Sea Carriers, LP I, Et Al. V. NYSE Euronext, Et Al. 07-CV-04658
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SEA CARRIERS, LP I and SEA CARRIERS CORPORATION (individually and on behalf of those similarly situated), 101 t;W 465ts Plaintiffs, NYSE EURONEXT., et als, 7 JUN '0 Defendants. ^p/^ ?^ ^,'¢ ^$ Kr)^CASSiH^4^1 5 INTRODUCTION 1. Sea Carriers LP I and Sea Carriers Corporation (collectively "Sea Carriers" or "Plaintiffs") bring this class action on behalf of all persons who placed market orders to purchase or sell securities on the New York Stock Exchange through the New York Stock Exchange's Super Designated Order Turnaround ("SuperDOT") System between October 17, 1998 and the present (the "Class Period") 2. SuperDOT is an electronic trading system designed to facilitate the transmission of both market and limit orders directly to the trading post (and specialist) where the security is traded. The goal of SuperDOT, at least ostensibly, is to allow for a more rapid - and, therefore, more efficient - transaction, because the order can be delivered directly to the specialist rather than phoned down to a floor trader and done manually. SuperDOT is intended to be used for smaller orders (under 10,000 shares). 3. During the Class Period, defendants materially misrepresented to Class Members the market for execution services and costs of execution of trades on the New York Stock Exchange; manipulated trading on the New York Stock Exchange; and colluded to, and did, raise, fix and maintain at anti-competitive levels the costs of execution services provided to Class Members. These practices were consistent with Defendants' stated willingness (as admitted to the SEC) to "Screw the Dots" or "[Expletive] the Dots". 4. Defendants exploited their exclusive control over order execution and publication of the data relating to order execution to create, maintain and conceal the existence of two distinct submarkets on the New York Stock Exchange: (1) a dominant, "insider" submarket comprised of trades executed for the benefit of those members of the New York Stock Exchange who operated on the floor of the exchange (the "Floor Submarket"); and (2) an inferior, "outsider" submarket comprised of SuperDOT trades (the "SuperDOT Submarket") 5. The primary beneficiaries of the Floor Submarket were the floor brokers themselves and large non-member financial institutions (such as pension funds) that traded through floor brokers. 6. To accomplish this intentional, systemic "subordination" of SuperDOT trades, Defendants and their co-conspirators made material misrepresentations, concealed material information and used a number of contrivances, many of which were facilitated by new technology systems costing billions of dollars, which allowed Defendants and their co- conspirators to easily and rapidly share information and exploit informational advantages to manipulate the execution of floor orders over SueprDOT orders. 7. According to an investigation by Plaintiffs' counsel, including information provided by a confidential informant who worked for a New York Stock Exchange specialist during the Class Period, these contrivances included: (a) filling floor orders ahead of simultaneously or previously placed SuperDOT orders; 2 (b) allowing floor brokers to see the incoming SuperDOT orders so the floor broker could devise bidding strategies which took unfair advantage of the information and harmed SuperDOT customers; (c) routinely slowing the execution time of SuperDOT market orders that were placed under advantageous market conditions (i.e., orders executed with price improvement); and (d) routinely accelerating the execution time of SuperDOT orders under disadvantageous market conditions (i.e., orders executed outside the quote existing at the time the orders were sent to the New York Stock Exchange). 8. Empirical evidence confirms that Class Members received worse execution quality using SuperDOT than was provided to similar floor orders. That empirical evidence demonstrates that those who traded through the SuperDOT system got consistently worse executions than those who traded through Floor Brokers regardless of whether the orders through SuperDOT received faster or slower execution. 9. As a result of Defendants' collusive activity, Sea Carriers and the Class suffered significant injury, as execution costs to Class Members were fixed and maintained at levels above those which would have resulted absent collusive activity. A conservative estimate based upon empirical evidence fixes the amount of this injury at approximately one billion dollars per year. 10. Defendants' manipulation, collusion and conspiracy to raise, fix and maintain investor costs of doing business on the New York Stock Exchange via SuperDOT at anti- competitive levels violates federal antitrust laws and federal securities laws. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 11. Sea Carriers brings this class action pursuant to Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, for treble damages and injunctive relief, as well as reasonable 3 attorney's fees and costs. Sea Carriers and Class Members are entitled to such relief as a result of Defendants' violations of federal antitrust laws, including Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.§1. 12. Sea Carriers also brings this class action pursuant to Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq., and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder, 17 C.F.R § 240.1 Ob-5. 13. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331; 15 U.S.C. § 78aa; 15 U.S.C. § 15; and 15 U.S.C. § 26. 14. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 22 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because each Defendant either resides in, is licensed to do business in, or transacts business in this district. IDENTIFICATION OF PARTIES PLAINTIFFS 15. Both Sea Carriers LP I and Sea Carriers Corporation are corporations organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, which maintain a common principal place of business at 700 Canal Street, Stamford, Connecticut. From January 2003 through October 15, 2003, Sea Carriers LP I traded 1.3 billion such shares in a limited partnership structure in which Sea Carriers Management LLC, an affiliated entity was its general partner. From October 16, 2003 through October 2005, Sea Carriers LP I traded approximately 800 million shares within the same structure. From 1998 through the end of 2002, Sea Carriers Corporation traded 4.5 billion shares of New York Stock Exchange-listed stock via SuperDOT through a joint venture or other form or contractual relationship with Empire Program, inc. A certification of Plaintiffs' trades is submitted herewith. 4 DEFENDANTS NYSE Euronext 16. Defendant NYSE Euronext ("NYSE") is a holding company created by the combination of NYSE Group, Inc. and Euronext N.V. NYSE Group,' Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of NYSE Euronext that operates two securities exchanges: the New York Stock Exchange and NYSE Arca, Inc. (formerly known as the Archipelago Exchange, or ArcaEx and the Pacific Exchange).' Classification of Defendants 17. One class of defendants named in this complaint is comprised of member firms that maintain operations as Specialist, Floor-Broker and Routing Broker.2 These defendants are referred to as the "Fully Integrated Defendants." The Fully Integrated Defendants have the greatest degree of participation in the market (and, by extension, the greatest amount of information regarding market dynamics), as they know how the New York Stock Exchange executes orders from every facet of a trade - i.e., as routing broker, as floor broker and as specialist. 18. A second class of defendants named in this complaint is comprised of member firms that serve as both specialist and floor broker, but not as routing broker. These defendants are referred to as the "Internally Integrated Defendants." 19. Even though a Fully Integrated or Internally Integrated Defendant would only act as a specialist for specific assigned stocks, the broker operations of the Fully Integrated and Internally Integrated Defendants traded in all stocks (with other Defendants' specialist operations as needed), 1 The NYSE and ArcaEx merged in 2 006 to form the NYSE Group, Inc. 2 Each function is explai ned infra. 5 20. A third class of defendants named in this complaint is comprised of member firms that serve as specialist only. These defendants are referred to as the "Independent Specialist Defendants." 21. Collectively, all defendant specialist operations are referred to as the "Specialist Defendants." 22. The fourth group of defendants include parties which directed orders for execution, or executed orders, using the floor facilities of the NYSE. Fully Integrated Defendants 23. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ("Goldman Sachs") is a global investment banking, securities and investment management firm, and is the parent company of Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Specialists LLC (" Spear Leeds"). Spear Leeds is the second largest specialist firm on the New York Stock Exchange, making a market in approximately 550 listed securities. Goldman Sachs Execution & Clearing, L.P., was formerly known as Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, L.P. ("Goldman Sachs E&C"). Goldman Sachs E&C and Spear Leeds directed and brokered orders through the NYSE, including through their NYSE floor brokers, for themselves and their affiliates. Goldman Sachs controls the foregoing entities. 24. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. ("Bear Steams") is a broker-dealer subsidiary of Bear Stearns Companies, Inc., an international investment banking; securities and derivatives trading; and clearance and brokerage firm. Bear Steams is a member of the New York Stock Exchange, and is the broker-dealer affiliate of Bear Wagner Specialists LLC ("Bear Wagner"). Bear Wagner is the fifth largest specialist firm on the New York Stock Exchange, making a market in approximately 350 listed securities. Defendant Bear, Steams Securities Corp. ("Bear, Stearns Securities") is a broker-dealer, who, with its parent, Bear Stearns, directed and brokered orders 6 through the NYSE, including through its NYSE floor brokers. Bear Stearns controls Bear Wagner and Bear, Stearns Securities.