Naval War College Review Volume 64 Article 15 Number 1 Winter

2011 A Little aW r That Shook the World:, , and the Future of the West David T. Burbach

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Recommended Citation Burbach, David T. (2011) "A Little aW r That Shook the World:Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 15. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss1/15

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BOOK REVIEWS 155 Burbach: A Little War That Shook the World:Georgia, Russia, and the Future

and the development of the military of- suggesting that no such unifying conser- ficer corps as a profession. The book vative ideology exists. Yet a number of serves as a dialogue on those theories authors comment on the overwhelming and produces often-diverging view- Republican Party affiliation of military points about Huntington’s ideas and personnel. Other authors discuss im- the condition of the American civil- provement of professional military edu- military relationship. cation, expansion of military missions to Regarding Huntington’s “The Crisis of include stability operations, American Civil-Military Relations,” the “Madi-sonian” approach to national se- book begins with the current state of curity and civilian control, and the re- civil-military relations. Richard D. Betts sponsibility of military professionals to suggests that while tension may exist build trust with civilian leaders of incon- between the military and its civilian sistent military expertise. leadership, it is not unusual, given the In the final chapter, Nielson and Snider realities of our democratic system. This advance nine conclusions resulting is so because “objective control,” al- from their research (however, not all though not of a pure form, has kept the contributors are in agreement). The last military obedient to various adminis- is probably the most instructive, that trations. Matthew Moten discusses Sec- Huntington’s work provides “continu- retary Donald Rumsfeld’s leadership of ing value” to the discussion regarding the Department of Defense, characteriz- American civil-military relations. This ing it as a period of “broken dialogue” book is best regarded as a commentary marked by “distrust within the Penta- on Huntington’s 1957 work, one that gon and throughout the defense estab- also provides a good review of the cur- lishment.” General Eric Shinseki, rent scholarship on American civil- retired Army chief of staff, serves as a military relations theory and experience. model for the military response to such However, keep a copy of Huntington strong civilian leadership, providing nearby as you read it. forceful military advice in private, while DAYNE NIX publicly supporting political superiors. Naval War College The assembled authors agree that mili- tary officers should avoid political in- volvement. When military and civilian leaders disagree on security policy, sev- eral authors state, resignation is not an Asmus, Ronald D. A Little War That Shook the option for the military officer, since it is World: Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West. an inherently political act. Yet James New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 272pp. $27 Burk comments that military officers In August 2008, Russia shattered the are also morally autonomous and ac- post–Cold War peace in Europe by in- countable for their actions, not “purely vading the former Soviet republic of instrumental” agents of the state. Dis- Georgia. Though only days long, that cussing Huntington’s assertion that the war dashed NATO’s hopes to expand to “military mind” should reflect a conser- the Caucasus and sparked fundamental vative outlook in support of American reevaluations of American and Euro- institutions, Darrell Driver cites research pean Union (EU) relations with Russia.

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156 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 1, Art. 15

Ronald Asmus’s A Little War That rashness of Saakashvili and the dither- Shook the World is an engaging read ing of the Europeans. that combines the best available history Asmus sheds light on important ques- of the war with a broader analysis of the tions like whether the geopolitical forces that led to it. gave the “green light” to Tbilisi to esca- Asmus is well positioned to write this late (Asmus convincingly argues it did book. He was a senior Clinton official not) and whether Russia’s invasion was dealing with NATO enlargement, and preplanned or opportunistic (Asmus since 2001 he has been a senior re- believes it was preplanned). Ironically, searcher at the German Marshall Fund. Georgia’s preparations for NATO Asmus has wide access to U.S. and EU membership hurt its military capability: officials, and although uncommonly when war started, 40 percent of its army well connected in Georgia, he is not a was in Iraq or preparing to leave. Ac- supporter of President Mikheil cording to NATO doctrine, Georgia Saakashvili. While Russian sources were hadtrainedandequippedforpeace- not forthcoming, overall this is a very keeping operations, not territorial well documented account. defense. The book offers a blow-by-blow ac- AsmussuggeststhatmoreadroitNATO count of prewar diplomacy and the diplomacy would have averted the war. conduct of the war, with lively portraits He lays out a clear and compelling case, of key personalities. Asmus also puts but given Russia’s demonstrated will- the war in the context of post–Cold ingness to incur costs, the claim is not War Europe, arguing that the war was fully convincing. Even President George about much more than Georgia. Strik- W. Bush was far less willing to risk a ing at Tbilisi sent a message to Wash- U.S.-Russian conflict than were the Eu- ington and Brussels. It culminated ropeans. The disparities of interest, risk Russia’s decadelong frustration with an tolerance, and geography made the international order it believed to be Western goal of a Georgia in NATO fundamentally against it. From a West- very difficult without a fight, but Asmus ern perspective, former Warsaw Pact is correct that the United States and the nations had been freely choosing to as- EU could have better played their sociate with NATO and the EU, in an hands. environment where force and “spheres What emerges is a larger story of Amer- of influence” were passé. Russia, under ican overstretch and a failure to balance President , saw instead ends and means. The United States si- encroachment and a running rough- multaneously wanted to have its way in shod over Russian concerns (as when the Balkans and the Caucasus; to obtain NATO ignored Russia on Kosovo). Russian support for Iranian sanctions, NATO’s halfhearted moves toward ad- Afghan logistics, and counterterrorism; mitting Georgia and Ukraine in early and to enjoy active EU support for all 2008 offered Putin a window to act. that,evenasU.S.policeswerehighly Georgia’s “frozen” separatist conflicts unpopular among EU voters. Washing- in Abkhazia and South Ossetia pro- ton did not credibly back its Georgia vided a pretext that was aided by the policy militarily or politically, nor would it choose between competing

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BOOK REVIEWS 157 Burbach: A Little War That Shook the World:Georgia, Russia, and the Future

goals.Asmusthinksmoreskillandres- eventual end of the organization olution might have carried this (Sendero Luminoso, for example) but through, but one wonders whether the in other cases has not (Hamas). Though bigger lesson isn’t really about the finite she does offer insights into the different nature of national power. outcomes, she tempers her conclusions by emphasizing that the act of decapita- DAVID T. BURBACH Naval War College tion provides “critical insight into the depth and nature of a group’s popular support.” In effect, one cannot know in advance. The final chapter, “How Al-Qaeda Cronin, Audrey Kurth. How Terrorism Ends: Un- Ends,” attempts to apply some of these derstanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist lessons. Cronin convincingly argues Campaigns. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. that decapitation will not end al-Qa‘ida. Press, 2010. 311pp. $29.95 Beliefs that decapitation will have a dra- Audrey Kurth Cronin’s engaging and matic impact on that organization are enlightening book examines how ter- “tinged with emotion, not dispassionate rorist movements come to an end, fo- analysis.” Killing Bin Laden, Cronin ar- cusing almost exclusively on terrorist gues, might “actually enhance his stat- organizations over the last half-century. ure, in practical terms.” She offers six pathways by which terror- Although Cronin firmly states that all ist groups end: decapitation, negotia- terrorist groups end, this reviewer read tion, success, failure, repression, and the final chapter wondering whether reorientation. there are numerous aspects of al-Qa‘ida One of the book’s strengths is that it (all of which Cronin notes in some ca- captures the full spectrum of possible pacity) that make it a candidate for outcomes for terrorist organizations some form of irrelevant perpetuity and explains why particular campaigns among terrorist organizations. It is did or did not end. The organization of transnational in influence like no other the book is laudable—by looking in group in Cronin’s study. In 2001, each chapter at tactics and strategies for al-Qa‘ida struck an unprecedented blow ending terrorism, rather than simply against the sole global superpower. marching through case studies, one is Cronin asserts that the group’s message able to examine more soberly specific will have staying power for some people strategic approaches to counter- as a call for resistance that will endure terrorism and their effects. In this re- formanyyears,nomatterwhatBin gard, this book will be very useful for Laden’s fate. This may be an unprece- policy makers and counterterrorism dented recipe for unusual longevity. practitioners. A combination of increased counter- Cronin is cautious in making causal terrorism measures, a military offensive claims. For example, in her chapter on in Afghanistan, and al-Qa‘ida’s own un- decapitation she recognizes that killing derrecognized organizational and oper- the leaders of terrorist organizations ational deficiencies have rendered the has sometimes contributed to the group unable to execute a successful

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