The University of Akron

From the SelectedWorks of Alan S Kornspan

2014

A historical analysis of the Cubs’ use of statistics to analyze performance Alan S Kornspan, University of Akron Main Campus

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/alankornspan/30/ AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF 1

1 A Historical Analysis of the ’ Use of

2 Statistics to Analyze Baseball Performance*

3 Alan S. Kornspan 4 5 University of Akron 6 7 *Pre-print manuscript for the published article, “Kornspan, A. S. (2014). A historical 8 analysis of the Chicago Cubs’ use of statistics to analyze baseball performance. NINE: 9 A Journal of Baseball History and Culture, 23 (1), 17-40.” 10 Copyright by University of Nebraska Press 11 Publisher: University of Nebraska Press. 12 13 Link to Home Page for NINE: A Journal of Baseball History and Culture: 14 http://www.nebraskapress.unl.edu/catalog/CategoryInfo.aspx?cid=163 15 16 Link to Published Copy on Project Muse: 17 https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/nine/v023/23.1.kornspan.html 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Author Note. Alan S. Kornspan is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sport 37 Science and Wellness Education. 38 Address correspondence to: Alan S. Kornspan, Department of Sport Science and 39 Wellness Education, University of Akron, 307-B InfoCision Stadium, Akron, OH 40 44325-5103; 41 330-972-8145 (work) 42 330-972-5293 (fax) 43 [email protected] 44 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 2

45 An Historical Analysis of the Chicago Cubs’ Use of

46 Statistics to Analyze Baseball Performance

47 Recently, the discussion of baseball statistics has become a popularized aspect of

48 today’s culture. For instance, a best-selling book, Moneyball, portrayed general

49 Billy Beane’s use of statistical analysis to lead the organization.1

50 While modern best-selling books and films have focused on the use of baseball statistics,

51 there has been a long history of the utilization of statistical analysis within professional

52 baseball.2 For example, one of the first individuals to scrutinize baseball statistics was

53 Henry Chadwick. Throughout the 1860s, Chadwick initiated the recording of home runs,

54 hits, and total bases which influenced others to devise statistics such as the batting

55 average.3

56 Even though statistical analysis has been interwoven within baseball culture for

57 decades, a question of interest is when did (MLB) teams initiate

58 the utilization of individuals to collect and analyze baseball performance data to assist in

59 coaching decisions and athletic improvement? Baseball historians have noted Branch

60 Rickey’s influence on the development of the use of statistical analysis in professional

61 baseball.4 While acknowledgement is provided to Rickey for hiring Allan Roth, a full-

62 time statistician for the Brooklyn Dodgers, recent authors have also recognized Philip

63 Wrigley’s use of performance data to assist the Chicago Cubs.5 Holtzman believed that

64 Wrigley should receive credit as one of the first individuals to use statistical analysis in

65 .6 According to Dewey, until the 1930s, professional baseball teams

66 only utilized data to provide an explanation of what baseball players did on the field of AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 3

67 play.7 Dewey suggested that Wrigley was the first to use statistics to analyze how players

68 performed in various situations.8

69 Although the use of statistics throughout the history of baseball has been

70 documented, few details about Philip K. Wrigley’s employment of individuals in the late

71 1930s to provide data analysis for the Chicago Cubs organization have been discussed.

72 Since minimal attention has examined Wrigley’s utilization of statistical analysis during

73 the late 1930s, an assumption may be presumed that before the late 1940s, few team

74 statisticians provided professional baseball management and coaches with detailed

75 information to aid in decision making and performance improvement. Therefore, this

76 manuscript details the work of Coleman R. Griffith, Jack Sterrett, and Chester Lynn

77 Snyder who were hired by Philip K. Wrigley in the late 1930s to assist with the collection

78 and analysis of baseball data.9 Additionally, this paper provides information about

79 individuals who provided the Chicago Cubs organization with statistical analysis in the

80 1950s and 1960s including, Cliff Jaffee, Stan West, Don Biebel, and Ed Whitlow.

81 Hence, the purpose of this paper is to detail the initiation of the use of data

82 analysis by Philip K. Wrigley and the Chicago Cubs organization. First, an overview of

83 Coleman R. Griffith’s beliefs about the importance of statistical analysis and athletics are

84 described. Next, Wrigley’s views and applications of science to improve performance are

85 presented. Specifically, a synopsis of the Chicago Cubs Experimental Laboratories will

86 be depicted. This is followed by reasons Wrigley employed individuals to investigate the

87 scientific components of baseball. Following a discussion of these motives, the work that

88 Griffith, Sterrett, and Snyder provided to the Chicago Cubs will be recounted. The

89 growth of the utilization of statistical analysis by the Chicago Cubs throughout the 1940s AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 4

90 to the 1970s is delineated. Finally, the Chicago Cubs current use of data analysis is

91 presented.

92 Coleman Griffith, Jack Sterrett and the

93 Chicago Cubs Experimental Laboratories

94 Dr. Coleman R. Griffith, the director of the Athletic Research Laboratory at the

95 University of Illinois, believed that statistical records could be utilized as a critical tool in

96 helping athletes enhance performance.10 Specifically, in the text Psychology of Coaching,

97 Griffith explained how data analysis could be utilized in various sports. Examples were

98 provided of how business used statistical analysis which was disseminated in the Babson

99 Reports.11 Likewise, Griffith’s viewpoint was that coaches and athletes could benefit if

100 they utilized data in a comparable manner. Griffith stated:

101 There is only one way to be absolutely sure of selecting the right man for the right

102 place and that is to secure all the statistical data about him that can be gotten.

103 Information should be obtained not only from formal games but during every

104 practice hour.12

105 Additionally, in the Psychology of Coaching, illustrations are provided of how

106 baseball statistics can be utilized for decision making and to assist athletes with various

107 technical and tactical elements which can be improved. Griffith proposed that data could

108 be collected on a ’s accuracy by charting whether a pitch was high, low, inside, or

109 outside. Additionally, he suggested that records of balls and strikes for the batter and the

110 location of hits could be recorded.13

111 Griffith also provided an example of a case study utilizing baseball statistics. In

112 this illustration, he presented the types of hits two batters produced. The data AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 5

113 demonstrated that the first hitter mostly grounders to the left of the pitcher while the

114 second batter mostly hit the ball in the air to right field. According to Griffith, when the

115 decided who should pinch hit with a winning run on base, he used the statistical

116 data to make the decision. Thus, the manager chose the individual who was more likely

117 to hit the ball to the outfield on a fly, which would allow the base runner to score on a

118 sacrifice fly.14

119 Griffith’s Ideas Presented to Wrigley

120 Over a decade after Griffith wrote about how statistics could be beneficial for

121 making baseball decisions, Philip K. Wrigley contacted Coleman Griffith to explore how

122 Griffith could potentially assist the Chicago Cubs.15 Wrigley was aware of how statistics

123 were being used both in business and in other sports. In fact, he believed that a scientific

124 approach could be useful in assisting professional baseball organizations to better

125 understand how athletes can develop their skill in order to progress toward the major

126 leagues.16 Perhaps Wrigley was also aware of the work of Travis Hoke who collected

127 statistical data for and the St. Louis Browns baseball team during the

128 1914 and 1915 baseball seasons.17 Only two years before Wrigley began to contemplate

129 the utilization of statistical data for the Cubs, Hoke published an article in Esquire

130 explaining how he compiled data for the St. Louis Browns.18

131 Angle, in the Biography Philip K. Wrigley: A Memoir of a Modest Man,

132 explained the situation that influenced Wrigley to correspond with Griffith about

133 assisting the Chicago Cubs.19 Wrigley observed a batting practice in which a rookie was

134 pitching to a successful veteran. As the rookie pitcher was struggling, Wrigley asked the

135 veteran if he would assist the rookie in learning how to be a more successful pitcher. The AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 6

136 veteran hitter was reluctant to offer assistance. Thus, based on that circumstance, Wrigley

137 began to contemplate a more efficient way to instruct future major league professionals.

138 Subsequently, Wrigley became cognizant of the work Coleman Griffith was conducting

139 and the success that he had with the University of Illinois football team.20

140 After contemplating if there may be a better way to train athletes and learning of

141 Coleman Griffith’s work, Wrigley contacted Griffith to explain his inquiry. Wrigley

142 described to Griffith that scouts would frequently have dissimilar opinions of players

143 when observing athletes in the minor leagues. Therefore, Wrigley asked Griffith:

144 Can’t we take an established ball player and in some way measure his skills, his

145 reactions, reflexes or what have you so that we can chart them. Then if we find a

146 young player with the same skills and reflexes we will know that he has the raw

147 material and with training and practice has a good chance of being a first-rate

148 ball player.21

149 Throughout the Fall of 1937 Griffith and Wrigley began discussions about the

150 initiation of a baseball skills laboratory.22 Griffith believed that he could apply the same

151 system utilized at the University of Illinois.23 Hence, Griffith provided Wrigley with a

152 detailed outline of proposed studies. The initial plan was exceptionally detailed.24 The

153 outline began with an explanation of the “Continuous Studies” which Griffith suggested.

154 A primary aspect of these studies were data collection and statistical analysis. Griffith

155 recommended commencing studies related to:

156 2. A statistical record of each ball pitched to a Cub player during season analyzed

157 according to: a. Types of balls pitched, b. Habitual sequences in types c.

158 Successful hitting by types, d. Persistent missing by types, e. Situation for each AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 7

159 pitch, score, men on base, etc., f. Seasonal variations

160 3. Similar records for opposing batters, data to be correlated with Cubs .

161 4. Statistical records of landing or field spot for each ball hit in relation to

162 fielding positions, to pitched balls, etc.25

163 In early 1938, subsequent to Wrigley approving the proposal, Griffith continued to have

164 additional meetings with Cubs front office personnel to discuss the details of work to be

165 conducted within the laboratory.26

166 Specifically, Philip Wrigley provided reasons why he was interested in working

167 with Griffith and Sterrett. Wrigley stated:

168 They have been called psycho-analysts; when they are really making a

169 psychological study of affairs. When I thought it might be a good idea to reduce

170 one part of the baseball business to records that would be readily available, much

171 as has been done in collegiate football and kindred sports, I took that up with

172 Grimm.27

173 Thus, clearly, Wrigley was interested in using data and various records and

174 measurements to make informed baseball decisions just as he utilized statistical analysis

175 in leading the Wrigley Chewing Gum organization.28

176 The Collection of Data by Jack Sterrett

177 After Griffith’s proposed outline was approved by Wrigley, he met with the

178 Chicago Cubs General Manager, Charles Weber, and other personnel during the early

179 months of 1938 to finalize the details of the project.29 Griffith’s main role was to

180 supervise the collection of data and consultation that Jack Sterrett provided throughout

181 spring training and during the season at both home and away contests.30 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF 8

182 According to Griffith, an abundant amount of time was expended during January

183 and February of 1938 in preparation for the consulting work to be conducted. In

184 particular, Griffith met numerous times with Sterrett before spring training.31 Throughout

185 spring training and during the season, Sterrett submitted daily progress reports to

186 Griffith.32 At games, Sterrett observed contests from behind home plate and recorded

187 various behaviors that occurred throughout the contest. The data recorded by Sterrett

188 consisted of charting what part of the strike zone the ball was thrown to, whether the

189 pitch was a ball or strike, what type of pitch was thrown (fast, curve, slow), which type of

190 pitch was hit, and where the ball was hit to.33

191 Griffith’s Discussion of How Data Can be Utilized by The Cubs Organization

192 The work that Griffith and Sterrett completed was multifaceted as the

193 accumulation of data for statistical analysis and decision making was only one part of the

194 comprehensive scientific study that Griffith and Sterrett conducted. In analyzing the data

195 collected, Griffith provided his point of view on how the records could guide decision

196 making.34 Griffith believed that the information provided to players was a way to help

197 them understand their current level of performance and what they needed to focus on to

198 improve.35

199 Griffith also discussed the importance of statistical data collection for pitching

200 performance. A main point of emphasis made by Griffith was that each pitch should be

201 recorded. Also, he stated that the data collected showed that the most hits occur when one

202 or more men are on base.36 Additionally, Griffith believed records kept for pitchers

203 should include the location of where the pitch was supposed to finish based on the signal

204 from the . In order to help the pitcher improve based on this data, Griffith believed AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 9

205 that pitchers should be provided with charts which demonstrated their progress in

206 obtaining accuracy. Specifically, Griffith emphasized the importance of this data by

207 stating “Your investigators, of course are prepared to keep these records.”37 In addition to

208 providing information about using statistical analysis for pitching, Griffith also discussed

209 how data collection could be used to improve hitting. For example, Griffith provided

210 analysis based on the type of pitch counts that hitters face throughout the season.38

211 In summarizing how the statistical data could be utilized, Griffith recommended

212 that the game by game data collected during the season should be summarized for players

213 to study during the off-season. He suggested that after the data is compiled, players can

214 be sent a report about their previous season’s performance which would include diagrams

215 and charts and also would also contain strategies to consider for use against individual

216 opposing pitchers. Also, Griffith believed that the data could assist the coaches in their

217 preparation for the 1939 spring training.39

218 During the early months of 1939 Griffith provided the Cubs organization with

219 data based on the records that Sterrett had compiled during the 1938 season. Player

220 reports were submitted for six players who were on the Cubs during the 1938 season and

221 three players acquired by the Cubs during the off-season.40 The reports that were

222 submitted were very detailed and were based on data collected during the season. The

223 data analysis provided the Cubs with information about how various batters did against

224 certain pitchers. In particular Griffith reported how many times a batter faced a specific

225 pitcher, how many pitches were thrown, where the pitcher threw most pitches, and what

226 types of pitches the pitcher was most likely to throw to the batter.41

227 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 10

228 Chester Lynn Snyder

229 Griffith continued to submit reports to the Chicago Cubs during the 1939 baseball

230 season.42 However, Sterrett resigned from his position with the organization at the end of

231 the 1938 baseball season.43 Although offered a full-time job with the Chicago Cubs,

232 Griffith declined the offer.44 Thus, in order to continue collecting the performance data

233 for the Chicago Cubs players and their opponents, Wrigley hired Chester Lynn (C.L.)

234 Snyder to record the statistical data for the 1939 baseball season.45 In hiring Snyder, the

235 Cubs issued a statement from Wrigley’s assistant Charles Drake:

236 The statistician, C. L. Snyder is compiling information Mr. Wrigley hopes will

237 give him a yardstick for judging young players…We are seeking to discover the

238 characteristics that make a big league player….We are simply following up

239 something we started a year ago. Mr. Wrigley feels that young ball players thru

240 study of conditioning methods and the characteristics of established players, can

241 be brought along more quickly.46

242 Who was C. L. Snyder?

243 Chester Lynn Snyder was born in Rockford Illinois. He attended the University

244 of Illinois from 1929 to 1931 before enlisting in the Army from 1933 to 1936. He then

245 returned to the University of Illinois where he studied statistics and completed his degree

246 in industrial administration. Prior to his work with the Chicago Cubs, he was an assistant

247 statistician with the University of Illinois statistics department during the 1938-1939

248 academic year.47

249

250 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 11

251 Chester Snyder’s Work for the Chicago Cubs

252 Similar to the support Griffith and Sterrett received, Wrigley was also very

253 supportive of Snyder.48 For instance, Snyder was given an office in the Cubs Suite of the

254 Wrigley Building. Additionally, Wrigley planned to provide Snyder with a few years to

255 compile specific statistics for the team.49 Based on the perceived usefulness of Snyder’s

256 work, Wrigley was prepared to hire Snyder in a long term position with the Chicago Cubs

257 organization.50

258 Snyder’s main responsibilities were similar to tasks Sterrett completed during the

259 1938 baseball season. For instance, Snyder attended every home and away game. While

260 observing every contest, Snyder recorded what occurred for each pitch and every play.

261 The data collected included the results of every at-bat for every hitter. To compile this

262 data, Snyder utilized one page of his notebook to record the statistics for each at-bat.

263 Each page included the batter’s name, the pitcher’s name, the baseball diamond, and a

264 rectangle to represent the strike zone. For each pitch, Snyder recorded pitch location, and

265 where the ball was hit on the field. After the completion of every game, Snyder analyzed

266 the data to determine various reasons for the outcome of the contest. Next, the data would

267 be filed and organized so that Snyder could statistically analyze the information during

268 the off-season.51

269 During the off-season Snyder planned to divide the data into small details. For

270 instance, Snyder intended to put the data on note cards for a specific occurrence.

271 Specifically, one card listed who the pitcher was and every pitch thrown to a specific

272 batter. Next, exactly what occurred would be recorded. He also planned to provide how a

273 batter hit against a specific pitcher.52 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 12

274 Warren Brown’s Summary of the Use of Statistics by the Chicago Cubs

275 By 1946 the Chicago Cubs use of statistical analysis was documented by Warren

276 Brown in the book The Chicago Cubs. As part of the historical documentation of the

277 Chicago Cubs, Brown provided a detailed summary of the statistical work that Wrigley

278 had initiated during the late 1930s.53 Particularly, Brown noted that at the end of the

279 season, performance data was available for each player. Additionally, the Chicago Cubs

280 front office expected a detailed analysis of the statistics recorded. Specifically, Brown

281 wrote:

282 The Cubs’ management is not content with the routine records of batting and

283 fielding and pitching averages. It knows in record form, how a batsman has

284 conducted himself during the season, when runners are in scoring position, and

285 when the bases are empty; it knows what he has done when he has batted in close

286 games as well as in the one-sided games; it knows how he reacted at that plate

287 when a tying or winning run is in scoring positions, it knows, in brief, just how

288 valuable an asset he has been to the club, and what sort of a competitor he is.54

289 Brown specified that the statistical performance data was compiled by a

290 statistician who followed the Cubs throughout the season. Specifically, he noted that the

291 statistics kept by the statistician analyzed how the hitter performed against various types

292 of pitchers, and also how successful the hitter was in various stadiums throughout the

293 league. Additionally, Brown noted that the Cubs analyzed a pitchers performance in

294 various situations, and the fielding percentages of the Cubs players.55

295 During this time period there was debate about the usefulness of the work

296 Griffith, Sterrett, and Snyder were completing. The practical value of the statistical AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 13

297 analysis was questioned. However, Brown believed that the in-depth statistical analysis

298 was valuable even though other writers during this time period criticized the Cubs

299 approach. Brown wrote: “If any of the carping critics had been so minded, they might

300 have discovered that there was merit in these Cub statistical surveys.”56

301 In the 1940s reports of other professional baseball teams utilizing statisticians to

302 record and analyze statistical data began to surface. Specifically, the Brooklyn Dodgers

303 hired Allan Roth in 1947. When Roth was hired the national news media knew of the

304 work the Cubs had previously conducted. In fact, when Roth began working with the

305 Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947, The reported:

306 Roth gathered reams of figures in which he spent hours after the games to reduce

307 them to a chart for the perusal of Rickey, who expected them to decide what was

308 the matter with his team in the west. Several years ago, the Cubs had a chart

309 expert who diagrammed all the plays made by the team with the idea of

310 presenting a scientific analysis to owner Wrigley that would show him the

311 strengths and weakness of the Bruins.57

312 Roth brought much attention to the utilization of statistical analysis during the 1940s,

313 1950s and 1960s. During this time period it was reported that many other teams began to

314 complete their own statistical analysis.58

315 The Chicago Cubs Continued Use of Statistical Analysis in the 1950s and 1960s

316 Throughout the early to mid1950s, Cliff Jaffe provided statistical analysis for the

317 Chicago Cubs. Keeping track of statistical data was one of the many responsibilities Jaffe

318 was assigned as press agent and publicity director.59 Subsequent to Jaffe’s resignation,

319 Stan West was hired as the Chicago Cubs statistician for the 1958 baseball season.60 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 14

320 Thus, while this organization initially employed individuals to analyze statistical data

321 during the 1938 and 1939 baseball season, the Chicago Cubs continued statistical

322 analysis to evaluate baseball performance during the 1950s and 1960s.61

323 The Work of Stan West

324 In providing statistical analysis for the Chicago Cubs organization, West

325 submitted statistical reports to Chicago Cubs general manager John Holland and manager

326 .62 Specifically, at the conclusion of the 1959 baseball season, West

327 prepared a special analysis of the Chicago Cubs players’ batting performance based

328 upon, “advancing base-runners, hitting safely with men on base, and percentage of runs

329 batted in” which were not considered to be part of the official statics recorded.63 The

330 statistical method utilized by West to determine how well a player advanced runners on

331 base was based on the total amount of bases the hitter advanced each runner when

332 batting. For instance, if a runner was on first and the batter did not advance the runner,

333 West would record that situation as the hitter going zero for three since the runner at first

334 could have potentially advanced three bases. After calculating this statistic for the 1959

335 baseball season, West reported that led the team in the advancing runner’s

336 statistic.64

337 Another statistic that West calculated for the Chicago Cubs management was the

338 percentage of runs batted in. Specifically, this figure was calculated based upon what

339 occurred when a batter was at the plate with runners on second and third. For example, if

340 a batter came to the plate with a runner on second and third and they got both runners

341 home, West recorded that situation as 2 for 2 for the batter. If the batter did not advance

342 either runner to home plate, West scored that result as 0 for 2.65 Additionally, West AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 15

343 produced specific statistical information related to the performance of the Cubs pitching

344 staff for general manager John Holland.66

345 Before the start of the1961 baseball season, Wrigley announced that an IBM

346 computer would be utilized to assist coaches with decision making.67 Wrigley reiterated

347 that the tracking of statistical data had occurred for many years, however, the use of a

348 computer allowed the organization to utilize the information in a quicker manner.68 In

349 particular, Wrigley planned to use the computerized statistical analysis to determine how

350 each Cubs hitter performed against a specific pitcher and how Cubs pitchers did against

351 opposing batters.69 When introducing the concept of using the IBM computer to conduct

352 baseball statistical analysis, Wrigley stated, “This is a speed-up in a system we have been

353 using…In the past we had the figures all-right, but by the time they could give us the

354 dope, the ball game was over.”70

355 The Work of Don Biebel

356 Similar to the responsibilities of Jack Sterrett and Chester Snyder during the 1938

357 and 1939 baseball season, Don Biebel, the Chicago Cubs publicity director also collected

358 the baseball performance data during the early 1960s.71 The methodology for the

359 collection of statistical data was similar to the approach utilized by the Cubs organization

360 during the late 1930s. Biebel recorded the type of pitch thrown, the pitch count, where the

361 ball was hit, and the inning. In explaining his role related to statistical analysis, Biebel

362 stated, “I just fill out the sheets and send them down every week…We get them back in

363 the mail in time for every series we go into. The intensive records include how all the

364 Cubs hitters do against each pitcher in the league and how the Cubs pitchers fare against

365 the opposing hitters.”72 Based on the data collected by Biebel and the statistical analysis AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 16

366 utilizing an IBM computer, Elvin Tappe the head coach of the Cubs explained how the

367 figures were being used during the 1962 season. He provided an example of a late inning

368 when the Cubs were deciding whether or not to utilize a pinch hitter. He described that

369 based on the data from the computerized statistical analysis, they brought in a hitter who

370 had a very good average in the park in which they were playing even though his overall

371 average was not as good as other potential pinch hitters. Proudly, El Tappe explained that

372 the batter who pinch hit produced a hit and got the game wining .73

373 The Work of Ed Whitlow

374 In a similar way to previous individuals that kept statistical records for the

375 Chicago Cubs, Whitlow recorded pitch location, outcome of fair and foul balls, pitch

376 count, balls and strikes, and type of pitch during the 1963 baseball season.74 The

377 information compiled was then analyzed by an IBM computer located in the Wrigley

378 building. In discussing the importance of charting games and utilizing the computer to

379 analyze the data, Whitlow stated:

380 As for charting games, the Cubs have been doing that a long time, but not in the

381 detail I think necessary. We will use the charts through an electronic device that

382 whips out tape and relates unlimited combinations that should provide answers to

383 any situation – batting, pitching, fielding, etc.”75

384 Whitlow believed that charting games and analyzing the data was helpful for the

385 organization.76 In fact, he stated:

386 From our statistical approach we have found we have a better book on opposing

387 clubs and individuals. Aiding the over-all earned run average of our pitchers (near

388 2.70, lowest in the majors), of the statistical value to them of showing how to AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 17

389 deploy their defense against batters for the types of pitches they throw. If an

390 infielder or is deployed to where the balls are hit, you have licked quite

391 a problem”.77

392 Whitlow also provided a specific example of how charting pitches and conducting

393 statistical analysis can help athletes improve. Whitlow explained that in two previous

394 series, Eddie Matthews had difficulty hitting low and outside pitches. Recognizing the

395 trend of where the pitchers were frequently pitching Matthews, Cubs coach

396 worked with Matthews on making the correct adjustments to hit low and outside pitches.

397 This coaching was beneficial and Matthews began to have success hitting the low and

398 outside pitch.78 The decision making made in the previous example was a result of the

399 Cubs possibly being, “the first to rely on a computer on the use of pinch-hitters and other

400 strategic moves”.79

401 The Use of Statistical Analysis by Cubs General Manager John Holland

402 In addition to utilizing statistical analysis for making on the field decisions and to

403 help with the instruction of players, the Chicago Cubs organization also utilized data to

404 make contract negotiation decisions. John Holland, the Cubs general manager, gained

405 notoriety for frequently being the first general manager in Major League Baseball (MLB)

406 to complete yearly contracts with the players. Bill Heymans, a former secretary treasurer

407 for the Chicago Cubs organization, was of the opinion that the Chicago Cubs use of

408 statistical analysis was a main reason that Holland had great success in negotiating

409 contracts. For instance, the analysis completed by Holland allowed him to demonstrate

410 the value of each player to the Chicago Cubs organization.80 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 18

411 Holland used numerous statistics for contract negotiations. A main collection of

412 statistics utilized was related to how the player did when . Explicitly valued by the

413 organization were statistics associated with how a player performed with runners in

414 scoring position and when they had an opportunity to drive in the tying or go ahead run.81

415 When analyzing hitting performance, Heymans, the Cubs secretary treasurer at the time

416 stated, “The game is divided into three areas with the first three innings called ‘average’,

417 the next three ‘critical’ and the last three ‘clutch’. The batter gets a plus or minus

418 depending on whether he knocks in the run.”82

419 In addition to utilizing the data collected to measure hitting performance, Holland

420 also believed that the use of the official published league statistics to evaluate pitchers

421 was not an accurate gauge of actual pitching performance. To illustrate his point on how

422 pitchers should be evaluated, Holland discussed the contract negotiations that occurred

423 with Larry Jackson. Throughout the 1963 baseball season, Jackson accumulated a 14-18

424 record, and a 2.55 earned run average. Holland and the Cubs organization believed

425 Jackson had an excellent season, and thus offered him a $5,000 pay raise.83 The fact that

426 Jackson pitched very well in numerous contests was noted by Holland; however, in

427 several of these games the Cubs did not score many runs. Hence, Holland believed that

428 when starting pitchers gave up three or less runs in one game they had a worthy

429 performance and when they allowed more than four runs their performance was

430 inadequate.84

431 As the Chicago Cubs organization was utilizing statistics during this time period,

432 a book was written by Earnshaw Cook titled Percentage Baseball. This text presented

433 major changes in how baseball decisions could be made based on computerized statistical AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 19

434 analysis. Because of the statistical information presented, various major league baseball

435 organizations contacted Cook for further details about his statistical theories. Not

436 surprisingly, the Chicago Cubs organization was one of three major league baseball

437 teams to contact Cook about the statistical concepts presented in the text.85

438 As the previous example exemplifies Wrigley remained committed to the use of

439 science and statistics as integral part of the player development process throughout the

440 1960s. In fact, Wrigley stated the following about his employees: “Instead of going

441 fishing or hunting after the season ends, they’ll be in the office tabulating and working on

442 a scientific system which we hope will be reflected in winning teams.”86 Additionally, the

443 organization intended to purchase a new computer to improve data processing from the

444 utilization of punch cards to magnetic tape.87

445 After Whitlow resigned, the Cubs continued to chart pitches which led to

446 computerized statistical data. In fact, the Cubs system of charting pitches influenced

447 the manager of the Giants to begin charting pitches.88

448 After Whitlow left the team, it was reported that Rip Collins would serve as the

449 statistician for the Cubs.89

450 Subsequent to Whitlow’s resignation, the Chicago Cubs hired as

451 manager. One of the first tasks Holland gave to Durocher was to begin studying the team

452 statistics.90 Clearly, Holland and Wrigley believed in the importance of using statistical

453 information to guide baseball decision making. Thus, it is not surprising that during

454 Durocher’s time managing the Chicago Cubs he was provided with statistical

455 computerized printouts of the performance of his players which he kept in an office

456 drawer. The statistical information from the computer printouts were given the label the AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 20

457 “Average Performance Index”. This data included information related to the various

458 situations that each Cubs player was involved including how a batter performed based on

459 the score of the game, a certain number of outs, how many men were on base, and what

460 inning it was. Durocher studied the statistical information provided in order to make

461 various decisions such as a productive batting lineup. In fact, Durocher believed that the

462 computerized statistical information was helpful. 91

463 Cubs Use of Statistics in the 1970s and 1980s

464 Just as the Cubs did in the1960s, the organization continued to use computers and

465 statistical data in contract negotiations with players in the early 1970s. Ferguson Jenkins

466 discussed the use of computerized data when he was negotiating his contract before the

467 1971 baseball season. Jenkins stated, “You tell them you won 20 games again and they

468 tell you that you also lose a lot…The club bases the pay raises on percentages. They have

469 it all computerized. They said I only had 24 winning performances.”92 Similarly, when

470 there was a discussion of whether or not the Cubs would trade catcher Joe Pepitone, the

471 use of statistical analysis by the Cubs front office was demonstrated as a reason for not

472 trading him. For instance, John Holland, the Cubs General manager stated, “It may come

473 as a surprise to some people, but Pepitone is the best clutch-hitter we have. We keep

474 statistics on such things and they reveal that Joe has the best percentage insofar as hitting

475 with men on base is concerned, of anybody on the ball club.”93

476 At the conclusion of the 1971 season the Cubs organization continued to utilize

477 the computer to provide the organization with statistical information about player

478 performance. According to Wrigley, the statistical information aided the organization in

479 making a decision to retain manager Leo Durocher. Specifically, Wrigley stated, “I really AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 21

480 haven’t given the managerial situation much thought yet. As a matter of fact, there are a

481 lot of figures and statistics on the club that are now being run through a computer. I’d

482 like to study all these figures along with their evaluations, before we come to any

483 conclusion about our situation.”94 Subsequently, Wrigley analyzed the statistical

484 information from both the official statistics and the more in-depth statistics kept by the

485 organization. After a thorough analysis, Wrigley decided to retain Durocher because he

486 believed that a main reason the Cubs did not win the pennant was because of the

487 and inadequate defensive outfield play.95

488 The Cubs continued to utilize statistical information in the 1980s. Just as Leo

489 Durocher was provided with computerized printouts of statistical data to make decisions,

490 , also used computerized statistical data to make various decisions during the

491 mid 1980s.96 Interestingly, another manager, Steve Boros, who had played for the

492 Chicago Cubs in the early 1960s, also began to utilize computer technology. Perhaps

493 Boros, who had received the nickname the “professor”, was influenced to use computer

494 statistical technology based on what he observed as a player for the Cubs during the 1963

495 baseball season. As the manager of the Oakland Athletics two decades later in 1983, he

496 utilized computerized statistical analysis to make baseball decisions. Similar to the head

497 coaches for the Cubs during the 1963 baseball season, Boros studied the computerized

498 statistical printouts which provided information about what hitters and pitchers had done

499 against each other.97

500 Conclusion

501 In the late 1930s Philip Wrigley surmised that science could assist baseball

502 players in performance improvement. In order to scientifically advance baseball AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 22

503 achievement, Wrigley discovered the work of Coleman R. Griffith who had been the

504 director of the Athletic Research Laboratory at the University of Illinois. Dedication to

505 this initiative led Wrigley to meet with Griffith in the Fall of 1937. This meeting inspired

506 Griffith to propose a baseball laboratory investigating the behavioral, psychological, and

507 physical aspects which lead to professional baseball success. Specifically, a main part of

508 the proposed work was to keep in depth statistical records of the Cubs pitching and

509 hitting outcomes.

510 After gaining approval and implementing the baseball laboratory throughout the

511 1938 season with the assistance of Jack Sterrett, Griffith prepared a detailed report for

512 Wrigley. Although Griffith continued to provide reports to the Cubs organization during

513 the 1939 season, Sterrett resigned his position and Chester Snyder was hired to conduct

514 the statistical analysis for the Chicago Cubs. In 1946, Warren Brown detailed the in depth

515 records that were kept by the Chicago Cubs statisticians. The following year, Branch

516 Rickey hired Allan Roth as the full-time statistician for the Brooklyn Dodgers. From the

517 late 1940s until the late 1950s, the utilization of statistics for baseball decisions gained in

518 importance. In the early 1960s, the Chicago Cubs organization began to use a

519 computerized approach to analyze statistical data more efficiently to quickly obtain the

520 information necessary to make managerial decisions. See Table 1 for a timeline of

521 historical events about the use of Statistical Analysis within the Chicago Cubs

522 organization.

523 Today, the Chicago Cubs, a leader in the initiation of statistical analysis in

524 baseball have individuals who work within their analytics department. In particular, the

525 Chicago Cubs utilize an analytics system developed by Bloomberg Sports.98 Recently, AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 23

526 the assistant general manager of the Chicago Cubs, Shiraz Rehman has been a speaker at

527 the 2013 Society of American Baseball Research (SABR) analytics conference.99

528 Additionally, in a recent webinar, representatives from Bloomberg sports and Shiraz

529 Rehman provided an example of how the Bloomberg system is used to collect and

530 analyze baseball data. It seems likely that the utilization of baseball statistics as

531 demonstrated by Rehman and representatives from Bloomberg Sports will only continue

532 to grow in importance throughout the 21st century.

533 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 24

534

535 Table 1. Historical Events in the Chicago Cubs Use of Statistical Analysis

536 Date Event

537 538 1928 Griffith writes about how statistical 539 analysis can be used in baseball to 540 guide decision making in the book 541 Psychology of Coaching 542 543 1937 Coleman Griffith and P.K. Wrigley begin 544 correspondence about how Griffith can 545 provide consultation to the Chicago Cubs 546 organization 547 548 1938 Coleman Griffith and Jack Sterrett 549 hired by Philip K. Wrigley to develop 550 The Chicago Cubs Experimental 551 Laboratories; A major part of this work is 552 the collection and analysis of baseball 553 statistics 554 555 1938 Jack Sterrett attends Chicago Cubs baseball 556 home and away games and records various 557 performance data 558 559 1939 Coleman Griffith submits player reports 560 to Philip Wrigley which provide statistical 561 analysis of baseball player’s batting 562 performance 563 564 1939 Philip K. Wrigley hires Statistician 565 Chester L. Snyder to provide statistical 566 analysis for the Chicago Cubs 567 568 1946 The book, Chicago Cubs authored by 569 Warren Brown details of how the Cubs 570 organization had utilized statistical 571 analysis 572 573 1947 Branch Rickey Hires Allan Roth as a full- 574 time statistician for the Brooklyn 575 Dodgers. A Sporting News article 576 refered to the Chicago Cubs organization as AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 25

577 another organization who had completed 578 similar work 579 580 1950 Cliff Jaffe of the Chicago Cubs organization 581 begins to publicize various statistics 582 583 1952 Cliff Jaffe publicizes statistics on how the 584 Cubs pitchers and hitters performed both 585 during the day and night 586 587 1959 Stan West, Cubs Statistician, provides 588 statistical reports to the Chicago Cubs 589 General Manager John Holland; These 590 reports included statistics on successful 591 hitting with runners on base, the 592 advancement of base runners, and a percent 593 of runs batted in statistic 594 595 1961 Philip K. Wrigley Announces that the 596 Chicago Cubs will be using an IBM 597 computer to analyze statistical data 598 599 1962 Don Biebel described how the Cubs collect 600 baseball data and have the information 601 analyzed by the IBM Computer 602 603 1962 Elvin Tappe, Chicago Cubs Coach explained 604 how he used computerized statistical 605 analysis to make managerial decisions. 606 607 1963 Bob Whitlow hired by Philip Wrigley as 608 athletic director for Chicago Cubs; 609 Whitlow charts baseball performance 610 data and IBM computer Wrigley Building 611 utilized to analyze data 612 613 1964 Cubs Secretary Treasurer Bill Heymans 614 provides a description of how John Holland 615 utilizes statistical analysis when negotiating 616 contracts with players 617 618 1964 John Holland, Cubs General Manager asks 619 Major League Baseball to change the main 620 way pitching success is evaluated 621 AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 26

622 1965 The Chicago Cubs announced that Rip 623 Collins would be the statistician as the 624 director of public relations 625 626 1965 Herman Franks, manager of the San 627 Francisco Giants is influenced by the 628 Cubs system and decides to implement 629 a similar system of statistical analysis 630 with the Giants 631 632 1971 sportswriter George 633 Langford reported that the Chicago Cubs 634 use the computer to develop an average 635 performance index that provides various 636 statistics based on various situations each 637 batter faced during the season. 638

AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 27

Notes

1. Michael Lewis, Moneyball: The Art of Winning an Unfair Game (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

2. Allan Schwarz, The Numbers Game: Baseball’s Lifelong Fascination with Statistics (New York: T. Dunne Books, 1984).

3. Andrew J. Schiff, “The Father of Baseball Was a Sportswriter,” The National Pastime 28 (2008): 26-29.

4. and John Palmer, Hidden Game of Baseball, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1984); Lee Lowenfish, Branch Rickey: Baseball’s Ferocious Gentleman, (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 74.

5. Donald Dewey, The 10th man: The Fan in Baseball History, (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2004), 290 ; Jerome Holtzman, “Sometimes Hitting, Pitching Statistics Don’t Figure,” Baseball Digest, 49 (3), August 1990, 49-51.

6. Holtzman, “Sometimes Hitting, Pitching Statistics Don’t Figure,” 49-51.

7. Dewey, The 10th man: The Fan in Baseball History, 290

8. Dewey, The 10th man: The Fan in Baseball History, 290

9. Coleman R. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago Ball Club January 1, 1938-January 1, 1939,” In Coleman R. Griffith Papers RS 5/1/21, Box 13, Folder, Chicago National League Ball Club Experimental Laboratories General Report, 1938-1939, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives.; J. G. T. Spink, “Peeping Over the Shoulder of the Cub Statistician,” The Sporting News, July 6, 1939, 4, 6.

10. Griffith, Psychology of Coaching, (New York: Schribner’s and Sons: 1926): 25-30.

11. Griffith, Psychology of Coaching, 26.

12. Griffith, Psychology of Coaching, 28.

13. Griffith, Psychology of Coaching, 28-29.

14. Griffith, Psychology of Coaching, 29.

15. Coleman R. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club January 1, 1938 - January 1, 1939,” 3, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives. AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 28

16. Paul M. Angle, Philip K. Wrigley: A Memoir of a Modest Man, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1975), 64-73.

17. Schwarz, The Numbers Game: Baseball’s Lifelong Fascination with Statistics, 56; Lowenfish, Branch Rickey: Baseball’s Ferocious Gentleman, 74.

18. Travis Hoke, “The Base in Baseball: a Simple System To Replace the Present Clumsy Method of Figuring Player-Performance,” Esquire, 4(4), October, 1935, 67, 140; Hoke reported that he sat behind home plate for at least one series of games for every team in the league for two seasons with the St. Louis Browns. He recorded the various pitches, and what happened for each batter.

19. Angle, Philip K. Wrigley: A Memoir of a Modest Man, 64.

20. Angle, Philip K. Wrigley: A Memoir of a Modest, 64.

21. Angle, Philip K. Wrigley: A Memoir of a Modest, 64.

22. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 3, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives.

23. Angle, Philip K. Wrigley: A Memoir of a Modest, 64.

24. Griffith (1938), “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 4-5, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives.

25. Coleman R. Griffith (1938), “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club,” 4, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives.

26. Griffith (1938), “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 3, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives; After the approval of the outline by Wrigley, Griffith planned the details of the laboratory with the general manager Boots Weber and other members of the front office.

27. Warren Brown, “Wrigley’s move was in ‘Cards’,” The Charleston Gazette, July 24, 1938, 14.

28. Angle, “Philip K. Wrigley: A Memoir of a Modest Man”, 64; According to Angle: “Wrigley persuaded Griffith and an assistant to accompany the team to Santa Cantalina Island for spring training.” Additionally, Angle in relation to having Griffith and Sterrett accompany the Cubs stated “In 1938 Wrigley embarked upon one of his most famous innovations.”

29. Coleman R. Griffith (1938), “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 3, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives.

AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 29

30. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 8 ; Charles Dunkley, “Idea of Wrigley: Future Cubs Will go Through Lab”, The Oshkosh Northwestern, March 9, 1938, 13.

31. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 8. Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives.

32. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 8-9. Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives. Although Griffith did not collect the statistical data he would travel to Chicago during home stands to review the data that Sterrett had collected and to also talk with the manager and various players. Griffith noted specifically on page 9 of this report that, “Continuous records were kept of each game.”

33. P. Mickelson, “Lo and Behold! Psychologist to study the Cubs,” The Oshkosh Northwestern, May 18, 1938, 13.; Bill James and Rob Neyer in the book, The Neyer/James Guide to Pitchers: An Historical Compendium of Pitching, Pitchers, Pitches” (New York: Fireside, 2004) suggested that the John McGraw by 1923 was the first manager to have his athletes begin to chart pitches. However, it is not known if McGraw’s teams used this information to conduct statistical analysis to make decisions.

34. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 131-132, 145, 180. Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives.

35. Coleman R. Griffith, “Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club – Pitching Practice , Report No. 7, July 10, 1938,” 2, In Coleman R. Griffith Papers RS 5/1/21, Box 13, Folder, Chicago National League Ball Club Experimental Laboratories Subject Reports, 1938-1939, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives 1938.

36. Griffith, 1938, “Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club – Pitching Practice , Report No. 7, July 10, 1938,” 8. Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives 1938.

37. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 6. Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives.

38. Coleman R. Griffith, “Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club – Batting Practice , Report No. 5, September 30, 1938,” 1-10, In Coleman R. Griffith Papers RS 5/1/21, Box 13, Folder, Chicago National League Ball Club Experimental Laboratories Subject Reports, 1938-1939, Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives 1938.

39. This suggestion that Griffith made would become an important job that Allan Roth would conduct for the Brooklyn Dodgers. It appears that Roth was not aware of the work that had been done in the Cubs organization in relation to a record being kept of AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 30

each pitch, See the article, by Earl Wright, “Roth’s Notebooks Hinted Key to Dodger’s Success,” Pacific Stars and Stripes, June 16, 1953, 13.

40. Christopher D. Green, “Psychology Strikes Out: Coleman Griffith and the Chicago Cubs,” History of Psychology, 6, (2003): 267–283.

41. Christopher D. Green, “The Chicago Cubs and the headshrinker: An early foray into sports psychology,” Baseball Research Journal, 40 (1), (2011): 42-45.

42. Christopher D. Green, “Psychology Strikes Out: Coleman Griffith and the Chicago Cubs,” History of Psychology, 6, (2003): 267-283.

43. Griffith, “General Report Experimental Laboratories Chicago National League Ball Club”, 8. Courtesy of the University of Illinois Archives. Griffith stated that Sterrett left the team near the end of August. M. E. Barnes had been asked to help Sterrett analyze the data and after Sterrett resigned, Barnes continued to help Griffith for an additional ten days in order to summarize the data.

44. Daniel Gould and Sean Pick, “Sport Psychology: The Griffith Era,” 1920- 1940,” The Sport Psychologist, 9, (1995): 391-405; Angle, Philip K. Wrigley: A Memoir of a Modest Man, 65. A possible explanation for Griffith not wanting the job could be the description provided by Wrigley of Griffith’s mood by the end of the season. Specifically Angle reported that Wrigley remembered Griffith as very dissatisfied by the end of the season.

45. J. G. T. Spink, “Peeping Over the Shoulder of the Cub Statistician,” The Sporting News, July 6, 1939, 4, 6.; Edward Burns, “Cubs Lose Again, 4-1; Hartnett Benches Himself”, The Chicago Tribune, May 4, 1939, 25-26.

46. “Cubs to Study Football in Talent Hunt,” The Lima News, May 14,1939, 17.

47. Spink, 1939, “Peeping Over the Shoulder of the Cub Statistician,” 4, 6.

48. Gould and Pick, “Sport Psychology: The Griffith Era,” 1920-1940,” 398.

49. “Cubs to Study Football in Talent Hunt”, 17.

50. Spink, 1939, “Peeping Over the Shoulder of the Cub Statistician,” 4, 6; No evidence was located to determine if Snyder was hired for more than one year with the Cubs organization. However, it does appear that these statistics were still being kept into the mid-1940s by the Cubs organization.

52. Spink, 1939, “Peeping Over the Shoulder of the Cub Statistician,” 4, 6.

52. Spink, 1939, “Peeping Over the Shoulder of the Cub Statistician,” 4, 6.

AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 31

53. Warren Brown, The Chicago Cubs, (New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1946); This historical analysis was part of the G.P. Putnam’s endeavor to produce a team history for all sixteen major league baseball teams. In fact between 1943 and 1954 team histories were written and published by the G. P. Putnam company for fifteen of the sixteen major league baseball teams.

54. Brown, Chicago Cubs, 136 -137.

55. Brown, Chicago Cubs, 136-137.

56. Brown, Chicago Cubs, 136-137.

57. “B.R. and A.R. Figure it Out,” The Sporting News, June 4, 1947, 16. Additionally, the New York Giants were also reported to have hired a statistician, Jack Carter during the 1951 baseball season which was described in J. Prager (2006). The echoing green: The untold story of Bobby Thompson, Ralph Branca, and the shot heard round the world” (New York: Pantheon Books: 2006). According to Prager Carter had been a fan of baseball statistics and while just out of school developed some various statistics to rate players on their value to the team. In Echoing Green, Prager recounted that Carter met with baseball professionals with the Giants and Chub Feeney the vice president the Giants became interested in Carter’s work. Prager wrote that after meeting with the Giants manager, Leo Doroucher, Carter was offered a job to be the statistician for the Giants during the 1951 baseball season.

58. Gardner Soule, “How They’re Using Mathematics to Win Ball Games,” Popular Science, 171 (1), (1957): 64-66, 224.

59. Ed Burns, “Bob Rush Best Distance-Going Cub Since 1945”, The Sporting News, November 8, 1950, 12 ; Ed Burns, “Fancy Figures on Flingers Give Cubs Swap- Mart Rating”, The Sporting News, October 29, 1952, 18.

60. P. Schaff, P., Sports, Inc.: 100 Years of Sports Business, (2004), Ahmerst, NY: Prometheus Books; “Ray Hayworth New Director of Cubs 13 Man scout staff”, The Sporting News, January 13, 1960, 20; It was reported that Stan West was hired after Cliff Jaffe left the Cubs organization. Jaffe was the Cubs publicity director and also kept the statistics for the cubs.; Jerry Holtzman, “Cubs Skids on HR Pace, But Speed On Clutch Clouts”, The Sporting News, June 3, 1959, 25.

61. Edgar Munzel, “Irv and Earl Used Big Bats as Bruin Belters,” The Sporting News, December 30, 1959, 17; Robert H. Boyle, “Off Year for the Chicago Orgs.”, Sports Illustrated, 17 (6), (1962): 44-45; Ed Stone, “Whitlow Charts Every Pitch: Funnels Valuable Info to Cubs,” The Sporting News, May 25, 1963, 15-16; Richard J. Puerzer, “The Chicago Cubs College of Coaches: A Management Innovation That Failed,” The National Pastime, 26, (2006), 3-17.

62. Edgar Munzel, “Bruins Beam at Hill’s Staff ’59 Figures,” The Sporting News, November 18, 1959, 17. AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 32

63. Munzel, “Bruins Beam at Hill’s staff ’59 figures,” 17.

64. Munzel, “Irv and Earl Used Big Bats as Bruin Belters”, 17.

65. Munzel, “Irv and Earl Used Big Bats as Bruin Belters,” 17.

66. Munzel, “Irv and Earl Used Big Bats as Bruin Belters,” 17.

67. Richard J. Puerzer, “The Chicago Cubs College of Coaches: A Management Innovation That Failed,” 6; David Condon, “In the Wake of the News”, Chicago Tribune, January 20, 1960, C1. Condon reported that Wrigley’s innovation of the use of the IBM computer received much national media attention.

68. Richard J. Puerzer, “The Chicago Cubs College of Coaches: A Management Innovation that Failed”, 6; Although Wrigley suggested that the statistical data that the cubs had been collected for many years, it is unclear from the historical record if the data that was collected by statisticians Cliff Jaffe and Stan West tracked each pitch, the pitch location, where the ball was hit, and the pitch count.

69. Richard J. Puerzer, “The Chicago Cubs College of Coaches: A Management Innovation That Failed,”, 6.

70. Charles Chamberlain, “Chicago Cubs Coaches Now Total Eight,” Gettysburg Times, January 13, 1961, 3.

71. Bob Smith, “IBM Machine Give Lowdown on Cubs,” The Sporting News, February 29, 1962, 15.; Ed Stone, “Whitlow Charts Every Pitch: Funnels Valuable Info to Cubs”, 15.

72. Bob Smith, “IBM Machine Give Lowdown on Cubs,” 15.

73. Bob Smith, “IBM Machine Give Lowdown on Cubs,” 15.

74. J. G. T. Spink, “Peeping Over the Shoulder of the Cub Statistician,” 4, 6.

75. Charles Chamberlain, “Pitcher Assists Cubs Boss,” The Sumter Daily Item, April 10, 1963, 1B, 3B.

76. “Computers are Helping Cubs,” Ludington Daily News, July 17, 1963, 10.

77. “It’s time to take the Cubs Seriously,” July 18, Ocala Star Banner, 1963, 5.

78. Ed Stone, “Whitlow Charts Every Pitch: Funnels Valuable Info to Cubs,” 15- 16.

79. Edgar Munzel, “Cubs Hand Pencil Pad to Aguirre as Lip’s New Sec,” The Sporting News, December 25, 1971, 34. AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 33

80. Edgar Munzel, “Holland Fastest Negotiator – Cub Pacts All Inked”, The Sporting News, February 22, 1964, 20.

81. Munzel, “Holland Fastest Negotiator – Cub Pacts All Inked,” 20.

82. Munzel, “Holland Fastest Negotiator – Cub Pacts All Inked,” 20.

83. James Enright, “Pitching Figures Lie – Claims Holland,” The Sporting News, February 22, 1964, 1-2.

84. James Enright, “Pitching Figures Lie – Claims Holland,” 2; A most interesting aspect about the issues of pitching statistics is that Holland just did not use unofficial statistics to aid the Cubs in making decisions, he was an outspoken critic of the official pitching statistics and believed that Major League Baseball should develop new statistics to measure pitching performance. Specifically, Holland stated “Present scoring rules are unfair to starting pitchers as well as misleading to the public…I don’t have all the answers, but we should strive for new standard immediately”

85. , “It Ain't Necessarily So, And Never Was,” Sports Illustrated, March 6, 1972, 59-60.

86. Edward Prell, “Cubs to Use 8 Coaches Next Season,” Chicago Tribune, December 20, 1960, B1-B2.

87. Charles Chamberlain, “Cubs Acclaim Charts by Computer,” Gettysburg Times, January 13, 1961, 3.

88. Bob Stevens, “Franks to Copy Bruins’ System of Using Charts,” The Sporting News, April 10, 1965, 17.

89. “Cubs name Blake Cullen as Traveling Secretary,” The Sporting News, December 4, 1965, 28.

90. Edgar Munzel, “Lip Studies Scouts’ Sizeup Hears Cub Coach Give Fill In.” The Sporting News, November 13, 1965, 13.

91. George Langford, “Cub Computer Lineup Rips Mets 9-3,” Chicago Tribune, April 26, 1971, C1; Specifically, within this article Duroucher stated, “The computer is damn valuable. I believe in it.”

92. Ron Rapoport, “Cubs’ Jenkins Struggles to Become Known,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 1971, E6; In the1970s other Chicago Cubs players referred to the use of computer printouts. At the end of the 1975 baseball season, Rick Monday stated, “…I think we’ll have to look back at the club’s computer readout to put our finger on how we slipped after our good start. Richard Dozer, “Swap Rumors Fail to Ruffle Monday,” The Sporting News, October 25, 1975, 27.

AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 34

93. Edgar Munzel, “Holland denies Cubs Will Put Pepi on Block,” The Sporting News, October 30, 1971, 29.

94. Edgar Munzel, “Leo’s Fate Delays Cubs Trading Plans,” The Sporting News, November 13, 1971, 50.

95. Edgar Munzel, “Cubs Open Spot for Banks as Coach,” The Sporting News, November, 27, 1971, 44.

96. , “Frey Fumes on Attitudes, Not Starting is Starting to Grate on Cubs Veterans,” Chicago Tribune, May 30, 1986, C3.

97. Ray Kennedy, “It’s the Apple of His Eye: A’s Manager Steve Boros is Helping Lead Baseball Into the Computer age,” Sports Illustrated, June 6, 1983.

98. “Cubs, Bloomberg Sports to Partner on New Baseball Analytic Technology Solutions System,” January, 12, 2012 accessed November 18, 2013, http://chicago.cubs.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20120112&content_id=26325158&v key=pr_chc&c_id=chc

99. Bill Squadron and Shirhaz Rehman, “Bloomberg Sports — Next Generation of Team Analytics,” Presented at the Society of American Baseball Research Analytics Conference , Phoenix Arizona, March 15, 2013. Accessed, November 18, 2013, http://sabr.org/latest/sabr-analytics-conference-bloomberg-sports-next-generation-team- analytics ; For detailed information about how the Bloomberg Analytics Technology is utilized see the following video “BWB Live - Digital Chalk Talk with Bloomberg Sports and the Chicago Cubs” at http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/20765241