The Impact of Periods of Crises on Voting Behavior in Brazil

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Bruna A. Pereira

May 2019

The Impact of Periods of Crises on Voting Behavior in Brazil

BRUNA A. PEREIRA

has been approved for

the Department of Political Science

and the College of Arts and Sciences by

Matthew Layton

Assistant Professor of Political Science

Joseph Shields

Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences 3

ABSTRACT

PEREIRA, BRUNA A., M.A., May 2019, Political Science

The Impact of Periods of Crises on Voting Behavior in Brazil

Director of Thesis: Matthew Layton

Research on voting behavior is one important area of study in the field of political science. One explanation of vote choice, the Economic Voting Theory, suggests that democratic citizens tend to favor governments whose time in power corresponds with positive economic or social outcomes and reject governments they see as responsible for poor performance. When poor performance occurs, voters tend to choose the opposition during subsequent elections. Based on this discussion, the purpose of this thesis is to evaluate how the recent period of political and economic crisis affects popular voting behavior in Brazil. Few studies based on economic voting theory have relied on in-depth data collected in the field during political-economic downturns. This thesis draws on analyses of 21 semi-structured interviews conducted with voting age adults from different economic backgrounds in the city of Belo Horizonte in Brazil, during the election year of

2018. The results suggest that the Economic Voting Theory is effective in explaining voting behavior in Brazil. Respondents who expressed grievances with government performance express strong preference for the opposition. However, the theory fails to explain the variation in voter certainty regarding their choice of opposition candidate. At the time of the study, many respondents expressed significant uncertainty regarding the alternatives available in the campaign. This demonstrates the need to incorporating other variables, such as level of education and ideological inclination, to understand voting 4 preferences. Combining Sociological and Psychological theories with Economic Voting

Theory improves predictions of respondents vote choice.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you, Dr. Layton, for teaching me so much since my first Master’s at OU and for advising me in all the required steps of this thesis. I have learned a lot from you as a professor and researcher that I truly admire. Thank you, Dr. Waterbury and Dr.

Mosher, for being part of my committee, providing me with insightful advice, and for contributing to my growth as a student. Thank you, Dr. Sandal, for encouraging me to pursue my academic goals and for guiding my steps throughout all of these years. Finally,

I am thankful for my family in Brazil for always supporting and loving me unconditionally. 6

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract ...... 3

Acknowledgments...... 5

List of Tables ...... 8

List of Figures ...... 9

Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 10

Recent Historical Background ...... 13

The 2018 Elections ...... 16

Chapter 2: Theories of Voting Behavior: Limitations and Combined Perspective ...... 21

Economic Voting Theory ...... 23

Shortcomings of the Economic Voting Literature...... 27

Sociological Theory ...... 29

Psychological Theory...... 34

The Brazilian Voter under Conditions of a National Crisis – A Combined Perspective

...... 39

Chapter 3: Method ...... 43

Chapter 4: Brazilians’ Voting Preferences during the Period of Crisis ...... 51

Main Themes from the Data ...... 52

Perception of the Economy and National Politics as Necessarily Linked...... 52

Dissatisfaction with Brazil’s Politics and Economy...... 54

Evaluation of the PT Administration...... 59 7

Voting Preference...... 67

Level of Education and the Vote...... 71

Ideological Inclination and the Vote...... 73

Results’ Discussion ...... 82

Chapter 5: Conclusion...... 85

References ...... 90

Appendix ...... 104

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1: Overall Opinion about Politics in Brazil ...... 55

Table 2: General Evaluation of the PT Administration ...... 60

Table 3: Evaluation of the Government's Social Programs ...... 65

Table 4: Vote Choice ...... 67

Table 5: Possible Options to Improve Brazil's Political and Economic Situation ...... 68

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Ideological Spectrum of Some of the Candidates of the 2018 Elections ...... 20

Figure 2: Level of Education of Participants Certain about their Vote ...... 72

Figure 3: Level of Education of Participants Uncertain about their Vote ...... 72

Figure 4: Evaluation of the PT Administration According to Bolsonaro's Electorate ...... 76

Figure 5: Evaluation of the PT Administration According to Ciro Gomes' Electorate .....78

Figure 6: Evaluation of the PT Administration According to Amoedo's Electorate ...... 81

Figure 7: Evaluation of the PT Administration According to Lula's Electorate ...... 81

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

In the beginning of 2018, Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva, a charismatic leftist politician who governed the country from 2003 to 2010, was arrested on charges of corruption. A few months later, the country was in the midst of a presidential election campaign. With the backdrop of an economic and political crisis, voters could select from among 13 registered candidates. In October of 2018, a far right-wing candidate who gained prominence with a controversial campaign and social media discourse won the elections with 55.13% of the votes in the country.

Between 2013 and 2018, Brazil was in the middle of a severe economic crisis that included steeply negative rates of economic growth, an increase in unemployment rates, and high inflation. This economic crisis was coupled with corruption scandals and misappropriation of public money in the past years (De Paula & Pires, 2017). These scandals involved not only Lula, the former president who is now in jail, but also several other politicians being investigated under the “Lava Jato” operation. These events made this crisis the worst ever faced by the country (Barbosa Filho, 2017; Toledo, 2017).

Given this context, the purpose of this thesis is to address how this joint crisis affected

Brazilians’ voting preferences as they began to consider the options available to them in the beginning of the presidential campaign.

Several political science theories attempt to explain popular voting preferences.

The most prominent theories address the economic motivations that lead voters to withdraw their support from incumbent governments and parties who voters perceive as accountable for negative national economic outcomes. This “Economic Voting Theory” 11 is rooted in Rational Choice Theory, which assumes that individual voters seek to maximize the personal benefit of their choices (Bloom & Price, 1975; Downs, 1957;

Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Gélineau & Singer, 2015; Lewis-Beck, 1988). Cognitive factors may also affect the individual’s beliefs and their vote, as argued by scholars who take a more psychological approach to study voting behavior (Bartle & Griffiths, 2002;

Carreirão, 2002; Figueiredo, 2008; Radmann, 2001; Santos, 2010; Singer, 2002). Yet, other scholars rely on a sociological approach that focuses on similar vote choices for citizens who are part of the same social group (Castro, 1992; Figueiredo, 2008; Radmann,

2001; Santos, 2010).

Economic Voting Theory presents an important, yet incomplete, argument about voters’ preferences. The theory has largely been tested with studies in the American and

European contexts where stable party systems present political and electoral dynamics that differ from multiparty systems existing in the majority of other countries in the world. Therefore, the Economic Voting Theory provides an incomplete assessment of voting outcomes in multiparty systems. As I will discuss further, although economic voting theory addresses the motivations that might lead voters to reject an incumbent candidate or party coalition, in multiparty systems, economic voting theory cannot fully account for which opposition candidate or coalition will receive the support of dissatisfied voters. In other words, the Economic Voting Theory does not take into account the uncertainty and cognitive overload of the population when choosing a candidate in a scenario where there are dozens of political parties in the country and an 12 equally large number of candidates for the presidential office, as represented by the

Brazilian case.

Nevertheless, the Economic Voting Theory still presents a relevant, although partial, explanatory lens to address the Brazilian case. In the context of a country going through an unprecedented economic crisis, it may be possible to assume that voters’ preferences trace not only to a backlash against the previous model of administration, but also as a reaction to the political-economic instability, resulting in a demand for change.

In other words, the way people are affected by the crisis may alter their political preferences during elections.

Building on this discussion, the hypothesis of this thesis initially draws on the predictions of Economic Voting Theory. Brazilians tend to vote for the opposition when their country’s economic performance is not favorable. However, given the large number of political parties in Brazil and, consequently, the large number of candidates for the presidential elections, I would expect to observe a significant level of uncertainty among voters. Given these features of the political system, I argue that people with high levels of education tend to be more certain about their voting preferences than those with lower levels of education. Additionally, variables such as ideology and social class should play a role in their decision-making process. The former affects citizens’ decision according to the similarity of their beliefs and the candidate/party’s proposals, whereas the latter encompasses possible patterns of choices of people from the same social class. Thus, social and psychological factors shape vote choices in conjunction with perceptions of the economic and political performance of the incumbent. 13

In order to understand the circumstances that led to the political-economic crisis and the results of the last election, it is important to know the Brazilian context and past political events. The following sections, therefore, address a brief recent historical background of the country that explains the “pink tide” in Brazil and the rise of the PT

(Workers’ Party – Partido dos Trabalhadores) era that set the basis for understanding the current situation in the country and hence the need to study it.

Recent Historical Background

The “pink tide” is a political phenomenon in Latin America that started at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s in which leftist parties rose to power through democratic elections across the region. These governments focused on promoting social justice and reversing the consequences left by the failure of neoliberalism in the region

(Kirby, 2010). Lula was the leftist president elected in Brazil’s 2002 election. Once in office, he targeted social development as one of the main goals of his administration and claimed to have a responsibility to assist the lower classes of the country (Anderson,

2011).

Lula’s government was marked by the emergence of social programs that assisted the poor population in Brazil. Bolsa Família, a conditional cash transfer program created in 2004, is the most relevant program created during Lula’s administration. In order to participate in this monthly governmental cash assistance program, families enroll their children in school and ensure they attend classes, as well make regular visits to the doctor for the kids to receive stipulated vaccines and for the mothers to obtain prenatal care. 14

Millions of families in extreme poverty continue to receive this governmental assistance based on a monthly cash transfer (Layton, Donaghy, & Rennó, 2017).

During Lula’s administration, considerable investments were made in college education as well, broadening access to public and private universities to include the lower social and economic classes of Brazil. Governmental programs to facilitate access to college education for the Brazilian population were also created, such as the ProUni program (University for All Program - Programa Universidade para Todos) that granted partial or total scholarships to students unable to afford theirs studies (MEC, 2018a), and

FIES (Fund for Studies’ Financing - Fundo de Financiamento Estudantil), which covered university tuition for students until they graduated and were able to pay that investment back to the government (MEC, 2018b).

Economically, Brazil presented positive results during Lula’s mandates, achieving the position of the 6th largest economy in the world in 2011 with its GDP growing an average of 3% per year. However, these results were not sustained by Lula’s protégé and successor, Dilma Rousseff, who assumed Brazil’s presidency in 2011. The international economic scenario was not favorable during this time; furthermore, Rousseff’s economic choices, coupled with the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics hosted by the country during her terms, harmed Brazil’s economic and political situation (Costas,

2016).

What is more, during Rousseff’s presidency, Brazil did not achieve the same results in social development as the previous administration. Moreover, the Brazilian government heavily invested in the preparation for these large international events, a 15 condition that favored the deviation of public money. In 2013, thousands of Brazilians went to the streets of the main capitals of the country to protest against corrupt practices and the lack of investment in the population (Villela, 2018).

To be clear, Lula’s government was not exempt from corrupt practices. In 2005, a corruption scandal called Mensalão arose. The scheme involved an arrangement in which

Congressmen were receiving money in exchange for their political support (The

Economist, 2013). Nevertheless, during Rousseff’s administration, the Lava Jato operation, which dwarfed the Mensalão scandal in scale, uncovered a multibillion-dollar bribery scandal involving the state-owed oil company, Petrobrás. Former president Lula, the former president of the Chamber of Deputies of Brazil, the head of the senate, and other senior politicians from nearly every political party in the country have been and continue to be investigated by the Federal Police.

This history of corruption scandals and the negative economic performance of the country were not favorable for Rousseff’s government and for the PT’s image. Under the opposition-led accusation of fiscal crimes, Rousseff was impeached and removed from office in 2015-2016 by the Brazilian Congress (The Guardian, 2016). Her vice-president,

Michel Temer, then governed Brazil with a high public disapproval rating in all opinion surveys leading up to the 2018 elections. Although unemployment rates and GDP per capita growth improved in Brazil during his government, his actions did not significantly improve the country’s situation standing in the run-up to the 2018 elections (G1, 2018;

Brazilian Government, 2018). 16

The 2018 Elections

Brazil is a federal republic with a multiparty system paired with presidentialism, in which, by necessity, political parties make alliances with each other in order to occupy governmental positions, thus facilitating the achievement of political and policy goals

(Limongi & Figueiredo, 1998). Currently, there are 35 political parties officially recognized by the Superior Electoral Court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - TSE). In times of elections, therefore, the population typically can select from among several candidates when voting. Universal and compulsory suffrage was established during redemocratization under the Constitution of 1988. In practice, this means that every citizen from 18 to 70 years old is obligated to vote during elections. If they are outside their registered voting district on Election Day, voters must go to polling place and present a justification. Voters who fail to vote in successive elections will lose access to certain government services until they pay a fine and normalize their voter registration.

Voting is optional for citizens between 16 and 18 years old and those over 70 years old.

Considering the complex political and economic situation Brazil has been facing during the past years with corruption scandals, high levels of violent crime, the impeachment of the former president, and the negative performance of the national economy, the 2018 elections represented an opportunity to change the country’s direction. Thirteen candidates in total were launched for these elections and four of them were mentioned by the participants interviewed for this study; they are: Jair Bolsonaro,

Lula1, Ciro Gomes, and João Amoedo. Given the scope of this study and the results of the

1 Haddad was not mentioned in interviews with the participants of this study because his candidacy was not launched by the PT until one month before the elections. The party announced Lula’s pre-candidacy 17 elections, the main actors were Bolsonaro and the PT’s representative (Lula or Haddad).

After the first round of the elections, Bolsonaro received 46% of the valid votes in the country, Fernando Haddad, the PT’s final candidate, received 29%, and Ciro Gomes had

12% of the votes.

Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right wing politician, joined the Social Liberal Party (PSL –

Partido Social Liberal), a right-wing conservative political party, and proved to be the main opponent of the PT in the elections. Bolsonaro claimed to be as irritated with

Brazil’s performance as was the country’s population and started to gain popularity by making promises to eliminate corruption in Brazil, directly confronting the PT and its ideology. Bolsonaro is a former military officer who entered politics in 1989 as Councilor of Rio de Janeiro, then as Federal Deputy of Rio de Janeiro from 1991 until he was elected president in 2018. Throughout his political career, the candidate has defended topics such as lowering the age of criminal responsibility, allowing repressive responses against criminality, promoting the adoption of the death penalty, and disregarding the disarmament statute (Cioccari & Persichetti, 2018). Furthermore, Bolsonaro explicitly supports a role for the military governing and, before announcing his candidacy, he affirmed that the military would return to power through the popular vote (Martí, 2017).

As a candidate, he also used racist, sexist, and misogynist speech.

In an interview on TV in 1999, Bolsonaro stated: “Through the vote you will not change anything in this country. […] I favor torture, you know that, and the people favor

immediately after the former president’s imprisonment in the beginning of 2018 (Stochero, 2018). The Superior Electoral Court ultimately rejected Lula’s candidacy in August (Ramalho & Oliveira, 2018). Fernando Haddad, PhD in Philosophy, professor at São Paulo University (USP), and minister of education from 2005 to 2012, was then chosen by the PT to replace Lula. 18 it too”2 (Bolonaro, 1999). In the same interview, when asked about a possible coup d’état if one day he got elected president of Brazil, Bolsonaro replied saying that he would undoubtedly conduct a coup, “I would conduct the greatest coup in the same day […] and

I am sure that at least 90% of the population would party and clap”3 (Bolsonaro, 1999).

Years later, in an encounter in the Chamber of Deputies, Bolsonaro said to the

Congresswoman, Maria do Rosário: “I would never rape you, because you do not deserve it”4 (Bolsonaro, 2003). Some years after that, the candidate restated the same remark to the Congresswoman: “I said I would not rape you, because you do not deserve it”5

(Bolsonaro, 2014). Bolsonaro is also intolerant regarding LGBT issues. During a radio interview, the candidate said “when a son starts to act gay, if he is beaten, he changes his behavior. Look, I see a lot of people saying: good thing I got spanked, my dad taught me how to be a man”6 (Bolsonaro, 2011). The candidate has also stated before that he would be incapable of loving a homosexual son, and that a dead son is better than a gay son.

On another TV program in 2016, Bolsonaro was questioned about defending gendered wage gap. The candidate changed the topic, but did not deny the affirmation.

Furthermore, another example of a misogynist and also racist comment was made by the politician in 2011, when Bolsonaro said that he would never have to deal with black

2 “Eu sou a favor da tortura, tu sabe disso, e o povo é a favor também [...]. Através do voto você não vai mudar nada nesse país” (Bolsonaro, 1999) (Translated by the author). 3 “Não há a menor dúvida, daria o maior golpe no mesmo dia [...] e tenho certeza que pelo menos 90% da população ia fazer festa e bater palma” (Bolsonaro, 1999) (Translated by the author). 4 “Jamais iria estuprar você, porque você não merece” (Bolsonaro, 2003) (Translated by the author). 5 “Eu falei que não ia estuprar você, porque você não merece” (Bolsnaro, 2014) (Translated by the author). 6 “O filho começa a ficar assim meio gayzinho, leva um coro, ele muda o comportamento dele. Olha, eu vejo muita gente dizendo por aí: Ainda bem que eu levei umas palmadas, meu pai me ensinou a ser homem” (Bolsonaro, 2011) (Translated by the author).

19 people in his family, because he raised his kids properly, therefore, they would never get involved with black women (Folha de S. Paulo, 2018).

Ciro Gomes, who was third after the first round of the elections, also has an extensive political career since redemocratization in Brazil in the 1980s: state deputy for the state of Ceará, mayor of Fortaleza (Ceará), governor of Ceará, minister of finance, minister of national integration, and federal deputy for Ceará. Gomes is affiliated with the

Democratic Labor Party (PDT – Partido Democrático Trabalhista), a center-left party that claims to defend populism, social movements, and the rights of women and black people

(PDT, 2018). For more than two decades, the PDT has claimed leadership of the left- wing in Brazilian politics.

João Amoedo received 2.5% of the votes in the election. The candidate built his career as an administrator, banker, and engineer, running for the presidential office in the last elections with the New Party (PN – Partido Novo). This political party is considered center-right to right wing. Unlike the PSL, the New Party does not hold clear issue positions related to abortion, drug legalization, and same-sex marriage. However,

Amoedo presented a more liberal discourse related to these topics (Partido Novo, 2018).

Considering these candidates, their parties and political ideals, the ideological spectrum of them would be similar to the image shown in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Ideological Spectrum of Some of the Candidates of the 2018 Elections

The PT and PDT represent the center-left/left parties in Brazil, although the PT is considered a progressive left party and the PDT is more conservative compared to the former. The New Party (PN) is a center-right political party with a more liberal and independent discourse in comparison to the PSL, which is far-right and conservative.

This spectrum will be further evaluated in the fourth chapter of this thesis, in which the results of the data analysis will be discussed together with the voters’ preferences that reflect these candidates’ ideological inclinations.

After this discussion about the recent historical background of Brazilian politics and the main candidates of the 2018 election, it is possible to move forward to the theoretical discussion and then to an analysis of the data collected for this thesis. The following chapter contains the literature review of important works that address the main theories of voting behavior. Chapter three presents the methods applied to collect and analyze the data, followed by chapter four with the results and discussion. The conclusion includes final remarks and suggestions for further studies in the field.

CHAPTER 2: THEORIES OF VOTING BEHAVIOR: LIMITATIONS AND

COMBINED PERSPECTIVE

Popular elections are characteristic of democracy, although the mere act of holding elections fails to provide sufficient evidence that a regime has achieved democratic consolidation. In conjunction with the electoral process, civil participation, accountability, and the existence of institutions that underpin these practices are also of vital importance (Mainwaring & Welna, 2003). Notably, Latin American democracies are relatively young, and vary widely in their level of democratic consolidation, even in relation to their electoral processes (Freedom House, 2019). Since the beginning of the third wave of democracy (Huntington, 1993), many countries in the region have struggled to liberalize their political institutions amidst economic, political, and social crises that in some contexts have produced chronic threats to the well-being of citizens. This thesis addresses the question of how recent crises in Brazil shape the voting choices of the

Brazilian electorate.

According to the economic voting literature, voting choice is typically based on a retrospective and prospective evaluation of the country’s economy. More specifically, this perspective hypothesizes that rational voters will choose an opposition candidate over the incumbent when they perceive that the incumbent has performed below expectations (Downs, 1957; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Gélineau & Singer, 2015; Lewis-

Beck, 1988). However, I will argue that this classic theory is insufficient to explain voting behavior in Brazil. Social and psychological aspects of the vote choice, such as the influence of social groups, level of education, and cognitive capacities also factor into the 22 decision-making process for voters. To understand recent electoral outcomes in Brazil, observers must account for the ways that these phenomena shape decisions and perceptions of the options available to voters during a political-economic crisis.

Other scholars have similarly noted the limitations of the economic/performance voting model in the context of Brazil. For examples, Moisés (1990) carried out a quantitative analysis of the results of the first popular elections after Brazil’s “Third

Wave” democratic transition in 1989. Although his research was written almost 30 years ago, Moisés (1990) provides insights into the agitation of the era that included the end of the military dictatorship in the wake of the economic crisis7 of the previous decade. This delicate moment in Brazil’s history had a significant effect on the population’s political responses.

According to Moisés, the misuse of public money, clientelism, corrupt practices, and blatant disregard of the popular voice in politics related to problems in Brazil such as poverty, unemployment, and inflation. As a result, the population distrusted politicians and evaluated the political institutions negatively. Moisés claimed that corruption and the feeling betrayal by the political class directly affected the voting behavior of the Brazilian electorate. Indeed, Moisés provided evidence that people used their vote as a sanctioning weapon to approve or reject governments based on their ability to handle the economic situation of the country and promote growth, as the 1989 elections demonstrated.

Additionally, as it is also relevant for this thesis, the author emphasizes the relevance of

7 In the 1980s, the Latin American countries went through a political-economic crisis caused by the dependence on international funds, carrying on the process of internal privatization, and having influence of foreign enterprises in their territories. For these reasons, Brazilian scholars and economists refer to the 1980s as the “lost decade” (Ometto, Furtoso, & Silva, 1995). 23 ideological preferences and level of education for popular voting choices that explained the results of that election.

Twenty-eight years after the election studied by Moisés, most observers see Brazil as a more consolidated democracy (Baquero, 2008). Nevertheless, the recent events in

Brazilian politics suggest that Moisés’ (1990) analysis is still relevant. The author’s argument presents elements defended by the most discussed theories of voting behavior in the field of political science and his inferences are still valid for Brazil’s current situation, given the voters’ discourse in the present. After addressing the theoretical basis of this study, this chapter concludes with a discussion of my combined theory of vote choice as it relates to the Brazilian voter during the current period of crisis.

Economic Voting Theory

Economic Voting Theory builds on the underlying assumptions of rational choice theory. According to the literature, in the latter, individual use their vote as a strategic tool to maximize and enhance their utility. Through the lens of a self-interested logic, the voter ranks their options in an election, choosing the candidate that seems to promote the greatest benefit to the individual if elected. Voters retrospectively assess the state of the economy and, when they perceive that the economy is not favorable to them, they will be more likely to vote for the opposition over the incumbent.

This discussion about voting behavior emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, with

Anthony Downs’ classic work. Downs (1957) proposed a theory that addresses the rationality behind the government’s strategy to gain votes, and the population’s decision- making process when deciding their vote. Considering the high cost of getting 24 information and the individual’s goal of minimizing possible losses in a condition of uncertainty, Downs emphasized that voters act on a self-interested basis, choosing the candidate who appears to bring higher utility to them.

In this decision-making process, the electorate faces two choices before voting.

The first is whether to participate or not. The individual considers the costs of voting related to acquiring information about the candidates and then the time and energy spent on going to the designated place to vote (Downs, 1957). Therefore, this effort is only made when the expected benefits from that election appear to be higher than the costs of the process (Gélineau & Singer, 2015).

After deciding the vote, the economic situation of their country appears as a key variable in their vote choice (Bloom & Price, 1975; Downs, 1957; Duch & Stevenson,

2008; Lewis-Beck, 1988). As revealed by Lewis-Beck (1988), “the economic voting hypothesis, in its most raw form, argues that ‘as the economy worsens, the government losses votes’” (p. 8). This means that the economic status affects the population’s voting preferences, which may or may not be favorable for the incumbent party. Thus, voters act individually in response to their perceptions of the economy and the impact it causes in their lives (Lewis-Beck, 1988).

In the population’s evaluation of the cost-benefit ratio of voting for the incumbent, Radmann (2001) stated that

What matters to the individual is the effectiveness in which policies produce

expected benefits. These are the results that matter, thus the electoral success of

candidates for the government depends on their performance. Conversely, if the 25

government is ‘bad’, the opposition demands might be met. (Translated by the

author) (p. 32)8

This is to say that, since the cost of getting information and voting is high, as demonstrated by Downs (1957), retrospective evaluations of government performance serves as a heuristic, or cognitive short-cut, for voters. They allow past performance to stand in as the “best estimate” to predict future performance. When past performance is poor, it is more likely that voters will choose the opposition party.

Santos (2010) addressed the same premise in her study, in which a politician has better chances of remaining in office if the national economy is expanding. According to her findings, if unemployment rates are increasing in a country, if the purchasing power of the citizen is decreasing, or if the economy is negatively affecting the individual in any aspect, it is unlikely that the head of state or their successor from the same party will be chosen in the next elections. Duch and Stevenson (2008) also reached the same conclusion by defining this pattern as the “economic vote of a cabinet party or of an opposition party” in which both depend on the voters’ perception of the economy.

Carmagos’ (1999) research applies Economic Voting Theory to the case of Brazil research is an example of a case-study in Brazil. The author analyzed national surveys in the country during three months of the election year of 1998. Camargos (1999) demonstrates that one of the factors that guaranteed Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s (FHC) re-election in 1998 was the success of “Plano Real” during his first term as president.

8 “O que importa para o indivíduo é a eficácia da política em produzir os benefícios esperados. São os resultados que importam, logo, o sucesso eleitoral dos candidatos do governo depende de seu desempenho. Inversamente, se o governo ‘vai mal’ os apelos oposicionistas podem ser atendidos” (Radmann, 2001, p. 32). 26

This economic plan stabilized the national currency during his first mandate, which gave the population hope for their futures, especially after years living under an unstable economy with high levels of inflation. The results of Camargos’ (1999) study showed that the Brazilian voter is rational and votes for the candidate whose proposed policies are closer to the individual’s evaluations and expectations. Indeed, the 1998 election in Brazil is an example of the electorate taking into account both retrospective and prospective evaluations before voting. The positive results of the “Plano Real” in the previous years and the expectation that FHC would continue this work during his second mandate guaranteed the vote for the incumbent party that year.

Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) also conducted a study addressing economic voting theory’s premises with a focus on citizens’ evaluation of incumbent governments as conditioned by their perceptions of corruption and economic evaluations.

The authors found out that during times of economic prosperity, citizens tend to maintain presidential approval, regardless of their perception of corruption of that government. At the same time, decreases in people’s income tend to lead to a depreciation of the president’s administration. Therefore, their study also confirms the explanatory power of

Economic Voting Theory. Likewise, Manzetti and Rosas (2015) also affirmed that under the conditions of high inflation and negative economic performance, voters who were previously aware of corruption practices tend to withdraw their support for the incumbent party. These findings are important for this thesis because they directly address important theoretical assumptions that are crucial for this study, and also because of elements such as corruption, that are related to the current political and economic crisis Brazil is facing. 27

Shortcomings of the Economic Voting Literature

The economic voting literature reviewed here has contributed important insights into voting behavior. Nevertheless, there are important limitations in existing studies. For one, much of the literature is focused analyzing the popular vote only in cases of economic prosperity or recession, without considering other measures of government performance. Moreover, although the theory presents enough explanatory power to explain voting behavior during periods of economic recession, few studies test the

Economic Voting Theory in times of intense economic and political crisis, like the recent crises observed in Brazil.

Furthermore, the most prominent studies of the Economic Voting Theory based on the long-standing political structures of the United States, or European countries9.

These democracies present different party dynamics when compared to Brazil or other extreme multiparty states. Lewis-Beck (1988) recognized the challenges of studying a multiparty system and admitted that there are few research studies done in these countries, such as Italy and Spain. However, not even these two countries present the same number of political parties as in Brazil. Therefore, if studying multiparty systems in

Europe is challenging, where the number of political parties does not approach the

Brazilian case, it would suggest that Brazil represents an interesting case that deserves further in-depth study.

The US and Europe have their specific political systems and party arrangements that do not represent most of the countries around the world. The Brazilian case, which is

9 E.g., Bloom and Price (1975); Downs (1957); Duch and Stevenson (2008); Lewis-Beck (1988); Pacek and Radcliff (1995). 28 the focus of this thesis, is a challenging context for the Economic Voting Theory for two reasons. First, the most recent presidential election occurred during an unprecedented economic and political crisis. Secondly, the Brazilian case represents an example of a developing country with a multiparty system and a complex economy. Brazilian citizens struggle to make sense of economic issues and the fluid party system; consequently, these elements hamper the decision-making process for voters. Considering other countries in

Latin America, Africa, Middle East, and South and East Asia, it is possible to argue that

Brazil’s context and political features are more common around the world than the

American and European political and electoral structures. It is therefore unlikely that voters’ economic perceptions will explain the entirety of their electoral choice.

The economic voting literature also does little to clarify why voters might accept or prefer an inexperienced or unviable alternative to the incumbent, as proved to be the case in Brazil’s 2018 election (Radmann 2001). João Amoedo is an example from the last election. This candidate was mentioned by some participants interviewed for this research, and he received 2.5% of the valid votes in the country that correspond to more than 2 million votes in total, even though his party is new and the candidate does not have experience in politics. This exemplifies a particularity of a multiparty system that is less common in more developed democracies.

This is not to say that voters will not at least attempt to behave as if they were rational; however, relying solely on the Economic Voting Theory to explain voting behavior may be an overly simplistic approach. I argue that due to the large number of political parties and candidates in the Brazilian elections, choosing an opposition 29 candidate to replace the incumbent due to negative retrospective evaluations of the country’s economic performance might be a difficult decision to make. Predicting vote choice under these challenging conditions may require the inclusion of other variables such as those recommended by the sociological and psychological theories of voting behavior. I will address these literatures in the following subsections of this chapter.

Sociological Theory

The sociological and psychological theories of voting behavior are similar in many aspects, this have led some scholars to combine them into a single framework of analysis. For instance, Bartle and Griffiths’ (2002) study calls the combined theory

“Social-Psychological Voting Behavior Theory”. According to these authors, this approach presents different inferences in comparison to the economic voting theory. For the purposes of this thesis, I present these theories in separate sections in order to highlight their distinct claims and variables of each framework.

Sociological theories of voting behavior focus on the effect social and cultural contexts have on vote choice. This approach claims that people in the same social group or social class interact more; therefore they affect each other’s beliefs and preferences.

Members of the same social group or class will make similar voting choices (Aiba, 2002).

Moreover, rather than the individual, it is the social community that puts in motion political dynamics. Individual decisions, in this sense, have to be analyzed based on the social context in which the variation of beliefs and actions are understood. One’s social network is a key element in shaping and changing ideologies and choices (Aiba, 2002). 30

The theory also addresses the importance of the historical context in determining actions, beliefs, and ideology of the group, and therefore, of the individual. This is to say that the general context related to the historical moment lived by a person, including the political, economic, social, and cultural norms and habits of a given time, determine the characteristics of a social group (Borba, 2005). Consequently, what affects the social group also affects the individual. Identity formation, including party identification, results the socialization process that draws on the shared historical experiences of the cohort or group thereby leading to similar political beliefs and behaviors for all individuals within that group.

For the sociological approach, the notion of social class is considered as an important explanatory variable that represents an active factor in the decision-making process of the popular vote. On one hand, the Marxist tradition emphasizes the relevance of the economic component and class structure in defining the vote, which will be discussed later in this section. On the other hand non-Marxist approaches take into consideration other variables such as gender, age, level of education, income, and occupation of a set of people belonging to a certain group.

Borba (2005) notes that, in addition to historical experiences, social communities are also defined by the combination of these variables defended by the non-Marxist tradition and their interplay within a social context. Gender, level of education, and occupation, for instance, are interdependent elements because they shape the individual as they define the group, exposing the mutual-constitutional feature of these variables, the 31 subject, and the social context. This means that individual features impact the group, as well as the group shapes the individual’s characteristics.

When there is a change in these elements discussed by the non-Marxist tradition, the social context is altered, as well as the political behavior of its members. For instance, when the level of education of the individuals of a group increases, the tendency, therefore, is that these people will have more information about politics. Hence, ideally, the group will discuss more about the topic, which affects the individuals’ political behavior in general. Thus, political behavior, according to the sociological perspective, is a result of the interactions happening under a specific social context, because each social group presents its own features based on a series of variables (Figueiredo, 2008;

Radmann, 2001).

With this perspective in mind, an individual’s level of education is a particularly relevant element in the study of popular voting behavior. It is of particular importance for the argument of this thesis because this variable directly impact the citizens’ levels of information about politics and their levels of certainty about their vote, as it will be shown later in this study. Reis (2009) stated that less access to education is correlated with lower interest in politics. Moisés (1990) also reached the same conclusion in his study. According to him, the interest in politics grows proportionally to an increase in one’s level of education and income. This suggests that the poorest portion of a population represents the least politically engaged part of the electorate part due to their low incomes and low access to education. As demonstrated by Moisés (1990), some 32 studies of electorate sociology have concluded that once an individual moves up to a new social-economic class, the change in social context may also alter their interest in politics.

However, this causal chain may not be robust to the consideration of structural conditions that shape the extent to which opportunities and incentives are provided to the individual in addition to the challenges they may face in the process of pursuing superior living standards. These factors, in turn, depend in part on the government’s arrangements to facilitate or hinder social mobility. The sector of the population with low income and low level of education is acquainted with these structural constraints, which demonstrates that they are not completely uninformed about the political context in which they live

(Moisés, 1990).

Besides the non-Marxist sociological approach that addresses several possible explanatory variables for voting behavior, the Marxist tradition of the topic claims that political identity is created under social classes in the sense that individuals in the same class tend to engage in similar political behavior (Castro, 1992; Figueiredo, 2008). This happens because the members of each social class share similar basic interests. In this sense, party identification results from the interactions between political parties and the individuals, and then between the subjects themselves within a group. This dynamic is only occurs through the structure provided by class identification. Conversely, the absence of class-consciousness results in a lack of political identity (Figueiredo, 2008;

Radmann, 2001). Class-consciousness and political engagement thus coexist in an endogenous relationship where each breeds the other. 33

Despite the important contribution of the sociological framework in understanding democratic voting behavior, this tradition presents some flaws. The

Marxist perspective, for instance, focuses on exposing the relationship between the working class and the political parties with the intention of addressing alienation and lack of class-consciousness among the exploited. The primary concern of this tradition is to understand why voters might not choose the parties that claim to legitimately represent them. This perspective, albeit relevant, withdraw popular voting preferences as the main goal, hindering the purpose of the understanding voting behavior from a holistic perspective (Castro, 1992). Similar to the Economic Theory, this approach also fails in explaining electorate participation (Radmann, 2001).

Furthermore, the Marxist tradition recognizes the impact political parties’ activities have on the electorate’s choices; however, considering the substantial relevance of this influence, these parties constitute an autonomous variable in the decision-making process of the individual, because it’s the elite of constituents are not part of the popular social groups. Therefore, this factor should be more carefully assessed (Przeworski,

1985).

Even considering the existence of political parties that claim to defend a certain social class, the relationship between class and vote is not inexorable. It is possible that the citizens change their vote based on personal reasons or other specific interests that are not attached to their social group. Therefore, this tradition is insufficient to the extent that it fails to explaini the role of personal preferences in shaping voting choices (Radmann,

2001). The number of potential variables addressed by the non-Marxist approach also 34 reveals another shortcoming of the theory due to the impracticability of gathering a complete set of information in order to understand vote preferences under this complex model (Figueiredo, 2008). Social class and social identity are constantly shifting and are often context-dependent, which further complicates the data collection effort. Even if appropriate data were variable, this tradition also often disregards the factors that lead to personal decisions.

Due to these gaps in this theory and given the purposes of this thesis, I will draw on only few key elements of the sociological approach. Besides the evident significance of the main argument regarding the importance of social interactions for vote choice, the focus of level of education is the most relevant contribution from the sociological tradition. This study will reveal that, in addition to Brazil’s economic context, respondents’ level of education proves a crucial explanatory variable when assessing vote choice. Furthermore, respondents’ consciousness of ideological preferences also helps us in understanding their voting logic. I explore this latter variable further in the next section.

Psychological Theory

The psychological theories were initially developed at Michigan University using public opinions surveys (Bartle & Griffiths, 2002). According to this approach, although external factors affect the individual’s behaviors, the structure of their personality and cognition carries direct weight on their voting choices.

The focus of this approach is the consolidation of the political normative categories of each individual and their impact on the person’s behavior and answers to 35 stimuli in different contexts (Visser, 1998). This process is possible through political and social interactions that happen once a person’s psychological basis is structured.

Therefore, the argument of the theory emphasizes elements such as the individuals’ own conceptions of their social role and their personal perception of the situations and interactions they face throughout their lives (Figueiredo, 2008).

Political engagement, in this sense, is a constitutive part of someone’s psychological formation (Radmann, 2001). In other words, personal actions are shaped by the individual’s own perception of the social and political environments in which they live. Consequently, political behavior is only possible as structured by political socialization and this process starts in the individual’s early childhood social formation

(Visser, 1998).

Political behavior and personal characteristics are therefore related. In this regard, psychological theories focus on the importance of the individual’s personal traits in the study of popular voting behavior. This is contrary to the sociological theories that ignore the role of cognitive aspects and personal preferences in shaping the vote, paying extra attention to social interactions. In other words, Castro (1992) explained that

“[Psychological theories] propose an attitude-based approach, in which researches

seek the proximate motivations and perceptions that potentially lead individuals to

party choice and political behaviors. Thus, attitudes may provide a fuller

explanation because they may be closer to the behavior, in a temporal causal

chain” (Translated by the author) (p. 14)10.

10 “Essa corrente propõe uma abordagem baseada nas atitudes, em que se procurem as motivações e percepções que levariam os indivíduos imediatamente à escolha partidária e ao comportamento político. 36

Therefore, the psychological approach provides tools to explain different levels of political participation, because this tradition takes into consideration other elements in the analysis of voting behavior, such as institutional and legal factors, and non-psychological limitations (Radmann, 2001).

As in the sociological approach, an individual’s level of education is also important in the psychological theories. According to Baquero (1985), there is a direct correlation between level of education and ideological preferences. This means that people interpret the political world according to their levels of knowledge about it. Social groups, in this context, encompass citizens with similar levels of education. People from privileged socio-economic groups, for instance, usually have higher levels of political information and hence, the ability to engage in more sophisticated analysis of political issues.

Additionally, voting choices may be predicted once we understand the level of the individual’s political engagement and their preference for specific political parties or political ideas. According to Figueiredo (2008), level of education predicts the consolidation on one’s political belief system and only social classes with well-structured belief systems are highly politicized. In this sense, it is easy to anticipate that higher socio-economic classes are the ones that present these characteristics due their superior levels of education and access to information. The percentage of people in such classes, however, is usually low, particularly in Brazil where no more than 10% of the population belongs to high social-economic classes (Mendonça, 2018).

Assim, atitudes forneceriam uma explicação mais completa porque estariam mais próximas do comportamento, em uma cadeia causal temporal” (Castro, 1992, p. 14). 37

Conversely, political belief systems are arguably less coherent in lower social- economic groups. There is evidence that those in lower social classes lack crystalized opinions and ideological structures (Castro, 1992). According to Palfrey and Poole (1987, p. 511), it is possible to “expect voters who are relatively uninformed about the issues to express either inconsistent or noncommittal preferences on these issues, as compared to well-informed voters.”

Besides the role of social interactions and level of education in affecting the individual’s cognitive perspectives and then the vote choice, the psychological theories also focus on the importance of political ideologies in this process. Ideological identification then is a relevant variable in the analysis and prediction of voting behavior.

Singer (2002) considered this variable an important factor in the decision-making process of the vote for the citizen. However, addressing this variable in the Brazilian case is challenging, because the majority of the population does not know how to classify their ideological preferences, nor is it clear that they understand what the term ‘political ideology’ means (Almeida, 2001; Carreirão, 2002; Carreirão, 2007; Oliveira & Turgeon,

2015). According to Carreirão (2007),

Most of the [Brazilian] voters do not know how to express what is right or left;

the contents attributed to these expressions by the vast majority of voters are

different from those contents attributed by Political Science. [Therefore] it is very

difficult to measure the concept of ideology [in Brazil]. (p. 311)11

11 “[...] a maioria dos eleitores não sabe expressar o que é direita ou esquerda; os conteúdos atribuídos a estas expressões pela grande maioria dos eleitores são diferentes daqueles conteúdos atribuídos pela ciência política a estas noções. É muito difícil medir o conceito de ideologia […]” (Carreirão, 2007, p. 311). 38

Considering this gap between the definition of political ideology in theory and the popular conception of it, when analyzing the variable based on the Brazilian population’s perception of term, it is necessary to first evaluate if the concept is at least known by the citizens, or if it makes any political sense to them. It is possible to encounter individuals who use the labels “left” and “right” without having any idea of what these terms mean

(Oliveira & Turgeon, 2015). Furthermore, it is common for citizens to not be interested in learning about political concepts such as ideology, particularly those with less information about politics in general (Turgeon, 2009).

This claim is directly related to the level of education of the population. Carreirão

(2002) affirmed that ideology is not significant for less educated voters. For the purposes of the study at hand, it is important to keep in mind that the Brazilian electorate represents a special case. This is because the high levels of social inequality in the country create a considerable gap between well-educated and less educated people.

Oliveira and Turgeon (2015) empirically confirm the prediction of the theories reviewed here. As suggested by the theory, a portion of the population presents a more sophisticated point of view about politics relative to the larger majority. There is a correlation between level of education and political interest and the less educated majority of the electorate in Brazil does not understand the meaning of political ideology or the traditional left/right conceptualization.

Similarly, partisanship in Brazil also represents a similar case. Party attachment is usually a strong determinant of the vote, especially in advanced democracies (Bartels,

2000). However, in the context of Latin America, in which competitive democratic 39 elections were reestablished in the 1980s and 1990s, the level of partisanship varies. In a regional context, the Brazilian case is one of the most complicated, because the party system in the country is considered weak. Elections tend to focus on the candidate, rather than highlighting the party (Lupu, 2015). In order to proceed with the theoretical argument about voting behavior in Brazil, the following section presents a combined theory of vote choice in the country’s context. This perspective draws on each of the traditions presented throughout this chapter.

The Brazilian Voter under Conditions of a National Crisis –

A Combined Perspective

As highlighted in this chapter, each theoretical approach falls short in holistically explaining voting choices. Each theory highlights important variables to understand voting behavior; however, they fail to provide theoretical clarity for the Brazilian context in particular. By reviewing these theories and combining their significant arguments, I propose a more precise theoretical narrative of voting behavior in Brazil during periods of crisis.

Drawing on the economic/performance voting literature, I argue that crises will induce Brazilian voters to more likely to support opposition candidates. However, the logic of economic voting theory does not entirely address the complexities of Brazil’s political dynamic. Furthermore, this tradition underestimates the impact that cognitive factors, social interactions, and ideological structures inherent to social groups have on defining the vote (Bartle & Griffiths, 2002; Baquero, 1985; Carreirão, 2002; Castro,

1992; Figueiredo, 2008; Radmann, 2001; Singer, 2002; Visser, 1998). In particular, the 40 extensive number of political parties in the country, besides contributing to difficulties in developing partisan identities, enhances the complexity of the vote choice.

As mentioned previously, these conditions do not invalidate the primary explanatory power of the economic voting theory. Rather, these circumstances demonstrate the theory’s gaps, and hence the need for combining it with other significant traditions of voting behavior. This approach is established in this study as an additive model in which the arguments of the Economic, Sociological, and Psychological theories of voting behavior complete each other and enhance the theoretical explanatory power of voting preferences in Brazil during political-economic crisis.

As argued previously, economic voting theory’s prediction that voters will select opposition candidates in times of crisis does not completely answer the question about how Brazilians vote, particularly considering that voters had to choose between 13 candidates for the presidency in the 2018 elections. Economic voting theory provides little direction as to which alternatives voters would choose in this context. Therefore, how do voters make a choice under these circumstances?

First, it is important to highlight that some citizens in Brazil would not vote for the incumbent party, regardless of economic performance considerations due to ideological preferences. According to Limongi and Cortez (2010), systematic votes for a particular party or candidate are not common in Brazil. Less than one third of the population use of what they call the “faithful vote.” Still, a significant number of people tend to constantly reject the incumbent party, particularly in the case of the PT that was in power for more than one decade. This group furthermore tends to have a long-lasting 41 negative evaluation of these presidents’ administrations even under the context of a national economy with a positive performance.

My argument in this study is that, under this condition and considering the number of candidates running for president, there is a considerable level of uncertainty among the Brazilians about their vote. The level of education of voters will condition this uncertainty. People with lower levels of education tend to be more uninformed about politics, and consequently more uncertain about their vote. The opposite logic applies to those with higher levels of education. These voters are often more informed about politics and their country’s political and economic situation, and are therefore more certain about their voting choice.

The more confident group tends to express specific expectations about the change they hope to see in Brazil’s political and economic scenarios. In consequence of these preferences, their opinions and vote intentions mainly center on one of two perspectives: radical or moderate alternatives. This division is best predicted by different political ideologies of these voters. Although, it is common for the Brazilian population to not have a clear discernment between right and left ideologies, which hampers their own classification of their beliefs within this scale, it does not mean that they do not present any level of ideological preferences. In this regard, even considering the challenge of understanding this population’s ideological inclinations, it is possible to notice some core convictions in each group.

On the one hand, voters with radical preferences are usually more conservative and extremely unsatisfied with the current crisis. They demand a radical change in the 42 country and deposit all of their hopes in the opposition candidate with the same discourse. On the other hand, moderate voters are equally disappointed with Brazil’s economic turmoil and corruption scandals, and wish to witness an improvement of that situation. This group, however, presents a more liberal discourse, highlighting their disapproval of extreme right-wing candidates. Furthermore they prefer to vote for candidates who, beyond presenting promises that are more allied with this group’s ideas, would also be a strong moderate competitor against the radical candidate in both rounds of the elections.

Voters uncertain of their decision are also unhappy with Brazil’s political- economic crisis, and express a considerable degree of hopelessness about the country’s situation. Nonetheless, this group expresses high levels of confusion and a lack of information about politics,

In this regard, the conditions that underlie certainty and uncertainty among the voters are best explained by variables associated with sociological and psychological theories of voting behavior, including level of education, social influence, and political ideology. Adding these elements to the Economic Voting Theory’s claims strengthens the explanatory argument about voting behavior in Brazil. The next chapter discusses the methods used to test this theory.

CHAPTER 3: METHOD

This chapter addresses the methods used in this qualitative case-study to assess

Brazilian’s voting preferences during a national political-economic crisis. Through this approach, it was possible to analyze the data collected in order to develop a deep understating about respondents’ voting behavior. This chapter starts by revisiting the purpose of the thesis, encompassing the goal and hypothesis, followed by the methodology, interviewed participants, procedure, and analytical strategy.

This study focuses on the current political and economic crisis in Brazil, a major event that has increased academic interest. The turmoil has its roots in 2013 when popular protests against governmental expenditure started, followed by the occurrence and disclosure of corruption scandals. Furthermore, the beginning of an economic recession in 2014 resulted in a decrease in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the next three years. This scenario resulted in inflation, depreciation of the national currency and wages, and high rates of unemployment (Mancebo, 2017). In the middle of this situation, the country went through a presidential election in October of 2018; therefore, the focus of this study is to understand how this period of crisis affects voting preferences of Brazil’s citizens.

The hypothesis presented here relies on the Economic Voting Theory’s inference about the impact of the national economic status on people’s voting decisions. In this sense, under the uncertainties and disadvantages of a political-economic crisis, the

Brazilian population would choose to vote for the opposition on the elections. This decision, however, seems to be more complicated in the Brazilian context, considering 44 the large amount of political parties in Brazil and, therefore, the 13 candidates running for office on this previous presidential election. Thus, taking into account the complexities of this choice, relying only on the Economic Theory’s perspective may be limiting when analyzing voting behavior because this approach ignores the important social and cognitive factors that also impact the voters’ decision.

In this regard, I expect variables such as level of education and social class interactions to play an important role in the population’s decision-making process. On one hand, citizens with higher levels of education would be more certain about their vote, even considering the large number of candidates running for presidency. On the other hand, the common beliefs and the political opinions that people of the same social groups share would also impact on their decision in the way that those belonging to the same group would present similar voting choices.

Considering the goal of this study, a qualitative research was conducted in order to comprehend the social occurrence by entering its natural setting. In other words, in view of the purpose of identifying people’s voting preferences during crisis, this method allows the researcher to explain this event by analyzing the individuals’ own experiences and point of views regarding the phenomenon (Stake, 2010). This approach is suitable for when it comes to understanding the relationship between the variables presented here, which are the political-economic crisis in Brazil as the independent variable and its possible impacts on the population’s voting preferences, as the dependent variable.

As qualitative research, this thesis was conducted as a case-study, in which a case is an instance of a given event and a case-study is a well-defined aspect of an episode 45 selected by the researcher for investigation (George & Bennett, 2005). In this category, the focus of the study is to understand an event, a group, or an individual through a comprehensive analysis of a certain matter. According to Starman (2013), “case studies highlight a developmental factor, which means that the cases are generated and evolve over time, often as a series of specific and interrelated events that occur in ‘that particular time and that particular place’ ” (p.31). This quote reminds of the uniqueness of each case, even considering the relevance of applying their study to other cases. In the

Brazilian situation, the current crisis represents a milestone in the country’s history, being different from other recessions that the state went through in the past, and also distinct from other crisis other countries are facing or may face in the future. Therefore, it is important to consider each case’s specificities, either regarding the same country, or when studying a different state.

The sample selected for this research is a small portion of the Brazilian population. I conducted semi-structured interviews with a non-representative sample of citizens of voting age in one of the most political and economic relevant capitals of the country, Belo Horizonte. I selected this city for this field research in Brazil due to its considerable impact on national politics, and also for being located in one of the most important economic and political regions in the country. The main criteria used to select the interviewees were: age, economic class, level of education, and participation in governmental social programs.

As a first requirement, it is important to have in mind that voting in Brazil is optional for citizens of 16 and 17 years old and those above 70 years old, but mandatory 46 for the population of 18 to 70 years old. This range, therefore, was the focus for the research, giving the fact that these voters are obligated to attend the designated polling place and make a decision to whether vote for someone, vote blank, or justify their absence in their original voting place.

Economic class and level of education are important information to inform about patterns of voting behavior. These elements are intrinsically related to the variables of the hypothesis presented earlier, but they are also relevant due to the high level of social- economic inequality in Brazil. This is substantial because people from distinct social and economic classes and, consequently, with distinct levels of education tend to vote differently based on their level of knowledge about politics and the extension of their political engagement within their social groups, as it was highlighted in the previous chapter.

Beyond these criteria, another relevant element for this study is whether the interviewees were part of any governmental social program that provides assistance for the population of lower economic classes. This information may inform about the citizens’ level of approval of the political parties and administrations that created such programs. In this regard, these criteria were chosen with the purpose of enhancing the diversity of the selected sample.

Certain indicators of voting behavior, such as religious affiliation, racial self- identification, and other forms of social identity, were left out of the questionnaire because they do not seem as relevant for voting behavior during presidential elections in

Brazil as the ones addressed in this thesis. That does not mean that these variables are not 47 important in understanding voting behavior in the country. However, based on Brazil’s context during the time the interviews were conducted, and other similar studies about voting behavior during presidential elections, other variables such as the ones analyzed here appeared to have a greater impact on vote decision in the country. These academic works include Nascimento’s (2011) research about the 2006 presidential elections based on interviews made in the city of Salvador in Brazil, and Oliveira’s (2017) qualitative study conducted in the capitals of Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, and São Paulo.

The snowballing sampling strategy was used to recruit interviewees in Belo

Horizonte. This approach allows researchers to contact participants through recommendations of people they know (Robinson, 2014). The interviews were conducted during the summer of 201812 in Belo Horizonte, approximately four months prior the presidential elections in October. After getting in contact with possible interviewees in the city, the researcher arranged to meet them in places such as their houses or any other space where they could talk in private. In total, 21 semi-structured interviews were conducted, lasting for 20 to 40 minutes each approximately. Additional interviews could not be conducted by the researcher due to the reluctance of some citizens to participate under the allegations of discomfort with the topic, lack of knowledge about politics, or disinterest in the theme.

The participants signed the consent form or orally agreed with its terms after reading it. The official questionnaire of these interviews is shown at the Appendix 1 of this thesis. The interviewees responded to a total of 25 questions, without counting

12 The Northern Hemisphere is the reference for this season. The interviews were conducted during the months of June, July, and August of 2018. 48 specific probing questions of each case. The researcher started the interviews by asking the participants about their age, occupation, level of education, and economic class, in order to have a better understanding of their background and to classify them according to the first criteria of the study cited above. The following questions encompassed the citizens’ opinion about politics and the current situation of the country. Furthermore, and only if applied, they were asked about possible solutions for their dissatisfaction with

Brazil’s politics and economy. The next round of questions required the interviewees to indicate their voting intentions for the next elections and to justify their preference. The last set of questions were related to the individuals’ thoughts about the previous administration of the country, possible changes in their living standards, participation in governmental social programs, and their opinion about the programs. At the end of each interview, the participants were asked if they wanted to add any additional comment or information about the topics discussed.

The structure and order of the questions were carefully organized in order to obtain as much information as possible from the interviewees. The targeted data was related to possible ideological inclinations, party or candidate preferences, personal assessment of past administrations, individual interpretation of the crisis and its implications on the country and on their life’s standards. This strategy was used in order to have a broader perspective of the individual’s level of information and opinion about the current crisis and how these elements, coupled with additional variables raised by other questions, help to understand their vote intentions. 49

The interviews were recorded by an electronic device and then transcribed by the researcher who speaks the same native language as the participants. Additional notes were taken during the conversations in order to register more precise reactions, body language, and other relevant information for the study. These memos also include the researcher’s own thoughts about any particular moment of the interview that should be highlighted after conducting them during the data analysis. This procedure is useful as an initial step of the coding process, as it will be addressed next.

The analytical method of this research is the thematic analysis, in which the focus is to emphasize explicit and implicit information from the interviews by grouping them into meaningful themes. This process is conducted by coding the transcriptions, highlighting important ideas, separating and classifying them into sets of data that form specific labeled themes (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012). This procedure was made manually by going through each interview and their memos. This strategy decreases the chances of the researcher to focus only on some ideas, rather than considering all the relevant aspects of each interview (Stake, 2010).

The first step of the coding process is to carefully read all the interviews to become acquainted with the data and to notice the emergence of patterns of meaning that later will be classified under certain themes (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012). The next phase encompassed the creation of initial codes or open codes and the interpretation of their meanings. Once these codes were created, they were then grouped into specific themes. At this point, it was possible to have an idea of the extent to which the data seemed to corroborate or contradict the hypothesis of the thesis. During this process, it 50 was necessary to revisit initial codes and compare them to new ones in order to make concise connections. This step was important to observe whether the themes reached a consistent theoretical basis. If not, it would be required to revise the codes and themes to identify inconsistencies or misinterpretations (Boyatzis, 1998).

Once these processes were covered, it was interesting to organize the answers and consequently their connections with the themes on figures, such as tables and graphics.

This was carried out to have a broader understanding of the main claims of this study.

These figures will be explained in the following chapter, in which the results and the analysis will be presented in this section.

CHAPTER 4: BRAZILIANS’ VOTING PREFERENCES DURING THE PERIOD OF

CRISIS

This chapter presents the results of the case-study about the voting choices of a non-representative sample of the Brazilian population during a period of crisis. The hypothesis for this inquiry is based on the Economic Voting Theory’s inference about voters choosing the opposition during elections when the national economy presents negative results. However, this approach does not fully explain the Brazilian voter under the condition of crisis. This is because this theory disregards important explanatory variables about voting decision, such as social and psychological motivations. Moreover, some specificities of the Brazilian context, such as the significant number of political parties in the country and the difficulties in measuring partisanship in Brazil enhance the complexities of this decision-making process. Therefore, a considerable level of uncertainty among the participants about their voting choices is expected, and the main explanatory variable for certainty and uncertainty among the voters in this case is level of education. Ideological inclinations and the impact of social interactions then play a role in explaining the voting decision of those who are more certain about their preferences.

The goal of this study is to understand how a political-economic crisis impacts the population’s voting choices and the relevance of not only the economic factor, but also the importance of social and psychological variables in explaining people’s preferences.

Based on this purposes, this chapter briefly addresses the methods applied in this research; the results of the analysis with the use of tables, figures, and the discussion 52 about these results; and the final remarks that tie this analysis back to the theoretical discussion of this thesis.

These results draw on 21 interviews conducted in the city of Belo Horizonte in

Brazil with citizens of voting age from different economic classes. In order to understand the content of the data, I used thematic analysis to code the interviews and then group them into meaningful themes. Throughout this chapter, these main themes will be presented along with tables, figures, and direct quotations that will facilitate understanding their significance for this thesis’s purposes.

Main Themes from the Data

The topics covered by the questions during the interviews and the common answers and reactions from the participants revealed patterns of meanings and standard responses that answer the research question of this thesis. For instance, the participants’ voting choices, their level of dissatisfaction with the country’s politics and economy, their opinion about the previous administration, their level of education, economic class, and their relevance in explaining the interviewees’ voting choices will be presented below. These are the main topics that emerged from the data and they are directly related to the research question and hypothesis of this thesis.

Perception of the Economy and National Politics as Necessarily Linked

Before understanding this study’s respondents’ opinion about Brazil’s political and economic aspects, it is important to highlight their general perceptions of these terms in first place. When asked about their levels of concern about these aspects of Brazil, approximately 80% of the participants directly affirmed that both elements are linked and 53 that the national economy is highly dependent on the country’s political policies and politicians’ decisions, as seen below:

“Politics creates the economy of the country, so competent politicians are able to

change the economy of the country.”13

“The economic situation is bad because of the political class. If the political class

and the political situation were to stabilize, an economic improvement would be

the reflection of it.”14

“The political situation is worrying because [the politicians] have the power to

change the economy, right? And since they are tied to businessmen, they will not

do this, so this power is totally wasted. They have the power to change the

economy, but they do not create laws for it.”15

“I think that without the politicians there is no economy, and vice versa. So I

could care slightly more about maintaining the political order rather than the

economic progress, because in the long run, if politics is organized, economic

progress will be a consequence of a good political administration.”16

These direct quotes show that most of the respondents perceive the national economy as a direct outcome of political decisions made by the politicians in office. In a

13 “A política faz a economia do país, então tem que pôr político competente pra mudar a economia do país” (Participant 007) (Translated by the author). 14 “A situação econômica está ruim devido à classe política. Se a classe política e a situação política conseguissem se estabilizar, a melhora econômica seria um reflexo” (Participant 009) (Translated by the author). 15 “A situação política é preocupante, porque eles têm o poder de mudar, né? E como eles são vinculados aos empresários, eles não vão fazer isso, então é um poder totalmente desperdiçado. Eles têm o poder de mudar, mas eles não fazem leis pra isso” (Participant 012) (Translated by the author). 16 “Eu acho que sem o político não existe o econômico, e vice versa. Então eu poderia dar um peso de um pouco mais importante manter a ordem política do que o progresso econômico, porque ao longo prazo, se você tiver uma organização política, o pregresso econômico vai ser uma consequência de uma boa organização política” (Participant 024) (Translated by the author). 54 context of economic crisis, therefore, citizens that believe in this dynamic would tend to blame these officials for the negative economic performance of their country, which may be a naïve perception of both spheres.

The goal of highlighting this point is not to detach politics from economy, or claim that one does not influence the other. Rather, the emphasis here is on voters’ incomplete or deficient understanding of how national politics and economy actually works. Typically, citizens ignore the impact the international economy, for instance, has on domestic dynamics. In the Brazilian case, the Chinese economy’s slowdown that started in 2014 was enough to undercut Brazil’s economy, due to the Brazil’s reliance on commodity exports (Alvarenga & Laporta, 2015).

Citizens’ perceptions about the Brazilian economy and politics thus affects their entire evaluation of the national economy when voting. As claimed by the Economic

Voting Theory, the population’s opinion about these topics shapes their voting preferences. However, it is important to keep in mind that citizens are not fully informed, or even minimally informed, about the real dynamics between politics and economy, which creates a gap between reality and the population’s perception of it. In this sense, the data below is based on the respondents’ own understanding about these two elements and illustrates the opinions and preferences that derive from their perceptions of their environment.

Dissatisfaction with Brazil’s Politics and Economy

Most of the participants interviewed for this research exposed their frustration about Brazil’s political and economic status. Even the interviewees who did not expand 55 much on their explanations or provide more details about their opinion, also expressed disappointment with the country’s economy and political arrangements. The table below shows the most common topics raised by the participants related to their opinion about politics in Brazil. The respondents broadly expressed a general dissatisfaction with the country’s economic and political aspects.

Table 1

Overall Opinion about Politics in Brazil

Corruption was the most cited reason of discontentment among the participants regarding their country. Eighteen interviewees out of the twenty-one in total directly 56 mentioned corruption as the main flaw of the Brazilian politics. As a result of corruption and the common disregard of politicians towards the citizens, approximately the same amount of participants highlighted that the Brazilian population is the most harmed in this process. Most of the interviewees affirmed that the population “pays the price” of the corruption in the country and its corollaries, as seen in the examples below:

“The economy, as we have seen and suffered to this day, all of it is related to the

political issue of corruption […]. We are suffering because of the taxes and all the

consequences of corruption in everything we see.”17

“The situation is very chaotic because of corruption, it is very bad. We do not

have a government, a policy focused on social issues, which should be the case.

Focus on education, health [...]. All this carelessness scares people, people are

afraid. It is really complicated, it is a very unstable situation.”18

“Unfortunately things are bad. Corruption, lack of responsibility on the part of the

government officials, bad administration [...]. The longstanding corruption of

years ago that came out now, the misuse of public money, robberies.”19

Other relevant, but less cited topics were related to the governing elite in Brazil that works based on achieving their own personal goals and interests, which is also linked

17 “A economia aí, igual a gente viu e tá sofrendo até hoje , tudo foi a questão política aí da corrupção [...]. Aí nós estamos sofrendo com os impostos e todas as consequências da corrupção em tudo que se vê” (Participant 010) (Translated by the author). 18 “A situação está muito caótica por causa da corrupção, muito ruim. A gente não tem um governo, uma política focada mesmo em questões sociais, o que deveria ser. Focar em educação, saúde [...]. Todo esse descaso assusta as pessoas, as pessoas tão com medo. Aí tá bem complicado mesmo, tá um situação bem instável.” (Participant 017) (Translated by the author). 19 “Infelizmente as coisas estão ruins. Corrupção, falta de responsabilidade por parte dos governantes, péssima administração [...] A corrupção de longas datas, de anos atrás e que veio estourar agora, o mau uso do dinheiro público, os roubos.” (Participant 016) (Translated by the author). 57 to corruption, mismanagement of public money, and the misuse of the country’s natural resources.

“[Politics in Brazil] is governed by the rich, by the businessman. Therefore I think

it is not good, so I think it is biased. It will always favor the ones in power.”20

“Regarding the economy, we could be a great power, because Brazil is gigantic

country, with several resources, several things. It just does not happen because

they [the politicians] do not care, the guys do not care, they just want to steal.”21

A valid point to emphasize is the emphasis that seven participants put on the

Brazilian populations’ lack of knowledge about politics as a major determinant for the country’s flawed politics.

“My opinion is that [the country’s situation] could improve if we learn how to

vote, if the people learn how to vote, learn to choose the candidate, understand

what politics is.”22

“It is interesting to have a renewal, because the politicians who are there are not

good. Otherwise, you are coherent and vote by checking Ficha Limpa23, we have

20 “Ela é governada pelos ricos, pelo empresário. Por isso eu acho que ela não é boa, por isso eu acho que ela é tendenciosa. Ela vai sempre favorecer aqueles que governam.” (Participant 012) (Translated by the author). 21 “Em questão de economia, a gente poderia ser uma potência gigantesca, porque o Brasil é gigantesco, o país, com vários recursos, várias coisas. Só que não vai pra frente porque eles não tá nem aí, os cara tá nem aí, eles só quer roubar.” (Participant 023) (Translated by the author). 22 “A minha opinião é que tinha tudo pra melhorar se a gente aprender a votar, o povo aprender a votar, aprender a escolher o candidato, entender o que é política.” (Participant 004) (Translated by the author). 23 Ficha Limpa is a Brazilian law that reinforces accountability by publicizing the politicians’ actions and possible involvement with dishonest practices. 58

the Ficha Limpa for this, but only, I think less than 2% of the population has this

awareness.”24

At the same time, 70% of the participants said that the Brazil’s economic performance is deeply linked to the country’s political dynamics, affirming that the economic crisis and the political crisis Brazil is going through are both mutually constituted and related. These interviewees also stated that in order to improve the country’s economy, it is necessary to improve the political situation.

“The economic situation is bad because of the political class. If the political

situation were to stabilize, an economic improvement would be a reflection.”25

“The economy goes hand in hand with the politics of the country. When the

economy goes bad, the population loses in several aspects in the sense of

purchasing power and several other things, which is what the population is usually

concerned about: these immediate concerns. It also negatively affects the

government, because much of the investments come from the Brazilian

government. So it really is very disturbing. But I think politics [in Brazil] is also

very worrying, because it is the government officials who adopt a series of

policies and formulate laws that also directly affect the population, companies,

people who are interested in starting investment, and so on. So, for me, the

economy and politics are equally important and go hand in hand. We are in a

24 “É interessante você ter uma renovação, porque os políticos que estão aí não são bons. Ou então você ter coerência e votar conferindo a Ficha Limpa, nós temos a Ficha Limpa pra isso, mas só que, eu acho que menos de 2% da população que vai ter essa consciência.” (Participant 009) (Translated by the author). 25 “A situação econômica está ruim devido à classe política. Se a situação política conseguisse se estabilizar, a melhora econômica seria um reflexo.” Participant 009) (Translated by the author). 59

moment of crisis in which we must rethink the way of doing politics in Brazil and

address the also concerning economic aspect.”26

Addressing the political problems in the country and then the economic issues related to the current crisis are the final comments of the respondents that link their perception of the overall conditions of the country throughout its history with more recent events. The population’s dissatisfaction with politics in Brazil in a general aspect is particularly related to corruption practices, disregards with the population, and all the consequences of those for the citizens, especially the ones belonging to lower classes.

This reinforces their concern and disappointment with the political-economic crisis of the present. In this sense, before understanding how this impacts on their voting decision, it is important first to consider their opinion about the 12 years of the administration of the leftist party PT (Workers Party – Partido dos Trabalhadores) in Brazil.

Evaluation of the PT Administration

The Workers’ Party governed Brazil from 2003 to 2015 by Lula during two mandates and then by Dilma Rousseff until her impeachment during the former president’s second term in 2016. Throughout this period, Brazil presented a relevant economic growth and poverty alleviation, which is deeply linked to the creation of social programs during this era. At the same time, the scandals of corruption and the negative

26 “A economia e política do país nadam lado a lado. Quando a economia vai mal, a população perde em vários aspectos no sentido de poder de compra e várias outras coisas, que é o que a população geralmente tá preocupada é com essas preocupações imediatas. Afeta de forma negativa o governo também, porque grande parte do investimento vem do governo do Brasil. Então, realmente é muito preocupante. Mas, eu acho que a política também é muito preocupante, porque são os governantes que adotam uma série de políticas e formulam leis que também afetam diretamente a população, as empresa, as pessoas que estão interessadas em empreender e tudo mais. Então, pra mim a economia e política são igualmente importantes e andam lado a lado. Estamos num momento de crise que é preciso repensar a forma de fazer política no Brasil e cuidar da economia também preocupante.” (Participant 025) (Translated by the author). 60 economic performance of the country that emerged towards the last few years of the PT government significantly marked the party and these years of administration.

Understanding the popular opinion about the PT administration, considering its positive and negative aspects, is important to create a sense about people’s possible ideological inclinations and also their evaluation of the current situation in Brazil from a prospective assessment. These elements, coupled with the participants’ perception of

Brazil’s politics and economy, as seen in the previous section, assist in understanding their voting preferences during this time. In this regard, the table below shows the percentage of people who approve, partially approve, or disapprove the PT administration in Brazil and their justifications for each opinion.

Table 2

General Evaluation of the PT Administration

As seen in the table above, the justifications for the level of approval or disapproval of the PT’s 12 years of administration in Brazil are similar, according to the participants’ answers. Those who approved the party’s government mentioned that the creation of the social programs, investment in health and education systems, and consequently the decrease in the national level of poverty were significant for the country, which is why they approve the PT administration. This percentage of participants (19%) who approve the PT also mentioned a special sympathy for Lula or

Dilma, former presidents of the country during the PT era. Most of those who totally approved the PT administration are beneficiaries or former beneficiaries of some governmental social program, as noticeable in their comments below:

“Even considering the flaws, the PT helped the poor. Lula, despite all the

problems, was the one who helped the poor the most. […] A lot of jobs were

created during his administration. […]. I was part of Bolsa Família [social

program] and my daughter was enrolled in an administrative course because of

it.”27

“I liked Dilma, I liked her government. [...] I think that after all, before it

happened [Rousseff’s impeachment], she always found a way of fixing things.

[...] I still receive Bolsa Família [social program]. It is not much, but it helps.”28

27 “Apesar de tudo, o PT foi o que ajudou os pobre. O Lula, apesar de todos os problema dele, foi o que mais ajudou os pobre. [...] No governo dele teve muito emprego, muita coisa. [...] Eu era parte do Bolsa Família e ganhei um curso administrativo pra minha menina.” (Participant 011) (Translated by the author). 28 “Eu gostava da Dilma, gostei do governo dela. [...] Eu acho que apesar de tudo, antes de acontecer, sempre ela dava um jeitinho de consertar. [...] Eu ainda recebo o Bolsa Família. É pouco, mas ajuda.” (Participant 014) (Translated by the author). 62

The percentage of interviewees who totally disapproved the PT administration was lower (14%); however, these participants also brought to the conversation the main topics of dissatisfaction about politics in general in Brazil that were covered in the previous section. Although the interviewees affirmed that corruption and a government ruled by the elite are common conditions of politics in Brazil that persist for centuries, the participants blamed the PT for the current political and economic crisis. According to them, the PT administrations worsen the Brazilian economy after years in power and intensified corruption practices in general.

“[The PT administration] was disappointing. [...] I voted for him [Lula], I thought

he would be the change, he was just one more who governed for the lower classes

with the intention of getting votes, but he was one more that was only corrupt, if

not one of the most corrupt.”29

“For me, it is totally disapproved [PT administration]. Look at what we are living

now, suffering because of corruption, so it is heavy. They [the PT] invested only

in things that could give them votes, [...] [they] invested in a World Cup that only

brought debt [to the country] and in the construction of stadiums in a places where

there is no need for that, while there are hospitals that need this investments, a lot

of things.”30

29 “Foi decepcionante. [...] Eu fui um que votei nele, eu achei que ele seria a mudança, ele foi só mais um que governou para classes mais baixas com o intuito de angariar votos, mas foi mais um que só foi corrupto, senão um dos mais.” (Participant 009) (Translated by the author). 30 Pra mim, totalmente reprovado. Olha o que nós estamos agora vivendo, sofrendo com a corrupção, então é pesado. Investiram só em coisas que poderiam dar voto, [...] investiu numa Copa do Mundo que só trouxe dívida e construção de estádio em lugar que nem precisa, sendo que tem hospitais precisando, várias coisas.” (Participant 010) (Translated by the author). 63

However, the majority of the participants partially approve the PT administration

(67%). They presented the same positive comments of those who approve the government as pros, and the same critical opinion of the ones who disapprove the PT administration as cons. In this sense, most of the participants believe that the social programs created by the PT were significant in alleviating poverty in the country.

Furthermore, the investment in college education was one of the most prominent results of the PT administration, according to this group. However, they also agree that along with these positive outcomes, this government presented some flaws, such as deficient monitoring of those benefitted by the social programs, which also exposes a poor administration. Moreover, the unprecedented scandals of corruption and the economic crisis negatively marked the PT administration and cannot be ignored.

“[The PT administration was] partially positive. I think that a certain level of

assistance is good, because it has given opportunity to many people who have

never had it. I believe that the social programs were not totally bad, the problem is

that, as anything else in Brazil, there is a lack of criteria. There are a lot of people

that are retired, that should not be assisted; there are a lot of people who receive

the governmental assistance that should not receive it. We witnessed a scandal

involving a rich person, who has a good purchasing power receiving Bolsa

Família. That is my criticism of this type of government, a lot of people benefit

from something that they should not benefit.”31

31 “Por parte positivo. Eu acho que o assistencialismo de certa forma e bom, porque levou oportunidade pra muita gente que nunca teve. Eu acredito que as bolsas, elas não foram totalmente ruins não, o problema é que, como qualquer coisa no Brasil, fica sem critério. Tem muita gente que é aposentada, que não deveria tá recebendo, tem muita gente que recebe bolsa que não deveria receber. Já teve escândalo envolvendo 64

“I think the PT had some breakthroughs, they were smarter in a way, because they

provided some progress in education that was never thought before. [It includes]

increasing the number of vacancies, increasing the access to public education

institutions, to the best education institutions, also the private ones with their

governmental incentive and scholarships. That was very important and worth

it.”32

“The PT helped the lower class a lot, the poor who were hungry in Brazil. That

certainly lifted a lot of people out of hunger, people who got Bolsa Familia and

those things, although a lot of people went into it irregularly, since they did not

need it, but [the social programs] helped, at least with the issue of hunger [...]. But

the corruption was too strong. A lot of corrupt politician came out during the PT

era; Mensalão [corrupt scandal], Lava Jato [Federal Police’s investigation of

corrupt practices], the Federal Police never worked as much as during the PT

government and never arrested so many politician as during the PT

government.”33

pessoa que é rica, que tem um bom poder aquisitivo recebendo Bolsa Família. A minha crítica desse tipo de governo é isso, e aí muita gente se beneficia de coisa que não deveria se beneficiar.” (Participant 008) (Translated by the author). 32 “Eu acho que ele teve alguns avanços, o PT, ele agiu de certa forma, de forma mais inteligente, porque ele proporcionou alguns avanços na educação que isso nunca foi pensado. De ampliar vagas, de ampliar o acesso à instituição pública de ensino, às instituições melhores de ensino, privadas também com incentivo do governo, bolsas. Isso foi muito importante e valeu a pena.” (Participant 012) (Translated by the author). 33 O PT ajudou muito a classe baixa, os pobres que passavam muita fome no Brasil. Isso aí com certeza, tirou muita gente da fome, gente que aí arrumou Bolsa Família e essas coisas aí, apesar de que muita gente entrou irregular nisso aí, que não precisava , mas ajudou, pelo menos com a fome, ele combateu muito isso [...]. Mas a corrupção foi forte demais. Apareceu muito político corrupto no tempo do PT, foi o Mensalão, Lava Jato, a polícia federal nunca trabalhou tanto quanto nesse governo do PT e nunca prendeu tanto político nesse governo PT. 65

In addition to the participants’ perception about the PT administration, their opinions about the social programs that emerged during this era are related to their own evaluation of the party’s 12 years of government as well. The table below provides a notion about the amount of people who approves, partially approves, or disapproves the social programs in the same logic as the table about their general opinion of the overall

PT administration.

Table 3

Evaluation of the Government's Social Programs

The social programs boosted by the PT administration are one of the most prominent results of this government that reduced the level of poverty in Brazil and assisted the lower classes of the country with a monthly economic assistance or college scholarships, for instance. The difference between the table above and the one about the participants’ general opinion about the PT administration is that some of the respondents who partially approved the government overall, totally approved the social programs. 66

Beneficiaries and former beneficiaries of these social programs are also part of this group. They defended the existence of such programs, but affirmed that the assistance provided by the government is limited.

Those who partially approve the social programs support this initiative for the same reasons mentioned by the group who totally approve them. Assisting the lower social-economic classes in Brazil and lifting people out of poverty are significant roles of the social programs. However, according to these participants, these programs are not entirely effective; since they have a deficient monitoring that allows families and individuals who do not need the assistance to receive it, as already mentioned in the quotes above. Additionally, this group believes that the beneficiaries become dependent on the governmental support, not acting towards finding a job or another source of revenue.

The same participants who disapproved of the PT administration also criticized the social programs created by this government. As well as those who partially approved the programs, this group also believes these policies are not well supervised, thus benefiting who does not need governmental assistance. Those who rejected the idea of the social programs also stated that this practice is a strategy of the incumbent party to gain votes and popular approval, rather than a real commitment with assisting the population. These ideas and opinions about the Brazilian politics and economy, coupled with the participants’ evaluation of the PT administration, draw the reasoning line that explains their voting preferences that are shown in the following section. 67

Voting Preference

The participants’ opinions about the topics covered in the previous two sections are crucial in understanding one of the most important questions of the interviews, their voting preference for the 2018 elections, as seen below:

Table 4

Vote Choice

Based on the Economic Theory’s premise about the relationship between the populations’ vote and the economic performance of the country and the data presented in the previous sections, it is now possible to have a more defined notion about the respondents’ preferences. The political-economic crisis Brazil is currently going through and the consequent popular disapproval about both spheres in the country led the voters to choose the opposition in the elections, rather than voting for the incumbent party. As shown in the table above, only one participant intended to vote for Lula in the 2018 elections, in case the former president ran for the position again. The remaining 20 respondents either chose to vote blank, or considered the opposition that encompasses 68 some candidates among the 13 options they had, or they were still uncertain about their decision.

Additional information that reinforces the prediction of the Economic Theory about citizens tending to choose the opposition when they negatively evaluate their current government and national economic performance was the respondents’ wish for a renewal in the country’s politics. More than half of the participants stated that a new president or a renovation of the entire political class in Brazil would be the best options to improve the current situation in the country, as demonstrated in the table below:

Table 5

Possible Options to Improve Brazil's Political and Economic Situation

Five participants pointed out their discontentment towards Michel Temer’s administration, although this topic was briefly touched by few of them. This, coupled with the general dissatisfaction with the political class in general, led a considerable number of respondents (52%) to believe that Brazil’s political-economic conditions will change with the election of a new and honest head of the state not related to the PT. This 69 demonstrates people’s distrust of the incumbent party and expectations that voting for the opposition will improve the situation.

“There has to be a more drastic change in the political and economic model […].

The country needs order, order and progress, which is written in our national flag,

but does not exist. Brazil needs someone to follow a tougher line of repression to

corruption.”34

“I imagine a person who is different from this political class in order to fight

corruption. [...] Actually, it would be necessary to change the whole political

class, [...] the president only cannot do much without the support of the

government, congressmen and senators.”35

“The first thing really will be to change this government, to elect a new

president.”36

“It is necessary to find someone who wants to govern the country without this

robbery, without corruption. [Someone who] at least tries to be honest.”37

A considerable part of the participants affirmed that a political reform in Brazil, or governmental investment in education – so the population will be better informed about politics in the future – are more effective options to improve the country’s situation.

34 “Tem que ter uma mudança mais drástica no modelo político e econômico [...]. O país precisa de ordem, ordem e progresso, que é o que tá na nossa bandeira e não existe. O Brasil precisa de alguém que siga uma linha mais dura mesmo de repressão à corrupção.” (Participant 008) (Translated by the author). 35 “Eu imagino que uma pessoa que seja diferente dessa classe política pra que a gente comece a combater a corrupção. [...] Na verdade teria que mudar toda a classe política, [...] só o presidente não consegue fazer nada se não tiver o apoio do governo, deputados e senadores.” (Participant 009) (Translated by the author). 36 “A primeira coisa realmente vai ser mudar esse governo, eleger um novo presidente.” (Participant 013) (Translated by the author). 37 “Tem que arrumar alguém que queira governar o país sem essa roubalheira, sem corrupção. Pelo menos tentar ser honesto.” (Participant 021) (Translated by the author). 70

“Prohibiting private sponsorship of political parties is an option to improve the

country’s situation. [...] The number of political parties in Brazil should be

reduced as well.”38

“Changing the Brazilians’ mindset would be compelling, but a utopian solution.

[...] A first step towards improving the country's situation would be to strengthen

the three powers [executive, legislative, and judiciary]. [...] Eliminate corruption

in the judicial system. Create a legislative system with stricter laws, establishing

corruption as a crime, for example, are steps towards improving the country's

situation.”39

“In the short run, a political reform is needed to revise the number of politicians in

power and the amount of their benefits.”40

A small portion of the respondents believe that once corruption is not a problem in Brazil anymore, the political and economic situation of the country will improve. This group, however, did not elaborate much on possible paths to achieve this goal.

After understanding the Brazilians’ dissatisfaction with the current political and economic status of the country with the assistance of the Economic Theory’s arguments, it is possible to notice their preference for a change in the country’s presidency, thus

38 “A proibição do patrocínio de partidos políticos é uma opção para melhorar a situação do país. [...] O número de partidos políticos no Brasil também tinha que ser reduzido.” (Participant 012) (Translated by the author). 39 “Mudar a mentalidade do brasileiro seria conveniente, mas uma solução utópica. [...] Um primeiro passo para melhorar a situação do país seria fortalecer os três poderes. [...] Eliminar a corrupção do sistema judicial. Criar um sistema legislativo com leis mais rígidas, estabelecer a corrupção como crime, por exemplo, é um passo para melhorar a situação do país.” (Participant 018) (Translated by the author). 40 “Num curto período, tem que ter uma reforma política para revisar o número de políticos no poder e o a quantidade de benefícios que eles têm também.” (Participant 022) (Translated by the author).

71 choosing to vote for the opposition in the elections. However, this tradition does not explain the variance of the responses among the participants. First, the distinction between the two groups of voters, those voters who were certain and those who were still uncertain about their choice, is relevant and need explanation, as well as the different vote intentions of those who are certain about their decision. As suggested in the

Literature Review, the level of education of the participants is the major variable that explains the distinction between certain and uncertain respondents. The variation within the group that is certain about their vote is understood through their ideological inclinations and both aspects will be covered in the next two sections.

Level of Education and the Vote

The main variable that underlines the difference between voters who are certain of their vote, and those who are uncertain about it, is level of education. Participants with higher levels of education tended to be more certain about their decision than those with lower levels of education, as seen in the figures below: 72

Figure 2: Level of Education of Participants Certain about their Vote

Figure 3: Level of Education of Participants Uncertain about their Vote

The participants with higher levels of education were not only certain about their vote, as they were also more informed about politics and recent events in Brazil. 73

Although their vote choices were different, the quality of their discourse was similar.

Conversely, the uncertain voters did not elaborate much on their answers, presenting low levels of information about politics and the current situation of Brazil.

This evidence corroborates the argument presented in the second chapter of this thesis that claimed that the level of education is an important variable in explaining citizens’ relationship with their vote. People with higher levels of education are usually more informed about politics, presenting a more refined opinion about the topic, a possible ideological inclination, and voting preferences, while the groups with lower level of education present opposite characteristics, as argued by the socio-psychological theories of voting behavior and confirmed by the data of this study. The variable underlying the variation within this group of people with higher levels of education, and then more informed about politics and certain about their vote, is represented by these respondents’ ideological inclinations, as exposed in the next section.

Ideological Inclination and the Vote

The group of voters who are certain about their choice presented different preferences related to their vote for president in the last elections that are explained based on these people’s ideological inclinations. As seen in the previous chapter, identifying the ideological preferences of the Brazilian population is not an easy task, particularly because the majority of the population does not understand the concept of political ideology or their own preferences in this scale (Turgeon, 2015). Nevertheless, through the analysis of this group’s discourse and opinions, it was possible to notice their ideological inclination. The participants’ evaluation of the PT administration and the 74 social programs emerged during this period and certainly their justification about their voting preference also provided a consistent basis to identify this group’s ideological inclination.

As seen in the figure and table that represent the participants’ voting preferences for the 2018 presidential election, the four mentioned candidates were Jair Bolsonaro,

Ciro Gomes, João Amoedo, and Lula. Bolsonaro, from the Social Liberal Party (PSL –

Partido Social Liberal), a right-wing conservative political party, defends a Christian discourse, supporting nationalist and anti-communist ideals, privatization, and economic liberalization. Bolsonaro is against popular debated topics such as abortion, liberalization of marijuana, and the questions related to gender identity (PSL, 2018). In his social media and interviews during his campaign, the candidate also advocated for traditional values related to family and religion, also presenting racist, misogynist, and homophobic ideals (Cioccari & Persichetti, 2018).

Conversely, Ciro Gomes, from the Democratic Labor Party (PDT – Partido

Democrático Trabalhista), is a center-left/left politician with a liberal discourse focused on social issues (PDT, 2018), similar to PT. The Workers’ Party another center-left to left-wing party that advocates for social causes, and the reduction of oppression, exploitation, oppression, and injustice in Brazil (PT, 2018). As indicated in the introduction of this thesis, during the time when the interviews for this research were conducted, the PT had not presented an official candidate for the country’s presidency.

Fernando Haddad was the party’s final choice, once Lula’s candidacy was denied.

However, both candidates and parties represent the left in this study. 75

Last, although João Amoedo is part of the New Party (PN – Partido Novo), considered as center-right to right wing, the candidate had a more liberal liberal that fit between the Bolsonaro’s PDT and Lula’s PT. In this context, it is relevant to emphasize that the leftist parties in Brazil are not extremist and do not strongly advocate for a communist regime in the country, particularly the two leftist parties mentioned above.

The New Party has also a more centrist discourse, being Bolsonaro’s party, PDT, the only radical party among the others existing in this study’s data. Based on this information and the answers of the Brazilians who participated in this research, it was possible to have a notion about the respondents’ ideological inclinations in a right/left range.

On one hand, rightist and more conservative participants chose Bolsonaro as their voting options, presenting low levels of approval of the PT administration and a strong belief in the figure of a far-right wing candidate as hope and salvation for the country. On the other hand, leftist voters demonstrate a strong preference for Ciro Gomes, although few of them intended to vote for Amoedo, who defended a more liberal discourse although representing a center-right party, or Lula, also from a center-left/leftist party, as

Gomes. Contrary to Bolsonaro’s voters, this group presented high levels of approval or partially approval of the PT administration. Furthermore, most of these voters also positioned themselves against Bolsonaro and his radical and conservative discourse. The figures and quotations below demonstrate this logic. 76

Figure 4: Evaluation of the PT Administration According to Bolsonaro's Electorate

The figure above shows that half of the participants who intended to vote for

Bolsonaro partially approved the PT administration and its social programs, whereas the other half completely disapproved them. These voters blamed the PT for the current political-economic crisis Brazil faces and affirmed the country’s social, economic, and political aspects considerably worsened after Lula and Dilma’s administrations. This group presented a more rightist discourse and high levels of trust in the figure of

Bolsonaro as the representation of hope and improvement for Brazil.

Those who partially approved the PT government, acknowledge the necessary assistance provided to the poor population in the country through the social programs, but highlighted the inefficacies of them as well, focusing more on the negative aspects of the administration. One of the respondents affirmed to be conservative, justifying then his vote for Bolsonaro: 77

“I am more conservative, but it is not only that. It is a matter of a more radical

change that I believe the country needs and I think there is a lot of talk about him

[Bolsonaro] that I do not agree with. [...] I do not believe that he is an extremist

and that he will be unfair with minorities as they say.”41

The other participants did not classify their ideological preferences; nevertheless, all of them presented a similar rightist discourse.

“[Bolsonaro’s] ideas are close to mine, at least regarding what is related to justice

[…]. He is not corrupt, at least his name has never been in the newspaper, or

anything, and he really likes the law, the right thing. [...] He demonstrates that he

will put some order in this situation.”42

“[…] because I see this renewal in him [Bolsonaro]. He may be a difficult pill to

swallow, but he will be difficult to swallow for those who are corrupt, for those

who are not trying to improve Brazil. [...] I see no other promise to improve this

issue of corruption coming from another candidate.”43

Two out of the total of four people in this research that defended Bolsonaro are part of the military police of the state of Minas Gerais, a group that was largely supporting the candidate during this campaign. This reinforces the Socio-Psychological

41 “Eu sou mais conservador , mas não por isso mesmo. É uma questão de mudança mais radical que eu acredito que o país precise e eu acho que tem muita coisa que se fala a respeito dele que eu não concordo. [...] Eu não acredito que ele seja extremista e que vai ser ruim pras minoras como falam.” (Participant 008) (Translated by the author). 42 “As ideias dele são as que mais se aproximam das minhas, pelo menos em matéria de justiça [...]. Ele não é corrupto, pelo menos o nome dele nunca saiu no jornal, nem nada, e ele gosta muito de lei certa, de coisa certa. [...] Ele demonstra que vai colocar um pouco de ordem nessa história.” (Participant 007) (Translated by the author). 43 [...] porque eu enxergo nele essa renovação. Pode ser um remédio difícil de engolir, mas vai ser difícil de engolir pra quem é corrupto, pra quem não está tentando melhorar o Brasil. [...] Não vejo nenhuma outra promessa de melhorar essa questão da corrupção em outro candidato.” (Participant 009) (Translated by author). 78 theories of voting behavior that emphasize the strong influence that social groups have on the individuals’ voting choices.

As opposed to Bolsonaro’s voters, the respondents that had Ciro Gomes as their voting choice presented a better evaluation of the PT administration.

Figure 5: Evaluation of the PT Administration According to Ciro Gomes' Electorate

Most of these interviewees partially approved the 12 years of the leftist party’s government. Although they had similar opinions as part of Bolsonaro’s voters related to the PT administration, these group presented more positive comments about this party than the conservative respondents. Their discourse revealed more liberal preferences and this group also positioned themselves against Bolsonaro. 79

“I still have to be sure about my vote [...], but what I do not really want is

Bolsonaro to win. I do not think he is going to be a positive choice for the

country. I think he is very radical, so I am considering Ciro so far as an option.”44

“Bolsonaro does not represent me, I think he... I think he is ironic, you know, I

think he does not take his proposals seriously, he does not take them seriously.

And first, I think it is even anti-Christian to talk about religion coupled with

politics and, in this case, he does not represent me.”45

“I am definitely not voting for Bolsonaro [...]. I know that I will not vote for a

rightist candidate [...]. I want to vote for someone who thinks of investing in

social issues. The economy is important, of course, but I prefer to vote for

someone who will address social matters.”46

Besides presenting a more liberal discourse that goes against Bolsonaro’s ideals, which underpins these participants’ preference for a more leftist candidate, it does not mean that they considered voting for the PT. This reinforces the Economic Voting

Theory’s argument about the opposition that, in Brazil’s case, does not necessarily mean another candidate with an opposed ideology. Ciro Gomes’ electorate then reveals the impact of ideological and personal traits in defining the vote as well. Most of the

44 “Eu ainda vou me certificar desse voto [...], mas o que eu não quero de jeito nenhum realmente é o Bolsonaro. Não acho que ele vai ser uma escolha positiva pro país. Eu acho ele muito radical, daí eu penso no Ciro até agora como opção.” (Participant 013) (Translated by the author). 45 “Bolsonaro não me representa, eu acho que ele faz... eu acho que ele ironiza, sabe, eu acho que ele não leva a sério, as propostas dele, não leva a sério. E primeiro, assim, eu acho que é até anti-cristão, em falar em religião com a política que, no caso dele, não me representa.” (Participant 016) (Translated by the author). 46 “Eu com certeza não vou votar no Bolsonaro [...]. Eu sei que de direita não [...]. Quero votar em alguém que pense em investir em questões mais sociais mesmo. A economia é importante, é com certeza, mas eu prefiro votar em alguém que vá trabalhar com questões sociais.” (Participant 013) (Translated by the author). 80 respondents that planned to vote for Gomes also emphasized that he was not the best option; rather, the candidate was just not intolerably unacceptable as the other options.

“[...] I have no favorites. I am not much of a party advocate. I would not vote for

an alternative [to Ciro Gomes], because maybe s/he would not have the strength ...

I would vote for a candidate who is able to go to the second run.”47

“[...] because it has to be someone with the courage to say no to the elite, those

who are rich. So you must have enough courage and you also have to give up on

illicit enrichment that ends up attracting the politician, easy enrichment. Then it

has to be someone like that, and he [Ciro Gomes] could try.”48

“The options so far do not please me. I do not intend to vote for Jair Bolsonaro

under any circumstance, I do not want to vote for any representative of the PT

either. I have read something about Ciro Gomes, so maybe he is […] the best

among the worst.”49

The same logic is applied to Amoedo and Lula’s electorate, as seen in the figures below. These two candidates received less votes compared to Bolsonaro and Ciro Gomes, but hey had similar opinions about the PT administration as the group who voted for

Gomes.

47 “[...] não tenho nenhum preferido. Eu não sou muito de defender partido. Eu não votaria num alternativo, porque talvez não iria ter forças... Eu vou votar num candidato que seja capaz de ir pra segunda fase.” (Participant 017) (Translated by the author). 48 “[...] porque tem que ser alguém com coragem de dizer não pra elite, que são os ricos. Então você tem que ter coragem suficiente e tem que abrir mão também de um enriquecimento ilícito que acaba atraindo o político, o enriquecimento fácil. Então teria que ser alguém assim, e ele pode tentar isso.” (Participant 012) (Translated by the author). 49 “As opções até agora não me agradam. Não pretendo votar de nenhuma maneira em Jair Bolsonaro, também não pretendo votar em nenhum representante do PT. Tenho lido alguma coisa sobre Ciro Gomes, então talvez ele seja [...] o menos pior dos piores.” (Participant 018) (Translated by the author). 81

Figure 6: Evaluation of the PT Administration According to Amoedo's Electorate

Figure 7: Evaluation of the PT Administration According to Lula's Electorate

The only participant who intended to vote for Lula affirmed to not be considerably interested in political discussions. This respondent also emphasized to not have a strong preference for the candidate or his party.

“[Lula] is the best among the worst. For me he is the least bad. I am not trying to

defend Lula or the PT. For me he is the best among the worst.”50

Amoedo’s electorate had a similar justification for their vote as Ciro Gomes’s voters. They said the candidate’s proposal is interesting and the he may be a relevant option to improve Brazil’s situation. The participants who mentioned these two candidates did not elaborate much on this discussion, as the ones who chose either

Bolsonaro or Gomes. The latter were more convinced about their ideals, exposing better their motivations to choose one or the other, rather than the respondents who preferred

Amoedo or Lula.

After analyzing the data, understanding their meaning and connections throughout this chapter, the next section summarizes these findings and highlights their connection with the broader theoretical discussion of this study.

Results’ Discussion

Considering the discussion addressed in this chapter, it is important to note that the data and results of this research have limited explanatory potential due to the size of the sample and timing of the interviews (two to three months prior to the elections).

However, the conclusions of this thesis represent a suggestive discussion that may

50 “Dos piores, e o menos pior. Pra mim é o menos pior. Não é questão de defender Lula ou PT. Pra mim ele é o menos pior.” (Participant 23) (Translated by the author). 83 facilitate a further research about the topic in Brazil and other contexts, using the theoretical approach developed in this study.

Therefore, even considering such limitations, after analyzing the data and themes that emerged from the interviews, it is possible to notice how Brazilian citizens’ discontentment with the country’s politics and current economic performance directly influence their vote preferences prior to the last presidential campaign. This dissatisfaction led them to reject the incumbent party and express a vote preference for opposition candidates, as defended by the Economic Voting Theory. This was seen in the first two sections of this chapter, in which the participants of this research noted their disappointment with the country’s political and economic situation and then expressed their opinion about the PT administration. Although a considerable number of respondents approved or partially approved the incumbent party, they emphasized that it was time to change Brazil’s government.

In this interim, considering the number of political parties in Brazil and the populations’ lack of ideological identification, it becomes difficult to predict their vote; therefore, the arguments of the Economic Voting Theory alone are not enough to understand the Brazilian electorate during a period of crisis. Four candidates were mentioned in the interviews by the majority of the respondents, while two of the participants had decided to vote blank and six of them were still undecided about their vote. Therefore, in order to explain this condition, it is necessary to add the variable

“level of education” defended by the Social-Psychological Theory. Those with higher levels of education tended to be more certain about their vote than the contrary. The 84 variation among those certain about their votes is based on their ideological inclinations.

Through their answers and preferences it was possible to notice that more rightist and conservative participants chose to vote for Bolsonaro, while the leftist participants presented a more liberal discourse, refusing Bolsonaro as an option and choosing to vote for Ciro Gomes instead. A smaller number of respondents presented the same ideas, but mentioned other candidates. The Social-Psychological Theory, in this sense, also provides another tool to understand this pattern, by focusing not only on social aspects, but also on the impact that ideological preferences have in defining the individual’s vote.

This variable added to the Economic Voting Theory’s argument, assists in understanding voters’ behavior in Brazil.

In this regard, the discussion of the theories of voting behavior in the literature review part of this thesis provided a relevant tool to understand and analyze the data gathered for this study. The following chapter, therefore, addresses these considerations and provides further discussion about voting behavior under the condition of crisis.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

During the “pink tide,” the rise of leftist governments in Lain America that started at the end of 1990s, the PT (Workers’ Party – Partido dos Trabalhadores), the main leftist political party in Brazil, governed the country for 12 years. Lula, the PT’s representative, became the president in 2003, governing Brazil for two consecutive mandates with positive economic results, creating social programs that lift thousands of people out of poverty. In 2011, his co-partisan successor, Dilma Rousseff, gave continuity to his government plan; however, due to both international and domestic reasons, she could not maintain the economic success achieved during Lula’s terms. In the beginning of

Rousseff’s second mandate, a political crisis took shape. Low rates of growth, lack of foreign investments, an increase in unemployment rates, and high levels of inflation started to characterize the Brazilian economy in 2014. In this interim, corruption scandals were being uncovered, intensifying the national crisis and in 2016, the former president was impeached under the accusations of responsibility crimes.

This scenario preceded the 2018 elections in Brazil, in which the population had to choose a new president while frustrated with the country’s poor economic performance and with the corruption cases involving the political actors who should advocate for their well-being and Brazil’s development. Considering this context, the purpose of this thesis was to understand how Brazilians vote during a period of political and economic crisis.

The hypothesis for this inquiry suggested that Brazilian voters tend to choose the opposition during crisis; however, the variation between those who are certain and uncertain about their vote would be explained by the individuals’ levels of education. 86

Furthermore, citizens who are certain about their choice have different ideological preferences, which also affects their decision.

In order to conduct this study, 21 semi-structured interviews were led with citizens of voting age (18 to 70 years old) in the city of Belo Horizonte, the capital of one if the most politically and economically important states in Brazil, a few months before the elections. The respondents belonged to different economic classes and had distinct backgrounds. The participants were asked to expose their opinion about the country’s political and economic situation, to evaluate the PT administration in the country, and to reveal and justify their voting preferences for the upcoming presidential elections. As a qualitative research and case-study, the analytical method applied to examine the data was thematic analysis.

The results showed that the participants are dissatisfied with Brazil’s political and economic situation. They highlighted that corrupt practices, lack of responsibility of the politicians towards the population, and the negative results of the economic crisis are jeopardizing their living standards. As a consequence, the majority of the respondents planned to vote for an opposition candidate in the last elections. This tendency is consistent with the Economic Voting Theory about the rational logic of a cost-benefit calculus that leads the individual to reject the incumbent party and choose the opposition in case the national economy presents negative results. This logic is based on the citizens’ retrospective and prospective evaluations of their country’s economy (Bloom & Price,

1975; Downs, 1957; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Gélineau & Singer, 2015; Lewis-Beck,

1988). 87

However, it is important to emphasize that, even if voters’ are behaving according to the Economic Voting Theory’s assumptions by choosing the opposition after taking into consideration their retrospective and prospective evaluations of the economy, this may be a thin representation of the theory. The population’s evaluation of the economy may be biased given that the citizens are not well informed about the connection between politics and economy or about the many determinants of this relationship.

As seen in this study, the level of education of the citizens influences their level of information about politics, which affects their notions of economic dynamics as well.

Furthermore, the individuals’ level of education is also related to the extent in which the citizens are certain or not about their vote. This variable is highlighted by the Social-

Psychological Theory and may explain a significant part of the uncertainty about vote choice among this thesis’s respondents (Baquero, 1985; Carreirão, 2002; Castro, 1992;

Singer, 2002; Zechmeister, 2015). Participants with higher levels of education in this study mostly had graduate or bachelor’s degree and were more certain about their voting preferences, as opposed to the respondents who had a middle school or high school degree. This group was not as sure about their voting choices and did not expand much on their answers.

The variable that explains the variation of voting preferences among the participants who were sure about their choice is their ideological inclination. The analysis of the data showed that more conservative and rightist respondents affirmed to have Jair

Bolsonaro, the far-right wing candidate, as their voting choice for the elections.

Conversely, leftist and more liberal participants decided to vote for Ciro Gomes. A few 88 exceptions voted for Amoedo, Lula, or blank. The liberal group in general furthermore emphasized their disapproval of Bolsonaro’s discourse and conservative ideals. The

Social-Psychological Theory supports this logic: this approach predicts that besides the individuals’ levels of education, their ideological preferences, result of social interactions and cognitive capacities, also shape vote choice (Bartle & Griffiths, 2002Castro, 1992;

Figueiredo, 2008; Radmann, 2001; Singer, 2002; Santos, 2010).

This study is limited due to the non-representativeness of its sample. Therefore, its findings are not necessarily generalizable, even though the results are consistent with the hypotheses of the various theories of voting behavior. Still, by providing a deeper understanding of some voters’ thinking and the way they express themselves, the thesis may provide useful insights into these theories of voting behavior. For example, this thesis demonstrates that each theory of voting behavior is limited when applied individually to the study of respondents’ answers. Importantly, each theory addresses some of the shortfalls of the others. Moreover, studying voting behavior in Brazil is relevant for addressing a case that not only differs from the European and American cases widely analyzed by the existing literature, but also because a study about a Latin

American and developing country, such as Brazil, can be applied to dozens of others with the same status. Some political features of Brazil also makes this study interesting to be applied to other multiparty countries.

In this sense, this thesis represents an initial effort to more clearly understand voters’ intentions when deciding how to vote, even considering its limitations. The small number of participants, even for a qualitative study, constrains the representativeness of 89 the results. Moreover, voters start to discuss the election the month before the voting day, particularly because the debates with the candidates for president happen during this same time. Conducting interviews two to three months prior to the election may mean that the data do not reflect the final vote choice of respondents. Still, this study is suggestive of important patterns in respondents’ reactions to challenging information environments. In this regard, future research about the topic should be conducted weeks before the elections with more participants throughout the country. A quantitative approach could also be used coupled with the qualitative semi-structured interviews in order to improve the analysis and understanding of more representative data and enhance the accuracy of the results.

This thesis demonstrates the potential importance of combining the arguments of economic voting theory, sociological theories, and psychological theories in explaining voting behavior during periods of crisis. Economic voting theory, as currently conceived, has limited explanatory power in contexts outside the United States and Europe. In complex and fluid information environments, like those found outside these standard areas of study, the explanatory power of models of voting behavior will be enhanced through the inclusion of social and psychological factors like those addressed in this thesis. As observers learn to understand the voting calculus better in these contexts, it may be possible to improve predictions about election outcomes and the functioning of democracy worldwide. 90

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104

APPENDIX

Questionnaire

To start with, I need to know a little more about you. First, how long have you lived here

(Belo Horizonte)?

How old are you?

What is your occupation?

What level of education did you complete?

Which economic class would you say that you belong to?

What is your opinion about politics in Brazil?

What do you think about the current situation of the country?

What would be a greater concern for you: the current economic or political status of the country? Why?

Do you think the population is being affected by this situation? In which way?

What would be a good option to improve the country’s situation?

Who do you intend to vote for in the next presidential election? Why?

What is your opinion about the PT administration in Brazil?

In your opinion, what were the best achievements of the previous government?

What about the worst?

Are you part of any social program of the government?

o (If yes): Which one? What is your opinion about it? What did it change in

your life and in your family’s life? 105

o (If no): What is your opinion about these programs? Do you think they are

beneficial to Brazilian citizens who are part of it?

Do you think your standard of living changed after the PT administrations? Why? In which ways?

Is there anything else that you would like to say about the topics we discussed today?

Thank you for your participation!

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Thesis and Dissertation Services ! !