THE POLITICAL RELATIONS OP THE UNITED STATES AND NICARAGUA
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement] for the degree of Master of Arts of the Graduate Sehool of the Texas Technological College 1930
Mamie Wolffarth
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^05" TABLE OP COHTESTS
I Ve>^D Chapter I QKOORAPHIC AND OTHER FACTORS 3 &-A>.ti 1. Area and Population. 2* East and West* Chapter II EARLY RELATIONS 9 1* Traditional Parties* 2. Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. 3, Rivas Walker Government* Chapter III OVERTHROW OF THE ZELAYA REGIME 16 1* Central American Court of Justice* 2* Conservative Revolution. 3* Dawson Agreements* 4* Mena ^evolt* 5, Bryan«>Chamorro Treaty* Chapter IV THE CHAMORKO COUP D'ETAT 27 1* Washington Compact, 1923* 2* Election of 1924* 3. Withdrawal of Marines* 4* Chamorro Coup d*£tat* 5* Liberal ^evolution* 6* Peace Conference* Chapter V ELECTION OF DIAZ AND HECOGNITION 39 1. Election of Diaz, 2* Reeognltlon of Dias* 3* Mexican Interference. 4* Ameriean Intervention* •2
Chapter VI THE STIMSON AGREEMENT 55 1* Peaee Movements* 2* Stismon Investigati Chapter I i^^]r aSOSHAPHIC AND OTHER FACTORS Sj**'' The Rgpublies of Central America and the West Indies secured their independence from Spain in 1823* The Central American countries were first united under *The Federation of Central American States* which was recognized by the United States when President Monroe received Mr. Canaz as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, August 4, 1824*^ This confederation consisted of the States of Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Salvador. The union, however, did not last long. The people had had virtually no self government under Spanish mO-e; they did not understand their new constitutions; they were accustomed to favoritism and corruption and it was difficult if not iispossible to ia^lant respect for law and honesty in adnd.nistration The holding of fair elections was impossible** ^ -'• >- the party in power always won* Hewolts were chronic ., ?• -'^'^^ so the union split up into five republics* Hiearagua was recognized by the United States Deeenftier 24, 1849, by President Taylor*s receiving Mr. Bduardo Comanoho as Mlearaguan ChargI d«Affaires .^ ^Mo«re2 Interaatlonal Law Digest, Vol* I, p. 92, *IW:d« Nicaragua is the largest of the five Central Asierican Republics having an area of 46,950 square miles of which Lakes Nicaragua and Managua occupy substcmtially 3,000 square miles*^ Nicaragua is bounded on the South by Costa Rica and on the North by Honduras* Nicaragua is sharply divided into the East and the Wcat* In the West the two lakes are the doidnant feature, the climate is coaqparatively healthful, and a considerable portion is capable of cultivation* Although the western and eastern portion of the country is fairly evenly divided, seven-eights of the population reside in the western part largely because of the more healthful climate. Around the lakes on the fertile plains may be found the capital, Managua, and the rival cities of Granada and Leon* Connecting these cities from Iiske Nicaragua to Corinto on the Pacific Coast runs the only railroad. So far all efforts to extend this railroad to the East have failed* The eastern district is made up of Jungles and swaa^s having an average rainfall of 194*9 inches per year with a rainfall of 251 inches in San Juan del Norte* Rainfall in the H[. W. Cu29herland: Nicarai^ - -An Economic and Financial Survey, p. 6* -5 western district averages 61*5 inches* No exact count has ever been made of the population of Nicaragua* It is approximately 650,000. About two-thirds of the population are of Indian stock, about one-sixth are primarily of Europeeua origin and about one tenth are negroes— the rest are mixed* Oriental immigration is prohibited* Because of the high birth and death rate a relatively small portion of the total population is found in the economically productive age group which is estimated at 125,000. Peonage in Nicaragua is absent and Nicaragaan workmen are considered as good as any in Central America *1 A line miglht be drawn tram Seuva Segovia to the town of ^an Juan del Norte (Greytovn) dividing the East from the V/est* One of the greatest problems of Nicaragua today is amalgamating these two parts into a unified state. The twenty-five thousand Mosquito Indians, megroes, mixed and whites continue to distrust, as they have a right to do, those six hundred and twenty-five thousand citizens of predominantly Spanish blood who continue to look iipon the "Costinos*' with contesq^t. They have very little chance of ever seeing each other* ^^hn&erland: Nicaragua—An Economic and Financial Survey, p. 12* -6 fM sust sosst tedsy is sv^a further f roM Ifansgus thsm tt vss itam Cemellus Vsndsrhllt ofsrsted hits ssmsl* Tbm Xong rslagr ssas 'Hhitiag liNlismsi*Ooottgupid>o Determinism ia Mosrsgasf AaasJUi^ IMv. p* 142* "atats Dspartmeast A Brisf History of ths ^slstioM -7 revenue so all incoBie from tariff, liquor, and similar duties is sent in to Managva* Direct and local taxes are almost imused in Nicaragua so the districts must depend uxxm the central government to return enough taxes to meet their local needs* Since 1894 to the present time all Bluefielders have believed that the central government promised England to spend a certain part of the district's income within the borders of the district and they resent the fact that this is very seldom done if at all*^ Local pride j^evails more in Nicaragua than patriotism* The cost of living in the east la also much higher than in the west* In view of these facts it is only natural for Bluefields to be the center for plotting revolutions Most any leader can get followers if he promises justice from Managua or sejjaration of the east and west* Then, too, government troops, especially during the rainy season, can hardly get over the mountains, through the Jungles, and down rivers to p«it down a revolution in less than three or four months* It is not strange that the rebellion against Zelaya started here, nor that ^aeasa set up his capital on the east coast* ^IThiting Williams: "Geographic Determinism in Nicaragua*" Annals, 1927. p. 144* -8 Another sore spot which results from the geographic conditions is the fact that becaiise of the wide separation of these isolated parts from the central government, the local governor is usually a despot* He is too far away to receive daily orders and be checked up on by the govemntent* In Bluef ields every officer from Governor down to ordinary policeman is sent from Managua. One Governor after foxir months on a salary of two hundred and fifty dollars retired with twenty thousand do3talars*^ And yet it is necessary to keep this system of appointive officers so that the central govemsient can protect itself in time of revolt by sisqply removing all local officers and sending new ones in to check up on the sit\iation* It is necessary for an American to understand these geographic factors and also bear in mind that the Latin tenqperament is extremely different from the Anglo-Saxon in order to understand the political situation as it exists in Nicaragua* nliiting Williams: "Geographic Determinism ia Nicaragua.* Annals, 1927. p* 143* -9 Chapter II EARLY RI::LATIONS Added to the natural difficulties under which Nicaragua struggles because of geographic conditions is the fact that political rivalry in the state resembles a nation wide feud and elections frequently become riots which may res"ult in revolutions* Politics is based upon sectionalism rather than principle * There are two parties in Nicaragua today and they are traditional rivals* The Conservatives got their start at Granada when it was an important trading center between Madrid and the Central Americeu:! capital at Guateroala City. The Liberals look down on the traders of Granada and trace their origin fcLrther back to the more professional and idealistic citizens of Leon*-^ The years have grown to represent so much prosecution and so many iisprisonments that a meniber of either party upon gaining power is considered a traitor to his x>arty and relatives unless he gets revenge by bringing about the ruination of as many x>olitical enemies as possible* Political leaders are forced to go into exile when the rival party gains control ^Dodd: "The United States and Nicaragua^' The Annals, 1927, p. 135-136* -10 of the government and wait for the return of their I>arty to power. The property of those v;ho do not leave is ordinarily seized and the political friends of the government grow fat* Practically all of the higher class, more intelligent people are members of one or the other of the two parties, A business career since it is made so risky by the political situation is hardly worth while for any of them. A political career means endangering one's life and property and probably years of exile so the leaders naturally have grown to believe that they should make the best of it while they are in power. All sorts of political graft may be practiced without any stigma whatsoever being attached to a man's honor. In atteBqE>ting to analyze the situation in Nicaragua it is always well to bear in rdnd the fact that one is first a Conservative or a Liberal and then a Nicaraguan. A Conservative is more closely akin to a Conservative in Honduras than he is to a Liberal in Nicaragua* The above mentioned conditions contributed to two events between 1850 and 1860 which served to turn the attention of the American people to Nicaragua. The first of these was the signing •11 of the ClsytOBo-Bulwer Treaty and the seoox»i was the filibusteriag expedition of William Walkor* Prior to the signiag of the treaty Great Britaia had ooeupled the Xosq:«ito Coast under ths guiss of a protectorate over the Mosquito Kiagdom* This aet was based upon claims dating back to the sii^teeath century which had been abandoned by a treaty with Spain in 1786 and were revived a^UUi ia 1841« The Mosquito flag was raised and ths Sagllsli. and Indians drove out the Nisaraguans and renamed the city Oreytown* The United States Gonsistsatly refused to recogalse the Mosquito kiag*s claim to sovereignty over the regioa* This teivitory beloaged to Costa Rica and Hioaragua and iaoluded ths mouth of the ^aa Juan River* This gave Orest Britaia eotitrol over ths possible eanal route through Nicaragua* Great Britaia gained from Xis6Lragua certaia rights ia coaaeetlon with the navigation of the Sua Juan River^. but ths Siosraguan govsmmeat disregarded its obllgatioas aad prooeeded to grant soafliotiag rights to ths Ibtited States* la Juas 1849, Mr* Hue, ChargI dtAffaires of the United States ia Central Amsspisst negotiated without the authorization or knowledge '^Idsasir History of Foreiga Policy of the United States* W?rf»I7 -12 of his govemmsat a treaty with lisaragua which gave the United States exclusive rights in the eoftstructioa of a eanal throa^ the territory of that stats^^ Sspteaher 28, 1849, Mr* Squier sigasd a treaty with Hondaras which ceded Tiger Island ia the Bay of Fonseca to the United States giving to her a zxaval station on the Pacific side of the isthmus* Neither of these treaties were ever submitted to tlie Senate but both were used to oust Great Britaia from her position* The United States could not consent to a canal of such vital importaaoo to the Uaited States being under the exclusive control of any other power* The Clsytoa^Buli^r Treaty was signed April 19, 1850, sad remained in force until 1901*^ It was agreed ia the treaty that neither nation would *ever obtain for itself axqr exclusive control over any ship sanal, or fortify it or colonize or assums to sxereise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Hioa^ the MMquito Coast or any portion of Central imsrloa**^ This invited the building of the sanal by private capital rather than governments* la case a private con^any built a eanal both nations ^Lstaass American Foreign Policy, p* 312* ^Adsass Bistory of ^oreiggToIXcy of j^^ United « Ststss» p* aaS* 13 were to have etasl tolls* The British however failed at first to withdraw from the Mosquito Coast sad relatioas became extremely strained* Just at this time Great Britaia became iavolved ia the Crimean War and as a result receded from her positioa and in direct negotiations with Niearagas aeknowledged Nisaraguans sovereignty over the Bay Islands aad the Mosquito Coast in 1860*^ Just when conditions were most strained with Great Britaia ia 1854, William ^alker gained control of the government of Nlfl»ragaa through a filibustering ea^editioa* Peior to this ia 1849 Cornelius Vaaderbilt sad Bfwe San Francisco capitalists had established the Aosessory Transit Qmai^axx^ la Hiearagna to oarry persons across the isthimis lAio were on their way to California I a monopoly was secured from ths goveraaseat* When Walker and his band of Amerieaa adventurers arrived Nioaragua was in the throes of oae of its numerous rovblutioas* ^alker sueessded ia overthrowing tise goverameat and set \x^ Doa Pateioio Rivas as President and himself as eommai^er* ia-ohief of the araQf*^ At first the United States refused reoognitioa aad issued orders to prsveat W^^ g ^ Paaiffi POU2I ££ tj. ^ItoorOf laterafttioaal Law Digest* WLm I, pp* 140-141. -14 all such expeditions. However, on May 14, 1856, a minister from Nicaragua was received*! President Pierce defended this action ui>on the grounds that it was necessary to recognize some government in order to be able to protect American lives and property and Walker's government was the only one which existed. Recognition was withdrawn a few months later, July 24, 1856, because there were two factions contesting for the government and the United States did not want to make a decision in favor of either,2 The two factions which were attesting to secure control were each backed by American financiers. In 1855 Vanderbilt made the mistake of going to EHirope and leaving the Accessory Transit in the hands of Charles Morgan* 'talker was dependent upon Morgan for the transportation of men and supplies and so Morgan forced him to annul the charter of the company and create another in which Morgan had chief control* Vanderbilt returned from Europe and set out to ruin Morgan and incidentally %lker. He advanced money to pay for the armies of Walker's enemies in Hond-uras and Costa Hica.^ Each group of "patriots" was backed %oore: International Law Digest, Vol. I, p. 142, gibid: p. 143-144* *^;\dains: History of the Foreign Policy of ths United states, p. ^85* -15 by an Amsrieaa capitalist* The government of the United States protested wsakly and the American people cheered for one side or the other, Vanderbilt's army was successful. Walker was shot, and the govern ment fell back into the hands of natives* -16 Chapter III OVERTHROW OF THE ZELAYA REGIME Following the turbulent period of the fifties there was a period of Conservative rule in Nicaragss lasting about thirty years. This was for Nicaragss a period of unusually stable rule. Even the Liberals were fairly well satisfied since life and property was protected. Executive offices according to ths Conservative practice were rotated among ths most influential Conservative families, Dissentioa eventually arose however in the ranks of the Conservatives and as a result a youxig Liberal leader, JosI Santos Zelaya becaiiie President ia 1893*^ For sixteen years he continued to domiaate the country. His regis^ was nmrked by cruelty and corruption of the worst kind. He negotiated a loan from England and entered into secret negotiations with Japan concerning the building odT a canal*^ For several years prior to 1906 Zels^fa systematically Interfered in Central American affairs and exercised such coaq;>lete control over Hondaras that Guatemala and Salvador were endeavoriag jfican NlcaragEua cmd The United States, pp* 705* gibidt pp» 7W-W8* -17 to stir up revolutions against v^im in Honduras and Nicaragua, Conditions in Central America during this period were unusually unsettled, A war had been ended between Guatemala and Salvador through mediation by the United States and Mexico and in 1907 due to the influence of Roosevelt and President Diaz of Mexico, the five republics sent delegates to Washington where a general treaty of peace was signed and the Central American court of Justice was established for the peaceful settlement of disputes*! The countries at this time also agreed not to support any government which had come into power through bloodshed* President Zelaya opposed the court and continued to control Honduras* He encouraged revolutionary BK>vements of all sorts and fitted out filibustering expeditions * In October, 1909, members of the Conservative party started a revolution at Bluefields against Zelaya*^ The movement was regarded with sympathy in other Central American republics and by the United States* Conditions became intolerable and many people in Nicaragua and Hondxiras appealed to ^Latane: American Foreign Policy, pp. 549, 2lbid. -18 the United States to intervene and restore order.! President Diaz of Mexico was friendly to Zelaya and refused to cooperate with the United States any further. Nothing was done however until in NoveMber, 1909, two Americans were put to death attended by barbarous cruelties,^ These men had forfeited their right to the protection of the United States through participating in the revolution but that did not prevent the United States from resenting the manner in which they were treated. December 1, 1909, Mr. Snox as Secretary of State notified Senor Rodriguez, Nicaraguan Chargl d'Affaires at Washington, that the United States had decided no longer to recognize the government of President Zelaya*^ The Knox note which atteopted to lecture Zelaya for his behavior and set forth the reasons for tlie United States' breaking off diplomatic relations bro\ight Mr, Knox great renown and esteem in Central America* This action of the United States caused the downfall of Zelaya* He turned the government over to Dr. Jose Madriz cuid went into exile. The United States because of the stand it ^Latane: American Foreign Policy, pp, 549-550, ?Ibid* ^Soorej International Law Digest, Vol, I, p, 266* -19 had taken could not recognize a friend of zelaya, Madriz attesqpted to hold on for awhile but when the United States frustrated his attenqpted blockade of Bluefields! he yielded to the inevitable and the government fell into the hands of the insurgent chief Estrada, August 21, 1910,^ Estrada immediately attes^ted to secure the recognition of the United States* The American Minister at Panama, Sflr. Dawson, was sent to Nicaragua to report upon the situation* Mr. Dawson presented the views of the United States to Estrada and as a result the Dawson agreements were signed in October, 1910*^ Under these agreements Provisional President Estrada, Minister of Foreign Affairs Diaz, Minister of Finance Mena and General Chamorro agreed to call immediate elections and convoke a constituent assembly to elect a President and Vice-President for a period of two years* Estrada and Diaz were agreed upon for President and Vice- President respectively for the teaqporary period during which regular elections were to be held* A new constitution was to be adopted to include guarantees for the rights of foreigners, the ^ox; Nicaragtia and the United States, p. 709. foreign R#latlons ot tlte'UCT^eT'SlgaTes, 1911, p. 652. -20 sbolltioB Of monopolies, and free elections at ths expiration of tl» two year period* It was further agrosd that Nicaragua would seek the good off lees of ths United States in obtaining a loaa ia order to rehabilitate the country's finances and settle its foreign aad doioestie claimB* The loan would be secured by the custcmm revenue of Nioarsgiis* Provision was made for the establish- msnt of a slaims eonmlssicm to investigate claims sgaiast the government*! The sleotioa la HoveaS>er was a Coaservative viotox7* Thirty-thousand votes were east and General Estrada was elected President uwier ths %wsoa agre«»sats aad to^ office January 1, 1911*^ The Sioaragoaa Mixed Claims C<»miissloa coaposod of two Americaas aiMl a Nlearaguan heard 7911 claims representiag twoaty-five nati<»ialitles and aaouatiag to $13»806,1S1 of whl<^ 11,840,432 were allowed* Oaly 7«X ptsMimBt of American claims were approved as oon^arod to 12*7 for other foreigners and 22*2 for xmitives*' The Knox policy freed Niearagas from moaofpoll^B and coaeessions iie^urred duriag the Zolaya rogias through settlements madto by this ^tate Departzaents A Brief Histoxy of the Relatioas ^ Between the Ualte'E ^tates*ltna Nicaragua> P» €• ^/eiisols "The Uaited States and Central /laerlea* Annals* 1927, p* 125* -21 commission* Nicaragua is singularly free from such today* The first step in the plan for financial reorganization was to be the raising of stifficient capital by loans placed in the United States under the supervision of the Department of State at a reasonable rate of interest so as to provide for the development of resoxirces*! Through efforts of the State Department American bankers made preliminary loans to Nicarag\ia while a treaty was being negotiated* Brown Brothers and Ccmqpany and J, and W. Seligman and ConQ>any made an advance loan of 11,500,000 in return for treasury bills secTired by customs revenues. Colonel Clifford D, Ham was appointed Collector-General of Customs and has had that office every since* He was representative of both American and European bond holders and was responsible to the Nicaraguan Minister of Finance and the Secretary of State of the United States,2 The plan provided also for an annual budget to cover ordinary expenditures and for a national bank* Fifty-one percent of the stock in the national bank and also the majority stock in the national railway were turned over to ^/eitzel: "The United States and Central America" Annals, 1927. p, 122* ^Cox: Mfcaragua and the United States, p. 714* -22 American bankers who had advanced loans*! When the treaty was rejected by the Senate bankers refused further loans. However, there now existed the interest of American bankers in the national bank and railroad to be "protected.* Conditions in Nicaragua during this period were far from stable* There was a constant sotirce of friction betv/een the two rival Conservative leaders Mena and Chamorro. In June, 1911, President Diaz, who was then serving out Estrada's term, liad stated that American intervention woxild be necessary to maintain peace and he prcj^csed in Deceniber to insert a clause in the new Constitution which would permit intervention by the United States in order to maintain peace and the existence of a lawful government *2 The United States failed to express any opinion on this matter* In July, 1912, Diaz appointed Emiliano Cb&morro Minister of War instead of Mena, Mena then revolted against Diaz*^ This was a serious challenge to the Knox policy of constitutional governments* In August, 1910, conditions in Managua had become so serious that a Legation guard !cox: Nicaragua and the United States, p, 714* ^Foreign kelatjons olHEke^irrST, 1911, p. 670. ^Cox? Nicaragua an^the United States, p. 717, -23 of one hundred men was sent by the United States Navy. Managua was attacked by the rebels and property of various foreigners, including Americans, Italiams, British and other nationalities was seized by revolutionary forces.! The Legation guard was increased by three hundred and sixty additional marines* American forces were landed at Bluefields for the protection of American and foreign interests there* President Diaz indicated his inability to afford protection for American citizens and property. The United States thereupon declared its policy which was to keep an adequate litesgatio:! guard at Managua, keep open communication, and protect American lives and property*^ The United States also opposed a return to Zelayaism* American marines took over the railroad* Because of the American attitude the Mena revolt failed, but it had cost the national govern ment about |2,000,000 and had increased the war claims to about $20,000,000.^ Finances were thus placed in a worse condition than ever. Diaz was reelected in the election of November 2, 1912. Secretary Knox attempted to negotiate a new !state Department: A Brief History of the Relations ^ Between the Unite'3 ^tates'"and illcaragua, p^ S, 3lSr3: p. 10. -24 treaty to aid Xiosrsgoa ia her fiaaacial troubles* CIrsat Britaia was threateaiag to f ores paymeat oa her claims| Germaa iaterests were attempting to sosure a eoasossioa for ths coastructioa of a saaal*-^ Fotouary, 193L3» toward the close of President TsTt's admlaistratioap a treaty was negotiated granting to the Uaited States the exclusive right to build a oanal by the Xisaragoaa route aad lease the Cora IsXaads as naval stations, the United States agresiag to pay |3#00090(K>*^ Certaia parts of ths Piatt amsadmeat were iaoluded in this treaty aad the Senate objected* Costa Rica, Salvador, aad Eoadaras filed formal protests with the United States govenmiont because they held that it formed an obstacle to Central American unioai Hondii2*as and S«tlvador objected because it Infringed their JarisdictioaaX rights ia the Gulf of Foaseca; Costa Rica alome objected because Nicaragua ia grant lag the canal conoessioa without her coassat disregarded the terms of President Cleveland's sward of Hsy 22, 1888^ as to their mutual 3 Xhs Wils ^Lataast American Foreign Policy* p* 552* 5i^<»3POs latemationai Law Digest* Vol* I, p* 400* ^tato Psgartmsats A BrlsT gjstory of ths Relatioas of lioaim^caa aad "ghe Oaited StalesT fT^Xfl •25 policy and on August 5, 1914, a new treaty which omits the provisions of the Plett Amendment was signed at Washington and was ratified by the Senate February 18, 1916 and granted to the United States in perpetuity the exclusive right to construct a canal by way of the San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, and leased to the United States for ninety-aine years a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, aad also Great Corn and Little Com Islands as coaling stations. The consideration for these favors was $3,000,000 to be expendSd with the approval of the Secretary of State of the United States in paying the debts of Nicaragua and for other purposes.! To meet the objections of Costa Rica, Salvador, and Honduras the Senate attached to their resolution of ratification the proviso "that nothing in said convention is intended to affect any existing right of any of the said states."^ This reservation did not satisfy Costa Rica and Salvador and they took their cases to the Central American Court of Justice requesting that Nicaragua be enjoined from carrying out the provisions of the treaty* Nicaragua refused to be a party to the action but the co\irt assumed Jurisdiction.^ The court handed down a decision ^Latano: American Foreign Pollcy, pp. 553-554* ^state Department I A Brief history of the Relations Between the Unite? states^and Nicaragua, p. 17* ^Latane;""Amerioan Foreign PoTIcy, pp. 555-554. •26 ia favor of Costa Riea aad Salvador but it had no jariadiotion over the United States* Siaaragna aad the Uaited States ignored its dseisicA aad it oalisaqpmitly oollapsod* Xhs I^^OOO^OOO i^ich ths United States paid XioaragQa in coaB^ideratioa f«* ths favoxrs ssoured uadar the trea^ was used to stabillzo ths sordova aad oonsolidate the debts of ths Republlo*! This series of oveats brouglit about two develop- meats ia the Uaited States poli^ toward Nioaraguas the Ittox poUey of lending moral support to eoastitu- tioaal gov^raasats, aad ths asosssity t&r pa*oteotii^ ths ri^^s secured vx^b^r the treaty* MMB Slstgr:^ of the RelatRelatioai s aad iJloaragua* p* xv* -27 Chapter IT THE CHAMORRO COUP D'ETAT A Legatioa guard of about one hundred mariaes rsmaiaed ia iioaragittL uatil 1925, The. electioas of 1916 aad 1920 were typical Nicaraguan elections* The'Liberals were ia reality not allowed to participate* However, it was assumed that the Legatioa guard was supporting the Conservative party so no revolutions broke out during this period* In the interim Nicaragua's financial condition had been iaproved considerably due to financial sttpervisioa. At the end of 1924 the Collector- General reported the largest trade In the history of the coaatry* The debt had heen reduced to less than 07,500,000 which was less than a fourth of what it had been ia 1911*^ By Septesiber, 1919, the bankers wer-e paid in full for the advances mads ia 1913 ia the form of treasury bills* The firm of Brova Brothers withdrew! the S^Ugmaa Coaqpany soatimied to act as agents for the foreign b ^oau NJearagittL aad the United States* p* 737* •> '\ -28 the national baak became the property of the govera meat*! Mr* Hughes in 1923 succeeded in concluding a group of treaties by which the five Central American republics bound themselves to recogalse oaly cimstitutional governments in their sister z^publies and to refraia from participating in coup dtetats against the government of another state or from intervening directly or Indirectly in one another's internal affairs^2 The United States was not a party to these treaties but sines she had acted as sponsor of them the policy of reoognizlng only constitutional goveramente was adopted* The United States for a rxmi&>GT of years had been wanting to withdraw the marines from Nlcaragiia but could not do so because it would have meant the immediate outbreak of a revolutioa* The root of the trouble seemed to be the fact that fair. eleotioas were nerGv held* The Liberals did not. <^Jeot to the Amerieaa Legatioa goard so maoh as they did to the faet that it was impossible for a Mberal to be elected while the marines kept tho Conservatives ia power* The first step necessary ^coLi yiearagua and the United States* a* 738* ^Doddt^'flie tfaited Siaies aad Nicaragua* Anaals* 1927 p* 136* -29 to remedy the situatioa clearly was electioa reform* In January, 1922, the United States Department of State la accordance with agreeranats made with President Chamorro, recommended Dr, H, '7, Dodd to study the Nlcrraguan electoral situation*! In 1922 a new electoral law had been drafted and this was presented to the next Congress and was passed In satisfactory form on March 16, 1923* President Diego Chaisorro died in October, 1923, before the cos^letion of his term as President and Vice-President Martinez to<^ his place*2 Preaident Martinez desired to become a csutididate to succeed himself although this would have been unconstitutional* The Liberal party for this reason passed a resolution requesting the United States to supervise the elections* A method for holding a fair election having been provided, the American Legation infomwd the Presldest of Hioaragua that the marines would be withdrawn in Jaanary 1925 when the new President chosen ia the 1924 electicms would take office*^ Before time for the election there was a faotioaal split ia the Conservative ranks* General ^Bepartmsnt of States A Brief History of ths Relatioas ^ Betweea the tteited States aad Sioaragg,'lg723?I Sxbio* Tild* p* 24* -30 Smillsao Chamorro returned from Washington, where he had beea serviag as minister, to run for President* President Martinez was opposed to him bat was too weak to carry the eleetloa aloae* He had intended to run for President himself but could not carry the majority of the Conservative votes so he formed a coalition with the Liberals whereby Dr, Juan B* Sacasa \^s nominated for vice-presldeat aad Solorsano, a Conservative of the Martinez faction, was nominated for President*! Now the situatioa was reversed. The Liberals no loager wanted American supervision of the elections and Chamorro who had always been opx>osed to American si^rvisl '^Dodds *9he Thiited States aad Hioaragua* Annals* ^l»r, p. 138* ^rngSrUmit of Statss A Brief History of the Relatioas Betweea the United Sta'tes and Nicaragua, p. ^* «^1 President Solorsano that since the United States had iaforaed the Hioaraguan government fourteen moaths ia advance, the Nicaraguan government was responsible for any unfortunate results which might occur from the withdrawal through failure to provide for meeting the situation.! The Ds]^rtment of State, however, agreed to allow the marines to remain until Septeiatoer 1, 1925 provided satisfactory progress in the organisatioa of the constabulary was made in the n^antime* On January 7, 1925, the Uaited States formally recognized the Solorzano government.^ Having secured the recc^^nitlon of the United States aad the support of the marines for an exteaded period the Nicaraguan government xaade no attempt to organize a constabulary as it had agreed to do* No progress was made at all until in June, 1925* The Legation guard left Managiua on August 1 and sailed from Corinto on August 4, 1925*S Chamon^ had been waiting for this opportunity* la October Fort Loma which overlooks l^magaa revolted aad General Rivas doe to the influence of Chamorro ordered President Solorzano to dismiss several !Department of States Brief History of the Helaticats A gstweeBotweea the "Uaite * * d* atate '**~' s aad Hioaragua, p\ ^Ihid* 9* 28* -32 msmbers of his cabinet and appoint Conservatives* General Rivas then yielded his command to General Jose Solorzano Diaz, a brother-in-law of Presidsat Solorsano* But instead of protecting the President, General Diaz transferred his coBBsaad to followers of Chamorro and fled to the Atlantis Coast* General Chaiaorro took charge of Port Loma October 25^! Fort Loma is Nicaragua's only armory and contained al^ the amnoniti^si and war equipment* General CimjmoTro trained machine guns on President Solorzano's home for twenty-four hours* As a result President Solorzano decided to go back on his agreement with the Liberal Party, More changes were made in the cabinet, Chamorro was appointed General of the armies, and the Treasury was ordered to pay him #10,000 "war expenses•*2 President Solorzano became the puppet of Chamorro, A seiablance of legality was maintained through having Solorsano siga all papers and orders* An armed force was sent to Leon to bring back Sacasa, the Vice-President* Saeasa was warned that he mlg^t be killed so he rode horseback all night to the Gulf of Donsoca and took a launch to Salvador* ^New York Timess April 18, 1926, VIII, 1617. trXpWi !»» li86p VIII, 16:8* -33 Coagress oa Deseiober 4 charged Sacasa with disloyalty aad demaaded his return to Managua ia thirty days* Naturally he ref>i»ed to return so he was exiled for two years, the duraticm of Solorzano's term, for acts hostile to the Solorzano administration* He went from Salvador to Guatemala aad then on to New Orleans to spread Liberal propaganda* A number of congressEsen who had already met in one session of the legislature were refused their seats because they were "not constitutionally elected*" General Chamorro had himself elected Senator from the Province of Managua and the Senate appointed him "first designate" in line for the presidency*^ On March 4, Carlos Solorzano insisted that his resignation be accepted*^ Congress acceded and Solorsano sailed for San Fz^anclsco* According to the Niearaguaa Coastltutioa the Senate must choose a presidsat from its own members in case there is a vacancy both in the office of president aad vice-president* Chamorro since he was first designate was selected* The Uaited States because of the treaty of 1983 wherel^ the Central American Republics agreed j-Hew York Timest April 4^ 1926* njririS, 1926* -34 not to recognize any government coming into power through coup d'etat or revolution, refiised to recognize the Chamorro government. The United States' failure to recognize Chamorro cut off the receipts from customs to a large extent. Customs make up the greatest part of Nicaragua's income and are depended upon to pay bond issues and other obligations. It was not because Chamorro was personally objectionable to the United States that he was refused recognition* There were, in fact, several things in his favor. He had served a term as President from 1917 to 1921 and during that time he had granted complete freedom of speech and press, released political prisoners, advocated and advanced reforms and progressive works, labored for an Atlantic coast railroad project, improved Nicaragua's financial status, and declared war on Germany,! Upon again becoming President he granted all kinds of concessions to United States citizens in the Nicaraguan forests, mines, and oil lands, and attespted to negotiate a loan hoping that the moneyed interests would influence the United States to recognize his government. ^New York Times: April 4, 1926, 12:2. L1 -35 Naturally the Liberals rebelled against Chamoin?o. They held that upon the resignation of Solorzano Dr. Sacasa became constitutional president and many people agreed with them. On May 5, 1926, the United States fotind it necessary to send the United States Cruiser Cleveland to protect American interests in Bluefields.! j^ August, the American Legation reported vile excesses, murder, pillage and burning of property on the part of the rebels* The headquarters of the Nicaragua Sugar Estates, a London Company, was attacked and the assistant superintendent killed*^ During this time the govemii^nt hired American aviators and equipped their planes with machine guns and bombs in order to check gun running* Mexico was at this time aiding the rebels by supplying ammunition and men. August 27, 1926, Nicaragua protested Mexico's action to the League of Nations*^ This was of no avail for the Ifoxican foreign minister in replying to a note from the League stated that Mexico had no connections whatever with the League of Nations,^ The revolutionists used Mexico, Guatemala, and !New York Times: May 6, 1926, 10s2. gTildmSfrust 30, 1926, 3:4. yibid: Aiigust 28, 1926, 1:4. *Ibid: 1:3, ^v -36 Salvador as bases for entering Nicaragua, Thlu of course violated that part of the treaty of 1923 whereby the republics agreed not to assist revolutions against a sister state. During the latter part of August several hundred marines were landed at Bluefields to protect foreign life and property,! The Governor of the province had requested the landing saying that he could not guarantee the protection of foreign lives and property. The United States was obligated because of the Monroe Doctrine and also to protect American lives. * Conditions continued to grow worse so August 30 Rear Admiral Latia^r, Commander of the Caribbean Special Service Squadron was ordered to Bragmans Bltaff,2 This brought the total number of vessels up to thx^ee: one at Bluef ields and one at Corinto, Nicaragiia's leading sea port. Early in Septesiber Chamorro realized that he could not hold out since the United States continued to refuse him recognition. He indicated his willingness to resign in favor of a designate chosen by Coixgress. He was willing to allow the Liberal Party to participate in the government. ^New York Times: August 29, 1926, 18:4 ^Ibici: JTugust 51, 1926, 4:3, -37 On September 13, President Coolidge declared an embargo on the shipment of arms to Nicaragua*! Lawrence Dennis, American ChargI d'Affaires in Nicaragua, was authorized to use his good offices to bring about an agreement between the two parties. On September 17, an invitation was issued to the leaders in the Conservative and Liberal parties to attend a peace conference aboard the U.S.S. Tulsa at Corinto* The United States was merely to use its good offices in transmitting messages and providing a neutral place for the meeting to be held* President Chamorro issued Mr. Dennis safe conduct for members of the opposition party to attend the conference. Political prisonei»s were released for the same purpose. September 24, the Liberal National Committee agreed to attend a conference to provide for peace and constitutional government subject to the approval of Dp. Sacasa.^ A commission of Liberals was sent to request him to attend the conference. However, he refused saying he would not attend unless constitutional government was to be restored and to him that meant his being made president* !Departraent of State: "Nicaragua", September 13, 1926 For the Press* 5SE ^o^^ Times; September 25, 1926, 36:2. -38 Corinto was made a neutral zone from October 4 until the end of the conference. American sailors kept order. On October 16 the conference met without disorder.^ Mr. Dennis kept it from going on the rocks for awhile but on October 28 it came to a close—a co2i5>lete failure*2 The Liberals could not accept Diaz as the next president and they also admitted that they would be breaJiing their pledge to Mexico if any one but Dr, Sacasa v/as made president. They did indicate their willingness to accept a Conservative president chosen by Liberals or a Liberal president chosen by Conservatives. The Conservatives refused to accept Dr. Sacasa as constitutional president. They offered general amnesty to all, a president chosen by the legislature, and Liberal participation in the government. In spite of the fact that the conference was a failure, Chamcrro resigned tu3?ning the government over to one of his friends, Uriza. On November 2, 1926 the Conservative leaders asked the United States to support Uriza during the period of reorganiza tion of the government and to withstand expeditions from Mexico,^ THew York Timesi October 27, 1926, II. 7:5, gICT Chapter V ELECTION OF DIAZ AKL RECOGMTIOI. Uriza, in t\irn, was not acceptable to the United States. He was merely continuing the Chamon^ regime and he was not constitutionally elected. He soon realized that he coxild not continue in power so he called the members of the Congress which was chosen at the popular election in 1924 in extraordinary session to choose a President, The changes made diiring the regime of General Chamorro were nullified and the members who had been expelled were invited to resume their seats. Congress was thus restored to its original co]q>osition« Fifty-three were present out of a possible sixty- four. Adolfo Diaz received forty-five votes and so was elected by an absolute majority.! Carlos Solorzano had resigned in January, 1926 and Vice-President Sacasa had been out of the country since November, 1925. In the absence of these two the duty devolved upon Congress to name a designate from its own membership to fill the unexpired tez*m, November 14 in the presence of Congress, the diplomatic corps, government officials and naval TIew York Times: November 18, 1926, 14:4, k -40 officers of the United States, Adolfo Diaz was inaug\irated President of Nicaragua,! In Ills inaugural address he stated that he hoped for the continued friendship and good offices of the United States and deplored Mexican interference in an effort "to force on Nicaragua Mexican influence,"2 The Liberals could not agree to Diaz, The chief reason for the failure of the peace conference had been the fact that the Liberals refused to accept Diaz and the Conservatives insisted upon him,^ The United States recognized the Diaz government November 17. A number of other countries soon followed suit: Salvador, Gtmtemala, Colombia, and Panaaia,* Diaz was recognized by every cotmtry which recognized Nicaragua except Mexico,^ Many people thought that Dr. Sacasa should be the President. However, the Department of State since Sacasa was out of the country and had refused upon several occasions to return and the United States could not bring him back and make him President decided to recognize the de facto President Diaz who was willing to abide by international obligations and who incidentally was friendly to the United States, Mr. Kellogg stated that the ^New York Times; November 15, 1926, 4:5. yibid; November 14, 1926, 2:1. ^November 17, 1926, 4:2. December 1, 9:8. !toid: January 11, 1927, p. 2, -41 United States was only following International Law and the policy of Mr, Hughes toxrnrd Obregoa which is that the United States cannot always Inquire into how elections are held or how governments come into being. But if a de facto government is found exercising authority and upholding laws and international obligations then the United States recognizes it,! Mr, Charles C, Kberhardt, American Minister to Nicaragua, returned to Nicaragua in December cmd upheld Diaz,^ The Nicaraguan Minister Alejandro Cesar arrived in Washington and presented his letters of credence to President Coolidge Jcuouary 20, 1927,^ The recognition of Diaz was protested by T. S, Vaca representative of the Nicaraguan Liberals at Washington, He charged "dollar diplomacy." On November 17, a coimnission appointed from among the Liberal revolutionists left Bl\iefields for Guatemala to request former Vice-President Sacasa to retxim to Nicaragua and establish a Liberal government on the coast ,^ On December 2, iir. Sacasa was inaugurated as "Constitutional !New York Tiros; January 8, 1927, gXCTrfT December 9, 1926, 4:3, *^partment of State: "Remarks of the Newly Appointed Minister of Kicaragua Senor Dr, Don Alejandro Cesar Upon the Presentation of His Letter of Credence Thursday, January 20, 1927," New York Times: November 18, 1926, 14:4, -42 President" by a band of Liberals at Puerto Cabezas where his capital was set up. Dr. Sacasa named his cabinet and appointed General Jose Marie Moncada War Minister,! Six days later Mexico recognized the Liberal government,2 Immediately upon being recognized by the United States Diaz had sought American aid against a Liberal revolution supported by Mexico, In fact he stated that when he accepted the presidency he thought that the United States would aid in restoring order and securing peace,5 He continued to seek aid from the United States throughout his administration saying that whatever means the United States xised would meet with his approval. He repeatedly stated that the government did not owe one cent to American bankers. The only bonded indebtedness of Nicaragua was ;J7,000,000 contracted under the Zelaya regime,^ The State Department however proceeded slowly. Intervention to protect American citizens was one thing. Intervention to pacify Nicaragua and assist in setting up a responsible govemiaent was quite another. The j^New York Times: Decexaber 3, 1926, 2:2* gXCTd: December 9, 1926, 4t2* ^Ibld: December 10, 1926, 2:5* ^tblds January 3, 1927, 9:3* -43 State Department did extend its good offices in an endeavor to coaipose political strife in Nicaragua in compliance with President Diaz's request and Secretary Kellogg attesqpted to persuade the Liberals to lend their support to Diaz but beyond that the United States was at first unwilling to go* Mexico's interference in Nicaraguan affairs was a sore point. True, Mexico was not a iiiUropean country but relations with Mexico were already strained because of the land and oil lav/c^ in Mexico which the United States held to be retroactive, because of the struggle between the ^alles government and the Catholic Church whereby American citizens were denied freedom of religion, and because the Mexican government was to a certain extent under Bolshevist influence, Mexico had been systematically aiding the rebels in Mexico since the revolution against Chamorro and continued to send filibustering expeditions, arms, and munitions of war to the Nicaraguan rebels, Mexico had refused to place an embargo on arms when the United States had requested it saying that "because of the absence of manufacturing plants in Mexico for making arms and munitions, the matter had little practical iB^portance*! ^New York Times: January 11, 1927, 2:1* -44 The United States became increasingly concerned about the situation but nothing .vas done for awhile aside from the warning statement made by Secretary Kellogg that "The United States views with concern outside Influence on Nicaraguan affairs,"! He also unofficially stated that the sale of arms to rebels by Mexico was an "unfriendly act,"2 A Nicaraguan govermi^nt hostile to the United States would constitute a mienace to the Panama Canal* The Mexican government officially claimed no knowledge of any Mexican aid to Nicaragua stating that It was impossible to watch its extensive coasts.5 The Mexican Foreign Minister stated that Mexico had no material interest but only a spiritxial interest in Nicaragua*^ Sacasa also denied Mexican ald*5 But the facts seem to prove that the Mexican government did render aid to the rebels. President Coolidge In his message to Congress concerning conditions in Nicaragua stated that there was conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities had been shipped from Mexico to Nicaragua on several occasions— oSSZ Yorfe Times: November 19, 1926, 2:4, ^EldTTanuary 10, 1927, 22:2, ^Xbid: November 19, 1926, 2:4, llblds January 12, 1927, p, 2, °lbicl; December 15, 1926, 33:2* ^5 soas boariag evidease of haviag belonged to the goveraasat* Boats were fitted out ia Mexican ports—soam with the knowledge and eacourageasat of Mexican officials and ia one instance a vessel was soaBBHLaded by a Mexicaa naval reserve officer*! Admiral Latiasr stated that there was no doubt bat that ths Mexicaa government had sent arms aad mea to Hioaragua*^ A Hicaraguaa colony was established ia Mexico City led by Dr* Pedro Zepeda, a Hioaragaaa Liberal* Dr* Sacasa was at one time the guest of Uiis eoloay* It was ia reality a revolatioaary junta and openly aided the rebels*^ Kxn:, Many American officials thought that Bolshevist agenoies were partly responsible for the Mexicaa iaterveatioa ia Hicaraguaa affairs* Secretary Hellogg idtea he appeared before the Seaate Foreiga Relatioas Comaittee stated that the All Amerieaa Anti 3D90rialist League^ an oz^ganization backed by the Red latematioaaX of the Conosnist partyp iateaded to organize Latia America as a basis of activity againstt ths United States^ B» presented writtea reports to substantiate his report* Hs further stated that activities ia Ifoxico aj^ tmim %ouso Doo* Ho* 633, 69th* Cmigress, 2d, sessioa* JHew YQA riammi Deaeaiber 14» 1926, 20s4* ^ibldt Noisi^mi>er IB, 2M6« 2t4« -46 and Nicaragua were a part of the steps of the Red International to overthrow American control in the Phillipines and Porto Rico and establish governments hostile to the United States in Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, and Central and South America.-^ Russia officially denied any connection with Nicaraguan affairs,^ Many people were inclined to look askance at the Bolshevist menace but any threat at the Panama Canal finds the United States always prepared. It is clear even to those xmfriendly to intervention that if Mexico were able to place in power a Nicaraguan government luider obligation for its stability to the Mexican government, the threat to American interests of every sort would be very serious. Mexico might establish and equip in the Nicaragiian Jungles an airplane base constituting a continuous menace to the Pcoiama Canal or perhaps enter into secret agreements with potential enemies of the United States. The situation might easily have led to war with Mexico but President Coolidge and President Calles were finally able to reach an understanding concerning the Mexican land question and so war was averted* jie^ York Times: January 13, 1927, 1:8. fs 15ecember 27, 1926, 1:8. -47 At first ths Uaited States msrely stated that it would keep an eye oa Americaas and their property ia HiOaragaa aad any moves against it by the Liberals* Five vessels were stati<»ied oa the east coast where Saeasa's stronghold was located* Disc eontinued to plead for American aid and beeomiag discouraged stated that it might be "better to save lives and industries of Hioaragua to deal with President Calles direct,"! Complaints aad requests for protection hj American citizens and business concerns in Hioaragua inoreased* Amerieaa mahogai^ compaaies c<»i^plaiaed tlmt they were payiag double taxes since both the Liberals aad the government collected taxes froaa thea*^ In order to stop this practice Admiral Latimer instruoted the mahogany concerns to pay taxes only to the Conservatives and further stated that Ameriean vessels would be ordered to protest boats loading ashogany if necessary* Amerieaa coffee growers necir MatagaJLpa asked the protecti ^Hew York Timest Dsoesi>er 19, 1926, 2;5< fXSSdfrnfeliSBor 29, 1926, 7i4* ^'Ibi'ds Hoveaber 9, 1926, 46t4* -48 adopted a more active policy* Bluefields was already a neutral zone having been neutralized by agreement of both sides* Other neutral zones were created for the protection of American and foreign lives and property* Rio Greuide Bar on the Mosquito Coast sixty miles above Bluefields was neutralized 5Ln order to protect American and foreign lives and property*^ The next step was the neutralization of Puerto Cabezas for the protection of American lives and property. There were about eleven hundred Ameriean people, also lumber and other interests around Puerto Cabezas*^ But Puerto Cabezas was Dr* Sacasa's capital, and when Admiral Latimer ruled that Dr, Sacasa; members of his cabinet, and all his troops in Puerto Cabezas must disarm or leave the city and when a sensorship was established at Puerto ^abesas and Rio Gi^nde Bar on the necessary radio stations to maintain the neutrality of the zone by preventing the sending out of military instructions or information by either 8ide,S a storm of protest ax^oss JiSow Yor^ Timess I>ecember 24, 1926, ls2, ggIdTDeeeml>er 28^ 1926, 1:1* ^^ibidt December 31^ 1926, 3:4* -»49 Dr* Sacasa charged that his movements were impeded end that the act was merely to aid the Conservative goverament* He stated that American lives and property were not endangered* The Department of State ia defease of the acti ?:New York Timess January 6, 19S^, 3i3* J^dJ-7«««iTr ». IWT. 2.1. ,„„ „^,^^^^ LUBBOCK. TEXAS -50 By the end of January four more cities had been neutralized to protect American lives and Americcui mahogany interests on the east coast. These cities were Pearl Lagoon, Penazpoica which is sixty zoiles north of Pearl Lagoon, Rama which is twenty miles inland on the Escandido River, and Wawa on the mouth of the Wawa River,! Admiral Latimer was given authority to use his discretion in stopping the transportation of foodstuff and establishing neutral zones for the protection of American nationals and to bar entry of arms and mRinitions intended for the Liberal revolutinnary forces. All United States vessels on the Pacific were ordered on patrol duty,2 This in reality formed a blockade to prevent the transportation of provisions and arms. General Feland was given control of the land forces and was to work in harmony with Admiral Latimer, Neutralization was gradually extended to the iiK>st isqportant cities along the railroad. Marines were stationed along the railroad to guard bridges and water tanks in order to safe giiard communication between the Legation and Legation guard at Managua and the sea*S -^New York Times: January 11, 1927, Is7, ^TBTdT Tanuary 30, 1927, 2;6, Siblfi: February 21, 1927, Is3, «^51 ^,ttaall;y# by tte last of Fetauary there were oaly two aities of say iaq^rtanoe, Matagalpa sad Clvluatda^ that were net aeutralized*-^ la the aoaatias, the Uaited States forces ia Hioaragua had i«q:airsd airplaaes for malataiaiag coaaiBicatioas aad for observaticm purposes* ^l' Ia the latter part of Febraarye Presidsat l>ias presented to Mr* Eberhardt a plan for a treaty betweea the Uaited States and Hicaragaa which provided for the foUovingi a defensive allianee with the United States, American polios control in Nicaragua, and American supervision in certain Hittitragaan govenaantal affairs as in the Piatt amendment *2 This was to provids a means whereby ths Uaited States would protect the interests of Hioaragia for a hundred years^ guarantee the sovereignty aad independeaoe of Kisaragaagr aad retaia the agreeasats of the prsssat BsP$B»F4ammafrrQ tv^sJefm^ Uhder ths pN>^osed plaa the United States was also given rl^sta to develop the eountry so as to assijire finanaial rehabilitation aad security and the pgSbXAm health* A loan was to be floated for the !He j^Hoa Yorjt Tjasat February 24, 1927, 2s2* gHAdt ttarch ft, 1987* 14»3* 9tSat Fehroary 24, 1927, 2t2* »53 iavostmenta of #8,500,000*^ It seeaed prdbabls that the Xtaliaa goveraaent mig^it do the same since Italiaa nationals had lost |40,000 ia the destraotion 9j: property at Chinandega* Ths British ship Coloid>o was seat to Corinto for "moral* effect and as a refuge for British subjects ia case of need. The Hritish AidDassador requested tlat the United States protect ^itish nationals in the same measure as afforded United States citizens* The British vessel was to work in conjunction with Admiral Latisar*^ Conditions continued to grow worse. Many Americans including Mr* Ebez^iardt received threatening letters, Dr, Saeasa threatened that violence would occur and stated that he could not be responsibls* As a result sixteen himdred more mariaes were sent to Hicaragiai*^ The British Mlaister then felt that British si^jeots woald be adeqaately protected and the British vessel withdrew. In the latter part of March American marines were fired wp(m and consequently were given orders to *^iase, shoot, or capture attackers**^ Harsh 23, the United States War Department began to sell arms to Dias*^ Precedent for this TTew York Timest February 24. 1927, 2t2* giDids i-^e^ruaSar 8S# It^'a^* 2t2* *^bi'as Marsh 8p 1927, 27t3* tiblds Marsh 23, 1927, 3s3 aad March 29, 3t5* ^'^'^t aarA 24, 1927, ItT* oan be foond in i^ravious dealings with Mexico and Events were proving that Secretary Kellogg was rii^ when ho stated ttmt "when the United States reoognises a government it is no esqpty gesture*"! matm ^SSSl yo3E>k Timess January 8, 1927, 4x3* . •. • .-."••SI' Otaptsr VI THK STIMSOH AGREEMENT Throagiioat ths revolution there were attoaipts to briag aboat peace through agreement of the two partioa* President Sias Aran ths tioss hs twA mftX^m oontinasd to offer gsnsral saassty and sabinet posts to the Liberals aad ss^i^sht their ooopMntticai in oadiag the revolt'*! Mr, Eberhardt sad Adairal Latisar worlEsd aiMeasingly for psaco conferring first with the Consenwtives and then with ths Liberals to att^igpt to l»rii^ abeat aa agroeaaat*^ Several f Hovaater 18, 19S6, Isl* 88, 1987, lt6* 84, 1M6, •iS* 9, 1926, 4t2* ted rsoogaiaod liia and ttet Prssident Jiaenss was pgojadiood*! Saa Salvador suggsstsd a foraala gaarsatooiag tte lives and i^poperty of all idisrsby Dr* Saoasa and Dias would both withdraw aad Calderoa Baairos (fosaar Hioarsgasa Minister of Forsign Affairs) should prosido daring tte general elootioa*' Zhia flam ia tarn was rejiMtsd siase aeitter Presidsat Siaa ai»p Hr* teoasa was williag to give up his poaititts* Tte Literals ia turn offsred plsas for oadiag hostilities* They proposed arhitratioa by tte my^tsd Statea aad tte Cea^pal Amerlssa govemasata sigaatiKPiss of tte Treaty of 1983 of tte claia to tte preaidaoi^* Mr* l^imis upoa ro^ipt of this ma^um^t9A inforasd Dr* Saoasa ttet aa iatemal jpolitioaX diapate was not a proper sahjoot twt arMtratioa* Tte Bspartasat of State stated ttet this voald te iapraotioahlo aad insoasisteat wiUi national dignity*^ Hr* Sacasa a3LSO off sred to roliataish his elaias to aayons affiliated aeitter with tte Csaservativoa nor tte Literals aad saitable to tte Hiaaragaaa po^pla chosen at sa hcaiest and sspsrviasd olootioa, or to aaorono chossn throac^ I Jauaary IS, 1887* 18, 18BT, Itf * . 18, 1987, p^Zm •07 tta asdiatioa or tte ^^aitod States and tto sigaatory ptmmwm af ttia lattbingtoa ssapsot with tte final approval oT tte asatral araters of tte preso^ Csagrwls or by a aow teaMtly stesea C ftim 84, 1887, 2t8« 8, 1807; UhXm 80, 1887, 4t4* •i Crk' ''•• v58 gaf^raasat^ W a aixod olaias ooaaissica with ot«al CoasoFiativo, Literal, and Aaeriean roprosontation t# sottXo.iagpartially aH revolatioaary olaias, aad, (4) tte par^MUio by tte goveraasat of ali tte araa of tte Literals to te sarroaderod*! Dr, SaoaMi Xavorod ttet part of tte proposal which prowidod t€» Aasriosa si^pervisioa of tte prosideatial oteotioa of 1888 althoagh te woald teve jsref errod ttet tte tetia Aaerloaa signatories of tte Hushington ooqpaot psrtioipato,^ A ooaaissiim seat to confer with Geaeral Moamtda, ooaiiaader of tte Literal fSdM^a, fOptd hia aot indisposed to treat for peace provided as^iitiatioaa were carded oa throai^ l^yteardt*^, He litowise. favored Aaeriean n^^rvision ot tte 1828 alaoticaa,' Dr* Saoasa in a final sffort asted aJU Ooatral Aasrioa to work togetter for a te^^*^i Xt aoaasd iapossiblo for tte Hioaragaaas to •^^feii-——* • '^ •'' lew YorlcHmest Jaasary 17, 1887, 1x8* nSf dTTIffiffirf 88. 1887, 8|8* nrr^f teMU 88, 1887^83t«^ jsasary. 88, 1987, 8tt, Hsr«h 6, 14x5* -58 sottlo tte tTOnSSHM thnaolves, tte otter Central -. *' .• Aanrt.osa ooaatrios refased to do so and perteps 'I -- no Cinitral Aasriosa ooaatry coald teve been iz^artial, tterofore it se«Bsd vsp to tte United States to attempt a sottloaent* Oa April T, 1927, Henry L* Stimson of Hew York ooxuionted to mate a trip to Hioaragua as a representative of tte President, at tte suggestion of tte Iksotetary of state, in order to tate to XP* Hterhsrdt and Adairal Latimer views of tte siiiilntstration i^ich eoald x^t c^xveniently te taken i^ by com^i^poii»iente# a^ ia order to get infonati^Ei froa ttem as to tte entire situatioa in ttet ooantx7 to bring teek for tte use of tte govointxasnt, i^txieh thsy could not give by correspondence*! fte Proaidsnt *s «eily instructions were ttet if Hr* StiaMa should find a ctenee to straighten tte aattsr oat te wisted ttet te woald try to do so*^ Mp0 Stiasoa ty^m his mrrVnl foaad cimditioas ia Xiosragaa torriblo* Ho prisoners were teing taksa, tte maaded wore eitter killed or fell viotins to tte hardship of tte ooaatry* Hon- co9iid>ataats were froqasntly batctered in cold blood* Tte ooantry was fast drifting into anarchyi deserters ^asrtasat of Jtitex April 7, *Hioaragaa"* For press* Ml g aliasonx'ntSaglefy a ftHs' "' y JB Hloaragoa, p* 13. -60 f3roa both ayaios wsrs finding it easy to fora bandit baxids end proy i^pon tte country*! In general tte aHitsry siteati »•' Dias's roaaiaiag in office, and tte lack of wtet thoy oonsiderod effeotive guarantees for a fair olootioa* Ho fair olootioa ted ever teen teld in Hiosrsgas* Tte party in power always coatiaasd ita ozisisxwo titxroa^ eontroUixig tte elect ioas* As a i*osalt revolatioxis were iiaavltsblo aad ^tiite psasrtasats "Statemsat of Hoary L* Stiiuon -. WLtk <^reroxioe to Hioaragua** Hay 23, 1827* ^SU L* Stiasonx Azarioan goUoy in Hioaragua> p* 16* •81 should sapsrviso tte zmtticmal election in 1828* JhiOmp t3m Wlmmti^mn 9en»tltntlcm tteir presidsat 1 is slootod owex?y f O«B* years on tte sams year as in tte Aasriosa Frosident* Tteir congress consists of a aoaate and hoase of deputiesf (axe-third of tte seaate and eae-telf of tte house is elected overy two years*! After xaOcing a study of tte situaticnx and boforo taldxxg any fm^tter steps, Mr* Stiuioa soourod frca President Coolidge a statement ttet te would te win lag on tte request of tte Hioaraguan govenawnt and «ader Hioaraguan law to reooanend a ooiaiilssicm tcnp tte si^pervisicm of tte electioa*^ President Diss and mesiters of his cabinet froa tte first tesx»tily cooperated with Mr* Stimsca* On Aj^il 82 President WLAZ i^ve to ttr* Stiasoa a samorandiai of tte peace terms te was williag should te ^^Tfered tte Literals x 1* laasdiate general peace ia time for tte ^ new orop owl delivery of arm slaigliiiieoasly by teth parties to Aaerloaa custody* 2* Ooxioral umesty axid retixm of exiles and rotam of ooafisoated ]^raporty* 8* fartioipatiott ia Biases cabinet by ropresoatativs Literals* him L* stiasonx Axiariean Policy in » P* !•• ^ihid» a* 10, ~— r—^ — -68 .-?..-•-*••' 4* Ovgoaimtioa of a Hioaragaan constabulary oa a aoa fsrtiaan tesis eoaaandod by Aaerlosn offiooxw* ^4^ $• 2Nipervision of slscticms in 1928 and saoossdtng ysars 1^ Aaerioaas wte shoald teve mj^fiM polioe power to mate such supervision offootivo* 6* Coxxtiananoe teiq^rarily of a sufficient foroo of aarines to mate tte foregoing effective*^ Literal leaders in Haaagaa ted commaixicated wil^ Dr* Saoasa at Paerto Catesas aad ted suggested ttet te eitter come himself to leet Mr* Stimscm or ttet te send delegates for this purpose* A copy of D&as's peace terms was cabled to hia* April 27, Dr* Sacasa appointed Dr* Radolpte Bspinoss, his Foreiga Minister and chief advisor, Dr* Leonardo Argaello, a well known Literal leader, and Dr* aaaael Cordex^o Reyes, his private secretary, as dslegates to confer with Mr* Sterhardt and Mr* Stimson* Coitferenses were teld during tte next two days sad tte delegates agreed to all tte poiats of tte peaoo prof or oxoept tte retention of Diss for tte roiaiinder of tte terxi*^ Xr» Stlason ted dooided ttet it was essential to an iaaediate pMLOOful settlement of Hiearaguan affairs to retain President Diaz ia offioe for ni* L* 8tini«ax American Polioy in Hioaragua* p* 19* Pir 81, -83 sovoral roasoiis* Hteder tte Hioaragaaa Coastltutioa te ia# iasligihls to te a oax^lidate in tte olootion to saososd hiaaolf * Ho was willing to surrender sTU tte traditional power of tte i^residency to soeuro a fair olootioa* He was williag to disband tte way axxd tate tte laooossaxfy executive and fixianoial wtops to ostabliA aa impartial o ••A "•' tedor tte Hioaragaaa ooxaititatioB any suooossor m^mm 'i^ hu hm Stiasoax tewrioia Poliey «-64 to Ddaa woald tevo to te otessa by Coagroas* Tte terat ot tte logslly olooted Coagress ted expix^d » ia TUsssmfcsPe liM, sxxd beoaase of tte revolutioa osagvoaaieaal oloctioxxs ted not been held in soVMPal of tte aost isq^ortaat Liberal districts duriag X92^0 Tte surviving xsenters of Coagress wteso toras ted teld over were chiefly Consexnratives*^ Hatarally, maj olootion by this Congress would arouss violsttt objootiotts on tte part of tte Liberals* --.I '> To teld xxow sleotions to i^ll tte vacancies was impoasiblo aotil ttere ims peace* Tte logical solaticox seemed to te to take a fresh start froa tte 1828 elootioiM* At tte end <^ tte sooond e<»if erence with tte Literal dilei^tos it was decided ttet ZK> fartter progroaa ooald be made until Moncada was consulted* %: Mr», Stiason and Gex[»ral Honcada xaet and coiaf erred at Tifdltapa on Hay 4* Oeaeral Hcmcada read tte peaoo toras sxid fixlly ai^roved ttea^^-all except tte aasaqpirod tera of Diss* He felt ttet he coald xiot sinoo Ms aen ted been fighting for a year against IAMM volaatarily mate such a settlement* Ho stated howovsr ttet if tte United States was williag te aoo^pt Hiasxfac^Mt^s ixxvitatioa to si^expviso %, L< Stiasoai Ansrioaa Polioy in Hioaragaa* p* 80* ^68 tte olootieas axel ixxsisted ttet Dias fiixish oat his».tera as a oenditioa of aoeeptaxioe te would yield te ttet dooisioa and do his best to persaado his srny to do so*-'' He asked for a written stateasnt to Show his amy axxd Mr* Stimson dictated tte foUowii^^ letters ^ ~^ '^ •Confiraixig our conveirsation of this moxmiag 1 teve tte hmior to inform yoa ttet I am autterised to say ttet tte President of tte I^iited States intends to aooopt tte x^equest of tte Hicaxragusa "" Goverxxneat to si^rvise tte olectioxis of 1928 { ttet tte xfotention of President Diaz daring tte remainder of his term is regarded as essential to ttet plan axid will be ixisisted tqx»| ttet a gWAiOral disarmament of the country is also regarded as neoessary for tte ptoper and sucoessful coxxduet of steh eleotiont and ttet tte forces of tte Uxxited States will be autterised to ateepf^tte ousto^ of tte arms of those wiUixig to lay ttea down includiag tte government and to diaaxai forcibly those idK> will not do so**8 Tte last sentence was not directed as a threat to Honeada^^a orgaxxlzed aray'tet was a wamixxg to tte bandit Ifriage to restrain ttem froa i^oyixig K^on ^tte co«nti!7 when tte govennaeat ^jfoopm had laid down tteir azaa* Tte Saeasa delegates wten told of tte decision stated ttet Saoasa would xiot x*esist tte acticux of tte Ulxited Stet«i* Br* Sacasa aaintaixxed tte positioa 'ttet^ tte Uterals woald not aooopt office under Dias sad tteroforo would xwt |oia Cabixiet ministers but immmm hu £^ Stiasoa(^iUx American policy in Hioaragua* pp* 82-23* Of StSu/'Iloaragoa** Iky 18,^1827* •66 ha aasarsd Ha, J^^^isoa ttet tte Uberals would eooporate ia ^foaste^sloxial by^elootioiM in certaia distriote axxd woald also accept positions neoesssx:^ t^set teldiag tte 1928 eleotioxis or neceasaxry for tte future reconstruction of tte coaatry,! ^^^^ In tte meantime before eitter side ted disarasd, Frosident Diaz ted taten several steps tomurd carrying oak his part of tte settlement* On May 5, te proolaiaed an iasediate general aanesty axid permitted all his politic^il enemies to return to tte coiaxtry* He proclaixoed tte fx*eed€ai of tte press axid gave to Hcmcada express permission to issue thi^ou^ tte :i^e88 a general proclamation to tte Liborala* He gave pablic notice ttet tte meitership of tte supreiae ooart, which ted beea disrupted by Genexwl €teaon*o, would be restored te its original status* He agreed to appoint Literal governors for tte six Literal provinces of tte ooantry in plaos of tte Coxxservatives wte tten teld tte offices*^ In stert, te was atteaptixxg to Mirry oat^ttr* S^ixxson^s saggssticni to restore 8s far" as possible tte political condition as it existed tef ore tte Chamorro con^d^otat* * 1' AS a result, idion Mr* Stixoscm aet with ^^mm"' !Dep8gtaaat of Statox Tolograa tv^m Heziry L* Q|iason, %[rX, Stiasoax Aasriosa POUCT in Hioaragua* p* 23* •67 Oexxoral Honoada again en Hay 11, te was able to roport tte progx^ss ttet ted already teen made axid to reiterate tte px^omise of a siq;>ex*vised electioa axid tte fact ttet tte President of the United States had consented to assign Aiaerlcan officers to train axid command a xKUXpartlsan national constabulary which Should teve tte duty of secxirixig a fair election and of preventlxig any fraud or intimidation of voters*! Lieutenant Colonel R* Y, Rtea of tte Uxxited States Marine Corps was appointed by President Diaz Chief of tte Guardia Hacional and took command IzaBediately, .8 Gexxeral Moixcada ted been given by his amy tte authority to conclude negotiations with Mr* Stimson* He decided ttet his army would be fully satisfied and dictated tte following statement to Kr« Stiasonx *Tte Literals cannot telieve ttet the United States Govei^xmant, through the persoxial representa tive of President Coolidge, will give a promise xdxieh it will not falfiU* *Oxxte s|^in tte Liberals place tteir confictoxioo ^^in tte United States, Tte leaders of tte amor will try to coavixxoe tteir mea ttet Uiis promise will te falfilled* Tte centx^l point idilch tte ar^y wistes to te assured of is ttet tte United Statea will do its test to give Hicaragua a fair olooUea in 1988**S !H* L*' Stimsoax Asaricaa Policy in Hioaragua* p* 24* gpeaarteont of State: *iic'aragVn&iy 13* 1827* rB# 1» BtBmoSbnGSvXcan PoUoy Is Hioaragua* p* 25* •68 .•*«'- te rotsomsd to his an^ sad on tte following day sexxt Xr* Stimson a telegram sigxied by himsslf axul all his ehieftoxxs eacoept Saxxdiao formally agreeing to lay down tteir arms axxd askiag ttet Amerieaa foroes te immediately seat to x*eoeivo ttea and *gaarantee order, lltexfty, axxd px»ospsrity**^ Oa Hay 13, Boaco was occupied by tte forty-third coaqpany of marixxes acoos^panled by commissioned officers autterized to receive arras and on betelf of tte Hioaxraguan government to pay ten cordovaa for each rifle and machine gun surrendered*^ Within a week both Liberals and Conservatives ted turx»>d over praetl^Llly all arms to tte marines* The semi-Independent bands of guei«rlllas followed Honcada^s exai^le and turned in tteir arms with tte exception of Sandlxio* Sandino, oxxe of Koncada*8 lieutenants, first promised Gonex^al l^aicada to join in tte settlement but after- aards brote his word and with about a hundred axid fifty followers, a xnts^er of whom were Honduraxis, ss^tetllr lleft the arqy and started southward toward tte Hondaras terder*^ A force of marines and ot tte now eottStabulai*y were suteequently sent :!SU ik» ^Imsonx American Policy ia Nicaragua * p, 25* IteaartaSat of Siaiex *Kioarag5a^nky lS*"lfl27* iSsi AxBorlcaxx Policy in Hioaragaa* p* 25* •88 oat attor Saxxdiao into tte wild ooontvy of tte Sandlno^s force was sagmeated by other bandit groaps ttet ted drifted to him axxd on Jaly 16, thoy attaeted a atxoh siaaller group of marines sad oooxstebalary at 0^»tal aear tte Honduras terder bxxt wex*e ropalsod* Ttey continued to prey off of tte people and x^sorted to guerrilla warfare for a niaBter of aontte* Sandino set ap a x*opublio ia Heuva Segovia, oxie of tte twelve states of Hioaragua* It is ia tte mouatain wilderness and less tten seven percent ot the total population live in tte state, Sendixto oooxq^ied a small part of this state* te ted oonsidorable power over the illitexnite people axui issued proalaaatioxxs ttet ted a strong appeal to tte Tndians.aad negroes aa»ng tte population in Hortteest Hii^ragua, He was tw«ity-»elght years old and was faadllar with marine warfare. He issaed decrees oonfisoatlag all property of foreigxisi^s and ottttsolling all ooaoossio^*^ The All Aaord^sn Anti Ssperialist Loag«» pat out piropaganda to aroaso sys^athy in his betelf,^ Sandino demanded tte immediate wlthdx»awal of tte American ^Literary Digest* February 4, 1928, pp* 42-46* ioBx roarasry ^2, 1^8, p* 205* a!W» -70 t, tte appoiatasxxt of a provisioxial presidsat wte ted never boon president or a candidate for tte presidoxiey-«a civilian of any party, and supervision of tte eloeti«xs by Latin Americans*! He was affiliated with neltter party and seems to teve received more syaq^tl^ abroad than at home* He was classified by his own General as a bandit axid fir* Castrillo, a former Sacasa exxvoy to tte United States, stated ttet te was an outlaw pare axxd slxqple, pro^^Lxxg elite on natives and foreigners *S Gexieral Honoada and his own fatter went to him and x*equestsd hia to lay doim his arsus but he refused*^ G^Eieral K(»!^ada after his tx^oops were disarmed entered Managua and was greeted by a popular demoxxstx*a- tion as to a victorious genez*al by tte Liberals* He and his offloeini stood side by side with tte I^as oabixiet at tte railroad 8tati ••?'^ iTte Natioas February 22, ltK28, p. 205* mgeotx ^^ 30, 1887, 94x6-6. ?!bldr^efa^py'4* ]^8, TO* 42^6* ^^l^'**^**^^ ^la^yl^^M* P^lJggr in Hioaragua* p. 26* ft? -71 Chapter VII -s THE ELECTION OF 1928 On tey 15, 1927, President Diaz formally <•' requested of Pi^sident Coolidge tte assistance and *3 good offices of tte Uxxited States in ixisurlxig a fair election in Hioaragua* He asked President Coolidge'8 asslstaxxce in preparing a proper election law in Hioaragua, In semirixig supervision by impartial Aaoricans over tte actual conduct of tte elections, in seoorlng American assistance to train •»:i and direct an liqpartlal and nonpaxrtlsan force ot coxxstobulary to secure law and order and prevent intimidation of voters and to in other ways secure Axserican assistance in tranquilllzlzig tte condition of tte countxry so ttet such elections could be fairly teld*! He suggested an election law ttet te thought adequate but reserved to tte President of tte Uxxited States, through tte exq^rt or otterwise, tte right to suggest modifications and chaxiges i. ia tte electoral plan to be prescrited by tte slootoral law. Tte State Department's Law was mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm iDepartaiHt of States March 22, 1928. *Text of a Loiier Jt^m'fte Frosident Of Hioaragaa to tte Px!*oaid«Bit of tte Ihiited States, tey 15, 1927** »72 lax^goly based vpem tte plan which Presidsat Diaz suggsstod* In order to preserve law and order for tte parposo of tte coxiduct of tte election a national Conatobalary was orgaxxised under tte instructioa snd so far as possible, tte direction axid command <^ American offieezni wte were in active service axid detoHed to this duty by tte President of tte Uxxited States* Since tte time was too limited to adoq[aatoly orgsxxize, instruct, and disciplixio tte Hatioxial Constabulary, tte govemmexit of Hioaragaa roqiM»sted tte President of tte United States to permit a sufficient force of AaiericaB aarines to remain in tte country pending the ^rgaaisation aad instruction of the Constabulary snd during tte election to reinforce the work of tte ooxistobttlary in securixig an absolutely iaqpsrtial eleoti^Ei between both parties*! Presidont Coolidge agreed to provide for Aasrioan supexrvision of tte election and assistance in txpulaixig tte coastabalary and instructed tte Amoxfioan Mlaister at Managua to discuss with Presidont Diss tte wmmamr in which tte aid of tte ^Dspsr taant of Statof teroh 22, 1928, "Text of a Letter If^rca^tte President of Hioaxragua to tte Prosidont of tte United States, Hay 15, 1927** *>!.» -75 United Statea aii^t test te sxtendod*! Tte olootion law wten eoapleted provided for tte teapovary suspexision of tte Hioaragosa olootioa law, axxd a Hatioxial Boaxrd of Elections to eoBsist of thx?eo pers »m '-PspsrtxMXXt SJL S tots I March 22, 1928, "Text of Letter rroa tno hrosident of tte Uxxltod Stotes to tte Prosidont of Hioaragaa, May 15, 1927** -74 electioxxs, settle all contests, and issue certificates of electioa* It ted tte authority through tte cteirman to coaaand tte services of tte National Constabulary for the purpose of preventlxig intimidation and fraiid and of preserving law and order d\iring the various acts of registration and voting*! Brigadier General Frank R, McCoy, Dr, Raaion Castillo, Conservative, and Dr, Cordevo Reyes, Liberal, were appointed meaobers of tte National Election Board*^ The first hitch in tte smooth workixig Of tte plan occured wten the Nicaraguan House of Deputies voted against tte bill pz^viding for Americem 8upe2*vision of tte elections .S The Speaker ^f tte House declared that the election law was contrary to tte Nicaraguan Coxistltution* He said ttet under the constituticux Congress alone ted the power to regulate voting and to qualify and declare tte electiCHX of tte President and Vice-Pz*esident tence it could not be taken away from Congress and given to an American electoral supervisor*^ This aaight have placed the United States Government in a very embea*ra8sing position because ^See Appendix C* ^Literary Digest: November^ 17, 1928, 99:10* 3lbids—Ipril 14, 1928, 97s3* 4fEe^ations Februairy 22, 1928, pp* 222-224* -75 tte Literals ted laid dova tteir arms relyixig apon tte prsedLso ot an Aaex*lcan siq^rvised election* Howover, tte Saprsia Coart of Hioaragua deslgnatsd Goxieral teCoy as President of tte National Board of Elections and Px^sldent Diss issued aa executive decxpoe invostixxg General HoCoy with full autterity to si^psxrrise elections* This exeuctive decide was bassd xq^oa a daase ia tte Hicaraguaa Constitution chargixxg tte executive branch with the duty of proservixxg tte iaterxial peace and security of the Repoblie sxxd (^ taking tte aieasitres necessary to ixwure^to its ixitebltants the right of suffrage*! Hogistratioa was eoapleted without serious disorder axxd without imports of any person's teing aolested at tte registx*ation place* Tte sale of IXq^tMt was restricted during registration and this was partly respoxisible for tte fact that there was xxo serioBs disoi^der in ax^ precinct*^ Tte leaders of teth parties were well pleassd with tte work of tte conalsslon and the orderly waf in which registration was carried on* Genez*al Hoasada, tte Liberal candidate, wrote a letter to Senor Benard, tte Conservative oandidate, praising tte way in idxish American supervision was teing •76 cax^iod on by tte officials and pzHadsed ttet if te was slooted te woixld agree in tte subsequent election to willixigly accept Aaierican supei'vision steuld tte Coxxservatives desire it*! Senor Benard . J,. in his reply heartily agreed to tte proposal*^ Tte osxly disturtences of any iaiportance ttet oceured prior to tte election were some attempts of Sandino's rebels late in Octoter to terrorize •ffi -iii. aitizens by mazHiers and threats etc* to interfere with tte elections *S General Chamorro ted contemplated running for l^resident but refrained wten he was inforaied by tte United States State Depaxrtment that te could not te reoo^aized should te be elected because tte United States could recognize only constitutiozially elected presidents in Latin America* He was ineli||ible under tte coxistitution*^ Wten asted if tte Uxxited States wotild object to General Moncada as a candidate, tte Secretary of state x*eplied ttet tte United States was not it'. goixig to select any candidate either Conservative or Libex*al,nor was it goixig to use its influence in tte election for axiy pax^ticxxlar person* He further ^Depsx^msxxt of States October 24, 1928 "Nicaragua"— Lsator of tFexierai Moxioada to Ssnor Benard* jihidx Lejitor of Senor Benard to Gexieral Moxicada* 5S^»^ Historys Deoemter 1928, pp* 488-488* yartnent or States October 23, 1927, *Hicaa?agua** -77 stated ttet xxo q:uestioB of tte eligibility of Gexxeral Hoaeada ted been raised and so far as te knew'te mis not disqxxallfied under tte Constitution of Hiosi>agaa or tte Central Aaierican Treaty*-^ Gexieral Honoada with a slogan of "Nicaragua for tte Hiimzaguaxis* was tte Libex*al candidate and Senor Adolfo Bexiard was tte Conservative candidate* la tte election of Hovemter 4, General Moncada was elected by a majority of 19,556 votes carz*ying all but four preolnots* Congress was fairly evenly divided tetween tte Consexfvatives and Liberals* One third of tte mooters of the Senate were to be elected* Of this xnteber twelve Coxxservatives and twelve Liberals were elected* One-telf of tte Deputies were elected and the result of tte votixxg gave office to twenty^two Coxxservatives and twenty-one Liberals*^ The results of the election vindicated General Hoxxoada's cause and also tte fairness of tte American polioy* Gexieral Moncada was educated abroad, tes progressive ideas, telleves in economic and political devel^psant, improving tte educational system axid protecting business interests*^ Ttere was general satisfaction over the supervision iDepartment of States Octoter 26, 1927, "Hicaragaa"* ^Current Hiatorys i)ecember 1928, pp. 486-487* ^"literary Digests Novexater 17, 1928, 99s 10* -78 of the election in Hicaragua* La Prensa, the chief conservative paper, stated ttet tte elections were honest, tranquil, correct and honoz»able and thst tte Liberals won the victoxTT* El Comercio, tte leadixig Liberal paper, said that the United States was vindicated before the world. President Diaz v/ired President Coolidge that. General McCoy and all other American officials had performed well tte duties imposed upon them and that both parties recognized the impartiality and Justice with which tte officials acted*! •Current History: January, 1929, p, 681, •-80 Gtepter VIII THS CANAL AND OTHER FEATURES A report was prepared by Dr, W, W, Cxmberland of tte Department of State upon tte economic and fixianelal coxxditions in Hicax:»agua at tte request of t President Dias* This report was aiade public by tte Departmeat of State November 9, 1928, Dr, Cumberlaxxd found tte fixianoial conditions in Nicaragua coxqparatively satisfactox^. Revenues were adequate, tte budget telanced, currency was stable, and tte pablic debt was saall. He found, tevever, ttet Hioaragua was ia a state of uzistable economic equilibrium because of tte fact ttet coffee coxxstitutes an undue pox^ion of tte exports and te recommended financial reorganization. His rew<»&mendatioxi8 provided for virtual fixianelal eont]*ol of Nicaz*agua by tte Uaited States for the purpose of makixig secuire tte loaxxs which Hicaragua needed*! Four days after tte report was made pablic Px*esident Coolidge azmounced ttet tte Uxxited Stotes would be disinclined to assume rospmasibility for tte admixiistratioa of Niearaguaa affairs to provide security for loaxxs to tte Hioaraguan government as sxxggested in tte report* "Wr* W* Cuzterlaxids HICARAGUA An Economic and Fixiancial Sarvey, pp* 8*6* -81 Secretary Kellogg also stated that he disapproved of some of the things in tte report*! A Nicaraguan Militai*y Academy v/as established on January 1, 1929. United States marine officers serve as instructors*^ One of President Moncada*s first problems was to dispose of Sandino who was atteaqpting to separate Neuva Segovia from the rest of Nicaragua.5 Through tte combined efforts of marines and the constabulary this was accomplished. In April, 1929, a Pacification CoBBnission cterged with the duty of originating plaxis and constructive measures looking to tte general welfare and prosperity of Northwestern Nicaragua in order to facilitate the restoring of government control.^ Nicaragua is now peaceful but the fact remains that Bluefields and the eastern coast will always be a hot bed of revolt and revolution unless either the canal or the long planned railraod is built. Added to this fact the majority of the voters of the country are illiterate. The solution of this problem is of course mass education but this in tux*n requires better means of transportation and coamnxnicatioi] ^Current History; January, 1929, p. 681* STSIH: March, 1929, 1017. ^YCTcT: April, 1929, p. 144. This rofuiros toroiga capital so it is cvidsat ttet Hioaragwua^ troahles caa terdly te lessened withoat outside teip aad outsids telp meaxxs tte Uxxited States* 11 Thoro is grsat used for tte investment of foreiga capital ia Hioaragaa bat this slways tes attaeted to it tte stigas of "dollar diplomacy** Perteps a sKxreoxxlightoxied view of tte matter and tte exhibition of Bare tact oa tte part of tte govemaieat would xfoxMdy tte situatioa* *'.-j> . Tte Uaited States has a special iaterest ia Hiosragua teoause of tte Bryan-Chaaiorro Treaty* Just tefox^ tte Panaaa Canal was built aK>8t Amerieaa engineers favored tte route through Hicaragaa* Tte length of tte route from Greytown on tte Atlantic to ^ito on tte Pacific by way of tte San Juan River and throng Lake Hicaragua is about a hundred and ssventy miles* Tte elevatioa of tte lake above tte sea is about one hundred and ten feet* Its western shore is oaly twelve miles from tte Pacific with an ixxtoxPVOXiiJEig divide oxie handx>ed axid fifty-four feet above tte sea* Frxm. tte southwest cox*ner of tte late flows .tte Saa Juaa River oxxe hxxodred and twenty fldles to tte Atlantic with an average fall of ten ixxotes to tte xdLlo*^ Tb» entrance on tte Atlantic side is tte mouth of tte San Jixan River which is tte !LataBSX Aaaricaa Foreiga Policy* pp* 307* •83 teaadary lias between Costa Rica and Hicaragua* Tte distonoo fx^oa tte month of tte river on tte ^tlantie to tte ontxraxxoo of tte Panaaa Caxial by steamer is approaisately five haxxdx*ed miles* Commerce beixig taraxxaported from tte Atlantic seateard of the Uxxited SV1 States to tte Pacif ie seaboard would thus save \M approxiaatoly a thousand adles, five hundred south snd fivs handred north in making a trip from tte xiorth Atlantic to tte north Pacific. This from a standpoint of cost of transportation and coxxsua^tion of coal, oil, and tiaa is a large item in carryixig cost*! Tte Uxxited States would te brought in closer contact with Hicaragaa and Costa Rica because of tte eanal axid with Salvador and Honduras if a naval station were built on Fonseca Bay as tte 1/ treaty provides* Oxie serious objection to this route is tte lack of terbors at tte terminals* Brito is a mere indentation on tte coast making tte construction of immexxse breakwaters neoessary, while at Greytown tte San Juan broadens out into a delta ttet would require extexxsive dredgixig* Tte enormous aaxmnt of rainfall at Greytosn is also a factor* It is nearly twenty- five feet*S Tte cost of building tte canal is ^Sdgsx*Practical Relatioxis with Latin Aaxerlca*, Axmala, 1928, p* 68* ^iZSSsT Amsrieaa Forsiga Policy* p* 307* r -84 estimated at $1,000,000,000 as compared with tte $385,000,000 ttet it cost to build the Panama Canal*^ Some day in tte future it will probably be necessax*^ to b\iild this canal. Traffic is Increasing in tte Panama Canal and will in tte future reach tte saturation point*2 The building of new locks in tte Panama Canal will relieve tte situation teaiporarily but not permanently* ^ew York Times: January 14, 1927, 1:7* r -85 Appendix A BRYAH»^HAM0RR0 TREAIT Article I. Tte government of Nicaragua grants in perpetuity to the government of the United States, forever free from all taxation or otter public charge, the exclusive proprietary rithts necessaz>y and convenient for tte construction, operation, and maintenance, of an interoceanic canal by way of the San Juan River and the Great Lake of Nicaragua or by way of any route over Nicaraguan territory, the details of the tei*ms ui>on which such oanal shall be constznicted, operated, and maintcdLxied to be egreed to by the two governments whenever the govemiment of the United States stell notify tte government of Nicaragua of its desire or intention to construct such a canal* "Article II: To enable tte government of the United States to protect the Nicaraguan canal and tte proprietary rights granted to the government of tte United States to take any measure necessary to tte ends conteBq;>lated herein, tte government of Nicaragua tereby leases for a term of ninety-nine years to tte United States the islands in tte Caribbean Sea known as Great Com and Little Com Island, and the government of Nicaragua furtter grants to tte goverzmant of tte United States for a -86 lite period of ninety-xiiBS years tte right to estsblish, opexate, axid maintain a xiaval base at such place oa tte tez>ritory of Nicaragua boz*derixxg upon tte Gulf of Fonseca as the government of tte United States may select* Tte government of the United States shall have the option of renewing for a further term of ninety- nien years the above leases and grants upon tte expiration of their respective terais, it being expz*essly agreed ttet the territory hereby leased and the naval base which amy be maintained under tte grant aforesaid nbRlX te subject exclusively to tte laws axxd sovereign autterity of the United States darixig tte terms of such lease and gz*ant and over axiy renewal or rexiewals ttereof*" ii. f •87 Appendix B li^t^TY OF 1923 Artlelo II* "Desiring to mate secure to tte republics of Cexxtral Amerloa tte bexieflts which are derived from tte maintenance of free institutions and to contribute at tte Sana tiaa towaj-d strexigttening tteir stability, and tte prestige with which ttey should te surrouxxded they declared ttet every act, disposition or measux*e which alters tte constitutloxial orgaxiizatlon in any of thea ia to te deemed a ii»nace to the peace ofttte said republics, wtetter it proceed fx^om any public power or fx*<»a tte private citizens* "Coixsoquontly, tte govemaants of tte contx*acting parties will not reoogziize any otter govomximnt which amy cooie into power in any of the five x*epublics through a coup d'etat or a revolution against a x»ecogxxized govez*nment so long as tte freely elected z*epx*e8entativoB of the people ttereof have not constitutionally z*eorganized the country and even in sueh a case ttey obligate ttemselves not to acknowledge tte recogxiition if axiy of tte persons elected as Pz^osident, Vice-President, or Chist of State Desigxiate steuld fall under any of tte following teadsx -88 *(!) If te should be tte leader or one of tte leaders of a coiq;» d'etat or revolution, or through blood rdlationship or aarriage te an ascendant or descendant or brotter of such leader or leaders* "(2) If te should teve been a Secretary of State of should teve teld s<»ie ad-litary command during tte accoBq?lishment of tte coiq> d'etat, tte revolution, or while tte election was beixxg carried on, or if te should teve teld this office or coamiazid within six aK>ntte precedizig tte coup d^etat, revolution or tte election* *Fixrttermore, in no case stell recogxxitliOa be aceorded to a government which arises from election to power of a citizen eJ^ressly and unquestioxiably disqualified by tte cozistitution of his country as eligible to election as President, Vice-fresldent, or Chief of State Designate*" 1^1 ? ij J .f. .*/•<.J"... .4. !»..•»• -89 Appendix C T.'ICARAGUA ELECTION LAW "Article I. In order to consuaanate tte arrangement niade between the government of Nicaragua at its request, and the President of tte United States whereby the latter will extend friendly assistance to the end that the election for tte supreme autterities in the year 1928 may be free, fair, and iaqpartial tte election law proclaimed on March 20, 1923, togetter with aziy law or executive decrees which may subsequently teve been passed or promulgated to aaiend or aaQ>lify said law, is hereby suspended during the period of said election. This act shall te known and may be cited as the Transitory Provisiozis Governing the Election of 1928. It shall take effect upon passage and shall continue in full force and ^ effect until the said election of 1928 has been held and tte results thereof proclaimed by Cozigress, and tte electoral lav of March 20, 1923 shall have no force or effect until said results have been proclaiaad* "Article II. For the purpose of said election of 1928, a National Board of Elections is hereby constituted, to consist of three persons, appointed by tte President of Nicaragua as follows: A chairman r -90 to be appointed upon tte noadnation of tte President of tte United States, and two political meaibers, to be appointed in like manner upon tte noaiixiation of tte executive committees of the Conservative and Liberal parties respectively. Tte chairman of tte board shall be a citizen of tte United States. Two political alterxiates, ozie of whom stell be a member of tte Conservative Party and one a meaiber of the Liberal Party, stell be etesen in the same manner as the regular political members* If any political meaaber te unable or fails to perform the duties of his office teaq>orarily on account of absence or otter incapacity, his place stell be filled by tte alterziate during tte period of absence or incapacity of such regular aiember* Tte meabers of tte National Board of Elections and tte alternates stell take possession of tteir .» V ^ offices from the President of the Republic of Nicaragua, Tte President of Nicaragua stell remove from office any political member of tte National Board of Elections or alternate upon recoaanendation of the cteirman of tte board, but no such reawval stell be aade witteut such recoimQendation* Axiy vacancy stell be filled as the original appointment* "Article 3: Tte Natioxxal Board of Electioxxs as cozistituted terein stell have full axxd gezieral power axxd autterity to sxqpervise said election and •81 to pxasox^te x^gulatioixs tevix^ tte fores ot law tor tte registration ot voters and for tte easting and coanting ot tteir tellots and for axiy otter aatters properly sppox^aining to tte eleetlon* "Article 4s A majority of tte National Board of Sloetioxxs, one of whm stell be the cteiraan, shall constitute a quoznxm for tte tz*anssction of buslxxessi provided ttet tte presence of tte cteiraan slims stell be deeaied to constitute a quorum at an oaergexxsy aaetlxig* An eaargency aieeting is one tte teldixxg ot whieh is coxxsldered by tte cteirman to te indispexuiable to tte accoB9>li8hment of a fair and ta*ee election axid which tes teen so deslgxxated by him in foznsal axxnounoemsnt, under one clear day^s notioe, to tte political mesS^ers and sx^^lsntes. Ho aetion or x*esolution of tte boai^ stell te valid unless concurred in by tte American cteixnaan, axid in case of a tie vote tte cteiraaua steU teve power to castas seooad axid decidAzm^ vote. The cteirmaa stell also tevs power to decisive any aotioa or resolutioa, which in his Judgment is indispexxsable to tte aooos^lishneBt of a fair axxd free electioa, an oaergenoy aaasure, and suoh measure stell corns into tall toroe and effect as sn action or resolatioa ot tte Hatioxxal Bosx^ ot Electioxxs toeaty-foor hoixrs stter its preseatatica at a foraal xaeotiag of said board as an sasrgsncy aaasure*