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3.3

Sudan & South

More than a year after ’s inde- main faction of JEM and other rebel groups pendence in July 2011, Sudan and South still refuse to support the peace agreement. Sudan remain embroiled in border disputes, Following a review of the activities and im- while conflict in Sudan’s South Kordofan, pact of the UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur Blue Nile, and Darfur states persists, creating (UNAMID), the Security Council in April an- a challenging environment in which the nine nounced a reduction in the mission’s strength international peace operations deployed by by 4,000 troops, to be completed within the UN, AU, and EU operate. eighteen months. Peace agreements that remain the basis for ongoing negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan saw little forward movement in Background 2012 as deadlocks persisted. An intensifying The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement dispute over the area and oil agree- (CPA) settled a decades-long conflict between ments nearly escalated to full-scale war be- tween the two countries in April 2012. Ten- sion was slowly diffused through UN- and AU-mediated agreements reached in Septem- ber, including on oil revenues. However, for (*<37 much of the year, both countries suffered the Wadi Halfa 1 2 5 7 + ( 5 1 Special Envoy consequences of oil-related austerity meas- Sudan and South Sudan1 Port Sudan 07/2011 ures. In addition, these agreements have yet Dongola 1,/( 5 ( ' 6 ( $

UNAMID Haiya to be implemented, leaving the potential for 07/2007 Ed Damer AU Liaison Office renewed violence in 2013. Joint AU-UN Chief in the Sudan Ed Damer Mediator for Darfur 08/2007 08/2008 1257+(51 Omdurman .$66$/$ Deteriorating security in South Kordofan .25'2)$1 Kassala (5,75($ & + $ ' and Blue Nile in Sudan worsened humanitar- Khartoum (/*(=,5$ 668'$1 8 ' $ 1 Wad Medani Al Fasher Gedaref ian conditions and further increased instabil- Geneina El Obeid Rabak Singa *('$5() :(67(51 ity. Ongoing clashes between the Sudan Armed UNISFA :+,7( 6(11$5 '$5)85 06/2011 1,/( Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People’s Libera- Nyala %/8( 1,/( (7 + ,23,$ tion Movement-North (SPLM-N) rebel group Kadugli Abyei 833(5 1,/( intensified in the latter part of 2012. Ethnic &(175$/ 1257+(51 8 1 , 7 < $)5,&$1 %$+5$/ Bentiu Malakal 5(38%/,& *+$=$/ :$55$3 conflict in in South Sudan un- :(67(51 Kuacjok %$+5 Aweil UNMISS $/*+$=$/ 66287+ 2 8 7 + derscored the extent of security reform neces- 07/2011 Wau 668'$1 8 ' $ 1 Special Envoy /$.(6 sary to stabilize the country. Sudan and -21*/(, AU Liaison Office 1 Bor in South Sudan South Sudan 08/2007 07/2011 :(67(51 ($67(51 In Darfur, the security situation remained (48$725,$ (48$725,$ AU Task Force precarious in 2012, posing a continuing risk on the LRA &(175$/ 11/2011 EUAVSEC (48$725,$ .(1South Sudan <$ to civilians and peacekeepers. While an off- 09/2010 EUSR for Sudan and South Sudan 2 shoot of the Justice and Equality Movement 09/2010 (JEM) rebel group began negotiations with the government of Sudan in November, the

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(UNMIS) in March 2005. The six-year in- UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) terim period of the CPA ended after the CPA- stipulated referendum, which resulted in se- cession for South Sudan in July 2011. UNMIS • Authorization Date 8 July 2011 (UNSC Res. 1996) was subsequently withdrawn and the Security • Start Date 9 July 2011 • SRSG Hilde Johnson (Norway) Council authorized the UN Mission in South • Force Commander Major-General Moses Bisong Obi Sudan (UNMISS) to provide assistance to the (Nigeria) new state, with a focus on supporting the de- • Budget $839.5 million (1 July 2012– velopment of state institutions and South 30 June 2013) Sudan’s capacity to govern its territory. The • Strength as of Troops: 6,405 mission has a Chapter VII mandate authoriz- 31 October 2012 Military Observers: 145 ing it to use force to protect civilians under Police: 549 imminent threat and to deter violence. In 2011, International Civilian Staff: 831 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon also ap- National Civilian Staff: 1,375 pointed Haile Menkerios, former head of UN Volunteers: 352 UNMIS, as his Special Envoy for Sudan and For detailed mission information see p. 385 South Sudan, to help the parties settle out- standing CPA and postsecession issues. In addition to the UN, the European Union also has operations in Sudan and South Sudan. Since 2010, Rosalind Marsden has served as the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for Sudan, and since 2011, also for South Sudan. The EUSR is mandated to support peace be- tween the two states through liaising with rel- evant stakeholders and cooperating with the UN and AU toward mutual goals. The Euro- pean Union also authorized an EU Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) in South Sudan under the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy in June 2012. Deployed in September 2012, EUAVSEC is mandated to strengthen aviation security at Juba international airport. The CPA also included provisions for a referendum in the Abyei area, a resource-rich border region, to be held in 2011. However, UN photo/Albert González Farran progress toward the referendum was stalled A UNAMID peacekeeper from Nigeria escorts UNAMID water trucks at the water point in El Daein, East Darfur, 9 October 2012. and the security situation deteriorated as both The troops have to travel twice a day to the local borehole to states built up their security forces in early collect water for the team site. Nigeria has a battalion (860 soldiers) deployed in El Daein that is tasked with providing security in the area. 2011. After AU-facilitated negotiations, an agreement was reached on 20 June 2011 that called for the establishment of a civilian ad- Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation ministration for the Abyei area and the de- Army/Movement (SPLA/SPLM). In order to ployment of third-party security guarantors. support implementation of the CPA, coordi- In response, the Security Council established nate humanitarian assistance, promote human the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei rights, and protect civilians, the Security (UNISFA), under Resolution 1990, to monitor Council authorized the UN Mission in Sudan and verify a demilitarized zone, strengthen the 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 49

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capacity of the Abyei Police Service, and fa- cilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, and Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan authorized it to use force to protect civilians. The longest-running UN mission in the • Authorization Date 27 July 2011 (SG Letter S/2011/474) area, UNAMID, was authorized in 2007 after • Start Date 1 August 2011 the 2006 Darfur Agreement attempted but • Special Envoy Haile Menkerios (South Africa) failed to establish peace between the govern- • Budget $1.3 million (1 January 2012– ment of Sudan and various rebel groups.1 31 December 2012) UNAMID is tasked with protecting civilians, • Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 4 contributing to security for humanitarian as- 31 October 2012 National Civilian Staff: 1 sistance, and monitoring and verifying imple- For detailed mission information see p. 291 mentation of peace agreements, including the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, signed between the government and the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) in July 2011. EU Special Representative for Sudan and South Sudan Since the signing of the Doha Document and departure of Joint Chief Mediator Djibril • Authorization Date 18 July 2005 (EU Council Joint Action Bassole, the head of UNAMID also serves 2005/556/CFSP) as the acting mediator for Darfur, a position • EUSR Rosalind Marsden (United Kingdom) created in 2008 by the AU and UN to help • Budget $2.5 million (1 October 2011– resolve the conflict. After the AU Mission 30 September 2012) in Sudan (AMIS) transferred authority to • Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 5 UNAMID in 2008, the AU opened liaison of- 30 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 7 fices in Khartoum and Juba to follow up on implementation of the peace agreement. In 2009, the African Union further estab- EU Aviation Security Mission in South Sudan lished the AU High-Level Implementation (EUAVSEC South Sudan) Panel (AUHIP), led by former African presi- dents, including Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), • Authorization Date 18 June 2012 (EU Council Decision Abdulsalami Abubaker (Nigeria), and Pierre 2012/312/CFSP) Buyoya (Burundi). The panel is mandated to • Start Date October 2012 oversee implementation of the CPA, facilitate • Head of Mission Lasse Rosenkrands Christensen negotiations between Sudan and South Sudan, (Denmark) and provide advisory opinions on settling border disputes. Although the Doha Document is meant to engender peace in the Darfur region, the re- jection of the agreement by rebel groups be- Key Developments sides the LJM means that conflict persists and the security situation remains unstable. Sudan and South Sudan Despite the death of JEM leader Khalil Ibra - Tension between Sudan and South Sudan, him in December 2011, the alliance formed which escalated to the brink of war in April between JEM and two other major rebel groups 2012, remained high throughout the remain- against the Sudanese government remains der of the year due to unresolved issues in- largely intact, further complicating political cluding citizenship, oil revenue, and border negotiations for peace not only in Darfur but demarcation. After the closure of UNMIS, is- also in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states sues relating to the humanitarian situation in as well. South Kordofan and Blue Nile states were 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 50

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the economies of both countries. The security UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) situation rapidly deteriorated in April when South Sudan’s armed forces took over Heglig oil fields in Sudan, allegedly in response to • Authorization and 27 June 2011 (UNSC Res. 1990) Sudanese incursions and cross- border bomb- Start Date • Force Commander Lieutenant-General Tadesse Werede ings. Fighting quickly escalated, resulting in Tesfay () shelling and firefights between the two • Budget $257.9 million (1 July 2012– armies, which dealt a significant blow to ef- 30 June 2013) forts by the UN and the AUHIP to maintain • Strength as of Troops: 3,830 peace and security between Khartoum and 31 October 2012 Military Observers: 136 Juba. International Civilian Staff: 84 With the threat of an interstate war, the National Civilian Staff: 47 AUHIP adopted a roadmap on 24 April, bol- UN Volunteers: 4 stered by Security Council Resolution 2046, For detailed mission information see p. 361 that threatened to consider imposing sanc- tions unless both sides took meaningful steps to de-escalate the conflict, including with- drawal of security forces, establishment of the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Joint Border Verification Monitoring Mecha- nism (JBVMM), and restoration of peace ne- • Authorization Date 31 July 2007 (UNSC Res. 1769) gotiations within two weeks. • Start Date Implement mandated tasks no later than After the majority of forces withdrew 31 December 2007 from the border areas in May and June, nego- • SRSG (acting) Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane tiations resumed in Addis Ababa, though prog - (Niger)a ress remained slow. Original deadlines set in • Force Commander Lieutenant-General Patrick Nyamvumba (Rwanda) the AU’s April communiqué were extended • Police Commissioner James Oppong-Boanuh (Ghana) until 22 September, with negotiations eventu- • Budget $1,448.6 million (1 July 2012– ally producing agreement on 27 September. 30 June 2013) The new agreement addressed a number of • Strength as of Troops: 16,171 contentious issues, including oil and security 31 October 2012 Military Observers: 285 arrangements, status of nationals, and eco- Police: 5,037 nomic matters. Although the 27 September International Civilian Staff: 1,087 agreement marked a step forward in efforts to National Civilian Staff: 2,935 end tensions, it failed to reach consensus on UN Volunteers: 445 critical issues, including the status of the dis- Note: a. The SRSG also serves as the Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for puted Abyei area and the situation in South Darfur ad interim. Mohamed Ibn Chambas (Ghana) was appointed as Joint Special Representative for Darfur and head of UNAMID on 20 December Kordofan and Blue Nile states despite pro- and will replace acting SRSG Souleymane in early 2013. posals by the AUHIP on a way forward on For detailed mission information see p. 313 each issue. Few elements of the agreement were implemented by the end of 2012, in- cluding the resumption of oil production, which was set for January 2013 but indefi- incorporated into mediation efforts by the UN nitely delayed in November over Sudan’s and AU on the conflict between Sudan and condition that the SPLM-N be disarmed by South Sudan, further complicating negotiations. South Sudan, which it holds accountable for At the end of January 2012, in retaliation the rebel group’s activities. to a dispute over pipeline fees, South Sudan The AUHIP proposed an additional six shut down oil production, threatening to derail weeks of negotiating time that ended on 5 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 51

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December 2012, and an additional two weeks in November to resolve the status of disputed Joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur border areas in Abyei. Since no agreements were made during the extensions, the AU’s • Authorization Date 30 June 2008 (SG Letter S/2008/438) Peace and Security Council (PSC) is sched- • Chief Mediator Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane uled to make a final determination. In De- (Niger) cember, the PSC reconfirmed its acceptance Note: The SRSG also serves as the head of UNAMID. Mohamed Ibn of the September 2012 AUHIP proposal, Chambas (Ghana) was appointed as Joint Special Representative for Darfur which recommended an October 2013 refer- and head of UNAMID on 20 December and will replace acting SRSG endum on the status of Abyei, and announced Souleymane in early 2013. that the proposal would be taken up at the For detailed mission information see p. 251 AU’s Heads of State and Government meet- ing in January 2013. Although the proposal requested the Security Council’s endorsement, AU Liaison Office in Sudan (Khartoum) the PSC has not yet sought this endorsement, nor has the Security Council explicitly given its approval. Further negotiations between • Authorization Date 24 August 2007 (PSC/PR/Comm. Sudan and South Sudan in December 2012, [LXXXIX]) • Head of Office Ambassador Mahmoud Kane led by the AUHIP’s Thabo Mbeki and at- (Mauritania) tended by UN Special Envoy Haile Menke- • Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 11 rios, failed to progress any of the issues. 30 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 16

Abyei Due to hostilities between Sudan and South Sudan, the disputed Abyei area remained AU Liaison Office in South Sudan (Juba) volatile in 2012, with no decision reached on its final status and the establishment of a • Authorization Date 24 August 2007 (PSC/PR/Comm. civilian administration in the region. [LXXXIX]) Under the auspices of the Abyei Joint • Head of Office Ambassador Stanislas Nakaha (Burundi) Oversight Committee, Sudan and South Sudan • Strength as of International Civilian Staff: 10 have taken part in negotiations on the Abyei 30 September 2012 National Civilian Staff: 11 area in order to implement the security arrange- ments called for in the 20 June 2011 agreement and reconfirmed in the 27 September 2012 agreement. Meetings throughout 2012 man- oil complex, also remain in Abyei in violation aged to register some progress. Parties were of the 20 June 2011 agreement and Security able to adopt a joint appeal for the sustainable Council Resolution 2046. return and restoration of livelihoods, and terms As noted, in an attempt to spur progress of reference for the Joint Military Observer on the future status of Abyei, the AU’s Peace Committee, which will be responsible for ob- and Security Council endorsed the AUHIP’s serving and monitoring the security situation proposal for an October 2013 referendum, and verifying and investigating allegations of with voting rights granted to the Ngok Dinka, threats to civilians. However, negotiations to a tribe aligned with South Sudan, and only establish the larger Abyei-area institutions, to those Misseriya nomads who have perma- including the Abyei Police Service, the nent abodes in Abyei, a determination that JBVMM, and the demilitarized border zone Sudan rejects. The 5 December 2012 deadline remain stalemated. Sudan’s oil police, sta- set by the AU for Sudan and South Sudan to tioned to protect installations within Diffra’s resolve disagreements over Abyei passed 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 52

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Security Implications of Climate Change

Though climate change is not itself by civilians traveling to collect water. and civilian staff in peacekeeping mis- viewed as a primary driver of conflict, Other missions, including the UN Polit- sions on natural resource management. there is evidence that it can act as a ical Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and Missions also engage in preventive threat multiplier,1 and that climate- the UN Regional Office for Central activities. The UN Regional Centre for related disasters can also increase the Africa (UNOCA), increasingly address Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia likelihood of violence,2 making this an competition over arable land as climate (UNRCCA) is mandated to work with important issue for present and future change exacerbates land degradation. regional governments to mitigate and peace operations. Natural resource scarci- Operations themselves can put a prevent conflict arising from scarcity is- ties pose significant challenges to mis- strain on the environment through oil sues like water disputes. The UN Inte- sions as they attempt to confront natural spills, production of waste and hazardous grated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) resource exploitation, improve gover- substances, and depletion of resources. and the UN Development Programme nance over resources and the environ- The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping (UNDP) are also anticipating security ment, and incorporate natural resources Operations engages in efforts to mitigate challenges resulting from climate change into peace and security objectives. The the security impacts of climate change, by offering technical support to state UN Security Council highlighted the including through policy guidelines de- authorities. nexus between climate change and con- signed to assist mission staff in address- As the security implications of cli- flict first in 2007 and then again in a ing environmental issues that could arise mate change grow clearer, the issue may July 2011 debate aiming to increase the as a result of their mandates. The UN’s become more firmly entrenched in Secu- Council’s consideration of the issue. Department of Political Affairs, along rity Council deliberations and within UN Though direct linkages between cli- with the UN Environment Programme field missions. Better awareness within mate change and conflict still lack clar- (UNEP) and other UN agencies, co- the UN system, along with additional ity, indirect security impacts are already produced a set of manuals on natural re- environmental staff with stronger capac- affecting many of the countries on the source management in 2012 as well as ities in the field, will help increase the Security Council’s agenda. The AU-UN guidance notes for practitioners in 2010. success of mitigating these security im- Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) The 2012 UNEP report Greening the plications. Climate change, however, does faces the potentially destabilizing effects Blue Helmets identified and highlighted not occur in isolation, and a comprehen- of water and land scarcity, and works to environmental and natural resource con- sive approach that considers other polit- increase water access through the distri- siderations for UN peacekeeping. Follow- ical, social, and economic factors will bution of high-capacity containers in ing this report, UNEP announced that it ultimately be key. order to mitigate security risks sustained would begin training for military, police,

Notes: 1. UNEP, Greening the Blue Helmets: Environment, Natural Resources, and Peacekeeping Operations, Geneva, 2012, http://www .unep.org/disastersandconflicts/Introduction/EnvironmentalCooperationforPeacebuilding/GreeningtheBlueHelmetsReport/tabid/101797/Default.aspx. 2. UNDP, “UN Disaster Risk Reduction Chief Commends Efforts to Tackle Disasters,” 22 November 2011, http://www.tl.undp.org/undp/ UN%20disaster%20risk%20reduction%20chief%20commends%20efforts%20to%20tackle%20disasters.htm.

without resolution, but the PSC has not taken UNISFA also supported mediation efforts and further steps to compel either side toward a increased patrols in advance of the 2012 an- compromise, nor has the PSC taken action to nual migration by Misseriya nomads in order implement the decision. to prevent intercommunal conflict over limited In the meantime, UNISFA continues to resources. While some violent events were re- assist with preparations to ready the JBVMM, ported, the 2012 migration season ended in including through supporting integration, August without any major security incidents. training, and predeployment of monitors. All While tensions between Sudan and South parties have deployed monitors to the tem - Sudan have de-escalated, the establishment of porary headquarters in Assosa, Ethiopia.2 Abyei-area joint institutions and an agreement 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 53

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on the future status of the area remain critical one another. Heavy fighting between Suda - to further reduce cross-border tensions and to nese government forces and rebel groups in handle increasing threats to law and order. October and November 2012 raised the Despite UN and AU efforts in 2012, political prospect of increased aerial attacks in the re- negotiations surrounding the Abyei area re- gion and continued violence into 2013. main at an impasse, increasing the likelihood that UNISFA will remain in the region de- Security and Political Developments spite its intention as an interim force. In No- in South Sudan vember the Security Council extended UN- South Sudan’s statebuilding agenda was sig- ISFA’s mandate for the third time, until 31 nificantly hindered by hostilities with Sudan May 2013. as well as domestic security and financial dif- ficulties in 2012. Border disputes remain un- Continued Conflict in the North: resolved and oil production at a halt, while South Kordofan and Blue Nile States violence in Jonglei state underscored both the Fighting between Sudan and the SPLM-N in- lack of capacity of the state’s institutions to tensified in the latter part of 2012, and fur- provide security as well as the continuing ther complicated tense relations between grievances of minority ethnic groups. Work- Sudan and South Sudan. Following a rejec- ing within these tense conditions, UNMISS tion by the government of Sudan of an exten- assists the government in developing South sion in the mandate of UNMIS, as recom- Sudan’s institutions, but does so amid a lack mended by the Secretary-General, the mission of resources, including military helicopters withdrew in 2011 before all provisions of the and engineering capacity. The mission is ex- CPA were implemented in South Kordofan pected to reach its troop ceiling in March and Blue Nile states, leaving limited oppor- 2013, though the establishment of thirty-five tunities for international stakeholders to en- county support bases will be staggered over gage with the parties. Along with clashes be- five years instead of three. tween Sudanese government forces and rebel The security situation in South Sudan groups, humanitarian agencies also raised posed significant challenges to nascent secu- concern over an ensuing food crisis as sup- rity institutions and UNMISS in 2012. The plies ran low and the restriction on access to year saw heavy ethnic fighting in Jonglei state, affected areas prevented agencies from as- including a January attack by the Lou Nuer sisting civilians.3 armed group that resulted in hundreds of civil- Informal negotiations in 2012 failed to ian deaths and vast population displacement break the political deadlock between the par- despite efforts by UNMISS and the Sudan ties. The SPLM-N seeks an agreement that People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) to stop the includes issues related to Darfur, release of attack.5 South Sudan also experienced large political prisoners, and lifting of the organi- civilian movements, with the presence of an zational ban, while Sudan refuses many of estimated 285,000 refugees and internally dis- these demands. Both sides remain unwilling placed persons (IDPs), and 125,000 South Su- to negotiate directly with each other.4 danese refugees returning from abroad.6 Absent any political agreements to settle After the January attack in Jonglei, the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile UNMISS was criticized by national and inter- states, security in these areas will continue to national actors over its failure to take more deteriorate. Any political negotiations, how- robust actions to protect civilians, despite ever, will need to take wider regional implica- employing early warning mechanisms and air tions into consideration as the various sources reconnaissance to track the advance of the of tension between and within Sudan and Lou Nuer armed group. UNMISS maintains South Sudan continue to negatively impact that the protection of civilians, while a core 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 54

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mission task, is primarily the responsibility of further statebuilding and cutting back already the government, which had been warned of weak delivery of government services. the impending violence. At the same time, the mission continued to implement its strategy Security Sector Reform and on the protection of civilians. The strategy Rule of Law in South Sudan sets five priority situations in which UNMISS Mechanisms for security sector reform and will apply its protection mandate: incidents in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegra- the border areas that affect civilians; rebel tion (DDR) of state security forces in South militia activities; intercommunal violence; Sudan continued in 2012 with technical and threats to civilians during security operations, logistical support from UNMISS. However, including civilian disarmament; and activities the DDR process has been beset by numerous of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). UN- delays related to continued hostilities with MISS also began to roll out training modules Sudan and austerity measures in South Sudan. developed by the UN Departments of Peace- In 2012, UNMISS supported capacity-building keeping Operations and Field Support to im- efforts for the national security council and prove its protection capabilities. However, its executive Secretariat, while also providing asset shortages, especially military utility hel- training in security sector governance and icopters, have hindered UNMISS’s ability to oversight for senior SPLA and SSPS person- reach the most vulnerable populations. nel. In September the government of South In December, following violent outbreaks Sudan launched the national security policy in the western city of Wau, UNMISS provided drafting process, with UNMISS supporting shelter to about 5,000 civilians who sought the training of the drafting committee and protection around the mission’s base. The provision of technical advice to six state se- mission also deployed peacekeepers and per- curity commissions. sonnel carriers to secure the Wau airport and The process to professionalize the SPLA to patrol the city and surrounding settlements. and SSPS remains a top priority for UNMISS, In March, the South Sudan Police Ser vice the need for which was highlighted by the (SSPS) and the SPLA launched Operation Re- human rights abuses committed during the store Peace, a civilian disarmament process. civilian disarmament processes. In December UNMISS and the government tried to encour- the SPLA opened fire on protesters, killing age voluntary disarmament through extensive ten people in what the UN described as an sensitization campaigns, and UNMISS de- “excessive use of force” and further calling ployed integrated monitoring teams composed into question the professionalism and readi- of civilian, military, and police personnel to ness of South Sudanese security forces.8 monitor disarmament processes. However, UNMISS focused on SSPS capacity building serious allegations of human rights abuses through support to the screening and registra- perpetrated by security forces during the dis- tion of officers, co-location with SSPS lead- armament process, including torture and rape, ership, and development of training curricula overshadowed the proceedings, during which and courses. A national DDR document, fi- over 10,000 weapons were collected.7 nalized in April 2012, outlines the eight-year In 2012, South Sudan continued to estab- process through which an estimated 150,000 lish various state institutions with support armed forces personnel will be demobilized from UNMISS, including an expansion of the and integrated into a national army.9 national constitutional review commission In October, EUAVSEC deployed its head and establishment of a national electoral com- of mission, Lasse Rosenkrands Christensen, mission. As a result of a significant budgetary along with a core team of ten members, to shortfall, South Sudan passed an austerity begin assisting the South Sudanese govern- budget that limited expenditures, hindering ment improve security at Juba international 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 55

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airport. The mission is expected to be fully peacekeepers, and previous deadly attacks in operational, with forty-four international staff January and April. and twenty local staff, in early 2013. It will In order to monitor and report on civilian provide advice, mentoring, technical assis- protection issues, UNAMID deployed civilian tance, and training of security staff in order to staff members to twenty-one team sites and support the government in building capacity. provided security escorts for food distribution South Sudan, with UNMISS’s support, by the World Food Programme. UNAMID also continued efforts to establish rule of law, also developed a new strategy for protection and improve justice and correctional institu- of civilians that intends to leverage coopera- tions, which suffer from a lack of capacity and tion among state and civil actors to gain ac- resources. UNMISS drafted prison regulations cess to areas targeted by violence. However, and internal auditing processes, while also the governor of northern Darfur, a region fac- conducting pilot projects to map the detained ing escalating violence, voiced concern about population. In November 2012 the AU Liaison the strategy, arguing that protecting civilians Office in South Sudan announced a new agree- was a direct responsibility of the state.12 ment that will allow it to support prison sanita- In December 2012 a faction of JEM tion in collaboration with the government. began negotiations with the government of In June, South Sudan requested that Sudan, making it the second armed group to UNMISS’s Chapter VII mandate be with- do so. Notwithstanding this development, the drawn,10 and in November it expelled an main arm of JEM, along with the two other UNMISS human rights investigator for pub- main rebel groups, once again rejected ap- lishing what the government called “unethi- peals by the acting joint chief mediator and cal” reports.11 Both actions call into question other Doha mediators that JEM integrate it- the relationship between the mission and gov- self into the peace process. These challenges ernment as the government struggles to im- led to a one-year extension of the implemen- plement the significant tasks of building the tation timetable for the agreement. Cease-fire capacity of state institutions, especially secu- and final security arrangements remained un- rity forces. In December the SPLA shot down finished by the 30 September deadline, due to a UN helicopter, killing all four of its crew disagreement over the verification of rebel and further straining the relationship. The UN forces. UNAMID continued to provide tech- stated that the incident was only the latest in nical and logistical support for the dissemina- a series of repeated SPLA attacks against tion of the Doha Document, while holding mission helicopters as well as direct threats workshops for stakeholders to express their against peacekeepers. The UN called on the views.13 government of South Sudan to carry out an In February 2012 the Darfur Regional Au- investigation to hold those responsible for the thority (DRA) was officially launched, replac- incident accountable. ing the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority and signaling a positive step forward. Estab- Darfur lished under the Doha Document, the DRA has Fifteen months since the signing of the Doha responsibility for leading the implementation Document for Peace in Darfur, progress on of the document, along with preparing for the the implementation of its measures remains eventual Darfur internal dialogue and consul- modest, despite efforts in 2012 to disseminate tations. With UNAMID’s logistical support, the document and prepare for internal dia- over 900 Darfur stakeholders attended a July logue. The security situation in Darfur re- preparatory conference for the dialogue, voic- mained unstable in 2012. UNAMID also ing concerns about the precarious security suffered deadly attacks by armed groups, in- situation. Much like other bodies arranged cluding an ambush in October that killed four for by the Doha Document, the DRA lacks 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 56

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sufficient funding, as Sudan’s contribution re- mains absent. EUSR Marsden announced that Conclusion the European Union is willing to provide fi- While negotiations on various peace accords nancial assistance for the DRA, but only if between Sudan and South Sudan continued Sudan contributes as well. throughout 2012, very little progress was made In July 2012, Ibrahim Gambari, UNAMID’s and peace operations in the two countries con- joint special representative and joint chief tinue to struggle against fragile political and mediator since January 2010, left his post. In security realities. December 2012, Ghanaian diplomat Mohamed Looking ahead, domestic issues in Sudan Ibn Chambas was appointed to the position, may further limit the government’s commit- and will take over from Aichatou Mindaoudou ment and capacity to implement the various of Niger, who held the post in an acting capac- agreements. Growing civil unrest over the ity. In April 2012, citing improved security economy and other government practices re- conditions, the UN announced its intention to sulted in protests in July and in December, reduce UNAMID troops by 4,000, to be com- and police responses turned violent. President pleted within eighteen months.14 Sudan, which Omar al-Bashir’s political base also appeared has frequently obstructed the mission, wel- to weaken in 2012, after an alleged coup at- comed the decision. However, some stakehold- tempt was thwarted in November with the ar- ers, including a rebel force and residents of IDP rest of the former head of Sudan’s National camps, pushed back against the UN’s security Intelligence and Security Service, leaving the assessment, arguing that it was ignorant of the ruling party’s Islamist core expressing frus- reality on the ground.15 It remains to be seen tration over corruption and the need for polit- how UNAMID’s new configuration will affect ical reform. its ability to implement mandated tasks, partic- Ensuring coherence between missions ularly the protection of civilians. Reports in and international partners will be crucial as December alleging an SAF attack on the LJM, violence continues in South Kordofan, Blue the only rebel group to have signed the Doha Nile, and Darfur states, and as unresolved is- Document, underscore the continuing violence sues still pose a risk of reigniting hostilities in the area and pose further questions about the between Sudan and South Sudan in 2013. prospects for peace in Darfur.

Notes 1. The Sudan Liberation Army faction led by Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) was the only signatory, but withdrew from the agreement on 3 February 2011 after Omar al-Bashir removed Minawi from his po- sition as head of the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority. 2. Sudan, South Sudan, and UNISFA have deployed thirty-two, thirty-five, and thirty-three moni- tors respectively. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Abyei, UN Doc. S/2012/583, 25 July 2012. 3. A three-month tripartite initiative that began on 5 August 2012 between the AU, the Arab League, and the UN, along with Sudan and the SPLM-N, raised cautious hope about opening up Blue Nile and South Kordofan states to the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, at the end of September the agree- ment had not been implemented, with each side allotting blame to the other. On 7 November, Sudan announced that it would not renew the initiative’s mandate after it failed to achieve significant results, ending the deal. 4. The conflict between Sudan and the SPLM-N has also interfered with the resumption of oil pro- duction between Juba and Khartoum, as it did in November 2012 when Sudan added the disarming of the SPLM-N by South Sudan as a condition for oil transportation, a stipulation that South Sudan re- jects as impossible, claiming that it does not control the rebel group. 5. “Number of People Affected by South Sudan Clashes Doubled—UN,” UN News Service, 20 Jan- uary 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40986&Cr=south+sudan&Cr1=&Kw1= South+Sudan&Kw2=&Kw3=#.UL-6Bq5ChwE. 2012_CIC_3_Peacekeeping_FM_qxd.qxd 8/7/13 3:26 PM Page 57

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6. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, UN Doc. S/2012/140, 7 March 2012. 7. Amnesty International, “South Sudan Army and Police Forces Shooting and Raping Civilians,” 10 March 2012, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/south-sudan-army-and-police-forces-shooting-and- raping-civilians-jonglei-2012-10-03. 8. “South Sudanese Army Shoots Dead 10 Protestors in Wau,” BBC News, 9 December 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20658915. 9. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan, UN Doc. S/2012/486, 26 June 2012. 10. Letter from the government of South Sudan to the UN Security Council (S/2012/429), in “Monthly Forecast, July 2012,” report of the UN Security Council, 29 June 2012, http://www.security councilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2012-07. 11. “South Sudan Expels UN Human Rights Investigator,” BBC News, 4 November 2012, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20200042. 12. “New Strategy for Protection of Civilians,” Radio Dabanga, 29 November 2012, http:// www.radiodabanga.org/node/39017. 13. Outreach efforts ultimately included 25,000 participants since October 2011, of whom 34 per- cent were women. See United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2012/231, 17 April 2012. 14. “UN Recommends Reducing Darfur Force,” VOA News, 25 April 2012, http://www.voanews .com/content/un-recommends-reducing-darfur-force-149129245/370489.html. 15. “UNAMID Comments ‘Ignore Reality on the Ground,’” Radio Dabanga, 21 May 2012, http:// www.radiodabanga.org/node/30799.