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By Systems Assessment Group NDIA Strike, Land Attack and Air Defense Committee October 1998 By Systems Assessment Group NDIA Strike, Land Attack and Air Defense Committee October 1998 3 Agenda Page • Introduction 5 • Historical Developments and Technology Migration 13 • Trends in Third World Ballistic Missile Weaponry 43 • Threat Development on a Compressed Schedule 63 • Candidate LRBM Configurations 81 • Summary 107 10/1/98 5 Study Objectives • Assess feasibility of Third World countries to develop/acquire LRBM capability • 3000km - 10000km • Assess the time required to develop/acquire LRBM capability • One or two demonstrated test articles • Politically effective capability (as few as three missiles) • Fully deployed military capability • Assess the feasibility of launching warheads of mass destruction • Assess implications on defense • Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) policy 10/1/98 7 Study Approach • Review lessons learned from historical missile development programs • WW II Germany, North Korea, Iraq • Development time and motivation • Strategic objectives for LRBMs with WMD warheads • Assess potential range growth of evolving family of Third World TBM threats • Conduct Third World Threat Analysis • Technology assessment • Development forecast • Assess Candidate LRBM Configuration Alternatives • Space launch vehicle conversion • TBM stacking / clustering 10/1/98 9 Definitions TERM DESCRIPTION CRITERIA TBM TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE <150 km SRBM SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC Up to 1,000 km MISSILE MRBM MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC 1,000 - 3,000 km MISSILE IRBM INTERMEDIATE RANGE BALLISTIC 3,000 - 5,500 km MISSILE ICBM INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC >5,500 km MISSILE LRBM LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE 3,000 - 10,000 km CM CRUISE MISSILE RANGE NOT SPECIFIED SLBM SUBMARINE LAUNCHED RANGE NOT SPECIFIED BALLISTIC MISSILE LRCM LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILE <3,000 km INF TREATY INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR LIMITED PERFORMANCE & FORCES TREATY NUMBERS OF TBMs & CMs (EUROPEAN THEATER) START STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION BILATERAL US-RUSSIAN TREATY NUCLEAR FORCES REDUCTION SALT STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION BILATERAL US-RUSSIAN TALKS NUCLEAR FORCES REDUCTION 10/1/98 11 Agenda Page • Introduction 5 • Historical Developments and Technology Migration 13 • Trends in Third World Ballistic Missile Weaponry 43 • Threat Development on a Compressed Schedule 63 • Candidate LRBM Configurations 81 • Summary 107 10/1/98 13 Historical Analysis Objectives • Understand the critical event structure & timelines of early ballistic missile development programs • Describe technologies required to meet mission requirements in early missile programs • Describe innovative solutions that enabled early rapid ballistic missile development • Describe the spread of ballistic missile capability over the past 50 years tracing its technology and system development genealogy 10/1/98 15 • WW II Germany • North Korea • Iraq 17 Key Ingredients of the German Program • Political/Cultural Climate • Rocket development not constrained by Versailles treaty • Autocratic rule • Warring factions within the Nazi party for control of ballistic missile program • 1920’s Weimar Republic had strong interest in rocketry and space flight • Use of slave labor • Technological and Strategic Surprise • Early recognition of the value of ballistic missiles for maximizing surprise (1929) • Extreme secrecy of the program - first large “black” program • Suppression of German amateur rocket societies for security reasons (1933-34) • Speed of Development • National priority / significant funding resources available • Excellent domestic industrial skill base to develop required technologies • Rapid prototyping using technology demonstrators • Test / Fail / Fix / Re-Test / ……. ManyMany of of these these key key ingredients ingredients are are found found in in Third Third World World programs programs 10/1/98 19 German ICBM Design A9/A10 Manned A9 10/1/98 Source: “Secret Wonder Weapons of the Third Reich”, J. Miranda, P. Mercado, Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1996 21 Design for Use of Chemical/Radiological Payloads Payload Compartment 10/1/98 Source: “Vengeance. Hitler’s Nuclear Weapon. Fact or Fiction?”,Phillip Henshall,Alan Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1995 23 Alternative Concept for Attacking North America Project Lifevest 10/1/98 25 Source: “Secret Wonder Weapons of the Third Reich”, J. Miranda, P. Mercado, Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1996 • WW II Germany • North Korea • Iraq 27 North Korean Ballistic Missile Programs • 1975 ~ DF-61 Program with China Terminated • 1981 ~ Egypt Supplies Scud-B Missiles for Evaluation • 1984 ~ Scud-B Mod A Tested • 1985 ~ Scud-B Mod B Tested • 1987 ~ Scud-B Mod B Exported to Iran • 1989 ~ Scud-B Mod C Deployed • 1990 ~ Nodong-1 Program Underway • 1993 ~ Nodong-1 Tested • 1995 ~ Taepo Dong 1 and Taepo Dong 2 Programs Underway • 1996 ~ Nodong-1 Exported to Iran • 1998 ~ Nodong Technology Incorporated in Pakistani Ghauri • 1998 ~ Potential Space Launch/LRBM Capability Demonstrated 29 • WW II Germany • North Korea • Iraq 31 Iraqi Ballistic Missile Programs • 1970s -- Iraq receives first Scud-B ballistic missiles from USSR (813 imported by 1990) • 1982 -- First Iraqi Scud-B attack on Iran • 3 August 1987 -- Al Husayn tested (500 km range) • February - April 1988 -- 189 Al Husayn missiles fired in “war of the cities” • 25 April 1988 -- Al Abbas missile fired on Tehran (860 km) • 1980-1988 -- Total of 361 Scud-B and Al Husayn missiles fired in Iran-Iraq war • 5 December 1989 -- Successful launch of Al Abid SLV • 7 December 1989 -- Tammuz 1 SLV announced (2,000 km range) • 1991-- Desert Storm saw 88 Al Husayns fired • 1997 -- Iraq announces Al Hamid ballistic missile (150 km range) 33 Genealogy of Technology Transfer After WWII 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 • V-2 (A-4 SRBM) India • Personnel • SA-2 SAM (Back Engr to SRBM) • U.S. Scout Solid Rocket Technology • Technology USSR CIS • Facilities USSR • R-17 (SCUD B SRBM) Germany FRGFRG Iraq • Funding for Condor 2 MRBM • Badr 2 MRBM (Based on Condor 2) • Personnel • Technology Argentina • Vector IRBM (Terminated) Egypt • SS-1B • Personnel • R-17 (SCUD B SRBM) • Technology (SCUD B) North Korea • R-17 (SCUD B) • Funding • SCUD B • SCUD C Production Iran • V-2 (A-4 SRBM) • SCUD B • SCUD C (Transshipped) • Personnel • R-1 (V-2 copy) Syria (Von Braun & team) • R-2 (SS-2 SRBM) • Technology • Technology Libya Peoples Republic of China • DF-3 (CSS-2 IRBM) • People South Afr Saudi Arabia (H.S. Tsien Deported) • Jericho 2 / RSA-3 Israel • People/Technology France • Technology 10/1/98 United States 35 International Technology Transfer Technology Recipients Israel India Egypt Iraq Pakistan Iran Libya Saudi Syria Arabia Trained Personnel/Advisors NL, US AT, DE, ES, AR, AT, BE, CL, EG, CN KP DE DE, PK, CH, SU, US FR, DE, LI, KP, CN, CN, US CH, US, SU Reentry Vehicles DE, CH, US CL, EG, FR, DE, LY, CN CL SU US Technology Suppliers Ballistic missile Propulsion AT, BE, FR, DE, IT, CN, KP CS, IR, IT LI, CH, US LY, SU Guidance/Navigation ZA, TW BR, FR, DE, US HK, JP IL, CN US Flight Controls BR, DE HK, JP Production Assistance FR, DE AR, DE, KP AR, AT, BE, BR, EG, DE, CN KP, CN DE DE CS, DE,LY NL, US SA, CH, US FR, DE, IT, MC, KP KP, SA,SU CN, CH, GB, US, SU Materials Manufacture US DE, LI, GB, US CA, FR, CH, US Computers US SA, CH, US DE NO, GB US Testing/Ranges ZA MR Notes: (1) This information was extracted from the International ballistic missile Proliferation Project database, compiled by the Monterey Institute of International studies under the direction of Dr. William C. Potter and Dr. Edward J. Laurance. It is a compilation of open source material and covers only reports of actual deliveries and transfers since 1989. The table does not include information relating to proposals, offers, negotiations, or orders (unless clear transfers have resulted). (2) The two-letter codes used in this table are the American National Standard Institute (ANSI) international country codes, defined as follows: AR - Argentina, AT - Australia, BE - Belgium, BR - Brazil, CA - Canada, CH - Switzerland, CL - Chile, CN - China, CS - Czechoslovakia, DE - Germany, EG - Egypt, ES - Spain, FR - France, GB - United Kingdom, HK - Hong Kong, IL - Israel, IR - Iran, IT - Italy, JP - Japan, KP - North Korea, LI - Liechtenstein, LY - Libya, MC - Monaco, MR - Mauritania, NL - Netherlands, NO - Norway, PK - Pakistan, SA - Saudi Arabia, SU - Soviet Union, TW - Taiwan, US - United States, ZA - South Africa. 10/1/98 37 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) • Missile technology non-proliferation partnership formed in 1987 as a voluntary agreement between members • United States and G-7 partners were original members • Current membership totals 29 countries • Objective is to restrict proliferation of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, and related technologies • Applies to systems carrying payloads of 500 kg or greater • System ranges of 300 km or greater • Includes all warhead categories -- conventional or NBC • NOT intended to impede national space programs or int’l cooperation in such programs • Restricted technologies include • Complete ballistic missile/cruise missile/UAV systems and some subsystems • Production facilities 10/1/98 39 What MTCR Doesn’t Control • MCTR does not “control” anything. Its signers agree to exercise “restraint”. There are not even restraints on the following: • Transfer of missiles and components from non-signatory states (e.g., North Korea and China) • Emigration of scientists, engineers and technicians • Technical education in sciences and
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