The Post-Soviet

In recent years, the Russian Orthodox Church has become a more prominent part of post-Soviet . A number of assumptions exist regarding the Church’s relationship with the Russian state: that the Church has always been dominated by Russia’s secular elites; that the clerics have not sufficiently fought this domination and occasionally failed to act in the Church’s best interest; and that the Church was turned into a Soviet institution during the twentieth century. This book challenges these assumptions. It demonstrates that church–state relations in post-communist Russia can be seen in a much more differentiated way, and that the Church is not subservient, very much having its own agenda. Yet at the same time it shares the state’s, and Russian society’s, nationalist vision. The book analyses the Russian Orthodox Church’s political culture, focus- ing on the Putin and Medvedev eras from 2000. It examines the upper echelons of the Moscow Patriarchate in relation to the governing elite and to Russian public opinion, explores the role of the Church in the formation of state religious policy, and the Church’s role within the Russian military. It discusses how the Moscow Patriarchate is asserting itself in former Soviet republics outside Russia, especially in Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus. It con- cludes by re-emphasising that, although the Church often mirrors the Kremlin’s political preferences, it most definitely acts independently.

Katja Richters gained her Ph.D. from the UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UK. She currently works as a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Erfurt, Germany. Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series

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The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church Politics, Culture and Greater Russia

Katja Richters First published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2013 Katja Richters The right of Katja Richters to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Building justice in post-transition Europe : processes of criminalisation within Central and Eastern European societies / [edited by] Kay Goodall, Margaret Malloch and Bill Munro. p. cm. - - (Routledge frontiers of criminal justice ; 2) Includes bibliographical references. 1. Crime- -Europe. 2. Criminal justice, Administration of- -Europe. 3. Criminal law- -Europe. 4. Law enforcement- -Europe. 5. Post-communism- -Europe. I. Goodall, Kay Eileen. II. Malloch, Margaret S. III. Munro, Bill (William G.) HV6938.5.B85 2012 364.943- -dc23 2012003040

ISBN: 978-0-415-66933-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-11573-2 (ebk)

Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books Contents

List of tables viii Acknowledgements ix Abbreviations x A note on translations, transliteration and place names xi

1 Introduction1

2 The Bases of the Social Conception and political culture: theory and practice 18

3 The ROC’s approach to other religious associations: from tradition and national identity to ‘Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture’ 36

4 The Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Army: sharing a nationalist vision 57

5 Political and religious challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate in Estonia 75

6 The Moscow Patriarchate’s defence of its canonical territory in Ukraine 96

7 Church–State relations in post-Soviet Belarus 128

8 Conclusion 149

Notes 169 Select bibliography 204 Index 208 Tables

3.1 Number of registered Parishes or Equivalents in Russia, 1990–2004 37 5.1 Size of the two Orthodox Churches in Estonia, 2001–2002 76 6.1 Number of Orthodox Parishes in Ukraine, 1997–2011 97 6.2 Distribution of Believers in Ukraine in 2000 98 6.3 Size of ROC and Romanian Orthodox Church, 2010 112 7.1 Number of Parishes or Equivalents in Belarus, 1996–2010 129 Acknowledgements

This book is based on my doctoral thesis which I wrote at UCL–SSEES. Many people have helped me during my years as a Ph.D. student and since then as a post-doctoral researcher and I am very grateful to all of them. Peter Duncan, who was my main supervisor at SSEES, made an invaluable contribu- tion to the success of this project. His attention to detail, extensive knowledge and understanding for my concerns never ceased to amaze me and are greatly appreciated. He has also been very kind to continue discussing my research ideas with me even after I graduated. Geoffrey Hosking, who supervised me during my first year at UCL and who read the complete final draft of my dissertation, also deserves special thanks. Very useful feedback and comments were also provided at different stages by Edwin Bacon, Sergei Bogatyrev, Rasmus Nilsson, Sebastian Rimestad, Peter Sowden and Philip Walters. I am grateful for their constructive criticism, but all errors are, of course, exclusively mine. I would not have been able to write this book without the input of my interview partners. They deserve my gratitude for their time and patience when answering my questions and for sharing their views and experiences with me. Thanks to the funding provided by the UCL Graduate School, the University of London’s Central Research Fund, the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies, and SSEES I was able to travel to Russia and elsewhere to carry out this fieldwork. In addition to this, the UCL Graduate School and SSEES as well as the University of Erfurt funded my attendance at international conferences where I received interesting comments and encouragement. During the final year of my Ph.D., I was sponsored by the British Federation of Women Graduates, and as a post-doctoral researcher I have received financial and other support from the Graduate School ‘Religion in Modernisation Processes’ at the Uni- versity of Erfurt and the ‘ProExzellenz’ programme of the county of Thuringia (Germany). All this is greatly appreciated. Last but not least, I would like to say a warm thank you to Prof. Dr. Vasilios Makrides who has very generously given me the time and space to turn my thesis into this monograph. Abbreviations

BAOC Belarussian Autocephalous Orthodox Church BROC Belarusian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) DECR Department for External Church Relations (Moscow Patriarchate) DRAFLEA Department for Relations with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies (Moscow Patriarchate) EAOC Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church EOC Estonian Orthodox Church EOC–MP Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate FOC Fundamentals of Orthodox Culture FOM Fond ‘Obshchestvennoe Mnenie’ FRCSE Fundamentals of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics NRM New Religious Movement OPRRNA Office of the Representative for Religious and Nationality Affairs RISU Religious Information Service of Ukraine ROC Russian Orthodox Church ROCOR Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia RPTs Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ UAOC Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church UOC–Kiev Patriarchate Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate UOCMP Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate A note on translations, transliteration and place names

All translations from Russian and German sources my own, except where otherwise indicated. I have used the Library of Congress transliteration system throughout the text, but in the footnotes and the bibliography I have kept authors’ names as they appear in the original if this was in Latin script. For reasons of simplicity and coherence, the names of cities and regions in Ukraine are stated in their Russian version throughout this book. This is not intended to express a pro-Russian bias.

1 Introduction

Since the early 1990s, scholars and other commentators started noticing the re-emergence of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) on the political stage. Members of its governing body, the Moscow Patriarchate, attended official Russian state events and secular politicians procured funding for the recon- struction of the Christ the Saviour Cathedral in central Moscow, which was meant to symbolise the end of religious persecution and the country’s spiri- tual rebirth.1 In 2009, the Orthodox hierarchy was officially granted the right to preview and comment on legislation that was under consideration in the Duma.2 While ample evidence exists that illustrates the Church’s importance in the new Russia, little has been said about the actual policies it advocates. This study has grown out of the idea to shed light on the Moscow Patriarchate’s political preferences and strategies and to investigate the impact these have on Russian politics. The overarching theme is the ROC’s political culture since the fall of com- munism and its agreements and disagreements with the Russian state’sofficial agenda, especially since 2000. It is asked whether the Moscow Patriarchate has its own opinions and formulates its ideas independently of the secular authorities. Or does it deliberately mimic the political elite? Apart from this, the question regarding the past experiences that have shaped the Church’s political culture runs like a red thread through the following chapters. Special attention is paid to the way in which the ROC constructs the post-Soviet Russian national identity. Is the population defined by ethnicity, religion or other criteria? In the three chapters on foreign policy towards Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus it is also queried to what extent the Church retains its Russian character and how it relates to the secular authories in these countries. A thorough examination of the ROC’s policies is not only worth doing as it is Russia’s largest and most influential religious body. Moreover, the political scientist Samuel Huntington predicted after the collapse of the Soviet Union that the Cold War would give way to a clash of civilisations which would run along religious lines.3 Although his theory attracted considerable criticism it provides at least a partial explanation for some of the post-1991 developments. Especially the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the USA, which terrorists committed in the name of Islam, have highlighted the continuing existence of 2 Introduction religious faultlines that secularisation has been unable to eliminate. So, religion is a continuing factor in Russian and global politics. This chapter starts with a brief historical overview of church–state relations in Russia. After this, a definition of political culture is drawn up and the way of its application, as well as the advantages and drawbacks of this approach, are discussed. In the following sections I spell out my hypothesis, define the polticial cultures of the USSR and Russia in the twenty-first century and explain what I mean by ‘Greater Russia’. The chapter ends with a short presentation of my methodology and an overview of the following chapters.

Church–State relations in Russia from 1721 to 1990 Since its initial creation in 1448 the Moscow Patriarchate has had a close rela- tionship with the Russian state. In 1511 a monk at the Eleazarov Monastery in Pskov praised the Russian tsar for heading a particularly important state in which the Orthodox Church played a noteworthy role.4 Several decades later, the monarch supported the ROC’s request for the recognition of its autocephaly, i.e. its total canonical independence from its Mother Church in Constantinople, which was granted in 1589.5 Between 1721 and 1917 the Moscow Patriarchate did not exist as a leadership body and the ROC was directed by a secular official. The Church formed part of the imperial state and its priests were officially compelled to inform the relevant authorities if their parishioners’ confessions made them believe that the tsar’s powers were threatened.6 In return for these ‘services’ Russian rulers supported the clergy in various ways, including by giving them the almost exclusive right to minister to the Empire’s ethnically Russian population.7 These privileges came to an end after the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917. Inspired by Marxist ideology, Lenin made it his official mission to turn the Russian population into atheists and to eradicate all forms of organised religion. In 1918, the separation of the ROC from the state and the education system was decreed and the Church’s property was nationalised.8 It soon became virtually illegal for faith-based organisations to engage in any activity other than the celebration of their rites in their respective places of worship. Even this proved increasingly problematic as the Soviet authorities implemented a number of measures to prevent believers from attending the liturgy. By 1929, all monasteries and convents in the USSR were closed and Stalin had thousands of clerics and believers imprisoned or executed before he eased the repressions during World War II and allowed the recreation of the Moscow Patriarchate.9 Although the ROC was initially perplexed by the communists’ hostility the Orthodox leaders did not organise a vocal opposition against the atheist regime. Whilst individual cases of defiance are known, the leader of the official hierarchy, Metropolitan Sergei (Stragorodskii), declared in 1927 that the ROC would share ‘the joys and sorrows of the [Soviet] motherland’.10 This con- troversial declaration of loyalty provoked a schism in the Church and resulted Introduction 3 in the establishment of the Russian Orthodox Church outside Russia, which strongly condemned the Muscovite Church’s deals with the USSR.11 Many scholars believe that the ROC became remarkably subservient to the USSR’s authorities after Metropolitan Sergei’s statement.12 According to Jane Ellis, an expert on religion in the Soviet Union, the number of functioning Orthodox churches dropped from approximately 80,000 in 1914 to an estimated 6,000 in the mid-1980s.13 Ellis details the renewed atheist persecution conducted by Nikita Khrushchev between 1959 to 1964 as well as the Moscow Patriarchate’s accession to the World Council of Churches in 1961. Regarding the latter, she reveals that the ROC has influenced the Council in the Soviet Union’s favour and systematically con- cealed the restrictions it was subject to in its homeland. During the Cold War, the Church was actively involved in the international peace movement, but its stances always coincided with those of the Politbureau and it used Christian concepts to justify the USSR’s use of force in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.14 It can be argued that the USSR’s anti-religious policy ended in 1988 when ROC hierarchs had a historic meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev, after which the secular authorities assisted the Church in the celebration of the 1,000th anniversary of the baptism of Rus.15 In contrast to earlier practices, the state- controlled media reported on the festivities extensively and without doctrinal bias. However, General Secretary Gorbachev also made it clear that ‘Leninist principles’16 would continue to guide the Soviet Union’s approach to religion. Nevertheless, the legal restrictions placed on the Moscow Patriarchate and other faith-based organisations were officially abolished in October 1990 when both the USSR and the RSFSR adopted liberal laws that brought the polities’ religious legislation in line with ‘Western’ standards.

Political culture: definition and methodology The term ‘political culture’ has been used since the eighteenth century17 and has attracted a fair amount of scholarly attention, including from political scientists and experts on the USSR and post-Soviet Russia. Archie Brown produced one of the most frequently quoted definitions of political culture when he wrote:

political culture will be understood as the subjective perception of history and politics, the fundamental beliefs and values, the foci of identification and loyalty and the political knowledge and expectations which are the product of the specific historical experience of nations and groups.18

These words highlight that the concept under discussion refers primarily to thoughts and mental attitudes. They emphasise that the political expectations a group has depend on its past experience of politics, its knowledge of alter- native systems as well as its beliefs about how politicians should be acting and 4 Introduction what they should be providing. Most scholars agree with him either directly or indirectly that history has influenced the formation of these variables.19 One of the few points of consensus that they have reached apart from this is that political culture changes slowly.20 Although I agree with Brown that beliefs, values and ways of thinking and reasoning form an important part of political culture I find his definition somewhat misleading as he describes the perceptions of history and politics, which he includes in his definition, as subjective. This seems to suggest that different individuals can have different perceptions of history and politics and therefore have different political cultures. In my opinion, however, any culture is something that is shared by the majority of a given group. Stephen White draws more adequate attention to the concept’s communal aspect when he refers to it as ‘the political “way of life” of a nation or social group’.21 He defines political culture as ‘the attitudinal and behavioural matrix within which the is located’22 and elaborates that:

[t]he political culture [ … ] both expresses and influences the patterns of political belief and behaviour within a given political system: it informs the actions of political actors, comprehends political symbols, foci of identification and fundamental beliefs and values; and generally both reflects and influences political orientations towards the institutions and practices of .23

In contrast to Brown, White’s understanding of political culture includes both a mental and a behavioural component. His work is useful in that it draws attention to the mutually reinforcing relationship between political culture and political actors, i.e. the latter are both the product as well as the producers of political culture. This explains why political cultures change slowly. White’s definition also suggests that political actions, e.g. policies, are inspired by a political culture, but are not synonymous with it. One could argue that policies can change rather quickly, i.e. after a crisis or the election of a new leadership, whereas political cultures tend to remain more constant. The general terms, which White uses in his explanation, underline that this con- cept is reasonably vague and can therefore be stretched to include several variables. It is therefore very difficult to define political culture precisely, which in turn suggests that policies are more precise, less complex and more easily discernible than political culture. This concept also differs from ideology in that the latter never includes behaviour and in that it does not need to be something shared by many members of a national group. The most funda- mental difference between political culture and ideology is, however, that the latter is a set of beliefs which results from conscious reflection and that it is usually spelt out explicitly and in writing. It is therefore more rational and intellectual than political culture, which can be characterised as more mundane and organic. Introduction 5 Political culture is also not the same as a world view, although both share the less intellectual aspects which distinguish them from an ideology. The key characteristic which sets world views apart from political cultures is that the former are more personal and less political than the latter. Due to this greater attachment to private individuals, world views tend to be transmitted to a far narrower circle of people than political cultures and involve issues that might be considered outside the realm of politics. They are also less resistant to change than political cultures, as one person’s experience can encourage them to change at least a part of their world view whereas the same cannot be said about political culture. Regarding the application of this concept to Russia, White suggested in 1984 that researchers should first identify the main features of the pre-revolutionary political culture and then those of the contemporary one. These should subsequently be compared to find out if any influence of the former on the latter can be seen. Finally, White recommends that this analysis be used to examine to what extent a given political culture might give rise to future political developments and changes.24 This methodology remains appropriate for today, but it needs updating. Since the USSR’s collapse, political cultur- alists have had to trace the similarities and differences between Russia’s contemporary political culture and that of both the tsarist and the Soviet eras. Despite its merits, White’s contribution to this theoretical discussion is not without its problems and has attracted some criticism. Brown took issue with the inclusion of behaviour in political culture and argued that this could lead to circular arguments, i.e. when behaviour is used to infer values and norms, which in turn are employed to explain behaviour.25 This has apparently not convinced White, who left his above-mentioned definition unchanged. To an extent, this disagreement rests on an artificially constructed dichotomy. If we understand behaviour as a set of actions then verbal or written expressions of beliefs and norms should also be classed as behaviour. It is impossible to exclude these kinds of actions from political culture studies, as a researcher can only decipher another person’s ideas by analysing the way in which they are expressed. This is why I believe that behaviour cannot be excluded from political culture. I therefore follow White’sdefinition of this concept although I accept that care must be taken to avoid the construction of circular arguments. While Mary McAuley agrees with White on the need to seek out the main features of a political culture,26 she challenges the idea that similarities in two eras’ political cultures automatically indicate an influence of the earlier period on the later, which is implicit in White’s proposed methodology. While McAuley accepts that history will feature in an explanation of how a parti- cular culture developed, she wants the ways in which past norms and standards influence contemporary ones spelt out. To prove that previous experiences and standards influence what comes in their aftermath McAuley recommends to examine and reject ‘explanations of today’s culture which do not include past culture as a variable’.27 In addition to this, she argues that the past should be clearly defined.28 6 Introduction Although McAuley points out a significant gap in the literature, her proposed method of filling it is more suitable for tracing continuities between periods of history that are separated by long stretches of time. However, when investigating post-revolutionary eras it can be safely assumed that there are certain con- tinuities with the pre-revolutionary period as ‘in no instance of a revolution is the break with the past culture total’.29 Despite the change in leadership and politics that successful revolutions bring about it must not be forgotten that even the new leaders will have been socialised under the previous regime and that through them as well as the general population, elements of the old political culture survive. In response to McAuley’s comments, writers have started analysing which institutions and practices transmit ‘traditional’ ideals and perceptions from one generation to the next. This has enriched political culture research, but also opened it up to the claim that it has failed to allow for cultural change. Nicolai Petro, for example, contends that trying to trace post-Soviet Russian culture back to one unitary and authoritarian tradition would ‘inevitably lead to political and historical determinism’.30 This criticism is surely also directed at the belief that political cultures resist modification. In response to this, White has developed a typology of political cultures. He distinguishes between a ‘mass political culture applying to the population at large as well as an elite political culture characteristic of the political decision- makers and other such groups’.31 He also mentions that the mass political culture can be further fragmented into various sub-cultures.32 White, as well as Stephen Whitefield, have also been careful to point out that their research does not aim at determining future changes, but simply investigates one of several areas that influences them.33 In White’s terms, this book is a study of elite political culture as it focuses on the statements made by the Church’s hierarchs and spokespersons. Practical as well as methodological reasons have determined this choice. The upper echelons of the Moscow Patriarchate are more publicly visible and only they have been granted the right to speak on the Church’s behalf. Further- more, Frank Parkin points out that political ideals tend to work their way from ‘the top’ downwards.34 This applies especially to hierarchical organisa- tions like the Moscow Patriarchate, which did not hesitate to defrock the independently-minded priest and political activist Gleb Iakunin in 1993.35 Since the ROC prides itself on being post-communist Russia’s main institution with roots in the tsarist empire it cannot be denied that the country’spre-Soviet period shaped today’s Church to some extent. I nevertheless believe that the past, which influenced the contemporary Moscow Patriarchate’s political culture most, can be limited to the Soviet era. This is so because the Soviet Union created a totalitarian system, in which ideological and political alter- natives – including neutrality – found it difficult to survive, and which spared no effort to disseminate its culture to the ROC leadership. As many of the decision-makers in the Moscow Patriarchate grew up in the USSR, their socialisation is likely to have more consequences for the Church’s political Introduction 7 culture during the period under discussion than its long Christian tradition. This will be tested in the following chapters.

Hypothesis It is possible to speak about the political culture of the ROC as its involvement in Russian politics has been well documented. Aleksandr Verkhovskii, an expert on Russian nationalism, reasons that the Moscow Patriarchate can be considered a political party although it is not formally registered as such. It has a discernable programme and has institutionalised ties to the government in the form of the World Council of Russian People.36 One could add that the ROC’s Department for Relations with the Armed Forces and Law-Enforcement Agencies (DRAFLEA), which was established in 1995, as well as the official introduction of classes on Orthodox culture into public schools in 2009 have also created mechanisms for the systematic transmission of the Church’s political ideas to parts of the state. Furthermore, the researcher Andrew Evans has found that international actors need to take the Church’s aims and opinions into account when dealing with Russia.37 Apart from this, none of the theoreticians in this field limit the application of political culture to nation-states or political parties in the strict sense. McAuley highlights that any institution develops its own culture and argues that ‘unless we include a cultural dimension, we will not understand how institutions work or why they do not work as was hoped or expected’.38 This has inspired the following hypothesis: When President Boris El’tsin vowed to transform Russia from a totalitarian polity into a democratic nation-state based on the West European model he put the country onto a historically unprecedented course. His intentions did not only lead to the break-up of the Soviet Union, but also formally ended the religious persecutions that drew their legitimacy from Marxism–Leninism. Given the radical nature of El’tsin’s proposed reforms one can expect that his accession to power precipitated a modification of the state’s political culture. As this in turn resulted in a revolution in church–state relations it can further be assumed that the ROC’s political culture also underwent noticeable change. After 1991, it had the opportunity to rejuvenate, withdraw from the state’s tutelage and embrace democratic ideals. However, the vast majority of researchers suggest that the Church has failed to take full advantage of this opportunity. Zoe Knox’s work has shown that the Moscow Patriarchate contributes little to the formation of a Russian and that its leadership opposes democratic norms.39 Leslie McGann has argued that the ROC continues to serve the secular authorities, and Anastasia Mitrofanova suggests that the latter reap more benefits from their mutual cooperation than do the clergy.40 A common theme in the lit- erature is therefore that little has changed in church–state relations since the USSR’s disintegration and that the Church supports the government and the Kremlin unquestioningly without pursuing its own interests. 8 Introduction In this study, I challenge this idea. I posit that the post-communist ROC does have its own agenda which it has formulated independently of the state and which it seeks to implement by all available means. This was true of the time when Aleksei II, who was elected as Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia in June 1990 and who died in December 2008, led the Church. It, however, remains equally valid since Kirill, who had been the Metropolitan of Smolensk and the head of the influential Department for External Church Relations (DECR), was enthroned as Aleksei II’s successor in February 2009. When looking at the Moscow Patriarchate’s actions between 1992 and 2011 it becomes obvious that it aims at gaining and consolidating a predominant position not only in Russian society and politics, but also in the international Orthodox community. The hierarchs are vocally reclaiming the space their institution occupied in the tsarist empire, plus room for independent action. They have revived their ancient competition with the Ecumenical Patriarchate for the position of first amongst equals in worldwide Orthodoxy. Their main strategy for achieving these ends has been to turn to the Russian state for support. While this prevents the Church from openly antagonising the political establishment it does not mean that the Orthodox leadership has remained naively loyal to the post-Soviet lawmakers. Instead, Aleksei II’s acknowledgement that Russia is a multi-religious country,41 an attitude which he shares with the Putin administration, can be seen as a deliberate tactic aimed at obtaining the state’s goodwill. One can, nevertheless, not deny that certain aspects of the USSR’s political culture have continued to influence the Moscow Patriarchate since 1991. Its reliance on secular structures, for example, has roots in the Soviet era when the state wielded so much power that it could force through almost any policy. However, neither Lenin nor his successors invented the idea of a strong state. Before them, Russian tsars made a reputation for themselves as authoritarian rulers. This leads to the hypothesis that the post-communist ROC’s political culture can be characterised as both Soviet and traditional. It further supports the thesis that due to this, the Moscow Patriarchate’s approach to politics matches Medvedev’s and Putin’s rather than El’tsin’s. Russia’s second President made it his mission to restore a firm central com- mand within the country and to lead her back to the prominent international position she occupied before 1991. When Medvedev became head of state in May 2008, he vowed to continue his predecessor’s political line. They thus revived their country’s traditions. It is consequently argued that the simila- rities between the ROC’s political culture and that of the Putin and Medvedev administrations result from their shared historical experiences rather than the Moscow Patriarchate’s subservience to the state.

Soviet political culture and Greater Russia During the USSR’s 73-year-long existence, the guiding force of its politics was said to be Marx’s communist philosophy supplemented by Lenin’s additions Introduction 9 to this theory. While Soviet leaders came and went, the country’sofficial histor- iography presented the October Revolution as the event that brought about a radical break with the past and facilitated the creation of a new political system in which the working class’s aspirations were realised. White, however, believes that the USSR incorporated many features of the tsarist empire and that its political culture owed more to tradition than was officially acknowledged.42 He concisely summarised Russia’s traditional culture as an environment where

representative institutions were weakly articulated and ineffective; levels of popular participation were low; and governing style was centralised, bureaucratic and authoritarian. Popular political attachments, in con- sequence, were highly personalised [ … ]. The scope of government was unusually broad: it extended not only to those spheres of life in which other of the time were active, such as public order and taxation, but also into economic entrepreneurship and control, religion and morals, and the detailed administration of justice. It was based, finally, upon a society of a highly ‘traditional’, gemeinschaft character, in which there was a strong tradition of group solidarity together with its converse, a suspicion of outsiders; a greater degree of reliance upon face- to-face relations than upon anonymous procedures; and in which it was accepted that every aspect of the life of the community, from agriculture and military service to beliefs and behaviour, should be subject to the regulation of the community as a whole.43

Although the Bolsheviks’ accession to power in 1917 did not result in as com- plete a rupture as they and their successors claimed, their formal commitment to Marxism–Leninism remained undiminished. White highlights the importance attached to this ideology when he describes the USSR as

a state within which the official teachings of Marxism–Leninism are understood to apply to all aspects of the activities of government and citizens, and in which no area of social life [ … ] is regarded as beyond the scope of state action.44

He thus underlines that the Soviet Union’s political culture did not only have a strong doctrinal aspect, but also that it allowed the state to become virtually omnipresent. Its attachment to an official system of thought led to the repression of all other ideologies, including religious belief. Since the CPSU established itself as the only party with the ‘right’ philosophy it gave itself a monopoly on power and effectively outlawed all organisations that were independent of it. As a consequence of the elite’s ambition to control the masses’ thoughts and actions it invested heavily in political socialisation.45 Teachers were trained to give instruction in Marxism–Leninism and political education 10 Introduction classes were organised in schools, universities and other public places. Participa- tion in them was strongly encouraged.46 In the USSR’sofficial discourse this socialisation effort proved popular and fruitful, although White demonstrates that it did not facilitate the understanding and embrace of the ideology that the Soviet leadership had hoped for.47 This hints at another feature of the USSR’s elite political culture: the discrepancy between theory and reality is strikingly large, but this is glossed over and the political elite did not critically assess its own ‘achievements’. Furthermore, the USSR’s leadership interpreted Marxism–Leninism imperfectly, so that it came to regard nation-states rather than a certain class as their country’s enemies. This resulted in a Cold War between the communist East and the capitalist ‘West’. Since the non-communist states never formed the homogeneous collective that is suggested by calling them ‘the West’, this term will always be placed within inverted commas. For Soviet political culture, this dichotomous world view means that collectives are important and that antagonistic policies towards the capitalist bloc seem legitimate or even desirable. This perceived hostility also created the suspicion of ‘Western’ subversion of the USSR and thus fuelled an atmosphere of fear and omni- present threat which in turn promoted isolationism. So, the official Soviet ideology could be interpreted pragmatically and proved adaptable to the given international system. Apart from this, Brown points out that in Soviet bloc countries in general the

political culture can also embrace norms which, by no stretch of the imagination, could be called Marxist–Leninist, and which have included at times the attribution of almost superhuman powers to the country’s top leadership [ … ], glorification of the national past and present [ … ] and the sanctioning and abetting of suspicion of foreigners.48

Brown cites Stalin as an example of the leader who was venerated as a super- human and pursued particularly harsh policies towards non-Soviet citizens. His findings indicate that in the USSR’sofficial political culture the country’s leadership, especially the general secretary, was exalted and therefore deemed to be omnipotent and never-erring. This reveals that the Soviet Union’s highest-ranking politician personified both power and justice and was therefore implicitly compared to a ‘divine Father’. Brown’s statement further communicates that nationalism continued to play a role in Europe’s communist part. He argues that especially in the USSR, ‘patriotism, including love of the motherland and pride in Soviet super- power status’49 formed part of both the elite and the mass political cultures. This shows that the USSR’s victory in World War II and the dominant position it achieved in the international system after 1945 boosted the country’s pride and made a decisive impact on its self-perception. The well-known foreign policy expert Zbigniew Brzezinski, however, underlines that the Soviet Union’s international standing rested exclusively on its military capabilities.50 Introduction 11 Stalin and his successors therefore emphasised the importance of the weapons and resources they had while neglecting to mention which ones the country was lacking. This resulted in a political culture which celebrated the USSR’s technological and military progress, but eschewed a detailed international comparison. Brzezinski further characterises the Soviet Union as ‘organically expansive’ and asserts that the urge to accumulate territory was reinforced by the Politbureau’s fear of attack from capitalists and general paranoia.51 He thus highlights that the USSR’s political elite operated in a culture that put no limit on their potential sphere of influence and legitimised imperial ambitions. As the Soviet leadership thought of itself as implementing the ‘best’ and most progressive ideology, its drive to expand the country’s borders during World War II and its sponsorship of communist parties worldwide also had a messianic element. By assisting the spread of Soviet-style communism the USSR’s political elite presented itself as the group that knew best how to run a country and from which other politicians could learn. This is closely related to the concept of Greater Russia which, according to the political scientist Bertil Nygren, refers to the uncertainty regarding Russia’s historic borders and the expansionist ambitions that result from this. Nygren explains that it is difficult to determine whether the Russian nation-state ori- ginated in Novgorod, Kiev or Moscow, and that by the time the USSR fell apart ‘Russia’ had been growing for 500 years. Even the territory that con- stituted the RSFSR included large areas that had not belonged to the original Russian heartland, however that might be defined. Economic, geopolitical and security reasons had encouraged this expansion.52 Despite the ambiguity surrounding Russia’s place of origin, Greater Russia can be conceptualised as an entity that is governed by Moscow during the timeframe under consideration and that seeks to protect the Russian national interest both inside its own state and abroad. One of the main means by which this is done is to expand the polity’s borders or at least to maximise the Kremlin’sinfluence on other countries, especially those that it shares a border with. According to the academic Marlene Laruelle, this usually goes hand in hand with disrespect for the non-Russian populations’ language, religion and culture.53 The concept of Greater Russia therefore has colonial connotations, but it differs from other countries’ imperialism in that it understands the Russian nation as a multi-cultural one and therefore does not necessarily recognise neighbouring nations as foreign.

Political culture in Russia since 2000 Given the above-mentioned consensus that political cultures resist modification and that a change in the country’s leadership does not necessarily result in a transformation of its political culture, it is reasonable to argue that the transfer of the presidency from Putin to Medvedev has had little or no effect on the culture in which Russian politics are being conducted. This is even 12 Introduction more so since Putin officially enjoyed high approval ratings throughout his time in the Kremlin,54 which suggests that his policies matched the masses’ political culture. Furthermore, Putin hand-picked Medvedev as his successor and thereby ensured his ‘election’.55 This, as well as the mass support for Putin’s policies, implicitly obliged the current President to maintain the status quo as much as possible. In addition to this, Putin has remained a very well connected and dominant actor on Russia’s political scene since becoming Prime Minister in 2008.56 He is therefore in a position to continue shaping his country’s political culture. These circumstances have fuelled extensive debate about Medvedev’sactual powers and his independence from his predecessor. Although the 1993 constitu- tion declares the president to be Russia’s highest-ranking politician, many observers believe that Medvedev is forced to share his powers with Putin to a greater or lesser extent. As it is practically impossible to determine the amount of informal control that Putin and his allies exercise over Medvedev, it is equally difficult to distinguish the President’s political preferences from those of his Prime Minister except for when the two men state them clearly, as was the case in regards to the military intervention in Libya in March 2011.57 Due to the two politicians’ extraordinarily close relationship scholars have started calling them either the ‘tandem’ or the ‘duumvirate’.58 Although it might be unusual for Russia’s highest ranking politician to be restricted in such a way as Medvedev is by Putin and his associates, the duumvirate’s existence points to some significant continuities in the cultural environment in which Russian politics take place. Putin’s ability to choose his own successor without having to await the outcome of a competitive election can be seen as an indicator of the illiberal and autocratic features that have returned to post-Soviet Russia’s political culture during his presidency. Further evidence for this can be found in the decline of civil liberties and political pluralism that have occurred since Putin took office. During his first term, most of the media were brought under government control, non-governmental organisations have been monitored more closely by the state since 2006, and the liberal parties did not win any seats in the Duma in the December 2007 elections.59 Instead, the Russian parliament has been dominated by Edinaia Rossiia (United Russia), a party loyal to Putin since its creation in 2001 and that has been led by him since becoming Prime Minister.60 Edinaia Rossiia’s comfor- table majority ensures that policies proposed or endorsed by Putin face no significant opposition. This authoritarian trend is continuing, although news- paper journalists are said to have started criticising the government again and Medvedev has made it easier for opposition parties to stand in regional elec- tions.61 Nevertheless, widespread irregularities were recorded at the March 2010 regional elections and the number of observers was reduced significantly. In addition to this, there have been calls for government controls of the internet from among members of Russia’s political establishment.62 Although Medvedev himself has spoken out against this, these developments show that Introduction 13 the undemocratic aspects of the USSR’s political culture remain in place during his presidency. This hints at another facet which the Putin–Medvedev era shares with the way in which politics were conducted in the USSR. Although the two post-communist Presidents do not adhere to an official ideology, a dis- crepancy between their words and their deeds has become noticeable. Both of them have talked about the need to form and consolidate a civil society in their addresses to the Federal Assembly,63 but the policies described in the previous paragraphs at best sent mixed signals in this regard and thus contributed little to the formation of a Russian civil society. Furthermore, the number of authors who believe Putin to have remained Russia’s most influ- ential politician, as well as the former President’s uninterrupted lead over Medvedev in the public popularity ratings,64 means that Russians and for- eigners alike see Putin rather than the office he holds as powerful. One can infer from this that the personalisation of power, which characterised Soviet political culture, has also been taking place during both the Putin and the Medvedev presidencies. Apart from this, Russia’s foreign policy orientation also started to be reminiscent of the Cold War era. After the country became independent of the financial aid provided by ‘the West’ it could afford to reassert itself vis-à-vis this group of states, and friction soon increased. The colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, in which various American organisations played a covert, but crucial role, were interpreted by Moscow as attempts to encroach on its sphere of interest and to install a US-friendly regime in these countries. The Russian leadership worried that it might be the next target of this alleged campaign and took measures to protect its interests.65 So, a fear of foreign subversion has returned to Russian politics. In response to the heightened tensions, Putin first attacked Washington’s imperial ambitions in a much publicised speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2007, and later decided that Russian nuclear bombers should resume the long-range flights that were usual until 1991 and that go far beyond Russia’s borders, to ensure the country’s security.66 He thus reinvoked the antagonistic and militaristic nature of Soviet political culture. His successor’s administration took this a step further when it used military force against Georgia in August 2008 and thus deterred NATO from admit- ting the country in the foreseeable future. While Medvedev has been using friendlier rhetoric towards ‘the West’ than Putin and even spoke out in favour of a UN resolution legitimising the ‘Western’ intervention in Libya,67 this cannot be regarded as a change in political culture as his administration has sent con- tradictory signals in this regard. Both the current President and his Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, have met with political leaders who are reviled in ‘the West’ and the Russian public are said to support this anti-‘Western’ trend.68 Moreover, Medvedev has been promoting a European security proposal which would replace NATO if adopted.69 He thus revealed that his foreign policy is also based on a suspicion of Russia’s Cold War opponents. 14 Introduction In addition to this, the Putin administration actively sought to recast its country as a dominant international player. Since Gazprom, the state-owned gas company, cut off supplies to Ukraine in January 2006 and thereby put its customers in Western Europe in jeopardy, Russia has been labelled an energy superpower. The gas dispute was seen as Moscow’s retaliation for the Orange Revolution of 2004,70 which spoiled the Russophile Viktor Ianukovich’s bid for the presidency. So, Putin’s Russia resembled the USSR in its ambition to bring foreign countries into its sphere of influence and thereby recreate a Greater Russia. Russia’s war with Georgia and its rapid rapprochement with Kiev after Ianukovich did become the Ukrainian President in early 2010 show that this has not changed since Medvedev became head of state.71 Unlike the USSR, the duumvirate’s Russia relies on its abundant natural resources rather than on military equipment to reach its desired position. As the country’s vulnerability to price decreases for its commodities has demon- strated,72 Moscow has remained a one-dimensional heavyweight. Its capitalisation on oil and gas reserves to achieve foreign policy aims indicates that the Kremlin under both Putin and Medvedev has retained its imperialistic drive. It has, however, shed its messianic role in the sense that it no longer seeks to export a complete political and social system.

Methodology: selection of case studies and interviews This study consists of six case studies, as political culture can best be examined by looking at different environments or scenarios in which politico-cultural characteristics become salient. While it cannot be hoped that this method will produce an exhaustive analysis of the ROC’s political culture, an effort has been made to select case studies that deal with different aspects of the Moscow Patriarchate’s interaction with the state and society so that this book paints a varied and representative picture of the Church’s political culture. Consequently, each case study adds a different fragment to the overall picture and was chosen for this reason. Chapter 2 on the ‘Bases of the Social Conception’ details the ROC’s relationship with the Russian state and society as it is expressed in this docu- ment and the associated discussions. It deals with the Moscow Patriarchate’s understanding of the monarchy and democracy, Medvedev’s modernisation proposals, the USSR’s approach to religion, the CIS and social issues. The analysis of the Church’s approach to other religious associations, including traditional and non-traditional ones, traces the ways in which the ROC has been cooperating with the Duma and the Ministry of Education from 1992 onwards. It focuses on the ROC’s vision of post-Soviet society, the Russian national identity and the debate surrounding the nature of religious education in secular schools. The Moscow Patriarchate’s cooperation with the state is elaborated in the following chapter on the Church’s relationship with the Russian army. Here, a closer look is taken at the ROC’sdefinition of the Russian nation and Introduction 15 patriotism, as well as the manner in which it presents historical and current military affairs. The availability of an extensive and under-used source in the form of the DRAFLEA’s website (http://pobeda.ru), as well as the increasing importance of the military as a symbol of Russia’s might and the official introduction of military chaplains in 2009, presented additional reasons for choosing this particular case study. The chapters on Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus add an international dimension to the discussion of the Church’s political culture and make it possible to compare the ROC’s foreign policy to that of the Kremlin. They afford insights into the Moscow Patriarchate’s ability to retain a presence outside the post-Soviet Russian ‘heartland’ and thus explore the theme of ‘Greater Russia’ from a religious perspective. Although Estonia, Ukraine and Belarus formed part of the USSR they are quite different countries. The latter two republics belong to the Eastern Slavic civilisation and, together with Russia herself, make up the ‘Russian world’, which Patriarch Kirill has praised repeatedly. Ukraine, however, differs from Belarus in that its religious sphere has fragmented into several schisms whereas this was avoided in the politically more totalitarian Belarus. While Estonia has less intrinsic value for the ROC than Ukraine and Belarus, it became important when the Moscow Patriarchate’s main competitor in the Orthodox world, i.e. the Ecumenical Patriarchate, claimed the Baltic state as its canonical territory. In all chapters, an attempt is made to keep the examples as up to date as practically possible and to devote sufficient attention to the different fractions within the Church. Often the ROC’s policies are analysed with the aim of discerning the fundamental beliefs and values as well as the foci of identifi- cation of the Orthodox hierarchy. The texts produced by the Moscow Patriarchate as well as the quotes by its hierarchs from other sources are examined to highlight the clues they contain about their authors’ political culture. In this, I concentrate on how the Church views and uses Soviet history and what duties and capabilities it ascribes to itself and the post-communist states. Another question, which I repeatedly ask throughout this study, is whether and how the ROC succeeded in gaining the Russian state’s support and vice versa. What do the secular authorities do that keeps the clerics interested in their goodwill? I am mainly interested in determining how independent the Church is of the Kremlin. When selecting my interview partners I used the snowball method, i.e. after I had spoken to one person I asked them to recommend someone else whom I could consult. In this, I concentrated on clerics and especially the religious hierarchy, as this is a study of the ROC’s elite political culture. Whenever it proved impossible to interview bishops or metropolitans I approached lower ranking clerics who had shown an active interest in their respective churches’ political course by publishing on this topic or who had been mentioned by a third party as being involved in church politics. Due to the bias inherent in these interviews I asked to be referred to journalists and academics who had studied the religious situation closely and who would take a more neutral stance. 16 Introduction Since I carried out a qualitative analysis on my other sources I chose to also make my interviews qualitative rather than quantitative. All of my interviews were done face to face and in a semi-structured format. As I am researching the relationship between the Moscow Patriarchate and its competi- tors in Estonia and Ukraine as well as the Church’s relations with the Russian, Estonian, Ukrainian and Belarusian states, I took care to speak to Orthodox clerics from all the jurisdictions involved as well as to state repre- sentatives. This allowed me to compare their different perspectives and to thus gain a more thorough understanding of the most salient issues. When speaking to clerics I aimed at capturing the political orientations and values they expressed when answering the above-mentioned questions, as this forms part of political culture as White defined it.73 To do this I analysed their discourse to find out what aspects of their church’s politics they were empha- sising and which qualifying words, expressions or concepts they used to convey their ideas. The information I derived from the interviews with journalists, aca- demics and state officials provided an appropriate context for the interviews I conducted with clerics and was useful in underlining the bias in their answers.

Organisation of chapters An analysis of The Bases of the Social Conception of the Russian Orthodox Church constitutes Chapter 2. Its first section assesses the nature and significance of this document and argues that due to its initially limited impact on the ROC’s practice it could be classed as a statement of intent at the time of its publication. In the second part, the criticism that the Social Doctrine’s state- ments on the monarchy and civil disobedience attracted from the Kremlin and other actors is analysed, together with the Moscow Patriarchate’s defence of its positions. Its continuing relevance is highlighted by the hierarchy’s reference to it in response to Medvedev’s proposed modernisation campaign. The third section compares the Conception’s approach to the USSR’s dissolution, the CIS, Russia’s ideal place in the world and social welfare to what Putin and Medvedev said about these issues in their Addresses to the Federal Assembly. It becomes obvious that the ROC and the political leaders have similar views on these matters, but that the Orthodox hierarchy agrees with Putin more than with Medvedev. In Chapter 3, the Moscow Patriarchate’s contribution to the adoption of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Religion and its cooperation with the Ministry of Education is studied. The first half of this chapter analyses how the ROC pro- moted the concept of tradition, which is closely linked to its vision of a Russian national identity. I discuss how the Church highlighted the need to nurture post-Soviet society and protect it from non-traditional and foreign influences, and how it encouraged the state to do so by adopting new religious legislation. The Patriarchate’s successes in gaining access to state schools introduces this chapter’s second half. Here, the ways in which the clergy have used the opportu- nity to teach their norms and values to Russian pupils is examined, both before and after Medvedev authorised an official experiment in religious education. Introduction 17 The focus of Chapter 4 is on the Moscow Patriarchate’s interaction with the Ministry of Defence and the Russian military via its Department for Relations with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies. In the first section, the ROC’s approach to war, death and the separation of church and state is explored. It is demonstrated that the DRAFLEA’s director, Fr Dimitrii (Smirnov), has more fundamentalist views on these issues than the Moscow Patriarchate’s top leadership, but that his opinions are tolerated. The second section looks into the demographic context in which the DRAFLEA acts. The third and fourth parts analyse how the ROC uses history and semi-fictional sources in the military context. In Chapter 5, the Moscow Patriarchate’s problems in gaining registration and property rights in post-Soviet Estonia are explained. The first section deals with the contentious issues that emerged in the Church’s relations with the government of the Baltic state while the second section focuses on its dispute with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and its followers in Estonia. After this, the chapter discusses the political culture in which the ROC operated during these two conflicts and compares it to the Kremlin’s. It is shown that the Church successfully influenced the Duma so that Russo–Estonian rela- tions cooled, but that it did not get any sympathy from either the Estonian judiciary, nor the OSCE or the EU. The first section of Chapter 6 highlights what Ukraine means to the Russian political and religious elites. It then concentrates on how the Moscow Patri- archate handled the Ukrainian calls for autocephaly in the early 1990s and its efforts at preventing its clerics from leaving its jurisdiction to join one of the alter- native churches. This chapter’s final part investigates how the Russian Church interacts with the Ukrainian state, especially during the 2004 presidential elections and the ensuing Orange Revolution as well as during the 2010 elections. It also looks briefly at the Russian Church’s cooperation with the Ministry of Defence. Finally, in Chapter 7 church–state relations in post-Soviet Belarus are examined. The first section discusses the similarities and differences between the Church in Russia and Belarus. It is argued that the hierarchy succeeds in combining features from both countries without contradiction. In the next section, an overview of the ways in which the Belarusian Orthodox Church (BROC) and the Lukashenka regime have cooperated is given. This is followed by an analysis of how the Church and the state have joined forces in preventing the establishment of schisms in Belarus. It is demonstrated that the two insti- tutions’ relations seem particularly close and harmonious, but that there are problems which have encouraged the Moscow Patriarchate to distance itself from the Belarusian state as of 2009.