomplish this because of their ability to move fast and efficiently. Even though they were used as line infantry, they were given objectives that allowed the military doctrine to expand. Before the Brest campaign they had not been able to prove their ability as a highly mobile and fast moving fighting force. During the Brest operation, they moved so quickly that the number of prisoners that they seized actually slowed down their progress. The Rangers also proved their ability to work as attached units. By having to coordinate their movements with other units in the 28th Division, they had to not only operate independently to achieve their objectives, but also work together to get the necessary support in supplies and fire power for their advance. From that time forward, the Rangers were consistently attached to different units who needed their superior fighting ability. By proving how well they worked as an attached unit, it became part of their doctrine. As Ranger Robert Gillespie states, “We were attached where needed. Mostly a tough position that had to be held.”134 This evolution of the Ranger doctrine still had to be put to the test. The Rangers were first brought into the Hurtgen Forest to fill in an area of the line that was collapsing. Had the line collapsed, the Germans would have been able to rush through their forces and cause a serious set back to the advance of the allies. When the 112th Infantry was

133Hogan Jr., Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing Role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada, 233.

134World War II Survey, U.S. Army Military History Institute. Robert Gillespie 9081.

56 pulled out and replaced by the Rangers, General Cota knew he was sending in a superior fighting force that would be able to hold the critical ground. The Rangers easily handled this mission because they had already fought as an isolated unit on Pointe du Hoc. Then came a turning point for the Rangers: their mission to capture Hill 400 (Castle Hill). This juncture was crucial for their doctrine because they not only had to capture a critical area of the battlefield, but they also had to use all their training and work with area artillery to capture the hill. The swift frontal assault the Rangers made against the hill was the only successful operation that captured the hill. Previous units including a calvary unit, had failed to take the hill. In contrast, the Rangers used their speed, unit cohesion, and morale to overcome the far superior enemy. By demonstrating their ability to execute a swift and successful frontal assault, they evolved their doctrine from just going in and holding critical ground, but also taking it. While they had done this on Pointe du Hoc, they had been trained especially for that mission. The battle for Castle Hill was not an operation for which the Rangers had trained. Instead, they demonstrated that their training as a elite force allowed them to fulfill multiple roles in battle. The last evolution in doctrine that the Rangers underwent was their campaign from the Roer River to the Rhine River. This situation was unique for the Rangers. For the first time, they were to work in conjunction with another unit, a calvary unit. This attachment turned out to be a great “marriage” for the Rangers. They were able to combine their speed with a force that could not only keep pace with them, but also provided much needed overhead fire power for their advance. The two forces worked well together and advanced quickly, capturing critical towns and eliminating all areas of enemy resistence. Their advance was so quick that not only did they have a hard time staying supplied, but most Germans fled to the east knowing that they had no defensive lines on which to fall back. Thanks to three different types of missions they were given, the Rangers went from a unit with no stated doctrine after their first mission, to being able to evolve into the type of fighting force the Allies needed to help win the war. The Rangers were able to evolve their doctrine during the war to fulfill the different roles commanders needed in order to win because of three reasons. The first was their training. While training in America for Operation Overlord, they also spent time preparing for all types of small unit problems as well. This training encouraged the men to think and solve different kinds of problems that develop during battle. They also continued to train and condition after the

57 landing on Pointe du Hoc. After every major operation in which the Rangers participated in they were taken to rest areas and allowed to train their replacements. This move helped to keep the Rangers on the edge during the operations to which they were assigned to. The second was the leadership in the Rangers. During training, all the men had to learn the jobs of their leaders. This allowed casualties to take place at the command level without the battle collapsing due to inadequate leadership. The leaders also led by example. They were out there with their men leading not only by command, but more importantly, by example. Herbert Appel, a private during the war with the Rangers, describes what made the Ranger leadership outstanding: “Our leaders led, sharing foxholes, exposing themselves to enemy fire...In a Ranger Battalion everyone was capable of stepping into leadership roles as needed.”135 Training allowed men to step forward into leadership positions, but what kept the men together was their unit cohesion. The last reason the Rangers were able to perform the various roles called for during the course of the war was how close they were to each other. Being an elite unit, the men had to endure harsh training conditions to earn the right to become a Ranger. Once in their unit, the men would fight together in some of the most desperate conditions of the war. Fighting as an isolated unit twice brought the men together and created high unit morale. Also, their ability to quickly go in and take objectives that other regular infantry could not take created in the men a sense of real pride at being a Ranger. This “elan” got them through the tough times. In the battles for Nazi occupied Europe, American special forces played critical roles during major operations against the Germans. In Operation Overlord, the Rangers destroyed the guns and held the ground at Pointe du Hoc. In the same operation, the U.S. 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions were to drop behind enemy lines and held off enemy resistence until relived by the landing infantry on D-Day. These two separate forces made the landings on the beaches of Normandy to be a success. After Operation Overlord, the Airborne and the Rangers went in separate directions. While the Airborne played a critical role in holding the lines during Operation Market-Garden, the Rangers were demonstrating their speed and mobility during the Brest campaign. Then the

135World War II Survey, U.S. Army Military History Institute. Herbert Appel 9099.

58 Rangers not only held collapsing lines during the battle for the Hurtgen Forest, they also captured the high ground after numerous attempts had been made by regular infantry. The Airborne in December during the Battle of the Bulge held the key city of Bastogne. During the spring offensive both forces proceeded to capture key cities along the route to Berlin. Despite the fact that the Rangers and Airborne were small forces compared to a division, they were given objectives that if not accomplished successfully could have led to the failure of the operations. The roles they played were secondary, but their involvement in major operations were significant and lead to the final victory for the allies.136 They also lead the way for a more prominent role for special forces in the U.S. military after the war. The U.S. Army 2nd Ranger Battalion during the Second World War paved the way, along with the U.S. Airborne forces, in creating a permeant place for special operation forces after 1945. When the war ended, the large majority of Airborne men were discharged from the Army. The Airborne, however, did not completely disband and continued to train and revise their military doctrine after the war. For the Rangers, it was different. They were completely disbanded after their assignment in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia. Once, it was decided that they were not needed as a special operations unit because the military had the Airborne. Despite this decision, when the Korean War broke out in June 1950, the Army quickly reformed the Rangers based on the doctrine that had evolved during World War II. To this day, the Army Rangers are still deployed as a special operations unit. Throughout World War II, they proved that the Rangers could and would accomplish any objective given to them. Whether it was simply holding a line that was collapsing or capturing critical objectives on the battlefield that regular infantry had failed to capture, the Rangers proved that they were an elite fighting force. On the 40th anniversary of D-Day, President Ronald Reagan’s speech on Pointe du Hoc drew worldwide attention to the Rangers. He spoke about the dangerous and critical mission the Rangers had completed on 6 June, 1944. While the Rangers were all honored and felt privileged to receive such accolades from the President, the mission on Pointe du Hoc was only the beginning for 2nd Ranger Battalion. They fought hard during the war creating the image of the

136David Hogan Jr. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992), 133.

59 tough, no nonsense soldier who could and would successfully achieve any mission given to them. Ralph Goranosn describes just how and why the Rangers evolved into the elite fighting force they are today: “We went through many hardships together, and we formed many enduring friendships...It is hard to explain, but the highlight of my military career, was the frightening work, training and privations that we went through, to create a fighting force equal to none.”137

137Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive: The Eisenhower Center for American Studies, University of New Orleans, Ralph Goranson.

60 APPENDIX: Research Summary

In order to better understand the primary documents and the collections from which they came, I have listed the two archives I used and the major collections I cite. This system should allow the reader to better understand the not only the citations I have used, but also the conclusions I have drawn from the documents. Primary sources come from two archives. The first one was the Eisenhower Center for American Studies, which is in conjunction with the University of New Orleans and the National D-Day Museum. The second was the United States Army Military History Institute. From the Eisenhower Center for American Studies, I have used two collections. One was the Sims Gautheir Collection.138 This collection contains declassified documents during the planning stages of Operation Overlord. They contain information about believed enemy capabilities, pre- bombardments by the air force, naval documents regarding preparations for Operation Overlord and casualty reports after D-Day. These are useful in examining how much planning went into the operation and how critical the planers considered Pointe du Hoc. The second collection is from The Eisenhower Center for American Studies’s oral history collection. This collection is labeled the Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive.139 This collection was started the historian Stephen Ambrose. It contains letters, interviews, and submitted accounts of the men who were involved in Operation Overlord. The collection contains accounts by men in all the different branches of the military. In this study, however, I used only those from the 2nd Ranger Battalion. These are the only two collections I used from

138When citing this source it will be as follows: Sims Gautheir Collection: The Eisenhower Center for American Studies, University of New Orleans. Then what kind of document it was.

139In the study this collection will be cited as follows: Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive: The Eisenhower Center for American Studies, University of New Orleans. It will then be followed by the name of the person. In shortened citations it will be labeled: Kalikow Archive and then the name.

61 the Eisenhower Center for American Studies. The rest of my primary sources come from the U.S. Army Military History Institute. The second archive used was the U.S. Army Military History Institute. While all the collections contain information about the 2nd Rangers, each collection needs to be singled out in order to better understand how I used them in support of my thesis. At the Military History Institute, the collections are named after the person who donated the sources or the author. They are not collections that are the testimonies of the people who they are named after. In the Ranger Collection I used a paper written by Peter Deeb titled, “Why Rangers.”140 It also contained newspaper clippings and other stories about the U.S. Army Rangers from World War II through the present. I also use two collections donated by Colonel Robert Black. One is the Robert W. Black Collection 1940s–1990s. It is one box that contains reports, journals, and diaries, rosters, and unit histories.141 In this collection I use Ivar Jone’s S-2 journal. It chronicles the action hour by hour of the battalion. The other collection I use of Colonel Black’s is the Robert Black Collection,142 the institute’s largest collection of primary sources dealing with the 2nd Ranger Battalion. This collection includes: after action reports, operation objectives issued by headquarters, declassified “secret” documents, detailed narratives of operation actions, and detailed training reports, newspaper clippings and declassified official accounts/interviews conducted on the field about different operations. The JoAnna McDonald collection was also used.143 This collection contains books about the Rangers and a variety of after action reports. The same is true of the James Moor Collection, but contains more items that deal with specific operations.144

140This is cited as: U.S. Army Military History Institute: The Ranger Collection. This was followed by the box number and the document.

141Cited as: U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert W. Black Collection 1940'– 1990's.

142This collection is cited as: U.S. Army Military History Institute: Robert Black Collection. The box number follows along with what kind of document it is.

143This is cited as: U.S. Army Military History Institute: JoAnna McDonald Collection.

144Cited: U.S. Army Military History Institute: James Moor Collection followed by the

62 The next collection contains a useful narrative history of the Twelfth Field Artillery Battalion, which the Rangers were attached. This collection is the Burton A. Smead Collection.145 The next two collections are either books that are hard to find or extracts of books. These are the Merle T. Cole and the Ella Bieroth papers.146 I also use two unit histories. One is the 2nd Ranger Battalion, Company E from 1943-1945. The other is the 2nd U.S. Ranger Infantry Battalion Germeter-Vossenach-Hurtgen-Bergstein-Hill400 Germany, 14 November-10 December 1944. Not only does this account give excellent detail about the Rangers in the Hurtgen Forest, but also provides maps of the area that are used. The other collection that I use for maps is the Louis Lisko Collection. The last collection I used from the Military History Institute are their World War II Veterans Collection.147 They were questionnaires completed by any veteran of the U.S. Army at any time and any division. Considering this study focuses on the 2nd Ranger Battalion, these sources are very appropriate in their use.

box number.

145The citation follows the previous outline.

146Citation follows the outline of: U.S. Army Military History Institute, the collection name and what kind of document it was.

147These are cited as: World War II Survey, U.S. Army Military History Institute. Followed by their name and the collection number.

63 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources U.S. Army Military History Institute The Merle T. Cole Collection Ella Bieroth Papers JoAnna McDonald Collection James E. Moore Collection Robert W. Black Collection 1940's–1990's Robert Black Collection Burton A. Smead Collection Unit History 609-2 Ranger 1945 Unit History 609-2 Ranger 1991 The Ranger Collection World War II Veterans Collection, Rangers The Eisenhower Center for American Studies Sims Gauthier Collection Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive Brown, Owen Eikner, James W. Goranson, Ralph Keating, Jack Lisko, Louis Lomell, Leonard Maimone, Salva South, Frank Secondary Sources Ambrose, Stephen. The Supreme Commander: The War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower: New York: Doubleday and Company, Incorperated, 1969. Ambrose, Stephen. D-Day: June 6, 1944: The Climatic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Ambrose, Stephen. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany June 7, 1944-May 7, 1945. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997. Ambrose, Stephen. The Victors: Eisenhower and his Boys: The Men of World War II. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998. Astor, Gerald. The Bloody Forest: Battle for the Huertgen September 1949-January 1945. California: Presidio Press, Incorporated, 2000. Black, Robert. Rangers in World War II. New York: Ivy Books, 1992. Bradley, Omar. A Soldier’s Story. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.

64 Cottman, Edward. “The Duality of the American Military Tradition: A Commentary.” The Journal of Military History, 64 Number 4(2000), 967-980. Chandler, David and James Collins, Jr. The D-Day Encyclopedia. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Hogan, David Jr. The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Rangers, 1942-1983. Duke University, 1986. Hogan, David Jr. U.S. Army Special Operations in World War II. Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1992. Hogan, David Jr. Raiders or Elite Infantry? The Changing role of the U.S. Army Rangers from Dieppe to Grenada. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992. Eisenhower, Dwight. Crusade in Europe. New York: Doubleday and Company Incorporerated, 1948. Este, Carlo d’. Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign. London: Collins, 1986. Gavin, Major General James. Airborne Warfare. Washington D.C.: Washington Infantry Press, 1947. Harrison, Gordon. Cross-Channel Attack. Edited by Office of the Chief of Military History. Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 1951. Hoebbs, Joseph Patrick. Dear General: Eisenhower’s Wartime Letters to Marshall. Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971. Huston, James. Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Operations in World War II. Indiana: Purdue University Studies, 1972. Lane, Ronald. Rudder’s Rangers. Virginia: Ranger Associates, 1979. Leighton, Richard. “Overlord Revisited: An Interpretation of American Strategy in the European War, 1942-1944.” The American Historical Review 68, no. 4 (July 1963): 919-37. MacDonald, Charles B. The Battle of the HuertgenForest. New York: J.B.L. Lippincott Company, 1963. McManus, John C. The American at D-Day: The American Experience at the Normandy Invasion. New York: Forge, 2004. Millet, Williams. A War to be Won: Fighting the Second World War. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000. O’ Donnell, Patrick. World War II’s Rangers and Airborne Veterans Reveal the Heart of Combat. New York: The Free Press, 2001. Rush, Robert Sterling. Hell in Hurtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2001. Ryan, Cornelius. Longest Day: June 6, 1944. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959. Smith, General Walter Bedell. Eisenhower’s Six Great Decision, Europe 1944-1945. New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1956. Sullivan, John. Overlord’s Eagles: Operations of the United States Army Air Forces in the Invasion of Normandy in World War II. North Carolina: McFarland and Company Incorporated, 1997. Thomas, David. “ The Importance of Commando Operations in Modern Warfare 1939-82.” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 4 (1963): 689-717.

65 Whiting, Charles. The Battle of Hurtgen Forest: The Untold Story of a Disastrous Campaign. London: Leo Cooper, 1989. Williams, R.C. Jr. “Amphibious Scouts and Raiders.” Military Affairs 13, no. 3 (1949): 150-57. Chapter Pages Quotes Introduction Robert Black Collection Chapter One World War II Veterans Collection, Rangers Chapter Two The Ranger Collection Chapter Three The Ranger Collection Conclusion Peter S. Kalikow World War II Oral History Archive

66 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

I was born in Great Falls, Montana in April 1981 and moved at the age of five to Minneapolis, Minnesota. I graduated from Cooper High School in 1999 and moved down to Tampa, Florida right afterwards. While an undergraduate at Eckerd College, I decided to major in history with a minor in psychology. As a senior there I was the only person selected to do a thesis in my department. My undergraduate thesis examined the role the Rangers played during Operation Overlord. When I graduated from Eckerd College in 2003, I took some time off to figure out what graduate school to attend. I enrolled at Florida State University in January 2004 and almost immediately began my research for my Masters thesis. During my college years I have focused on teaching history to school-aged children.

67