Court File No.: CV-19-00628 883 0000
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
FAIR VOTING BC and
SPRINGTIDE COLLECTIVE FOR DEMOCRACY SOCIETY
Applicants
- and -
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN BIRD
I, Karen Bird, of the City of Hamilton, in the Province of Ontario, AFFIRM AS FOLLOWS:
My qualifications and acknowledgment of my duty as an expert
1. I am Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science, McMaster University.
2. I hold a PhD in Political Science from the University of Minnesota.
3. My area of specialization is comparative politics, with a focus on comparative electoral
systems, women’s and ethnic minority representation, and gender and ethnic electoral
quotas.
1 4. My research focuses on women’s and ethnic minority representation, and gender and
ethnic electoral quotas in countries around the world. I also study the impact of socio-
demographic diversity, and the engagement of women and minorities in Canadian
politics. I have published 39 peer-reviewed books and journal articles on these and related
topics, including The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters,
Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies (co-edited with Thomas Saalfeld and
Andreas Wüst, Routledge 2011). My research articles on the political representation of
women and visible minorities have appeared in the peer-reviewed journals
Representation; Canadian Journal of Political Science; Politics, Groups and Identities;
International Political Science Review; Politics & Gender; Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics, among other venues. I am currently Principal Investigator, with Dr. Netina Tan,
on a 4-year SSHRC-funded research project “Ethnic Quotas and Political
Representation: A Global Study.” This study examines special representational
arrangements for Indigenous and ethnic minorities in parliaments worldwide.
5. Attached to this affidavit and marked as Exhibit “A” is a copy of my résumé.
6. Attached to this affidavit and marked as Exhibit “B” is a true copy of my signed
acknowledgement of expert’s duty in this case.
7. On 3 August 2020, the applicants in this matter retained me to draft an affidavit. I was
asked to provide a fair, objective, and impartial opinion on the following two questions:
(i) What is the impact of Canada’s current First-Past-the-Post voting system on the representation and participation of women? What would change under other voting systems?
(ii) What is the impact of Canada’s current First-Past-the-Post voting system on the representation and participation of minorities? What would change
2 under other voting systems?
Attached to this affidavit and marked as Exhibit “C” is a true copy of the email sent by
counsel for the applicant, retaining me as an independent expert.
Summary of answers
8. Whether women, ethnic minorities and Indigenous peoples are actually present in
legislatures, whether their voices are heard, and whether their interests are taken into
account are important indicators of the quality of decision making and the perceived
legitimacy of democratic parliamentary assemblies. Canada has an imperfect record in
this regard.
9. A central shortcoming of Canada’s First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) voting system is that it
leaves us a laggard in terms of women’s parliamentary representation, which is deeply
problematic for an advanced and egalitarian-minded democracy. Though the share of
women in the House of Commons reached its highest ever in the most recent 2019
elections, Canada ranks in 52nd place in the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Women in
Parliament world rankings (as of January 2021), well behind most comparable
democracies that have moved much faster towards gender parity in parliament. It is
nearly certain that the introduction of multi-member districts, most often seen in voting
systems with proportional representation (PR), would raise the share of elected women
when compared with the winner take-all single-member contests that exist under
Canada’s FPTP voting system, because the former are better at incentivizing party leaders
to balance the slate of candidates. In Canada, there is little or no evidence of voter bias
against female candidates, so such a structural response would likely be quite effective.
3 10. On the issue of minority representation, Canada’s FPTP system advantages some
minorities and disadvantages others. Large and spatially concentrated minorities (e.g.,
voters of South Asian descent) achieve reasonably strong descriptive representation and
participation in Canada. FPTP also has a clear mechanical effect of over-rewarding
“sectional” parties with a disproportionate seat share (e.g., the Bloc Québécois), as it is
able to convert marginal wins in ridings across the province into a disproportionately
large seat share; and this has tended to exaggerate regional cleavages. But FPTP has the
problematic effect of siloing visible minority candidates into crowded fields in only the
most racially diverse ridings, leaving visible minorities elsewhere less likely to become
candidates. In contrast, minorities that are geographically dispersed and politically less
cohesive have done poorly under FPTP in Canada: aside from the over-representation of
MPs of South Asian descent, FPTP has kept virtually every smaller visible minority
group under-represented, with most holding less than half the share of seats relative to
their population share (e.g., Blacks and Filipinos). FPTP has also left the territorially
dispersed Indigenous population less well represented, though these numbers have
improved markedly in the past 10 years.
11. Ultimately, fully addressing the deficits in political representation of women and diverse
ethnic minorities in Canada will require changes in both the electoral system and other
aspects of our democratic system such as party nomination practices. There are several
different electoral reform options that could improve the political representation of
women and diverse ethnic minorities in Canada. The challenge is that there is no single
reform that would equally benefit all groups across the board. And while the impact of
various reforms on women’s representation is fairly clear, it’s far more challenging to
4 forecast the dynamics across diverse ethnic minority and Indigenous groups. It is fair to
say, however, that all things being equal, our current FPTP system causes women to be
systematically under-represented, and certain minorities to be systematically over-
represented while others are under-represented; in some cases, these disparities are fairly
extreme. Under a PR system (with multi-member districts), women and diverse
minorities would likely be represented in closer accordance with their population size and
in a broader range of ridings outside the primary enclaves.
Preliminary comments
12. This affidavit discusses the impact of Canada’s current FPTP single-member plurality
electoral system on the political representation and participation of women and visible
minorities1 and considers the effects that various reform proposals could have. Before
turning to that review, I take up two preliminary issues. First, is a brief consideration of
the meaning and consequences of “descriptive representation.” Second is an overview of
the role of electoral systems.
13. In what follows, I address political representation primarily in numerical terms. What
Hanna Pitkin (1967) calls “descriptive representation” is an important part of the
multifaceted concept of representation. Subsequent democratic theorists have argued that
if a group has few legislative representatives, their preferences risk being overlooked
while jeopardizing the legitimacy of the representative system (Mansbridge, 1999;
Phillips, 1995; Williams, 1998). This argument has been supported quite consistently by
1 The term ‘visible minority’ also merits a brief definition. It refers to “persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.” In practice, the term conceals considerable diversity, but “consists mainly of the following groups: South Asian, Chinese, Black, Filipino, Latin American, Arab, Southeast Asian, West Asian, Korean and Japanese” (Statistics Canada 2015). And while the term has been criticised as out- dated, essentialist and misleading, it is still widely used in government and academic research.
5 empirical studies, especially in the U.S. In that political context, minority representatives
tend to be more substantively responsive to minority interests in their legislative and
service responsibilities, while from the citizen’s perspective sharing a salient identity
with one’s representative has been shown to increase political efficacy, empowerment,
communicative trust and democratic participation (e.g., Banducci, Donovan, and Karp,
2004; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Broockman, 2013, 2014; Gay, 2002; Haider-Markel et al.,
2000). In Canada, there is evidence of a link between descriptive and substantive
representation for visible minorities. For example, Bird (2011) finds that even after
controlling for constituency diversity, visible minority MPs made nearly twice as many
parliamentary speeches on ethnic-related issues as their non-minority counterparts, while
Black (2016) finds similar results for interventions in Question Period. However, there is
not yet clear evidence in Canada that legislator-based descriptive representation increases
visible minority voters’ sense of political responsiveness (Snagovsky, 2020). The effect
of female descriptive representation on substantive representation, and on political
engagement and efficacy among female citizens is even more nuanced (e.g., Dassonville
and McAllister, 2018); however, the presence of more female legislators has been shown
to alter decision making institutions to make them more deliberative, and strengthen
public belief in women’s ability to govern (e.g., Beaman et al., 2009; Dasgupta and
Asgari, 2004; Karpowitz et al., 2012).
14. A brief discussion of the role of electoral systems is also useful. The question of how
alternative electoral systems impact the political representation and participation of a
particular group is a challenging one. This is because there is inevitably a wide variety of
cultural, ideological, socioeconomic and demographic factors that interact with electoral
6 rules to yield distinct patterns in representation (Bird et al., 2011; Norris 1993). With so
many moving parts, it is difficult to separate the role that electoral rules play from those
other forces.
15. Further, the causal impact of electoral systems is itself complex. Electoral rules and ballot
structure can influence the diversity of parliamentary bodies both mechanically, and
through more indirect psychological effects and inducements. Mechanical effects concern
the mathematical transformation of votes into seats after the ballots have been cast.
Psychological effects, on the other hand, operate prior to or at the moment of the vote, by
shaping perceptions and decisions of various participants including voters, candidates,
and political parties. Different electoral rules lead candidates and parties to make certain
strategic decisions based on where they think their chances of winning are highest.
16. For example, under a FPTP system which uses single-member districts (SMD), a party
might nominate a visible minority candidate in a riding with a large visible minority
population, expecting that such a candidate can increase turnout and party support among
“co-ethnic” voters. The incentive structure to nominate such a candidate may change,
however, if a multi-member district (MMD) system is introduced, district boundaries
widened, and the population size and electoral leverage of the minority group in the
riding diminished.
17. Revisions to the rules can alter these dynamics in unpredictable ways. For example, the
degree to which the electoral reform sketched above changes the incentive structure for
nominating minority candidates depends on assumptions (made by party elites/candidate
selectors and those who seek to become candidates) about the strength of co-ethnic
affinity voting in both ethnic minority and majority populations. Consequently, changes
7 may unfold slowly as actors learn and adjust to the new incentives, and as the system
attains new points of equilibrium.
18. There is no doubt that there are viable alternatives to our current FPTP system that would
promise significant improvements for women’s representation, and greater equity in
representation across diverse minority groups. The difficulty is that different reforms
present different kinds of obstacles to different kinds of traditionally under-represented
groups, such as women, visible minorities and Indigenous people. No single reform
solution will work equally to the advantage of all groups, with the effects for women and
geographically concentrated minorities being especially distinct. Nevertheless, as will be
discussed below, the introduction of MMDs would be optimal for improving women’s
representation and, as long as several conditions are met, can be at least as (if not more)
advantageous as SMDs for global levels of ethnic minority representation, while ensuring
fairer representation among minority groups.
1. What is the impact of Canada’s current FPTP voting system on the representation and participation of women? What would change under other voting systems?
19. Though the share of women in Canada’s House of Commons reached its highest ever in
the 2019 election, at 29.6 percent, this put Canada in only 52nd place in the Inter-
Parliamentary Union’s Women in Parliament world rankings as of January 2021 (IPU
2021). We fall well behind most comparable democracies that have moved much faster
towards gender parity in parliament.2 There is no evidence of voter bias against women
2 Among established western democracies, Canada as of 2021, ranked behind New Zealand (48% women, MMP electoral system), Sweden (47%, List PR), Finland (46%, List PR), Norway (44%, List PR), Spain (44%, List PR), Belgium (42%, List PR), Switzerland (42%, List PR), Portugal (40%, List PR), Austria (40%, List PR), Denmark (40%, List PR), Iceland (40%, List PR), France (40%, majoritarian), Italy (36%, List PR), the UK (34%, majoritarian), the Netherlands (33%, List PR), Luxembourg (32%, List PR), Germany (31%, MMP), and Australia
8 candidates in Canada (i.e., the odds of a woman being elected in a winnable riding are
essentially the same as those of a man). This confirms that impediments to increased
representation of women in Parliament are primarily institutional rather than cultural in
nature (unlike countries like Ireland or Poland, for example, where a strong social
conservative element mitigates against the election of women).
20. The existing research strongly suggests that our current FPTP elections are
disadvantageous for the political representation of women and that the introduction of
MMDs in Canada would likely raise the share of elected women when compared with
winner-take-all SMDs. This is because, on the whole, MMDs are better at incentivizing
party leaders to balance the slate of candidates.
21. One of the most well-established findings in the political science literature is that
countries with MMDs using either plurality or PR rules broadly outperform SMD
systems with respect to the election of women (Matland, 1998; Matland and Studlar,
1996; Norris, 1985; Paxton and Hughes, 2007; Rule, 1987; Siaroff, 2000; Stockemer,
2007; Welch and Studlar, 1990). This pattern has also been observed in countries using
mixed or combined electoral systems – such as Germany, Japan, and New Zealand –
where women are more likely to be elected as list MPs rather than district MPs (Barker
and Coffé, 2017; Curtin, 2014; Davidson-Schmich, 2014; Eto, 2010; Fortin-Rittberger
and Eder, 2013; Vowles et al., 2017). The crucial determinant of this outcome is district
(31%, majoritarian), while ranking ahead of only the US (23%, majoritarian), Ireland (23%, STV), and Greece (22%, List PR). It is worth noting that Canada runs close to Poland in these rankings (currently in 60th place), a country that has recently banned virtually all access to abortion.
9 magnitude.3
22. District magnitude (DM) refers to the number of members to be elected in each electoral
district. There are single-member systems such as FPTP, Alternative Vote (AV) or the
Two-Round System (TRS), where voters elect just one representative in each district
(DM=1).4 On the other hand, multi-member systems, which include proportional variants
(e.g., List PR, Single Transferable Vote (STV), and mixed systems), semi-proportional
variants (e.g., the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV)), and some majoritarian systems
(e.g., Block Vote (BV)), all have at least some districts with a DM greater than one
(DM>1). It is important to bear in mind that not all of these MMD systems are designed
to achieve proportional outcomes.5
23. There are three interrelated reasons why district magnitude impacts the share of women
elected. First, the cost of nominating women is higher in SMDs because doing so often
involves directly displacing men. Second, the incumbency advantage tends to be higher
in districts with smaller magnitudes (Fréchette et al., 2008; Murray, 2012; Schwindt-
Bayer 2005), and because that advantage falls largely to men, it makes their displacement
3 Aside from the principal factor of district magnitude, a process of “contagion” is also involved, in which parties in multi-member systems are more likely to emulate each other with respect to running a gender-balanced slate of candidates in a district, as compared to parties in single-member district systems (Matland and Studlar, 1996). 4 While there is strong evidence that MMDs outperform SMDs, some types of SMD may nevertheless produce more diverse representative outcomes than others. In particular, some studies in the context of non-partisan civic elections in the U.S. have found that AV (ranked ballot) systems can have a significant positive effect on descriptive representation (John et al., 2018). 5 MMD systems, even those with very large district magnitudes, can return highly disproportionate results. This is most clearly true for block voting systems, where the party winning the plurality of vote share is awarded the full block of seats in the district. The electoral college system in US presidential elections is a form of block vote, where the plurality winner of the popular vote in a state receives 100% of that state’s electoral college votes. There are also semi-proportional systems with large DMs that arguably fail to achieve proportional outcomes. For example, municipal elections in France involve very large district magnitudes (in most municipalities, the entire city constitutes a single electoral district). However, this system dispenses a prime au vainqueur, in which the party winning the plurality of votes is first awarded half of all council seats, and only the remaining half are distributed in proportion to parties’ vote share.
10 even costlier.6 Finally, elections with larger district magnitudes are typically
characterized by more centralized nomination processes (Castles, 1981; Gallagher and
Marsh, 1988; Rahat, 2007). In a competitive political context, these central bodies are
more inclined and more able to encourage and coordinate a balanced list of candidates
that can attract broad voter support. In contrast, local selectors in systems with smaller
district magnitudes work relatively autonomously with little sense of collective
responsibility for balancing the social profile of the parliamentary party at the national
level.
24. In fact, it is not so much district magnitude as party magnitude that matters. While
district magnitude is defined by the number of seats to be elected in a district, party
magnitude describes the number of seats a party wins (or expects to win) in a district.
Evidently, district magnitude and party magnitude are interrelated. For example, in a
constituency with a DM of 4, parties that expect to win only one seat (PM=1) can
effectively exclude women just by listing them in second place. Such exclusion is less
likely as party magnitude increases: at PM=2, the practice of listing women in second
place will nevertheless produce a gender-balanced result, though a female who is placed
third on the party list would be excluded. There are diminishing returns to party
magnitude, such that gender-balance in the parliamentary party increases significantly
once PM>1, but generally doesn’t grow much once a party wins about two to five seats in
a district.
25. Another factor that impacts the share of women elected is the presence of legal
6 Canadian parliamentary elections tend to produce much lower levels of incumbency than comparable SMD systems, and certainly much lower than US Congressional elections. This feature, attributable to high levels of party entry and exit, is thus not a major factor in explaining women’s under-representation in Canada (Matland and Studlar, 2004; Young, 1991).
11 thresholds. This feature, which is unique to PR systems, refers to the specified minimum
vote share a party must win in order to be awarded seats. Legal thresholds aim to exclude
small parties from holding seats, and thus prevent the fragmentation of the parliamentary
party system. In some instances, they are designed to impede the formation of “ethnic
parties” thought to pose a risk in terms of democratic destabilization (Rabushka and
Shepsle, 1972). In contrast, some countries allow a special exemption from the legal
threshold for minority ethnic parties on the grounds of forming a more inclusive
democracy.
26. The desire to be more inclusive of small parties by setting high DMs and low legal
thresholds within a PR system can have a contrary effect on the representation of women
in parliament (Bird, 2016a; Lucardi and Micozzi 2020). Consider an example where the
entire country comprises a single district, electing all 100 legislative seats (DM=100). If
the legal threshold is set at 5 percent, the smallest party that enters does so with 5 seats.
In comparison, if the legal threshold is set at 1 percent, or if there is an exemption from
the legal threshold for ethnic parties, then a number of marginal parties may enter
parliament, each winning a single seat. In these cases of low PM, the seats in question
tend to be won by men, thus reducing the share of women in parliament.
27. While there is a robust debate on district size, either of two distinct formulae – a) large
DM with high legal thresholds, or b) DM of around five to seven seats (whereby no
threshold is needed) – are seen as equally optimal with respect to achieving gender
balance. Of course, other pragmatic considerations have to be weighed in establishing the
size of electoral districts, including pre-existing administrative divisions, such as
provincial or municipal boundaries.
12 28. Aside from shifting to multi-member districts, I will discuss two other strategies that
could potentially increase the share of female candidates and elected members of the
House of Commons. First is the implementation of statutory gender quotas requiring
parties to run a certain share of female candidates (Krook, 2007, 2009; Murray, Krook,
and Opello, 2012; Thames, 2016). While these can be implemented at all levels of
governance, I limit the discussion here to a brief survey of the roughly 60 countries
worldwide that apply statutory candidate quotas to their lower house parliamentary
elections.7
29. Gender quotas are most commonly and effectively implemented in list-based PR electoral
systems, where they can include strict placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms.
Worldwide, there are about 50 countries that elect their MPs this way, though they vary
considerably in their threshold, placement requirements, and sanctions. The strongest
laws set a 40 to 50% threshold, require “zippered” lists that alternate male and female
placement, and provide for the rejection of non-compliant lists. In contrast, fewer than ten
countries at present apply gender quota laws via SMD (e.g., France), or other less
common voting systems, such as STV (e.g., Ireland). As I discuss below, ensuring quota
compliance in non-PR systems is much more challenging.
30. The clearest evidence of the effectiveness of PR-list systems for gender quota
implementation comes from France (Baudino, 2003; Bird, 2002, 2003). Since 2000,
France has applied a “parity law” requiring that men and women comprise an equal share
of candidates for elections at virtually all levels. However, this 50 percent gender quota
rule interacts with distinctive electoral systems at each level. Municipal councils across
7 Reserved seats are another form of statutory gender quotas; these are not considered here as they are unsuitable for a democratic system of governance.
13 France are elected using PR methods, where the parity law imposes a placement mandate
and provides for the rejection of non-compliant party lists. In 2001, in the first parity
elections to city councils across the country, women’s seat share virtually doubled
overnight (from 25.7% to 47.5%), demonstrating the effectiveness of the quota law under
PR rules. The post of mayor, however, has remained predominantly masculine.8
31. The outcome was quite different in France’s 2002 parliamentary elections, which saw just
71 women elected among 576 MPs (12.3%), compared to 62 women (10.9%) prior to the
parity reform. France uses a single member plurality-majority two-round system for
elections to the National Assembly, and the parity law levies a financial penalty against
any party that fails to nominate an equal number of male and female candidates.
However, in the initial implementation of the law, the large parties holding most
parliamentary seats simply paid the fines to avoid displacing male incumbents. Also,
without placement mandates, which are impossible in an SMD system, the main French
parties selectively nominated female candidates in unwinnable districts – effectively
exploiting a feature of FPTP to bolster their public image while suppressing the election
of women (Murray et al., 2012). However, women’s representation has risen steadily
since these initially disappointing results. Over four consecutive elections, women’s seat
share in the National Assembly increased from 12.3% (2002) to 18.5% (2007) to 26.9%
(2012) to 38.7% (2017). This can be attributed to several factors, including strengthening
of the parity law (doubling the financial penalties for non-compliance) and sustained
8 The first position on party lists was almost invariably allocated to men, which led to only 7.8% of French cities electing female mayors in 2001. Subsequent amendments to the parity law now mandate a fully zippered list for municipal slates, but men still top the list. As of the most recent elections in 2020, 19% of French cities are currently led by female mayors.
14 advocacy for more gender-balanced representation, as well as other legislative changes.9
32. These results in France are in line with the impact of gender quotas worldwide, which
have been shown to become more effective over time due to policy learning combined
with growing public pressure that makes it harder for parties to intentionally thwart the
rules. Examining data on 145 countries from 1990 to 2010, Paxton and Hughes (2015)
find initially weak gains from quotas; however, by 2005 and 2010, countries with
candidate quotas saw an average 8.5% higher rate of increase over time in elected
women, compared to countries without quotas. Over the entire period from 1990 to 2010,
they found a relatively stable gain of approximately 3% for countries utilizing a PR
electoral system, compared to plurality-majority and mixed systems. While there are
significant variations across countries in the design elements of statutory gender quotas,
this study finds the threshold they are set at has the greatest impact on the share of
women elected.
33. From a mechanical perspective, shifting to a fully proportional system in Canada’s 2019
election would have increased the share of female MPs in the House of Commons by just
7 (2%), if we assume that all the parties would have nominated the same proportions of
women under PR as under FPTP.10 However, this calculation does not account for the
psychological and cross-party contagion effects of a PR system, which should induce
9 An important legal reform, in 2017, was an end to the “double mandate.” This widespread feature of French politics allowed MPs to simultaneously hold multiple offices at different levels of government; most often the second mandate was that of local mayor, a position that secured a high profile and probability of re-election. This advantage had been predictably gender-skewed: while 78% of male MPs simultaneously held more than one elected office, only 55% of female MPs enjoyed a double mandate (and they rarely served as mayor). The legal change led many male MPs to step aside in the 2017 election, and those open seats allowed the election of more women. 10 This calculation is based on redistributing the 52 seats that were over-rewarded (relative to vote share) to the Liberals, Conservatives and BQ, and reallocating them to the NDP and Green Party. On average, the share of female candidates among the over-rewarded group of parties was 28%, while the share among under-rewarded parties was 41%.
15 parties to present more gender-balanced slates. This effect has been significant in New
Zealand, for example. New Zealand does not apply a gender quota, but switched in 1996
from SMD elections to a mixed-member proportional (MMP) system. The result was an
immediate increase in women’s parliamentary representation, from 21 to 29 percent. This
gain came principally from the share of list seats won by Labour, which ran the most
gender-balanced slate. But there has been a contagion effect over time, as parties on the
left and right have come to recognize the value of having women as candidates in both
the list and single member district portion of that electoral system (Arseneau, 2014;
Curtin, 2003; Vowles, 2005).
34. Comparing the rate of change in women’s parliamentary representation in France and
New Zealand is insightful, and fairly consistent with the broader trend reported by Paxton
and Hughes (2015). In France, with its SMD electoral system and 50% gender quota, the
share of women’s seats has grown by 28 points (from 11% to 39%) in five elections over
twenty years. In New Zealand, with its MMP system but no quota, women’s seat share
has grown by 27 points (from 21% to 48%) in ten elections over two dozen years.
Extrapolating to Canada, these results suggest that a statutory gender quota of 40%
minimum female candidates, even while maintaining our SMD system, could be as
impactful as wholesale reform to a more proportional MMD system; though evidently
combining both reforms would be most effective.11
35. A final reform strategy that may be advantageous to women in the short-term is to
11 It is not an abstract question to ask about the relative impact of quotas versus a more proportional electoral system, given that both possibilities were separately debated by parliament in 2016. A gender quota was proposed under a private member’s bill, C-237, the Candidate Gender Equity Act; similar to the French quota rule, this would have penalized parties for whom disparities in the share of male and female candidates exceeded 10 percent. The House of Commons Special Committee on Electoral Reform was formed following the Liberal campaign pledge to “take action to ensure that 2015 will be the last federal election conducted under the first-past-the-post voting system.” In the end, neither reform proposal was adopted.
16 increase the number of seats in the legislature. Previous research suggests that adding
seats to a legislative assembly does tend to increase the share of women in parliament
(Kjaer and Elklit, 2014; Salmond, 2006; Thames, 2016). In a longitudinal analysis of 98
democratic countries from 1955 to 2012, Thames (2016) finds that increasing the number
of seats in parliament has a strong and statistically significant effect on women’s seat
share in the following year. However, this seems to be a short-term or time-sensitive
effect, as open seat opportunities are immediately exploited by parties and other actors, so
there is no durable acceleration in women’s seat share. Consistent with my discussion
above, Thames also found that electoral reforms involving an increase in district
magnitude, a shift from a majoritarian to a more proportional system, and the introduction
of gender quotas caused an increase in women’s seat share over time.12
36. It is less clear whether these reform proposals would have any impact on women’s
participation as voters. There is no evidence of a gender gap in voter participation in
Canada; if anything, women are slightly more likely than men to have voted in recent
federal elections.13
2. What is the impact of Canada’s current FPTP voting system on the representation and participation of minorities? What would change under other voting systems?
37. Under SMD rules, the most important determinant of minority representation is the
degree to which minorities are geospatially distributed or concentrated (Norris, 2004;
Ruedin, 2007); specifically, what is important is how SMD boundaries align with
12 Other factors shown to cause an increase in women’s seat share over time include years since suffrage and increases in female labour force participation. 13 Voter turnout in Canada in 2011 was estimated at 59.6% for women, and 57.3% for men. In 2015, the figures were 68.0% and 64.1%, and in 2019 turnout was 68.5% and 65.5% respectively for women and men. (These figures are based on administrative data compiled by Elections Canada; see https://www.elections.ca/content.aspx?section=res&dir=rec/eval/pes2015/vtsa&document=table2&lang=e)
17 geospatial residence patterns. On the one hand, SMDs may facilitate elections of
candidates from ethnic and linguistic minority groups if they are territorially
concentrated, particularly if they form an ethnoregional party (like the Bloc Québécois in
Quebec), or vote as a cohesive block (like African Americans in the U.S.). On the other
hand, minorities that are more geographically or ideologically dispersed do less well
under SMD rules because voters belonging to these minorities do not form a local
plurality, which is required to elect a candidate in SMDs. The complexity of ethnic
diversity in the Canadian context means that our current system does not serve all
minority groups well.
38. To begin, we need to review the current situation for minority representation in Canada.
In contrast to the chronic under-representation of women, the overall percentage of the
Indigenous and racialized MPs14 in the House of Commons is closer to their percentage
of the population in the country as a whole. Following the 2019 election, 10 Indigenous
MPs held seats in the House of Commons, for a share of 3.0 percent of all seats. This is in
contrast to the overall 4.9 percent Indigenous share of the population (though, due to the
Indigenous population’s relatively young age profile, it is similar to the proportion of
eligible Indigenous voters in Canada, which is 2.8 percent). Historically, furthermore,
they have been significantly underrepresented.
39. Visible minority MPs currently comprise about 15.1 percent (51 of 338 seats) of the
House of Commons (Black, 2019; Griffith, 2019). While this lags behind the 22.3 percent
share of visible minorities in the population, it is closer to the 17.2 percent figure of the
14 The Canadian census and the Indian Act are historically, and remain today, the principal legal instruments through which racial categories are made and manipulated (Thompson, 2020). While I will touch on the political representation and participation of all three categories of ethno-racial minorities that are formally recognized in Canada – Aboriginal, official language minorities, and visible minorities – my main focus will be on “visible minorities” as defined by Statistics Canada.
18 visible minority population who are citizens, and thus eligible to vote and run for elected
office. While definitional issues make it challenging to compare representation of ethnic
and racialized minorities globally, Canada clearly stands ahead of countries such as the
US, the UK, Germany, France and Australia on this score (Adams, 2007; Bird, 2005;
Bird et al., 2011; Pietsch, 2017; Ruedin, 2009), which suggests that Canadian voters are
open to voting for minority candidates (as will be further discussed below).
40. Still, some visible minorities are less well represented than others. Following the 2019
federal election, MPs of South Asian descent held half of all seats (26 of 51) won by
visible minorities, a number which makes them considerably over-represented (with 7.7
percent total seat share) relative to their population (5.6 percent). Virtually every other
visible minority group remains under-represented, with most holding less than half the
share of seats relative to their population share.15 Furthermore, racialized candidates tend
to be concentrated within a relatively small number of electoral districts such that they are
largely competing against each other. This leaves most racialized voters outside these
districts unable to vote for members of their ethnic group – or more generally for any
visible minority candidate.
41. What impact does the FPTP electoral system have for minority representation in Canada?
There are three broad research themes to consider when answering this question (some of
which pull in opposite directions). The first theme concerns territorially concentrated
ethnic minorities who are dominant in their geographic territory, such that they are
able to form a viable ethnoregional party. Evidence from around the world shows that
15 According to Andrew Griffith’s (2019) tabulations, in the 2019 election, only 2.3 percent of seats in the House of Commons were won by MPs who are ethnically Chinese, though according to 2016 census data 4.6 percent of the total population identifies as Chinese; just 1.4 percent of seats are held by Black MPs, though Blacks comprise roughly 3.5 percent of the population; less than 0.6 percent of seats are held by Latin Americans, a group comprising 1.3 percent of the population; while Filipinos, with 2.3 percent of the population share, held no seats.
19 such groups tend to win a higher seat-share than their corresponding vote share under
plurality voting than under proportional rules (Lublin, 2014). They are very likely to do
so if the minority in question achieves an evenly-distributed simple plurality across
several seats within its heartland, and is not split across more than one party. This
dynamic clearly applies in the case of francophones whose level of concentration in
Quebec has allowed them to form a federal political party, the Bloc Québécois (BQ), to
defend their linguistic and cultural interests in Ottawa. The BQ has thrived under the
FPTP electoral system by turning modest plurality wins in ridings across the province
into a significant parliamentary seat share.16 In its first contested election, in 1993, the
party captured 54 of the province’s 75 seats (72%) though it garnered just 49.3 percent of
the province’s votes. Though the BQ contested no seats outside of Quebec, its seat share
put it in second place behind the governing Liberals, allowing it to form the official
opposition (a feat aided by the splintering of the federal Progressive Conservative Party).
Over six successive elections from 1993 through 2008, the BQ won 22 percent more seats
than votes, until it collapsed in 2011; the party then rebounded in 2019, winning 41
percent of Quebec’s seats with 33 percent of the vote. Moving to a more proportional
system would correct the over-representation of this type of ethnoregional party.
42. The second theme concerns national minorities (i.e., anglophones, francophones) that
16 According to Alan Cairns, this mechanical tendency of Canada’s FPTP system to over-reward “sectional” parties with a disproportionate seat share had the more general effect of exaggerating regional cleavages. His discussion is worth quoting at length: “The electoral system has not been impartial in its translation of votes into seats. Its benefits have been disproportionately given to the strongest major party and a weak sectional party. The electoral system has made a major contribution to the identification of particular sections/provinces with particular parties. It has undervalued the partisan diversity within each section/province. By doing so it has rendered the parliamentary composition of each party less representative of the sectional interests in the political system than is the party electorate from which that representation is derived. The electoral system favours minor parties with concentrated sectional support, and discourages those with diffuse national support. The electoral system has consistently exaggerated the significance of cleavages demarcated by sectional/provincial boundaries and has thus tended to transform contests between parties into contests between sections/provinces” (1968, 62).
20 have a significant but non-majority or non-plurality presence in a region.
Indigenous groups are also included in this discussion. In Canada, such groups have
historically voted along linguistic and religious lines, though such patterns have
diminished over time. In the case of Indigenous groups, they have been characterized by
low turnout and limited engagement in federal electoral politics. Canada’s SMD system
makes ethnic parties non-viable except for francophones in Quebec, and leaves these
more dispersed groups under-represented in the regions where they live in contrast to
MMD systems. SMDs reduce the odds of people from these groups being nominated (and
subsequently elected) because the single-member nomination process is biased toward
individuals from the local majority or plurality group. These groups thus pose a different
challenge than the groups considered under our first and third themes, and there have
been attempts to “protect” them by ensuring representation through various types of
electoral arrangements.17
43. Under our SMD system the only effective means to do this has been through the statutory
establishment of “exceptional ridings.” These are designed with significant deviations
from the normal electoral quotient (i.e., malapportioned) to improve the chances that
certain minority communities may elect a same-ethnic representative. This approach has
been taken in provincial and territorial elections in BC, Alberta, Ontario, Nova Scotia,
PEI, Newfoundland and Labrador, and the NWT. For example, Ontario in 2018 followed
the advice of its Far North Electoral Boundaries Commission to establish two such
17 The arrangements discussed here are generally referred to as “ethnic quotas.” Various forms of ethnic quotas can be applied across all kinds of electoral systems (PR, majority/plurality or mixed families) either to compensate for past repression or to promote “power sharing” (see Bird, 2014; Hine, 2009). Such arrangements are currently in place for parliamentary elections in about three dozen countries worldwide, and in lower level jurisdictions in many countries as well. The most familiar example is New Zealand’s system of reserved seats for Māori representation, but measures are common in Central and Eastern Europe (especially in the Balkan region), Asia, and Latin America.
21 provincial ridings, one with a population that is 68 percent Indigenous and another that is
60 percent francophone. Each contains fewer than one-fifth the average riding population
for the province. From 1992 until 2012, and again since 2019, Nova Scotia’s electoral
map included four such exceptional districts, designed to improve the chances of electing
Acadians and African Nova Scotians.18 Another alternative, with which Canada has some
historical experience, is the adoption of ethnically- and linguistically-balanced slates of
candidates in two- or multi-member districts.19 Albaugh (2018) finds, in the case of New
Brunswick, that this historic arrangement worked to a degree, even though francophones
and Catholics remained under-represented relative to their population size. Cultural
prejudices of the era account to some degree for this under-representation, as SMD
systems in other provinces appear to have had a similar effect.
44. These solutions under SMD systems can only be of limited effectiveness: for example,
the majority of Indigenous people in Canada live in larger urban areas, where their
proportion of the population is less significant.20 Conversely, MMDs would reduce the
barriers to (and could even encourage) parties putting forward minority candidates in
regions where they have a significant presence but not a plurality. In turn, the lack of
strong voter bias against minority candidates (as will be discussed below) would likely
enable more of them to be elected under MMD rules.
18 Beginning in 2012, those small ridings were merged into adjacent ones due to new rules prohibiting more than 25 percent deviation from the average riding population, with no exceptions. That decision was overturned by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in 2017, after which a commission was struck to assess how best to provide effective representation for ethnic minorities in the province. Following that report, the province resumed its prior practice of creating exceptional ridings to advance minority representation, as reflected in its boundary adjustment in 2019. 19 For example, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and PEI previously used a dual-member plurality system to elect representatives to their respective provincial assemblies. The practice dates from their establishment as separate colonies in the late 18th century, and extended through the mid-twentieth century (Albaugh, 2018; Cross and Stewart, 2002; Thorburn, 1961). 20 Statistics Canada provides some insight into the distribution of Indigenous people in urban centres, however it is well-documented that census counts underestimate urban Indigenous populations two to four times (e.g., Caldwell, 2019; Congress of Aboriginal Peoples, 2019).
22 45. The third broad theme concerns polyethnic immigrant-origin minorities who through
individual and collective migrations to find safe refuge or economic improvement,
together with their descendants, cumulate into a substantial presence, especially in
“gateway” cities and their peripheries.21 Today, such groups constitute a numerical
majority in 41 of 338 federal ridings, making them a politically significant presence
(Griffith, 2017). There are unique considerations and dynamics here that do not apply
under the previous two themes. Most important is that the “visible minority”
classification conceals considerable diversity. Not only is there no shared ethnic identity
among this group, there is also little evidence of identity-based voting in Canada. Under
these conditions, it is likely that SMDs and more proportional MMD electoral systems
would be equally effective for advancing visible minority representation overall in
Canada; however, proportional MMD systems are more likely to achieve equitable
representation across diverse racialized groups.
46. Many scholars in Canada assume that visible minorities generally benefit from plurality
SMD electoral rules (e.g., Marwah et al., 2013; Tanguay and Bittle, 2005; Tolley, 2017).
The argument is that, because candidates need only win a plurality of votes in their
constituencies, the SMD system, in combination with significant shares of immigrant-
origin ethnic minorities in competitive urban ridings, compels parties – even socially
conservative ones – to compete for the votes of those minorities. They do so, it is argued,
predominantly through the strategic selection of minority candidates (e.g., Marwah et al.,
2013). Yet because we have no counterfactual to actually test the causal effects of
21 To simplify, I will refer to these interchangeably as visible or immigrant-origin minorities, though I recognize that not all visible minorities see themselves as immigrants (for example, the history of African Nova Scotians spans more than 400 years in that province, while Chinese Canadians were among the earliest settlers of British Columbia). Nor are all immigrant-origin minorities racialized.
23 plurality SMD in these conditions – at least not for federal or provincial elections22 – we
need to be cautious about this assumption.
47. In the absence of a counterfactual, scholars have relied on two kinds of sources regarding
the presumed effectiveness of SMD rules. First is observational data on their actual
performance in Canada. As noted, there is a comparatively strong track record of federal
parties nominating and electing visible minority candidates in competitive ridings with
large minority populations (Adams, 2007; Bird, 2005; Bird et al., 2011; Black, 2019;
Forest, 2012; Griffith, 2019). Yet this observational data does not imply that federal
parties would cease to nominate and elect visible minority candidates in these ridings
under MMD rules. Furthermore, when disaggregated, the data also establishes that for
every minority that does well under Canada’s SMD rules (e.g., South Asians), there are
others that do poorly (e.g., Blacks and Filipinos).
48. Second, scholars have looked to the experience in the U.S., and to a lesser extent, other
countries. The history of the U.S. Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its impact in addressing
minority vote dilution and advancing African-American representation looms especially
large in the Canadian understanding of minority-friendly electoral reforms. Two streams
of evidence in the U.S. context suggest that SMDs can create favorable conditions for the
election of minorities. One is the overall positive effect that the creation of “majority-
minority districts” – electoral districts where a racial minority is the majority – has had on
the political participation and descriptive representation of Black and Latinx voters in
U.S. Congress and state legislatures, in comparison with standard SMDs where the
boundaries are not adjusted to create such districts (Gay, 2001; Grofman and Handley,
22 London, Ontario is the only Canadian jurisdiction to currently use a non-plurality electoral system, having adopted ranked-choice voting for its 2018 municipal election.
24 1989, 1991; Lublin, 1997; Lublin et al., 2015). The other is evidence at the municipal
level showing that single-seat, ward-level elections generally provide an electoral edge to
geographically concentrated groups in comparison with “plurality at-large elections.” A
plurality at-large election, also known as “block voting,” is a non-proportional winner-
take-all voting system in which each voter in a district can vote for a number of
candidates up to the number of available seats. It has been shown to dilute potential
minority voting strength when groups are spatially segregated, as such minority groups
lack the power to outvote the majority and thus win few or no seats, resulting in much
lower rates of election for African-Americans in many U.S. cities (Grofman and
Davidson, 1994; Trebbi et al., 2008; Trounstine and Valdini, 2008; Davidson and Korbel,
1981; Engstrom and McDonald, 1981, 1982; Karning and Welch, 1982; Grofman et al.,
1985, 1992; Migalski and Noviello, 1986; Welch, 1990). So strong is this latter finding
that at-large voting arrangements were cited by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg as
one of the most egregious “second-generation barriers” designed to dilute minority
voters’ influence.23 Some U.S. courts have struck down at-large election schemes on the
grounds that they violate the Voting Rights Act by diluting the minority’s vote, in
comparison with SMDs.
49. Evidence drawn from municipal elections in England may contradict, to an extent, the
U.S. findings on the benefits of SMDs over MMDs using plurality rules. Dancygier
(2014) finds no relationship between the district magnitude (i.e., multi- or single-member
districts) within a plurality-based system and the share of Muslim councillors elected.
Rather, the size and concentration of the Muslim population is the most decisive factor in
23 Shelby County v. Holder (2013).
25 electing fellow Muslims to the local council, under any set of rules. The crucial feature of
Dancygier’s analysis is that, by taking advantage of an as-if-random variation in the
electoral rules across boroughs, she is able to isolate institutional effects from other
confounding variables (such as racially polarized voting). Her findings are thus important
for resolving conflicting theoretical predictions and mixed findings across prior studies.
50. More importantly, the U.S. evidence in relation to majority-minority districts is only of
partial relevance when trying to understand the Canadian context, for three main reasons.
First, while the U.S. experience may support the conclusion that SMDs can create
favourable conditions for the election of minorities compared to the inequities of plurality
at-large voting, it does not imply that other more proportional MMD systems (e.g., list
PR, MMP, STV) are also ineffective in advancing minority representation. In fact, there
has been some broader push-back in the U.S. against SMDs as a method for advancing
minority representation, the main drawback being that majority-minority districts require
the continuation of some degree of residential segregation (in addition to the fact that
majority-minority districts do nothing for minorities in other districts). U.S. courts have
also increasingly limited states’ use of race in drawing legislative district lines. This has
led advocates to argue for proportional methods (e.g., Single Transferable Vote (STV),
Limited Vote (LV) and Cumulative Vote (CV)) as alternatives to SMD. These systems
allow minority communities that are geographically dispersed to vote cohesively for a co-
ethnic candidate, and in multi-racial communities they tend to allow different racial
minorities to obtain co-ethnic representation. The evidence suggests that using
proportional systems such as limited or cumulative voting in local at-large elections can
produce minority representation at levels similar to SMDs configured to have majority-
26 minority districts (Brockington et al., 1998). In addition, reform advocates have argued
for Alternative Voting systems (AV), in which voters rank candidates in order of
preference and transfer their ballots to lower-ranked candidates if their top choice is
eliminated. These appear to be more resistant to vote splitting among competing minority
candidates than other single-member systems, at least in the context of non-partisan
municipal elections (John et al., 2018). These findings are encouraging in the U.S.
context, in that intrinsically more proportional voting systems offer an alternative to the
acrimonious process of drawing majority-minority districts on the basis of race (Amy,
2002; Guinier, 1994).24
51. The second reason the U.S. context may only be of partial relevance is that voting in the
U.S. tends to be characterized by extreme racial polarization. That is, racialized
minorities tend to vote in a substantial block for candidates who are members of the same
group, while white voters are substantially unwilling to vote for minority candidates
(Fisher et al., 2015; Terkildsen, 1993).25 In racially polarized contexts, and where
minorities are spatially segregated, the advantage of a functionally segregated SMD
electoral system, particularly when compared to plurality at-large elections, is that it
allows parties to mitigate the risk of an “ethnic penalty” by running minority candidates
uniquely in minority concentrated ridings.
52. In Canada, the evidence does not imply similar extreme racial polarization. On this
24 In the U.S., evidence on proportional voting systems is drawn from a number of small and medium sized local jurisdictions, including city councils, county councils, and school boards. As of 2020, over 200 local jurisdictions in the U.S. use alternatives to plurality voting, including cumulative, limited and ranked-choice voting. See https://www.sightline.org/2017/11/08/over-300-places-in-the-united-states-have-used-fair-voting-methods/ 25 Racially polarized voting need not be based on racial animosity, but at least requires evidence of race-based perceptions that candidates of minority ethnic backgrounds differ systematically in terms of their ideologies and issue positions (e.g., that Black or minority candidates are more liberal), from candidates of non-minority backgrounds.
27 matter, as Erin Tolley writes (2019, 72): Canada “is a country where there should be
fewer attitudinal barriers to minority candidate emergence. In such a context, we should
expect minority candidates to emerge in a range of electoral districts (not only the most
racially diverse), for all major parties (not only those at the center-left)…” In fact,
research in Canada has generally found that visible minority candidates do not face racial
discrimination from white voters (Black and Erickson, 2006; Murakami, 2014). Only
research by Besco (2020) suggests that minority candidates who run for the Conservative
Party (though not the Liberal Party) are likely subject to substantial discriminatory effects
from white Conservative voters.
53. The possibility that racially polarized voting might be stronger among Conservatives than
other party supporters raises a complex set of incentive structures under different
electoral systems. In an SMD system, it could induce the Conservative Party (more so
than other parties) to run ethnic minority candidates in only the most ethnically diverse
ridings. In contrast, under any kind of MMD closed-list electoral system, the
Conservative Party would find it harder than other parties to present a diverse candidate
slate, given the greater likelihood of “friendly fire” from its own supporters. Our current
SMD system thus appears to be relatively advantageous to the Conservative Party
compared to MMD closed list systems, allowing it to court minority voters without
bearing the racially polarized backlash of its white supporters. Similarly, open-list PR,
STV, and MMP electoral systems would allow the Conservative Party to maintain its
uneasy coalition of visible minority and non-minority voters. In those systems,
Conservative supporters who are thus inclined could simply vote for the white candidates
on offer.
28 54. The third reason the U.S. context may be only of partial relevance is the role of partisan
voting. Although much of the scholarship (particularly in the U.S.) presumes voters are
inclined to cast ballots for candidates of their own ethnic group, ethnicity becomes much
less relevant when party loyalty is strong. In Canada, voters’ party identification has been
shown to be far more influential than affinities for candidates of their own sex or
ethnicity (Goodyear-Grant and Croskill, 2011; Murakami, 2014). This is not to say that
candidate characteristics do not matter, but they likely do not figure as prominently in
parties’ selection strategies as they do in the U.S. (Cain et al., 2013).
55. Once the Canadian context is distinguished from the U.S. context – through an absence of
racially polarized voting and the presence of strong partisan voting – the SMD system
seems to present no greater structural incentive in Canada to the representation of
spatially concentrated visible minorities than would a plurality MMD electoral system
such as at-large voting. Extending the analysis to proportional MMD systems requires
taking into account additional considerations. First, as noted above, inducement structures
may differ by party. Second, moving away from SMD shifts control over candidate
selection from the local electoral district to the central party, at least to some degree. This
is a good thing for advancing gender balance, but it may be less so for visible minorities
under closed list systems, particularly as racialized party gatekeepers at the local level
appear to be a key factor in the emergence of minority candidates (Tolley, 2019). Third,
because almost every vote counts in determining seat share under proportional MMD
systems, there is an incentive for parties to engage in ticket-balancing. This would likely
incentivize parties to run ethnically diverse slates, which could lead to wider distribution
of seats across diverse visible minority groups. Central or regional party directors under
29 these systems would therefore likely be sensitive to the need to present a balanced slate.
Finally, under MMD systems, there may also exist societal contagion pressures to put
forward balanced slates, which would in turn increase the diversity of candidates.
56. There is one additional problem with Canada’s winner-take-all SMD system. Despite
lack of evidence that voting is racially polarized, it is nevertheless clear that visible
minority candidacies are heavily clustered within a limited number of super-diverse
federal ridings (Tolley, 2019).26 Racialized candidates largely compete against each other
within a relatively small number of electoral districts. This may not diminish the
parliamentary representation of visible minorities overall – as noted, the share of visible
minorities in the House of Commons closely approximates the share of visible minorities
who are citizens in the total Canadian population. However, it means that winners tend to
emerge from the most sizeable and spatially compact ethnic groups, to the exclusion of
others (Gagnon, 2015; Griffith, 2019; Tolley, 2019).
57. While the U.S. scholarship on minority representation is predominant, we can also draw
from numerous single-country and nationally comparative studies of the representation of
immigrant and migrant-background minorities across Europe, Australia and New Zealand
(e.g., Anthony, 2006; Anwar, 1994; Barker and Coffé, 2018; Bird et al., 2011;
Bloemraad, 2013; da Fonseca, 2011; Dancygier, 2013, 2014; Fisher et al., 2015; Givens
and Maxwell, 2012; Morales et al., forthcoming; Schöenwälder, 2012, 2013; Sobolewska,
2013; Togeby, 2008; Wüst, 2014; Zingher and Farrer, 2014). Yet extrapolating from
these findings to Canada also presents challenges. One reason is that immigrant
26 Tolley (2019) notes that 89 percent (137 of 153) of all visible minority candidates who ran for one of the three main parties in the 2015 federal election were nominated in ridings with above-average racialized population-share (the mean visible minority population in those ridings was 37 percent).
30 candidates in these countries tend to run primarily for left parties, whereas minority
candidates in Canada are more evenly distributed across all parties. This introduces a
potential confounder: it could be that greater left party success under PR systems in other
countries accounts for higher rates of immigrant-origin representatives, rather than the
electoral system itself. The spatial politics of minority representation in these countries is
also quite different from Canada. For example, in mixed member systems in Germany
and New Zealand, immigrant-origin MPs are more likely to win their seats through the
PR-list tier than the SMD tier (Barker and Coffé, 2018; da Fonseca, 2011; Schöenwälder,
2012; Wüst, 2014). However, the decisive factor here is that, even though minorities tend
to be concentrated in urban areas, they still never constitute more than a minority at the
polls in any of the SMD races in New Zealand or Germany, whereas they constitute
pluralities in certain Canadian ridings.
58. Yet one interesting feature of some PR-list systems in Europe does make a difference.
The ability of voters to cast “preference votes” for individual candidates on party lists has
helped to increase minority representation in municipal elections in Denmark, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Norway. While party elites in these systems often place immigrant-
origin visible minority candidates near the bottom of the lists, candidate mobilization
strategies within their co-ethnic electorate frequently result in high rates of preferential
voting. In some cities, this dynamic has facilitated minorities’ election to municipal
council at levels proportionate to their share in the population (Bird, 2005; Bergh and
Bjørklund, 2011; Teney et al., 2010; Togeby, 2008).27
27 It is important to note that PR-list systems that do not allow preferential votes pose a significant hurdle to the election of immigrant-origin minorities in many European countries, as party leaders - whether due to their own prejudice or feared adverse voter reactions - are resistant to selecting minority candidates and placing them in an
31 59. Altogether, these studies from other countries, albeit with different political contexts,
show that various kinds of list-based/MMD systems can be at least as effective in
advancing visible minority representation as single-member districts, in contexts where
these groups are geographically concentrated. As Dancygier (2014, 258) concludes,
irrespective of the particular electoral system, what matters is that “those minority groups
that can successfully mobilize co-ethnics...are in a position to bypass existing elites and
take advantage of electoral rules.” This appears to be the case, even in the context of
racially polarized voting and situations of resentment against immigrants.
60. Summarizing the three research themes concerning the representation of different types
of minority groups, we arrive at several conclusions. First, SMD tends to over-represent
ethnic minority groups that are large, geographically concentrated and politically
cohesive; the BQ in particular gains significantly from this feature of FPTP systems, as it
is able to convert marginal wins in ridings across the province into a disproportionately
large seat share. In contrast, minorities that are geographically dispersed and politically
less cohesive do much worse under SMD rules. Finally, in the context of super-diverse
urban settings, it appears that more proportional list-based/MMD electoral systems would
be equally effective as SMD systems for advancing overall numbers of visible minorities,
and more likely to produce equitable representation across diverse racialized groups.
61. It is thus fair to say that, all things being equal, our current FPTP system causes women
to be systematically under-represented, and certain minorities to be systematically over-
represented while others are under-represented; in some cases, these disparities are fairly
extreme. Under a proportional system, women and diverse minorities would likely be electable list position (e.g., Dancygier et al., forthcoming; Dancygier et al., 2015; Ruedin 2013; Street 2014; Portmann and Stojanovic 2019; Soininen, 2011; van der Zwan, Lubbers, and Eisinga 2019).
32 represented in closer accordance with their population size and, in the case of minorities,
in a broader set of ridings throughout the country.
3. Reviewing reform alternatives
62. The final step in this analysis is to consider how a range of alternative electoral systems
might impact the representation of women, Indigenous peoples, and diverse ethnic
minorities. This prescriptive assessment is brief and more speculative, as it is not possible
to address how every electoral system, or every variation thereof, would impact each
group.28 Nevertheless, this sketch covers the likely impact of each family type, and notes
features that should help to advance more equitable representation of all groups across the
board.
63. I begin by reviewing proportional methods, starting with the full PR-list system. There is
a well-established literature demonstrating the effectiveness of PR systems for electing
more women, and even critics do not contest this outcome (e.g., Rush, 2001: 79). Such a
PR system would correct the over-representation of “sectional” parties that gain a
disproportionate seat share under FPTP and that thereby tend to exaggerate regional
cleavages. It could also fix the problem that has become common in Canada where a
party with significant support in a region nonetheless elects no representatives in that
28 There are variants within each family, as well as many specific subsidiary rules that cannot be considered here. For example, whether lists are open or closed, the size of district magnitudes, the legal vote threshold, the alignment of district boundaries, the size of the compensation tier in mixed systems, whether candidates in mixed systems are allowed to run in only a district or on a party list, or both, whether preferential voting is full or optional (etc.), are features that can produce distinctive strategic choices among parties with respect to the selection and placement of candidates of diverse backgrounds.
33 region.29 For ethnic minorities, the key advantage is that because almost every vote
counts in determining seat share, parties would be more incentivized to seek votes from
small minority communities. This should lead them to curate richly diverse candidate
lists. While lower barriers to party entry can generate a proliferation of smaller parties
reflecting more diverse perspectives, it is possible (and likely advisable) to design a PR
system to avoid that scenario, so as to reduce the emergence of parties driven by anti-
immigrant sentiment. This concern, together with significant urban/rural differences,
suggests that the best fit for Canada would likely be small to medium-sized multi-
member districts (electing between three to seven members) in most areas, possibly with
compensatory elements such as are used in some of the Scandinavian countries. Given the
challenges of representing sparsely populated districts of vast geographic size, especially
in the far North, it may be necessary to allow some degree of malapportionment with
district magnitudes not exceeding two in those regions.
64. The single transferable vote (STV) is another proportional option that has received
considerable attention in Canada. Also known as the Hare-Clark method, it is the option
that was presented to B.C. voters in that province’s 2005 referendum on electoral reform
(recommended by the Citizens' Assembly on Electoral Reform, the proposal to adopt
STV fell just shy of the 60% voter support that the government had required). Variants of
STV are used in Ireland to elect members of the lower chamber in constituencies of
between three and five seats, and in Australia for Senate elections (with 12 Senators
elected from each state, and two from each territory) as well as elections to the
Tasmanian House of Assembly and the Australian Capital Territory Legislative
29 This problem – for example, as when the Conservatives sweep Alberta, leaving a Liberal government with no seats in that province – makes it very challenging to ensure effective representation of regional interests within government and cabinet.
34 Assembly, in the Northern Ireland Assembly, at the local council level in Scotland, and in
a number of cities in New Zealand. In this system, each elector votes in a district election
that elects multiple winners, and has the opportunity to rank-order candidates on the
ballot. In the initial round of ballot counting, voters’ first preferences are tallied, and the
lowest scoring candidate is eliminated. But if a voter’s first preference is eliminated,
instead of the ballot being thrown away, their second preference is transferred to the next-
designated candidate. This process continues until there are only as many remaining
candidates as there are unfilled seats, at which point the remaining candidates are
declared elected.
65. How would this system impact women and minorities? Like all MMD systems, STV
creates an incentive for parties to engage in ticket-balancing. We should therefore expect
at least a modest positive impact on women’s representation. The STV system would
similarly incentivize parties to run ethnically diverse slates, which could lead to wider
distribution of seats across diverse visible minority groups, including Indigenous people
in urban areas. On the other hand, it could be detrimental to Indigenous representation in
the northern areas of provinces, where doubling or tripling a district’s geographic size
could make the practicalities of serving a very large area more challenging. This could be
addressed by creating malapportioned districts that would elect just two members in those
regions.
66. Another model often considered for Canada is a mixed-member proportional (MMP)
system. MMP is a family of electoral systems that combine district-based elections with
list voting. The latter acts as a corrective mechanism to any disproportionality produced
by the constituency contests. Voters in this system typically have two votes: one in their
35 local constituency, and one for the party lists. Voters can and do split their tickets, voting
strategically for different parties on the two ballots.30 Unlike the fully proportional
systems considered above, the key advantage of MMP for Canada is that it allows for a
share of SMDs in sparsely populated Northern areas. It can also be easily joined with
“exceptional districts” to advance effective representation for Indigenous peoples.31
67. It is clear that MMP systems produce better female representation than SMD-based
systems. Given the incentives for ticket-balancing, we should also expect to see a
reasonable distribution of smaller minorities and Indigenous candidates nominated and
elected to the list tier. Compared to the siloing effect of visible minority representation
within our SMD system (Tolley, 2019), MMP could produce more representative
outcomes among a wider range of diverse ethnic minority groups. Implementation of a
Canadian-style MMP system would likely require regional or province-wide lists; thus
DMs would be small in the Maritimes and could range from mid-sized to possibly quite
30 There are various explanations for ticket-splitting, but in general the idea is that voters evaluate the electoral situation in their own constituencies, and conduct benefit/cost analyses as to which party and candidate to support in the two contests, respectively. If their preferred party seems assured of winning in the constituency, the elector may cast their list vote strategically for their second-choice party. As an example, the Māori Party in New Zealand has encouraged its voters on the Māori roll to split their vote between Labour candidates in the Māori electorates and Māori Party candidates on the lists, with the aim to get as many Māori MPs into parliament as possible. See https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/428352/what-you-need-to-know-about-splitting-your-vote-in-the-maori- seats. 31 The NZ case is most often raised in considerations of how an MMP system with reserved Indigenous seats could work in Canada, so it is worth examining that briefly here. Māori representation in New Zealand has jumped more than threefold since the country adopted mixed-member proportional representation in 1996. That first election run under the new MMP system saw the share of Māori MPs rise from 8.1% (under FPTP rules) to 14.2%, while more recent numbers are around 21 to 23 percent. While these are remarkable gains, it is the size of the Māori electorate, combined with the longstanding system of reserved Māori seats, that are the critical factors there. The Māori are the second largest ethnic group in New Zealand, comprising 16.5% of the national population, compared to just 4.9% in Canada. Their population size combined with relatively high rates of voter participation has induced mainstream parties to place more Indigenous candidates in electable positions on their lists. The emergence of a viable Māori Party under MMP rules has also been a factor, though in fact most Māori MPs are elected from the mainstream parties. See https://www.parliament.nz/en/visit-and-learn/mps-and-parliaments-1854-onwards/m%C4%81ori-mps- in-the-new-zealand-parliament-1868-onwards/. However, in principle, if a separate Indigenous electoral roll were created in Canada, it could ensure that Indigenous peoples would not see their votes diluted or overlooked in mixed Indigenous/non-Indigenous electorates.
36 large in provinces such as Ontario, Quebec and B.C.32 So the incentive and capacity for
ticket-balancing in the list tier would vary regionally.
68. Are there drawbacks to an MMP system? One potential risk is that a mixed system can
create two classes of MPs, which could have implications if women and minorities tend
to be relegated systematically to the lower status tier. There appear to be some initial
effects of this nature when a country transitions from SMD to MMP. This was the case
for New Zealand’s first MMP elections in 1996. While that first election produced an
overall higher share of female MPs (29 percent compared to 21 percent under the
previous FPTP election in 1993), those women were disproportionately elected at the list
tier, where they comprised 45 percent of elected members, compared to just 15 percent
among the district tier (a figure well below the 21 percent elected by FPTP in 1993).
Furthermore, voters reported lower name recognition of list MPs compared to electorate
MPs (Karp, 2002). But over time, these differences have evaporated.33 Indeed, the
preponderance of evidence suggests there are few long term differences in perceived or
actual status of list versus district MPs in countries that use MMP systems (Massicotte,
2004: 61-7).
69. Another potential problem with MMP is that the list-based mandate could erode the
32 Scotland and Wales, which have used MMP since 1999, are probably better models for Canada than New Zealand in this respect. In NZ there are 72 members elected in the first-past-the-post constituency contests, with the remainder (48) elected according to the vote distribution in a single national list. In comparison, in Scotland there are 73 single-member constituencies electing representatives by first-past-the-post, with a further 56 elected from list votes in eight regional constituencies. Similarly, Welsh Assembly elections involve 40 first-past-the-post constituencies and a further 20 representatives with four each elected from five regional lists. Germany, another well-known MMP system, offers a different model. Technically, Germany allocates its list-tier of seats in ten regional districts, but since parties have the option to pool their votes nationally, in practice, total seats are determined in a single national district and awarded to candidates. 33 The gender disparities of the 1996 results are partly related to right-party victory in that election, as left-parties are generally more likely to run female candidates in both the district and list tiers. Indeed, the subsequent elections of 1999 and 2002, both of which returned a Labour government, saw more even shares of women across both tiers. Recent elections in 2014, 2017 and 2020 have all produced a roughly equal share of female MPs in both the list and electorate tiers, under right and left party governments.
37 connection and sense of “responsiveness” that voters have of their MPs in the
constituency, something that is vital to the quality of representation as members of
minority groups perceive it (Bird, 2015). This could be mitigated by allowing candidates
to compete simultaneously in the list and district portion of the election. The experience
in Germany, where this is the practice, is that legislators elected from a list typically see
their role as being available to people in the districts in which they (unsuccessfully) ran
(Bol et al., 2020; Zittel and Gschwend, 2009). Another potential problem, as noted above,
is that shifting candidate selection away from the local electoral district may weaken the
positive impact that racialized party gatekeepers at the local level have on the emergence
of minority candidates in racially diverse ridings. However, this could be counterbalanced
by pressure on parties to balance the slates, and by allowing voters to indicate preferences
among list candidates. As has been demonstrated in other countries, preferential voting
(especially on the list side) can allow minority communities to boost the ranking of ethnic
minority candidates, and improve their status in the party. This dynamic can also serve to
strengthen the chains of accountability and responsiveness of preferentially elected
members to voters.
70. Shifting to non-proportional methods, the Alternative Vote (AV) is another reform
option that has been considered for Canada. This electoral system goes by many names
including “ranked choice,” “instant runoff,” and “preferential” voting. It is part of the
family of SMD systems, and is used to ensure that the single winning candidate always
secures an absolute majority rather than a simple plurality of votes. The AV system is
applied in Australia in single-member electorates for House of Representative elections,
and also used in Fiji and Papua New Guinea (the latter from 2007). These are, in fact, the
38 only three countries in the world to use this system for national elections, though the
model is familiar to Canadians given its common use by political parties to select their
leaders. At the ballot booth, AV works similarly to STV in that voters are allowed or
required to rank order candidates; but it lacks STV’s proportionality feature, in that only
one member per riding is elected. In tallying the ballots, a candidate who receives more
than 50 percent of the first preference votes (rank 1) is declared elected; however, if no
candidate receives 50 percent of the first preferences, then the candidate with the fewest
votes is removed from the contest, and the second preferences on those ballots is
redistributed. This process continues with candidates progressively excluded, and second
or later preferences distributed until one candidate has more than half of the total number
of votes.
71. How would the AV system impact women and minorities? Unlike STV, this is not a
proportional or MMD system; because each party runs just one candidate, there is no
option or pressure to present a balanced ticket. Still, there is some evidence in non-
partisan municipal elections in the U.S. that the adoption of AV (as compared to FPTP)
increases the share of female and candidates of colour (John et al., 2018). While the
mechanisms are still somewhat unclear, the theoretical explanations differ for ethnic
minorities as compared to women.
72. For ethnic minority representation, the basic argument is that AV is better than FPTP
because it can more effectively accommodate competing ethnic minority candidacies,
without splitting the vote. What is important to understand about this argument is that it is
most relevant in elections where there are low barriers to candidate entry (e.g., municipal
elections that operate without parties), such that a proliferation of competing ethnic
39 minority candidacies is a real risk. In such cases, under FPTP rules, diverse minority
communities face the challenge of rallying behind a single viable candidate rather than
splitting their votes among many contenders, and allowing a non-minority candidate to
claim victory. In this context, gatekeepers and community groups are apt to discourage
competing ethnic minority candidacies. The AV system mitigates this problem. Because
voters get to rank their preferences, there is less reason to discourage competing ethnic
minority candidates, and would-be candidates need not worry that entering the race could
harm their community’s interests, by splitting the vote. There may even be an advantage
in having two or more candidates from the same community, who can capture more first
and second preferences from co-minority voters. While AV would likely be effective in
increasing visible minority representation in non-partisan municipal elections in Canada,
these dynamics would not apply in federal or provincial elections carried out within a
competitive party system.
73. The argument for why female candidates and women of colour are advantaged by AV is
somewhat different. Here, it is supposed that AV rewards a style of campaigning that
may come more easily to these actors, as it favours candidates who can build coalitions
and discourages negative campaigning. This is because, unlike in FPTP elections,
candidates need to attract not just first preference votes from core supporters, but also
second and third preferences from their competitors’ voters. In fact, any gains for women
under AV appear to be quite modest. In Australia, which uses AV for elections to the
lower chamber, and STV for the upper chamber, there is a striking difference in the levels
of women’s representation in the two houses that can only be explained by the different
electoral systems. In that country, the benefits of multi-member districts in STV elections
40 (in particular, ticket-balancing and centralized party control over nominations) result in a
much higher level of women’s representation in the Senate compared to the House of
Representatives (Kaminsky and White, 2007).
74. Another possibility is to maintain FPTP rules but apply them across a hybrid mixture
of single-member and multi-member districts. In this system (which is not a PR
system), voters would have a single vote with the top finisher(s) elected in each riding.
Applying this plurality system in MMDs is known as the Single Non-Transferable Vote
(SNTV). As with other mixed systems, retaining some SMDs may help to provide better
constituency support of more isolated and sparsely populated areas. The creation of a
share of MMDs would also produce some incentives for ticket-balancing; however,
unlike systems that offer voters the opportunity to cast multiple votes or rank candidates,
SNTV allows voters only one vote. This presents parties with an internal coordination
problem, as presenting too many candidates could divide their voter support and create a
“spoiler effect.” Parties will thus be wary of running multiple candidates from different
ethnic communities, or presenting multiple female candidates. It is thus unlikely that the
SNTV portion of such a hybrid system would produce any gains in diverse
representation.
75. Finally, we must weigh two modest reforms to our current FPTP single-member district
system. The first would be to simply add new House of Commons seats. Adding seats
could be advantageous to minorities if they are introduced as part of electoral boundary
realignments to correct for malapportionment in fast growing and ethnically diverse
urban population centres. Outside of urban areas, new “exceptional ridings” could
potentially be created to provide some “majority-minority” districts (e.g., to promote
41 more Indigenous MPs), though at the expense of increasing disparity in riding
populations. As noted, this approach has been taken by several provinces, but is not a
feature of federal electoral maps. These two moves – reducing “visible minority vote
dilution” by adding seats in urban centres (Pal and Choudhry, 2014), while protecting
more sparsely distributed “communities of interest” through creation of malapportioned
(i.e., low population) ridings in exceptional cases (Courtney, 2001, 2019) – are inherently
contradictory, but may nevertheless be appropriate in a complex multinational federation
such as Canada’s.34 But neither of these reforms can address the under-representation of
women, at least beyond the short term.35
76. The last reform option, which has already been reviewed above, would be to introduce a
statutory gender quota. As discussed, adding a quota of 40% minimum female
candidates, even while maintaining our SMD system, could be as impactful when it
comes to women’s representation as shifting to a proportional MMD system, though
evidently combining both reforms would be most effective. And of course, a gender
quota does nothing to correct the mechanical over-representation of sectional and ethnic
parties, or the siloing and under-representation of smaller visible minority groups such as
Blacks and Filipinos.
77. In conclusion, there is no doubt that there are viable alternatives to our current FPTP
34 Procedurally, John Courtney argues it would be a relatively simple matter to implement these two changes via reforms to the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act (EBRA). The first would involve a reduction from +/- 25 percent to +/- 15 percent in the allowable deviation of a province’s quotient in constituency population, a step that would in turn require the creation of new ridings in diverse and highly populated urban centres. The second would be to treat the more isolated and sparsely populated areas of a province as “special cases” and thereby eliminate them from the determination of a province’s electoral quotient. To help make these changes palatable to the MPs who would have to approve them as amendments of the EBRA, it would be prudent to “grandfather” them into the Act and re-visit it after two decennial redistributions (Courtney, 2019). 35 While new seats typically make it easier for women to overcome the incumbency advantage, in fact incumbency in Canada is quite low and not a significant barrier to diverse representation (Matland and Studlar, 2004; Young, 1991).
42 system that would promise significant improvements for women’s representation, and greater equity in representation across diverse minority groups. The introduction of some share of multi-member districts would be optimal for improving women’s representation, would correct the overrepresentation of Bloc voters, could likely enable better representation for minorities outside minority enclaves, and would likely be at least as advantageous as SMDs for global ethnic minority representation in super-diverse urban ridings while ensuring a fairer representation among various ethnic groups, as long as several conditions are met. Most critically: voting must not be racially polarized; district magnitude should be modest (ideally between two to seven members elected per district); and a role should be preserved for diverse local populations in the prioritization and ranking of suitable candidates. For urban centres, DM can be larger. However, for smaller and more dispersed minorities, especially Indigenous communities living in the northern areas of provinces, the need for geographically manageable districts and the historical marginalization of these groups should instead favour the practice used in many provinces of treating them (at least temporarily) as
“special cases” that are exempted from the calculation of a province’s electoral quotient.
Under these terms, MMDs can be integrated within either a full PR-list system, a
Mixed-Member Proportional (MMP) system, or the Single Transferable Vote
(STV). Incorporating a candidate gender quota would further enhance gender equitable outcomes. For Indigenous communities, such a solution could resemble the gender parity concept that was recommended in 1997 by the Nunavut Implementation Committee, whereby voters would cast ballots for one man and one woman in each constituency. But it may be more palatable to establish a flexible rule whereby each party must meet a
43 Nicolas M. Rouleau (LSO #54515D) Nicolas M. Rouleau Professional Corporation 41 Burnside Dr. Toronto ON M6G 2M9
EXHIBIT "A"
This is Exhibit "A" to the affidavit of Karen Bird, affirmed by videoconference on the 26th day of February, 2021.
______Nicolas M. Rouleau (54515D)
A Commissioner, etc.
Karen Bird CV| 1
CURRICULUM VITAE
NAME Karen Lynn Bird
BUSINESS ADDRESS Department of Political Science McMaster University 1280 Main Street, West Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4M4
Work: (905) 525-9140 ext. 23124; Cell: (905) 745-5135 Email: [email protected]
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND 1997 Ph.D Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA. Dissertation: Free Speech or Hate Speech? Democracy, Racism and The Law in France and the United States (371 pp). 1991 Graduate Certificate, Summer Institute for Political Psychology, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA 1988 B.A. (Honours) Political Science & English, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada
CURRENT STATUS AT MCMASTER Professor and Chair, Political Science Interruptions (maternity/parental leave): Jan – Dec 2000; Feb – Dec 2006
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 2012 – Member, Association for the Study of Nationalities 1997 – Member, Canadian Political Science Association 1997 – Member, American Political Science Association 1997 – Member, International Political Science Association
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY a. Academic 2016 – Professor, Department of Political Science, McMaster University 2003 – 15 Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, McMaster University Karen Bird CV| 2
1996 – 02 Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, McMaster University (tenure awarded 2003) 2001 Visiting Professor, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lille, France (Feb-May) 2000 Visiting Professor, Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Grenoble, France (Sept-Dec) 1993 – 94 Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota 1990 – 93 Teaching / Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota 1990 – 92 Researcher, UMN Voter Analysis (summer contracts) 1987 – 88 Teaching / Research Assistant, Department of Political Science, Wilfrid Laurier University 1986 Researcher, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (summer contract)
b. Consultations – Not applicable
c. Other – Not applicable
SCHOLARLY AND PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES a. Editorial boards
2020 – 23 Editorial Advisory Board, Canadian Journal of Political Science
2016 Member, Best Chapter Award Selection Committee of the Migration and Citizenship Section, American Political Science Association
2015 – 17 Member, Executive Committee of the Representation & Electoral Systems Section, American Political Science Association
2010 Member, Jury Committee for the Donald Smiley Prize, Canadian Political Science Association
2005, 2017 Member, Jury Committee for the Jill Vickers Prize, Canadian Political Science Association
2004 Member, Jury Committee for the Georges Lavau Dissertation Award, French Politics Section, American Political Science Association
2001 Section Head for Comparative Politics, Programming Committee for the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting
1998 Member, Jury Committee for the Best Paper Award, Political Psychology Section, American Political Science Association
b. Grant and personnel committees 2010 SSHRC National Adjudication Committee for Doctoral Fellowships (Public & Private Policy Studies)
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c. Executive positions d. Journal referee Manuscripts reviewed for: American Journal of Political Science; American Political Science Review; Australian Journal of Political Science; British Journal of Canadian Studies; British Journal of Political Science; Canadian Journal of Political Science; Citizenship Studies; Comparative Politics; Culture and Society; Electoral Studies; Ethnopolitics; French Politics; International Feminist Journal of Politics; International Journal of Politics; International Political Science Review; Journal of Politics; Journal of Women, Politics, & Policy; Political Psychology; Political Studies; Politics; Politics & Gender; Politics, Groups & Identities; Representation; Sex Roles; Signs; Social Forces; Social Identities; e. External grant reviews External Reviewer, SSHRC Insight Grant (2019), SSHRC Standard Research Grant (2010, 2011, 2014, 2015); European Research Council, Consolidator Grant (2014); Marsden Fund, Royal Society of New Zealand (2014); Austrian Science Fund FWF International Cooperation Project (2013); Swiss National Science Foundation (2012). External Evaluation, Tenure & Promotion, Awards External reviewer for tenure and promotion files: University of Toronto (2019); Pepperdine University (2018); University of Guelph (2017); University of Western Ontario (2013). External reviewer for Early Researcher Award, University of Toronto (2018).
AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Research Comparative politics, comparative electoral and party systems, political representation Ethnic Politics, politics of multiculturalism, migration and settlement Gender and politics (electoral quotas and political representation of women) Teaching Comparative Politics; Ethnic Politics; Politics of Immigration, Multiculturalism and Diversity; Gender and Politics; Research Design & Methods Consulting – Not applicable
HONOURS Fellowships 2016 Senior Fellow, Electoral Integrity Project (Harvard University/University of Sydney), held at the Department of Government and International Relations, University of Sydney, Australia (Feb-May). 2004 Visiting Fellow, Unité de Recherche Migrations et Société (URMS), Université de Paris VII, France (Feb-April) 2003 Visiting Fellow, Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark (AMID), University of Aalborg, Denmark (Nov-Dec)
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2001 Centre National des Recherches Scientifiques (CNRS) Fellowship, held at the Centre d’Informatisation des Données Socio-Politiques (CIDSP), Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Grenoble, France (March-Dec)
Scholarships 1995 – 96 Foreign Government Awards Program (Canada/France), Dissertation Fellowship 1995 – 96 National Science Foundation (USA), Political Science Doctoral Dissertation Research Award 1992 – 94 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Canada), Doctoral Fellowship 1989 – 90 University of Minnesota Graduate School Fellowship 1988 Wilfrid Laurier University Gold Medal in Political Science 1988 Wilfrid Laurier University President’s Award 1984 – 87 Wilfrid Laurier Incentive Scholarship for Academic Excellence
Scientific Awards and Prizes 2015 “Challenges to Intersectional Inclusion: Institutional Dynamics of Ethnic Quotas and their Impact on Ethnic Minority Women.” Winner of the Canadian Political Science Association Jill Vickers Prize for best conference paper on gender and politics. 2000 “Gender Parity and the Political Representation of Women in France.” Inaugural winner of the International Political Science Association Wilma Rule Award for the best conference paper on gender and politics. 1992 “Do All of the People Have All of the Rights All of the Time? Exploring Political Tolerance with Adolescents” (co-authored by Patricia Avery, Karen Bird, Sandra Healy, John Sullivan and Kristina Thalhammer). Winner of the American Educational Research Association Distinguished Paper Award.
Teaching Awards 1999 McMaster University Students’ Union Certificate of Achievement for Outstanding Teaching
Community Awards 2018 Women Who Rock. Award presented by Empower Strategy Group, Hamilton, to recognize local women who have made a lasting impact in their field and community. 2017 YWCA Women of Distinction, Nominee
COURSES TAUGHT (LAST 5 YEARS) a. Undergraduate Political Science 3G03 Diversity and Multiculturalism: Political Theory and Practice Political Science 3V03 Gender and Politics: A Global Perspective Political Science 3H03 Honours Topics in Comparative Politics & Policy Political Science 3HP3 Field Placement in Policy Planning and Delivery
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Political Science 3UU3 Reading Course: Minority Rights, Ethnic Relations and Conflict Political Science 4Z06 Honours Thesis (8 students over 5 years) Arts & Science 4C06 Honours Thesis (12 students over 5 years)
b. Graduate Political Science 796 Research Methods and Design Political Science 765 Reading Course: Parties, Electoral Systems and Representation Political Science 765 Reading Course: Gender and Politics of Representation Political Science 748 Democracy and Diversity Political Science 746 Issues in Comparative Politics: Ethnic Politics and Ethnic Conflict Political Science 746 Issues in Comparative Politics: Politics of Immigration Political Science 740 Theories of Comparative Politics c. Postgraduate (medical): Not applicable d. Other: Not applicable
CONTRIBUTIONS TO TEACHING PRACTICE a. Pedagogic innovation and/or development of technology-enhanced learning: Not applicable
b. Leadership in delivery of educational programs: Experiential Education Grant, 2021. For guest speaker Celina Caesar-Chavannes ($500). Model City Hall Hamilton, 2019 – 2021. Socrates Project support ($15,000) to supervise Cassidy Bereskin (Political Science student) in organizing and implementing Model City Hall Hamilton 2020, a full day event that included over 100 participants, and contributed to civic awareness and engagement among youth (high school and university students) in Hamilton and the wider community. Experiential Learning in Academic Programming grant ($4000) for Model City Hall Hamilton: A Capstone Experiential Learning Course in Politics and Public Policy. POLSCI 4UP3: Urban Politics in the Post-Industrial Era: Hamilton & Detroit. Experiential Learning in Academic Programming grant, secured with instructor Angela Orasch ($5000 for 2020, $4000 for 2021). McMaster Queen’s Park Day, 2019. Experiential Learning in Academic Programming grant ($2884) Queen’s Park Remarkable Assembly & MPP Job Shadow, 2019. Socrates Project and FSS Office of Experiential Education “Student Experience” grant ($3300) to support a 65-hr RA-ship plus travel and overnight accommodation for 12 female students to participate in this 2-day learning and leadership event. Public Leadership for Change Distinguished Visiting Professorship, 2018-2020. Socrates Project funding ($50K) to create and implement this 2-year teaching and outreach position. The inaugural DVP was Dave Levac, former Speaker of the Ontario Legislative Assembly.
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4ZZ6 Experiential Learning in Research - Democracy, Authority and Dissent in the Trump Era, 2018-19. The course aligned with the Trump Talks series (2018-19), plus featured several Political Science faculty who presented at each seminar meeting, and supervised students’ final papers/projects. Trump Talks, 2018-2020 (see 18. Other responsibilities, Community).
c. Course/curriculum development Political Science 3HP3 Field Placement in Policy Planning and Delivery. Students gain practical experience working within a local government department or non-governmental organization in planning and delivery of immigrant settlement/diversity services. Political Science 3V03 Gender and Politics. Students participate in community-based initiatives, and produce a community ‘deliverable’ or advocacy project focusing on gender equity. Political Science 796 Research Methods and Design. Students and faculty participate in a year-end workshop on research design workshop to develop research questions and design strategies in a collaborative and constructive environment.
d. Development/evaluation of educational materials and programs: Not applicable
e. Other Contributions to Teaching Supervisor, McMaster Undergraduate Student Research Awards. I have supervised 9 students who received funding to pursue independent research projects over the summer: Catherine Reid (2020); Maanvi Dhillon (2019); Sutina Chou (2017); Christina Vietinghoff (2014); Ana-Maria Qarri (2014); Kristen Campbell (2013); Alessandra Gage, Leanna Katz (2011); Rebecca Sciarra (2004). Supervisor, McMaster Indigenous Undergraduate Summer Research Scholars Program. I have supervised 2 Indigenous students who have received funding to pursue research, with a view to preparing them for graduate education (Brandon Gaudette, Eric Sault: summer 2016). Co-organizer (with Dr. Todd Alway) of the Clarke Prizes in Advocacy and Active Citizenship. Students identify a policy or social problem, develop and present an advocacy strategy to mobilize public discussion and support, engage media, and direct decision makers towards a solution. With support from a donor, $18,000 of prize money was distributed over three years.
SUPERVISORSHIPS a. MA supervision 2019 – 20 Rupinder Liddar, MA, Political Science, McMaster. Major research paper: “The Sikh Vote: Discussing Variations in Sikh-Canadian Political Orientations." 2014 – 16 Theo Nazary, MA, Political Science, McMaster. Thesis: “The Political Behaviour of Youth in Whitefish River First Nation.”
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2012 – 13 Erin McCannel, MA, Political Science, University of Guelph (co-supervised). Thesis: “Multiculturalism and Immigrant Political Participation in Sweden and Denmark: A Comparative Literature Review.” 2009 – 10 Adam Flores, MA, Political Science, University of Guelph (co-supervised). Thesis: “The Responsiveness of ‘Non-Gateway’ Municipalities to Immigrant Settlement: A Study of Guelph-Wellington.” 2005 – 06 Brooke Thomas, MA, Political Science, McMaster. Thesis: “Gradations of Accommodation: Electoral Laws as Power-Sharing Mechanisms.” 2004 – 06 Melissa Tam, MA, Political Science, McMaster. Thesis: “Marginalization or Empowerment? Rural Migrant Chinese Women in China’s Changing Political Economy.”
b. PhD supervision 2019 – Sibuh Gebeyaw, PhD Candidate, Political Science, Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia. In progress 2019 – 20 Christina Cummins, PhD Candidate, Political Science. (Withdrawn). 2016 – Rachel Barnett, PhD Candidate, Political Science. In progress. 2012 – 19 Marguerite Marlin, PhD, Political Science. Thesis: “Measuring Influence of Non- Governmental Testimony to Parliamentary Committees on Arctic Issues: Comparing Canadian and Russian Experiences.” 2013 – 18 Samantha Jackson, PhD, Political Science. Thesis: “Politicizing the White Coat: Medical Activism and Refugee Health Policy in Canada, Germany and the UK.” 2006 – 12 Jessica Franklin, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. Thesis: “Building from and Moving Beyond the State: The National and Transnational Dimensions of Afro-Brazilian Women’s Intersectional Mobilization.”
c. Post-doctoral/fellowship: Not applicable
d. Clinical/professional: Not applicable
e. Supervisory Committees PhD 2014 – 19 Kelsey Leonard, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. “Nipi Mamoweenene: Indigenous Water Governance to Protect the Hart of Ohke (Mother Earth), The Great Lakes, Nayanno-Nibiimaang Gichigamiin, Kanyatare'Kó:Wa.” 2012 – 18 Zeina Sleiman, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. “Transnational Citizenship and Regional Sanctuary Practices.” 2010 – 16 Andrea Rowe, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. “Overcoming Obstacles to Women’s Participation in National Innovation Systems in Canada and Sweden.” 2010 – 14 Halina Sapeha, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. “Explaining Variations in Success of Subnational Immigration Programmes in Canada and Australia.” 2008 – 15 Jessica Merolli, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. “Feeling Like a Citizen: Integration Exams, Expertise and Sites of Resistance in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.”
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2007 – 12 Chelsea Gabel, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. “Towards Healthier Aboriginal Health Policies? Navigating the Labyrinth for Answers.” 2007 – 12 Joanne Heritz, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. “The Inclusion of Atypical Minorities in Public Policy: Urban Aboriginal Peoples in Canada and Travellers in Ireland.” 2002 – 11 Christine Chiasson, PhD, Political Science, McMaster. “GMOs, Institutional Risks, Social Risks, Reflexivity, and Change: A Comparison of France and Canada between 1980 and 2001.”
f. Other: External PhD Examiner, International supervision 2020 – Through the Canadian non-profit organization Academics Without Borders, I am working in a volunteer capacity to supervise PhD students in Political Science at Bahir Dar University in Ethiopia. AWB’s broader project in Ethiopia aims to build capacity at universities by upgrading the qualifications of instructors from the Masters to the PhD level. At present, I am working with four students who have completed their first year of the PhD program (course work) and helping them to develop their thesis proposals. 2017 Roos van der Zwan, PhD, Sociology, The Inter-University Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS) at the Radboud University Nijmegen, Netherlands. Student completed a 4-month PhD internship abroad, under my supervision, as a required part of her program. Her project was “Ethnic minority representation in Canada and the Netherlands: What are the similarities and differences?” 2013 Tracy-Ann Johnson, PhD, Interdisciplinary Studies, University of New Brunswick. “The Mixed-Member Proportional Representation System and Minority Representation: A Case Study of Women and Maori in New Zealand (1996-2011). 2002 Nikolaos Liodakis, PhD, Sociology, McMaster University. “The Vertical Mosaic Within: Class, Gender and Nativity Within Ethnicity.” 1999 Nazilla Khanlou, PhD, Nursing, McMaster University. “Adolescent Cultural Identity and Self-Esteem in a Multicultural Society.”
LIFETIME RESEARCH FUNDING 2020 – 21 Karen Bird (PI) “Diverse Leadership and Policy Inclusiveness: Assessing COVID Response and Recovery Planning in 12 Ontario Cities.” McMaster COVID-19 Research Fund (Stream 2). $28,777 2018 – 23 Karen Bird (PI), Netina Tan “Ethnic Quotas and Political Representation: A Global Study.” SSHRC Insight Grant $355,314 2017 – 18 Karen Bird (PI), Netina Tan "Diverse & Meaningful Inclusion: Advancing Substantive Representation of Ethnic and Indigenous Groups Worldwide.” SSHRC Connection Grant $24,947 2016 – 17 Karen Bird (PI), Netina Tan “Electoral Quotas for Ethnic Minorities: Building a Global Database” ARB Major Seed Grant, McMaster University: $15,000 Seed funding for international study electoral quotas for indigenous and ethnic minorities. 2015 – 16 Karen Bird (PI), Netina Tan
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“Electoral Quotas for Ethnic Minorities: Building a Global Database” International Initiatives Micro-Fund (IIMF), McMaster University: $3,750 2014 – 17 Chelsea Gabel (PI), Karen Bird, Nicole Goodman (Co-Applicants) “The Impact of Digital Technology on First Nations Participation and Governance” http://www.digitalimpactfn.com/ SSHRC Partnership Development Grant, March 2014 - July 2017: $199,980 SSHRC Funds; $659,080 Cash & In-Kind; Total Project Funds $859,060 2014/15 Karen Bird (PI) “The Women & Diversity EXCLerator Project: Executive and Community Leadership in Hamilton and Halton Region” YWCA Hamilton and McMaster Forward with Integrity grant: $10,000 Project to assess the representation of women in executive and leadership positions across nine employment sectors in Hamilton and Halton Region. 2014/15 Karen Bird (PI), Juliet Daniel, Kalaichelvi Saravanamuttu, Ayse Turak (Co-Applicants) “Vision 20/20: Achieving Gender Equity at McMaster” McMaster Forward with Integrity grant: $5,000 Project to develop an inventory of resources and best practices in addressing gender equity for female students and faculty. 2014/15 Kalaichelvi Saravanamuttu (PI), Karen Bird, Juliet Daniel, Ayse Turak (Co-Applicants) “McMaster Academic Women’s Summit for Mentorship and Leadership (AWSM Leadership)” McMaster Forward with Integrity grant: $5,000 Project to develop new leadership and mentorship opportunities for female students and faculty. 2013 – 20 Victoria Esses (PI), Karen Bird (Collaborator), and others “Pathways to Prosperity: New Policy Directions and Innovative Local Practices for Newcomer Attraction and Retention” SSHRC Partnership Grant: $2,500,000 Grant to develop a national network for research on immigration and integration of newcomers in second tier cities and rural areas. 2009 – 14 Victoria Esses (PI), Karen Bird (Collaborator), and others “Welcoming Communities: Working to Improve the Inclusion of Visible Minorities and Immigrants in Second and Third Tier Ontario Cities” SSHRC Community-University Research Alliance (CURA): $999,000 Grant to develop a provincial network for research on immigration and integration of newcomers in second tier cities and rural areas. My component was to study the political representation of visible minority and foreign born Canadians in Ontario municipalities. 2009 – 12 Karen Bird (PI) “Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities and Immigrants in Parliamentary Democracies” SSHRC Standard Research Grant: $79,709 Grant to undertake a comparative study of pathways into formal politics for immigrants and minorities, in liberal democracies. 2009 – 10 Karen Bird (PI) “Pathways to Politics: “Ethnic Minority Political Integration across Liberal Democracies” McMaster Arts Research Board (ARB) Major Collaborative Seed Project: $14,702
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Seed funding to establish an international network of researchers on immigrant political participation and representation. 2009 – 10 Karen Bird (PI), Thomas Saalfeld, Andreas Wüst (Collaborators) “Migration and Minority Representation in Comparative Perspective” SSHRC International Opportunities Fund: Development Grant: $25,000 Seed funding to establish an international network of researchers on immigrant political participation and representation. 2007 – 08 Karen Bird (PI) “Visible Exclusion: Ethnocultural Minorities within French Political Parties after the 2005 Race Riots.” McMaster Arts Research Board (ARB) Grant-in-Aid: $4,219 Grant to study changing attitudes toward ethnicity and identity in French politics. 2005 – 06 Karen Bird (PI) “Defining Lines: Redistricting, Redistribution and Minority Representation” Centre of Excellence for Research on Immigration and Settlement (CERIS) Community and University Research Alliance: project funds distributed to researchers on competitive basis: $13,200 Grant to evaluate effects of electoral boundaries and residential distribution on political representation of visible minority communities within the Greater Toronto Area. 2004 Karen Bird (PI) “Women’s and Minority Representation in French Politics” Sejours scientifiques de haut niveau (SSHN), Ministère de la Recherche, France: $8,000 Research award to examine the incorporation of women and ethnic minorities in French electoral politics. 2002 – 05 Karen Bird (PI) “Across Boundaries: Gender, Race and Political Representation” SSHRC Standard Research Grant: $80,400 Grant to examine gender quotas and other informal initiatives by political parties to nominate female and ethnic minority candidates, across liberal democracies. 2001 Karen Bird (PI) “Gender Parity in French Municipal Elections” McMaster University Arts Research Board (ARB) Incentive Award: $10,000 Award to study the implementation of gender parity in French municipal elections. 2001 Karen Bird (PI) “Gender Quotas in French Politics” Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques (CNRS), France, Visiting Research Fellow: $50,000 Award/fellowship to study the implementation of gender parity in French municipal elections. Fellowship held at the Centre d’Informatisation des Données Socio- politiques (CIDSP), a CNRS laboratory including 24 researchers and 22 doctoral students, at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Grenoble. 2000 Karen Bird (PI) “Parité et la Représentation des Femmes dans la Politique Française” l'Ambassade de France au Canada: Fonds France-Canada pour la Recherche: $2,000 Travel grant to examine the effects of gender parity law in French elections.
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2000 – 03 Robert O’Brien (PI), Roy Adams, Karen Bird, Belinda Leach, Wayne Lewchuk, Don Wells, Leah Vosko, Charlotte Yates (Co-applicants) “Workers and Social Cohesion in a Globalizing Era” SSHRC Strategic Program – Exploring Social Cohesion in a Globalizing Era: $375,000 Grant to investigate how workers are coping with increased competition in an era of globalization, and what effects this is having on social cohesion. My role was to examine the role of work in helping immigrants to integrate into Canadian society. 1999 Karen Bird (PI) “Ontario Political Culture and Ideology” McMaster University Arts Research Board (ARB) Grant-in-Aid: $5,000 Grant to survey Ontario residents on their political attitudes and views of government. 1996 Karen Bird (PI) “Freedom of Expression, Individual and Group Rights: Responses to Racist Speech” McMaster University Arts Research Board (ARB) Grant-in-Aid: $3,446 Grant to examine public response to racist speech and application of laws punishing such speech.
LIFETIME PUBLICATIONS
a. Peer reviewed
i) Books 1. Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, Andreas M. Wüst, eds. 2011. The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies. London: Routledge (284 pp).
ii) Contributions to books 2. Karen Bird. 2019. “Gender Equality, Diversity and Inclusion: Between Real Change and Branding.” In Lisa Birch and François Pétry (eds.), Assessing Justin Trudeau’s Liberal Government : 353 Promises and a Mandate for Change. Laval University Press (pp. 165- 178). Also published in French as “Égalité des genres, diversité et inclusion: Entre changements réels et une image de marque?” In Lisa Birch and François Pétry (eds.), Bilan du gouvernement libéral de Justin Trudeau: 353 promesses et un mandat de changement. Presses de l’Université de Laval (pp 175-190).
3. Karen Bird. 2016. “Understanding the Local Diversity Gap: Supply and Demand of Visible Minority Candidates in Ontario Municipal Politics.” Just Ordinary Citizens? Towards a Comparative Portrait of the Political Immigrant, Antoine Bilodeau, ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 180-200.
4. Karen Bird and Andrea Rowe. 2013. “Women, Feminism and the Harper Conservatives.” Conservatism in Canada, Jim Farney and David Rayside, eds. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 165-83.
5. Karen Bird and Jessica Merolli. 2012. “Diversity and Inclusion in the City of Hamilton. Municipal Policy Making within Multi-level Governance Arrangements.” Immigration, Integration and Inclusion in Ontario Cities. Caroline Andrew, John Biles, Myer Burstein,
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Victoria M. Esses and Erin Tolley, eds. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 225-51.
6. Karen Bird. 2011. “Patterns of Substantive Representation among Visible Minority MPs: Evidence from Canada’s House of Commons.” The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies. Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, Andreas Wüst, eds. London: Routledge, pp. 207-229.
7. Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, and Andreas Wüst. 2011. “Ethnic Diversity, Political Participation and Representation: A Theoretical Framework.” The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies. Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, Andreas Wüst, eds. London: Routledge, pp. 1-21.
8. Karen Bird. 2011. “Voter Turnout Among Immigrants and Visible Minorities in Comparative Perspective: 2.1 Canada.” The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies. Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, Andreas Wüst, eds. London: Routledge, pp. 25-28.
9. Karen Bird. 2011. “Party Choices Among Immigrants and Visible Minorities in Comparative Perspective: 3.1 Canada.” The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies. Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, Andreas Wüst, eds. London: Routledge, pp. 66-69.
10. Thomas Saalfeld, Karen Bird, and Andreas M. Wüst. 2011. “Epilogue: Toward a Strategic Model of Minority Participation and Representation.” The Political Representation of Immigrants and Minorities: Voters, Parties and Parliaments in Liberal Democracies. Karen Bird, Thomas Saalfeld, Andreas Wüst, eds. London: Routledge, pp. 266-275.
11. Karen Bird. 2010. “Gendering Minority Participation in Public Life.” Political Participation of Minorities: A Commentary on International Standards and Practices. Marc Weller, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 150-173.
12. Karen Bird. 2008. “Many Faces, Few Places: The Political Under-Representation of Ethnic Minorities and Women in the City of Hamilton.” Electing a Diverse Canada: The Representation of Immigrants, Minorities and Women. Caroline Andrew, John Biles, Myer Siemiatycki, and Erin Tolley , eds. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp. 136- 155.
13. Karen Bird. 2006. “La representación política de las mujeres y las minorias étnicas en las democracias establecidas.” Ellos y Nosotros Democracia y Representacion en el Mundo Actual. Gustavo Ernesto Emmerich, ed. Mexico: Demos, pp. 28-63.
14. Karen Bird. 2005. “Who are the Women? Where are the Women? And what Difference can they Make? The Effects of Gender Parity in French Municipal Elections.” Gender and Rights. Deborah L. Rhode and Carol Sanger, eds. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate; pp. 589-622. (Originally published in French Politics, reprinted with permission).
15. Karen Bird. 2004. “Lessons from France: The Role of Quotas and Electoral Reform for Improving Women’s Representation in Canada.” Making Every Vote Count: Reassessing Canada’s Electoral System, 2nd edition. Henry Milner, ed. Peterborough: Broadview Press, pp. 191-214.
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16. Karen Bird. 2004. “The Effects of Gender Parity in Elections: The French Case.” The French Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002. John Gaffney, ed. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, pp. 238-259.
17. Karen Bird. 1999. “Group Recognition in the Civic Republic: Citizenship, Equality and Pluralism in France.” Mistaken Identities: The Second Wave of Controversy over Political Correctness. Cyril Levitt, Scott Davies and Neil McLaughlin, eds. New York: Peter Lang, pp. 221-240.
iii) Journal articles 18. Michael McGregor, Aaron A. Moore, Karen Bird, Samantha Jackson, and Laura B. Stephenson. 2017. “Why so Few Women and Minorities in Local Politics? Incumbency and Affinity Voting in Low Information Elections.” Representation, 53(2): 135-152. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2017.1354909.
19. Nicole Goodman, Karen Bird and Chelsea Gabel. 2017. “Toward a More Collaborative Political Science: A Partnership Approach.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 50(1): 201-218. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S000842391700004X.
20. Karen Bird, Chelsea Gabel, Nicole Goodman and Brian Budd. 2017. “The impact of digital technology on First Nations participation and governance in Ontario.” Canadian Journal of Native Studies, Volume 36 no. 2: 107-127.
21. Chelsea Gabel, Nicole Goodman, Karen Bird and Brian Budd. 2016. “Indigenous Adoption of Internet Voting: A Case Study of Whitefish River First Nation.” The International Indigenous Policy Journal 7(3): 1-20. Retrieved from: http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol7/iss3/3
22. Karen Bird, Samantha Jackson, Michael McGregor, Aaron A. Moore and Laura B. Stephenson. 2016. “Sex (and Ethnicity) in the City: Affinity Voting in the 2014 Toronto Mayoral Election.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 49(2): 359-383. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423916000536
23. Karen Bird. 2016. “Intersections of Exclusion: The Institutional Dynamics of Combined Gender and Ethnic Quota Systems.” Politics, Groups and Identities 4:2, pp 284-306. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21565503.2015.1053399
24. Karen Bird. 2015. “‘We are Not an Ethnic Vote!’ Representational Perspectives of Minorities in the Greater Toronto Area.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 48: 2, pp. 249- 279. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423915000256
25. Karen Bird. 2014. “Ethnic Quotas and Ethnic Representation Worldwide." International Political Science Review, 35: 1, pp. 12-26. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0192512113507798
26. Karen Bird. 2012. “Towards an Integrated Model of Minority Representation: Perspectives from Canada.” Politics & Gender 8: 4, pp. 508-512.
27. Karen Bird. 2005. “The Political Representation of Visible Minorities in Electoral Democracies: A Comparison of France, Denmark and Canada.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11: 4, pp. 425-465.
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28. Karen Bird. 2003. “Who are the Women? Where are the Women? And what Difference can they Make? The Effects of Gender Parity in French Municipal Elections.” French Politics 1:1, pp. 5-38.
29. Karen Bird. 2002. “Valeurs démocratiques et propos à caractère raciste en France et aux Etats-Unis.” La Revue internationale de politique comparé, 9: 3, pp. 477-504.
30. Karen Bird. 2002. “Does Parity Work? Results from French Elections.” Feminist Studies 28: 3, pp. 691-698.
31. Karen Bird. 2001. “Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, Parité… and Diversité ? The Difficult Question of Ethnic Difference in the French Parity Debate.” Contemporary French Civilization 25: 2, pp. 271-292.
32. Karen Bird. 2001. “L’impossible réglementation des propos à caractère raciste aux Etats-Unis.” La Revue française de droit constitutionnel, 46, pp. 265-287.
33. Karen Bird. 2000. “Racist Speech or Free Speech? A Comparison of the Law in France and the United States.” Comparative Politics, 32: 4, pp. 399-418.
34. Karen Bird, Patricia G. Avery, John L. Sullivan, Kristina Thalhammer, and Sandra Wood. 1994. “Not Just Lip-Synching Anymore: Education and Tolerance Revisited.” The Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies, 16: 3-4, pp. 373-385.
35. John L. Sullivan, Patricia G. Avery, Kristina Thalhammer, Sandra Wood, and Karen Bird. 1994. “Education and Political Tolerance in the United States: The Mediating Role of Cognitive Sophistication, Personality, and Democratic Norms.” The Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies, 16: 3-4, pp. 315-324.
36. Kristina Thalhammer, Sandra Wood, Karen Bird, Patricia G. Avery, and John L. Sullivan. 1994. “Adolescents and Political Tolerance: Lip-synching to the Tune of Democracy.” The Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies, 16: 3-4, pp. 325- 347.
37. Sandra Wood, Kristina Thalhammer, John L. Sullivan, Karen Bird, Patricia G. Avery, and Kate Klein. 1994. “Tolerance for Diversity of Beliefs: Learning About Tolerance and Liking It Too.” The Review of Education, Pedagogy and Cultural Studies, 16: 3-4, pp. 349- 372.
38. Patricia G. Avery, Karen Bird, Sandra Johnstone, John L. Sullivan, and Kristina Thalhammer. 1992. “Exploring Political Tolerance with Adolescents.” Theory and Research in Social Education, 20: 4, pp. 386-420.
iv) Research creation and artistic contributions: Not applicable
v) Journal abstracts: Not applicable
vi) Other (peer-reviewed) 39. Karen Bird. 2020. Affidavit, prepared for FAIR VOTING BC and SPRINGTIDE COLLECTIVE FOR DEMOCRACY SOCIETY – and – ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA.
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Court File No.: CV-19-00628 883 0000. I was retained as an independent expert, and wrote a 35 pp affidavit addressing the following two questions: (i) What is the impact of Canada’s current First-Past-the-Post voting system on the representation and participation of women? What would change under other voting systems? (ii) What is the impact of Canada’s current First-Past-the-Post voting system on the representation and participation of minorities? What would change under other voting systems?
40. Karen Bird. 2004. “The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established Democracies: A Framework for Comparative Research.” Working Paper Series, Academy for Migration Studies in Denmark (AMID). Re-published with permission on the Portal for Parliamentary Development (AGORA), of the Global Parliamentary Development Program, United Nations Development Program. http://www.agora-parl.org/
b. Not Peer reviewed
i) Books 41. Patricia Avery, Dorothy Hoffman, John L. Sullivan, Karen Bird, Sandra Johnstone, Kristina Thalhammer, Amy Fried, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1993. Tolerance for Diversity of Beliefs: A Secondary Curriculum Unit. Boulder, Colorado: Social Science Education Consortium.
ii) Contributions to books: Not applicable
iii) Journal articles 42. Karen Bird and Roos van der Zwan. 2018. “Visible minority candidates and vote choice: The view from Canada.” Migration and Citizenship (Newsletter of Organized Section no. 43, Migration and Citizenship, of the American Political Science Association), Winter, Vol. 6, No. 1.
43. Liam Midzain-Gobin, Nicole Goodman, Chelsea Gabel and Karen Bird. 2017. “Time for change? Reforming the Indian Act to allow for online voting.” Policy Options. October 12. Online at: http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/october-2017/reforming-the-indian-act-to- allow-for-online-voting/
44. Chelsea Gabel, Nicole Goodman, and Karen Bird. 2014. “The Impact of Digital Technology on First Nations Participation and Governance.” Centre for e-Democracy Journal, Inaugural Volume, Fall/Winter, 1. Online at: http://www.centreforedemocracy.com/impact-digital-technology-first-nations-participation- governance/
45. Karen Bird. 2011. “The Local Diversity Gap: Assessing the Scope and Causes of Visible Minority Under-Representation in Municipal Politics.” Welcoming Communities Initiative Newsletter, 13 Dec. Online at: http://p2pcanada.ca/wp- content/uploads/2011/12/The-Local-Diversity-Gap-.doc
46. Karen Bird. 2009. “Ethnic Diversity, Social Solidarity and Political Community in Canada.” APSA-CP (Newsletter of the Organized Section in Comparative Politics of the American Political Science Association), 20: 1, pp. 19-22. http://comparativenewsletter.com/files/archived_newsletters/2009_winter.pdf
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47. Karen Bird. 2005. Parity of the Sexes by Sylviane Agacinski; Profession Femme Politique by Mariette Sineau (book review), SIGNS: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 30:3, pp. 1989-1994.
48. Karen Bird. 2005. “Guess Who’s Running for Office? Visible Minority Representation in the 2004 Canadian Election” Canadian Issues (Summer 2005), pp. 80-83.
49. Karen Bird. 2005. “Multiculturalism in Denmark.” Canadian Diversity 4: 1, pp. 39-42.
50. Karen Bird. 2004. “Obstacles to Ethnic Minority Representation in Local Government in Canada.” Our Diverse Cities 1 (Spring), pp. 182-186.
51. Karen Bird and Mathilde Dubesset. 2001. “Elections municipales de 2001: La mise en oeuvre de la parité hommes/femmes.” Fiches pratiques: Politique et communication, 34: 1-9.
52. Patricia Avery, John L. Sullivan, Karen Bird, Sandra Healey, and Kris Thalhammer. 1991. “Teaching Political Tolerance in Junior High.” CURA [Center for Urban and Regional Affairs] Reporter, 21: 5 (1991), pp. 1-6.
iv) research creation and artistic contributions: Not applicable
v) Journal abstracts: Not applicable
vi) Other 53. Karen Bird and Rachel Barnett. 2018. “Hamilton Council’s new gender balance.” Comment article, The Hamilton Spectator (1 Dec.) Online at: https://www.thespec.com/opinion-story/9060417-hamilton-city-council-s-new-gender- balance/ 54. Karen Bird. 2018. “Let’s end unruly behaviour in the legislature.” Comment article, The Hamilton Spectator (23 Oct.) Online at: https://www.thespec.com/opinion-story/8980086- let-s-end-unruly-behaviour-in-the-ontario-legislature/ 55. Karen Bird and Rachel Barnett. 2017. “Ward boundary outcome has to consider diversity.” Comment article, The Hamilton Spectator (6 Nov.) Online at: https://www.thespec.com/opinion-story/7805895-ward-boundary-outcome-has-to-consider- diversity/ 56. Karen Bird and Samantha Jackson. 2017. “EXCLerator Project: Women and Diversity in Executive and Community Leadership, Installment 2.0.” Executive summary and full report (65 pp) to the YWCA Hamilton. Online at: https://www.ywcahamilton.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/11/Full_EXCLERATOR-report_FINAL.pdf 57. Holly Ann Garnett and Karen Bird. 2016. “Good news: Canada’s 2015 federal election ranked among the world’s best in terms of electoral integrity.” Comment article, The National Post (31 March). Online at: http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/good-news- canadas-2015-federal-election-ranked-among-the-worlds-best-in-terms-of-electoral-integrity 58. Chelsea Gabel, Nicole Goodman and Karen Bird. 2015. First Nations Digital Democracy Newsletter, How Digital Democracy is Changing First Nations Participation and Governance, Issue No. 1, August 2015.
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59. Chelsea Gabel, Nicole Goodman and Karen Bird. 2015. Summary of Ballot Survey Results in Whitefish River First Nation. Report for Whitefish River First Nation, July 2015. 60. Karen Bird, “Inclusive, open cabinet good for everyone.” 2015. Comment article, The Hamilton Spectator (21 Nov.), p. 15. Online at: http://www.thespec.com/opinion- story/6127436-inclusive-open-cabinet-can-only-be-good-for-everyone/ 61. Karen Bird and Samantha Jackson. 2014. “The Women & Diversity EXCLerator Project: Women in Karen Bird. Executive and Community Leadership in Hamilton and Halton.” Executive summary and full report (43 pp) to the YWCA Hamilton. Online at: http://ywcahamilton.org/system/assets/attachments/000/000/209/original/TheWomenAndDive rsityEXCLerator_PROJECT.pdf
c. Accepted for Publication (in final form): Not applicable
d. Submitted for publication: Not applicable
e. Unpublished documents: Not applicable
PRESENTATIONS AT MEETINGS
Peer reviewed
a. Invited 2018 Karen Bird, “Diversifying Local Democracy: Participation and Equitable Representation of Visible Minorities in Municipal Government.” Bell Chair in Canadian Parliamentary Democracy, Carleton University, 1 March.
2017 Karen Bird, “Increasing Participation and Equitable Representation in Municipal Government: Visible Minorities.” Presentation at the Association of Municipalities of Ontario Annual Conference, Ottawa, 14 August.
2016 Karen Bird, “Not all Created Equal: Comparing Electoral Quotas for Ethnic and Indigenous Representation.” Paper presented to the Electoral Integrity Project seminar series, University of Sydney, 12 April.
2015 Karen Bird, “Focus Groups as a Tool for Advancing Research on Minority Representation.” Paper presented at the Women and Minorities Representation Workshop. McGill University, 24-25 August.
2014 Karen Bird, “Visible Minority/Immigrant Incorporation in Municipal Politics: The Puzzling Canadian Case.” Presentation at the Workshop on Theorizing Immigrant Integration in Multilevel States. Cornell University, 10-11 October.
2013 Karen Bird, “Comparing Ethnic Quotas and Ethnic Representation Worldwide.” Keynote address to the SCOPES Conference “Ethno-democracy in the Heart of Europe:
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Political Mobilization and Representation of Ethnic Groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a Comparative Perspective.” Sarajevo, 23-24 September.
2013 Karen Bird, “Challenges of Representation: The Perspective of Immigrant Communities.” Presentation to the Workshop organized by the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), on Electoral and Civic Involvement of Canada’s Immigrant Communities. Toronto, 25 October.
2012 Karen Bird, “Representation and Democracy in Diverse Societies: Understanding Ethnic Group Representational Schemes Around the World.” Paper presented at the Seminar “Democracy and Recognition.” Instituto de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales, Diego Portales University, Santiago, Chile, 10-11 December.
2010 Karen Bird, “Different Steps for Different Folks? Comparing Pathways to Parliaments for Women and Minorities Across Liberal Democracies.” Paper presented to the Paths to Parliament Conference, Ottawa, 19 November.
2007 Karen Bird, “Immigrant Participation in Different Political Systems: A Framework for Comparative Research.” Presented at the International Conference on Challenges for Integration Research and Policy, Social Science Research Centre, Berlin, 20 April.
2004 Karen Bird, “Different Routes to Representation: Comparing the Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” Presented at the Multicultural Futures Conference, Monash University, Prato, Italy, 22-23 September.
2004 Karen Bird, “The Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Canada: Problems and Prospects.” Presented to the Group de Travail Populations d’origine immigrée et Politique en Belgique, Workshop: Les Candidats d’origine étrangère et les strategies des parties politiques. Questions théorique et méthodologiques. Centre d’Etudes de l’Ethnicité et des Migrations, Université de Liège, Belgium, 20 April.
2003 Karen Bird, “Paths to (In)Equality: Recognition of Gender and Ethnicity in Comparative Perspective.” Presented to FREIA: Feminist Research Centre in Aalborg, Denmark, 20 November.
2003 Karen Bird, “The Political Representation of Women and Ethnic Minorities in Established Democracies: A Framework for Comparative Research.” Presented to the Socialforskningsinstituttet (The National Social Research Institute), Copenhagen, Denmark, 27 November.
2000 Karen Bird, “La place des femmes en politique: références françaises et étrangères.” Presented at the Journée d’études sur la politique à la veille des élections municipales de 2001. Centre d’Etudes de Droit Public de l’Université de Franche Comté, Besançon, France, 23 November.
b. Contributed
i) Peer reviewed
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2020 Karen Bird. 2020. “Quotas, Reserved Seats and Forms of Ethnic Representation in Africa.” International Studies Assoc. Annual Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, 25-28 March (cancelled due to COVID-19). 2019 Karen Bird. “Indigenous Representation within Canadian Federal Parties.” Paper presented at Diversity and Democratic Governance: Legacies of the Past, Present Challenges, and Future Directions, Conference of IPSA RC#14, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12-15 June. 2019 Karen Bird. “Toward More Effective Indigenous and Minority Representation in Canada: Electoral Boundary Developments in Nova Scotia and Ontario’s Far North.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, UBC, Vancouver. 4-6 June. 2018 Karen Bird. “How Big is the Tent? Indigenous Representation within Canadian Federal Parties.” Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Regina, Saskatchewan, 30 May-1 June. 2017 Rachel Barnett and Karen Bird. “Effective Representation for Whom? Visible Minorities and Ward Boundary Review in Ontario Cities.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association, Ryerson University, Toronto, 29 May-1 June. This paper was presented as evidence to the Ontario Municipal Board case no. MM170025 Dobrucki v. Hamilton (City), and was cited in the ruling overturning Hamilton’s municipal ward boundaries, 12 Dec. 2017.
2017 Karen Bird, Brandon Gaudette, Liam Midzain-Gobin, and Eric Sault. “Indigenizing Q: Applying Q-Methodology to Understand Indigenous Perspectives of Citizenship.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association, Ryerson University, Toronto, 29 May-1 June.
2017 Karen Bird. “Visible Minority Representation in Hamilton and Halton Leadership.” 19th National Metropolis Conference. Centre Sheraton Montréal, Québec, 16-18 March.
2016 Karen Bird, Elin Bjarnegard, Melanie Hughes, Jackie Steele. Co-organizers of pre- IPSA workshop: “Towards a New Global Database on the Policies for Political Representation of Ethnic Groups and Indigenous Peoples (PPREGIP-Database).” In collaboration with International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Faculty of Political Science/Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University (Morasko), Poznan, Poland, 22 July.
2016 Karen Bird, Chelsea Gabel, Nicole Goodman, Liam Midzain-Gobin, Eric Sault, and Brandon Gaudette. “Indigenizing Q: Applying Q-Methodology to Understand Indigenous Perspectives of Citizenship.” Paper presented at the 32nd annual Q Conference, New Orleans, LA, 7-10 September.
2016 Karen Bird. “Making Sense of Diversity: A Framework for Comparing Evidence on Ethnic Quotas and Representation.” Paper presented at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Poznań, Poland, 23-28 July.
2015 Karen Bird. “Can Unelected Senators be Good Representatives? Visible Minority Representation in Canada’s Second Chamber.” Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California, 1-5 September.
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2015 Samantha Jackson, Karen Bird, Michael McGregor, Aaron Moore and Laura Stephenson. “Gender and Racial Affinity, Incumbency, and the Underrepresentation of Women and Minorities in Local Politics: A Study of the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election.” Paper presented at the European Conference on Politics and Gender. Faculty of Social Sciences, Uppsala University, Sweden, 11-13 June.
2015 Karen Bird, Samantha Jackson, Michael McGregor, Aaron Moore and Laura Stephenson. “Choosing a Mayor: The Role of Race and Sex in Voting for Olivia Chow.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, 2-4 June.
2015 Michael McGregor, Samantha Jackson, Aaron Moore, Karen Bird and Laura Stephenson. “Gender and Ethnic Affinity Affects and Incumbency: Examining Ward Races in the 2014 Toronto Municipal Election.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, 2-4 June.
2015 Karen Bird, Chelsea Gabel and Nicole Goodman. “What does Internet Voting mean for First Nations? A Case Study of Whitefish River First Nation.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, 2-4 June.
2014 Karen Bird, “Beyond Just Numbers. A Theoretical Framework for Comparing Ethnic Quotas and Ethnic Representation Worldwide.” Paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Montreal, Canada, 20-24 July.
2014 Karen Bird, “Challenges to Intersectional Inclusion: The Institutional Dynamics of Dual Quota Systems.” Paper presented at the IPSA World Congress, Montreal, Canada, 20- 24 July.
2014 Karen Bird, “Dual versus Nested Quotas: The Interaction of Ethnic and Gender Quotas in Electoral Politics.” Paper presented at the Annual Association for the Study of Nationalities World Conference, Harriman Institute, Columbia University, 24-26 April.
2014 Karen Bird, Chelsea Gabel and Nicole J. Goodman, “The Impact of Digital Technology on First Nations Participation and Governance in Ontario.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, St. Catharines, Ontario, May 27-29.
2014 Karen Bird, “Power and Intersectionality: The Structure and Impact of Electoral Quotas for Ethnic Minorities and Women.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Brock University, St. Catharines, Ontario, 27-29 May.
2013 Karen Bird, “Representation and Democracy in Diverse Societies: Dynamics of Ethnic Group Representational Schemes Around the World.” Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Mainz, Germany, 11-16 March.
2012 Karen Bird and Jessica Franklin, “Re-thinking Race: Complex Pathways to New Identity Practices in France and Brazil.” Paper presented at the International Political Science Association Meeting, Madrid, Spain, 8-12 July.
2012 Karen Bird, “Comparing Group Representational Schemes: Political Representation for Women, Ethnic Minorities, and Ethnic Minority Women.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, 13-15 June.
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2011 Karen Bird, “The Local Diversity Gap: Assessing the Scope and Causes of Visible Minority Under-representation in Municipal Elections.” Paper presented at the conference: “The Political Immigrant – A Comparative Portrait.” Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. 18-19 November.
2011 Karen Bird, “Towards an Integrated Model of Minority Representation: Perspectives from Canada.” Paper presented to the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Seattle, Washington, 1-4 September.
2011 Karen Bird, “Representation from Different Perspectives: What Diverse Citizens Think about their Representation in Canadian Politics.” Paper presented to the ECPR General Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, 24-27 August.
2011 Karen Bird, “Sociodemographic Characteristics and Voter Choice: An Experiment to Assess the Role of Ethnic and Gender Stereotypes in Ontario Municipal Elections.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Wilfrid Laurier University, 16-18 May.
2011 Karen Bird, “Building Bridges and Working at Intersections: Enhancing Comparative Research on the Political Representation of Women, Ethnic Minorities, and Ethnic Minority Women.” Paper presented to the Scholarship Roundtable: “Challenges to Democracy in Divided Societies.” Duke University, 29 January.
2011 Karen Bird, “Complex Responsiveness: Assessing the Political Representation of Ethnic and Visible Minorities in Canadian Politics.” Paper presented to the ESRC Seminar: “The Role of Institutional and Policy Contexts in Ethnic Political Representation: Are Multicultural Models the Solution?” University of Manchester, 21 January. 2011 Karen Bird and Andrea Rowe, “Gender and the Conservative Party of Canada Paper presented at the European Conference on Politics and Gender. Central European University, Budapest, 13-15 January.
2010 Karen Bird and Mohammed Khan. “Giving Minorities a Voice: Understanding Ethnic Minority Representation in Canadian Politics, and the Factors that Enhance It.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Laval University, Montreal, Québec, 1-3 June.
2010 Karen Bird, “Political Representation of Immigrants and Visible Minorities among Parliamentary Democracies: Master Narratives and Counter Narratives – OR – What We Can Learn by Including Canada as a Case.” Council of European Studies Conference Montreal, Québec, 15-17 April.
2010 Karen Bird and Jessica Franklin, “From Colour-Blindness to Recognition? Political Paths to New Identity Practices in France and Brazil.” Prepared for presentation at the conference: Le multiculturalisme a-t-il un avenir? Paris 1-Panthéon Sorbonne University, 26-27 February.
2010 Karen Bird, “Gendering Minority Participation in Public Life.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, LA, 17-20 February.
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2009 Karen Bird and Jessica Merolli, “Diversity and Inclusion in the City of Hamilton. Balancing Economic and Social Dimensions in Municipal Policy Making.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Carleton University, Ottawa Ontario, 27-29 May.
2009 Karen Bird, “Running Visible Minority Candidates in Canada: The Effects of Voter and Candidate Ethnicity and Gender on Vote Choice.” Prepared for presentation at the Democracy and Diversity Workshop, Queen’s University, Kingston Ontario, 7-8 May.
2009 Karen Bird, “Running Female and Visible Minority Candidates in Canada: The Effects of Voter and Candidate Gender and Ethnicity on Vote Choice.” Prepared for presentation at the First European Conference on Gender and Politics, Queen’s University Belfast, 21-23 January.
2008 Karen Bird, “Running Visible Minority Candidates in Canada: A Survey Experiment.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Vancouver, BC, 3-5 June.
2008 Karen Bird, “Assessing the Multiple Impacts of Parity in France.” Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual National Conference, Chicago, IL, 3- 6 April.
2007 Karen Bird, “Patterns of Substantive Representation among Visible Minority MPs: Evidence from Canada’s House of Commons.” Paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Joint Sessions of Workshops, Helsinki, Finland, 7-12 May.
2005 Karen Bird, “Guess Who’s Running for Office? Visible Minority Representation in the 2004 Canadian Election.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 2-4 June.
2005 Karen Bird, “The Politics of Exclusion: Political Representation of Women and Minorities in the City of Hamilton.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, 2-4 June
2005 Karen Bird, “Electing a Diverse Canada? A Sampling of Canadian Cities: Hamilton” Paper presented at the 18th Biennial Conference of the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association, Ottawa, 14-16 October.
2004 Karen Bird, “Explaining (Under-)Representation: What Do We Know About the Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Democratic Societies?” Paper presented at the International Conference on “Ethnicity and Politics: What Have We Learned?” Research Committee on Ethnicity and Politics (RC#14) of the International Political Science Association, University of Ottawa, October.
2004 Karen Bird, “Unequal Gains: Descriptive and Substantive Representation of Ethnic Minorities in the Political Systems of France, Denmark and Canada.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 29 Aug – 1 September.
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2004 Karen Bird, “Electoral Systems and the Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities in National and Sub-national Governance in Canada, Denmark and France.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Winnipeg, Manitoba, 3-5 June.
2004 Karen Bird, “Political Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Hamilton.” Paper presented at the 7th National Metropolis Conference, Montreal, Quebec, 25-28 March.
2003 Karen Bird, “The Political Representation of Women and Minorities: A Framework for Comparative Research.” Presented at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Durban, South Africa, 30 June – 3 July.
2003 Karen Bird, “The Political Representation of Women and Minorities.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax NS, 30 May – 1 June.
2002 Karen Bird, “Looking for a Few Good Women. The Recruitment and Election of Women under Parity Rules in France.” Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Boston, Massachusetts, 29 Aug – 1 September.
2002 Karen Bird, “Politics, Work and Family. Parity and Candidate Recruitment Patterns in French Local Politics.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Toronto, Ontario, 29-31 May.
2002 Karen Bird and Mathilde Dubesset, “Une stratification sexuée du pouvoir dans les gouvernements locaux.” Presented at the conference, Régards croisés sur la parité, l’Université d’Evry-Val d’Essone, Evry, France, 14-15 February.
2001 Karen Bird, “Where are the women? Who are the women? And what difference do they make? Gender Parity in French municipal elections.” Presented at the conference, L’élection canadienne 2000 et la représentation des femmes: Quels enseignements le Canada peut-il tirer de l’expérience française de la parité?, Ottawa, Canada, 29-30 November.
2001 Karen Bird, “A First Try at Gender Parity: National Results for Women in French Municipal Elections 2001.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Québec, Quebec, 27-29 May.
2000 Karen Bird, “Les particularités du système fédérale et la représentation des femmes au Canada.” Presented at the conference, La citoyenneté des femmes en ses étages. Centre de Recherches Femmes et Politique, Institut d’Etudes des Femmes, Université d’Ottawa, 2-3 November.
2000 Karen Bird, “Gender Parity and the Political Representation of Women in France.” Presented at the International Political Science Association World Congress, Québec, Québec, 1-5 August.
2000 Karen Bird, “Identity Politics in “le creuset républicain”: Regulating Racist Speech in France.” Presented at the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Québec, Québec, 29 July – 1August.
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2000 Karen Bird, Douglas Baer, and Brian Tanguay. “Political Values and Change in Ontario.” Presented at the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Québec, Québec, 29 July – 1 August.
1999 Karen Bird, “Gender Parity and the French Exception: The Integration of Universality and Difference.” Presented as part of the keynote panel at the conference on Politics, Rights and Representation, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois, 14 October.
1999 Karen Bird and Luke Austin. “Striking While the Cup is Hot: French Multicultural Policies after World Cup 1998.” Presented at the Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Sherbrooke, Quebec, 6-8 June.
1997 Karen Bird, “Democratic Values and Support for Racist Speech Laws: Comparing France and the United States.” Presented at the Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, 21-24 July.
1995 Karen Bird, “Regulating Racist Speech in France: A Case Study of Liberty and its Limits in a Democratic State.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Law and Society Association, Toronto, Canada, 7-10 June.
1992 Patricia G. Avery, Karen Bird, Sandra Healy, John L. Sullivan and Kristina Thalhammer. “Do All of the People Have All of the Rights All of the Time? Exploring Political Tolerance with Adolescents.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Los Angeles, California, 20-24 April.
1992 Karen Bird, “Sensibilities and Responsibilities: Mothers of Soldiers in the Persian Gulf War.” Presented at the Annual Conference of the Society for the Interdisciplinary Study of Social Imagery, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 13-15 March.
1991 Karen Bird, “Leader Images in Canada and the United States: A Qualitative Exploration.” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, 2-4 June.
1991 Patricia G. Avery, Karen Bird, Sandra Healy, John L. Sullivan and Kristina Thalhammer. “Political Tolerance Among Adolescents: The Potential Role of Curricular Socialization.” Presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Convention, Chicago, Illinois, 18-20 April.
ii) Not Peer Reviewed
2019 Karen Bird and Denise Christopherson. “EXCLerator Project: Women and Diversity in Executive and Community Leadership.” Hosted by the Hamilton Community Foundation Women 4 Change, McMaster University Continuing Education. 31 January.
2018 Karen Bird, “Community Engagement & Participation.” Conversations that Matter: Civic Engagement Speaker Series. Hosted by Our Future Hamilton, Hamilton Public Library, McMaster University Continuing Education. 26 September.
2018 Karen Bird, “100 Years of Women’s Suffrage: Canada’s Cautious Commemoration.” Presentation to the Hamilton Law Association’s 100th Anniversary of Women’s Suffrage in Canada Celebration, Hamilton, ON, 15 June.
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2016 Karen Bird. Electoral Reform: “Why Canada Needs Electoral Reform: Lessons from Around the World.” Keynote address presented to the Probus Club of Flamborough, 21 November.
2016 Karen Bird, Denise Christopherson, Samantha Jackson, Lindsay Robinson, “It’s 2016! Women in Leadership: The Good News, the Bad News, and the Future.” Keynote address presented at the Leadership Summit for Women. McMaster University, 12 November.
2015 Karen Bird, “Intersections of Exclusion: The Institutional Dynamics of Combined Gender and Ethnic Quota Systems.” Presented to the Research in Progress Seminar Series, Department of Political Science, McMaster University, 27 October.
2015 Karen Bird, Denise Christopherson, Samantha Jackson, “Accelerating Women Leaders.” Workshop presented at the Leadership Summit for Women. McMaster University, 24 October.
2015 Karen Bird, Peter Graefe, Henry Jacek, Richard Stubbs, “Reflections on the 2015 Canadian National Election.” Panel sponsored by the Department of Political Science, McMaster University, 21 October.
2015 Karen Bird, “Challenges to Intersectional Inclusion: Dual Quota Systems for Ethnic Minorities and Women.” Presented to the Political Science Department, University of Calgary, 13 March.
2015 Karen Bird, “Municipal Electoral Reform: Strategies for Enhancing Diverse Representation at City Hall.” Presented at the City of Hamilton Town Hall Electoral Reform. Hamilton, Ontario, 23 July. https://www.thepublicrecord.ca/2015/07/town-hall- on-electoral-reform-with-desmond-cole/
2014 Karen Bird, “How Do We Achieve Diversity in Public Life?” Presentation to the Election Know How Workshop, YWCA Canada Annual Membership Meeting, Hamilton, Ontario, 5 June.
2014 Karen Bird, “Making Politics More Inclusive, in 5 Easy Steps.” Keynote Speech, Hamilton Centre for Civic Inclusion, Political Inclusion Boot Camp. Sheraton Hotel, Hamilton. 8 May.
2013 Karen Bird, “Celebrating Person’s Day: Why are there Still So Few Women and Minorities in Elected Office?” Delivered at the Churchill Society Public Lecture Series for the Advancement of Parliamentary Democracy, University of Toronto, 13 October.
2010 Karen Bird, “The (Sometimes) Quiet Political Work of Women, and Why We Ought to Listen.” Presentation to the Westover Women’s Institute, 20 April.
2007 Karen Bird, “What Can Ontarians Expect from Electoral Reform? Forecasting the Consequences for Women and Ethnic Minorities.” Presented at Fair Vote Canada Annual General Meeting and Conference, Toronto, 27 June.
2002 Karen Bird, “French Lessons on How (Not) to Elect Women to Political Office.” Presented at the Women’s Studies Speakers’ Series, McMaster University, 17 October.
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2002 Karen Bird, “Electing Women Under French Parity Rules: Some Lessons for Canada.” Presented at the Graduate Students Lunch & Learn Seminar, Department of Political Science, McMaster University, 13 February.
1999 Karen Bird, “Identity, Citizenship and Representation in French Politics: The Problem of Gender Parity.” Presented to the Political Science Department, Brock University, 18 November.
1998 Karen Bird, “Liberté d’expression où interdiction des propos à caractère raciste: France et Etats-Unis.” Presented to the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Grenoble, France, 14 June.
1993 Karen Bird, “L’Etat de la psychologie politique aux Etats-Unis, aujourd’hui.” Presented to the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Lyon, France, 27 January.
PATENTS, INVENTIONS AND COPYRIGHTS
Not applicable
ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES
Department Chair, Department of Political Science: 2017–present Graduate Chair: 2008–11; 2016–17 Member, Graduate Committee: 2006–17 Graduate Advisor, MA Political Science: 2012–14 Graduate Scholarships Coordinator: 2007–08 Comparative Politics Area Convenor: 2006–08; 2012–15 Member (elected), Advisory Committee to the Chair: 2010–14; 2016–17 Hiring Committee: Assistant Professor Comparative Public Policy, tenure-track (2019/20) Director, McMaster Indigenous Research Institute & Assistant Professor Political Science, tenure-track (2019/20) Assistant Professor Political Science (2017/18) Assistant Professor Political Theory (2013/14) Assistant Professor Comparative Politics (2011/12) Assistant Professor Comparative Public Policy (2010/11) Canada Research Chair, Public Policy and Globalization (2009/10) Tenure, Promotions and Reappointment Committee: 2005–11 Colloquium Committee Chair: 2004–06 Member, Undergraduate Committee: 1997–03; 2007–08 Undergraduate Balloting Coordinator: 2007–08
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Undergraduate Advisor: 1997–02 Convener, Lille Institut d’Etudes Politiques/McMaster Exchange: 2000–04 Member, Departmental Steering Committee: 1999–2000
Faculty Member, FSS Strategic Planning Advisory Group (SPAG): 2020 – Social Psychology Program - Dean’s Working Group on Program Growth & Restructuring: 2016–18 - Hiring Committee: 2013/14 - Program Advisory Committee: 2012–16 - Committee of Instruction for Development of Honours Program in Social Psychology: 2008– 10 Tenure and Promotions Committee (elected): 2016–17 Graduate Policy and Curriculum Planning Committee: 2013–17 Dean’s Advisory Committee on Technical Needs: 2009–11 Multi-media Computing and Electronic Communication Committee: 1998–03 Social Sciences Faculty Council, Member (elected): 1997–00
University EDI Action Plan – Research Capacity Building Implementation Team: 2019 – 2022 President’s Ad Hoc Committee on Protest and Freedom of Expression (appointed): 2017–18 University Planning Committee, Member (elected): 2014–15 University Planning Committee, Budget Sub-Committee, Member (elected): 2014–15 Graduate Council, Member (elected): 2013–15 University Senate, Member (elected): 2004–07 Ad-hoc Committee on Accommodation of Undergraduate Students with Disabilities, Member: 1998–00 McMaster University Faculty Association, Human Rights Committee: 1998–00
OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES
Academic 2020 – As Department Chair, I led the collaborative formulation of a departmental statement to address anti-black racism, and established a working group to review our processes and practices around faculty hires, student recruitment and admissions, funding packages, and scholarship allocations to ensure that they reflect the department’s commitment to inclusive excellence.
2020 Presenter/Panelist: “Pro-Active Support for Early Career Researchers in our Discipline.” A COVID-19 Virtual Workshop, organized by the Gender and Politics Lab (Memorial University), Canadian Opinion Research Archive (Queens University) and the Centre for Electoral Democracy (McGill). July 29.
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2014 – 19 Member of the Research Advisory Board, Pathways to Power: The Political Representation of Citizens of Immigrant Origin in Seven European Democracies (PATHWAYS), Manlio Cinalli, Laura Morales, Thomas Saalfeld, Jean Tillie, PIs. 2010 – 13 Member of the Research Advisory Committee, Francophone Immigrant Settlement Networks in Ontario, Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Caroline Andrew, Mireille Paquet, PIs. Community 2019 “Applying an Equity, Diversity & Inclusion Lens in the Hamilton City Manager Selection Process.” Background Report and Public Delegation to Hamilton City Council, 6 February 2019. 2018 – Trump Talks I have organized, moderated, and presented in a series of 12 talks, featuring experts from McMaster and elsewhere, to discuss “the Trump effect” in national and international politics. The series addressed legislating in polarized times, racism and resistance, women’s rights, international trade, global instability, and populism (among other topics). Developed in partnership with the Socrates Project and the Centre for Continuing Education (CCE). The series was sold-out, attracting at least 100 participants per talk from the McMaster and wider community, plus extensive on-line audience. 2018 “Ontario under Doug Ford – What Happened, and Where are We Going?” McMaster University, 25 September 2018 Co-organized with the McMaster Political Science Students Association (MPSSA), and moderated by Moderated by Public Leadership for Change Distinguished Visiting Professor Dave Levac (former Speaker of the Ontario Legislature). 2016 “Teach-In: Racism, Resistance and Strategies for Building Alliances in the World of Trump.” McMaster University, 16 November 2016 I co-organized with Dr. Karen Balcom (History) a jointly sponsored (History/Political Science) “teach-in” with scholars and activists from across campus and the community, exploring the place of racial rhetoric and racial divisions in the US presidential election, and implications of this racial environment for Canadians and Americans. 2016 “Online Voting Roundtable: Electoral Futures in Canada.” University of Ottawa, 26 September 2016 Co-organized with Drs. Nicole Goodman and Chelsea Gabel to support the Special Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reform. This one-day event leveraged insights and expertise of scholars, governments and practitioners from around the world, along with members of Indigenous communities in Canada, to discuss the adoption of online voting in Canadian federal elections. The Roundtable, along with our background research, has resulted in several academic and publicly oriented publications and working papers, and provided the basis for policy recommendations to the federal government. The event was broadcast by CPAC http://www.cpac.ca/en/programs/public-record/episodes/49104423 and made part of the series “Electoral Reboot: Changing the Vote” http://www.cpac.ca/en/electoralreform/. 2016 “Electoral Reform Town Hall.” McMaster University, 23 August 2016 I served as one of 3 keynote speakers, discussing the research and setting the context for public consultation on federal electoral reform. Hosted by Filomena Tassi, MP, Hamilton-West, Ancaster, Dundas.
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2014 – Academic Women’s Success & Mentorship (AWSM) I am a co-founder – with Drs. Kalai Saravanamuttu (Chemistry), Ayse Turak (Engineering), Juliet Daniel (Biology) – of the Academic Women’s Success and Mentorship Committee. The Committee organizes the AWSM Lecture Series, and develops various fora to facilitate interdisciplinary networking and mentorship across all ranks throughout the University. In the past five years, we have hosted more than a dozen university-wide talks by a diverse range of notable female leaders including public servants, politicians, community activists, scientists, medical doctors, businesswomen and scholars. We also initiated a Tri-Council Doctoral Award Peer- Review Program, an initiative to support McMaster University's newest women and female-identifying scholars, through cross-disciplinary mentoring. The Peer-Review Program connects students with others outside their discipline to make sure their applications are clear and impactful. 2014 – Women & Diversity in Executive and Community Leadership (EXCLerator) Project We know that women and racialized groups are underrepresented in Hamilton and Halton's leadership. However, until the launch of the EXCLerator Report, we didn't have the data we needed to prove this claim, or to create impactful solutions. In partnership with the YWCA Hamilton and McMaster University’s Forward with Integrity program, I have co-written with PhD student Samantha Jackson two reports (2014 and 2017) on diversity in leadership across nine employment sectors in our local community. The results of the project have been disseminated widely among advocates, community leaders and policy-makers through various forums and events. On November 7, 2017 we launched the most recent report to a gathering of over 150 local leaders. See: http://ywcahamilton.org/initiatives/women-diversity-the-exclerator- project 2007 “Ontario Electoral Reform: What You Need to Know” I co-organized with the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving South Asians, the Chinese Canadian National Council Toronto Chapter, the Canadian Arab Federation, Equal Voice, and Fair Vote Canada, a series of three public meetings on Ontario’s Proposed Electoral Reform. I also organized a Hamilton community forum on “Ontario’s Proposed Electoral Reform: What You Need to Know,” which was sponsored by the Political Science Department and McMaster Students Union.
2000 – Regular media commentator for diverse outlets, including: Al Jazeera, Bloomberg Business, CBC-Radio, 900-CHML, 570-News Kitchener, CHCH-TV, Christian Science Monitor, Community Channel 14, Edmonton Journal, Global News, Globe & Mail, Guelph Mercury, Hamilton Spectator, Maclean’s, OZY, Prospect, St. Catharines Standard, The Caravan, The Public Record, Toronto Star, and other local, national and international media.
Updated: 1 Jan. 2021
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EXHIBIT "B"
This is Exhibit "B" to the affidavit of Karen Bird, affirmed by videoconference on the 26th day of February, 2021.
______Nicolas M. Rouleau (54515D)
A Commissioner, etc.
EXHIBIT "C"
This is Exhibit "C" to the affidavit of Karen Bird, affirmed by videoconference on the 26th day of February, 2021.
______Nicolas M. Rouleau (54515D)
A Commissioner, etc.
Gmail - Expert opinion on Canada's FPTP voting system https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ik=46b8a7ea95&view=pt&search=all...
Nicolas Rouleau
Expert opinion on Canada's FPTP voting system
Nicolas Rouleau
Dear Professor Bird,
It was great to talk to you. I write to confirm that we are retaining you to provide an expert affidavit in the court case Fair Voting BC and Springtide Collective for Democracy Society v Attorney General of Canada.
Your duties as an expert
As an expert, you have the duty to provide independent assistance to the Court by way of objective unbiased opinion. Your opinion must be impartial in the sense that it reflects an objective assessment of the questions at hand. It must be independent in the sense that it is the product of your independent judgment, uninfluenced by who has retained you or the outcome of the litigation. It must be unbiased in the sense that it does not unfairly favour one party's position over another.
Similarly, rule 4.1.01 of the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure requires you:
(a) to provide opinion evidence that is fair, objective and non-partisan;
(b) to provide opinion evidence that is related only to matters that are within your area of expertise; and
(c) to provide such additional assistance as the court may reasonably require to determine a matter in issue.
It is essential for you to understand that this duty prevails over any obligation you could owe to the party that retained you or in whose name you've been retained. The acid test is whether your opinion would not change regardless of which party retained you.
Format of the affidavit
Your expert affidavit should contain the following information:
1. Your name, address and area of expertise.
2. Your qualifications and employment and educational experiences in your area of expertise.
3. The instructions provided to you in relation to the proceeding.
4. The nature of the opinion being sought and your opinion on the following issues:
(i) What is the impact of Canada's current FPTP voting system on the representation and participation of women? What would change under other voting systems?
(ii) What is the impact of Canada's current FPTP voting system on the representation and participation of minorities? What would change under other voting systems?
5. Your expert opinion respecting each issue and, where there is a range of opinions given, a summary of the range and the reasons for your opinion within that range.
6. The reasons for your opinion, including,
i. a description of the factual assumptions on which the opinion is based,
1 sur 2 21-03-01 12:38 Gmail - Expert opinion on Canada's FPTP voting system https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0?ik=46b8a7ea95&view=pt&search=all...
ii. a description of any research conducted by you that led you to form the opinion, and
iii. a list of every document, if any, that you relied on in forming the opinion.
7. A signed acknowledgement of your expert’s duty (Form 53, found here: found here: http://ontariocourtforms.on. ca/static/media/uploads/courtforms/civil/53/rcp-53-e.pdf)
Thank you very much.
Nicolas... ------nicolasrouleau.com
2 sur 2 21-03-01 12:38
EXHIBIT "D"
This is Exhibit "D" to the affidavit of Karen Bird, affirmed by videoconference on the 26th day of February, 2021.
______Nicolas M. Rouleau (54515D)
A Commissioner, etc.
REFERENCES
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