Muslim Youth and Women in the West: Source

MUSLIM YOUTH AND WOMEN IN THE WEST: SOURCE OF CONCERN OR SOURCE OF HOPE? New York University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West was established in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001, which highlighted the urgent need for greater communication among and about the Islamic World, the United States, and the West. With the attacks focusing the world’s attention on extremist movements in the Middle East and Islamic Asia, political commentators have been seeking, and often failing, to explain the political and social roots of these movements and their accompanying grievances against the West and the United States in particular.

The Center was launched as a structured forum for sustained dialogue involving voices from the various religious, intellectual, economic, and political sectors of Islamic and American/Western societies, including those non-elite Islamic figures with proven credibility in their communities who are too often unheard in the West. ABOUT THE CENTER FOR DIALOGUES Based on this sustained dialogue, the Center is committed to a number of academic, policy, and outreach activities, including conferences on a variety of criti- cally important topics today—the clash of perceptions, elections, the nature of authority in the Islamic world and in the West, Muslims in the West, the role of the media, and education, among others.

The Center is unique among comparable institutions at American universities for combining public outreach and international conferences, academic study, and policy review and recommendations. Government leaders and other relevant authorities and organizations, including media decision-makers, attend the meetings in order to help effect policy change and alter public perceptions. Findings from the Center are also published as policy papers, as well as in book form, and are disseminated to educational institutions worldwide for use by students, faculty, and researchers.

Moreover, the Center for Dialogues is creating a network of leaders who will continue to communicate with and consult one another for years to come—a valuable network for negotiating peace in times of crisis. MUSLIM YOUTH AND WOMEN IN THE WEST: SOURCE OF CONCERN OR SOURCE OF HOPE?

Report of the conference organized by New York University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West at the Salzburg Global Seminar

Salzburg, Austria, May 15-17, 2007

Funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, the Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs; The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Qatar Foundation; and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund

A private university in the public service MUSLIM YOUTH AND WOMEN IN THE WEST: SOURCE OF CONCERN OR SOURCE OF HOPE?

Copyright © 2007 by New York University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.

For more information, address Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West New York University 194 Mercer Street, 4th Floor New York, NY, 10012-1502 www.islamuswest.org

ii CONTENTS

Director’s Preface...... iv Executive Summary...... ix Session I—Tensions Produced by Islam in the West: How Can They Be Overcome? ...... 1 Part 1: Opening ...... 1 Part 2: Roundtable...... 7 Session II—Muslim Communities in the West ...... 21 Panel 1: A Survey of the Current Economic, Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape. . 21 Panel 2: A Vision for the Future ...... 28 Session III—Working Group Reports ...... 41 1. Security ...... 41 2. Integration—Best Practices...... 43 3. Religious Practice—A Western Islam? ...... 46 Session IV—Debate on Security, Integration, and Religious Practice—A Western Islam? ...... 49 Session V— Consideration of Policy Recommendations ...... 59 Session VI—Plan of Action ...... 63 Notes to Sessions ...... 66 Appendix I: Conference Program ...... 68 Appendix II: List of Participants ...... 72 Appendix III: Mustapha Tlili’s Opening Statement ...... 76 Appendix IV: Address of Dr. Ursula Plassnik, Austrian Federal Minister for European and International Affairs ...... 82 Appendix V: Keynote Address of Rikke Hvilshøj, Danish Minister of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs ...... 90 Appendix VI: Background Paper ...... 98 Notes to Appendixes...... 152 iii DIRECTOR’S PREFACE

No rational mind can readily accept how True to our mission to “knock down the a person could turn against a country that walls of misunderstanding and replace offered him or her residency or citizen- them with bridges of knowledge and ship, when he or she was a refugee, a reason,” the NYU Center for Dialogues: political exile, or simply a human being Islamic World-U.S.-The West thought seeking a second chance in life. the time was right to convene a major conference on the basis of solid scholar- The Madrid and London terrorist attacks ship and with the participation of all of 2004 and 2005, respectively, put the concerned—youth and women activists issue of Muslim immigrants’ loyalty to and community leaders, religious their host countries in dramatic focus leaders, policy makers, policy analysts, and highlighted the link between security scholars, government officials, and and what is commonly called “integra- media representatives—to address the tion.” Regrettably, the debate sparked by issues surrounding the presence of large these tragedies was not always nourished Muslim communities in the West. by informed arguments, falling more often than not into simplification, if not With a substantial financial commitment sheer ignorance. from the Austrian Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs and iv with additional funding from the Danish comparative politics, Brandeis Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and University; Martin Schain, professor of Integration Affairs; The Netherlands politics, New York University; Vincent Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Tiberj, senior research fellow, Center Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of for Political Research at Paris Institut des Foreign Affairs; the Qatar Foundation; Sciences Politiques; and Catherine and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, we Wihtol de Wenden, director of research, began the preparations for the confer- Centre d’Études et de Recherches ence by bringing together a group of Internationales, Center for Political experts from both the United States and Research at Paris Institut des Sciences Europe. The group met a number of Politiques. times throughout 2006-2007 to chart a course for the conference that included I also seize the opportunity to reiterate my the development of a background paper thanks to Dr. Ursula Plassnik, Austrian (see page 98), an agenda (see page 68), Federal Minister for European and and a list of participants (see page 72). International Affairs; Rikke Hvilshøj, I want to thank the following people for Danish Minister of Refugee, Immigration, their magnificent contributions: LaRue and Integration Affairs; Stephen Heinz, Allen, Raymond and Rosalee Weiss president of the Rockefeller Brothers Professor of Applied Psychology, Fund; Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Steinhardt School of Culture, Nasser Al-Missned, chairperson, Qatar Education, and Human Development, Foundation for education, science and New York University; Sophie Body- community development; and to their Gendrot, director, Center for Urban colleagues, as well as to all the governments Studies, the Sorbonne; Hassan Bousetta, that supported the conference. research associate, Center for Ethnic and Migration Studies, University of Because the focus of the conference was Liège; Jocelyne Césari, director, Islam to be on Muslim communities in in the West Program, Center for Middle Europe, it was natural that we would seek Eastern Studies, Harvard University; a European venue. The Salzburg Global Romain Garbaye, maître de Seminar welcomed us, and we could not conférences, the Sorbonne; Nadia have made a better decision than in Hashmi, member, External Relations forging a cooperative relationship with Team—EU Enlargement International the Seminar and its leadership. My Directorate, Home Office, United thanks go to my colleague from my Kingdom; Jytte Klausen, professor of United Nations days, Edward Mortimer, v former director of communications and whether in the plenary or the working head of the Speechwriting Unit for the groups, over dinner and drinks, or at secretary-general at the United Nations, receptions hosted by Dr. Plassnik or who now serves as senior vice president Heinz Schaden, the mayor of Salzburg— and chief program officer at the participants debated, argued, and finally Salzburg Global Seminar, and to his came up with a plan of action that is staff, who spared no effort at making the offered at the end of this report. Claudia conference’s logistical organization a Rivera-Bohn and Andrea Stanton, the full success. Center for Dialogues’ editorial consultants, worked tirelessly to reflect the The Center for Dialogues staff, particu- debate in their notes and initial draft of larly Shaanti Kapila, until recently assis- the report, and they also deserve our tant director, as well as Nyasa Hickey, thanks. program assistant, and Salimah Hadi, NYU intern, showed the utmost In closing the conference, I thanked the devotion, skills, and energy that earned participants for putting their minds to them due admiration from the partici- such difficult questions, which have a pants and other organizers. I am proud critical impact on both governments to have them as colleagues and I regret and civil society. I also stressed that a that after three years with the Center, Ms. number of countries had been repre- Kapila has embarked on a new phase of sented at the conference, including her intellectual development. My staff Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and I wish her all the best. France, Germany, The Netherlands, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tunisia, As was the case during the Center for the United Kingdom, and the United Dialogues’ previous international States. I said that given the level of conferences, we sought to formulate tension and uncertainties surrounding implementable policy objectives that the Muslim world, I imagined that the would contribute to lessening tensions recommendations issued by the diverse and increasing chances for better under- group of participants, in the form of a standing. The Salzburg conference “plan of action,” would be taken quite followed the same course, thanks to the seriously, and that the success of seriousness of purpose displayed by all integration for Muslims in the West is participants without exception. Over the everyone’s concern and everyone’s course of the three-day meeting— responsibility. vi It is my hope that governments— particularly European governments— as well as philanthropic foundations and concerned generous individuals would consider the plan of action developed by the Salzburg conference and would lend their support to help the Center for Dialogues achieve its implementation.

Mustapha Tlili Founder and Director Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West New York University

vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

How can tensions produced by the integration issues? Should the practice presence of Muslims in the West best be of Islam itself be adapted in any way to overcome? From what sources do these the realities of life in the West? tensions arise—from economic and social factors or from cultural and value These questions and more were differences? What role does public addressed and answered during presen- policy play in addressing these tensions tations, debates, and working group for the benefit of all citizens? What sessions over the course of the confer- does the current landscape of Muslim ence “Muslim Youth and Women in the communities in the West look like? What West: Source of Concern or Source of visions might be offered for the future? Hope?” The conference was held May What tools can be used to build commu- 15-17, 2007, in Salzburg, Austria, and nity resilience, prevent extremism, was convened by New York University promote successful integration, and Center for Dialogues: Islamic World- enhance security? In what ways can U.S.-The West at the Salzburg Global Muslim youth and women help infuse Seminar. new vitality into Europe? What practices, if any, have been proven The Center for Dialogues’ founder and successful in addressing security and director Mustapha Tlili opened the ix conference by noting the complexities social, cultural, and economic surrounding issues of Muslims in the backgrounds, so all can live harmo- West: the weight of historical memory, niously together. While Europe is the distortions of globalization, the already pluralistic in many ways, it is media’s simplistic reductions and politi- time for Europeans to ask some self- cians’ instrumentalizations. Mr. Tlili critical questions regarding whether proposed the consideration of a new current policies support rather than “citizenship pact” that would take into stifle cultural differences. She account today’s diverse societies in mentioned the need to develop tools that defining the terms under which the prevent young Muslims from becoming integration of Muslim communities in stuck in a spiral of hopelessness. As for the West should occur. Such a rethinking Muslim women, she noted that this of the reciprocal obligations of state and group comprises women with a vast citizens could offer hope for the future range of education levels, backgrounds, rather than further alienation. family situations, countries of origin, and personal orientations toward Islam. The mayor of Salzburg, Heinz Schaden, The challenges they face, including welcomed the conference participants employment issues and battering and noted that Salzburg is a particularly husbands, are certainly not limited to appropriate site, as the city has the largest the Muslim population. She closed by number of residents of non-European cautioning participants about the danger origin in the European Union and Islam of indifference, which is frequently is the second most popular religion in camouflaged as tolerance in Europe’s the city’s schools. Salzburg Global dealings with its Muslims citizens. Seminar senior vice president and chief Instead, she suggested we emulate the program officer, Edward Mortimer, image of two extended hands: one added that conference participants had extended toward Muslim communities an important contribution to make in in Europe and the other extended forging new relations of trust and mutual toward the Muslim world beyond respect among people of different Europe’s borders. religions and cultures. The conference brought together 60 Austrian Federal Minister for European policy makers, community leaders, and International Affairs, Dr. Ursula scholars, media professionals, and Plassnik addressed the issue of building activists from Europe, North America, confidence among people of different and the Arab world, including Muslims x and non-Muslims. Among the attendees arguments in favor of viewing Muslims’ were Rabin Baldewsingh, deputy mayor integration in the context of general of the Hague; Sophie Body-Gendrot, immigration issues, and case studies director of the Center for Urban Studies relating to the United Kingdom and at the Sorbonne; Ambassador Marc United States, official approaches to Perrin de Brichambaut, secretary integration, and security. Participants general of the Organization for Security also engaged in vigorous debate over and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); such critical issues as the role of the state Abdelmajid Charfi, professor emeritus vis-à-vis Muslim communities, the of humanities and Islamic studies at the relationship between integration and University of Tunis; Roger Hardy, security, and whether religious identity Middle East and Islamic affairs analyst or socioeconomic position is the better for the BBC World Service; Karen lens through which to examine integra- Brooks Hopkins, president of the tion. The conference concluded with a Brooklyn Academy of Music; Shireen session focused on providing concrete Hunter, visiting scholar at Georgetown policy recommendations—as well as University’s Center for Muslim- means of accountability to determine the Christian Understanding; Kamel effectiveness of the recommendations in Kabtane, rector of the Grand Mosque of fostering Western acceptance of diversity Lyon; filmmaker Zarqa Nawaz; Farhan in general and particularly of Muslims as Nizami, director of the Oxford Centre welcome and equal citizens. for Islamic Studies; Farah Pandith, senior adviser on Muslim engagement at The conference reached the following the State Department; Tariq Ramadan, conclusions, which are expressed as professor of Islamic studies at St an “action plan” to facilitate their Antony’s College, Oxford University; implementation: Iqbal Riza, special adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Alliance of Western media frequently depict Muslim Civilizations; Martin Schain, professor communities (both in the West and the of politics at New York University; and wider Muslim world) in terms of Susan Scholefield, director general for negative stereotypes. The result is Equalities in the United Kingdom’s widespread misconceptions that damage Department for Communities and Local relations between Muslim and non- Government. Participants heard Muslim communities. In response to presentations on the statistical makeup this are the following proposals: of Europe’s Muslim communities, xi 1. National media associations should 1. The Center for Dialogues: Islamic train media professionals to be more World-U.S.-The West should facilitate conscientious regarding how they contact between European and North portray Muslim communities. American governments, nongovernmental organizations, and community a. Nongovernmental organizations in groups. each country should organize training workshops, thereby avoiding concerns a. The Center for Dialogues should about official interference with compile a catalog of best practices freedom of the press. that focuses particularly on experiences at the grassroots level, b. Although they should neither including examples of particular organize nor run these workshops, difficulties local Muslim commu- the European Union and Western nities have faced and the actions national governments should support they have taken to overcome these them in principle. difficulties.

2. “Media guides” should be developed to b. The Center for Dialogues should provide journalists and other interested set meetings between Muslim youth parties with basic information and statis- and older Muslim role models whose tics on Muslim communities around the stories demonstrate that Muslims in world. Whether these take the form of Europe and North America can simple fact sheets or more substantive integrate and achieve success while academic papers, these guides should also maintaining their Muslim identities. be made available to school teachers, public figures, and authorities. c. Because the work of this conference will be ongoing, the Center for The exchange of “best practices”—sharing case Dialogues should organize a follow- studies of successful approaches to up meeting for conference partici- integration, security, and religious pants to reconvene in order to chart practice—was generally seen as a useful progress in general and on a state- exercise, despite some participants’ by-state basis. reservations that the context of Muslim experiences differs significantly from 2. With the support of high-level country to country. The following can authorities, government and community help to promote this exchange: organizations should encourage xii dialogue between Muslim and non- 1. National governments and the Muslim residents. European Union should define objective indicators for evaluating the success a. Many participants felt that local (or failure) of particular groups’ authorities were far better equipped integration into the national body. than national ones to develop and These indicators should take caution not engage in meaningful community- to conflate cultural and religious building initiatives. However, integration. governments should expand incentives, financial or otherwise, to 2. Governments should work with other encourage intercultural dialogue. organizations to meet the urgent need for statistical information on Muslim b. Local Muslim associations should communities in each country by creating organize events that engage with the hospitable conditions for the general public—for instance, commu- conducting of voluntary censuses. nity iftars and Ramadan festivals—as National governments and the European well as establish partnerships with Union’s ability to create and implement other community-wide organizations effective public policy measures would be that deal with issues of common greatly enhanced by access to dependable concern such as equal opportunity statistical information. employment.

3. Muslim associations, NGOs, and government organizations should call on Muslims and non-Muslim celebrities and successful individuals from the world of sports, politics, finance, and entertainment to actively promote a positive image of Muslim communities.

Integration is relevant not only in relation to security issues, but requires a careful rethinking of the rights and responsibilities of citizens as well as a willingness to expand the traditional ethnic and religious profile of the “standard” citizen. xiii

SESSION I—TENSIONS PRODUCED BY ISLAM IN THE WEST: HOW CAN THEY BE OVERCOME?

Part 1: Opening fate should be of interest not only to those in the West, but those in the larger Mustapha Tlili, founder and director of Muslim world as well. This conference is the Center for Dialogues: Islamic World- intended to help provide policy recom- U.S.-The West at New York University, mendations to further the integration of opened the conference by welcoming Western citizens of Muslim faith in the participants to a gathering sparked by economic, social, cultural, and political what he described as a call for creative fabric of their respective countries—and thinking regarding the inclusion of Islam the conference’s success will be judged, in the West, a call made more pressing by in part, on the implementation of these the clashes of recent years. Today, the 15 recommendations. to 20 million Muslims in Europe and the four to six million in North America Mr. Tlili thanked the government of contribute to their communities and Austria, the Austrian Federal Ministry their fellow citizens’ welfare, but rarely for European and International Affairs, feel as appreciated as their contributions and the mayor of Salzburg for their should make them—or worse, have support and for hosting the event. He become objects of suspicion due to noted that Austria was a particularly prejudice and security concerns. Their appropriate setting for a conference on 1 Muslims in the West, as Austria has short-term political gains during recognized Islam as one of several election season. These reasons make the national faiths since 1912. He also conference’s debates challenging but thanked the Danish Ministry of Refugee, important as a basis for a fact-based, Immigration, and Integration Affairs; reasonable dialogue in wider society, The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign which hopefully will lead to common Affairs; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia ground. The goal for conference partic- Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Qatar ipants, Mr. Tlili suggested, is to propose Foundation; the Rockefeller Brothers recommendations that could help policy Fund; as well as the Kronen Zeitung and its makers and others working to enable publisher, Herr Hans Dichand, for their citizens of Muslim faith to attain full and financial and other types of support. equal citizenship in the West—the proof of which would be that they would no Given the misunderstandings and longer be described first by faith and tensions that in recent years have struc- second by nationality. tured the issue of Muslim communities in the West, particularly issues Mr. Tlili acknowledged that recent events surrounding Muslim youth and Muslim have made it less easy to determine the women, Mr. Tlili stressed the need to right terms under which the integration consider the Muslim-Western relation- of Muslim communities in the West, and ship as a diverse and varied one. He particularly in Europe, should occur. In highlighted that the Center for Dialogues addition to intra-European social, has been committed to this focus and the economic, and cultural tensions, fostering of reasoned and respectful strained relations between the Muslim communication since the program’s and Western worlds have reverberated creation and will pursue the same within Muslim communities in the West. approach now that it has become an NYU While the path toward full inclusion of Center. Muslim and other minorities is a challenging one, Mr. Tlili noted that Mr. Tlili noted that the issues of Muslims both the United States and Europe have in the West are complex and are weighed successfully addressed similar challenges down by the heavy burden of historical regarding the integration of other memory, exacerbated by the distortions minority groups in the past. Moreover, of globalization, frequently reduced to the challenge cannot be ignored. After their most simplistic dimensions by the decades in Europe, many of the media, and often instrumentalized for immigrants of the 1950s and 1960s and 2 their descendants have become citizens. whether to wear a headscarf, to work The idea that their settlement in Europe outside the home, and to observe the is temporary has become an illusion held practices of their faith as they interpret only by the extreme right-wing. Ethnic them. In Mr. Tlili’s view, the principle of and religious pluralism is Europe’s new full gender equality, which has been social reality, and it requires govern- enshrined in the Universal Declaration ments and other social actors to lead the of Human Rights and other internation- way in rethinking the obligations that ally binding instruments, should be connect citizens to the state and to one upheld without question. another. When developing this new citizenship A new “citizenship pact” allowing for pact, Europe may look to the United pluralism and diversity must be States as a model, Mr. Tlili suggested, constructed, Mr. Tlili argued. Europe’s since American Muslims are at least traditional pacts of reciprocal obligation economically and socially far more must be rewritten to include Muslims integrated than European Muslims. and other immigrants who do not Creating the new pact might most fruit- seamlessly blend into the historical fully be considered as a European Union “national body,” whether ethnically or initiative, since EU capacities exceed religiously. This pact must address the those of individual states. The process issue of integration, whether in the might involve holding open meetings private sphere, which concerns an with Muslim populations around Europe individual’s faith and moral values, and to identify grievances and propose in the public, which concerns civic remedies; an open “constitutional culture as well as education, employ- convention” to incorporate findings ment, and political participation. from studies and surveys of the contemporary situation; and an “eminent This new citizenship pact would provide a persons” committee to draft policy set of principles regarding the obliga- recommendations and the pact itself. tions of Muslim citizens, as of all citizens, as well as the rights they enjoy in return; In conclusion, Mr. Tlili noted that while it would also outline the state’s obliga- the challenges are many, the effort tions to its citizens. Defining these required to address them is necessary in principles will take some work, as there order to offer hope for a bright, peaceful are difficult issues to work through, such future rather than one of alienation and as Muslim women’s right to choose violence. He restated his call for a new 3 citizenship pact as the instrument best conference can make an important suited to bring about the future that contribution to resolving misunder- the conference’s background paper standings by proposing new relations of envisioned: trust and mutual respect among people of different religions and cultures. This As citizens, reassured in the integrity conference should be seen not as an end of their private values but in full but as a beginning of a major effort by agreement with the encompassing legal system of their adopted Muslims and non-Muslims, the begin- countries and its civic culture, ning of a rethinking of what people Western Muslims could become an coming from different cultures are inspiration for the larger Muslim entitled to expect from one another. world as it struggles to strike a balance between faith, tradition, and modernity. The harmonious integration of Ursula Plassnik, Austrian Federal Muslim communities in the West Minister for European and International could also lead to a more peaceful Affairs opened her address by noting and productive relationship between that the issue of how people of different the West and the Muslim world. social, cultural, and economic backgrounds can build mutual confi- Heinz Schaden, mayor of Salzburg, spoke dence in order to live with one another next. The mayor began by noting that is often seen as a “soft” issue—but for her Salzburg is a particularly appropriate place it is far from being a soft issue. Instead, for a conference like this, because the city it is an issue that has direct implications has, within Austria, the largest number of for security, for the well-being of our non-European-born residents. Today, societies. The image she suggested is the Islam is the second most well-represented image of two extended hands, one hand religion in Salzburg schools. Hence extended to those within our society, dialogue is important to Salzburg because particularly those from the Muslim of its population as well as its position as a world, and the other hand extended to European city. people elsewhere in world, and particularly in the Muslim world, who are Edward Mortimer, senior vice president seeking dialogue and seeking to learn and chief program officer, Salzburg more about one another through our Global Seminar, noted that relations common interests. between Muslims and non-Muslims around the world are a key issue at this moment in history. He added that this 4 Today, women and youth are often in the increasingly successful in campaigning spotlight when it comes to questions of for equal education and the same rights of integration and relations between Islam access to the European job market. and the West. They are often perceived as victims and as those who suffer the most Pluralism is a force in Europe today and discrimination. However, gender roles is, at heart, a very European concept, Dr. are shifting, including among Muslims. Plassnik said. Estimates of the number of Furthermore, integration begs the topic Muslims in the EU range from 20 to 30 of identity—national, cultural, religious, million to more than 50 million. They and so forth—which is an especially come from a variety of origins, from the challenging issue for women and youth. autochthonous to those who have come during the past century as immigrants. Dr. Plassnik urged her fellow partici- European policies favor diversity and pants to look beyond complaints and support the idea that each individual stereotypes in order to identify the real should feel at home in Europe. The EU problems and solutions associated with has established solid foundations Muslims in the West. For example, she regarding the division between state and noted, citizens with immigrant religion, equal opportunities for men backgrounds often lack education and and women, and individual liberal rights. job prospects, which gives them few The new European core model is to possibilities for professional and social communicate and “live” pluralism. A promotion and therefore leaves them quote from the 2003 conference of with a feeling of nonbelonging. Looking Islamic clerics in Europe illustrates this: at statistics, this is particularly true for “European Muslims are aware of their male adolescents, even more than for religious identities as Muslims and their female adolescents. The lack of future social identities as Europeans.” This prospects and the feelings of exclusion sentence illustrates the core objective of that they face can lead to radicalization. European Islam. Europe’s core values as well as its legal system promote equal However, the question of nonintegration opportunity and combat discrimination. has been posed for years and particularly in relation to Muslim women. Is traditional Nevertheless, integration presents Muslim women’s dress a sign of noninte- challenges, demanding a new framework gration, for example? While the European be put in place that acknowledges the Court of Human Rights has looked into reciprocal rights and obligations of this issue, Muslim women are also Muslims living in Europe, Dr. Plassnik 5 underlined. The goal of integration is important part of the business commu- not the loss of one’s religious identity; nity, published a position paper on the rather, success lies in finding solutions future of integration in Austria, with the together. The challenge is also for a aim of improving conditions for people widespread internal Muslim dialogue, in already in Austria, including language which religious authorities and organiza- skills to help with jobs and social promo- tions play a strong role, but which is not tion for this generation and the next. limited to religious acceptance. We must also invest in promoting a One very important task is to avoid a European identity, Dr. Plassnik argued. situation where young people feel We live in an age of multiple or patchwork frustrated and get lost in a sea of blurred identities, and identity as we know it is perspectives. We must encourage young dynamic and keeps growing, changing, people by providing role models, i.e., and expanding throughout life. European getting those who have succeeded in identity is no exception. Dr. Plassnik Western societies to speak publicly about suggested that the schools, from the first their experiences. grade on, teach children what “Europe” is in a concrete manner that breaks down Language skills, confidence, and educa- fears of the unfamiliar. tion are cornerstones for young people— they are the “door openers” for social, With regard to Muslim youth, religious cultural, and political participation and instruction should correspond to for being integrated rather than European standards, in terms of the excluded. Dr. Plassnik reported that training of teachers and the pedagogy. Austria encourages language skills on Austria has put in place a study for several levels: courses are offered for mastering the pedagogy of Islam and the young people who come to Austria before creation of a center for Islamic theology, or after entering school here, and there but needs social support for Muslim are courses for mothers of school-age initiatives that counteract ideas that children as well. conflict with European values. Both the state and Muslim associations should be Unemployment particularly affects aware of electronic media that threaten to immigrants, including the young, Dr. radicalize rather than further under- Plassnik observed. In Austria, the standing and debate. Federation of Industrialists, which has approximately 500 members and is an 6 Muslim women are exposed to social In closing, Dr. Plassnik pointed out the tensions, both within Western societies danger of indifference, which is often and within their own religious commu- camouflaged as tolerance with regard to nities. A conference of imams convened Muslim citizens. She recalled the image in Austria in 2006 took a clear position of two extended hands as a model for on women’s rights: Muslim women and active outreach toward understanding men are equal partners in Islam, with and integration. equal responsibilities, equal dignity, the same right to work, to education, and to Part 2: Roundtable participation in social discourse. Mr. Tlili opened the roundtable portion Through strengthening the position of of the session by noting that for Muslims women, we can influence young people. A around the world, Islam is more than just modern educated mother will give confi- a private matter of faith. It is also an dence to her children so that they can external reference, and Muslims are succeed in life, Dr. Plassnik argued. But concerned about issues affecting their we must recognize that Muslim women fellow Muslims over the world. Thus in are anything but a homogeneous group in order to respond to concerns of Muslim European society. They vary in terms of constituents, local authorities in the West countries of origin, education level, must understand global issues. In family situations, backgrounds, and addition, he noted, in the last few years personal orientations and lifestyles. We many European countries have come to often speak about Muslim women and not the conclusion that their approaches to to them, Dr. Plassnik continued, stating integrating their Muslim communities that she did not want to speak this way. have failed. One new proposal is to develop and define a “citizenship pact” Muslim women’s challenges are only that would not be a binding agreement, partly due to religion. Although Islamic but rather a clear understanding of what authorities have spoken in defense of is expected from Muslim citizens in the women’s rights and equality, the histor- West. He remarked that the present ical experience has not been as positive. session explored these issues from two However, this is the case for women in perspectives: the geopolitical angle, which general. After all, battering husbands are ties together the domestic and global, not only Muslim. and the local angle, focusing on the interaction between Muslim communities—in

7 Europe, in particular—and their adopted Muslim. From the Austrian state’s point countries. of view, he added, it is an advantage to have a direct interlocutor for the Muslim He then asked Ambassador Ralph community with whom all relevant Scheide, deputy director general for issues—education, building mosques, political affairs and director of the Near etc.—can be discussed. and Middle East Department and Africa, Federal Ministry for European and Mr. Tlili next asked Ambassador Marc International Affairs of Austria, how, in Perrin de Brichambaut, secretary general his view, Austria’s recognition of Islam of the Organization for Security and Co- has furthered the integration of Austrian operation in Europe (OSCE), the Muslims. following questions:

Ambassador Scheide started by discussing Although Muslim majority states of Austria’s history, which differs in certain the OSCE are at the margins of Muslim world, they are key for respects from other European countries. European security, especially since Islam was recognized as an official the fall of the USSR. These states religion in 1912, after the Austro- have undergone profound changes— Hungarian Empire’s absorption of among them a reawakening of Islam. Serbia-Herzegovina. In the 1960s, ’70s, How do you assess these changes and relate them to Muslims in Europe? and ’80s, Austria absorbed a large Do you see similarities, lessons to be number of Muslims from different learned, or best practices when you countries (beginning with Turkey), many compare the situation of Muslim of whom now have Austrian nationality. communities in Russia and other These people came as guest workers, as states of the former Soviet Union? How do you assess the variable did people from the former Yugoslavia. “Islam” in the security equation In the 1990s, Austria absorbed refugees created by the situation that I have from the Balkan wars, first from Bosnia just described, particularly as regard and then Kosovo, many of whom have repercussions on Muslim minorities remained and become Austrian. in Western Europe?

Ambassador Perrin de Brichambaut Ambassador Scheide next pointed out began by noting that some might wonder that European states deal differently in why someone who deals with security was their relations with Islam as a religion. In present at a conference on Muslim youth Austria, “churches” have an official and women in the West. He explained status, whether Christian, Jewish, or 8 that since 1975, the OSCE has defined mutual respect, and understanding. The “security” broadly because political meetings found that national minorities agreement among states does not mean want to participate actively in normal, real peace if the human, economic, and mainstream society but need support. At social dimensions are not satisfied. the same time, they want rights protecting their full identity: their He noted that the OSCE had remarkable language, culture, and religion. It is easy success encouraging the fast transforma- to assert rights, Ambassador Perrin de tion of post-USSR societies. Having a Brichambaut noted, but translating them common framework of values has proved into practical implementation is crucial— very successful for these countries. and more difficult. He added that two However, the OSCE has had less success other meetings are to be held, one in the with countries where democratic condi- fall on Islamophobia and another on tions are less favorable for cultural and issues regarding youth. economic reasons. Hence today most of the OSCE’s attention is dedicated to The OSCE has also been trying to easing the democratic transition in parts combine the principles of security and of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, respect—the need to fight terrorist where the rule of law has not yet been as groups and to respect human rights and successfully consolidated. the rule of law (for example, the need to balance freedom of speech with protec- The question we share, Ambassador tion for the symbols of religious life). He Perrin de Brichambaut noted, is whether added that the question of standards on such a value-based, collective, “peer this issue is still being debated among the pressure” approach can be effective in OSCE states. Today, the OSCE is in terms of the integration of new groups dialogue with its Mediterranean partners and new minorities in OSCE states. So on issues of tolerance. In discussing the far the OSCE track record has been less Danish cartoon incident, Mediterranean brilliant in this new field. For the past states like Egypt and Algeria were the five years, the OSCE has been addressing most vocal in demanding investment in the issue by promoting tolerance. This the issues of respect and dialogue. The has been achieved through a series of OSCE is actively involved in seeking a meetings in Córdoba, Spain, which more permanent and solid exchange with stressed that all communities and all these partners for the future. religions shared equal responsibility for promoting dialogue, nondiscrimination, 9 Mr. Tlili then asked Iqbal Riza, special nition of the “Westophobia” common in adviser to the United Nations Secretary- the Muslim world. The media on both General on the Alliance of Civilizations, sides are exacerbating the problem by to give his opinion on the role of the presenting a negative view of “the other.” High Representative and describe what the Alliance of Civilizations can do to Finally, Mr. Riza suggested that the facilitate the integration of Muslims in “Jewish question” of the 1930s might the West. have relevance as a comparison to today. In the 1930s, Europeans asked whether Mr. Riza said that the Alliance of Jewish communities were fully integrated Civilizations’ responsibility is to follow or whether they were separate communi- the recommendations on two levels: the ties within Europe. This question led to political and the operational. On the problems and ultimately the Holocaust. political level, the source of tensions Is there a “Muslim question” developing between the Muslim and the Western in Europe today? world arises from the internal state of the Muslim societies that are trying to Mr. Tlili asked Ambassador Hans keep up with the rapidly changing world Gnodtke, commissioner for dialogue and Western interventions in the with the Islamic world and dialogue Muslim world post-1945. Possible ways among civilizations, German Federal to alleviate these tensions may include Foreign Office, whether he believes that the Irish model: bringing extremists the time has come for Western European into the debate. countries to seriously consider developing a citizenship pact as described Mr. Riza noted that today, religion is earlier. Ambassador Gnodtke said that playing a role in politics all around the replacing integration with a social world and not just in the Muslim world. contract would change labels but not the In Europe, for example, over 70 percent problem. It is a challenge to define what identify themselves as being Christians, Muslims can expect from their chosen while in the United States, the president nations and what these receiving countries ran on a platform that he frequently can expect of the immigrants. One may identified as “Christian.” call the outcome either integration or a contract, but the core issue is coming to Mr. Riza also noted that the complaints terms with the stress that this population of Muslims regarding Islamophobia in shift puts on both the migrants’ commu- the West need to be matched by a recog- nities and the receiving countries. 10 Ambassador Gnodtke added that it was in particular the Muslim youth in not appropriate to deal with this issue at Germany who have higher unemploy- the European level because of the differ- ment rates than non-Muslims due to ences between the states in terms of the their lack of language skills. This barrier respective legal and constitutional bases is usually overcome by the third genera- of citizenship and the composition of the tion, while the original immigrants migrant population. He also noted his remain insulated in homogeneous involvement with the German Islam communities with access to satellite TV in Conference’s Working Group One, their native tongue. He noted that educa- dealing with “German society and the tion is the key to fighting this problem, consensus on basic values.” It is one of which has no specific relation to Islam but three working groups of the German is just a general migration issue. Islam Conference, a program of negoti- ation and communication between the Ambassador Gnodtke continued by government and the German Muslim stating the necessity for Muslims in the community. Working groups two and West to come to terms with the majority three deal, respectively, with “religion society. Issues of gender equality, and the constitution” and “the bridging adequate opportunities for young girls, role of media and economy.” He went and the right of young people to choose on to say that there was a consensus their own education are not specifically among Muslim participants that they religious issues, but are complicated by were happy to be in their chosen the traditions of patriarchal societies of countries and generally able to practice origin. For example, Turkish officials their religion more freely than in some of visiting Germany claimed that the Turkish their countries of origin. However, immigrant population in Germany was things were not ideal; they had aspira- more “backward” than society in the big tions and hopes that they had expected to Turkish cities; this group would be under realize in their country of choice that the same pressure to assimilate if they they had not be able to fulfill. moved back to urban Turkey.

Despite this consensus, Ambassador Ambassador Gnodtke suggested that Gnodtke asked why receiving countries classic integration issues should be looked at Muslim populations as a addressed differently than in the past, by problem. In answer to his own question, establishing a dialogue with the people he stated that the problem was related to directly affected as well as with Muslim the access of migrants to the labor market, community leaders. This should be 11 promoted at the national level. He added the point of nonprejudice and laws for the impossibility of the German state to equality. Muslims have benefited from recognize any religion, due to its national other groups who came to the United legal system, but that five main Muslim States beforehand and fought these battles. congregations in Germany agreed to form a coordinating council and would apply In addition, Ms. Pandith argued that for public status so as to obtain financing. there are some interesting points that make it possible for American Muslims to He also raised the need to keep in mind feel part of the community. First, there is that only 20 percent of Muslims in an understanding that everyone has the Germany are organized in religious same civil rights and is equal under law. communities, and that within the Second, Muslims and other groups tend Muslim communities, there is a lot of to quickly blend their American identity diversity (Shia, Ismailis, etc.). To do and their cultural traditions. For justice to them all, a social pact cannot be example, at Thanksgiving, Italians eat attached while treating Muslims as one pasta with turkey and Pakistanis eat homogeneous group. biryiani with turkey. Third, in the workplace, Muslim Americans cannot be Next, Mr. Tlili asked Farah Pandith, discriminated against because of their senior adviser on Muslim engagement, religion. They enjoy the hard-won legal U.S. Department of State, to discuss if freedom to wear ethnic dress and to any lessons from the American experience pray. Fourth, many Muslim Americans of integrating minority groups would be learned English and learned to empower valuable for Europe, and to what extent a themselves within the community by solution to these issues would undercut watching their neighbors. Imams have support for extremist trends. found it essential to speak English to be able to communicate, in particular with Ms. Pandith said there were no lessons to youth seeking religious guidance. Ms. be given. The United States is a country of Pandith commented that the American immigrants with no integration policy for narrative of being American “first” is Muslims or any other ethnic group. insinuated early on (for instance, in Estimates indicate that 3 to 12 million school). It takes priority but leaves space Muslims from more than 80 different for ethnic and religious identity. While ethnic backgrounds live in the United immigrants often came to the United States today. She then explained that the States with the thought of returning United States took a long time getting to “home” to their country of origin, the 12 next generation tends to identify the system—from having a say in government United States as home and where they or running for office. are going to stay. Feeling at home is a key part of keeping away the feeling of being Ambassador Gnodtke responded by a victim. saying that German law has been changed to give immigrants easier access to citizen- In regard to European Muslim commu- ship. Even under the old law, it was nities, Ms. Pandith remarked that the possible to become German—more diffi- youths she encountered were raising a cult, but the myth of Germany simply not number of questions: Why do we feel granting nationality is just a myth. But like victims? Why do we have to choose Germany does require those who want between being a European national and citizenship to give up their nationality of a Muslim? Why are imams teaching us origin. In the Turkish community, many in Turkish rather than in German? Why have opted against citizenship, perhaps in don’t our parents encourage us to feel the hope that Turkey will join the EU. like Europeans? Why are our parents not more intent on education? In the Sophie Body-Gendrot, director of the United States, immigrant parents have Center for Urban Studies, the generally pushed their kids to learn. Sorbonne, noted that these comments Education is seen as a ticket to equal made no distinction between generations access. By contrast, she noted that in of immigrants, from those who just Europe there is no similar push and that arrived to the third generation. There is it is easy to feel like a victim if you a huge difference, particularly with cannot find a job and thus a place in the respect to women and youth. She community. mentioned an example taken from a conference in Berlin, in which a young Wael Mousfar, president of the Arab French man of Arab origin and a young Muslim American Federation in New German man of Turkish origin shared York, responded to Ms. Pandith’s the same frustrations—of employment comments by suggesting that American and also of resenting their fathers, who Muslim and Arab immigrants may kept links to countries of origin and sent integrate and thrive because they become money there, out of the pockets of their citizens. In Germany, he said, he had families in Europe. There is common heard that Muslims are not allowed to ground among people of the same become citizens as easily as in the United immigrant generation across countries— States, leaving them excluded from the hence the need to delineate generations. 13 Martin Schain, professor of politics, New Hassan Qazwini, an imam from Detroit, York University, responded to Ms. responded to Mr. Riza’s positing the Pandith’s comments by cautioning development of a “Muslim question” against too much optimism when along the lines of the “Jewish question” comparing American and European and its terrible result. Imam Qazwini Muslim communities. The American doubted that a holocaust was a realistic Muslim community is better educated possibility today, for Muslims or any and better employed than the overall other group. However, he noted that U.S. population, making the comparison there are voices in the United States with Europe potentially misplaced, since speaking of an expulsion of Muslims the European Muslim community is less from the country and asked whether Mr. educated and employed in fewer Riza saw this as a possibility. Mr. Riza numbers, as clearly demonstrated by the noted that he had asked participants to background paper that the Center for keep in mind what happened in the Dialogues disseminated to the confer- 1930s and had not stated that history ence participants.1 Also, he noted, at would repeat itself. However, in terms of least a third of the American Muslim the negative effects of suspicion being community is African American and placed on a certain community, and that native to the United States. In the United community’s exclusion from society, a States, there is confusion between the holocaust is only the most extreme Arab community and Muslim commu- example. If a certain atmosphere is nity. These considerations raise the created to make life in the host country question of conceptualizations. In uncomfortable for a minority group, the Europe, many community issues are group might start leaving of its own questions of class as much as religion: accord. Extremists say, well if they do not Muslim Europeans are largely working like it here, they can go back. But this and middle class, while in the United attitude ignores the very reason why the States, they are middle and upper- first generation chose to emigrate: middle class. Ms. Pandith agreed with because conditions were bad in the Mr. Schain’s comments: salary, educa- country of origin. tion, and context make a huge difference in the immigrant experience. She Mr. Riza noted that immigration has cautioned against using the expression been a fact for millennia, and integration “lessons learned” saying that the whole has meant different things in different world is learning together. times and places. In the United States, for example, there is both a fully 14 integrated Chinese community as well as Muslim minorities in the West. Mr. Chinese people in “Chinatowns” who Turkstani also asked whether the recent still do not speak English. However, these call for integration is a response to immigrants are not seen as foreign plants radicalization. He questioned the differ- or a threat to society. Muslim communi- ence between integration and assimila- ties have been susceptible to violence and tion, whether one is more “complete” or radicalism because of problems in the absolute than the other. source communities as well as the lack of opportunities in receiving communities, Ambassador Gnodtke responded to Mr. particularly for working-class citizens of Turkstani’s question about integration by immigrant background. It is an unfortu- asking participants to bear in mind what nate fact, Mr. Riza claimed, that the young Muslims complain about: lack of upper classes in minority communities social recognition, which cannot be do not identify with the working class. ordained from above but comes only from merit. It can only be achieved by Abdul Wahid Pedersen, foreign relations integrating into society, which involves manager of the Muslim Council of making society aware that one is Denmark, said that he lives in the heart- contributing to the common wealth. For land of the Muslim “ghetto” of this to happen, one must speak the Copenhagen. He worries because he sees language and engage with and participate Danish converts like himself feeling that in society. If minorities choose to remain they are being pushed out of mainstream out of the mainstream, they cannot gain Danish society from the moment they recognition. The state needs to support take up Islam. They may eventually feel integration; it cannot make it happen, compelled toward some kind of clash or but it can facilitate it. Mr. Riza confrontation with the majority society. responded to the question of why people This problem must be addressed so that migrate by saying that migrants move for alienation and anger do not result. He better economic and social prospects, added that the media are an important which are often realized by the second part of this process. and third generations. To integrate and assimilate, migrants have to know the Ahmed Turkstani, professor, Imam language and know and respect the rules Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University, of their new country. He noted that there asked about the role of the Muslim world are various models for this process, in the issue of integration, since events in including the “melting pot” in the the Muslim world have a direct effect on United States and Canada. 15 He also noted that Chinese communities the 1960s, the United States was willing that have not fully integrated are neverthe- to accept a large number of South Asian less not violent. What has happened with immigrants because the United States is a Muslim communities in Europe cannot be multiracial community. Also, the United disconnected from acts of violence, for States is larger than European states, which one cannot simply blame differences which are smaller and more homoge- in clothing or not learning the language. neous, making race a greater issue there. When it comes to harming host societies as happened in London, responsibility is Ms. Hunter reiterated the point raised with homegrown British Muslims.2 Host earlier that integration is a two-way communities’ fear and suspicion arise from street, with immigrants in a stage of these acts of violence. However, he noted, “probation” that they must adapt to the host communities also need to be tolerant— mainstream before having the legitimacy of what women wear, for example, whether to contest it. She pointed out that in a headscarf or a miniskirt. recent years, reporters calling her to ask about Muslims in the United States have Shireen Hunter, visiting scholar at been asking about her religion, to which the Center for Muslim-Christian she responds by asking why her religion Understanding at Georgetown University, is pertinent. observed that the problem of Muslim communities in the West today cannot be Imam Qazwini said that Muslims divorced from the broader strategic consider the fate of Muslim minorities context of the Western world’s relation in non-Muslim states seriously. They with the Islamic world. Why does the West have taken concrete steps by working feel so much more threatened by with the OSCE and other organizations Muslims than by, for example, the Hare on training courses for immigrants, Krishnas, she asked. Is religion the issue? with additional courses for countries The Middle East has also seen secular with the most immigrants. He noted extremism. Ms. Hunter noted that the that the Organization of the Islamic colonial context changes European Conference (OIC) is also working with relationships with Muslim communities. nonmember states and NGOs, with While she felt that Ms. Pandith’s descrip- joint programs planned. tion of the United States was too rosy, Muslims in the United States are not in Mr. Pedersen mentioned a debate the situation of coming to live in a sparked by a Danish member of parlia- former colonial power. She noted that in ment who compared the headscarf with 16 the Nazi swastika. The debate developed Pandith responded by saying that in The into one on the niqab, he said, which very Netherlands, there are Muslim-elected few women in Denmark wear.3 However, officials at all levels, including high a Danish convert who worked as a day care offices. This example offers hope, and provider was caught up in the debate. those elected officials are role models. Although parents were very satisfied with She added that community involvement her work, the local government took her is needed on the business level, including off the job, and said, according to Mr. programs to bring young people from Pedersen, that “you girls wearing this sort minority communities into local of veil are not ready to participate in the businesses, helping motivate them to labor market.” Mr. Pedersen also cited turn their hopes into something real. the example of forced marriages, agreeing Governments can contribute by using the that while there is no compulsion to Internet to further empower and estab- marriage in Islam, there is a need for lish connectivity between Danish, tolerance from the other side. Ideally, a French, British, and other youth. Danish girl who wants to marry a Muslim, for example, should not be pressured by Karen Hopkins, president of the her family to call off the marriage. Brooklyn Academy of Music, Regent of the Department of Education in New Rabin Baldewsingh, deputy mayor, The York City, responded by saying that she Hague, said that the most striking aspect wanted to return to the issue of language. of the session was the degree of hope In New York, the largest percentage of expressed by the participants. The high school dropouts is ESL (English as a greatest challenge today is getting people second language) students. Why is there in urban, multicultural areas to commit not a universal commitment to solving to one another and to the local commu- this problem? Israel, for instance, uses nity. The Netherlands prefers the term intensive immersion to teach the “citizenship,” with its connotations of national language so newcomers can belonging, caring, and sharing, instead participate and join in society. In-depth of “integration.” He asked Ms. Pandith language teaching is not the center of to elaborate on how to create the mindset school policy in the United States and the she discussed, of people feeling a kind of European Union—why not? Ambassador ownership in their city. How, he asked, Gnodtke agreed with Ms. Hopkins that can we in The Netherlands, a humanistic language is the key to joining society; for Catholic society, make a welcome home people who do not speak the language, for Hindu and Muslim immigrants? Ms. everything else is locked. In Germany, 17 he noted, there is a concentration on public enterprise, and civil society all language training, but universal fluency have a role to play in this process. cannot be accomplished by government offices alone. It also requires commit- Naheed Qureshi, board member, ment from parents and pupils. Muslim Advocates USA, noted that there had been job discrimination against Farhan Nizami, director of the Oxford American Muslims even before Centre for Islamic Studies, also asked September 11, and new targeting and participants to consider what the host scrutiny since then, including an countries’ responsibilities are to reinvent increase in hate crimes, discrimination at their historical narratives to accommodate work, housing, and so on. These actions those who come in. Furthermore, contribute to the feelings of marginaliza- regarding the issue of violent extremism, tion and exclusion among the Muslim he asked whether it should be addressed in community. It is not only a question of terms of law and order or in terms of learning the language or getting an cultural and social polity. In response, education and a job, but also about being Ambassador Perrin de Brichambaut noted welcomed and accepted. We need to that the nation-state model has historically think about how Muslim communities been and continues to be the model for are treated and how lives are affected in Europe. Change requires time, as well as the post-September 11 world. specific efforts to put things into perspective. This is a republican project, as in the She illustrated her point with a personal case of France, which offers the nation as a anecdote, noting that while working as an place for shared values rather than a shared attorney for the federal government in historical background. Progress is the field of human rights and hate happening gradually, with new textbooks crimes, she was traveling on business with coming out that reflect France’s new her boss, the assistant attorney general, multicultural reality. But the teachers to attend a community forum. She was themselves have to be trained to teach the detained in the airport for two hours new narrative. As for cultural violence, he despite having been born and raised in stated that immigrants must recognize the the United States, never having lived rule of law, even when it is not fair or anywhere else, and being a native speaker effective, since deeper societal change of English. She is in a position to work takes time. This is what the OSCE is with the government to build relation- trying to encourage; governments, ships with the Muslim community, and media, NGOs, educators, private and yet she was treated as a foreigner. 18 The session closed with Salah Al-Wahibi, security agencies. Even white American secretary general of the World Assembly Muslims have been interrogated for of Muslim Youth, Saudi Arabia, stating hours in U.S. airports. They go to that youth all over the world have Mecca, he explained, but while they are problems, and unemployment exists even there performing their religious duties, in the wealthy Gulf Cooperation Council they remain concerned about the countries. He also noted that there have problems they will face at immigration been Muslim minorities all over the upon their return to the United States. world, including in Europe, who have been present for more than 12 centuries and who have frequently had positive experiences. Some communities have sophisticated links with the local government, the federal government, and society at large. Muslim minorities are not something new, and there are many positive experiences out there. At the same time, Muslim communities in the West today are having problems, while in Mecca, there are Burmese and other non-Saudi communities that have been there for more than 40 years and yet still speak their own languages and are unable to cope with the Arabic environment. They are illegally immigrating to other areas of the kingdom, like Riyadh. This is becoming a concern because these communities are poor, and crime rates are rising in Mecca and Jeddah.

Regarding Ms. Pandith’s presentation, he suggested that she drew too rosy a picture of the situation before September 11 and that after September 11, the image of Muslims is no longer a positive one, in particular, from the perspective of 19

SESSION II— MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE WEST

Panel 1: A Survey of the Current meet its labor needs and face its Economic, Social, Cultural, and demographic challenges. Political Landscape Europe’s Muslim immigrants are Martin Schain, professor of politics, New arriving from the Mediterranean basin York University, opened the first panel, “A but also increasingly from sub-Saharan Survey of the Current Economic, Social, Africa. European Muslims tend increas- Cultural, and Political Landscape,” by ingly to be citizens rather than merely providing a general survey that drew on the immigrants or guest workers and are on conference’s background paper. average younger than Europe’s population as a whole. They provide a much- Muslim communities in the West are today needed economic contribution to the largest source of Western European Europe’s welfare states, but also place population growth and a growing minority demands on these states in terms of the in the United States as well. The Muslim welfare services they consume. population in the European Union is expected to more than double in next Mr. Schain identified three problems several years. Europe has both a short- and that Europe’s Muslims face—problems of a long-term need for more immigrants to which conference participants are already 21 aware: failures of integration, issues of Integration failures play into the second security, and questions of national and problem—security issues—particularly in European identity. terms of the threat of radicalized Islam. The struggle against radicalism must be He suggested that the first thing to note aided by governments’ cooperation with about the problem of integration is the Muslim minority communities. Policy disagreement over the meaning of the makers often draw links between domestic term itself. This relates to the question of security and external threats. Today, they how immigrants have negotiated the link “militant Islam,” and the growing boundaries they find in Europe: first, number of alienated young men in the the boundaries between “the ins” and Muslim world, to unrest in Britain, “the outs,” between those already in France, and Germany—Britain and Europe and those arriving, and second, France, because of periodic urban unrest the relative permeability or rigidity of in areas of high concentration of popula- those boundaries. These differ from tions of Muslim origin; Germany, place to place. In France, the boundaries because of the role of the Hamburg group are fairly firm; in The Netherlands and in the attacks of September 11, 2001.4 the United States, conditions permit Also troubling are the links between those overlapping memberships that make who are born and raised in Europe (or at inclusion easier. However, this also least Western-educated men) and the allows them to opt out and not integrate terrorist attacks of recent years.5 if they so choose. Debates over women’s dress codes are offered as evidence of the Regarding the third problem—Muslims failure of integration masking immigrant and a national or European “identity women’s strides in education and the crisis”—the reaction to Europe’s Muslim workplace, which often surpass those of presence has been politicized. Europe’s men. As for violence, if we take the extreme right-wing parties have shifted November 2005 French rioters as an from their anti-immigrant stance of example, most were French-born, but previous years to a specifically anti- most were also unemployed youth faced Muslim stance. This new strategy has with poor job prospects. In Europe, already proven successful for extreme unemployment rates among Muslims are right-wing groups in Austria, Belgium, twice as high or higher than in the and The Netherlands. general population. In closing, Mr. Schain restated the need to focus on youth because of their sheer 22 number and the fact that the success or Muslims in these three cities closely failure of integration will hinge on the associate with their religion, their resolution of challenges that these young country, and their ethnic background. people face, i.e., in terms of employment There needs to be greater recognition that and education. Likewise, the success or Muslim identity in Europe is a mixture of failure of security programs, and their these three subidentities. Interestingly, ability to isolate radicals, may well Muslims answered that “European” is an depend on policy makers’ ability to deal identity with which they are least likely to with Muslim youth. identify. Non-Muslim citizens’ perceptions of Muslims’ loyalty to their country, Zsolt Nyiri, regional research director for however, are very different. The Europe, the Gallup Organization, dangerous gap between what the public followed with a discussion of the findings thinks Muslims think and what Muslims of six Gallup surveys: three conducted in actually think must be addressed. Berlin, London, and Paris and three general surveys. He noted that the three The next section of the survey tackled cities were chosen because they represent integration, asking respondents what they Muslims from different backgrounds: consider necessary for integration into many of Berlin’s Muslims are of Turkish society. Results suggested that both the origin; many British Muslims came from general and the Muslim populations have the Indian continent; and many French similar priorities in terms of the specifics Muslims are of North African origin. of integration. The most important task, Furthermore, there are notable differ- everyone agreed, is mastering the national ences between these host countries in language. Finding a job was listed next, terms of their policies toward immigrants. followed by general agreement among respondents that getting a better educa- The first part of the survey dealt with tion aided integration. Celebrating identity, or identities. Identities are national holidays was also considered a often seen as if they are mutually exclu- necessary task for national integration. sive, and questions about identity are The majority of respondents also agreed often phrased in ways that force respon- that participating in politics is necessary. dents to choose a primary identity either Only a minority thought that toning religion or nationality. Gallup considers down religious observances was necessary identities to be complementary, Mr. for integration. Nyiri explained, and measures them independently. Its surveys found that 23 The results showed a wider difference symbols. There is a stereotype that between Muslims and non-Muslims when Muslims are intolerant of other faiths, it came to religiously observant clothing but Gallup’s evidence suggests otherwise. for Muslim women. Only a small percentage of Muslims thought that The next part of the survey addressed removing the headscarf and the niqab was religion, starting with the question, is necessary for integration—but a high religion part of your daily life? There was percentage of the general public thought a significant difference between Muslims so. To be precise, only 14 percent of the and non-Muslims in all three cities. Muslims in Paris thought that removing Muslims were much more likely to say the headscarf was necessary for integra- that religion is a very important part of tion, but 61 percent of the general public their daily life and were also more likely that was surveyed believed it was necessary. to say that they practice a religion and/or have attended a religious service or gone In an effort to gauge feelings of to a religious place of worship in the past Islamophobia among the general public, seven days. There was a less pronounced Gallup measured whether Muslim gap in Germany, however. In all cases, religious symbols were considered more the number of people that attended damaging to integration than those of religious services is lower than the other religions. The survey asked respon- number of those who said that religion is dents about five religious indicators— important to them. In response to a headscarf, niqab, Sikh turban, kippe, and question asking whether respondents the cross—and whether it was necessary to consider religious practices other than remove them for integration. The results theirs a threat, the overwhelming were surprising; in France, 61 percent of majority of Muslims and non-Muslims the general public thought that removing in all three cities said no. However, one the headscarf is necessary, but 54 percent in five Muslims in the United Kingdom thought the same of the cross. Similar and Germany did identify other religions trends were apparent in the United as a threat. Kingdom and Germany. Generally speaking, the French public was more The survey next probed respondents’ opposed to any religious symbol than the confidence in democratic institutions, United Kingdom, with Germany in asking whether religion is a substitute for between. Furthermore, Muslims in all democracy and whether the two conflict. three cities were not opposed to the Muslim respondents in all three cities public display of other faiths’ religious had a high level of confidence in 24 democratic institutions, including religious symbols are sometimes singled elections, the judicial system, the out because they are religious, not because national government, and the media. In they are Muslim. Regarding integration, the United Kingdom, Muslims had more European populations need to recognize confidence in British democratic institu- the common ground identified by tions than non-Muslims. In related Muslims and non-Muslims alike, questions, 65 percent of Muslims including learning the national language expressed confidence in the police, a and increasing educational opportunities. percentage similar to that of non- Muslims. The majority of Muslims Ceri Peach, professor of social agreed that it is important for Muslims to geography, Oxford University, followed be involved in politics, as did the with a presentation on “The Social majority of non-Muslims—except in Geography of Exclusion.” He began by Germany. The overwhelming majority of noting that exclusion occurs on multiple respondents, Muslim and non-Muslim, levels rather than one side keeping did not think that it is morally justifiable another out. There is a lack of to use violence, even for a noble cause. homogeneity within Muslim populations, with respect to ethnicity, class, and From these results, Gallup concluded sect. Since 1950, the ethno-religious that Muslims have higher levels of map of Europe has undergone significant religiosity than the general population, changes. The post-World War II demand but that this does not seem to contradict for labor in Europe brought in a great their high levels of national identity, number of “guest workers,” a large loyalty, and confidence in national insti- percentage of which were Muslims. tutions. The difference lies in how the Today, 10 percent of Western Europe’s general public perceives Muslims’ views— population was born outside its borders. particularly with respect to the finding These minorities are now more that strong Muslim majorities in all three accurately described as settled popula- cities condemned violence. tions than immigrant populations. Mr. Peach stated that the data on Muslims in Mr. Nyiri concluded by noting that the Europe—in terms of total numbers as consensus that religious and national well as specific breakdowns—are impre- identity do not conflict is encouraging cise and disputed. Roughly speaking, for better understanding between there were 200,000 European Muslims Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims in 1950, and there are 13 to 14 million should recognize that in Western society, today. The Muslim population of 25 Western Europe has nearly doubled from of origin, “New Muslims” around the the early 1990s to the mid-2000s. region share the same average working- class position. There are three main geographic areas feeding Europe’s Muslim populations: Mr. Peach noted that different European Turkey, the Maghreb, and South Asia. countries have handled the question of There are also three main corresponding citizenship differently. In Britain, a 1948 areas of settlement: Germany, France, law gave citizenship to everyone in the and Britain. However, there is consider- former British empire, although few able blurring of these categories; for people used it initially. It was probably a instance, there are now many Turks in shock to British immigration officials France and Pakistanis have moved into when people started arriving from Norway. More recently, refugee popula- former colonies. In 1962, the British tions like the Somalis have been added to clamped down on their immigration the mix. laws, but there was a huge influx just before the new laws took effect. The rush As for the total population of Muslims in of people trying to get in before it was too Europe, estimated at roughly 22 million, late is one of the many examples of the approximately eight million of those are unintended effects of immigration laws. “old Muslims,” from the former Since then, the United Kingdom has Ottoman and/or Balkan areas of Eastern been restricting citizenship, while its Europe. The 13 to 14 million mentioned European neighbors are expanding it. In above are “New Muslims,” most of whom the United Kingdom, as in France, being arrived between 1950 and 1973, and born there entitles one to citizenship. their children. (Since 1973, growth of Until 2000, being born in Germany was immigration has been mostly due to not sufficient grounds for citizenship. family reunification.) France now has Still today, to become a German citizen, the largest Muslim population in Western one must renounce other nationalities. Europe, but also the least certain data. Due to insufficient research, estimates of In Mr. Peach’s view, the British policy of the French Muslim community range encouraging groups to have their own from 3.7 million to 6 million. France is cultural practices and celebrations is a home to approximately 30 percent of the good idea. However, this multicultur- “New Muslim” population, while alism has come under attack since the Germany has roughly 25 percent. events of September 11. The result has Regardless of their ethnicity or countries been a backpedaling on multiculturalism 26 and more talk of social cohesion, with a younger, British Pakistanis are also subtext of xenophobia. The French having larger families. Conversely, Sikh model is likewise strongly conformist. In communities in England are encour- Germany, the school system splits aging girls to pursue higher education students into tracks. The result has been and good jobs. a strong channeling of the Turkish population into vocational sectors, from The result is that 40 percent of Muslim which it is quite difficult to break into women in Britain have no educational higher academic streams. qualifications, and, consequently, no access to good jobs. Muslim women in Taking Britain as a case study, Mr. Peach Britain are much more likely than non- asked whether Islam is being judged on Muslim women to be employed in the the actions of particular groups versus the home, leaving the families with only one religion itself. In the United Kingdom, breadwinner. A strong cultural prefer- there is a substantial Muslim population ence for keeping one’s family close but also a substantial Indian population, further translates into finding nearby including Sikhs and Hindus, which homes for grown children when they provides a way to compare groups of marry. Pakistani Muslim men exhibit a different religious but similar cultural high percentage of marriage within their backgrounds. As for Sikhs and Pakistani culture, unlike Caribbean men and Muslims, these communities tend to see Indian men, who are more likely to individuals as connected to larger family marry outside their ethnicity. Finally, an and social groupings, and marry accord- examination of British demographics ingly. In Pakistani Muslim communities, shows that Muslims comprise 35 percent marriages tend to be between people of the households living in the worst 10 from the same village of origin. In percent of British housing and 22 England, prior to marriage, Pakistani percent of those living in the next worst Muslim girls are going to school with 10 percent. These are far higher British boys, facing exposure to different numbers than for any other group. morality codes and behaviors such as drinking alcohol. These cultural differ- In conclusion, Mr. Peach noted that the ences explain in part why little encour- second and third generations of Muslim agement is being given to British Europeans are better educated than the Pakistani women to pursue higher educa- first generation, but not as well-educated tion or enter the labor market. Because as the rest of the population or as other they are being pressured to marry minority groups. Today, the political tide 27 in Western Europe is moving against the Furthermore, it is interesting to note permissiveness of multicultural policies, that 52 percent of British Muslims are which makes it difficult to be optimistic male, as opposed to a slight female in the short term. majority in the general population. Fifty-two percent of British Muslims are Panel 2: A Vision for the Future under 25, versus 31 percent of the population for England and Wales as a Mustapha Tlili introduced the second whole. These demographics have made panel, “A Vision for the Future,” by the government increasingly aware of the noting that Europe is facing need for a flexible and targeted demographic and labor problems. The approach, as one size does not fit all. influx of Muslim immigrants will have certain consequences. Ms. Scholefield stated that education and employment are key foci for her organi- Susan Scholefield, director general for zation. In 2004, studies found that 33 equalities, Department of Communities percent of the Muslims of working age in and Local Government in the United Britain had no work-related qualifica- Kingdom, opened with a presentation on tions—the highest percentage for any “Building Resilience and Preventing religious group. They are also the group Violent Extremism.” Ms. Scholefield least likely to have degrees. The employ- began by noting that historically, ment rate among British Muslims is research on this subject in the United much lower than for the general popula- Kingdom has not brought together tion, and it’s even lower for Muslim socioeconomic and citizenship data. This women. However, there are differences new approach attempts to diagnose between British Muslims of different problems and identify the factors that ethnic groups, with Indian men having improve or harm the situation. the highest employment rates and black Africans having the lowest. Sixty-eight Muslims are the second largest religious percent of British Muslim women are not group in Britain and the most ethnically working, as compared with only 26 diverse group. We can no longer talk percent of all women in the United about “the Muslim community,” but Kingdom—a striking gap. Muslim young rather about Muslim communities, of people have the highest unemployment which the largest group is ethnically rates in Britain. However, self-employ- Asian, comprising 74 percent of British ment levels among British Muslims are Muslims—43 percent of them Pakistani. high. Given that the workplace can be a 28 space where people of different that September 11 was a conspiracy backgrounds and faiths meet, this means between the United States and Israel. At that people are not mixing as much as the same time, 79 percent of British they might. Muslims feel that hostility toward Muslim communities in the United Kingdom is Surveys of geographical and housing increasing. The 2007 Gallup World Poll patterns show that Muslims in Britain contradicted these results, finding that are clustered in certain areas of the Muslims are as likely as the general public country and tend to have larger house- to condemn terrorist attacks on civilians. holds than other religious groups. Moreover, only a small minority of those Since the Department of Communities polled sympathized with the September 11 and Local Government is also the attackers. Similarly, the poll found no United Kingdom’s housing depart- correlation between religiosity, in terms of ment, Ms. Scholefield stated that there a strong personal commitment to Islam, is ample room for change through and violent extremism. housing policies. People often try to determine causation— A newspaper-sponsored survey of British “cause and effect”—what Ms. Scholefield’s Muslims indicated that one in five felt department sees as simply the difficult “sympathy” with the motives of the July 7 socioeconomic circumstances facing the bombers (see diagram below).6 Fifty-one Muslim population in Britain. She added percent of young British Muslims believed that what her department wants to achieve

29 is a British Muslim community resilient mentoring for young people in sports to pressure from those who want to and other activities. The department also radicalize young people—a community supports the development of strong that actively condemns and prevents faith-based institutions and leaders; it is terrorism, as opposed to one that does working to raise the standards of gover- not support terrorism but does not nance in mosques and to establish a actively condemn it, either. Furthermore, framework of minimum requirements the condemnation of terrorism should for all imams and Muslim chaplains. not be in response to fear of retribution. Regarding women, the department The department’s Action Plan was believes that greater participation by launched in April 2007 to prevent Muslim women is critical for British violent extremism and, in Tony Blair’s Muslims’ social integration and economic words, “to enable local communities to well-being. Women must be empowered challenge robustly the ideas of those to become active community members in extremists who seek to undermine our Britain and throughout the world. way of life.”7 The plan mandates a four- part approach: promoting shared values, Shaarik Zafar, senior policy adviser from supporting local solutions, building civic the Office for Civil Rights and Civil capacity and leadership, and strength- Liberties of the U.S. Department of ening the role of faith institutions and Homeland Security, followed with a leaders. To the department, “shared presentation on “Successful Integration— values” means respect for rule of law, Is It the Key to Enhanced Security?” He freedom of speech, equality of opportu- began by noting that the Department of nity, respect for others, and responsi- Homeland Security’s mission is to bility toward others. The department is prevent and deter terrorist attacks and also working to ensure the most effective other threats, secure the nation’s borders, use of the education system, including and welcome visitors and immigrants. universities, in promoting these ideals. The Office for Civil Rights and Civil For the past year, a committee on Liberties works to ensure that the depart- integration and cohesion has been ment maintains fundamental rights and identifying what works in practical terms. liberties while carrying out its tasks. It also Findings support the effectiveness of serves as a liaison between the department local solutions, including targeted and the American public. research and cooperation with grassroots organizations. Strategies include 30 The Department of Homeland Security, dealt with these challenges by emphasizing Mr. Zafar added, has sponsored a national identity grounded in shared dialogues with various American sub- civic values, rather than ethnicity, race or communities, such as people with religion, which allowed the country to disabilities, regarding emergency flourish as a nation of immigrants for preparedness. It has also met with groups over two centuries. of immigrants to discuss issues like border security and naturalization. In Muslims have been a part of the fabric of addition, it meets on an ongoing basis the American nation for generations, with Arab, Muslim, and South Asian and their experience in the United States Americans to discuss civil rights in the has been largely positive. The National context of homeland security. Journal recently stated that “Muslims come to the United States and flourish” and For the United States and for the are at average or above average levels in Department of Homeland Security, Mr. terms of prosperity.8 Zafar stressed, integration is understood in light of the national motto: “E For example, among the four individuals Pluribus Unum,” or “Out of many, one.” the Department of Homeland Security While this definition is certainly open to recently recognized as “Outstanding interpretation, when talking about Muslim Americans by Choice” were two Muslim integration, we must note, he said, that we Americans: Farooq Kathwari, the CEO of are talking about three groups: Ethan Allen Interiors, and Masrur Khan, immigrants, the descendants of a Houston, Texas, council member.9 immigrants, and well-established communities, particularly African Americans with However, with respect to political integra- roots in the country for hundreds of years. tion, there are European nations with noticeably greater success in electing The United States has welcomed over four Muslim members of parliament, million new citizens and almost seven remarked Mr. Zafar. The recent million legal permanent residents since Congressional elections in the United 2000. The consistently high volume of States were historic partly because of the immigration, coupled with new patterns election of Keith Ellison, the first Muslim of settlement, enriches American society representative. Despite this and other even while it creates significant challenges encouraging signs, the United States for the smooth integration of today faces challenges regarding immigra- immigrants. In the past, the United States tion, integration, and security. While 31 these challenges are not exclusive to the Department of Homeland Security is Muslim community, Muslim Americans taking five steps to further the already have become increasingly concerned high level of Muslim integration, as about civil rights violations and negative follows: views about Islam. Like other Americans, they are also concerned about issues of 1. Meeting with community members national and homeland security. The and responding to their concerns—all issue of “radicalization,” which, as Americans deserve an accountable Timothy McVeigh showed, is not exclu- and responsive government. Federal sively a religious phenomenon, is one that officials from various agencies have all Americans need to take seriously. begun to hold regular meetings with Muslim Americans and other To help prevent and counter ideological communities to discuss policies, radicalization, Mr. Zafar said, the country respond to complaints, and dissemi- needs to better understand and engage nate information. In Houston last with Muslim communities, both in the year, one set of community meetings United States and globally. By engaging resulted in better communication to with these communities and promoting Hajj pilgrims and FAA officials integration and civic participation, the regarding the safe transport of United States can hopefully minimize the Zamzam water in ways that adhered to isolation and alienation that can lead to the FAA’s ban on liquids.10 radicalization. But does integration bring greater security? This is a difficult 2. Developing cultural compe- question to answer, observed Mr. Zafar. tency among federal and other The Department of Homeland Security security officials regarding things like believes that improved security is one of common Muslim head coverings, many benefits of successful integration. which the department has worked to And regardless of the high level of promote through educational posters integration that Muslim Americans have and DVDs. achieved, there are still security issues. 3. Upholding liberties and protecting Integration is not only the responsibility civil rights, which the Department of of immigrants and their descendants. Justice has been doing by investigating Clearly, the state has a role to play by incidents of violence and hate crimes creating “spaces” for integration. With against Muslims, Arabs, and others. this in mind, according to Mr. Zafar, the Integration cannot happen in situa- 32 tions where certain communities are government to get involved, officials treated as second-class citizens, and have the responsibility to encourage these investigations not only reinforce citizens to participate in public life the law but also communicate several and engage with public policy and to key messages: that Arab or Muslim decrease tendencies toward isolation Americans are Americans and hence and alienation. entitled to the same rights and liberties as everyone else; that hate crimes The session continued with Tariq and discrimination will not be toler- Ramadan, professor of Islamic studies at ated; that the United States has a legal St Antony’s College, Oxford University, process for addressing discrimina- and visiting professor at Erasmus tion; and that all Americans have the University in Rotterdam, and right to expect justice from the legal Abdelmajid Charfi, professor emeritus system. of Arab civilization and Islamic thought, University of Tunis, discussing whether 4. Promoting civil service, encour- Muslim youth and women infuse new aging people of Muslim, Arab, and vitality into “old Europe” and on what South Asian descent to join govern- terms. Mr. Ramadan began by noting ment service, as the department that people at the highest levels of believes that this is a key aspect of government in the West identify three integration, and that engagement in main areas in which they are dealing with public service is a key way to influence perceived and/or real problems: integra- public policy. tion, demographics (i.e., the reported need for 20 million workers in the EU), 5. Promoting civic engagement and and terrorism. Mr. Ramadan noted that civic participation, as these provide in 90 percent of the talks he is invited to more chances for non-Muslim give, he is asked to address immigration Americans to meet Muslim and terrorism to related violence. For the Americans and learn about Islam, past 20 years, he continued, talk about which polls show promotes mutually immigration has focused on the necessity positive perceptions. This step is one for integration. “We start by speaking in which communities must lead, and about religious integration and end up they are doing so; the best action for talking about social and political integra- government to take in this case is tion as if they are the same. In fact, it may simply to stay out of the way. In situa- be that there are different problems to tions where it is appropriate for the consider, which may not necessarily be 33 due to being Muslim. In other words, we added, “Although social problems are not are confusing the issue by Islamizing a directly to blame for violence, we do need social problem,” he said. In Mr. to work together to overcome social Ramadan’s opinion, religious and problems and achieve the application of cultural integration is largely complete equal rights. It is salient to note that among Muslims in Europe. “What is the African Americans have been in the real issue we mean to address?” he asked. United States for generations and do not Mr. Ramadan continued, “Young experience integration problems or Muslims in the West are pushing our religious problems—they experience societies to reconcile themselves with social problems of inner cities. Instead of their own stated values and politics. We playing on religious fears, we need to know that we have shared values. The develop social policies that address the problem is consistency: we are not living frustrations of young people and strive to up to these values by implementing equal provide equal opportunity.” citizenship, for example. The issue of values arises not because of any religious Mr. Ramadan stated that his main conflict but because of social inequalities concern is not with the far-right parties and other policy problems.” in Europe but with the normalization of their discourse; in general, what was said For example, the 2005 riots in the Paris yesterday by the far right is tomorrow said suburbs had nothing to do with integra- by the center. The very discussion of tion. On the contrary, the protests Islam and integration presupposes old themselves were a very French form of white Europe as the norm. He said the venting frustrations. The rioters were following: “We all know that our asking for consistency in social, economic, European societies have changed; we and political policies. It is time to stop need to acknowledge this reality and stop conflating religious and social problems— talking about immigration as if it is a new the Paris rioters did not riot because they phenomenon, and integration the were Muslim. Similarly, the men who problem. carried out the July 7 bombing (as elsewhere) were very highly integrated, “It is time for European governments to both socially and educationally. They had use Muslims who have been in Europe no intellectual religious problem with for some time, and are now citizens, as a integration per se. It is therefore false to resource to teach new immigrants about collapse security problems and social the democratic process and Western way problems, Mr. Ramadan explained. He of life. Young Muslims, especially, 34 deserve to be heard as citizens, not Muslim women are now wearing spoken to in terms of immigration that headscarves and demanding equal pay happened a generation or generations (with men) for their work. Equal pay and earlier. As for the headscarf issue, let us freedom from domestic violence are embrace and live up to our shared values: universal right held by all women, not it is against Islam to make someone wear just Muslims. a headscarf, and it is against human rights to make someone take it off. Mr. Ramadan also noted that Muslims in the West are able to be completely “Regarding security, while there are integrated politically, socially, and marginal groups that pose a real danger, culturally—and at the same time practice some governments have used the danger their religion. However, the emphasis on posed by the few as an excuse to monitor integration from the Western perspective the whole community. The result is an implies that even third- and fourth- upsurge of mutual distrust. If we want to generation citizens “with immigrant be serious about confronting the threat backgrounds” are not considered truly of radicalism, we need a strong antivio- European. This situation is regrettable lence discourse among Muslims—but we but should also be taken advantage of by also need to provide a foundation for the Muslim community as an opportu- Muslims to trust their governments.” nity to come to a new understanding of their traditions and faiths in a new Mr. Ramadan stated his belief that the cultural context. question of cultural identity is not as complicated as some participants have Mr. Charfi spoke next. He began by suggested. Most European Muslims have noting that second and third generations a European identity—they are British by of Muslims who are more “integrated” culture, for example—and this identity are not yet sufficiently educated—they poses no problems for them. This is lack the means and the training they need especially true for youth and women. In to truly succeed in mainstream European fact, there is a strong leadership of society. Mr. Charfi announced that he educated Muslim women in European would focus on the Muslim communities society and in the West, challenging liter- of Arab origin, since the Turkish Muslim alist or cultural readings of religious communities are different and more texts. This helps European countries complicated. (Turkish Muslims are understand that there is not only one way believing Muslims but are also in favor of to be a Western woman. European laïcité, which is particularly true of 35 communities in Germany.) The Arab a new light. One of the key postulates in Muslim communities’ reliance on Islam today is that every action taken by “imported” interpretations of the faith men should be scrutinized from a has lead to a fundamentalist Islamic path, juridical point of view, to determine in his view. The renewal of Islam should whether it is recommended, permitted, come from Muslims who live their forbidden, or imposed. However, this religion in the West, because living there postulate is the product of historical provides a new situation for believers. interpretation—not dictated by the While the veil for women or the beard for Qu’ran itself. There are many such men is an exterior sign of adherence to postulates that need revising. Like the ritual practice, one must consider the Coptic Christians who find it difficult to simultaneous potential for spiritual integrate into Western society because depth in a secularized society. Today, they still adhere to doctrines in a tradi- most Muslims in the Western world know tional manner, Muslims in Western about Islam only through what they are world will continue to have difficulties taught in the mosques—and what is taught integrating until they take up this prereq- there are values of traditional societies, uisite critical reflection. which are often inapplicable to today’s complex realities. Islam is used to defend The floor was opened for general debate an outmoded social hierarchy, in which on the issues raised by the afternoon’s men are at the top, as are rich people and presentation. Aziz Huq, director of the military leaders, with women and Liberty and National Security Project, children at the bottom. Muslim Brennan Center for Justice at New York Europeans can choose to remain University School of Law, noted that Mr. marginalized, but if they want to succeed, Ramadan has put forth a notion of they must radically change their attitudes. “consistency” that focused on tolerance To this end, European imams must be and equality in terms of the treatment of fluent in modern, local cultures and others. However, without defining must be given direct access to the sources contestable terms like equality and toler- and to the debates that open Islamic ance, very little can be achieved. scripture to new interpretations. Reefat Drabu, chair of the Muslim Mr. Charfi renewed his call for Muslims, Council of Britain’s Social and Family particularly those in the West, to return Affairs Committee, asked for proof of to the spirit of the message of the Prophet Ms. Scholefield’s assertion that integra- and reexamine the Qu’ran and hadith in tions is a means of tackling extremism. 36 After the July 7, 2005, bombings in opportunity at the level of job markets, London, the British Muslim community just as the women’s movement accom- issued a statement that British foreign plished in the 1960s. If one has the skills, policy contributed to extremism. Asking one should get the job. The best solution Muslim communities to help tackle is to punish negative discrimination. extremism promotes the assumption that Policy should rely on three things: the ordinary Muslims in Britain have ties to legal framework of the country, the extremism and are able to help find and country’s heritage, and the collective deal with extremists, i.e., that “we are all psychology. Finally, while he himself is guilty by association.” not a proponent of self-segregation, Mr. Ramadan supports efforts like those in Vincent Tiberj, senior research fellow, France in which Muslim communities Center for Political Research at Paris have taken responsibility for failing Institut des Sciences Politiques, agreed schools that had effectively become with Mr. Ramadan on several points, Muslim public schools. noting that people coming from immigrant backgrounds are enjoying Ms. Scholefield seconded Mr. Ramadan’s relative success in education but suffering call for a practical approach. Neither she ethnic and religious inequalities and nor the British government make a discrimination in the workplace. Not connection between communities’ only are language courses needed but also cohesion and the equal opportunity effective policies that would change the issues that affect all who are underserved; lives of people who are already somewhat it is possible for very deprived communi- integrated and believe in the promise of ties to be very cohesive. What is needed is the Western way of life. Mr. Ramadan to act on the deprivation issue. Regarding responded to this group of remarks. foreign policy, Iraq is a concern in terms First, he acknowledged that defining of radicalization—but is certainly not the consistency is important, but stated that cause of extremism. As for the issue of he wants to avoid philosophical discus- Muslims being guilty by association, the sions. He disagrees with attempts at position of the British government is that comparative approaches in Europe—one everyone is in this together. It is the will never find a French solution to young people who are under attack from British problems, for example. This is outside, and the British government tries interesting as an intellectual exercise but to work with that perspective, continually not helpful in the real world. Next, he taking stock of how it is doing. stressed practicality—striving for equal 37 Mr. Schain noted that the great integra- could be done on a security level and on a tion problem for Europe has histori- community level about the small but cally been centered on the working significant Muslim minority committed class. If we look at Muslims in Europe as to violence or willing to provide tacit a primarily working-class group, and support. Even if these people are only 5 compare their integration with that of or 10 percent of the Muslim population, other working-class populations, we see this means that in the United Kingdom that Muslims’ integration has been at alone there are tens of thousands of them. least a comparative success. In terms of Mr. Ramadan responded that “in order education, there are of course Muslims to rely on Muslim leaders and organiza- in both Britain and France who have tions, we first need the institutionaliza- been successful in terms of getting into tion of the Muslim presence in Europe, and graduating from top universities. so that imams and religious scholars can The failure occurs in terms of the be trained in Europe or America. percentage of the Muslim population Unfortunately, today, the only Islamic that has no certifiable qualifications. institutions are in the Middle East. Islam is not only one culture, i.e., Arab Shamit Saggar, professor of political culture, even if Arabic is the language of science, University of Sussex, and former the Qu’ran. Muslims in the West need to senior policy adviser to the prime recognize that we share the same religion, minister, asked Ms. Scholefield how but that ours has a culturally European or comparing the description given by Mr. American dimension. Western Islamic Zafar with the socioeconomic picture of institutions will require financial and British Pakistani Muslims that Mr. Peach political independence in order to speak presented might change the distribution freely without relying on funding from curve she presented.11 In the United one wealthy country with a particular view States, Mr. Saggar suggested, Muslims on Islam.” and immigrants in general enjoy better economic and social prospects: “the “In Europe today,” Mr. Ramadan American dream.” He believes that the continued, “the economic need for labor is reason why jobs, education, and housing in conflict with cultural resistance against are constantly raised in connection with more new immigration. There is a need for extremism is because these conditions strong policy to deal with integrating seem more controllable than something working classes into mainstream society as amorphous as global Islam. In conclu- despite fears of social change. European sion, Mr. Saggar asked Mr. Ramadan what governments, opinion makers, and other 38 civil society leaders also need to communicate to people in Muslim communities that they have civil rights and civic duties, which include the duty to be engaged in and contribute culturally to the community at large. Part of integrating is also Muslim communities agreeing to address their political frustrations through voting and the exercise of free speech, even when the discourse strikes some as ‘scary.’ Within Muslim communities, we need to challenge extremists using strong Islamic arguments that we believe not just in our minds, but with our hearts.”

Mr. Charfi noted that Muslims may seem to speak with great bitterness and not only about the role they play in the West. In the Muslim world, the population has suffered not only on the material and economic levels, but also from the absence of liberty.

Mr. Tlili closed the session by noting that participants have offered valuable insights into the issues surrounding integration in Europe and in America, both from the perspective of Muslim communities as well as the “host” countries. The critical issue, especially in election times, is to build common ground and for Muslim communities in Europe and North America to gain full citizenship—without qualifications or other references.

SESSION III— WORKING GROUP REPORTS

1. Security Muslim communities so that they not only reject terrorism but do not allow extremist Randy Beardsworth, vice president, ideology to flourish? human capital and corporate communication strategies, Analytic Services Inc.; Context and Delimitation of the Discussions former assistant secretary, policy, planning, and international affairs direc- There was consensus that the focus should torate, U.S. Department of Homeland be on terrorist activities that occur within Security; and moderator of the working or around the Muslim community. The group on security, enumerated the group also acknowledged that the root questions raised by the panel. First, the causes leading to individual acts of group asked the meaning of “security”—is terrorism are difficult to define, and it the prevention of terrorist activity, is it therefore, combat. It seemed more civil security, or does it include crimi- important to identify the context within nology? Second, what is the context in which such violence takes place or is which security should be talked about? permitted. Thus the discussion centered Does security mean being safe from on ways to mitigate a violence-permissive individual acts of violence, or does it imply environment and ways to increase engage- building trusting relationships with ment on these issues within the commu- 41 nity, particularly among women and considering self-appointed leaders with youth. There was also an understanding caution, (3) train interlocutors in cross- by the group that there are no long-term cultural communication, and (4) promote experts in this field; hence much of the sound, scholarly Islamic teaching to group’s progress consisted of participants counter extremist views. learning from each other’s diverse expertise in a variety of disciplines. Ms. Body-Gendrot emphasized that the first point—direct communication with The panel decided to adopt the model of youth and women—is fundamental. “attitudes toward extremism” presented by Women should be taught, empowered, Susan Scholefield in the previous day’s and encouraged to speak publicly. City session. The diagram she offered distin- hall forums could provide an opportu- guishes between those who are willing to nity to women who would want to express come to authorities with news of radical themselves against terrorism. Inviting activities—and thereby help to prevent such celebrities and other interesting individ- acts—and those who are indifferent or uals who have credibility with youth could supportive of terrorist activities.12 also attract more participants. Another Discussions centered on how to reduce the suggestion was to maximize self-help by latter group. There were three areas of developing organic capabilities such as focus: how to deprive extremists of the the use of local mediators. “moral oxygen” that sustains their cause, how to build sustained trust, and how the Other relevant suggestions by the group community could be incentivized to actively were as follows: (1) calling on the commu- condemn and prevent terrorist activities. nity to identify root causes (in appropriate forums) rather than assuming root causes; Suggestions on Security (2) involving the community in crisis management to defuse misunderstandings Sophie Body-Gendrot, director of the and escalation of tensions (as, for Center for Urban Studies at the Sorbonne, example, in the case of the Danish France, presented the suggestions drawn cartoons); (3) recognizing and discussing from the discussions of the security international issues; (4) encouraging workshop. Presupposing an environment debate even when it is uncomfortable; of mutual respect, security policy should (5) working assertively to dispel the notion strive to (1) give a voice to Muslim women and language of a bipolar conflict; and youth, (2) access the Muslim commu- (6) identifying terms that are offensive nity beyond existing leadership, while to particular communities and cultures; 42 (7) using the media, city hall meetings, and at Georgetown University, began by the Internet to combat fear; and (8) outlining that the meaning of integra- establishing transparent contact with imams. tion was continuously raised as an issue by the participants. There was ultimately The group also expressed the need to no agreed-upon definition, which diversify partnerships beyond traditional seemed to differ by country. government programs by making use of NGOs and private firms, for instance, by Integration offering incentives for the private sector to establish intern programs that might lead Participants agreed that integration to jobs. Conclusions favored the replica- needed to be defined according to each tion of the Dutch model, which integrates state, and that religiosity should not be public and private neighborhood programs considered a barrier to integration or a to bring together youth, women, and local sign of nonintegration. States’ defini- fathers. This builds trust between the tions should also recognize multiple community and the government, while identities—and not force Muslims to giving authorities more accurate insight choose between their religion and their into the concerns of the community. country as a primary identity.

Furthermore, the group urged In judging the success or failure of (1) connecting counterterrorism authori- integration, responsibility should fall ties with the community and private equally on states and immigrant commu- sector, in addition to local authorities; (2) nities, and problematic issues should be developing exchange programs between addressed mutually. Civic engagement police departments so that officers can was indicated as one sign of integration educate each other about their experi- with the caveat that Muslims should not ences; (3) encouraging greater mobiliza- be held to a higher standard of civic tion of political power within the Western engagement than the population at large. Muslim communities; and (4) creating Citizenship tests, for instance, should hotlines for community grievances, not include questions that the general provided they are followed up on. public would be unable to answer.

2. Integration—Best Practices Lastly, Ms. Hunter reported the working group’s call for census taking, as has Shireen Hunter, visiting scholar, Center been carried out in the United Kingdom for Muslim-Christian Understanding and Canada. These censuses should be 43 conducted on a voluntary basis. principles of Islam and Islamic civilization in Adequate information regarding total schools either as part of comparative numbers, ethnic breakdowns, and religious studies or under other disciplines socioeconomic conditions of Muslim such as history or philosophy. communities was considered necessary for developing informed public policy Muslim Youth vis-à-vis these populations. On the issues surrounding Muslim youth, Stereotyping Ms. Hunter noted that there were four main concerns shared by the panel: (1) In the general discussion, participants poor scholastic performance; (2) low self- concurred that overall, Western media esteem; (3) feelings of uprootedness, loss engages in stereotyping of Muslim of identity, and alienation; and (4) high communities, influencing political unemployment. The working group discourse and popular opinion. The recognized that these problems impede group asserted the need for national and full integration and make Muslim youth local governments to facilitate Muslim potential targets of radical indoctrination. institutional and cultural outreach to Improving the education level of Muslim counteract widespread misconceptions youth was seen as a key to overcoming these about the community. The mayor of problems. Responsibility for remedying Amsterdam, who helped with the organ- the situation should be shared both by ization of the Ramadan festival there, and educational authorities and parents. the mayor of London, who likewise helped organize cultural activities, were The group also proposed engaging in held up as examples to follow. The group public debate in order to demonstrate also suggested that local Muslim commu- that civic values are also basic Islamic nities involve the general public in festi- values. According to the group, it is also vals and also set up alliances between through discourse, in particular through organizations with common interests. theological arguments, that the fallacy of radical discourses can be proven. In Ms. Hunter listed the following additional addition to schools, a sense of pride in conclusions about stereotyping: (1) the need the Islamic legacy should be promoted to distinguish between immigration and within the community at large, for citizenship; (2) to recognize that Muslim instance, by publicizing and introducing citizens have the right to fully exercise their real-life Muslim success stories as role civil and political rights; and (3) to teach the models for Muslim youth. 44 Empowerment of Muslim Communities conference secretariat with their own proven techniques. She added that Another major concern for the panel was some successful examples had already empowering Muslim communities. been presented during the workshop, Muslims should assert their rights and including the following: demand that governments take a consis- (1) Zarqa Nawaz’s sitcom Little Mosque on the tent and nondiscriminatory approach in Prairie, which has been airing in Canada. enforcing these rights. Nongovern- This particular program has been very mental and secular Muslim organizations successful and is an excellent example of diffusion of information about Muslim could help achieve this goal. Creating communities through entertainment. A such institutions would also provide a number of films, including East Is East and forum for internal debate within the the upcoming Kite Runner, brings Muslim Muslim community. characters to a wide audience. (2) The public Ramadan festival that Ms. Hunter outlined the main recom- takes place annually in The Netherlands mendations of the panel for empowering (http://www.ramadanfestival.nl/). Similar activities take place at Trafalgar the communities: (1) creating new organ- Square, and some mosques in Germany izations and intensifying interaction with are open for visitors after Friday prayers. existing institutions; (2) making proposals (3) The “footsteps” project in the United to national and local governments to insti- Kingdom (http://www.mcb .org.uk/). This tutionalize Muslims’ cultural outreach; program identifies role models and has and (3) encouraging government institu- them speak at different schools to encourage tions and law enforcement authorities, Muslim youth to achieve more in terms of education, to become socially active, and to such as the police, to treat Muslims with aspire success. respect and be sensitive to their cultural differences, and to recruit Muslims into (4) The American Learning Institute for Muslims in the United States, which organ- the civil service. izes a four-week program during the summer for academics to teach youth Best Practices (recent high school graduates and college students) about Muslim experience and Ms. Hunter reported the working thinking. One of the aims of the project is to build a new American Muslim identity. group’s recommendation to develop a list of “best practices” that have proved (5) The Radical Middle Way project in the United Kingdom (http://www effective in achieving the goals outlined .radicalmiddleway.co.uk/). This program above. Muslim organizations and insti- brings widely respected speakers with tutions could be asked to provide the expertise in Islamic theology and sociology 45 to speak with young people about the The Context of Discussions—Belief and Belonging fallacy of radical discourses. Youth are encouraged to adopt the “middle ground,” The theme the panel was intended to which is more in line with the Islamic spirit. elaborate on was the interaction between the universal message of Islam and the Other Points specific context of the present-day West. The discussions and case studies focused While there was no consensus on this largely on Europe. issue, Ms. Hunter noted that some participants recognized the need for Mr. Hardy noted that there was a wide further discussion of the link debated range of opinions on the relationship between foreign policy and local between “belief and belonging.” One radicalism in the West. member of the group stated that belief could underpin belonging. Overall, the Vincent Tiberj, senior research fellow, group felt that the states should keep out Center for Political Research at Paris of the realm of belief. However, when it Institut des Sciences Politiques, added that came to belonging, both the state and participants also noted that many issues society had an important role to play in concerning Muslims are also a source of helping Muslims feel welcome. In fact, concern to the general public. Therefore, the panel categorized four distinct Muslim communities should also establish “actors”—the state, the broader society, broader coalitions with organizations that Muslim communities, and individual deal with general common interests and Muslims—although their roles in belief problems of society. and belonging could not be firmly established. The views varied among the 3. Religious Practice— members of the panel with regard to A Western Islam? country and, in particular, in relation to education. The rapporteur, Roger Hardy, Middle East and Islamic affairs analyst of the State Intervention in Religion BBC World Service, began by noting that the idea that Islam can adapt to different The panelists agreed that the organiza- settings is not new, as Islam has flourished tion of essential social and religious tasks in a variety of different settings. for the Muslim community is a Muslim responsibility. The members of the group disagreed on whether the govern- 46 ment should play a major role, especially including command of the local language since states differ in their cultural, legal, and a clear understanding of the rights and political traditions. Even within the and duties of citizenship. Second, context of a particular nation, panelists Muslims must continue engaging in had different takes on the danger of dialogue with non-Muslims in order government meddling in religious to dispel prevailing ignorance about discourse. Some believed that society themselves, their religion, and their could arguably achieve more to foster values. belonging than the heavy hand of the state, while others felt that the state is a In conclusion, Mr. Hardy restated the crucial actor in important areas such as crucial relationship between belief and the training of imams. belonging. While belief can underpin belonging, the articulation of belief is a Imams Muslim responsibility, with the state and wider society playing a role in fostering The group concurred that imams in Muslims’ sense of belonging. Western society must be aware of their specific social context and know enough Mustapha Tlili thanked the rapporteurs about local culture so they can work effec- and opened the floor for debate. He tively within it. Mr. Hardy noted, stated that the group discussions would however, that there was disagreement as to be divided into two parts. The first part how imams should be trained, organized, would be a general discussion about the and paid. Some participants felt that the ideas that had been presented in the state should organize and pay the imams; reports. He urged participants not to others were against this idea and consid- revisit discussions of the previous days, ered it “top-down” social engineering. but to emphasize ideas that could “fill in” remaining blanks. The second half of the Conclusions debate would be about implementation— a plan of action. The rapporteur reviewed the conclusions that emerged from the discussions about the responsibilities of the governments, communities, and individuals with regard to Muslims in the West. First, Muslims must enhance what one member called “cultural competencies”— 47

SESSION IV— DEBATE ON SECURITY, INTEGRATION, AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICE— A WESTERN ISLAM?

Security and Western Foreign Policy and Politics States and its allies launched the war on terror, a fact acknowledged by the U.S. In the general discussion that ensued, National Intelligence Estimate, a précis some participants concurred on the of the best judgments of all importance of including in the debate intelligence services.13 the issue of Western foreign policy in the Middle East. Haroon Siddiqui, editorial Along the same lines, Martin Schain, page editor emeritus, Toronto Star, professor of politics, New York launched this part of the discussion by University, observed that more drugs, referring to Ms. Scholefield’s diagram terrorism, and illegal crossings have been (see page 29). In his view, we should not taking place since the war on terrorism shy away from discussing international and the fortification of the frontiers. conflicts that also give “oxygen” to Randy Beardsworth, vice president for extremism. There has been more human capital and corporate communi- terrorism since the war on terror was cation strategies of Analytic Services Inc. launched—it is not possible to overlook and former assistant secretary, policy, the centrality of this issue. It is widely planning, and international affairs recognized that terrorism has, in fact, directorate, U.S. Department of increased manyfold since the United Homeland Security, agreed that it was 49 impossible to pretend that Western Muslim generation of 16 to 35 year olds foreign policy in the Middle East is not an feels deeply committed to their commu- issue, even if the conference had no nity; they are frustrated about the capacity to directly change these foreign 600,000 dead in Iraq and about the policies. continued situation in Palestine.

Edward Mortimer, senior vice president Mustapha Tlili remarked that foreign and chief program officer, Salzburg policy is always the “elephant in the Global Seminar, spoke next, pointing room” in these debates, but he expressed out that although the conference was not the need to move on and be practical. He authorized to make foreign policy remarked that the Alliance of decisions, it was certainly competent to Civilizations’ High Level Group came to discuss surrounding issues. Foreign the conclusion that while foreign policy is policy, he stated, is a very important important, a compromise is necessary. dividing factor in at least a few Western He affirmed the need to be practical—to societies, as Ms. Scholefield’s presenta- focus on what can be done on the social tion indicated. In Britain, he added, policy level. there is remarkably little debate about how foreign policy gets made, even Aziz Huq, director of the Liberty and though a lot of people feel strongly about National Security Project, Brennan foreign policy. He expressed his regret Center for Justice at New York University that there was not a separate working School of Law, noted that American group on foreign policy and integration. Muslims found themselves in a small antiwar minority, while in the United Abdul-Rehman Malik, contributing Kingdom, there was a relatively broad editor, Q-News (United Kingdom), movement against the war in Iraq. The agreed that the conference should challenge in the United States lies in address the prevailing feeling at ground developing means by which Muslim level. He noted that while some say that minorities can participate in foreign young people are concerned with policy debates, even though they are a foreign issues as an escape, as a distrac- relatively small constituency. Other tion from socioeconomic problems, national and ethnic minorities in the that does not change the fact that people United States have been effective in feel that they have been poorly served by finding a voice in foreign policy the foreign policy of the United decisions, he added. Kingdom and United Sates. The 50 Integration as Part of the Security Agenda like the cold war, the war on terror threatens to become a distorting lens The discussion again acknowledged that through which we view the world. integration has become part of the security policy for many governments Difficulties Faced by Religious Leaders worldwide. Mr. Malik remarked that Cooperating with Governments there is a feeling that the Muslim community only became important in Abdul Wahid Pedersen, foreign relations terms of social policy once this commu- manager, Muslim Council of Denmark, nity became a threat to others, just as race raised the issue that religious leaders relations became a subject of interest might face difficulties with their commu- after the 1981 riots in Brixton. Mr. Malik nities if they choose to cooperate with added that religious practice is not a government security services. He noted discretionary issue, but a security issue that the imams in Denmark, who for that is driving the whole agenda. The vast several years met with the security majority of initiatives aimed at Muslim services, and with good results, were put communities today fall within security in a vulnerable position. They have been and counterterrorism measures; even the accused by their own people of being U.K. project called the “Radical Middle traitors. It is a very delicate balance to Way” belongs to this category. strike between cooperation and loyalty to one’s community of believers. Mr. Sophie Body-Gendrot, director, Center Beardsworth agreed and noted that for Urban Studies, the Sorbonne transparency of the interaction between (France), noted that it was unfair to religious leaders and the government mention only the riots in Brixton and could help alleviate fears. not mention what had happened after 2001, when British nationalist parties Definition of “Common Values” started inciting trouble. The subsequent discussion focused on Roger Hardy, Middle East and Islamic how to define common values. Mr. affairs analyst of the BBC World Service Siddiqui pointed out that nobody asks (United Kingdom), cautioned against for definitions of Western common associating security and integration, even values. What are “British values”? For though he recognized that there is a link instance, “national belonging” should be between them. Merging them leads to the defined by living within the geographical politics of fear, he warned. Furthermore, boundaries of the country and obeying 51 the laws of the land; to demand adher- to distinguish between values and ence to any set of beliefs places unfair religious practices. Human rights are demands on minorities. The best defini- considered universal values but have been tions of a country’s values are its consti- jeopardized since September 11 by tution and bill of rights, he concluded. Western governments’ actions outside of their borders, Mr. Charfi claimed. Mr. Huq commented that the issue of Muslim minorities and mainstream Shireen Hunter, visiting scholar, Center Western values had been raised in the for Muslim-Christian Understanding at discussions of the religious practice Georgetown University (United States), group, but not at length. In his view, noted that indeed there is no consensus however, there were both positive and in the West on issues such as abortion, negative aspects to this sort of integra- euthanasia, or homosexual marriage. tion. On the downside, the appeal to These topics and the value judgments “liberal values” can covertly exclude they imply should be subject to ongoing Muslim groups from shared consensus debate in Muslim communities and without being overtly racist. During the society at large. Danish cartoon crisis, for instance, there was much talk of differences in the way Lastly, Mr. Huq remarked that in regard “freedom of speech” is valued across to the Universal Declaration of Human cultures. On the upside, the appeal to Rights, the difficulty resides in specifying shared values can provide a stronger how universal values should be applied in bond than simply following the rule of the local sphere. law. The law itself is an inadequate reference for a nation’s value system since it Muslims and Political Participation does not include the processes of debate. Instead, shared values are influenced by Discussion turned to the poor represen- the media, the citizens, and the govern- tation of Muslims in politics. Mr. Schain ment in the creation of new policy. One mentioned that Muslim communities in way of thinking of shared values is to Europe and the United States are among debate those same values within a given the most undeveloped in terms of polit- community ical capacities—political mobilization and engagement in politics—and stressed the Abdelmajid Charfi, professor emeritus of need to focus on the development of these Arab civilization and Islamic thought, capacities. Mr. Hardy noted that there are University of Tunis, reminded the group only 32 Muslim parliamentarians in the 52 European Union and that the figures are Vincent Tiberj, senior research fellow, also low in the national parliaments. Center for Political Research at Paris Institut des Sciences Politiques, seconded Ms. Body-Gendrot agreed with Mr. the call for an empirical definition of Schain and noted that political parties integration. Statistical instruments, he should indeed make efforts to include agreed, are needed to identify the minorities. However, she acknowledged problem areas and evaluate the integra- the danger that extreme right-wing tion of subgroups, such as women. They parties can pose to minority candidates. are also important to judge public policy The Western Indies communities in and identify discrimination. France, for example, had played it very “softly,” choosing in various elections Ambassador Hans Gnodtke, commis- not to emphasize cultural difference. sioner for dialogue with the Islamic world and dialogue among civilizations, Federal Defining Integration Foreign Office (Germany), expressed his concern that the reports take an unneces- Once again there were concerns raised sarily defensive approach. In Ambassador over defining integration. Mr. Schain Gnodtke’s view, the project of integrating suggested that instead of asking what Muslim minorities in the West has been, integration is, the question should be, for the most part, already accomplished. how does one know when integration is The focus at this point should be to estab- successful? In his view, the conference lish where integration has failed. He should be looking to conceptualizing restated the notion that one country’s measures and public policy recommen- model could not easily be applied to the dations that focus on the recognition rest of the world. of integration. Mr. Hardy said that integration will have Ms. Hunter disagreed with Mr. Schain’s succeeded when Islam and Muslims have comments that fixed reference points must become “normalized,” in other words, be established for measuring integration when Muslims will no longer seem to be change, particularly in times of crisis. The exotic strangers but fellow citizens. Mina integration panel had recommended some Al-Oraibi, current affairs journalist, kind of definition based on statistical data, Asharq Al-Awsat (United Kingdom), agreed she recalled. In the case of Canadians, they with Mr. Hardy’s point, but noted that take adherence to their constitution as the Muslims need to address their problems only benchmark. and at the same time do not want to be 53 treated differently. Mr. Tiberj suggested dialogue through various forums. She that this problem could be mitigated by resumed the theme of role models and creating and joining associations that are the need for true leadership either based concerned with general community on authority or on a sense of belonging. problems. Mr. Malik referred to a piece written by Rudolph Chimelli, journalist, Süddeutsche Professor John Grey, which appeared in Zeitung (Germany), pointed out that the Spectator (February 17, 2007), about disenfranchised communities are not promoting the “habit of tolerance” as a necessarily the product of failed integra- baseline for living in a diverse society.14 tion. In some slums in Algeria, for Mr. Malik also advocated identifying instance, there is no drinking water, 75 Muslim grassroots organizations, which percent of young men are unemployed, are largely led by women and youth, and and there are poor education, housing, evaluating how their work is impacting and social services. Yet, these men are the community. Across the Western not children of immigrants; they are at world, leadership at the national level has home. In other words, integration is not failed in representing the diversity that is exclusively a national or religious present at the ground level. problem; it is a problem of social conditions—it is everywhere. In addition, he Echoing Mr. Malik’s remarks, Michael noted that it should not be assumed that Rolince, senior associate, Booz Allen integration, at least in terms of accepting Hamilton, and former special agent in Western norms, is an automatically charge of the Washington Field Office’s desirable outcome. Among both Counterterrorism Division, Federal immigrants and native Westerners, there Bureau of Investigation (FBI), agreed are those who resist supposedly that efforts should be focused at the mainstream values. grassroots level. However, his own experience in the United States was that Karen Hopkins, president of the the FBI and the American public resisted Brooklyn Academy of Music, and this approach. The process of integra- member, Board of Regents of the tion, he admitted, is like a marathon Department of Education in New York rather than a sprint. City (United States), urged participants to look for solutions in the realms of Mr. Pedersen then returned to the impor- education, language, employment, and tance of public debate in fostering a culture, while promoting constant feeling of belonging. He cited the strong 54 example provided by the Islamic- about Muslim leadership. For the first Christian Study Centre in Denmark, generation of Muslim immigrants in founded jointly by Muslims and Europe, there was no choice but to have Christians, which focuses on dialogue and male leadership. Now that these popula- the study of religion. It has been running tions have reached the third and fourth for 11 years with great success and impact.15 generations, more effort should be made to involve women in the governance of Muslim Women their own communities and wider society.

Farah Pandith, senior adviser on Muslim Ms. Hopkins asked whether Muslim engagement, U.S. Department of State, women in the West have the same inquired whether there was more to be concerns as other women (e.g., equal said on the role of women. Adeela compensation for the same jobs) or their Shabazz, trustee, Forum Against own particular set of concerns. Ms. Al- Islamophobia and Racism (FAIR-United Oraibi noted the conference had not Kingdom), expressed her concerns with established why Muslim women and the report on religious practice, which youth should be singled out from the only made reference to the training of community at large. imams, excluding women. While women do not want to be imams, she stated, they State Intervention in Religion do want the same kind of skills and have an important role to play in educating Discussion returned to the question of their families and communities. Ms. state intervention in religion. Mr. Schain Shabazz gave the example of a Muslim insisted that the role of the state is institute in Leicester, England, that impossible to ignore. The state can only trains imams while acknowledging the be religiously neutral by granting the way of life in the United Kingdom. same freedoms and privileges to all Muslim women have been asked to do a religious groups. The New York City presentation to each class and are thereby parking authority, for instance, honors a participating in the training of imams. variety of religious holidays as well as the For purposes of the report, she suggested building of mosques and halal butcher that a broader term than “imam” is used shops. Thus, he noted, the state plays a in order to include women. role, even if it is just by standing aside to facilitate religious practice. Mr. Hardy Mr. Hardy recognized that people are agreed that the state cannot be kept out of used to talking about men when talking religion. In the United Kingdom, he 55 noted, the state is in fact intervening more could have a positive impact on the Muslim- in these matters. For example, controversy Western relationship. Furthermore, when it was sparked in October 2006 by the comes to electronic media and television, British Labour MP and former Foreign she stated, there is less likelihood of letters Secretary Jack Straw in describing the full- to the editor being published or noticed. face veil as “a visible statement of separation and difference.”16 Since Mr. Straw Mustapha Tlili closed the session to was the leader of the House of Commons allow the group to focus on policy and a former senior minister, and his recommendations. remarks were endorsed by then-Prime Minister Tony Blair, many Muslims perceived the incident as state interference in their private affairs.

Media

Ms. Al-Oraibi urged people to write to journalists and editors each time the media provide distorted or incorrect information about Muslims or Islam. For the last five years, she added, the discourse on Islam and on the “clash of civilizations” has cast current events in biased terms. People need to rethink the vocabulary of the media to improve religious and cultural sensitivity. Mr. Rolince agreed that while the majority of the media are on the whole responsible, it is important for those with access to information to contact the media when there are mistakes.

Ms. Hunter noted that the main problem lies with editorial policies. Because the print market has shrunk, the media do not publish the kind of nuanced pieces that 56

SESSION V— CONSIDERATION OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The floor was opened for a general Siddiqui considered the national level discussion of policy recommendations preferable since conditions vary between that could be drawn from the previous countries. Furthermore, the workshops sessions. Haroon Siddiqui noted that in should be sponsored by nongovern- the United Kingdom, a media guide had mental media organizations to preserve been published the year before.17 Roger their apolitical authenticity and prevent Hardy mentioned that follow-up efforts accusations of government interference are under way to produce similar guides with freedom of the press. in Germany, Spain, and France under the auspices of the OSCE. Mr. Siddiqui In support of the notion of NGO- also urged the convocation of workshops sponsored workshops, Sophie Body- to train media professionals about Gendrot described a recent event in minority issues. Although the topic was Washington, DC, addressing the media’s different, one could look to the series of neglect of issues surrounding discrimina- workshops organized by the media tion and racism. Journalists from TV association and advertising standards channels, many of whom were themselves body in Canada in the 1990s as a general minorities, argued that their viewers had model. Such workshops could take place no interest in these topics. However, at the on a national or European level, but Mr. end of the meeting, the journalists agreed 59 to encourage editorial attention to populations in the West. As an example of discrimination and racism and to get more the former, he recalled that the Center involved in these issues in their own lives. for Dialogues hosted an event in February 2007 in honor of Farooq Kathwari, a Mr. Hardy pointed out that despite their Muslim American who came to the best efforts, journalists have a difficult country as a student and today is the chief time obtaining reliable information when executive officer of Ethan Allen Interiors, investigating, for example, how many a major American furniture company. Muslims are in Italy, where they come from, what issues plague them, and how Ambassador Gnodtke noted that while an they compare to other communities exchange of experiences already exists around Europe. A media guide with basic within Europe (as mentioned in the statistical information would benefit not Danish minister’s speech), the Center only the media and journalists, but could for Dialogues approach adds a transcon- also be made available to school teachers, tinental perspective. Naheed Qureshi, public figures, local councils, and so forth. agreed but proposed that the exchange of best practices also include the communi- Shireen Hunter noted that there are ties’ perspective on their difficulties. already some good resources, including a Karen Hopkins recalled the earlier book of essays that she herself had edited suggestion of having celebrity spokes- based on a conference held in 2000.18 people from various fields take up the The challenge lies in dissemination. cause of Muslim integration. The group Abdelmajid Charfi suggested that the agreed that these celebrities should be documents drafted as a result of the culled from both the Muslim communi- current conference be given to program ties and non-Muslim communities, as producers of stations like the French- they both have legitimacy. Participants German TV channel Arte, which once also recommended that efforts be made broadcasted a segment on Muslim at the grassroots level to reach out to women. people who harbor anti-Muslim senti- ments and are therefore often excluded Mustapha Tlili summarized that, so far, from the debate. two recommendations had been put forward: (1) convening workshops to Mr. Charfi noted while these practical exchange “best practices” and success measures are important, it is also neces- stories and (2) the publication of a media sary to establish a theoretical basis for guide with basic information on Muslim integration that can be reconciled with 60 religious thought. Several members agreed that only after a distinction is drawn between cultural and religious integration, will it be possible to collect accurate data and conduct meaningful discussions of the issue in the media.

Mustapha Tlili closed the session by thanking the participants for tackling these difficult issues, which have a critical impact not only on governments but civil society as well. He stressed that a number of countries had been represented at the conference, including Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Given the continued level of tension and uncer- tainty surrounding the Muslim world, he imagined that the recommendations issued by this diverse group of participants would be taken quite seriously. He seconded the call for a follow-up conference to evaluate progress and further expand the dialogue. He also urged participants to make personal efforts to brief the media and to distribute the conference report to actors on every level of society. Successful integration of Muslims in the West is everyone’s concern—and everyone’s responsibility.

SESSION VI— PLAN OF ACTION

The recommendations listed below repre- political and cultural differences in sent the key points of the conference action the Muslim immigrant experience, plan regarding the media, the exchange of as well as differences in the origin best practices, and integration. of the population itself.

Media b. The European Union and national governments should support these The following steps are recommended workshops in principle, but they must to overcome the tendency of Western be organized outside the government media to stereotype Muslim communi- system in order to guarantee freedom ties, thereby generating widespread of the press. misconceptions: 2. Media guides should be developed with basic 1. National media associations should promote information on Muslim communities in the West. workshops that train media professionals to be more conscientious about Muslim communities. Whether simple fact sheets or full papers, these guides should also be made avail- a. The workshops should be organ- able to school teachers, public figures, ized at the national level to allow for and local authorities. 63 Exchange of Best Practices b. Local Muslim associations should organize events that engage with the 1. NYU Center for Dialogues: Islamic World- general public and set up partner- U.S.-The West should act as a conduit for the ships with other organizations that transatlantic exchange of Muslim experiences and deal with issues of common concern. success stories. 3. Entertainers, sports stars, and successful a. It should compile a catalog of best individuals, both Muslim and non-Muslim, practices, focusing on grassroots should be called upon to help promote a positive efforts, including examples of partic- image of Muslim communities. ular difficulties local Muslim communities have faced and the actions they Academics and other “experts” should have taken to overcome these difficul- not be the only voices speaking about ties. The catalog should acknowledge Muslim communities in the West. national differences, as not all examples are applicable elsewhere. Integration

b. It should promote meetings between National governments and the European Union Muslim youth and Muslims identified as should define objective indicators for evaluating “success stories,” who can serve as role integration, clearly distinguishing between models for the younger generation. cultural and religious integration.

c. It should convene a follow-up They should work with NGOs to meet the meeting to chart progress on the action urgent need for statistical information plan and to evaluate ongoing issues. on Muslim communities by conducting voluntary participation censuses to 2. Local authorities and local communities inform policy. should encourage cross-cultural dialogue with the support of higher-level authorities.

a. Government authorities at all levels should expand incentives for the promotion of events that improve understanding and overcome misconceptions through intercultural dialogue.

NOTES TO SESSIONS

I. See Appendix VI of this report. 7. See http://www.communities.gov.uk/ 2. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/ index.asp?id=1165650. bsp/hi/pdfs/05_06_06_london_ 8. See Shane Harris, “Successes: bombing.pdf. Assimilation Our Weapon Against 3. Niqab: a face veil covering the lower Homegrown Terrorism,” National part of the face (up to the eyes) Journal, January, 20, 2007. worn by observant Muslim women. 9. See Outstanding American by Choice 4. See Kevin Sullivan and Joshua Partlow, Awards: http://www.uscis.gov/. “Young Muslim Rage Takes Root in 10. Zamzam is the name of the well that Britain,” Washington Post, August 13, provides the water to billions of 2006; Laurent Bonelli, “The Control people, especially during the Hajj of the Enemy Within? Police pilgrimage because the Zamzam well Intelligence in the French Suburbs and is located in Makkah, which is the Its Relevance for Globalization,” in heart of the Hajj pilgrimage. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, eds., 11. See page 29 for distribution curve. Controlling Frontiers (Aldershot: Ashgate 12. Ibid. Publishing, 2005), pp. 103-205; 13. See Haroon Siddiqui, “A Mountain Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry of Made-in-America Post-9/11 Muslims,” Foreign Affairs, July-August Disasters,” Toronto Star, July 29, 2005; “Minority Report: The Trouble 2007; “Spy Agencies Say Iraq War with Integration,” Economist, October Hurting U.S. Terror Fight,” 26, 2006. Washington Post, September 24, 2006; 5. See Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: and http://www.dni.gov. Politics and Religion in Western Europe 14. See http://www.spectator.co.uk/ (New York: Oxford University Press, archive/features/27962/the-best-we- 2005), pp. 45-47. Also, see Oliver can-hope-for-is-tolerance.thtml. Roy, “Euro-Muslims in Context,” 15. See http://www.ikstudiecenter.dk/ NYU Review of Law and Security, english_generalinformation.htm. Summer 2005, p. 20. 16. For an account of the episode and 6. See ICM/Telegraph Poll: http://www its wider context, see the Economist, .telegraph.co.uk/news/main October 12, 2006: http://www .jhtml?xml=/news/2006/02/19/ .economist.com/world/britain/ nsharia19.xml. displaystory.cfm?story_id=8035904.

66 17. See Ehsan Masood, British Muslims: Media Guide (Counterpoint: 2006). Counterpoint is the British Council’s think tank on cultural relations: http://www.britishcouncil.org/ brussels-europe-british-muslims- launch.htm. 18. See Shireen T. Hunter, ed., Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape (Westport, CT: Praeger Publi- shers, 2002).

67 APPENDIX I: CONFERENCE PROGRAM

MAY 15, 2007 Part 2: Roundtable 10:50 A.M.-12:30 P.M. SESSION I–TENSIONS PRODUCED BY Moderator ISLAM IN THE WEST: HOW CAN Mustapha Tlili THEY BE OVERCOME? Speakers Part 1: Opening Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Secretary 10:00-10:10 A.M. General, Organization for Opening Statement by Security and Co-operation in Europe Mustapha Tlili, Founder and Director, (OSCE) Center for Dialogues: Islamic World– U.S.–The West, New York University, Iqbal Riza, Special Adviser to the and Conference Chairman United Nations Secretary-General on the Alliance of Civilizations 10:10-10:15 A.M.

Welcome Remarks by Ralph Scheide, Deputy Director Gen- Edward Mortimer, Senior Vice eral for Political Affairs and Director of President and Chief Program Officer, the Near and Middle East Department Salzburg Global Seminar and Africa, Federal Ministry for Euro- pean and International Affairs (Austria) 10:15-10:35 A.M.

Address by Hans Gnodtke, Commissioner for Dia- Ursula Plassnik, Austrian Federal logue with the Islamic World and Minister for European and Interna- Dialogue Among Civilizations, Federal tional Affairs Foreign Office (Germany)

10:35-10:40 A.M. Farah Pandith, Senior Adviser on Mus- Remarks by lim Engagement, Department of State Heinz Schaden, Mayor of Salzburg (United States)

10:40-10:50 A.M. 12:30-2:00 P.M. Break Lunch with keynote address by Rikke Hvilshøj, Minister of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs (Denmark)

68 SESSION II–MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 3:20-3:40 P.M. IN THE WEST Successful Integration—Is It the Key to Enhanced Security? Panel 1: A Survey of the Current Shaarik Zafar, Senior Policy Adviser, Economic, Social, Cultural, and Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liber- Political Landscape ties, Department of Homeland Security (United States)

2:00-2:20 P.M. 3:40-4:20 P.M. A General Survey Can Muslim Youth and Women Martin Schain, Professor of Politics, Infuse New Vitality Into “Old New York University (United States) Europe” and On What Terms? Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Islamic 2:20-2:40 P.M. Studies, St Antony’s College, Oxford The European Story, in Numbers University (United Kingdom), and Vis- Zsolt Nyiri, Regional Research Director iting Professor, Erasmus University, for Europe, the Gallup Rotterdam (The Netherlands) Organization (United States) Abdelmajid Charfi, Professor Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Islamic 2:40-3:00 P.M. Thought, University of Tunis (Tunisia) The Social Geography of Exclusion Ceri Peach, Professor of Social Geogra- 4:20-4:40 P.M. phy, Oxford University (United Break Kingdom)

4:40-6:30 P.M. Panel 2: A Vision for the Future General debate

3:00-3:20 P.M. 8:00 P.M. Building Resilience and Preventing Dinner hosted by the Austrian Federal Violent Extremism Ministry for European and Interna- Susan Scholefield, Director General for tional Affairs at the Salzburg Residence Equalities, Department of Communi- ties and Local Government (United Kingdom)

69 MAY 16, 2007 Rapporteurs Vincent Tiberj, Senior Research Fellow, WORKING GROUP SESSIONS: Center for Political Research at Paris SECURITY, INTEGRATION—BEST Institut des Sciences Politiques (France) PRACTICES, AND RELIGIOUS Shireen Hunter, Visiting Scholar, PRACTICE—A WESTERN ISLAM? Center for Muslim-Christian Under- standing, Georgetown University 9:00-10:30 A.M. (United States) Working Groups Deliberate 3. Religious Practice— 1. Security A Western Islam? Moderator Moderator Randy Beardsworth, Vice President, Farhan Nizami, Director, Oxford Human Capital and Corporate Com- Centre for Islamic Studies (United munication Strategies, Analytic Services Kingdom) Inc., and former Assistant Secretary, Policy, Planning, and International Rapporteurs Affairs Directorate, Department of Aziz Huq, Director, Liberty and Homeland Security (United States) National Security Project, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University Rapporteurs School of Law (United States) Sophie Body-Gendrot, Director, Cen- Roger Hardy, Middle East and Islamic ter for Urban Studies, the Sorbonne Affairs Analyst, BBC World Service (France) (United Kingdom) Shamit Saggar, Professor of Political Science, University of Sussex, and for- 10:30-11:00 A.M. mer Senior Policy Adviser to the Prime Break Minister (United Kingdom) 11:00 A.M.-12:00 NOON 2. Integration—Best Practices Working groups resume deliberation Moderator Haroon Siddiqui, Editorial Page Editor 12:30-2:00 P.M. Emeritus, Toronto Star (Canada) Lunch

70 2:00-2:30 P.M. Working group rapporteurs prepare reports and submit them to conference secretariat

2:30 P.M. Guided walking tour of Salzburg

7:00 P.M. Reception and dinner hosted by the county and city of Salzburg at Hell- brunn Castle

MAY 17, 2007

9:00-11:00 A.M. SESSIONS III AND IV: WORKING GROUP REPORTS AND DEBATE ON SECURITY, INTEGRATION, AND RELIGIOUS PRACTICE— A WESTERN ISLAM?

11:00-11:20 A.M. Break

11:20 A.M.-1:00 P.M. SESSION V: CONSIDERATION OF POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1:00-1:30 P.M. SESSION VI: PLAN OF ACTION AND CLOSING

1:30 P.M. Lunch

71 APPENDIX II: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

Lina Abduljawad, student representa- Rabin Baldewsingh, Deputy Mayor, tive, Qatar Foundation (United States) the Hague (The Netherlands)

Fareena Alam, Editor, Q-News Randy Beardsworth, Vice President, (United Kingdom) Human Capital and Corporate Communication Strategies, Analytic Mina Al-Oraibi, Current Affairs Services Inc., former Assistant Journalist, Asharq Al-Awsat (United Secretary, Policy, Planning, and Kingdom) International Affairs Directorate, Department of Homeland Security Andreas Alsøe, Head of Section, (United States) Integration Policy Division, Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Coskun Beyazgül, President, Belgian Affairs (Denmark) Muslim Executive Office

Salah Al-Wahibi, Secretary General, Sophie Body-Gendrot, Director, World Assembly of Muslim Youth Center for Urban Studies, the (Saudi Arabia) Sorbonne (France)

Mojtaba Amiri Vahid, Minister Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Counselor and Deputy Permanent Secretary General, Organization for Observer of the Organization of the Security and Co-operation in Europe Islamic Conference to the United (OSCE) Nations in Geneva Abdelmajid Charfi, Professor Elena Arigita, Research Coordinator, Emeritus of Arab Civilization and Casa Árabe and the International Islamic Thought, University of Tunis Institute of Arab and Muslim World (Tunisia) Studies (Spain) Rudolph Chimelli, Journalist, Mohamed Baba, Cofounder and Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany) Managing Partner, MEX-IT Intercultural Management (The Reefat Drabu, Chair, Muslim Council Netherlands) of Britain’s Social and Family Affairs Committee (United Kingdom)

72 José María Ferré de la Peña, Special Rikke Hvilshøj, Minister of Refugee, Ambassador for Relations with Muslim Immigration, and Integration Affairs Communities and Organizations, (Denmark) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Spain) Kamel Kabtane, Rector, Grand Hans G. Gnodtke, Commissioner for Mosque of Lyon (France) Dialogue with the Islamic World and Dialogue Among Civilizations, Federal Haci Karacaer, Managing Director, Foreign Office (Germany) Foundation Marhaba, Centre for Islam, Culture, and Encounter (The Farid Hafez, Muslim Youth of Austria Netherlands)

Roger Hardy, Middle East and Islamic Humera Khan, Trustee, An-Nisa Affairs Analyst, BBC World Service Society (United Kingdom) (United Kingdom) Birol Kilic, Publisher, Yeni Vatan Bas Heijne, Journalist, NRC Handelsblad (Austria) (The Netherlands) Henriette Korf, Analyst, Security Karen Hopkins, President of the Intelligence Service, Center for Brooklyn Academy of Music, and Terrorism Analysis (Denmark) member, Board of Regents of the Department of Education in New York Edward Mortimer, Senior Vice City (United States) President and Chief Program Officer, Salzburg Global Seminar (Austria) Shireen Hunter, Visiting Scholar, Center for Muslim-Christian Mathias Mossberg, Ambassador, Understanding, Georgetown University Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sweden) (United States) Wael Mousfar, President, Arab Muslim Aziz Huq, Director, Liberty and American Federation (United States) National Security Project, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University Hadia Mubarak, Senior Researcher, School of Law (United States) Georgetown University and the Gallup Organization (United States)

73 Zarqa Nawaz, Filmmaker, Tariq Ramadan, Professor of Islamic FUNdamentalist Films (Canada) Studies, St Antony’s College, Oxford University (United Kingdom), and Farhan Nizami, Director, Oxford Visiting Professor, Erasmus University Centre for Islamic Studies (United in Rotterdam (The Netherlands) Kingdom) Iqbal Riza, Special Adviser to the Zsolt Nyiri, Regional Research United Nations Secretary-General on Director for Europe, the Gallup the Alliance of Civilizations Organization (United States) Michael Rolince, Senior Associate, Booz Farah Pandith, Senior Adviser on Allen Hamilton, and former Special Muslim Engagement, Department of Agent in Charge of the Washington Field State (United States) Office’s Counterterrorism Division, FBI (United States) Ceri Peach, Professor of Social Geography, Oxford University (United Shamit Saggar, Professor of Political Kingdom) Science, University of Sussex, and former Senior Policy Adviser to the Abdul Wahid Pedersen, Foreign Prime Minister (United Kingdom) Relations Manager, Muslim Council of Denmark Martin Schain, Professor of Politics, New York University (United States) Jane Perlez, Correspondent, New York Times (United States) Heinz Schaden, Mayor, Salzburg (Austria)

Ursula Plassnik, Federal Minister for Ralph Scheide, Deputy Director General European and International Affairs for Political Affairs and Director of the (Austria) Near and Middle East Department and Africa, Federal Ministry for European Hassan Qazwini, Imam and head of and International Affairs (Austria) the Islamic Center of America (United States) Susan Scholefield, Director General for Equalities, Department of Naheed Qureshi, Board Member, Communities and Local Government Muslim Advocates (United States) (United Kingdom) 74 Kurt Seinitz, Foreign Editor, Kronen Hugo Østergaard-Andersen, Zeitung (Austria) Ambassador, Embassy of Denmark in Austria Adeela Shabazz, Trustee, Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism Marietje Schaake, Diversity Dialogues, (United Kingdom) Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the American Embassy in the Haroon Siddiqui, Editorial Page Hague (The Netherlands) Editor Emeritus, Toronto Star (Canada) STAFF Vincent Tiberj, Senior Research Mustapha Tlili, Founder and Director, Fellow, Center for Political Research at New York University Center for Paris Institut des Sciences Politiques Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The (France) West (United States)

Ahmed Turkstani, Professor, Imam Shaanti Kapila, Assistant Director, Muhammad bin Saud Islamic University New York University Center for (Saudi Arabia) Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West (United States) Shaarik Zafar, Senior Policy Adviser, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Nyasa Hickey, Program Assistant, New Liberties, Department of Homeland York University Center for Dialogues: Security (United States) Islamic World-U.S.-The West (United States) OBSERVERS Fareed Alkhotani, Director, Islamic Salimah Hadi, Intern, New York Center in Vienna (Austria) University Center for Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The West (United Abduljaleel Lahmanate, Consultant to States) Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-Missned (Qatar) Claudia Rivera Bohn, Consultant (Brazil) Abdul-Rehman Malik, Contributing Editor, Q-News (United Kingdom) Andrea Stanton, Consultant (United States)

75 APPENDIX III: MUSTAPHA TLILI’S OPENING STATEMENT

Madam Federal Minister for European No wonder then, Madam Minister, that and International Affairs, Dr. Ursula from the first day I was honored to meet Plassnik; Excellencies; Ladies and with you to seek your support and the Gentlemen; Dear Colleagues and support of the Austrian government for Friends: this conference, you immediately came through. Since then, you and your What brings us here together today is a colleagues in the Austrian Federal call for imaginative ideas, a call made Ministry for European and International urgent by events over the last few years, Affairs have spared no effort to make this a call that would hasten the peaceful, event, we hope, a successful undertaking. harmonious, and more productive inclusion of Islam in the West, where Our success will be measured by the communities of citizens ranging from kind of policy recommendations that, if 15 to 20 million in Europe and 4 to 6 implemented by concerned actors, million in the United States and would further the integration of Canada contribute daily to the welfare Western citizens of Muslim faith in the of their fellow citizens, but who regret- economic, social, cultural, and political fully often do not feel as appreciated as fabric of their respective countries. they should be—worse, they have become the object of increasing suspi- My thanks go also to the Danish Ministry cion because of the misguided and most of Refugee, Immigration, and reprehensible activities of a few. Integration Affairs; The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Kingdom Let us not forget that the larger Muslim of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign world is concerned about the fate of Affairs; the Qatar Foundation; and the these communities. Rockefeller Brothers Fund, as well as to Kronen Zeitung and its publisher, Herr Austria, where we gather today, has Hans Dichand, for their financial and been, throughout its modern history, a moral support. Nor should I forget our link between the Muslim world and the hosts, the staff of the Salzburg Global West. It is a land in which the faith of Seminar, for their marvelous facilities citizens of Muslim origin is—by a law and services, and my staff who work adopted in 1912—established as equal to tirelessly to make this conference possible. Christianity and Judaism in the eyes of the state and, consequently, entitled to Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, no the same privileges. one can ignore the truth of continuing 76 misunderstandings and tensions that lend us their support to help us accom- over the last few years have colored and plish our shared goals. framed the issue of Muslim communities in the West. Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, the issues we are dealing with are We at New York University Center for complex issues weighed down by the Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The heavy burden of historical memory, West, since the inception of the exacerbated by the distortions of global- program in the aftermath of the tragic ization, often reduced to their most events of September 11, have focused on simplistic dimensions by the media and, the Muslim-Western relationship in all unfortunately, often also instrumental- its variations and diverse manifesta- ized for short-sighted gains by politi- tions. The issue of Muslim communi- cians heeding, sometimes cynically, the ties in the West is part of the equation. calls of electoral cycles. For these Now, more than ever, as we have reasons, we have unfailingly sought to become, by a very recent decision of the anchor our contribution to this leadership of NYU, a full-fledged challenging yet necessary conversation center of the University under the in the most current scholarship. We do name of the NYU Center for so to provide a basis on which reason- Dialogues: Islamic World-U.S.-The able men and women can engage in the West, we recommit ourselves to the give-and-take of true dialogue based on same focus. Our constant aim is to facts. They can then agree or disagree knock down the walls of misunder- on the interpretation of the facts and, standing and construct in their place in the end, maybe arrive at common bridges of communication based on ground that could lead to a better future reason and mutual respect. Our for all. ultimate goal is to promote fruitful cooperation between civilizations and Let me here express my gratitude to the peace and security for all. group of very fine scholars, both American and European, who, over the As we seek to provide the center with the last two years, assisted me in the prepara- necessary financial means to accomplish tions for this conference on “Muslim its task, we call on all governments, Youth and Women in the West: Source of institutions, and individuals, Concern or Source of Hope?” All of Westerners and Muslims alike, who them have been credited in the share our concerns and philosophy to background paper that you have received. 77 We hope that you will find in the well as external factors, such as interna- background material precisely the kind tional conflicts and the struggle against of springboard from which, in your transnational terrorism. diversity of backgrounds, professional expertise, faiths, and nationalities, you Clearly the path of full inclusion is a will, in the two days before us, come up challenging path, but both the United with visionary policy recommendations. States and Europe in their modern The goal of such recommendations history have successfully taken up should be to help all those concerned similar challenges. Until the 1960s, about these challenging questions— most European states were countries of governments, parliaments, community temporary migration, and governments leaders, faith leaders, security officials— and the public were ill-prepared for the to maximize the chances of citizens of challenges of long-term immigration. Muslim faith to attain full and equal After decades of uninterrupted citizenship so that one would no longer residence, immigrants and their be referred to first by faith and then by descendants became citizens and the nationality, but rather would be seen, idea that settlement is temporary like all his or her fellow citizens of other became an illusion. Ethnic and faiths or without faith, simply as an religious pluralism is a new social fact. It Austrian citizen, a French citizen, a compels governments and social German citizen, or an American partners to take the lead in rethinking citizen—full stop. the obligations that tie citizens to the state and citizens to each other. As we state in the conclusions of the background paper, these are not easy A new social pact—indeed, a new times to determine the right terms for “citizenship pact”—must be formed that the integration of Muslim communities allows for pluralism and diversity. in the West, and in Europe, in partic- Social equality became possible after ular. Tensions between the Muslim and World War II because reciprocity Western worlds are reverberating within subsumed the class divide. The pact of Muslim communities in the West. The reciprocal obligation must now be search for identity as far as Europe is rewritten to include Muslims and other concerned (among individuals, states, groups of immigrants who do not and Europe as a whole) is exacerbated by seamlessly blend into the national internal factors, such as economic and community as it was defined in the past. social problems, and cultural clashes, as 78 Indeed, throughout Europe, large and As I envision it, this citizenship pact growing Muslim communities are would be an understanding—a set of experiencing a set of challenges that are principles—of what is expected from similar between these communities and Muslim citizens as well as from all among their adopted countries. citizens, spelling out obligations and Generally referred to as problems of rights in a clear way. Obligations integration, these challenges can be incumbent upon both citizens and the broadly divided into two categories: state should include adherence to the those concerning the private sphere, law; respect for faith and private which includes personal faith and moral beliefs—belief (religious or moral) values, and those concerning the public should not be a litmus test for citizen- sphere, which includes education, ship; acceptance of the duties required employment, political participation, of citizens (military service, for and what might be called the civic example), even if these might put one culture—i.e., the ideological and in conflict with personal faith; and sole cultural norms generally accepted by allegiance to the country of citizenship, most citizens. its interests, and above all, its security. Rights should include freedom from As the conference’s background paper state interference in private belief, as clearly indicates, American Muslims are well as a recommitment to social far better integrated, at least economically citizenship by the state in the fields of and socially, than European Muslims. education, employment, and security Concerning Europe, the time has come, for citizens; economic and social we believe, for all stakeholders—govern- opportunity; legal justice without ments, ethnic associations, employers, discrimination; and a commitment by educational institutions, faith leaders, the state to combat discrimination in and others—to develop and define what employment, housing, and education. might become a “citizenship pact.” This Such a mutual commitment, particu- might best be initiated at the European larly as it concerns youth, would mirror Union level. As a set of institutions with the social citizenship understandings of binding decision-making powers, the EU the period after the Second World is capable of providing guidance and War—the so-called “postwar settle- leadership beyond the limitations of ment”—that served to bridge the class sovereign states. gap that had deeply divided Europe since the 19th century.

79 Muslim women’s right to choose for to articulate and carry out. We will themselves if they want to wear the explore together these challenges, headscarf or not, as well as to work including in the roundtable this and have careers or to observe their morning, in the general debate of this interpretation of what Islam requires afternoon, and tomorrow in the three of them, is a particularly difficult working groups on security, integration issue. Full gender equality, as best practices, and religious practice. enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and In conclusion—are the challenges worth other internationally binding instru- our effort? As Bob Dylan would say, ments, should, in all circumstances, times are changin’. But, unfortunately, supersede any other consideration. we have to admit that they are not on the whole changing for the best. In The process of defining and developing order to prevent rejection and alien- a citizenship pact at the European level ation, which surveys have shown to lead might include (1) parliamentary to radicalization and sometimes hearings in European countries with violence, all those concerned—and I significant Muslim populations in repeat: governments, ethnic associa- order for employers, educators, tions, employers, educational institu- experts, associational representatives, tions, faith leaders, and others—would and others to gather information on need to exert a concerted effort to grievances and suggested remedies; (2) develop the new citizenship pact that I an open process at the EU level, am proposing. Times will still be modeled after the European changing, but for the best, one might “Constitutional Convention,” that hope. As we conclude in the would include studies and surveys to background paper, “As citizens, provide factual background on the reassured in the integrity of their current situation; and (3) an eminent private values but in full agreement persons committee to make policy with the encompassing legal system of recommendations and draft a fair, their adopted countries and their civic objective, and forward-looking citizen- cultures, Western Muslims could ship pact that would undercut the basis become an inspiration for the larger of support for extremism. Muslim world as it struggles to strike a balance between faith, tradition, and What I am proposing is undoubtedly an modernity. The harmonious integra- ambitious program that might take years tion of Muslim communities in the 80 West could also lead to a more peaceful and productive relationship between the West and the Muslim world.”

You, Madam Minister, have worked tirelessly to bridge the gap between the two worlds. I am honored to give you the floor.

81 APPENDIX IV: ADDRESS OF DR. URSULA PLASSNIK, AUSTRIAN FEDERAL MINISTER FOR EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Secretary General of the OSCE Marc problems, expectations, and opportuni- Perrin de Brichambaut, UN Special ties and to devote due attention to them. Envoy Iqbal Riza, Director Mustapha Tlili, Senior Vice President of the Often we lack—and I say this with self- Salzburg Global Seminar Edward criticism—a differentiating approach, Mortimer, Ladies and Gentlemen: and we must look behind reproaches and stereotypes if we want to develop concrete I cordially welcome you to Salzburg. solutions to current problems.

Muslim youth and women in particular After all, we want to talk frankly about are often in the forefront of discussion problem areas and approaches to over integration and the relationship solutions at this event. between Islam and the West. Too many young people with immigrant Often they become the “yardsticks” for backgrounds have no education, no job, successful or failed integration policy, and little or no prospects for economic often they are styled as “victims” and see independence and social ascendancy, or to themselves as “discriminated against.” At put it concisely—for a life as they would like the same time, however, young Muslim to envision it. And—if you believe in statis- men and women partly change the old tical data—this applies to a greater extent to hierarchies in gender relationships and are male youths than to female youths. thus agents of change in the transformation of Muslim families and communities. We know that a lack of future prospects and a feeling of exclusion or of being Quite apart from the religious deliberately excluded leads to a propensity background aspect of the debate, it is for religious and political radicalization. generally accepted that in today’s world the great theme “identity and integra- In the diversity “of forming an Islamic tion” poses many new and sophisticated identity,” there are many young people challenges particularly for women and and women who consciously and actively young people. develop a European-Islamic identity.

This is reason enough to look into their Muslim women and the way they dress, basic situation, concerns, threats, the question of whether this is a visual sign 82 of nonintegration and nonacceptance of ishing numerical differences: sometimes European values, have been discussed for the figure is set at 20 to 30 million. This years. The fact that even clothing is a number includes both fellow citizens who delicate subject, and one which is not represent Europe’s autochthonous Islam, strictly private but involves aspects of legal or they are people who have come to us as and social policy, has already been appre- refugees or migrants since the second half ciated prior to the Sahin vs. Turkey case and of the last century. the respective judgment set down in 2005 by the European Court of Human Rights, Europe, its politics, and decision makers which dealt with the subject in a very are committed to diversity. This holds careful and conscientious manner. true for both the people and their countries: each single state, each At the same time, Muslim women are community should recognize itself in this increasingly successful in their striving new European amalgam. And the final for equal education and professional goal is that each individual man and training, as well as equal opportunities in woman, each human being, contributes the labor market. their roots, head and heart, and that they recognize themselves in this new Europe. Ladies and Gentlemen, a few words on Europe. In this endeavor, the European Union stands—and this is the very starting point In modern Europe, diversity is a reality for me—on the firm foundations of the that had been ferociously pursued and Enlightenment: reason, the separation of contested at the same time until it was church and state, individual and political finally achieved. Meanwhile, it has become rights and freedoms, self-determination the recognized—even the energizing—core of the person, and equal rights for men of our European self-conception. The and women. The core of this life model is daily application of pluralism is the truly to impart pluralism, to live pluralism. By successful “management concept” of our the way, Article I of the European specific European life model. Europeans Union’s constitutional draft contains a are turning out to be masters in the good summary of this objective.1 management of diversity. To this quotation on the foundation of The European Union is home to over 15 values, I should like to add another million Muslims. Estimates reveal aston- remarkable quotation from the final 83 declaration of the Conference of Leaders everything revolves around participating of Islamic Centres and Imams in Europe in and coshaping this society, having held in Graz in 2003: “European rights and obligations, and—in emotional Muslims are equally aware of their terms—sharing in its happiness and religious identity as Muslims as they are sorrows. And finally, finding a home. of their social identity as Europeans.”2 Integration is not a process that aims to Diversity is based on a firm foundation of endanger or make people lose their values. Europe has a carefully formulated religious or cultural identity. A precon- acquis communautaire for the protection dition for successful integration is also to and promotion of this diversity, for the deal honestly with the lives of Muslim furthering of equal opportunities and as women and youth—their life in our a foil against discrimination. society, their concerns and objectives, and also their problems—in order to find But have we also known how to make the solutions together. best of diversity in our actual daily lives? Looking more closely, do we detect cracks Many themes raised at the Conference— and gaps? Are there vague areas? If yes, including Muslim identity and European what are we doing about them? Islam—relate to Muslim communities themselves, constituting a challenge for Ladies and Gentlemen, integration is an the internal dialogue among Muslims. In ever-new challenge. this effort, Muslim organizations and religious authorities have an important Integration is a sophisticated social policy orientation function to fulfill. management task requiring a great deal of creativity. The new home country At the same time, we must aim for provides the framework conditions, precision at the political level: not although—and this is something I should every issue relevant to integration is like to emphasize—a lot remains to be related to religious identity. The situa- done on all sides. tion of, for example, Muslim women and youth is considerably more multi- Integration is not a one-way street laid faceted, and we should beware of out by a majority society. On the discussing problems in the limited contrary, integration means not being a context of religious affiliation. guest in a society but rather living in this society to the full, leading a life where 84 The concrete task is to make European Austria promotes language courses at many values attractive for young people and to levels. Let me mention but a few examples: win them over without calling their religious identity into question. This also • There are courses for young includes avoiding a situation in which “newcomers,” male and female, who arrive in Austria shortly before compul- groups of young people lose themselves to sory education starts or after it has ended frustration and a lack of future prospects, to assist them in becoming integrated. so that in their circle of friends and families they fall into an ever-deeper and • There are language integration more rapid downward spiral in which vouchers for immigrants, male and female, who come to Vienna within the everything appears hopeless. No young framework of family reunification. person must end up on the dead-end street of self-denial or defamation of others. • And there is the “Mom Is Learning German” Program—language courses It is our common task to convince our for mothers of school-age children. youth that there is no such thing as an inescapable situation. We have to The problematic lack of future prospects encourage young people in this belief. for young Muslims can be most clearly Let’s get personalities who have observed in the labor market. If asserted themselves in society, and let unemployment of young people consti- them talk in public about how they tutes a challenge in general, it is young have “made it.” Successful examples people from immigrant backgrounds may provide confidence. who are especially affected. We need targeted measures that deal with this Ladies and Gentlemen, we know that the problem. youth of today will determine the Europe of tomorrow. Let me give you an example. On May 9, a position paper formulated by the Language proficiency and education are Federation of Austrian Industry—which, crucial to the participation of young with some 3,500 members encompasses people in our society and shall open the a weighty part of Austria’s entrepre- doors to their contribution in the social, neurial world—was presented in Vienna. cultural, economic, and political milieus. Under the title “Creating Common Young people are key to coshaping our Spaces for Life—The Future of Migration common future—being inside, rather and Integration in Austria,” the paper is than having to remain outside. designed to optimize conditions for 85 people with immigrant backgrounds who autre” (I is another)—words that express are already living in the country. Their the root pluralism of being European. future prospects, it suggests, could be improved by acquiring a good knowledge To me, it is secondary what children of the language, by becoming increas- discuss under the label “Europe”— ingly better qualified, and by supporting whether they talk about the Chinese wall children at an early stage, as well as or Turkish fellow citizens. The important through measures on the part of local thing is to recognize the Europeanness of and regional authorities. that which is different.

There is a “Muslim elite” developing in Integration may be promoted successfully Europe—men and women who partici- through cooperation with Muslim educa- pate in society and who have “made it” tional facilities. Let me mention a few both economically and socially. They can examples from the Austrian perspective: and should be credible role models, especially for young people. • Providing of Islamic religious instruction that meets European standards with regard to the basic and But we also want to invest more in educa- further training of teachers, the tion about Europe and the formation of quality of teaching aids, as well as a European identity. After all, we live in educational concepts for children the age of multiple identities or patch- and adolescents. work identity—I think this is an appro- • Introduction of a European curri- priate term, since identity is nothing that culum for religious instruction. With is carved in stone but rather something the introduction of the “Islamic that develops and shifts. religious education” university study programs, Austria has taken an Participation requires being informed important step. This is where Austria’s secondary school teachers of Islamic and having the necessary tools. I have religion should be trained. therefore called for a new subject— “Europe”—to be introduced into • Establishment of Muslim theological Austrian schools from the first grade faculties and educational programs onward. The objective should be to allow for imams at European universities and teacher training colleges. recognition of that which is unfamiliar and instill confidence. Perhaps this will • Support by society for Muslim help children recognize what Arthur initiatives that resolutely reject Rimbaud articulated in saying “Je est un doctrines and traditions that contra- 86 dict European basic values and that authorities have to take clear positions on are also not rooted in Islam. such issues as the defense of women’s rights and promoting the image of the • Increased awareness in dealing with questions of media globalization. The Muslim woman having a full and equal Internet entails the danger of radical- role in all spheres of society. ization. On the other hand, it offers the opportunity to lead an open The same Vienna imam conference debate across borders. State and formulated the following groundbreaking Muslim organizations should face the challenges of this medium by engaging statements with regard to gender participa- in cooperation and providing orientation: “Men and women are equal partners tion. They should also clearly warn in Islam; they carry mutual responsibility against content that could endanger and are equal in human dignity. The right coexistence in Europe. to study and teach, the right to work, to financial independence, to vote and be “The opportunity to find a home” best eligible for political office, and to partici- describes the ultimate goal toward which pate in the social discourse are pillars which we should all be working. are to guarantee this status.”3

Ladies and Gentlemen, no matter which In my opinion, the active participation of individual course Muslim women follow women in decision-making processes—at in their lives and no matter whether or not an equal level with men and not only with they wear the headscarf, they are facing regard to so-called women’s issues, but in specific challenges and are exposed to relation to any subject—in internal specific tensions in Western society, as well dialogue and in the dialogue between as in their own religious communities. cultures, is at the core of the debate on these issues. I am convinced that no Our legally guaranteed social and polit- society can do without the strength, ical freedoms offer protection and experience, and expertise of women. encouragement. At the same time, they may increase the pressures shaping The training and education of young Muslim female identity. people is also affected by the position of women. A modern, open-minded The Conference of European Imams and mother will strive to give her children Ministers in Vienna in 2006 clearly confidence, create opportunities for addressed the question of what remains them, and do everything to ensure their to be done: the responsible religious successful future. 87 Muslim women in our societies—I have • Networking between civil society facilities already addressed this point and we are all and other organizations supporting aware of it—are by no means a homoge- women’s rights and human rights should be increased. Dialogue should point out neous group. They are characterized by that which concerns us all, such as violence diversity—not only by different countries against women, “as if there were no other of origin, different kinds of education, abusive husbands in Austria.” different situations in society and in their families, but also by their personal 2. Necessary action in society and politics life patterns. in general: • Topics should be dealt with honestly, Carla Amina Baghajati, the media spokes- without simplification, or complacency. woman of the Islamic Faith Community • Effective antidiscrimination measures in Austria, is getting to the point when she should be taken, including the creation of says that Muslim women—particularly if opportunities for greater participation by Muslim women. they wear headscarves—are the subject of more or less any discussion related to the • Awareness should be raised with regard theme of “Islam in Europe” ranging from to contradictions and dependencies. Where women cannot go to work to the issue of integration to questions of become financially independent from security. She says that “this is usually done their husbands, this is caused in part by without asking them and by talking about the difficulties involved in getting foreign them rather than with them.” degrees acknowledged, by problems concerning access to the labor market, and also on account of the legislation Regarding the wishes Muslim women governing the rights of foreigners—not voice with regard to politics, Ms. Baghajati “by Islam,” as is often generalized. When sees two levels of what remains to be done: wives do not end a marriage although it is 1. Necessary action on the Muslim side: “on the rocks,” this attitude may be due to responsible religious authorities should fears of losing their residence permit, which is controlled by the husband. take a clear stand on the defense of women’s rights and women’s image based Ladies and Gentlemen, terror caused by on equal rights: people who pretend to act in the name of • Cases in which women are wronged Islam, as well as anger and radicalization should be openly reviewed on a self- of marginalized groups, gives rise to critical basis. There should be no rejection negative generalizations of Muslims in through the claim that “this is not Islam.” This is the only way of achieving positive our country. awareness within the Muslim community.

88 The dangerous thing about stereotypes is We are trying to keep both hands that they paralyze. They threaten to take outstretched, one hand toward our hostage the positive potential of entire Muslim fellow citizens and the other societies—both in the Muslim world and hand toward our Muslim partners in the in the Western world. We should—and wider world. In this, we are aware of the must—identify, unmask, and dismantle crucial role of European Muslims, men stereotypes. and women alike.

Two current European initiatives I wish the Conference, its initiator addressing this challenge are the Director Mustapha Tlili, and his Center European Year of Equal Opportunities for Dialogues team a most successful event. for All (2007) and the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue (2008). Thank you.

One principle of the European life model is committed dialogue—based on mutual curiosity and interest, not merely tolerance, for “tolerating means offending” as Goethe said, and certainly not on indifference disguised as tolerance.

It is particularly the Austrian model of dealing with our Muslim fellow citizens that has proven successful. The “Memorandum by the Islamic Faith Community in Austria on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of European Unity” describes it as “a well-balanced relationship between the state and recognized religious communities,” including Islam, which has been recognized in Austria since 1912. We have a political climate in which issues are dealt with constructively among equals and in which solutions can be found.

89 APPENDIX V: KEYNOTE ADDRESS OF RIKKE HVILSHØJ, DANISH MINISTER OF REFUGEE, IMMIGRATION, AND INTEGRATION AFFAIRS

Introduction and women are a source of concern or a source of hope. This is an interesting Ladies and Gentlemen, I am very pleased and important question. I would like to to be here today among you at this highly stress generally that we are facing funda- interesting conference. I am also very mental and urgent problems in the pleased to be able to share some of my integration area. thoughts on current integration issues with an audience of such diverse On the other hand, these problems can be backgrounds and experiences. solved. But it requires that we acknowledge the challenges and do not ignore the I would like to thank Mr. Tlili and the problems as was the tendency some years Center for Dialogues for making this ago. It also requires that we be—politi- impressive event possible and Dr. cians and other authorities, civil society, Plassnik and Mr. Schaden for having immigrant organizations, religious Austria and the beautiful city of Salzburg leaders, and so on—ready to debate even host this conference. the most controversial issues and contribute to finding solutions. For Conference Themes and Focus example, the practice of forced marriages among some immigrant groups is a Integration policy is high on the political controversial and complicated question. agenda in most of our countries. We should not avoid debating this issue Challenges, experiences, and policies because of cultural sensitivity, and we differ from country to country, and we should not accept it as part of some can all learn from each other. There is immigrant group’s traditional culture. currently a growing interest in and need The right of young people to freely for exchange of information, ideas, and decide whom they want to marry is best practices, which is why I find this fundamental and nonnegotiable. There conference very relevant and useful. is no excuse for forced marriages. We need to make this very clear. Fortunately, The aim of the conference is to put the I think we are already seeing signs of focus upon Islam in the West. It aims, in positive developments—developments particular, to look at Muslim youth and that we can build on. But still, there are women in the West, and it raises the many unsolved challenges ahead of us. basic question of whether Muslim youth We do still need to intensify our efforts. 90 I would like to address two issues today. The immigrants were seen as guest Firstly, I would like to say a few words on workers, and they were expected to return Danish integration policy. What are the to their home countries if they were no main challenges and what are the main longer employed. However, many stayed aims? As this conference pays special in Denmark even though the need for attention to the position of Muslim youth labor diminished. Many lost their jobs. and women, I would like today to give you And in the following decades, Denmark a more detailed picture of how Denmark additionally experienced a rise in seeks to promote integration and partici- refugees and family-related immigration pation—in particular of immigrant youth with no affiliation to the labor market. In and women. Secondly, I would like to say Denmark today, it is generally acknowl- a few words on how Denmark aims to edged that we made a mistake in the past accommodate cultural and religious by not realizing that immigration diversity. In recent decades, Denmark— requires an active immigration and like many other Western European integration policy. Some of the conflicts societies—has seen a growing number of and challenges we are facing today could immigrants with cultural traditions and have been avoided or minimized if we religions that differ from the mainstream. had given them our attention at the I would like to say a few words on how we appropriate time. seek to respond to this diversity. Thus, we learned two lessons. Firstly, we Danish Integration Policy need to manage and control immigration. This will in general ensure that we Danish immigration history has in many have the necessary resources to promote ways followed the same path as the the integration of both newcomers and immigration histories of many other long-term immigrants. In Denmark, we Western European countries. Although recognize that there is a close link Denmark has a long history of immigra- between immigration and integration tion, larger scale immigration and the policy. Secondly, we learned that we must influx of immigrants with Muslim actively promote the integration of backgrounds is a relatively new phenom- immigrants in Denmark. We must enon dating back to the 1960s. In the provide immigrants with opportunities 1960s and early 1970s, immigration was and incentives in order to ensure a promoted as a valuable source of labor. successful process of integration. 91 So, what are the main challenges that we labor market has been introduced. The face today? Although many immigrants immigrant or refugee is, firstly, offered and refugees have been successfully short-term education, then on-the-job integrated, the unemployment level training, and finally recruitment with a among immigrants and their descendants wage subsidy before moving into the is too high when compared to the rest of ordinary labor market. We have launched the population. Too many immigrants do several additional initiatives aimed at not enroll in school or do not complete drawing immigrants into the labor the education in which they enrolled. market and educational system, Moreover, many immigrants, even including mentoring schemes and diver- immigrants who have been in Denmark sity management programs. for many years, lack sufficient knowledge of the Danish language. Youth and Women

Introduction to Program, Labor Market, and Immigrant youth and women are special Educational System focus groups in Danish integration policy. Immigrant youth in Denmark— These challenges have necessitated that many of whom were born or have grown language teaching and integration into up in Denmark—in many cases seem to the labor market and the educational inherit their parents’ problems: high system have become main aims of Danish unemployment, little or no education, integration policy. and an insufficient knowledge of the Danish language. Young immigrants In 1999, a three-year introduction need support. They need role models program aimed at newly arrived refugees and positive goals for their future. We and their families was introduced. The have therefore established the campaign program is offered for free and includes “We need all youngsters.” The campaign Danish language courses, labor market is aimed at raising awareness among training, and classes on Danish society. immigrants about the educational system Immigrants coming to Denmark for work and awareness among employers about or study are also entitled to Danish the qualifications and potential of language courses for three years. The immigrant youth. The campaign makes Danish government has also introduced use of role models—young immigrants initiatives aimed at promoting labor who have had success professionally or in market integration. Thus, a step-by-step their educational choices. Of special approach to active participation on the importance is the involvement of their 92 parents. Immigrant parents are in some women breaking out of their traditional cases not familiar with the active roles and moving into society. This calls parenting role that is required in our for admiration and support, and the society and educational system today. women who do successfully break from Furthermore, many immigrant parents their traditional roles could become role are fighting their own social or integra- models for others. Integration of tion battles and may not have the immigrant women is therefore a top resources to support their children. It is political priority in 2007 and onward. therefore important that we motivate the We will launch initiatives on dialogue, parents—with both sticks and carrots, so support to networks, upgrading of quali- to say—to assume responsibility for fications, etc. Generally, it is all about bringing up their children and supporting immigrant women’s efforts to supporting their educations. It is the get out of their homes and into society. duty of the parents to make an effort to integrate and learn the language so they Common Values and Accommodation of can better fulfill this role. Cultural Diversity

Immigrant youth was also the focus of a Immigrants bring with them cultural European conference held last year by traditions and religions that often differ The Netherlands and Denmark. We from the traditions in the host society. learned a lot from that conference, Immigration has in many ways enriched including that it is important to involve our societies. Western societies today are the group in question, that it is very culturally diverse societies, and we should important to discuss even sensitive issues value this diversity. like the risk of radicalization and of course the usefulness of exchange of ideas But immigration and cultural diversity and best practices. have also raised questions as to how our societies and public policies should Turning to immigrant women, the respond. How can our societies accom- challenge is that very often they are even modate this diversity? To what extent more isolated from the labor market and should the host society adapt to immigra- society than immigrants in general. Due tion? And to what extent must to their subservient position in many immigrants adapt to their new society? traditional immigrant cultures, it is also These are difficult and often controver- harder for women to become fully sial questions, but I see this conference as integrated. At the same time, we do see an opportunity to discuss these issues. We 93 have all taken different approaches Sharing and accepting the same common reflecting differences in our national set of values is fundamental to social policies, histories of immigration, and cohesion in our society, and we should our different traditions. In Denmark, we combat the trend toward parallel value diversity, and as a host society, we societies. An important element in must strive to respect immigrants’ fostering social cohesion is dialogue and cultural and religious traditions. involvement. The so-called cartoon crisis of last year showed us the importance of We recognize that immigrants should be supporting a positive dialogue with free to maintain their customs with immigrant groups, in this case primarily regard to food, dress, religion, and immigrants of Muslim origin. recreation, for example. But we also emphasize that this freedom and diversity The Danish government holds a series of exist within the basic values and laws of meetings with ethnic and religious Danish society. Democracy, equality groups, and we support NGOs and other between men and women, nondiscrimi- organizations that sponsor local dialogue nation, freedom of speech, and freedom initiatives in schools, youth clubs, etc. In of religion are some of these basic values. 2006, I launched a competition for We also emphasize the right of the young people encouraging them to write individual citizen to decide freely how he their own speeches for the Danish or she wants to live his or her life. Constitution Day. Many speeches were submitted, and many youngsters with Some have argued that we need to put ethnic backgrounds chose to participate. emphasis on the recognition of different cultures. These policies of multicultur- Each of the winners accompanied a alism have been criticized—rightly I minister to a Constitution Day celebra- believe—for eroding social solidarity and tion somewhere in the country and cohesion and for fragmenting our presented his or her own speech on societies. Placing too much emphasis on democracy, dialogue, and integration. ethnic identities at the expense of what we The contest generated a lot of media have in common may threaten social attention and provided an opportunity solidarity. In Denmark we emphasize for more focus on integration and social cohesion, inclusion, and the need dialogue. Positive images of youngsters to provide all citizens with equal oppor- caring about and reflecting on society tunities for participation in all aspects of were widely disseminated. It was truly a society. very rewarding day. It is important to 94 keep in mind that dialogue is with every- doorstep. Integration policy should body, not just religious groups. therefore also be important on the inter- Immigrants and their descendants in the national agenda as the exchange of infor- West should be seen as individuals and mation, ideas, and best practices not as one monolithic block. What is becomes more and more important, and important is that the individuals and as we realize that we face common organizations that engage in dialogue challenges and can learn from each actually do represent the groups and other. In the context of the EU, several views they claim to represent. initiatives have already been launched since the setup of National Contact Active participation and involvement Points on Integration in 2002—during creates a sense of responsibility among the Danish presidency. The Dutch presi- our citizens. Basically, participation in dency held the first conference for democratic life is open to everybody. European ministers for integration in Immigrants are entitled to participate in 2004. Last week, my colleague, the local elections and of course, if they German minister of the interior, Dr. become Danish citizens, they can partic- Wolfgang Schäuble, convened a confer- ipate in national elections. Many munic- ence in Potsdam as a follow-up. The ipalities have set up special institutions conference was a success, offering a for local representation of ethnic chance for a good and open debate on minorities—institutions which are then possible future directions for European consulted about questions relating to policy on integration. The focus was on integration, etc. We have established a sharing national experiences of best national Council for Ethnic Minorities. practices and intercultural dialogue. In a The Council plays an advisory role and is related context, Denmark and The an important dialogue partner for me as Netherlands held the European confer- minister of integration. ence on Integration of Immigrant Youth in 2006, which I also mentioned above. International Aspects and Closing Remarks The present conference is of a different Integration policy is still primarily a kind and has broader focus and broader national issue and each country has its range of experiences among the partici- own concept of integration, but in an pants. This allows for debates of cross- open society like the EU, which has cutting issues and a free and informal abolished internal borders, immigration dialogue and exchange of ideas between and integration does not stop at one’s individuals, organizations, and profes- 95 sionals who do not come together regularly to discuss integration. I see a lot of potential in this conference, and I really hope that the outcome will be a set of concrete suggestions taking the best experiences and practices from the involved countries, organizations, etc. And in the longer run, I also hope this conference will provide the basis for networks for future dialogue.

APPENDIX VI: BACKGROUND PAPER

Introduction teacher who had been critical of the Prophet Muhammad in a newspaper The year 2005-2006 has been a partic- column.4 Finally, there was the national ularly difficult period for the Muslim election campaign in The Netherlands, world and for Muslims in the West as in which a consensus developed among well. The period began in October 2005 political elites and the electorate that with three weeks of violence in predomi- definitively put an end to the multicul- nantly immigrant urban areas of France tural approach to the integration of and ended with the trial in London of Muslim populations, and local elections seven young British Muslim men accused in Belgium, where the anti-immigrant of conspiracy to commit murder.1 These Vlaams Belang party increased its share of were some of the worst moments in an the vote by 5 percent to more than 20 ongoing crisis. In between was a series of percent.5 events in Europe that included clashes and lawsuits in reaction to cartoons The year 2006 appears to have marked a mocking the Prophet Muhammad. First turning point in the crisis. During the published in a Danish newspaper and year the focus of anti-immigrant senti- then reproduced in other publications, ment, particularly in Europe, seemed to the cartoons raised sensitive issues of move sharply toward a focus on Islam. religious offense and free speech.2 This Perhaps more important, doubts and was followed by a bitter debate across questions about Muslim integration Europe that began when a teacher’s assis- have, for the first time, been expressed by tant was suspended from a British school a broad spectrum of political leaders— for wearing a niqab, or face veil, which Tony Blair, Angela Merkel, and Romano former British Foreign Secretary Jack Prodi, for example.6 In this context, Straw publicly declared to be off-putting naturalization requirements in many because it was “such a visible symbol of countries in the West have become more separation.”3 Then there was the airline demanding.7 crisis in August 2006, and the detention of 19 young Muslim men—all with deep As new generations of Muslim British roots—accused of plotting to blow immigrants are being incorporated into up transatlantic airliners; the speech by Western societies, questions related to Pope Benedict XVI quoting a 14th- the presence of Islam in the West have century Byzantine emperor who charac- clearly become salient. Figures on the terized Islam as “evil and inhuman”; and Muslim population in the West vary, but the threats against a French high school it is believed that there are as many as 15 98 million Muslims presently living in the Questions involving the integration of European Union8 and as many as six Muslim populations are also related to a million in the United States.9 Moreover, heightened sense of internal and external the Muslim presence in the West is security threats. Militant Islam and the growing. The U.S.-based National growing alienation of young men of Intelligence Council predicts that the Muslim origin have been linked by the Muslim populations in the EU will more press to urban unrest in Britain, France, than double during the next 20 years.10 and Germany.13 More troubling, however, have been the links between With policy makers increasingly preoccu- young Muslim men born and raised in pied with issues of identity, integration, Europe to terrorist attacks in the West and security, there has recently been since September 11, 2001. Most of the much discussion about the failure of young men who participated in the attacks Western countries—and those of Western in the United States, Spain, and Britain Europe in particular—to integrate their were either born or educated in the West. Muslim populations. Cycles of urban riots in France and Britain, for example, The rise of extreme right political parties and the debate on the integration of throughout Europe is an indication of women are often cited as a measure of the political resistance to Muslim communi- failures of socioeconomic integration in ties. What unites such electorally Europe.11 Assertions of Muslim religious successful political parties as the National and cultural traditions have clashed with Front in France, the Freedom Party of established norms of Western culture. In Austria, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, France, the 15-year struggle over the and the List Pim Fortuyn in The right of young Muslim girls to wear Netherlands, as well as other parties of headscarves in public schools has focused the populist right in Denmark (the FP) on French secularism versus religious and Switzerland (the SVP), is their ability expression. Well-publicized cases of to mobilize voters around anti- forced marriages and “honor killings” immigrant and especially anti-Muslim among the Turkish population in issues. In recent years, these parties have Germany have led to outspoken criticism shifted from an overall anti-immigrant of the role of women in Muslim culture, focus to an emphasis on Islam and the and similar human rights violations in perceived challenges to identity from France have resulted in the formation of large, settled Muslim populations.14 For an organized movement among French instance, only a few years ago the Muslim women.12 question of Islam was of relatively little 99 importance for the Austrian FPO. When processes of globalization, which, the party split, Jörg Haider, the leader of through commerce and migration, have the main branch, decided to shift to anti- forged unprecedented ties between the Islamic nativism. Against all expectations, Islamic and Western worlds. Similarly, the party made significant gains of more Islam has become a strong and growing than 10 percent in the 2006 national force within the West and another elections, attributed by some analysts to identity to which many “Westerners” this new emphasis. A similar strategy has ascribe through conversion.17 But the also been successful in Belgium, relationship between the Islamic and Denmark, and The Netherlands in Western worlds is dynamic, and neither elections in 2005 and 2006.15 has perfect knowledge or understanding of the other. Flare-ups like the Danish The integration of Muslim populations in cartoon affair are likely to continue.18 the West has implications for the relationship between the Western and Islamic These kinds of tensions often derive worlds. As the number of Muslims living from the general perception that and settling outside the Islamic world Muslims in the West are immigrants or continues to grow, Muslim-majority temporary residents, rather than citizens countries are taking a heightened interest and integral members of civil society. in the experiences of Muslim communi- Thus, the questions with which Western ties in the West.16 For more than three governments and scholars are most generations, Muslim populations in the concerned relate to incorporation and West have made important contributions integration. The focus of these integra- to the postwar development and suste- tion issues tends to be on the younger nance of Western societies while generations, in particular young women. maintaining their links with their home In this paper, we will explore the countries. Such Western Muslims could challenges of and to Muslim communi- be an example for those in the Islamic ties in the West through the lens of youth world who seek to reconcile their religious and women, who have emerged from identity with the modern world. traditional roles and are forging new identities for themselves, and, in some The experience of modernity, mani- instances, are becoming leading agents of fested in schools of thought, systems of change. knowledge, and political models whose origins lie in the West, has left its mark First, we will look at the question of the on the Muslim world, as have the presence of Muslims in the West—where 100 they came from, who they are, and what concluding with a look at the role of they are becoming—and examine some of Muslim communities in political life, or, the problems of simply knowing how more precisely, the role of political life in many of them there are. The diversity of the integration of Muslim communities Islam in the world is impressive, and it’s in the West. not surprising that there is great diversity among Muslims in the West as well. Fourth, we will consider how the presence of large Muslim communities Second, we will look at issues related to throughout Europe has been related to the presence of Islam as a religion in the questions of security on two levels.19 West and the relationship between First, we will raise the question of security religion and Muslim communities, in urban environments, as well as the focusing on two dimensions. We will start issue of the relationship between security by investigating the level and type of and integration. Second, we will examine religious practice among Muslims in the threat of “homegrown” terrorism different Western countries, among among youth of Muslim origin with ties different age groups, and between men to transnational terrorist networks. and women. Then we will examine the Thus, in one of their regular meetings, evolution of practice in the West and the European ministers of the interior and organization of practices within different home affairs noted in October 2006 that Western states in which Islam is a alienation among Muslims was at the top minority religion. of their agenda, and they would work together “to persuade young Muslims to Third, we will turn to the complex reject radical ideologies and embrace question of integration and the process democratic values.”20 through which Western societies are evolving as settled Muslim communities Fifth, we will examine the question of move from the second to the third whether in each of the above areas there generation. are “best practices” that have been demonstrably effective in promoting We will focus on three aspects of this integration and acceptance and that are process, starting with the meaning of most likely to have an impact on policies integration and how this is changing; and practices in other countries. proceeding to the question of whether there is a “crisis” of integration of The Western countries we will focus on in Muslim communities in the West; and this review are quite different in terms of 101 their experience with immigration and during the 30 years of rapid economic also their relationship with their Muslim expansion after 1948. communities. The United States and Canada are settlement societies that have Because of this imperial history, many of a long heritage of dealing with successive the first-generation Muslim families, waves of immigration. Immigration has who are now often thought of as been rooted both in labor-market needs immigrants, originally came to Europe as and in the need for populations to fill a citizens of the countries in which they vast territorial expanse. Muslim popula- now reside. Immigration of North tions that emigrated to France, Britain, Africans to France and Pakistanis to and Germany, however, came from Britain was vital to postwar economic within the colonial community (France recovery. In some countries that did not and Britain) or from countries with have a well-established imperial connec- which there was a traditional relationship tion, recruitment was based either on a (Germany). These populations were deep historical relationship (Germany accepted only reluctantly, with the hope and Turkey) or on business networks or intention that they would eventually go (Switzerland). By contrast, while there home. This reluctance has contributed to were small numbers of Muslims in the patterns of discrimination that have United States in the 19th century (and made integration more difficult. earlier, if we include the importation of slaves), the postwar growth of Muslim Chapter I: The Presence of Muslims communities in the United States dates in the West directly from the new immigration system that was created by the Hart- The expansion of Muslim communities Cellar Act of 1965 and had little to do in Europe and the United States dates with labor migration.21 from the 1960s, but the origins and dynamics of this expansion have differed As the need for labor diminished in the from country to country. In Europe, the late 1960s, European countries either Muslim population began to grow with suspended legal immigration through the labor immigration in the 1960s and administrative fiat, as in France and is closely linked with the history of Germany, or passed legislation that empire in the major European would exclude immigrants who had been countries. Labor immigration was arriving in large numbers, as in encouraged and facilitated by employers Britain.22 By 1975, no country in Europe and sanctioned by bilateral agreements permitted easy immigration from 102 countries outside of the European Commission have emphasized that community. However, mostly because European needs for immigrant labor will family unification could not be termi- increase over the next 25 years.25 Several nated under law, Muslim communities European countries have been devel- continued to grow and to evolve. oping policies that favor at least the Communities of workers became short-term immigration of high-skilled communities of families; migrant immigrants26 but there is also a demand workers, who tended to move back and for those with lower skills, and they forth before labor immigration was continue to arrive, increasingly from terminated, became settled families. parts of sub-Saharan Africa.27 With some variation by country, immigrant families gradually became While European countries were citizens, and immigrant communities attempting to limit immigration from became ethnic groups. In countries Muslim countries, the United States was where the rule of jus soli applied (those doing the opposite. The Immigration Act born on national soil have a right to of 1924 (known as the Johnson-Reed citizenship), such as the United States, Act) virtually excluded immigrants from Britain, and France, the evolution most countries with substantial Muslim toward citizenship was much more rapid populations, but even before 1924, fewer than in countries with a jus sanguinis tradi- than 5 percent of immigrants from these tion (nationality is determined by that of countries were actually Muslim.28 The a child’s parents), such as Germany and 1965 Hart-Cellar Act reopened the door all of Scandinavia. During the past 15 to immigration based on family unifica- years in Europe, however, there has been tion and skills, resulting in far more a movement toward convergence, as some Muslim immigrants than ever before. jus sanguinis countries have adopted Recent data show that, among countries elements of jus soli, while jus soli countries with large Muslim populations, the most have moved toward a more conditional immigrants have come from Iran, right to automatic citizenship.23 followed by Pakistan, Iraq, Bangladesh, Turkey, and Egypt. In contrast to While immigration is certainly not a Europe, the rate of immigration to the long-term solution, Europe has a short- United States from majority Muslim term need for immigrants to manage the countries grew, at least until 2000.29 demographic challenge posed by pressures on the welfare state.24 Reports by the United Nations and the European 103 How Many Muslims Are There twice as many people declared themselves in the West? to be Muslim compared with the same survey in 1998.31 Clearly, this cannot be 1. “The Numbers Debate”30 understood as a vast increase of the ethnic Muslim population, but it should Estimating the number of Muslims in not be understood as a reaffirmation of Western countries is problematic for religious identity either.32 several reasons, the most fundamental of which is that all estimates depend prima- In a highly charged political climate, rily on what we mean by “Muslim.” One there are also problems of sources, which way of counting is to determine the vary from more scholarly estimates based number of people who come from on census and survey data to estimates by majority Muslim countries or people who government agencies, political parties, are born into families that are ethnically and interested associations, often based Muslim. A second is to count only people on noncited sources. These numbers tell who identify as Muslims. Yet a third is to us very little about either religious count people (and perhaps their practice or the bonds of religious families) who are affiliated with mosques. identity. Each of these methods yields radically different numbers, and each is also Even more reliable sources have serious fraught with methodological difficulties. limitations. The last British census in 2001 did include questions about Estimates based on country of origin religious affiliation; however, this infor- include people who may not be of the mation cannot be asked in the census of Muslim faith, may no longer identify as many other countries including the Muslim, or may have intermarried. United States and France, where Estimates based on identity, while they estimates are based on surveys or are generally tend to focus on ethnic identity extrapolated from national origin. In and religious commitment, sometimes countries such as the United States, include those who do not come from where the proportion of Muslims is Muslim countries or even Muslim small, the results of surveys are neces- families (such as African American sarily unreliable because of the small converts to Islam). Identity estimates, subsamples.33 Even in countries where moreover, often change rapidly, there are large Muslim populations— depending on the political and social France, for example—surveys yield climate. In a survey in France in 2001, variable results, in part because of the 104 reluctance of Muslims to declare European countries, the Muslim themselves.34 In the case of Germany, population has tended to come predom- religious affiliation can be checked off on inantly from one area, even one country. tax forms, but since Islam is not an Most (though certainly not all) Muslims official religion, it is not an option on in France are from North Africa, while the forms. Consequently, the number of most in Britain are from Pakistan, in Muslims in Germany is estimated from Germany from Turkey, and in The the number of Turks. Netherlands from Turkey and Morocco. There are also large Turkish populations 2. The Numbers in Austria, Switzerland, and the Nordic countries.38 The current estimate is that there are about 15 million people of Muslim Muslims in the United States, by heritage in the original countries of the comparison, are proportionately fewer European Union, and that they account and much more diverse—they have come for about 3.2 percent of the total from more than a dozen countries and population in those 15 countries.35 settled nationwide. Estimates of this However, this percentage varies consid- Muslim population vary considerably erably from country to country and, in between those based on ethnicity and general, it is increasing. “Six countries those based on identity. In the United stand out in particular for the high States, there is often a conflation of number of Muslims who call them home: Arabs and Muslims. The most recent France, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, U.S. census of 2000 indicates a popula- The Netherlands, and Greece. In each of tion of Arab ancestry of over a million these countries, anywhere from 4 to 7 people,39 but the Arab American percent of the current population is Institute has estimated that only 24 Muslim.”36 Other European countries percent of this population is Muslim, have proportionately far fewer Muslims— while 35 percent are Catholic (Roman, Britain, for example. But Italy and Maronite, and Melkite).40 Spain, which also have relatively few, are the countries in which the Muslim The total number of Muslims in the population is growing the most rapidly.37 United States has been estimated as anywhere between 1.1 million (in a 2001 In absolute terms, the largest Muslim survey based on identity conducted by the ethnic group in Europe is North African City University of New York) to as many (Moroccan, above all). Within most as 7.5 million (sources imprecise).41 105 Arabs comprise only a small minority of among the population as a whole.44 Their American Muslims (12.45 percent) and levels of unemployment tend to increase are far outnumbered by groups from the the unemployment rate among Muslim Indian subcontinent (24.4 percent).42 A populations in general, in part because 2004 survey conducted for the Muslims youth unemployment is always higher in the American Public Square project than the mean. Indeed, what is estimated that 20 percent of the Muslims sometimes referred to as the “youth in the United States are converts, most of bulge” has been understood in both whom are African American.43 positive and negative ways. Second- and third-generation Muslim youth help to Finally, the proportion of youth among alleviate the demographic deficit now Muslim populations in Europe is gener- endemic in Europe, bolster programs of ally far higher than the proportion the welfare state that are increasingly

Table 1 The Muslim Population in Various Countries (in thousands) Number of People from Muslim Countries or Estimated Percentage of Country as Muslim Year Population France 4,150 1998 7% Netherlands 945 2004 5.8% United Kingdom 1,600 2001 2.8% Germany 3,000 2004 3.6% Italy 825 2003 1.4% Belgium 355 2003 3.4% Sweden 351 2003 3.9% Denmark 250 2005 5.0% Norway 73 2003 1.6% Spain 485 2003 1.1% Greece 370 1990s 3.7% Europe 15 12,000-15,000 1990s 3-3.2% United States 1,100-6,000 2000 +/-1.0%-2%

Sources: American Religious Identification Survey (ARIS), 2001, Graduate Center of the City University of New York (CUNY), 2001; Césari, When Islam and Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United States (New York: Palgrave, 2004), pp. 9-11, p. 221, pp. 181-182; U.K. Muslim population—Office for National Statistics, 2001 figures; German Federal Statistical Office, 2004 figures; Muslim population—Federal Ministry of the Interior estimate; Muslim population—Statistics Netherlands, 2004 figures; BBC News, Muslims in Europe: A Country Guide, December 2005. 106 dependent on the contributions of youth protectorates in Africa and the Middle to support an aging population, and East: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, and contribute to sectors of the labor market to a lesser extent, West Africa, Syria, and for which there are new demands. But Lebanon. During the years immediately they also place new demands on educa- following the Second World War, tion and other state services and suffer Muslims in Algeria were granted French disproportionately from patterns of citizenship and began to move to the discrimination. They have also metropolis in larger numbers. By 1954, contributed to a rising sense of insecurity there were over 200,000 Algerians among European populations.45 residing in France, and this number increased after the Algerian war for What Are the Sources of Muslim Immigration? independence began that year.

By the 1980s, labor migration of As economic growth spread in the 1950s, Muslims had become far less important France and other European countries than family unification in accounting for became increasingly dependent on immigration in all Western countries. immigrant labor, first from labor- Then, as all Western countries began to exporting countries within Europe, such tighten their entry requirements after as Italy, Spain, and Portugal, then from 1989, illegal immigration began to countries within their former empires or increase. This new surge not only served countries with which they had had quasi- to increase the number of immigrants in colonial relationships. Ultimately, the West, since many who arrived without colonial migration became a foreign papers were able to establish residency migration as decolonization progressed; through successive amnesties, but it also and “the free movement of peoples” altered the structure of resident within Western Europe became linked to immigrant communities. In the United the process of European unification and States illegal immigration did not therefore internal migration within the contribute much to the increase in the European Union. Muslim population, but in Western Europe it did, notably from Muslim In France, immigration from North countries south of the Sahara.46 Africa continued to grow relative to that from within Europe. At first Italians were To reiterate, the core source of Islamic replaced by Spanish, then Spanish by immigration into France has always been Portuguese, and finally Portuguese by from the former French colonies and North Africans. By the time the French 107 government ended large-scale immigra- percent of the population growth.49 tion from North Africa in 1974, the Workers arrived in Germany from foreign population from Muslim Muslim countries on the basis of bilateral countries had increased to a bit less than agreements signed with Turkey in 1961 40 percent of the total foreign popula- and Tunisia and Morocco in 1965. These tion, about 1.5 million, three-quarters “guest workers” were meant to replace the of whom were men. flow of Germans from the East, who were blocked by the wall, as well as Italians, The suspension of immigration in Greeks, and Portuguese, who were also France in 1974 was in some ways a logical recruited on the basis of bilateral agree- consequence of the economic crisis, the ments and whose numbers diminished as oil crisis, and the decline of smokestack the economies in their home countries industry.47 Yet the government’s efforts grew. The German Federal Employment to limit immigration were hindered by a Office set up field offices in Istanbul, decision by the French administrative Casablanca, and Tunis, where they high court (Conseil d’Etat) in 1978 that recruited workers who were supplied with consecrated the right to family unifica- permits as well as transportation.50 tion for immigrants legally residing in France. This decision, which would be Unlike France, in which there were no echoed by courts throughout Europe, formal arrangements for the return of encouraged continued immigration workers from Muslim countries, in through settlement rather than labor Germany it was universally assumed that migration. Within a decade the propor- these workers would return home. tion of women doubled, and the number Indeed, until immigration recruitment of settled families with children also was ended in 1973, the system worked increased.48 more or less as planned, but by the end of the decade, an activist German judiciary The pattern of Muslim immigration into had made it difficult, if not impossible, Germany was similar, but the unintended to deport guest workers, and required consequences were even more profound. that the state provide material support Unlike France, Germany was never a for family unification. By 1981, the country of immigration. Nevertheless, Turkish community of 1.4 million had during the 40 years after birth of the become the largest minority in the German Federal Republic in 1949, net Federal Republic of Germany and had immigration amounted to more than 12 grown by 30 percent in three years, million and accounted for more than 80 primarily due to family unification. The 108 transformation of guest workers into immigrants from these countries permanent residents began with the continued to increase.52 In marked passage of the Foreigner Law of 1990 and contrast to German and French recruit- was continued by legislation over the next ment of labor from Islamic countries, the decade.51 British did not actively recruit in the NCW countries after the Second World The British case is quite different, War.53 But men from Pakistan and although Britain, like Germany, has not Bangladesh often immigrated without been a traditional country of immigra- their families to find work. British courts tion; in fact, the United Kingdom was a and the European Court of Justice country of emigration until well after the constrained their subsequent attempts to Second World War. Between 1871 and send for family members, but over time 1931, there was a net outflow of more this Muslim community of men evolved than three million people, mostly to the into a community of families.54 colonies. Nevertheless successive waves of migrants have come to Britain, even as The Muslim population of Britain is others were leaving. smaller in absolute and relative terms than that of either France or Germany, While until the 1960s, the overwhelming but its political weight is greater because proportion of immigrants into France immigrants can vote even before they are and the United States was from foreign naturalized as citizens. So despite the countries (generally European), in change in the open-entry policy for Britain, two-thirds of those born abroad NCW citizens and the fact that they came from former colonies. Since the remained citizens of their own countries, 1960s, the mix of immigrants from those who did gain entry to the United former colonies has changed signifi- Kingdom were eligible to vote in all cantly. The proportion of entries from British elections, including those for Ireland (and the Old Commonwealth— deputies to the European Parliament. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) has Consequently, both Britain and France declined, while those from the New have almost the same number of Muslim Commonwealth (NCW—primarily India, voters, although the Muslim population Pakistan, and Bangladesh) has increased. of the former is far smaller than that of Even after 1962, when citizenship rules the latter. were changed to make it more difficult for citizens of NCW countries to enter Unlike in Europe, the expansion of the United Kingdom, the proportion of populations from Muslim countries in 109 the United States was a by-product of What is most striking about the Muslim new access established by legislation in immigrant population from the Middle 1965. Before 1965 most immigrants who East and South Asia is that, as a group, came to the United States from Islamic they are far better educated than the countries in the Middle East and South immigrant population in the United Asia were Christian rather than Muslim. States as a whole, and better educated It has been estimated that in 1970 only 15 than the overall American population as percent of immigrants from the region well. One analysis concludes as follows: were Muslim; the majority were Christians from Lebanon or Christian At the higher end of the education ethnic minorities such as Armenians. By distribution, almost 49 percent of Middle Eastern immigrants have at 2000, almost three-quarters of Middle least a bachelor’s degree compared to Eastern/South Asian immigrants in the only 28 percent of natives; and at the United States were Muslim.55 highest end, 21 percent have a graduate or professional degree, more than Most Muslim immigrants have come to twice the percentage of natives. Overall, the figure shows that the United States for the same reasons as immigrants from the Middle East are the non-Muslims who came before them, better educated than other immigrants namely, to escape ethnic conflict and and natives.56 war. The ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict has led to a large exodus of Palestinians, While the above analysis applies to not all of them Muslim, and some with immigrants from the Middle East, it can Israeli citizenship. Expulsion of South be extended to the Muslim population as Asians from Uganda, Tanzania, and a whole. According to a recent study of Kenya led to the arrival of about 6,000 Muslim voters, two-thirds have obtained Muslims in North America in the 1960s a B.A. degree or higher, and half are and 1970s. Saddam Hussein’s campaign professionals—far higher than the against the Kurds resulted in mass general voter population. It therefore exoduses in 1989, 1991, and 1996. Other follows that their incomes are higher Muslims sought refuge in the United than average and their poverty rates much States after the Iranian Revolution in lower.57 1979, and still others fled civil wars in Pakistan, Lebanon, Somalia, and the In short, the Muslim population of the former Yugoslavia. Indeed, the United United States is very different from States comes closest to representing the comparable populations in Europe as broad range of Islam in the world. well as from other immigrant groups in 110 the United States. American Muslims Chapter II: Islam in the West are, the evidence suggests, much more integrated, successful, and prosperous With Muslim communities in Europe than their coreligionists in Europe, as and the United States now extending was recently asserted by Daniel beyond three generations and practicing Sutherland, officer for civil rights and Muslims having to negotiate modern life civil liberties at the U.S. Department of in the West, there has been much discus- Homeland Security, in his testimony sion of whether a unique version of before the U.S. Senate Committee on Islam, different from that practiced in Homeland Security and Governmental majority Muslim countries, is emerging Affairs.58 They are far more diverse in out of the immigrant experience. This is terms of national origin than Muslim particularly relevant in the context of populations in Europe; they are far women and youth. better educated, too, and—on the whole— have enjoyed socioeconomic success. In Europe, Muslim women are usually depicted either as symbols of tradition or Muslim immigrants are also widely as symbols of change, but North African distributed throughout the United women in France, for example, are States. About a third of the Muslim proving that religious observance and population has settled in California and progress need not be mutually exclusive: New York, with the other two-thirds spread across the country, including a Public opinion is preoccupied by the large concentration in the Detroit area.59 question of the veil and of forced marriage, while these girls are light- The largest growth of Muslims during the years away from all of that. . . . These past decade has been in Virginia.60 Frenchwomen from the Maghreb are everywhere . . . in the universities, Although it is difficult to obtain accurate the civil service—as teachers in statistics on the number of Muslims in primary and secondary schools above all—in the administration, and even Europe and the United States, it seems in the army, even without consid- clear that this number is growing. ering the private sector.61

This emergent “European Islam” also raises questions about new forms of religious observance. Can a new interpretation of Islam, rooted in the West, lead to more effective integration of 111 Western Muslims in their adopted For some countries that had already societies?62 Are there useful compar- adjusted to other minority religions—to isons with the incorporation of other Jews and Catholics in Britain and the religious groups—for example, Jews in United States, and to Catholics in Europe or Catholics in the United Germany—this struggle has been easier. States—in terms of institutions and For others, such as France, that have had practice? more robust public policies of secularism (laïcité), closely held doctrines have come For decades after the arrival of large under question. Then-Interior Minister numbers of Muslims in such countries as Nicolas Sarkozy has suggested revising the France, Britain, Germany, and The basic law of separation of church and Netherlands, the governments of these state in France in order to integrate countries were either indifferent to or Muslim communities more effectively actively engaged in supporting their and give them a greater stake in society.64 religious practice. Received wisdom among Western policy makers was that Efforts to manage Islam in Europe have supporting religious practice would taken on a new urgency as radical Islam discourage radical politics and labor raises new concerns. Because many of the unrest and also possibly encourage recent terrorist attacks in Europe have immigrant workers to return home.63 been perpetrated by young men born, raised, or working in the West, govern- Then, as it became clear that Muslims mental authorities have recognized that were becoming permanent settlers and the struggle against radicalism is also a citizens in the West, policy makers began struggle within Western Islam. For this to struggle with ways to accommodate reason, they have given increased atten- Islamic practice. The most publicized tion to developing cooperative relations conflicts have been those over dress codes with Muslim community organizations. for women in France, Germany, and most recently, Britain. However, other Across Europe, new Islamic councils have issues around Islamic practice have been formed, modeled in many cases on emerged in almost every Western institutions that were developed for other country, from conflicts over ritual minority religions. Although these slaughter and burial grounds throughout councils have focused on managing Europe, to adjustments of the New York religious practice, they have also been City parking calendar for Muslim important interlocutors in such crises as holidays. riots and terrorist attacks. This, for 112 example, was precisely what the French purpose of building a strong French government had in mind when it estab- presence in the Muslim community. As a lished the French Council for the result, the French government subsidized Muslim Religion (CFCM). During the the construction and maintenance of the widespread urban riots in November mosque and combined it with a cultural 2005, the CFCM did indeed play a center to conform with the 1905 law on useful (if somewhat marginal) role in the separation of church and state.66 helping to calm the tense environment.65 In this context, we will further examine The Paris mosque notwithstanding, two questions in detail. First, in what Muslim houses of worship were rare in ways has Islam become a recognized Western countries until 25 years ago. religion in the West, and how has its Even now, there are proportionately far relationship with European states devel- fewer houses of worship for Muslims than oped? Second, how has Islamic practice for Catholics, Protestants, or Jews.67 The adapted to the West? number of mosques, though growing, remains relatively small in France, and is Islam as a Minority Religion in the West roughly mirrored in the United States (see Table 2). As Muslim populations in the West have become larger and more settled during Most of this growth has been within the past four decades, the practice of factories and housing projects that have Islam has simultaneously been influ- small rooms not identifiable as mosques. enced by secular forces in the West and Of the 1,685 Islamic prayer spaces in has also become better established, as France, there are only 20 that can hold measured by the number of mosques. 1,000 or more worshipers, with another 54 that can accommodate between 500 A few mosques have existed in some and 1,000. In contrast, there are about Western countries for many years. The 20,000 churches for a Catholic popula- first significant mosque in Britain was tion of about 25 million.68 built in Cardiff in 1860, and the Grand Mosque of Paris was opened in 1926. There is approximately the same number Officially, the Paris mosque was built as a of prayer spaces in Britain as in France,69 gesture of thanks by the government to and though they serve a much smaller those Muslims who had fought and died community, they are larger and better for France in the First World War, but it established. The number of mosques in was meant to serve the much broader Germany is far greater than anywhere 113 else in Europe, and in proportion to the there is a separation of church and state, size of its community, Muslims are far is different than in countries with estab- better served here than in either the lished churches—Denmark, Norway, United States or France. In the United Britain, Greece, Italy, and Portugal, States, however, the number of mosques where official religion is linked to either is growing, as more affluent Muslim the monarchy or to constitutional immigrants move from cities into the arrangements with a single church—and suburbs. In this way, Muslim immigrants those with recognized, but not officially are following the pattern of other established churches, such as Germany immigrant groups in the United States.70 and Belgium, where official recognition (and subsidies) are generally given to The way Islam is organized in Western numerous churches that fulfill certain countries has generally followed the conditions.71 However, even where there national models of previously integrated is a separation of church and state, the religious groups. Two factors have been very nature of that separation may create important for understanding how this privilege for some religions over others. organization has varied from country to For example, the French law of 1905 country: the historic relationship separating church and state gave the between church and state and the institu- French state ownership of church build- tions that have been created for interac- ings. As a consequence, the state tion between the state and organized maintains these older buildings, but religions. Thus, the organization of cannot pay for the construction of new Islam in countries such as France, religious buildings. Sweden, and the United States, in which

Table 2 Mosques and Prayer Spaces Country Estimated Number of Ratio of Muslim Population Mosques/Prayer Spaces to Mosques/Prayer Spaces United States 1,250 2,400 France 1,685 2,463 United Kingdom 1,669 959 Germany 2,300 1,304

Sources: Estimates from Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Contemporary France, p. 83; and from the Salaam Network, United Kingdom. 114 Countries in the West have also varied with the initiative of African American regard to the kinds of regulatory and Muslims and in accordance with similar consultative organizations they have arrangements made for Jews after the created to mediate between church and Second World War, American schools and state. Unlike Europe, wherein most workplaces have increasingly been recog- countries have at least recognized if not nizing Muslim dress codes, dietary restric- sponsored religious organizations as tions, and holidays since the 1970s.74 intermediaries, in the United States, there has been no state sponsorship of religious Officially there are no U.S. public funds organizations, Islamic or otherwise. available to construct mosques, but there have been documented instances of the The lack of official sponsorship in the use of local government power to help in United States should not be confused this endeavor in Massachusetts and with the political role played by organized California. In Boston, the office of the religion there, particularly at the local mayor subsidized land acquisition for the level. There are well-known affiliations construction of the mosque in West between the Catholic hierarchy and local Roxbury.75 In Fremont, California, the political machines, especially those of the mayor and planning board helped a Democratic Party in the 19th and 20thh Methodist congregation and a Muslim centuries. More recently the alliance masjid overcome homeowner opposition between the Christian Coalition (which to find houses of worship.76 includes conservative Protestant groups as well as Catholic) and the Republican Likewise the separation of church and state Party was a key factor in energizing that in France has not prevented public party and in the realignment of the party financing of religious buildings or system in the 1990s.72 religious education, or the establishment of a representative Muslim council. Moreover, the absence of state sponsor- However, the growing Muslim community ship in the United States does not mean has not benefited from the effective subsi- that religious organizations are not dization granted to established religions by accorded privileges.73 Under specific the 1905 law, which transferred all conditions, they are granted a special tax- churches and synagogues to state control, exempt status. Local governments also permitting their use free of charge.77 implicitly recognize religions by allowing absenteeism from schools and suspending Since 1957, the state has also paid the parking regulations on their holidays. At salaries of teachers in religious schools 115 under contract with the state. About 20 when the government decided to reduce percent of French students attend the foreign influence on the French Catholic schools, a percentage that has Muslim population and create an Islam of been stable for some time although the France. The state-led effort began in number of practicing Catholics has been 1997 and reached fruition in 2003, with declining rapidly. In contrast, the only the creation of the CFCM, the French Muslim school that now has a contract Council for the Muslim Religion. The with the French government is on the general problem for the French state was Indian Ocean island of Réunion. In to bring together three diverse groups— metropolitan France, a small private girls’ the Grand Mosque of Paris, dominated by lycée was founded in 1994 in response to Algerians; the National Federation of the first wave of the foulard problem, after French Muslims (FNMF), dominated by several Muslim girls had been suspended Moroccans; and the Union of Islamic from state lycées for wearing headscarves a Organizations of France (UOIF), few years before. It now has 46 students. dominated by Tunisians and close to the In total, there are now about 200 Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, but students in Muslim schools in France, far financed by the Gulf Emirates. The fewer Muslims than attend Catholic government’s strategy was to attempt to schools. By comparison, a quarter of isolate the UOIF, but when this proved to Jewish students—about 30,000—attended be impossible, then-Interior Minister Jewish schools in 2002.78 Most Muslim Sarkozy negotiated a complicated students in France attend public schools, arrangement that would assure the repre- where they comprise a large percentage of sentation of the broad variety of interests the student body in the “immigrant” that comprised the Muslim religious suburbs of Paris, Lyon, and Marseille. community in France, with the UOIF Although the number of Muslim schools emerging as the dominant force.79 The under contract with the state is expected council played a useful role in the massive to grow in the near future, the vast riots in October-November 2005.80 majority of Muslim students are likely to remain in public schools. While relations between the French government and Muslim religious The 1905 separation of church and state leaders seem to have been improving, the had no impact on existing representative comparatively easy relationship between arrangements that were already in place Islam and the state in the United States with the Protestant and Jewish religious declined after 2001. In reaction, Muslim communities. These were used as a model organizations have increased their role in 116 defending civil rights, much as Catholics Islam in Britain appear to have been and Jews had done in earlier periods.81 easily overcome, although positive state aid plays less of a role than in Germany. Processes of incorporation in other parts Planning permission for mosques has of Europe have been more complicated, not been a problem, and sites for ritual not only because of more stringent slaughter and cemeteries have been regulations, but also because Islam is last routinely granted.84 By the mid-1990s, in line and is seeking incorporation in 15 to 30 Islamic schools were established secularized countries that are less inclined with private funds, and in 1998, the to be sympathetic to religious practice in Labour government approved funding general, although Christian identity is for two state-supported Islamic schools.85 still strong.82 To a much greater degree By 2006, the number had grown to than in the United States, however, seven.86 Nevertheless, in the context of official recognition is a precondition for ongoing security concerns in Britain, it numerous rights and benefits in Europe. has become clear that any future growth of public funding for this purpose is In Germany, for example, recognized likely to be highly scrutinized. religions have a right to government assistance through tax money. In addition, they Religious Practice have the right to run hospitals, nursing homes, and day care centers, as well as It is useful to compare Islam in the West assistance programs of various kinds. They with other religions, both in terms of are also represented on government boards belief and identity, as well as observance. and are permitted to conduct religious Identification with Christian faiths in education in public schools. The Western Europe has been waning over the Coordination Council of Muslims in past several decades, but remains Germany (KRM), an umbrella association somewhat higher than actual religious of Muslim groups formed in April 2007, practice. In major European countries, aims to achieve official recognition of Islam no more than 10 percent of the adult so that Muslims in Germany can claim population attends church regularly, these legal advantages.83 although a much larger percentage (60- 70 percent in Britain and France) Unlike Germany, Britain has an officially identify as Christian. Two decades ago, established religion—Christianity—and large numbers of nonpracticing in that sense, the state is not neutral. Christians regularly attended church on Nevertheless, the barriers to recognizing major holidays; today, church attendance 117 is limited to life-cycle events, but here, 65 percent of the French population that too, attendance is declining.87 identifies as Catholic and 28 percent as of “no religion.”90 The basic pattern of As in Europe, Christian identification in the regular mosque attendance is also similar to United States has been declining. In 2001, that of Catholics in France. A survey showed 76.5 percent of American adults over 18 that 22 percent of those from Muslim (159 million people) identified themselves as countries in Africa and Turkey attended Christian, a decline from 86.2 percent a mosque at least once a month, compared decade earlier; this decline is identical to with 18 percent of their Catholic counter- that observed in Canada between 1981 and parts.91 Government services estimate that 2001.88 The level of Christian identity in the the figures for Muslims are considerably United States is somewhat higher than in lower than that, even as low as 5 percent.92 France or Germany (65-68 percent) and about the same as in the United Kingdom However, recent data also indicate that, (72 percent). by various measures, commitment to Islam has been growing among younger As for observance, it has been estimated generations born in France. Compared that about 40 percent of Americans to a decade ago, more Muslims in the attend church at least once a week, 20-29 age cohort agree that religion is although some studies have argued that “more important” in their lives, and far this is exaggerated and the real figure is fewer declare the “no religion” option. half of that.89 Whatever the real figures, In addition, as they have aged, formerly church attendance among Christians in less observant young people declare the United States is significantly higher themselves to be more observant. Finally, than in countries in Western Europe and these patterns of religious commitment the decline has been far slower. have been more pronounced among young women. This has not meant, Muslim populations in the West clearly however, that the French Muslim differ in both identity and practice from community is now more insular. There is Christians, but many of their religious little opposition to mixed marriage, for characteristics are similar. In France, 59 instance, particularly for men.93 percent of the population who originated in the Muslim countries of Africa and Turkey It is difficult to know to what extent this self-identify as Muslim (66 percent of French pattern is typical of other countries North Africans), while 20 percent say they in Europe. Data on mosque attendance have no religion. This compares with about are difficult to obtain and are often 118 unreliable,94 but comparative estimates of in the United States.101 There was consid- church/mosque affiliation rates from erable discussion about this subject at the country to country (where they exist) are time that France passed its law banning often the same or about the same for the hijab in public schools in 2003, and mosques and Christian churches in much of it centered on the need for Europe and in the United States.95 In the young girls to resist familial pressure to United States, mosque attendance appears dress in traditional ways. There is now to be lower among Muslim voters than the considerable evidence of pressure and American average for church attendance, even violence against young women within and the rate of nonattendance appears to Muslim communities in France and other be higher.96 Interestingly, though, more Western countries,102 but anecdotal than two-thirds of Muslims in the United evidence suggests that this movement States claim to pray daily.97 This toward conservative dress also represents a percentage is higher among women and generational rebellion against the West by increases substantially among young young Muslim girls. It is unclear if this people.98 Levels of mosque involvement tendency represents a religious revival or indicated by a 2006 survey are consider- an assertion of identity,103 particularly ably lower than those indicated in 2001.99 since it has been occurring outside the confines of the mosque. Studies of various aspects of piety—from belief in God to prayer—show that To reiterate, there have been clear indica- expressions of piety are surprisingly high tions that patterns of religious practice among European Christians and higher among Muslims in Europe have generally among Americans, and that this kind of paralleled those of the larger societies in piety is typically somewhat higher among the countries where these communities Muslims. However, what seems to differ- have taken root. However, new patterns of entiate Muslim and Christian religious observance among a younger generation commitment most clearly in the West is of Muslims, often related to assertions of the behavior of the younger generation. identity, have raised new issues in the process of integration. Many studies have focused on the question of the re-Islamization of Chapter III: Incorporation and younger generations of Muslims born in Integration Europe, and there seems to be little doubt that this process has taken root Scholars and policy makers agree that throughout Western Europe,100 as well as there have been important failures in 119 integrating successive generations of numbers of immigrants—mostly Irish Muslims in the West. Yet there is and German—who started arriving in the disagreement over the meaning of early 19th century and because of the integration itself, which has varied hierarchical nature of the religion. Full between countries and changed over time integration, marked by the election of a in response to historical processes of Catholic president, was not achieved immigration. Discussions have focused until the mid-20th century. Likewise, on the degree to which conformity to a Judaism was problematic for the United national community model is expected States and for countries in Western from and/or imposed on immigrants. Europe, where Eastern European immigrants started arriving in the late Two dimensions are important in under- 19th and early 20th centuries. Jews had standing how immigrants have negotiated to contend with a deep history of anti- communal boundaries within different Semitism in Europe and found that their countries: the rigidity of boundaries practice challenged not only religious between the “ins” and the “outs” and the values on both sides of the Atlantic, but permeability of these boundaries. In also emerging secular values in Europe. highly defined “Jacobin” models, typified by France, the boundaries are firm, but As questions of religious expression have may be crossed without either insiders or been confounded with those of class and outsiders having to change their basic race, there is a growing awareness that a identities. In multicultural models, high proportion of young Muslims, men typified by the United States (and in particular, have been economically formerly The Netherlands), overlapping and educationally marginalized. Except memberships and collective identities in the United States, a third generation blur these boundaries, often leading to of Western-born Muslims has experi- greater inclusion or exclusion.104 enced high levels of rejection, one often- cited measure of which is discrimination The integration of immigrant religions in employment and housing.105 Limited has always been difficult in the West, and studies on the subject are inconclusive Islam is the latest in a line of successive about whether discrimination is related challenges to the existing order. to ethnicity or religious background, or Catholicism called into question the both. But despite two directives enacted dominant Protestantism of the United by the European Union in 2003 and States and proved to be very difficult to requiring all member states to imple- integrate, both because of the large ment rules for equal treatment on a 120 variety of grounds including race and Models of Integration religion,106 there is still a widespread belief among Muslim youth that they Countries in the West appear to be continue to be targets of discrimination. committed to very different approaches to integrating their immigrant popula- A high level of unemployment persists tions, with variance seen in the use of among European Islamic communities state institutions to promote integration, and among youth in particular. In the kinds of policies pursued, and the France, follow-up reports on the 2005 assumptions that inform these policies. riots indicated that 95 percent of the rioters were French citizens, two-thirds The most explicit process seems to be the of whom were of immigrant origin. French Jacobin model, which is often What all the rioters had in common was misunderstood as a coherent government youth, a high level of unemployment, program for integration. In fact, it has and limited future prospects for socio- been more of an orientation—what one economic advancement.107 Muslim scholar has called a “public philos- youth unemployment rates are generally ophy”111—toward how public policy double those of the national average in should be used. The details of this countries of high unemployment, such orientation have become clearer as its as France,108 and sometimes more than assumptions have been challenged by the twice as high, as in Britain.109 One study most recent waves of immigration. In from 1999 ranked three countries with principle, the French state only recog- relatively low overall unemployment— nizes collective ethnic and religious Denmark, The Netherlands, and identities for very limited purposes (the Sweden—as the OECD countries with aforementioned religious council, for the worst record for employing example) and instead provides “color- immigrants.110 It is not surprising, blind” public support—and recognition— then, that the unrest of Muslim youth for individual advancement. In other has been seen as a manifestation of a words, the French State does not engage new class politics and is not well under- in “positive discrimination” to remedy stood by traditional interlocutors such past discrimination or permit the census as trade unions and political parties of to count those who are defined as the left. “minorities” in the British context. The census differentiates only between French citizens and immigrants—those people born abroad, legally resident in 121 France but without French citizenship— Fundamental debate (1958-63). . . . but does not differentiate people in (iii) political consensus (1965 to the terms of race and religious affiliation. present), when the front benches of the two major parties developed a The expectation is that immigrants will new consensus, politically arrived at, conform to French cultural and legal to depoliticize race once again.114 norms and accept that common public spaces are not venues for religious The British Race Relations Act of 1965 expression.112 was a consensus approach to immigration, race, and multiculturalism. The act In contrast, the American multicultural made written or spoken expressions of model recognizes collective identities as a hatred on the grounds of color, race, or basis for public policy, leading to wide- ethnic/national origins (“expressive spread ethnic lobbying. The United States racism”) subject to prosecution. It also emerged from the civil rights movement made discrimination in public places of the 1960s with far-reaching legislation unlawful (“access racism”) and estab- in support of a variety of ethnic, religious, lished a Race Relations Board to receive and language expressions. This was and manage complaints. markedly different from the more assim- ilationist “Americanization” approach it Subsequent extensions in 1968 and 1976 to had adopted in the early part of the 20th include housing and employment widened century, which had left far less room for the scope of this act, as did the strength- expressions of diversity.113 ened powers of the Race Relations Board (now the Commission for Racial Equality), The British approach to integration, which enabled it to investigate discrimina- while also multicultural, is different tion even without complaints.115 from the American model in that it is based on race: From the 1950s onward, British political debates about immigration applied [T]he central dynamic of British elite the distinction of “race” to New reaction to Third World migration has been an attempt to structure the Common-wealth immigrants, primarily politics of race to take race out of those from Pakistan and India (as conventional politics. Seen in these opposed to those from Canada, terms, the attempt to produce a Australia, and New Zealand). This view coherent politics (or non-politics) of of “colored” immigrants was essentially race has passed through three . . . distinct stages: (i) pre-political similar to those in France or Germany; the difference was in the formal policy 122 consensus (1948-61). . . . (ii) framework that was developed to incor- through which Dutch society had been porate them: organized hierarchically and power shared through the political party system.118 The emphasis on assimilation was . . . Pillarization has been described as rapidly abandoned in favour of “good race relations,” namely . . . a differentiation within society peaceful coexistence through toler- whereby the population is divided into ance, diversity and pluralism. There ideologically based social segments is an obvious contradiction between each with its own schools, political the belief in stringent immigration parties, broadcasting organizations, control and in diversity as newspapers, hospitals etc. It is a vertical contributing ipso facto to social differentiation running through all of order, but the compromise was the social classes . . . During the first 116 driven by party-political necessity. half of the 20th century, Dutch society was divided into a Roman Catholic In France, this kind of pluralism, often “pillar,” a Protestant “pillar,” which called “insertion” (for example, by the was further divided internally, and a 119 Commission de la nationalité, Etre neutral “pillar.” français aujourd’hui et demain, cited above), was seen as a substitute for full participa- Although the minorities policy was tion in society and rejected. inspired by this heritage, the key objective was integration into the dominant norms In The Netherlands, legislation in 1983 and values. Recent research argues that established a network of multicultural while the heritage of pillarization facili- programs to integrate Muslims while tated the establishment of religious schools encouraging them to retain their cultural and mosques, pillarization had little to do identities. The goal was to create a multi- with the minorities policy itself, which was 120 cultural society “in which immigrants, oriented toward integration. individually and as a group, would enjoy equal rights and opportunities with the By the early 1990s it became clear that native population.”117 Thus, immigrants there was a growing gap between the would be accepted as separate groups that policy and the objective, as the minorities would retain their cultural identities and policy was seen as having marginalized would be supported by publicly financed Muslims instead of bringing them into 121 communal institutions. the economic mainstream. A decade before Pim Fortuyn exploded on the This “minorities policy” was derived from scene, Dutch governments had begun to the long tradition of “pillarization” move sharply away from the multicultural 123 model.122 In much the same way as the different from their intended goals.125 Dutch minorities policy had appeared to France, for example, has dealt with and be the leading edge of a European supported immigrants as groups,126 while movement toward integration in the Britain and The Netherlands have 1980s, the breakdown of that policy increasingly limited their acceptance of served as a powerful symbol of its failure. multiculturalism.127

Nevertheless, the minorities policy was Understandings of integration models arguably more successful in promoting often ignore the evolution of public integration than is generally acknowl- philosophy and policy over time. edged. What finally appeared to under- Philosophies are finally altered when they mine it was less socioeconomic failure are challenged by empirical data and by than the value gap between a majority the contradictions of the very policies they population that agreed on certain are supposed to describe.128 Moreover, progressive values and a minority such models often fail to appreciate how Muslim population that challenged the the process of integration itself has altered consensus. These days, far from what it means to be a native of the host encouraging pluralist concepts of country, resulting in what one scholar has citizenship, “the Dutch have become called “negotiated identities.”129 less willing to make room for cultural differences.”123 A Crisis of Integration?

These various understandings of how Each of the aforementioned models is immigrants are incorporated into host perceived to have failed in particular societies are based on what Theodore ways. The British model has made it Lowi has called a “public philosophy,” a more difficult to handle questions of model that colors, shapes, and justifies discrimination against religion as state formation of public policy.124 There opposed to race,130 although it has been is often a wide gap, however, between far more effective than others in dealing stated public philosophies and policy on with discrimination in general.131 the ground. Belgian political sociologist In contrast, the French model has failed Marco Martiniello notes that deviation to adequately manage problems of from any public philosophy is inevitable, employment, discrimination, and urban and that both integrationist and alienation, which are widely understood multiculturalist policies can and have to have been at the root of the 2005 been applied in ways that are quite riots. A year later, the French govern- 124 ment had yet to develop an acceptable Whether or not integration has plan to address discrimination against succeeded in the West may be less impor- “suburban” youth applying for jobs and tant than a growing perception that it has had only just begun to formulate policy failed.138 After all, it is such perceptions approaches to a host of other problems that have fed the support for extreme such as educational attainment and the right parties in France, Belgium, Austria, inflexibility of the job market.132 Local Switzerland, Denmark, and Italy. governments and private employers, Perhaps more telling, by the fall of 2006, however, have been particularly active in leftist Prime Minister Tony Blair had developing initiatives to deal with joined a growing wave of criticism of employment and discrimination in the British integration policy. In the guise of “sensitive” suburbs since then.133 questioning whether the full-face veil is a “mark of separation,” he said, “People Integrating Muslim youth has been far want to know that the Muslim community less problematic in the United States. In in particular, but actually all minority part, this is related to the class structure communities, have got the balance right of Muslims who have immigrated there between integration and multicultur- during the past few decades134 and in part alism.”139 The minicrisis in Britain has to the relative openness of the economy provoked similar reactions in other and society. Things began to change after European countries, including Italy and the first attack on the World Trade The Netherlands.140 Center in 1993, however, and worsened after the second attack in 2001. There The success of integration in the West has have been widespread detentions of varied considerably and unexpectedly. For young people thought to be Muslim, example, two measures of integration— largely based on questionable ethnic attitudes toward intermarriage and polit- profiling.135 Not surprisingly, more than ical commitment—indicate that French 40 percent of Muslim respondents in policy has been more effective than is 2006 answered affirmatively to the generally acknowledged.141 Only 15 question, “Have you ever felt discrimi- percent of French Muslim immigrants nated against or profiled?”136 By other would disapprove of the marriage of a son measures—voting, associational member- and 32 percent that of a daughter to a ships, and manifestations of patriotism— non-Muslim; about the same percentage however, American Muslims appear to be of a general sample would oppose the even more committed to core U.S. values marriage of a child to a Muslim. Among than most Americans.137 French citizens of immigrant origin, 125 higher percentages than among a general Jytte Klausen’s study of Muslim elites in sample think that democracy is working Europe indicates a similar pattern. She well and that it would be terrible to has developed a typology of four prefer- suppress political parties or the National ences as modes of integration for Muslim Assembly. A far larger percentage, though populations: still a minority, express confidence that they can change things in the country— Secular Integrationist: respondents although the percentage not registered to believe that Islam is compatible with Western value and that the organiza- vote (23 percent) is more than three times tion of Islamic practice should be the national average.142 integrated into existing frameworks of church-state relations. Among immigrant groups in Europe, Neo-Orthodox: respondents believe French people who identify as Muslim that Islam is not compatible and appear to be the most “European” in terms should not be integrated into existing of their identity and compatibility with frameworks. national customs. As a minority commu- Voluntarist: respondents believe that nity, they have the most positive views of Islam is compatible in terms of values, but should not be integrated their Christian and Jewish compatriots and into existing frameworks. are among the least sympathetic to radical respondents believe that 143 Anticlerical: Islam. They are also by far the most Islam is not compatible in terms of supportive of the idea that there is no values, but should be integrated into conflict between Islam and modern society. existing church-state relations.144

Table 3 Muslims in Europe: Attitudes Toward Identity, Fellow Citizens, and Modernity

No conflict Consider Muslims in between being yourself first: your country Positive Positive a devout Muslim a citizen of want to adopt views of views of and living in your country/ national Christians Jews modern society Muslim customs

French Muslims 91% 71% 72% 42%/46% 78% British Muslims 71 32 49 7/81 41 Spanish Muslims 82 28 71 3/89 53 German Muslims 69 38 57 13/66 38

Sources: Pew Research Center, “The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other” (Washington, DC: Pew Global Attitude Project, June 22, 2006), pp. 3, 11-12; and “Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns About Religious and Cultural Identity” (Washington, DC: Pew Global Attitude Project, July 6, 2006). 126 The responses of Muslim elites by country These survey results reiterate that among are indicated in Table 4. The two most immigrants of Islamic origin in Europe, strikingly different patterns are those of the those in France have the strongest French and the British subsamples, each of national identity and are most inclined which overwhelmingly fits into a single toward integration. It is likely, therefore, category. While the support of French that the sense of alienation manifested in Muslims for “secular integration” largely the 2005 riots was less a rejection of conforms to French norms on church- French society than a demand for greater state relations, their strong support for integration. One reaction among youth “voluntarist” policies indicates a distrust of in riot-affected suburbs was a surge in the state but an acceptance of the compati- voter registration.145 Intellectuals and the bility of French and Islamic values. It is also government also reacted with a practical worth noting that the French sample has move away from Jacobin integration and the lowest “neo-orthodox” response of all toward a focus on questions of discrimi- the European groups. nation and employment that is more typical of multiculturalism. In contrast, the support of British Muslims for the “neo-orthodox” pattern Perhaps the greatest challenge posed by indicates their strong sense of isolation failures to integrate Muslims in the West from British norms and makes the is the immediate threat of radicalized United Kingdom different from every Islam. Since the attacks of September 11, other country in the study. 2001, government distrust of Islamic

Table 4 Policy Choice for Integration of Muslim Elites, by Country of Residence

Denmark Sweden France Germany The Netherlands U.K. Total %%%%% %% Secular Integrationist 20.8 37.5 60.0 25.0 13.6 10.7 23.5 Voluntarist 33.3 37.5 30.0 30.6 59.1 17.9 33.8 Anticlericals 33.3 12.5 0.0 22.2 9.1 0.0 14.7 Neo-Orthodox 12.5 12.5 10.0 22.2 18.2 71.4 27.9 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: Jytte Klausen,The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 95. 127 communities in the West has been differentials in life chances that exist tempered by the realization that the between majority and minority.”147 struggle against radicalism must be aided Representation also gives immigrants a by cooperation with these same commu- voice in the distribution of public goods nities. Thus, efforts to develop programs and clout within the communities in against discrimination were given a new which they live. Finally, by achieving impetus and were directly connected with elective office, immigrant groups gain domestic security. These programs will access to patronage from civil servants and be discussed in greater detail in chapters influence over the decisions they make. 4 and 5 of this paper. Irish Americans offer a compelling historical example of successful political Politics and Integration integration; they used their leadership of the reigning Democratic Party to bring One of the most significant failures of about massive municipal employment of integration in Europe has been the their coethnics a century ago.148 relegation of Muslim populations to the edge of the political process. Studies indicate the failure of both the Understanding immigrant populations French left and the right to make much as potential voters—and candidates—has effort to mobilize immigrant voters and policy implications as well as organiza- potential voters. In 2004, there were tional consequences for political parties. barely 1,000 municipal councillors of Yet European political parties have barely non-European origin (less than 1 attempted to address issues that percent) in France, a drop from 3 immigrants consider to be important, percent in larger towns between 1995 and nor have they integrated new ethnic 2001; this percentage did not rise in populations into their organizational Marseille and Paris, cities with a greater structures and their processes for concentration of immigrants. There was selecting candidates.146 better representation among regional councillors (2.6 percent) and among As Richard Alba and Nancy Foner have deputies in the European Parliament noted, election of immigrant candidates (almost 4 percent), but both of these to political office is a measure of their institutions are relatively marginal in integration “in the same sense that entry terms of their decision making.149 On by minority individuals into high-status the national level, there were no ethnic occupations is. It is an indication of a minority representatives in the French diminishment, however modest, in National Assembly, the directly elected 128 lower house of parliament, although in representation of immigrant groups on September 2004 two French women of local councils has been considerably lower Muslim origin, Alima Boumediene- in Britain than in France, relative to the Thiery and Bariza Khiari, were elected to size of the voting population. Where there the Sénat, the indirectly elected and less are concentrations of immigrant groups, prominent upper house of parliament. however, British Muslims have been far more successful in winning local office Research by Romain Garbaye suggests than their French counterparts. In the that the reluctance to name minority London boroughs, 10.6 percent of the candidates in France has been related to local councillors in 2001 were ethnic pressure from the National Front,150 but minorities. In all of the British towns another study by the same author attrib- where ethnic minorities exceeded 10 utes the relative success of the northern percent, the community from the Indian town of Roubaix in electing an unusually subcontinent achieved a position close to high percentage of minority candidates parity and exceeded parity in more than a to party weakness and the strength of quarter of these towns.153 community organizations.151 The French Socialist Party, in comparison with the Representation at the national parlia- British Labour Party, for example, has mentary level, however, has been far less been less inclined to see immigrant impressive. In 2004, 15 minority voters as a political resource, in part members of Parliament were elected to because decisions on candidates are made the House of Commons (2.4 percent). beyond the neighborhood level and are This is about a third of what we might often dictated by national priorities. expect in proportion to the population, but it is significant. Since no minority In contrast to France and the United candidate was elected in France in 2002, States, immigrants from the NCW in the comparison is relatively favorable, Britain are part of the electorate as soon but it is about half that of the United as they establish residency in the United States, where Hispanics comprise 23 Kingdom, as was noted earlier. At about members of the House of Representatives 6.6 percent of the electorate, over 80 (5.3 percent) and three members of the percent of immigrant minorities are in Senate (3 percent). the electorate, compared to only about half in France (2.7 percent of the Unlike France—where, as we have seen, electorate—based on census data).152 Alba local level recruitment is an exception and and Foner have observed that the overall has been attributed to party decentraliza- 129 tion and weakness—the relative success of second generation. Young Muslims, in immigrant candidates in the United particular, tend to support smaller parties Kingdom is related to the ward-based and the right.156 system of candidate designation in the Labour Party. This system simultaneously There are no studies of Muslim represen- empowers local ethnic politicians and tation (as opposed to overall minority accentuates the advantage of concentrated representation) in the United States, but ethnic votes in a single member district. there are other significant indications of Muslim political integration. Unlike their While the local political influence of European counterparts, a slightly higher immigrant voters in the United than average proportion of Muslim voters Kingdom can be transferred to national in the United States claims to vote candidates through the Labour Party, regularly. In addition, reported associa- there is no evidence that minority repre- tional membership among Muslims is far sentation has influenced Labour or higher than average.157 Both tendencies Conservative policies that are important may be related to the higher educational to immigrants.154 attainment among American Muslims. Like comparable voters in Europe, most To the extent immigrants are understood American Muslim voters also show strong as a political resource rather than a support for the leftist Democratic Party. challenge to identity, representation is a Several support no party at all, however, reasonable index of how much they are and in this regard they mirror the mobilized for electoral purposes, generally “independent” tendency of the rest of by political parties, but also by community the American electorate. organizations. Self-identified Muslims, cross-nationally, tend to vote overwhelm- Chapter IV: The Question of Security ingly for the left, but the level of voter registration of Muslims in Europe tends During the past 25 years, Muslims in the to be far lower than the remainder of the West—and young Muslims in particular— population.155 French data indicates that have been carefully scrutinized in matters the left cannot take the Muslim vote for of domestic and transnational security. granted, however. Sylvain Brouard and In Europe, the tendency to view Muslim Vincent Tiberj’s study notes that, while populations through the lens of security there is immense support for the left can be traced to the outbreaks of urban among first-generation immigrants, this unrest by some first-generation Muslim support is considerably smaller among the immigrants in several cities in Britain 130 and France in the early 1980s. These localities, particularly those controlled by riots were a factor in the action by a the left, were no longer able to deal with number of European countries to estab- the very real problems of ethnic incorpo- lish an institutional framework to address ration and education or to handle the issues of integration. outbreak of riots. Urban violence stigma- tized those areas in which young Muslims Urban riots in the Lyon region during the were concentrated as “sensitive suburbs,” summer of 1981 impelled the creation of which, in turn, reinforced the impression the French Inter-ministerial Commission of Islamic populations as outsiders, even on the Social Development of though by the 1990s they were no longer Neighborhoods and the Commission of just immigrants but also third-generation Mayors on Security. The Neighborhoods settlers in France.160 Commission recommended more long- term national support for efforts to The first manifestation of civil unrest in address security problems at the local level. Britain after World War II was in 1948- As periodic urban riots have continued 49 in Liverpool, Deptford, and then over more than two decades, French Birmingham. But the first serious riots authorities have sought intermediaries were in 1958 in Nottingham and Notting among the second generation of Muslim Hill in London. Subsequently, riots have immigrants158 and have supported ethnic erupted in major British cities with high associations they felt could maintain social concentrations of immigrant popula- order. A Senate report on the Lyon region tions at roughly the same intervals as in in 1993 noted as follows: France—1981, 1991-92, and 2001. British riots have had many of the same Certain mayors are, alas!, ready to characteristics as those in France, except provide everything to prevent cars that they have been more violent. The from burning in their towns. The public powers give in to the blackmail political consequences in the two of the fundamentalists, who present countries, however, have been quite themselves as the social actors who are different. The reaction of French best able to preserve order in difficult authorities to the first urban riots in neighborhoods where no policeman Lyon in 1981 was to frame the problem in dares to venture.159 terms of social control and education; the British saw the 1958 riots in terms of After the early 1980s, the central govern- race relations, the solution for which they ment became increasingly involved in local thought was to limit immigration and efforts to manage security in part because prevent a “British Little Rock.”161 131 Both the French and British approaches other, security services needed the were rooted in a need to maintain public cooperation of Muslim communities to order: “For [then-British Home Secretary effectively anticipate and investigate Sir Frank] Soskice, race relations legisla- possible terrorist incidents. tion was in large part related to concerns of public order, a lesson first learned by Robert Leiken, in an article in Foreign the [Labour] party in 1958.”162 By 1965, Affairs, characterizes the European Labour was able to get the Tory opposition approach to terrorism as soft (and is to agree to this strategic formulation. Race particularly critical of the British): relations became the core of the British policy on integration that was ultimately With a few exceptions, European applied to Muslim communities. Indeed, authorities shrink from the relatively stout legislative and security measures this approach endured and was strength- adopted in the United States. They ened even after three additional rounds of prefer criminal surveillance and serious riots between 1981 and 2001, as traditional prosecutions to launching well as the attacks on the London under- a U.S.-style “war on terrorism” and ground in July 2005. Although quite mobilizing the military, establishing detention centers, enhancing border different from that of the French, the security, requiring machine- British approach also set apart Muslim readable passports, expelling hate communities as “racial minorities,” preachers, and lengthening notori- subject to special scrutiny. The meaning of ously light sentences for convicted 163 this segregation became more evident in terrorists. both countries as the issue of internal security began to merge with that of Yet as we will see, British and French terrorism and external security. antiterrorist strategies have been robust for some time, perhaps more so than For France and Britain, the fight against those of the United States. international terrorism goes back to the 1970s and ’80s. In each case, it was France conceived and eventually institutional- ized as a domestic problem, and this France developed its present approach to understanding seriously affected terrorism after a series of attacks in the relations with the domestic Muslim early 1980s indicated that the earlier communities. On the one hand, young policy—dubbed the “sanctuary doctrine” men of Islamic origin were regularly by the French government—was producing targeted for special surveillance. On the more violence than security. Until then, 132 French authorities had concentrated their from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and considerable efforts on combating increased the administrative capabilities homegrown terrorism of the anarchist of the Ministries of the Interior and left, as well as regional separatist groups in Justice, which effectively coordinated the Brittany, the Basque area, and, above all, various intelligence and police Corsica. The French counterespionage agencies.165 Under the new legislation, service (the SDECE) and the agency for the fight against terrorism was centralized internal surveillance (the DST) had exten- in a core group of juges d’instruction (inves- sive experience in dealing with domestic tigating magistrates) in Paris, who took terrorism—from the Algerian revolt of both the judicial and investigative lead in 1954-62 that was played out on the streets the French struggle with terrorism for of Paris, to assassinations in the 1980s by the next 20 years. the anarchist group Action Directe, to separatist violence in Corsica—but no Under subsequent legislation passed in organizational means for dealing with 1986, 1995, and 1996, these investigating international terrorism. magistrates gained tools that are similar to, if less draconian than, those devel- The sanctuary doctrine—which presumed oped at the same time in Britain: that international terrorism was a foreign permission to stop and frisk in routine policy problem, rather than a law investigations and to detain suspects enforcement one—created an exchange without charge for up to four days in of sanctuary for an understanding that terror-related cases. The 1996 legislation acts of terrorism would not be perpe- recognized “conspiracy to commit trated in France or against French inter- terrorism” as a crime, giving investi- ests.164 The presumption was that, at its gating magistrates considerable power to core, the prevention of terrorism prevent acts from ever occurring. In depended on diplomacy. A change in addition, juges d’instruction could order policy finally came after 14 attacks in preventive detention for long periods 1986 by a variety of groups based in the once suspects were under judicial investi- Middle East, 12 of them by one previ- gation—some defendants spent up to ously unknown group, provoked the four years in prison before their trial French government to rethink its after a 1994 roundup.166 During the approach to terrorism. worst of the Algerian civil war, which again reached Paris, there were major The 1986 Law Relative to the Struggle roundups of Algerians in France in 1993, against Terrorism refocused efforts away 1994, 1995, and 1998. In each case, the 133 roundups far exceeded the number issue a list of proscribed organizations finally held over for trial.167 and to penalize anyone belonging to them, supporting them with financial The oft-cited virtues of this system are its and other means, or even wearing clothes specialization, centralization, flexibility, and symbols that could be linked to these coordination, and political independence. organizations. It also gave police the Its virtues, however, are also its problems, power to detain people judged to be since there is no political and little judicial threatening for up to seven days without oversight. Decisions by key magistrates, an arrest warrant and without any charge such as the preeminent antiterror judge being brought against them. Finally, it Jean-Louis Bruguière, are difficult to allowed authorities to exclude people question, as is police action.168 Moreover, from entering Britain, including citizens there is no discernible boundary between and residents who lived abroad. external and internal security. The effect of the merging of the two has been to subject The IRA was the only proscribed organi- young French Muslims to endless surveil- zation named under the act at first, but lance. Laurent Bonelli documents a full the list was expanded to include other range of legal police activity that targets militant organizations engaged in violent young people in the working-class suburbs, struggles, including those on the loyalist Muslims in particular.169 side in the conflict over Northern Ireland. Initially viewed as a temporary Britain measure, the Prevention of Terrorism Act was renewed each year and modified In Britain, the campaign against in 1978, 1984, and 1989. Most of its terrorism has always been domestic. The major provisions were finally incorpo- primary heritage of the troubles in rated into the Terrorism Act 2000, Northern Ireland is an accumulation of although some of the exclusion and broad powers of arrest and detention that internment-without-trial provisions apply to all residents of the United were dropped, at least until 2001. Kingdom. In 1974, reacting to a wave of Irish Republican Army (IRA) violence Home Office reports indicate that several throughout the year, the Labour govern- hundred people are stopped and ment rushed the Prevention of examined each year, very few of whom are Terrorism Act through Parliament soon formally charged. Although the number of after the October elections. The new act actual detainees fell each year during the gave the home secretary the power to 1990s, the number of those examined for 134 suspected involvement with international States, was not a sharp break with the terrorism grew each year, indicating a shift previous legislation, but its changes were away from the Irish problem.170 important because of their impact on immigrants and immigration. A key The Terrorism Act 2000 extended police consequence of the legislation was to stop-and-frisk powers and elaborated a further separate citizens from foreign list of 14 organizations involved in the residents; indeed the focus was on struggle for Ireland. In February 2001, foreign residents. Continuing the however, Home Secretary Jack Straw pattern begun in 1974, foreign residents requested that 21 “international groups” who were dubbed “suspected terrorists” be added to the list, which grew to 25 by could be detained without trial or appeal. September; 18 of these proscribed They could even be deported, unless the organizations were Islamic.171 Home Office decided they were likely to be victims of human rights violations by A year before the attack on the World their “home” governments. If deporta- Trade Center, British policy had already tion was not possible, foreign residents been reoriented toward transnational could now be jailed indefinitely. This terrorism in ways that heightened police necessitated that Britain opt out of powers and restricted civil liberties; Article 5 of the European Convention on perhaps more important, this legislation Human Rights, which prohibits impris- was no longer deemed temporary. A onment without trial. It was the only report on its operation indicated that signatory to opt out and did so by between January and the end of August declaring a “state of emergency,” 2001, only 12 of the 30 arrests under the permitted by the treaty in case of public act were related to Irish terrorism.172 More emergency or war. In the long run, the frequent targets were immigrant residents derogation of Article 5 proved to be a and British Muslim citizens. The crucial obstacle to the enforcement of the measures in place by 2000 were so exten- 2001 legislation. In December 2004, sive that in a variety of reports issued by the British High Court—the Law Lords— European and international organiza- found that the antiterrorism law was a tions, Britain ranked as one of the most breach of fundamental human rights, repressive countries in Europe.173 essentially rejecting the opt-out that had been written into the law. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Emergency Act 2001, passed in The solution to the court’s challenge, reaction to the attacks in the United however, created additional problems 135 for Muslim communities in Britain. 2006, the British Security Service (MI5) The government proposed new legisla- disclosed that it had about 1,200 “Islamic tion that finally replaced indefinite militants” under surveillance, that they detention with limited but renewable were engaged in an “unprecedented” 70 judicially controlled detention under separate terrorism investigations, and that “control orders”—a form of house the number was accelerating.174 As the arrest—for citizens and foreigners alike. focus of the fight against terrorism As a result, the Prevention of Terrorism shifted from the IRA to homegrown Act 2005 sought to correct the act of Islamic terrorism, police powers 2001 by making what was unacceptable increased, and the boundaries between against foreigners applicable to all issues of domestic security and terrorism suspects. became less clear.

The most recent British legislation, the The United States Prevention of Terrorism Act 2006, was passed in the aftermath of the July 2005 How can we compare what has happened attacks in London. It granted the home in Britain and France with what has secretary power to proscribe new groups, happened in the United States? On the including those thought to glorify one hand, because urban violence in the terrorism, and expanded the number of United States has not involved Muslim criminal offenses to include participa- communities as it has in Europe, the tion in acts deemed as preparatory to issue of terrorism has not been merged terrorism, incitement or encouragement with that of domestic security, although of terrorism, dissemination of terrorist there have been security issues involving publications, and presence at terrorist the black Muslim community, which has training locations. It also extended the come under frequent surveillance and powers of the police to search property detention. On the other hand, after and detain suspects for up to 28 days, 2001, the civil liberties of all Muslims in though detentions of more than two days the United States have become less secure had to be sanctioned by judicial and arguably far less secure than those of authority. other American citizens or residents.175

While it is not yet clear how these extensive Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act in powers will be used, they tend to further 2001, the U.S. approach to domestic antagonize relations between alienated terrorism was defined by the reaction to Muslim youth and the police. In July the 1993 bombing of the World Trade 136 Center in New York, which in turn instead been infiltrating those that were extended changes that had taken place a considered “subversive.” The 9/11 decade before as a result of investigations Commission Report argues, however, that by into the Watergate scandal. Both the FBI the 1990s, these governmental activities and the CIA were reorganized in ways had been curtailed by legislation as well as that made their separate missions less by court decisions and had no impact on distinct, but domestic terrorism never Muslim organizational life in the United became a priority for either. Although States. All of this changed in 2001. the counterterrorism budget of the FBI tripled in the mid-1990s, spending The primary changes in the United States remained constant between 1998 and after the attacks of September 11 have 2001. As the report of the 9/11 been legislative and organizational, but Commission indicated, “in 2000, there the application of executive powers to the were still twice as many agents devoted to war on terrorism has constructed a far- drug enforcement as to counter- reaching system that is largely outside of terrorism.”176 For the CIA, counterter- the legislative purview. One result has rorism appears to have become a priority been the activation of judicial oversight in 1997, with the appointment of George in areas only rarely touched before—the Tenet, an expert in the field, as director. military tribunals at Guantánamo Bay, In 2004, however, the agency head testi- for example—and judicial fine-tuning of fied before the 9/11 Commission that its the rights of U.S. citizens accused of clandestine service was still five years away terrorist activities. from being able to play a significant role in counterterrorism.177 Certainly, the Patriot Act, first passed on October 26, 2001, and renewed in Before 2001, U.S. law did not allow the 2006, is the most visible change since kind of preventive detention permitted September 11. The act incorporates into under British and French law, except in American law many of the anti-civil cases where bail could not be posted, nor libertarian principles that have existed in did it sanction most of the intrusive European law for some time. Enhanced police powers permitted under French surveillance powers not only provide the law. At that time, terrorist activity within FBI and other government agents the the United States was treated as criminal ability to issue more search warrants, activity.178 The McCarran-Walter Act of seize records, and scrutinize bank, 1952 had forbidden the outlawing of telephone, and Internet records certain organizations so the FBI had (through so-called National Security 137 Letters), but also to operate without brought before the courts were for direct transparency or accountability.179 acts of terrorism, and only one person, the “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, was The act is not directed against “aliens” or convicted of a direct act of terrorism immigrants; nevertheless, it specifically during that period. One widely reported provides for noncitizens to be detained case was that of two 16-year-old girls of for up to seven days. If the government Muslim origin, Tashnuba Hayder and states its intention to deport, detention Adama Bah, the first terrorist investiga- can be extended up to six months and is tion known to involve minors in the renewable. The seven-day limit can also United States. Although the details of the be extended if the attorney general certi- allegations against them were sealed by the fies every six months that there is a government, the two girls were believed to national security concern. A year after the have been detained by the FBI for their attacks of September 11, 2001, 400 activity on an Internet chat room people (of the 1,200 or so who were frequented by a radical Islamic cleric in detained in the weeks after September 11) London who has encouraged suicide were still being held on a variety of bombing. Both girls were eventually held charges, with 175 of them awaiting depor- on immigration charges (the immigration tation.180 In March 2003, then-Attorney papers of the parents of one girl had not General John Ashcroft claimed that 478 been renewed), yet neither was ever people had been deported and 211 charged with a crime. In May 2005, criminal charges had been legally brought Adama Bah was released to her home in since October 2001.181 In contrast, a New York, while Tashnuba Hayder report by the NYU Center on Law and accepted an order of “voluntary depar- Security (CLS) indicates that sweeping ture” to Bangladesh.183 surveillance under the Patriot Act has produced very few arrests and fewer The alternative—perhaps more serious— convictions.182 Among the 211 criminal effort of the government to combat charges claimed by Ashcroft, the terrorism has been an extralegal, ad hoc NYU/CLS study documents 120 cases. Of campaign, the results of which have been the 84 people arrested for terrorism dubious. The Patriot Act authorizes between September 2001 and October neither the incarceration of “enemy 2004, 54 have been indicted for combatants” incommunicado, nor the terrorism and/or support of terrorism, of detention of illegal immigrants without which 11 have been convicted and 16 have charges, nor secret immigration accepted a plea. Only 18 of the charges hearings.184 Although citizens, in 138 principle, have greater claims on the legal . . . is principally concerned with the system than noncitizens, there has been reorganization of the intelligence no consistency in the treatment of either. community and the creation of a new “czar,” the director of national intel- Thus, an American citizen, John Walker ligence, to oversee the intelligence Lindh, who was captured in Afghanistan operations of the Central as an enemy combatant, was charged in a Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon, federal court and given a plea bargain, and other agencies. In addition, while two other citizens, Yaser Esam however, it modifies many of the laws and regulations identified with the Hamdi and Jose Padilla, were detained Patriot Act. It expands the scope of without charges as enemy combatants.185 foreign intelligence surveillance, and Meanwhile Richard Reid, a British strengthens the power to detain citizen, and Zacarias Moussaoui, a suspected terrorists prior to trial. It French citizen, were both sentenced to sets minimum federal standards for personal identity documents and life in prison, after pleading guilty in attempts to bolster their security.186 federal court on terrorism charges. David Hicks, an Australian citizen, who As in Britain and France, all of these was captured in Afghanistan and additional powers and administrative detained for more than five years at the personnel have created hardships for the American military base at Guantánamo Muslim community. It is clear from the Bay, pleaded guilty in March 2007 to arrest pattern detailed in the NYU/CLS charges of supporting terrorism and was study that the focus of attention has been sentenced to serve just nine months in an on immigrants and that there has been Australian prison by an American increased detention and deportation of military tribunal. undocumented aliens. Legal residents have also had a hard time as new and The new American legislation does not existing rules are enforced with more appear to be harsher than laws already in vigor.187 Immigrants from Arab and place in France and Britain, but it makes other Islamic countries were required to life more difficult for immigrants and register with the INS after September 11, aliens, not only because of new rules, but 2001. Failure to register carried with it also because of the new means of admin- the danger of deportation. In the istering them that gave considerable immediate aftermath of the World Trade discretion to federal authorities to Center attacks, 60 percent of Arab detain suspects for long periods of time. Americans surveyed were concerned Thus the follow-up Intelligence Reform about long-term discrimination, and 45 Act of 2004 percent claimed to know someone who 139 had suffered ethnic discrimination. discussed in chapter 2. In the United Twenty percent claimed to have “person- States, these efforts are being coordi- ally” suffered discrimination.188 nated by the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties of the Department of Pursuant to law, the antiterrorism actions Homeland Security, which has organized of the United States have touched relatively an interagency Incident Management few people, as is also the case in Europe. Team (IMT). The IMT is meant to bring However, actions that have been enacted key bureaucrats who deal with both under the cover of executive power have security issues and public relations touched many thousands of people. together with two dozen Muslim scholars Consider the scope of the warrantless and community leaders in the United phone taps that have been reported by the States.192 We will come back to these New York Times and others since December efforts in the next section. 2005; thousands, “perhaps millions,” of phone lines were involved.189 This discussion of security is not intended to be exhaustive. It is meant to The targeting of Muslims has been illuminate how three large Western tempered in both Europe and the United countries with significant Muslim States by government attempts to enlist populations—Britain, France, and the Muslim individuals and community United States—have adjusted (sometimes organizations in their efforts to enhance dramatically) their security policies in security.190 These efforts have been most response to transnational terrorism and explicit in Britain in the announced incidents involving their own Muslim programs of the Foreign and communities. But this discussion does Commonwealth Office and the not encompass countries such as Department of Communities and Local Denmark, The Netherlands, and Spain, Government and are mainly aimed at which have also had to address problems engaging with Muslim communities to of radicalization and/or terrorism; their prevent radicalization and promote approaches to security likewise bear voices of mainstream Islam among further examination. Muslim youth.191 Chapter V: Best Practices The effort in France has been more complicated and has largely focused on In this section, we will analyze the success the establishment of the French Council of various attempts—often experimental for the Muslim Religion (CFCM), or pilot programs—by public authorities 140 and nongovernmental organizations to But there have been interesting experi- integrate Muslim communities into ments, both in private and public educa- Western societies. Studies of these “best tion, which could be useful tools of practices” have focused primarily on integration, if expanded and geared education, community development, toward Muslim communities. In the and discrimination,193 with some atten- United States, for example, some New tion to political participation. In recent York City public high schools that recruit years, government authorities in many students through special examinations— Western countries have also collaborated Stuyvesant High School, Townsend Harris with Muslim representatives on programs High School, and the Bronx High School to enhance security and integrate Muslim of Science, in particular—have been communities. recruiting immigrant children since before World War I. Together with the Any understanding of best practices universities that now comprise the City implies both comparison with other University of New York, these schools have countries and some evaluation of the become instruments of social and goals that are being pursued. The economic mobility for generations of implied goals are usually higher levels of immigrants. In more recent years, affir- integration and acceptance. With the mative action programs have also exception of recent projects by Aristide succeeded in educating new generations of Zolberg and Allison Joy Clarkin,194 minority students and in placing them in however, most existing scholarly studies positions of influence and power. Such have avoided transatlantic comparisons, programs have not affected the success of instead focusing either on a particular most members of those communities, but country195 or on the European Union.196 they have produced a more visibly The resulting lack of a comparative integrated network of minority elites. In framework makes an examination of best Britain, some faith-based Muslim schools practices somewhat less effective. have made an important contribution to the improvement of student perfor- Education mance.197 And in France, public education programs have been developed to There has been considerable discussion promote “positive discrimination” and on both sides of the Atlantic of the “equality of chances” (the French equiv- failures and difficulties in integrating alents of American affirmative action). Muslim immigrants through established In the case of the latter, however, there educational systems, especially in Europe. has not been much discussion of their 141 successes and failures so it is difficult to The most recent studies that have been judge to what extent, if any, they have conducted on these projects in fostered integration. different countries show clearly that the level of parental participation is higher when the activities are organized Education can be a highly effective means in cooperation with the schools and of integration, especially in Europe, their children, and take place in the where there are large numbers of Muslim schools. Such an approach also has the students within the school system despite secondary impact of facilitating contact between teachers and parents.199 the fact that Islamic populations are minorities within most countries. In Mentoring projects have also been Amsterdam and Rotterdam, immigrant successful, particularly in Britain, The children (the vast majority of whom are Netherlands, Sweden, and Belgium.200 of Muslim origin) are a majority; in During the past 10 years, immigrant Brussels, they comprise more than 40 students in these countries who have percent of the student body; and in succeeded at the university level have London, “English is a second language been brought back into the school system 198 for a third of the children in school.” to work as mentors within their commu- Education policies vis-à-vis accommo- nities. This method of linking successive dating religious practices vary with immigrant generations has its roots in patterns of church-state relations, but similar programs in the United States, schools have made considerable efforts to Israel, and Canada. In Europe, such advance integration, both of students as efforts are more recent and involve much well as their families. smaller numbers of students. They have also been organized, for the most part, at In Germany, Austria, and The the local level, and are therefore more Netherlands, for example, schools have widespread where the educational system provided language courses for immigrant encourages local initiatives. mothers that both facilitate adult learning of local languages and Colleges and universities are also encourage mothers to support their increasingly recruiting students from children academically. Perhaps more impoverished ethnic areas. The elite importantly, they have given parents a Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris (also place to meet and talk about common known as Sciences Po) has created a challenges. According to a report of the program to seek out and provide aid to Migration Policy Institute: talented students from neglected Zones

142 of Educational Priority (ZEP). These ZEPs, created partly on the basis of the A report on Islamophobia published in percentage of school-age immigrant 2006 by the European Monitoring children in different areas, were estab- Centre on Racism and Xenophobia lished in the early 1970s. Although the revealed a growing perception of scale of the Sciences Po program is discrimination among young Muslims.203 small—it recruits fewer than 20 students Patrick Simon has pointed out that there each year—it is a good model for other is a paradoxical aspect to the question of elite universities and colleges. Sciences discrimination: Po is also working to provide tutoring and financial aid to secondary schools in Discrimination becomes more a select number of places. widespread when young people of immigrant origin have succeeded in school and have solid credentials on Antidiscrimination the job market. They then look to gain more competitive jobs while employers As discussed in chapter 3, there has been perceive their origins as a “negative 204 a growing body of antidiscrimination sign” in the course of selection. legislation throughout the West, as Muslim populations establish a perma- In addition to governmental schemes that nent and growing presence there. In are being instituted under EU antidis- Britain, additional legislation during the crimination directives, there are other, past decade has extended the coverage of more informal programs, such as efforts the Race Relations Act to the police and by employer associations, to hire minority other public officials who had been previ- employees. The French experience since ously exempt from laws against discrimi- the 2005 riots indicates that the nation. In The Netherlands, many aspects combined efforts of local government and of the minorities policy have been toned industry can have an impact on down and more emphasis has been placed unemployment. In Yvelines, a locality in on combating expressive racism by the suburbs of Paris, a collaboration considering it as criminal activity. In between Renault and the local govern- France, the High Authority for the ment reduced unemployment by 15 Struggle Against Discrimination and for percent in one year by combining educa- Equality (HALDE), established in 2005, tion with training and jobs. This program has created a mechanism for receiving and has proved to be quite successful as a pilot project for how government and industry publicizing complaints.201 How well can work together to overcome the effects conceived and useful are these new of discrimination.205 approaches?202 143 In the United States, there has been National Assembly and relatively few in plenty of research into the tradition of local councils. There are indications that ethnic associations helping new arrivals growing social mobility has resulted in to bypass discriminatory barriers and increased immigrant activity in French create a niche in the American economy. politics and associational life, but this has One study reported that approximately generally occurred at the local level.208 In 12 percent of the labor force in the 216 contrast, there have been some successful metropolitan areas studied was employed Muslim candidates in the national legis- in ethnic niches.206 The development of latures of Britain and Germany, but only such niche employment has also been in areas of high immigrant concentra- studied in Europe, but the importance of tion. Studies have shown that political ethnic associations has perhaps been parties have played a more positive role in underestimated.207 recruiting minority candidates in Britain than in France, where community organ- Political Integration izations are largely responsible for political mobilization.209 Methods of political integration vary considerably across Europe and between Despite being far weaker, local branches Europe and North America. Canada and of political parties in the United States the United States have been integrating have been much more open to the polit- immigrant populations through the political recruitment of immigrants than their ical system since the 19th century. In fact, European counterparts, and this has many early settlers found it easier to rise resulted in stronger ethnic representation through politics than through business, nationally. However, this can vary consid- and ethnic political organizations in erably from one locality to another. Roger Boston, New York, and Chicago became Waldinger notes important differences legendary as instruments of mobility. between the more open political system in Immigrants in Europe, however, and New York and the more elitist system in particularly Muslim immigrants, have been Los Angeles,210 and Richard Alba and relatively unsuccessful, both at getting their Nancy Foner point out that very little is collective voices heard and in gaining polit- known about cross-national practices of ical office. political integration:

In France, which has the largest Islamic . . . there is another problem that community in Europe, there are comes from putting so much emphasis on convergence, as many cross- currently no Muslim deputies in the 144 national immigration studies do. Because convergence theorists (and Security and Islamic Communities indeed many other comparative analysts) focus so heavily on official As we have already noted, Western government policies, or the represen- tations of these policies in political governmental attempts to enhance discourse, they tend to tell a story of security by working with Muslim individ- increasing immigrant inclusion; and uals and community organizations are they risk missing, or at least seriously increasingly widespread. The success of underplaying, the way historically these measures, however, is not yet clear. rooted and durable social, political, and economic structures and arrange- The decadelong French effort to create ments create varying levels of barrier the French Council for the Muslim to immigrants and their descendants Religion (CFCM) has successfully in different societies. [W]e take as our provided a meeting point for religious focus an aspect of the political arena representatives and government officials, that has to do with actual political practices: the ability of immigrant- and played a useful role in winding down origin politicians to be elected to the suburban riots in the fall of 2005.213 office. Surprisingly, this topic has However, it has proved less useful for received little attention in the litera- integrating urban youth, whose primary ture on cross-national comparisons grievances are unemployment and lack of although it is clearly critical for the integration of immigrants and their access to French society rather than issues children—and indeed for their ability related to Islam.214 to influence the policies that shape 211 their lives in such important ways. In Britain, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the With the exception of a few community- Department of Communities and Local 212 based studies, there is little informa- Government have led government efforts tion and less analysis of best practices to institutionalize consultation with with regard to political integration in the Muslim community and faith leaders. West. Thus one cannot conclusively state But the stated objectives of these that the North American experience programs suggest that they have been indicates the importance of the political undertaken to mobilize support for system in fostering and leveraging British policy rather than to reflect the integration in society and the economy, priorities of that population.215 nor can one accurately gauge the signifi- cance of lower levels of political integra- Recent reports suggest the limitations of tion in Britain and the virtual absence of the British approach. Even Muslim political integration in France. community leaders who have been most 145 cooperative with government efforts have Management Team was formed to bring been reluctant to get involved in devel- key bureaucrats who deal with both oping programs for the operation of security issues and public relations mosques,216 for example, or to set together with two dozen Muslim scholars standards for the recruitment of Muslim and community leaders in the United prison chaplains. A series of measures States.220 For Homeland Security proposed by the Secretary of State for officials, this is the beginning of a larger Communities and Local Government effort to focus on the diversity of the Ruth Kelly to give civic training to imams United States, “to connect with young and to encourage “a message about being people from these communities,” and to proud to be British, proud to be bring more minority youth into public Muslim” has received little support service.221 However, the American federal among Muslim leaders.217 system is such that it necessitates the coordination both of various national For British government leaders, there agencies as well as local and national appears to be some sentiment that, from security programs, which can be the point of view of “best practices,” the problematic.222 New Department of emphasis of the French system on the use Homeland Security initiatives to deal of intelligence gathering and investigating with Muslim communities are part of an judges is worth emulating. After the attacks attempt to bridge this “federal gap.” on the London underground, then- British Home Secretary Charles Clarke These recent programs appear to be far stated a number of times that a French- less ambitious than the parallel efforts in style system in Britain could be more Britain and France. There is, however, effective in detaining suspects while a case one similarity. They all tend to work is being constructed against them.218 directly with Muslim organizations and Muslim community leaders, rather than In the United States, the Department of through local officials, or even local Homeland Security has an Office for authorities responsible for security. This Civil Rights and Civil Liberties that “has centralization is probably easier in France, worked to help the Department establish with a long tradition of centralized control and cement positive relationships with a through the Ministry of the Interior, than variety of ethnic and religious communi- it is in the United States, or even Britain, ties, and the organizations that represent where security and community relations them.”219 As mentioned in the previous have been far more decentralized. section, its interagency Incident 146 Generally speaking, the “best practices” made a significant impact on popular used by French, British, and American culture, cuisine, and the arts. For all of authorities to simultaneously integrate these reasons, reports of the European their Muslim populations and enhance Commission have called for more, not security measures include a combination less, immigration over the next half of gathering intelligence, defusing century.223 tensions, and enlisting community leaders in the struggle against terrorist So on the one hand, young Muslims are networks. As noted at the start of this at the core of problems of integration, section, however, insufficient evaluation both economic and social; on the other, and comparison of the impact of these they are also the key to the growth of programs makes it hard to assess which European economies and the stability of deserve to be elevated to the status of best European society. Young women, in practices. particular, embody this inherent contradiction. The recent focus on dress codes Conclusions and the demands by and for Muslim women seem to indicate a growing gap We began this analysis by noting that between European secularism and Islam. 2005-2006 has been a particularly diffi- Our report supports this conclusion in cult period for Muslims in the West. part, but has also found that young Many of the trends that we have examined Muslim women are more successful and herein—not the least of which is politically active than their male counter- continued immigration from the Islamic parts. As much as their patterns of dress world into Europe and the United and religious observance indicate tradi- States—have indicated that tensions are tional behavior, they also point toward likely to persist into the future as well. growing activism and independence.

Most Muslims currently living in the West Some of the agents of Muslim integration are no longer immigrants, however. The are the same as they were for previous majority are either citizens or on the way waves of immigrants. The economy, for to becoming citizens. They are also example, continues to be of overriding disproportionately young and thus an importance. Employment and antidis- important part of the future of the West. crimination programs are crucial to Beyond providing manpower for reducing the sense of alienation among economic expansion and contributing to Muslim youth. The American experience the European welfare state, they have has demonstrated that such programs are 147 most effective in creating new ethnic attempted to use mosques and religious elites who can serve as a bridge for authorities as intermediaries with the broader economic and social mobility.224 Muslim population. Despite increasing visibility at various levels of the economy, though, the In contrast, legal institutions have played unemployment rates of young Muslims an increasingly significant role in are significantly higher than those of integration by establishing minority other young people throughout Europe rights that in most cases support multi- (but not America). This is related in part culturalism. They have kept the doors of to their lower levels of education. But, as immigration open in Europe and have we have noted, and as confirmed by constrained the most questionable several European studies,225 it is also behavior of the federal government in caused by slow economic growth and the United States since 2001. Although discriminatory labor practices. the courts are not comparable to the Nevertheless, a large proportion of economy, religious institutions, and the Muslim youth have excelled within the political system in assimilating educational system and in the labor immigrants, they have been crucial market despite these barriers.226 negotiators of evolving identity.228 In France, for instance, many young The American experience, though Muslims are legally changing their names relatively recent, also indicates that to more European sounding ones to politics is an effective instrument for facilitate their integration, particularly creating a sense of civic identity among in the job market, and they seem to enjoy immigrants.227 Yet this traditional agent the sympathy of the judicial system. A of integration is not as important as it was recent Le Monde article relays the in the past. While previous generations of experience of the judge Anne-Marie immigrants were integrated through the Lemarinier who has presided over many trade union movement and through of these requests in the last two years: active participation in political life, these mechanisms have not been as effective for Mme Lemarinier knows them well, Muslims in this generation. Trade these files of French men and women of more or less remote foreign unions are less powerful than they used to ancestry for whom a Muslim first be, and political parties have made little name is an impediment to integra- effort to mobilize and integrate Muslim tion. Many tens of times per year, she citizens. Instead, state authorities in hears the same tales of refusal for jobs Europe and the United States have or for renting an apartment when 148 one is named Mohammed, Abdel or Integration is clearly a very complex Tarek, and the obstacles that are issue, and one that is difficult, if not removed as soon as they become Fred impossible, to define in universally or Paul.229 accepted terms. Context matters in terms of both time and space. Western The role of ethnic associations is also countries are struggling, with varying important to integration. Although their degrees of success, to develop policies number increased over the past decade, that will improve the process. It would be with various degrees of legitimacy, until inaccurate to say that integration is now they played only a relatively minor failing, either in Europe or the United role in developing and representing the States. Rather, we seem to be at a cross- interests of Muslim communities in the roads, where governments and their West. Now, as Western governments are Muslims populations are beginning to increasingly seeking out intermediaries articulate a new kind of citizenship pact to deal with their Muslim communities, in the West. such associations could play a more significant role as arbiters of both As the report of the High-Level Group identity and integration.230 Growing for the Alliance of Civilizations rightly considerations of domestic and transna- states the following: tional security have intensified the search for intermediaries and have also created a Establishing coherent integration greater sense of urgency among leaders of strategies requires regular dialogue Muslim communities to fill this role. among representatives of government and immigrant communities, civil Ethnic associations must play a role in society representatives, religious organizations and employers, developing such instruments as citizen- engaging at local, regional, national ship examinations and citizenship and international levels. While training programs, for example, that informal and ad hoc engagement is Britain and France, respectively, are valuable, institutional structures that using to assess the integration of support dialogue on a regular ongoing basis can ensure the efficacy immigrants. It is crucial that Muslim of such approaches in promoting minorities not become the objects of greater integration. Such efforts help such programs, but act in concert with achieve a balance between the governmental authorities in defining demands of integration and the need emerging national identities. to maintain one’s cultural and religious identity.231

149 The report goes on to say that values but in full agreement with the encompassing legal system of their political, civil society, and religious adopted countries and its political leadership in the West can help set culture, Western Muslims could become the tone within which debates regarding immigration take place by an inspiration for the larger Muslim speaking forcefully and publicly in world as it struggles to strike a balance defense of the rights of immigrants between faith, tradition, and modernity. wherever they are endangered and by Furthermore, the resolution of current acknowledging the contributions that tensions in which Muslim communities immigrants make to the life and livelihood of their communities.232 are embroiled in the West—tensions that are of concern to the rest of the Muslim These are not easy times to determine the world—might lead to a more harmonious right terms for the integration of Muslim relationship between the West and the communities in the West, and in Europe, Muslim world. in particular. Tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds are reverberating within Muslim communities in the West. The search for identity (among individuals, states, and Europe as a whole) is exacerbated by internal factors, such as economic and social problems and cultural clashes, as well as external factors, such as international conflicts and the struggle against transnational terrorism. Thus, all involved—governments, ethnic associations, employers, educational institutions, and religious voices—must exert a concerted effort to develop and define what might become a citizenship pact. Such a pact would spell out obligations and rights in a clear way; the question would no longer be whether integration is achieved, but whether citizenship is fully enjoyed and mutual obligations honored. As citizens,

150 reassured in the integrity of their private

NOTES TO APPENDIXES

Notes to Appendix IV 6. Dan Bilefsky and Ian Fisher, “Doubts on Muslim Integration I. See http://europa.eu/institutional_ Rise in Europe,” International Herald reform/index_en.htm. Tribune, October 12, 2006. 2. See “Islam in Europe—Towards an 7. In May 2006, the interior minis- Independent Self Image,” Islamische ters of Germany’s 16 federal states Glaubensgemeinschaft in Öster- agreed to common standards reich, Wien, 2006. governing language and citizenship 3. Ibid. courses for immigrants seeking naturalization. This was followed by Notes to Appendix VI the introduction in November 2006 of a new citizenship exami- I. Elaine Sciolino and Stephen Grey, nation in the United States “British Terror Trial Traces a Path intended to inculcate civic values to Militant Islam,” New York Times, and encourage democratic partici- November 26, 2006. pation. More stringent citizenship 2. Ian Fisher, “Pope Meets Envoys requirements adopted by Britain in from Muslim Nations,” International October 2005 include a language Herald Tribune, September 26, 2006. proficiency test and an exam meant 3. Alan Cowell, “A Glimpse of Limits to test a prospective citizen’s knowl- to Tolerance,” International Herald edge about life in Britain. For Tribune, October 23, 2006. further reading, see Judy Dempsey, 4. See, inter alia, H. D. S. Greenway, “Germany Recognizes Its Face Is “Once Again, Britain Looks at Changing,” International Herald Reasons Why,” International Herald Tribune, May 6, 2006; Holli Tribune, August 12, 2006; Fisher, Chmella, “New Citizens Will Need “Pope Meets Envoys from Muslim Deeper Knowledge,” New York Nations”; and Elaine Sciolino, Times, December 1, 2006; and Alan “French Critic of Islam Flees Travis, “Testing Passport to UK Threats,” International Herald Tribune, Citizenship,” Guardian, November October 1, 2006. 1, 2005. 5. John Vinocur, “Nudging to 8. Jytte Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Consensus Over Dutch Muslims,” Politics and Religion in Western Europe International Herald Tribune, November (New York: Oxford University 21, 2006. Press, 2005), p. 6.

152 9. The number of Muslims in the 12. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics United States has been estimated as and Religion in Western Europe, pp. 188- high as 6 to 7.5 million in Qamar- 190; Nacira Guenif-Souilamas, Des ul Huda, The Diversity of Muslims in the “beurettes” aux descendantes d’immigrants United States, United States Institute nord-africains (Paris: Grasset/Le of Peace (USIP) Special Report No. Monde, 2003), presents a particu- 159, February 2006, p. 1, online at larly interesting analysis of activism http://www.usip.org/pubs/special among young Muslim women in reports/sr159.html, and as low as France. 1.1 million in Graduate Center of 13. “Minority Report: The Trouble the City University of New York with Integration,” Economist. (CUNY), American Religious 14. European Union Monitoring Identification Survey 2001, online at Center on Racism and http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/ Xenophobia, Muslims in the European research_briefs/aris/aris_index.htm. Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, The various estimates, together 2006, pp. 60-62, online at http:// with sources, are summarized in B. eumc.europa.eu/eumc/material/ A. Robinson, “How Many Muslims pub/muslim/Manifestations_EN Are in the U.S. and the Rest of the .pdf; and Jocelyne Césari, ed., World,” Ontario Consultants on Securitization and Religious Divides in Religious Tolerance, September Europe: Muslims in Western Europe After 2002, pp. 2-3, online at http:// 9/11, submission to the Changing www.religioustolerance Landscape of Citizenship and .org/isl_numb.html. In general, Security 6th PCRD of European the higher estimates are based on Commission, June 1, 2006, ethnicity and the lower estimates on pp. 5-8, online at http:// identity indexes. See Table 1. www.euro-islam.info/PDFs/ 10. Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry ChallengeProjectReport Muslims,” Foreign Affairs, July- .pdf%20-4.pdf. August 2005. 15. Hans-Georg Betz, “Against the 11. “Minority Report: The Trouble with ‘Green Totalitarianism’: Anti- Integration,” Economist, October 28, Islamic Nativism in Contemporary 2006. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe,” a paper delivered at the Radical Right and Its Impact on Migration Politics and Policies, a 153 conference held by New York Columbia University Press, 2004), University in Paris and Center for ch. 1; Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Political Research at Sciences PO Minds: Islam and the West (Cambridge: (CEVIPOF), November 7-18, 2006. Harvard University Press, 2004), 16. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics ch. 1. and Religion in Western Europe, pp. 36- 20. “Joint Effort Pledged on 37 and 43; and Randall Hansen, Extremism,” International Herald “The Danish Cartoon Controversy: Tribune, October 27, 2006. A Defense of Liberal Freedom,” 21. The Immigration and Nationality EUSA Review, vol. 19, no. 2, Spring Act (popularly known as the Hart- 2006. Cellar Act) was passed in 1965 and 17. Jocelyne Césari, When Islam and fundamentally altered the U.S. Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and system of immigration control. It in the United States (New York: abolished the national origins Palgrave, 2004), p. 11. system, together with all race 18. What might have remained an restrictions to immigration; set an internal Danish problem became an annual limit of 170,000 visas for international affair when, in early immigrants from the Eastern 2006, a delegation of Danish imams Hemisphere with a limit of 20,000 went on a tour of Muslim countries per country (and was amended in to emphasize their anger and frustra- 1968 to include a limit of 120,000 tion. This was followed by official visas for immigrants from the statements of protest from Arab Western Hemisphere, with no governments, attacks on Danish country limits); and created embassies in Muslim countries, and preference systems for visas, widespread debate in the press and emphasizing preferences for those among intellectuals worldwide. with family connections and work. Reactions among Muslims in the For immigrants from Muslim West were varied, but were generally countries, the act effectively limited to formal declarations increased the limit of a few (France) or controlled demonstra- hundred places per year to the tions (Britain). See Hansen, “The possibility of thousands of places. Danish Cartoon Controversy: A 22. See Martin A. Schain, “The Politics Defense of Liberal Freedom.” of Immigration in France, Britain 19. Oliver Roy, Globalized Islam: The and the United States: A Trans- Search for a New Umma (New York: atlantic Comparison,” in Tim 154 Smeeding and Craig Parsons, eds., recruit skilled workers through the Immigration and the Transformation of Highly Skilled Migrant Program; a Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge new German Immigration Law to University Press, 2006). attract highly skilled workers went 23. Christian Joppke, Immigration and the into effect in 2004; and French Nation-State: The United States, legislation passed in 2006 (the loi Germany and Great Britain (New York: Sarkozy) also provided for highly Oxford University Press, 1999), skilled workers. introduction. 27. Renwick McLean, “Spanish Look 24. For elaboration, see Commission for Decisive EU Action,” of the European Communities, International Herald Tribune, May 25, Communication from the Commission to the 2006. Council and the European Parliament on a 28. Rim Latrache, “La Communauté Community Immigration Policy; Rainer arabe aux Etats-Unis: histoire Muenz, “Europe: Population and d’immigration et enjeux de la Migration in 2005,” Migration visibilité et de l’invisibilité,” Information Source, June 2006; Phillip doctoral thesis, University of Paris Longman, “The Global Baby Bust,” IV–Sorbonne, Civilisation Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004. Américaine, December 9, 2006. 25. Commission of the European 29. U.S. Census Bureau, online at Communities, Communication from http://www.census.gov/prod/ the Commission to the Council and the 2005pubs/censusr-21.pdf. Also see European Parliament on a Community Geneive Abdo, Mecca and Main Street: Immigration Policy, COM (2000) 757 Muslim Life in America after 9/11 (New final (Brussels: Commission of York: Oxford University Press, the European Communities, 2006). November 22, 2000), online at 30. This is the title of the first chapter http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/ of Césari’s book, When Islam and en/com/cnc/2000/com2000_075 Democracy Meet: Muslims in Europe and 7en01.pdf and United Nations, in the United States, pp. 9-18. What Department of Economic and follows is based on her analysis. Social Affairs, Population 31. Jonathan Laurence and Justin Division, “World Population Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Prospects,” February 2005. Religious Challenges in Contemporary 26. In 2002, the British government France (Washington, DC: Brookings launched a broad program to Institution, 2006), p. 21. 155 32. There is often a conflation of 39. U.S. Census Bureau, online at religion and ethnicity for purposes http://www.census.gov/prod/ of establishing numbers, and there 2005pubs/censusr-21.pdf. is considerable disagreement about 40. Arab American Institute, 2002, just how many Muslims there are www.aaiusa.org; and Latrache, La from country to country. Thus, the Communauté arabe aux Etats-Unis: estimates of the number of Muslims histoire d’immigration et enjeux de la in the United States vary from a low visibilité et de l’invisibilité, pp. 293-295. of about 1.1 million to a high of 7.5 41. See Césari, When Islam and Democracy million (see footnote 9), and for Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United France between 2.5 and 5 million. States, p. 221, footnote 10, for an (Laurence and Vaisse, p. 19). evaluation of sources. 33. Surveys rely on national samples of 42. See Ibid., p. 11, and Rim Latrache, no more than a few thousand La Communauté arabe aux Etats-Unis: people. Where the Muslim popula- histoire d’immigration et enjeux de la tion is 1 percent or less of the visibilité et de l’invisibilité, p. 6. population, the subsample of 43. American Muslim Poll 2004 Muslims would be less than 20, a conducted by Zogby International for number that is statistically unreli- Muslims in the American Public able, especially if there is variation Square (Project MAPS), pp. 47-48, of opinion within it. online at http://www.projectmaps 34. Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating .com/ AMP2004report.pdf. Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in 44. See Migration Policy Institute, Contemporary France, p. 20. 2004, Changer les principes en actions. 35. All of these estimates are from 45. Shireen T. Hunter, La Radicalisation et Césari, When Islam and Democracy les jeunes des minorités ethniques en Europe Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United for the Migration Policy Institute, States, appendix I. 2004, pp. 36-44. 36. Ibid., p. 9. 46. Estimates for illegal immigration 37. Shireen T. Hunter, ed., Islam, are usually issued without explana- Europe’s Second Religion: The New Social, tion by government ministries. Cultural, and Political Landscape Nevertheless, recent reports in (Westport, CT: Praeger Publi- several countries indicate an shers, 2002), chs. 4 and 8. important increase of undocu- 38. Ibid., appendix I. mented immigrants arriving in Europe from Africa south of the 156 Sahara. In France, immigrants 55. Steven A. Camarota, “Immigrants (legal and illegal) represent the from the Middle East: A Profile of largest increase of any single group. the Foreign-Born Population from Source: Institut National de la Pakistan to Morocco,” Center for Statistique et des Études Immigration Studies, August Économiques (INSEE), Les Immigrés 2002, online at http://www en France, 2005 ed. (Paris: INSEE, .cis.org/articles/2002/back902 2005), pp. 28, 244. .pdf. 47. Patrick Weil, La France et ses étrangers 56. Ibid., p. 11. For a picture of the (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), pp. 77-84. success of Muslims in the United 48. Martin A. Schain, “Ordinary States, see Paul Barrett, American Politics: Immigrants, Direct Action Islam: The Struggle for the Soul of a and the Political Process in Religion (New York: Farrar, Straus France,” French Politics and Society, and Giroux, 2006). vol. 12, nos. 2-3, Spring-Summer 57. Council on American-Islamic 1994. Relations (CAIR), American Muslim 49. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation- Voters: A Demographic Profile and Survey State: The United States, Germany and of Attitudes, October 24, 2006, pp. Great Britain, p. 64. 4-6, online at http://www.cair 50. Ibid., p. 65. .com/pdf/American_Muslim_Voter 51. Ibid., pp. 69-99. _Survey_2006.pdf. 52. “Trends in International Migration: 58. Daniel W. Sutherland, “Threat SOPEMI—2004 Edition,” OECD of Islamic Radicalization to the Social Issues/Migration/Health, vol. Homeland,” testimony before 2005, no. 4, April 2006, p. 350. the U.S. Senate Committee on 53. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation- Homeland Security and State: The United States, Germany and Governmental Affairs, March Great Britain, pp. 104-108; Randall 14, 2007. Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration in 59. CAIR, American Muslim Voters: A Post-war Britain (Oxford: Oxford Demographic Profile and Survey of University Press, 2000), ch. 1. Attitudes, p. 3. 54. Joppke, Immigration and the Nation- 60. Camarota, “Immigrants from the State: The United States, Germany and Middle East: A Profile of the Great Britain, pp. 114-134. Foreign-Born Population from Pakistan to Morocco,” p. 2.

157 61. Nadia Khouri-Dagher, “Française 69. This estimate by the U.K.-based du Maghreb: la Réussite Silencieuse,” Islamic charitable organization, Le Monde magazine, March 4-10, Salaam Network, is online at 2006. http://www.salaam.co.uk/mosques/ 62. See Tariq Ramadan, Western Muslims index.php. and the Future of Islam (New York: 70. See Andrea Elliott, “Between Black Oxford University Press, 2004). and Immigrant Muslims, an 63. Jacques Barou, “L’islam, facteur de Uneasy Alliance,” New York Times, regulation sociale?” Esprit Special March 11, 2007. Issue: Français/Immigrés, vol. 102, June 71. Only Belgium extends to Islam the 1985, pp. 207-215; and Schain, same recognition that it extends to “Ordinary Politics: Immigrants, other religions and to non- Direct Action and the Political believers. Subsidies are financed at Process in France.” the regional level, but disagreement 64. Pascal Ceaux, “M. Sarkozy defend between Turkish and Moroccan l’Islam et relance le débat sur la mosque associations has been laïcité,” Le Monde, October 27, largely responsible for the failure to 2004. implement a subsidy law passed in 65. Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating 2001. There has been a similar Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in problem of finance in Germany. Contemporary France, pp. 157-159. 72. Alan Wolfe, The Transformation of 66. John Bowen, “Does French Islam American Religion: How We Actually Live Have Borders? Dilemmas of Our Faith (New York: Free Press, Domestication in a Global Religious 2003), pp. 245-248. Field,” American Anthropologist, vol. 73. For a look at the privileges afforded 106, no. 4, 2004. to religious organizations in the 67. So, for example, Laurence and United States, see Diana B. Vaisse, Integrating Islam: Political and Henriques’s articles “Religion- Religious Challenges in Contemporary France, Based Tax Breaks: Housing to p. 83, estimate a ratio of just over Paychecks to Books,” New York Times, 1,000 Catholics for each church, 671 October 11, 2006, and “Religion Protestants for each church, and 238 Trumps Regulation as Legal Jews for each synagogue. Exemptions Grow,” New York Times, 68. Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating October 8, 2006, as well as other Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in pieces in a special series about Contemporary France, p. 83. religion in the New York Times. 158 74. Aristide Zolberg, “The Democratic Elaine C. Hagopian, Civil Rights in Management of Cultural Differences: Peril: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims Building Inclusive Societies in Western (London: Pluto Press, 2004), pp. 9- Europe and North America,” Human 71; Neil MacFarquhar, “Fears of Development Report (United Nations Inquiry Dampen Giving by U.S. Development Program, 2004) p. 17. Muslims,” New York Times, October 75. Charles A. Radin and Yvonne 30, 2006. Abraham, “Aide’s Role in Mosque 82. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics Deal Eyed,” Boston Globe, March 4, and Religion in Western Europe, p. 138. 2006. 83. “Muslim Group’s First Mission: 76. Diana Eck, A New Religious America: Official Recognition of Islam in How a Christian Country Has Become the Germany?” Spiegel Online Inter- World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation national, April 16, 2007, http:// (San Francisco: Harper, 2002), www.spiegel.de/international/ ch. 5. germany/0,1518,477438,00.html. 77. Patrick Weil, “Lifting the Veil,” 84. Steven Vertovec and Ceri Peach, French Politics, Culture and Society, vol. eds., Islam in Europe: The Politics of 22, no. 3, Fall 2004. Religion and Community (New York: 78. Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating St. Martin’s Press), ch. 1. Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in 85. Zolberg, “The Democratic Manage- Contemporary France, p. 82. ment of Cultural Differences: 79. See Zolberg, “The Democratic Building Inclusive Societies in Western Management of Cultural Differences: Europe and North America,” p. 39. Building Inclusive Societies in 86. Faith schools—including 7,000 Western Europe and North America,” Christian and 36 Jewish schools— p. 47; and Laurence and Vaisse, comprise about a third of the Integrating Islam: Political and Religious schools in the British public system. Challenges in Contemporary France, pp. See Alan Cowell, “Islamic Schools 138-139. at the Heart of British Debate on 80. Xavier Ternisien, “UOIF, Un Integration,” International Herald réseau en quête de reconnais- Tribune, October 16, 2006. sance,” Le Monde, June 23, 2006. 87. U.S. Department of State, 81. Zolberg, “The Democratic Manage- “International Religious Freedom ment of Cultural Differences: Report, Europe,” a report by the Building Inclusive Societies in Western under secretary for democracy and Europe and North America,” p. 52; global affairs in the Bureau of 159 Democracy, Human Rights, and 99. American Religious Identification Survey Labor, 2006. 2001; CAIR, American Muslim Voters: A 88. American Religious Identification Survey Demographic Profile and Survey of Attitudes. 2001, pp. 12-13. 100. Césari, When Islam and Democracy 89. See C. Kirk Hadaway et al., “What Meet: Muslims in Europe and in the United the Polls Don’t Show: A Closer States, ch. 3. Look at U.S. Church Attendance,” 101. Muslims in the American Public Square, American Sociological Review, vol. 58, p. 47. December 1993, pp. 741-752. 102. Guenif-Souilamas, Des “beurettes” 90. Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating aux descendantes d’immigrants nord- Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in africains, introduction. Contemporary France, p. 76. 103. See Nadia Hashmi, “Race, Gender 91. Sylvain Brouard and Vincent and Difference: Western Europe,” Tiberj, Francais comme les autres? in Suad Joseph, ed., Encyclopedia of Enquete sur les citoyens d’origine maghre- Women and Islamic Cultures, vol. 2 bine, africaine et turque (Paris: Presses (Leiden: Brill Publishers, 2003); de Sciences Po, 2005), pp. 30-35. Paul Cruickshank, “Covered Faces, 92. Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating Open Rebellion,” International Herald Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Tribune, October 24, 2006; and Contemporary France, p. 76. Guenif-Souilamas, Des “beurettes” aux 93. Brouard and Tiberj, Francais comme descendantes d’immigrants nord-africains. les autres? Enquete sur les citoyens 104. Zolberg, “The Democratic Manage- d’origine maghrebine, africaine et turque, ment of Cultural Differences: Building pp. 30-35. Inclusive Societies in Western Europe 94. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics and North America,” pp. 27-28; and and Religion in Western Europe, pp. 139- Ranier Bauböck, The Integration of 142. Immigrants PO-S_MG(94) (Strasbourg: 95. See American Religious Identification Survey Council of Europe), March 25, 1994. 2001, p. 26; and U.S. Department 105. Kevin Sullivan and Joshua Partlow, of State, “International Religious “Young Muslim Rage Takes Root in Freedom Report, Europe.” Britain,” Washington Post, August 13, 96. CAIR, American Muslim Voters: A 2006. Demographic Profile and Survey of 106. European Union Council Directive Attitudes, p. 9. 2000/43/EC, June 29, 2000. The 97. MAPS, p. 46. EU directive on discrimination has 98. Ibid. been an attempt to generalize the 160 British and Dutch initiatives in this 112. Gérard Noiriel, in Le creuset français area—which in turn had used the (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988), pp. American initiatives of the 1960s as 189-245, gives a good summary of a model—to the rest of the European the principles of integration. A Union; progress has been slow. A reaffirmation of this approach can well-written comparative analysis be found in the Rapport de la can be found in Pierre-Yves Cusset, Commission de la nationalité, “Les statistiques « ethniques »: Marceau Long, Etre français aujourd’hui premiers éléments de cadrage,” a et demain (Paris: Union Générale note submitted to the meeting d’Editions, 1988), pp. 82-105. Statistiques « ethniques » organ- 113. Desmond King, Making Americans: ized by the Centre d’Analyse Immigration, Race and the Origins of the Stratégique, October 19, 2006, and Diverse Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard available online at http://www University Press, 2000), ch. 1. .strategie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/ 114. Ira Katznelson, Black Men, White notecussetstatistiquesethniques.pdf. Cities; Race, Politics, and Migration in the 107. Leclerc, “Des émeutiers violents, United States, 1900-30 and Britain, mais bien insérés,” Le Figaro; and 1948-68 (London, New York: Stéphane Beaud and Michel Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. Pauloux, Violences urbaines, violence 125-126, published for the Institute sociale: Genèse des nouvelles classes of Race Relations. This observation dangereuses (Paris: Fayard, 2003), was made while British integration introduction. policy was still being formulated. 108. Organization for Economic Co- 115. See Hansen, Citizenship and Immigration operation and Development in Post-war Britain, p. 128 and ch. 6; (OECD), International Immigration and Erik Bleich, Race Politics in Britain Outlook (Washington, DC: OECD, and France: Ideas and Policymaking Since 2006), p. 73. the 1960s (New York: Cambridge 109. Sullivan and Partlow, “Young University Press, 2003), pp. 84-85. Muslim Rage Takes Root in 116. Patrick Weil and John Crowley, Britain,” Washington Post. “Integration in Theory and Practice: 110. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics A Comparison of France and and Religion in Western Europe, p. 62. Britain,” in Martin Baldwin- 111. Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism Edwards and Martin A. Schain, eds., (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), The Politics of Immigration in Western ch. 1. Europe (London: Cass, 1994), p. 118. 161 117. Jan Willem Duyvendak, Tjrees Securitization and Religious Divides in Pels, and Rally Rijkschroeff, “A Europe: Muslims in Western Europe after Multicultural Paradise? The 9/11, pp. 100-141. Cultural Factor in Dutch 124. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, ch. 1. Integration Policy,” unpublished 125. Marco Martiniello, Sortir des ghettos manuscript, 2007, p. 18. culturels (Paris: Presses de Sciences 118. The model was developed into a Po, 1997), pp. 58-63. political theory by Arendt Lijphart 126. Schain, “Minorities and Immigrant in The Politics of Accommodation: Incorporation in France: The State Pluralism and Democracy in The and the Dynamics of Multicultur- Netherlands (Berkeley, University of alism,” in Christian Joppke and California Press, 1968). Steven Lukes, eds., Multicultural 119. Duyvendak, Pels, and Rijkschroeff, Questions, (New York: Oxford “A Multicultural Paradise? The University Press, 1999), ch. 10. Cultural Factor in Dutch 127. Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Integration Policy,” pp. 18-19. Integration in Europe, pp. 44-46 and 120. Ibid., p. 21. 112-122. 121. See Andrew Geddes, The Politics of 128. Sophie Body-Gendrot, “From Old Migration and Integration in Europe Threats to Enigmatic Enemies: The (London: Sage, 2003), pp. 114-115; Evolution of Urban Violence in and Joppke, “The Retreat of France,” in Sophie Body-Gendrot Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: and Pieter Spierenburg, eds., The Theory and Policy,” British Journal of Civilization of Violence in Europe: Sociology, vol. 55, no. 2, 2004. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives 122. For more detail on the evolution of (New York: Springer, in press). the Dutch model, see Hunter, ed., 129. Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: Islam, Europe’s Second Religion: The New States and Immigrants in France and Social, Cultural, and Political Landscape, Germany (Princeton: Princeton pp. 111-113; and Ian Buruma, University Press, 2002), ch. 1. Murder in Amsterdam (New York: 130. Religion was not covered by the Penguin, 2006). various race relations acts, but it was 123. Duyvendak, Pels, and Rijkschroeff, included in the purview of the Human “A Multicultural Paradise? The Rights Act of 1998, which incorpo- Cultural Factor in Dutch Integration rated the European Convention on Policy,” p. 27; and Marcel Maussen, Human Rights into British law. “The Netherlands,” in Césari, 162 131. Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and 139. Alan Cowell, “Blair Calls Use of Veil France: Ideas and Policymaking Since the ‘a Mark of Separation,’” International 1960s, pp. 9-13. Herald Tribune, October 18, 2006. 132. Dominique Meurs, Ariane Paihé, 140. Stroobants et al., “Signes religieux: and Patrick Simon, “Mobilité L’Europe est gagnée par le débat intergénérationelle et persistance des sur la compatibilité du voile inégalités,” Institut national d’études islamique avec l’intégration.” démographiques, Document de 141. Stephanie Giry, “France and Its travail, no. 130, 2005. Muslims,” Foreign Affairs, September- 133. Banlieues un an après, a supplement of October 2006. Le Monde, October 26, 2006. 142. Brouard and Tiberj, Francais comme 134. Camarota, “Immigrants from the les autres? Enquete sur les citoyens Middle East: A Profile of the d’origine maghrebine, africaine et turque, Foreign-Born Population from pp. 33 and 47-51. Pakistan to Morocco.” 143. Pew Research Center, “The Great 135. Zolberg, “The Democratic Manage- Divide: How Westerners and Muslims ment of Cultural Differences: View Each Other” (Washington, DC: Building Inclusive Societies in Pew Global Attitude Project, June 22, Western Europe and North America,” 2006). p. 51. 144. Klausen, The Islamic Challenge: Politics 136. CAIR, American Muslim Voters: A and Religion in Western Europe, p. 87. Demographic Profile and Survey of 145. Chrispophe Jakubyszyn, “Après la Attitudes, p. 12; and MAPS, p. 35. crise de novembre, des jeunes 137. CAIR, American Muslim Voters: A veulent faire entendre leur voix aux Demographic Profile and Survey of prochaines elections,” Le Monde, Attitudes, p. 11. December 29, 2005. 138. Jean-Pierre Stroobants, Antoine 146. Richard Alba and Nancy Foner, Jacob, and Jean-Pierre Langellier, “Entering the Precincts of Power: “Signes religieux: L’Europe est Do National Differences Matter gagnée par le débat sur la compati- for Immigrant Minority Political bilité du voile islamique avec l’inté- Representation?” unpublished gration,” Le Monde, October 22-23, paper, February 2006, p. 20. 2006. 147. Ibid., p. 7. 148. Ibid., p. 8.

163 149. Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating 159. The report of the French Senate is Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in summarized in Le Point, August 28, Contemporary France, p. 196. 1993. Trans. Martin A. Schain. 150. Romain Garbaye, “Ethnic Minority 160. Schain, “Minorities and Immigrant Local Councilors in French and Incorporation in France: The State British Cities: Social Determinants and the Dynamics of Multicultur- and Political Opportunity alism,” in Joppke and Lukes, eds., Structures,” in R. Rinus Pennix et Multiculturalism Questions, ch. 5. al., eds. Citizenship in European Cities 161. In 1957, President Eisenhower sent (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), pp. federal troops into the University 47-48. of Arkansas in Little Rock against 151. Romain Garbaye, Getting Into Local the will of the governor to enforce Power: The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in the integration of a few black British and French Cities (Oxford: students into the university. Blackwell, 2005), p. 200. 162. Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and 152. Alba and Foner, “Entering the France: Ideas and Policymaking Since the Precincts of Power: Do National 1960s, p. 45. Differences Matter for Immigrant 163. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Minority Political Representation?” 164. Jeremy Shapiro and Bénédicte table 1. Suzan, “The French Experience of 153. Ibid., p. 12. Counter-Terrorism,” Survival, vol. 154. Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and 45, no. 1, Spring 2003. France: Ideas and Policymaking Since the 165. Ibid. 1960s, pp. 92-93. 166. Henri Astier, “Profile: France’s 155. Brouard and Tiberj, Francais comme Top Anti-terror Judge,” BBC News les autres? Enquete sur les citoyens d’origine Online, July 1, 2003: http:// maghrebine, africaine et turque, p. 49. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/ 156. Ibid., p. 56. 3031640.stm. 157. MAPS, p. 23; and CAIR, American 167. An exception to this occurred on Muslim Voters: A Demographic Profile and November 8, 1994, when 78 of the Survey of Attitudes, p. 11. 93 arrested were brought to trial, of 158. Sophie Body-Gendrot, Ville et which 51 were cleared. See Shapiro Violence: l’irruption de nouveaux acteurs and Suzan, “The French Experience (Paris: PUF, 1993), chs. 4-5; and of Counter-Terrorism.” Adil Jazouli, Les années banlieues (Paris: Seuil, 1992), concluding chapter. 164 168. Though the British police work in 173. “Anti-terrorism, Crime and much the same way as the French, Security Bill: Further Report,” a the former are not under the report from the Joint Committee authority of a judge. Former British on Human Rights to the U.K. Home Secretary Charles Clarke has House of Lords, 2002, p. 37. stated a number of times since the 174. Sullivan and Partlow, “Young attacks on the London under- Muslim Rage Takes Root in ground in 2005 that a French-style Britain,” Washington Post. system in the United Kingdom 175. Elaine C. Hagopian, Civil Rights in could be more effective in detaining Peril: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims suspects while a case is being (London: Pluto Press, 2004), constructed against them. See Julia introduction. Hartley-Brewer, “Clarke Launches 176. All of this information is taken Triple Offensive Against Terror,” from the The 9/11 Commission Report: Sunday Express, July 17, 2005. Final Report of the National 169. Laurent Bonelli, “The Control of Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the the Enemy Within? Police United States. (New York: W. W. Intelligence in the French Suburbs Norton, 2004), pp. 74-75, 77, 81, and Its Relevance for Globalization,” 93. in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, 177. George Tenet, “Written Statement eds., Controlling Frontiers (Aldershot: for the Record of the Director of Ashgate Publishing, 2005), pp. 103- Central Intelligence Before the 205. National Commission on Terrorist 170. John Rowe, QC, “Review of the Attacks Upon the United States,” Operation of the Prevention of April 14, 2004, online at https:// Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/ Act 1989,” a report by the U.K. Home speeches/2004/tenet_ Office, March 7, 2000, ch. 12. testimony_04142004.html. 171. Lord Carlile of Berriew, QC, 178. The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report “Report on the Operation in 2001 of the National Commission on Terrorist of the Terrorism Act 2000,” a Attacks Upon the United States, ch. 3. report by the U.K. Home Office, 179. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking the November 26, 2002, annex 1. This Patriot Act: Keeping America Safe and Free report is available for each year (New York: Century Foundation since 2002. Press, 2005), introduction. 172. Ibid., annex F. 165 180. Robert A. Levy, CATO Handbook for 186. Schulhofer, Rethinking the Patriot Act: Congress, Policy Recommendations for the Keeping America Safe and Free, p. 5. 108th Congress (Washington, DC: 187. Bernstein et al., “Questions, CATO Institute, 2002), p. 120, Bitterness and Exile for Queens online at http://www.cato.org/ Girl in Terror Case.” pubs/handbook/hb108/ 188. James J. Zogby, Arab-American hb108-12.pdf. Attitudes and the September 11 Attacks, a 181. Testimony of the Honorable John report of a poll commissioned by Ashcroft, attorney general of the the Arab American Institute, United States, before the U.S. October 15, 2001, p. 3. Senate Committee on the Judiciary 189. Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, hearing on “The War Against “Top Aide Defends Domestic Terrorism: Working Together to Spying,” New York Times, February 7, Protect America,” March 4, 2003, 2007; the numbers speculation was online at http://judiciary.senate further elaborated in Leslie .gov/testimony.cfm?id=612&wit_ Cauley, “NSA Has Massive id=42. Database of Americans’ Phone 182. Karen Greenberg, “The Courts and Calls,” USA Today, May 10, 2006, the War on Terror,” TomDispatch, and Susan Page, “NSA Secret March 13, 2005, online at Database Report Triggers Fierce http://www.tomdispatch.com/index Debate in Washington,” USA Today, .mhtml?pid=2256. May 11, 2006. 183. Nina Bernstein, William 190. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims.” Rashbaum, and Souad Mekhennet, 191. For more information about these “Questions, Bitterness and Exile initiatives, see the Web sites of the for Queens Girl in Terror Case,” U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth New York Times, June 17, 2005. Office, http://www.fco.gov.uk, and 184. Schulhofer, Rethinking the Patriot Act: the Department of Communities Keeping America Safe and Free, p. 3. and Local Government, http:// 185. Hamdi gave up his American citizen- www.communities.gov.uk. ship and was deported to Saudi Communities and Local Govern- Arabia in September 2004, after the ment was established in May 2006; U.S. Supreme Court remanded his one of its policy remits is to build case in June (124 S Ct. 2633 2004); community cohesion and tackle Padilla is now being tried, but not on extremism. the original charges. 166 192. See the testimony of Daniel 204. Migration Policy Institute, Changer Sutherland, pp. 4-5. les principes en actions, p. 60. 193. Pierre-Yves Cusset, “Les statis- 205. Michel Delberghe, “Des tiques « ethniques » : premiers Employeurs recrutent en bas des éléments de cadrage,” pp. 1-6. tours,” Banlieues un an après, p. iii, Le 194. Aristide Zolberg with Allison Joy Monde, October 26, 2006. Clarkin, Sharing Integration Experiences: 206. F. D. Wilson, “Metropolitan Labor Innovative Practices on Two Continents Markets and Ethnic Niching,” (New York: Center for Migration, paper no. 1204-00 in the Poverty Ethnicity and Citizenship, the New Discussion Papers series of the School, 2003). University of Wisconsin Institute 195. Khouri-Dagher, “Française du for Research on Poverty, 2000. Maghreb: la Réussite Silencieuse.” 207. Khouri-Dagher, “Française du 196. Migration Policy Institute, Changer Maghreb: la Réussite Silencieuse,” les principes en actions; and Hashmi, emphasizes the importance of “Race, Gender and Difference: hundreds of such associations for Western Europe.” the economic success of Muslim 197. Eric Pfanner, “Britain Debates women in France. State Aid for Muslim Schooling,” 208. Catherine Wihtol de Wenden and International Herald Tribune, October Christophe Bertossi, “Les militaires 31, 2005. français issus de l’immigration,” the 198. Migration Policy Institute, Changer Centre d’Études en Sciences les principes en actions, p. 48. Sociales de la Défense (Research 199. Ibid., p. 50. Center for the Social Sciences of 200. Ibid., p. 52. Defense/C2SD), no. 78, 2005. 201. Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and 209. Garbaye, Getting Into Local Power: The France: Ideas and Policymaking Since the Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British and 1960s, pp. 197-201. French Cities, p. 200 202. Cusset, “Les statistiques 210. Roger Waldinger and Mehdi « ethniques » : premiers éléments Bozorgmehr, “From Ellis Island de cadrage,” pp. 13-18. to LAX,” unpublished paper, 203. European Monitoring Centre on Department of Sociology, Racism and Xenophobia, Muslims University of California, Los in the European Union: Discrimination Angeles, August 1993. and Islamophobia (Vienna: Manz Crossmedia, 2006). 167 211. Alba and Foner, “Entering the House of Lords, has yet to deliver a Precincts of Power: Do National report on this subject that was Differences Matter for Immigrant commissioned in 2006. Minority Political Representation?” 217. These proposals have not been p. 1. endorsed by the Muslim Council of 212. See Garbaye, Getting Into Local Power: Britain. See Jane Perlez, “Britain The Politics of Ethnic Minorities in British Aims to Isolate Muslim Extremists, and French Cities; and Hassan Bousetta, Official Says,” New York Times, April “Immigration, Post-Immigration 6, 2007. Politics and Political Mobilization of 218. Hartley-Brewer, “Clarke Launches Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative Triple Offensive Against Terror.” Case Study of Moroccans in Four 219. See the testimony of Daniel European Cities,” doctoral disserta- Sutherland, p. 3. tion, Catholic University, Brussels, 220. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 2001. 221. Ibid., p. 7. 213. Laurence and Vaisse, Integrating 222. The 9/11 Commission report: Final Islam: Political and Religious Challenges in Report of the National Commission on Contemporary France, pp. 157-159. Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 214. See, inter alia, Leclerc, “Des pp. 74-75. émeutiers violents, mais bien insérés”; 223. Commission of the European Michel Delberghe, “Des Employeurs Communities, Communication from recrutent en bas des tours”; and the Commission to the Council and the Natalie Guibert, “La majorité des European Parliament on a Community mineurs présentés aux juges étaient Immigration Policy, pp. 24-28. ‘inconnus’ des tribunaux,” Le Monde, 224. European Union Monitoring November 26, 2005. Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 215. See the FCO Web site, Engaging Muslims in the European Union: with the Islamic World Group: Discrimination and Islamophobia, p. 32. http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/ 225. Ibid., pp. 44-47. Front?pagename=OpenMarket/ 226. “Active Participation of Ethnic Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= Minority Youth in Society,” a paper 1133774501517. delivered at the European 216. The Mosques and Imams National Conference on Active Participation Advisory Board led by Lord of Ethnic Minority Youth in Ahmed, a Muslim member of the Society, a conference hosted by the

168 Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs in Copenhagen, September 7-8, 2006. 227. Alliance of Civilizations, Report of the High-Level Group (United Nations: New York, November 13, 2006), p. 35. The Alliance of Civilizations is an initiative launched in July 2005 by then- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan and cosponsored by the prime ministers of Spain and Turkey. It works to bridge divides between societies that are being exploited by extremists. 228. Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany, ch. 1. 229. Pascale Robert-Diard, “Ce prénom, ce n’est pas moi! ” Le Monde, April 14, 2007. Trans. Shaanti Kapila. 230. European Union Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, p. 31. 231. Alliance of Civilizations, Report of the High-Level Group, p. 30. 232. Ibid.

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The Center for Dialogues has received funding from the Carnegie Corporation, the Spanish foundation El Legado Andalusí, the nongovernmental organization of His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, Majlis El Hassan, the MacArthur Foundation, the Qatar Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund; the governments of Austria, Denmark, France, Malaysia, The Netherlands, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom; and individual philanthropists Farooq Kathwari and Mortimer Zuckerman.

Sorbonne-educated Mustapha Tlili is the founder and director of the Center for Dialogues, a research scholar at New York University, and senior fellow at its Remarque Institute. Previously, Prof. Tlili taught at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and was a senior fellow at the World Policy Institute of the New School. He is a former senior UN official, having served as director for communications policy in the UN Department of Public Information; director of the UN information center for France, located in Paris; and chief of the Namibia, Anti-Apartheid, Palestine, and decolonization programs in the same department. An established novelist, Mustapha Tlili is a knight of the French Order of Arts and Letters. He is also a member of Human Rights Watch’s Advisory Committee for the Middle East and North Africa.

New York University is one of the world’s largest private universities. NYU’s president, Dr. John Sexton, is passionately committed to the goal of making NYU the first truly global university. As the University achieves its core mission—the production of knowledge and the education of students for lives of leadership and service–it also seeks to foster a culture of informed dialogue and debate. The University encourages the exchange of ideas, knowledge, practice, and beliefs inside, and outside, the classroom. A private university in the public service MUSLIM YOUTH AND WOMEN IN THE WEST: SOURCE OF CONCERN OR SOURCE OF HOPE? Center for Dialogues: Islamic World—U.S.—The West