Collective Action Vs. Collective Fishing

COLLECTIVE ACTION VS. COLLECTIVE FISHING: Understanding the attempted prohibition and uncontrollable growth of the ring seine in the district of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, Tamil Nadu

Ciara Phelan Research Project IDS - Field Work and Thesis Masters International Development Studies University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands (Student ID: 11181400) January 2017 [email protected] Word count: 22,338

Supervised by Dr Maarten Bavinck Professor of coastal resource governance Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands ABSTRACT

In recent decades, the Indian government has promoted the modernisation of fisheries and the growth of the fishing community. At the same time, fishers have been collectively regulating the use of gear seen to be harmful to the resources or to the community. Collective action studies so far along the Coromandel Coast have focused on individual village structures and processes, but many of the common pool resource challenges facing fishers are larger and need to be addressed at multiple levels of governance; little is known about the processes between different villages and actors at the regional level. The focus of this thesis is on the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region of Tamil Nadu, and the current challenge of the ring seine: a net banned by the central and state government, which has caused protests and divisions in the fishing community since its introduction. Despite an agreed phase out of the net by 2016 by all 64 village councils, or panchayats, the number of ring seine units has continued to grow throughout the region. This study explores the collective action problems faced by fishers at the regional level, in trying to stop harmful fishing methods. The findings are based on a set of individual and group interviews conducted in several villages throughout the region in the summer of 2016. It is clear that many fishers believe the prohibition of the ring seine to be in the interest of trawler boat owners, not for the collective benefit of small-scale fishermen or the resources, demonstrating a power struggle within the fisheries. The panchayats are not seen to be responsible for monitoring fishing practices, but the role of external actors in common pool resource management is unclear. In addition, the resources are open to access by ring seiners from outside of the region, so local fishers do not see the regional-level ban as a solution to the problem. The study highlights the importance of prohibiting potentially harmful fishing nets in the early stages of development in the future, rather than attempting gradual phase-outs when people have invested their money in the gear. The case of the ring seine in Nagapattinam and Karaikal has wider theoretical implications for the debate on fisheries governance, and the need for common pool resources to be managed at multiple collaborative levels – by fishers and external actors – with particular emphasis on the clear roles assigned to each.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are several people in Tamil Nadu that I would like to thank for their help with the completion of my research.

The first is my local supervisor, Subu, who took the time to come and welcome me into the Nagapattinam-Karaikal fishing community. I would like to thank Baskar and his family for taking me into their home, and for the great hospitality I received throughout my stay. I would like to give a special acknowledgement to Baskar himself, for his invaluable help in the field, personal insights into the research topic, and the contact details he provided for countless respondents that would otherwise have been missed. Thank you to Sekar, not only for translating throughout the data collection process, but for his companionship on long working days and daily bus journeys.

To all of the above-mentioned people, thank you for answering my endless questions about Tamil culture.

I am also extremely grateful for any friends and family members who have listened to me talk about my work in recent months, and have been a welcome distraction from it.

Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank Maarten Bavinck for the introduction to the research topic, for being a much-needed friendly face in Tamil Nadu, and for his incredible patience throughout the writing process. Without him both supporting and challenging me, I would not have completed this thesis.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS LIST OF FIGURES 1. INTRODUCTION 6 2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 9 2.1 Group Behaviour 9 2.2 Individually Rational Behaviour 11 2.2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons 11 2.2.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma 12 2.2.3 The Logic of Collective Action 12 2.3 Design Principles for Managing Common Pool Resources 14 2.4 External Actors 17 2.5 Conceptual Scheme 19 3. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND 21 3.1 Tamil Nadu Fisheries 21 3.2 Nagapattinam and Karaikal 23 3.3 Ring Seine Fishery 25 4. METHODOLOGY 29 4.1 Research Questions 29 4.2 Units of Observation 29 4.3 Selection of Villages 30 4.4 Sampling 32 4.5 Methods of Data Collection 32 4.5.1 Participant Observation 32 4.5.2 Interviews 33 4.6 Data Analysis 34 4.7 Methodological Limitations 34 4.8 Ethical Considerations 35 5. THE REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE RING SEINE 37 5.1 Numbers of Ring Seine Units 37 5.2 The Spread Over Time 38

5.3 Group Size 40 5.4 “There is no boundary” 42 5.5 Discussion 43 6. PERCEIVED HARM: MOTIVATIONS FOR A COLLECTIVE BAN 45 6.1 Perceptions of the Ring Seine 45 6.2 The Motivation for the Ban 51 6.3 Discussion 52 7. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAN 54 7.1 Governance Structure of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal Fishing Community 54 7.2 Meetings 55 7.3 Panchayat Rules and their Implementation 57 7.4 “Only the government can say no to this thing” 61 7.5 Discussion 63 8. CONCLUSIONS 65 8.1 Answers to Research Questions 65 8.2 Theoretical Reflections and Suggestions for Further Research 67 8.3 Recommendations for Policy and Practice 70

REFERENCES APPENDIX

FIGURES

Figure 1: Location of Tamil Nadu state and Nagapattinam-Karaikal district Figure 2: Taluks of the district Figure 3: Mapped locations of sample villages Figure 4: Bar graph showing units of ring seine and years of use in sample villages

Table 1: Units of ring seine currently in operation in each of the sample villages Table 2: Ring seine units and population size by number of families in sample villages

Image 1: A group of ring seine fishers with their net and mechanised boat Image 2: One fibreglass boat full of oil sardine Image 3: Fish drying in the sun Image 4: Large number of people unloading the catch of one ring seine unit

ABBREVIATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS

FAO: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations SIFFS: South Indian Federation of Fishermen Societies CPR: Common pool resource CMFRI: Central Marine Fisheries Research Institute Panchayat: Village council Mathi: Oil sardine Surukkumadi: Ring seine Rettamadi: Pair trawl INR: Indian rupee (€1 = INR 72.57) Lakh: INR 100,000 Crore: INR 10million, or 100 lakhs i1-i38: Interviews

1. INTRODUCTION

The blue revolution of the 1960s was promoted by the central government of India, modernising capture fisheries and introducing new technologies to increase catch levels, for the purpose of economic growth, poverty reduction and food security. In terms of increasing efficiency and production levels, the blue revolution was very successful, with the catch yield rising each year (Bavinck & Johnson, 2008). However, those now operating larger, more powerful boats and fishing gear continued to fish the same inshore waters as small-scale fishers where stocks are known to be rich, instead of advancing to deep-sea zones where the resources remain largely underexploited (Cacatian, 2010). As a result, fishers and fishery scientists both report that catches have significantly decreased in recent decades since the blue revolution, and that stocks in the inshore zone may be exploited beyond maximum level (Bavinck, 2001a). At the global level, over 75 per cent of fish stocks are estimated to be either fully exploited or overexploited; the majority of the main capture fisheries have reached their maximum potential (Mathew, 2009).

Small-scale fisheries are receiving growing recognition for their potential role in global poverty alleviation and food security (FAO, 2014) but, unfortunately, small-scale fishers are not receiving an equal share of the benefits generated within fisheries. Bavinck (2012) suggests that the distribution of economic wealth experienced through the industrialisation of Tamil Nadu fisheries is unevenly weighted in favour of those fishing at a larger scale, and that small- scale fishers suffer further from these encroachments into the coastal waters they occupy. The ecological problems associated with the depletion of natural resources are therefore accompanied by a sense of injustice among fisher populations.

A number of researchers have studied the collective action of fishers in the villages of Tamil Nadu, with regards to the members and decision-making structures of the panchayats (village councils). Particular attention has been placed on their involvement in regulating access to and usage of marine resources, to ensure sustainable and fair resource management (Bavinck, 2001b, 2014a; Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006; Thamizoli & Prabhakar, 2009). The collective prohibition of fishing gear in the villages of Tamil Nadu is referred to as an “institutional tradition”, with a long history of self-governing (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006:46). However, despite this information on how fishers organise within villages, little is known about the

6 structures at a regional level. The historically marginalised nature of marine fisheries has contributed to the way in which each village has strengthened its resource management structures in isolation (Bavinck, 2001b). As a result, the structures of different villages have frequently been studied in isolation from one another. Although the panchayats of Tamil Nadu are local scale organisations, the FAO (2014) argues that some of the challenges they deal with are much larger and that it is important for organisations to upscale in order to address important issues. Coming to regional agreements would make regulations more effective, replicating the results over a larger geographical area (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006).

This thesis is based on a study of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region on the south-eastern coast of India, and the collective attempts of fishers and panchayats here to regulate ring seine fishing. Recently the collective action of fishers has been studied in relation to the use of fishing gear, rather than collective bans. Research shows that fishers form collective groups within their villages to operate ring seine fisheries, as a strategy to overcome difficult natural and social circumstances, largely to collectively meet their basic needs by increasing their income (Hoefsloot, 2014). However, the operation of ring seine units is a matter of concern for other fisher groups, and has been protested against. This has led to an official ban by the central government of India, the state government of Tamil Nadu, and the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Department, as the net is seen to catch an unsustainably large number of fish, a high percentage of which are juvenile as a result of its small mesh size (Mohan Joseph & Jayaprakash, 2003). Yet in spite of regulations, the ring seine is still widely used in the region. So, my main research question is:

Why is the collective action of fishers difficult to realise in prohibiting ring seine fishing in the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region?

The chapter following this presents the theories of collective action and fisheries governance that guide the study, alongside a review of the existing literature on Tamil Nadu fisheries. The chapter concludes with a set of clear conceptual choices based on the theoretical framework, and the scope of the research is shown in a conceptual diagram.

Chapter three provides some geographical context and background relevance to the study. This includes information on Tamil Nadu fisheries, the district of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, the ring seine net, and the Indian oil sardine fishery that it targets.

Next is the methodology, which begins with a set of sub-questions aimed towards answering the main research question. I explain the sampling process for the respondents, as well as for the villages selected in the study. I also outline the main methods of data collection and data analysis used. Finally, the methodological limitations and ethical considerations of the research are highlighted.

I present my findings in three separate empirical chapters, providing answers to each sub- question and, in turn, the main research question. The focus of chapter five is on the geography of ring seine use in the region and how this has spread in recent years. In chapter six I move on to discussing the perceived social and ecological impacts of the net by members of the fishing community, and how these perceptions have motivated the prohibition. Chapter seven discusses attempts at implementing regulations, both by the Nagapattinam-Karaikal community and by state actors.

The thesis concludes with a summary of the findings that answer the research questions, reflections on the theory, suggestions for areas of further research, and recommendations for policy and practice.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Existing theories of collective action provide the framework for this research. Collective action may be defined and conceptualised in several ways, often depending on the context in which it is used. However,

“What most definitions have in common is that collective action requires the involvement of a group of people, it requires a shared interest within the group and it involves some kind of common action which works in pursuit of that shared interest. Although not often mentioned, this action should be voluntary, to distinguish collective action from hired or corvee labour.” (Meinzen-Dick, Gregorio & McCarthy, 2004:4-5, emphasis in original)

With these requirements in mind, I discuss some of the different theories of collective action highlighted in the literature, with particular reference to previous research on Tamil Nadu fisheries. I also try to position the individual and group behaviour of fishers and other actors in the wider framework of fisheries governance.

2.1 Group Behaviour

A popular assumption of group behaviour is that individuals who share common interests will act together to further these interests. Just as one individual is expected to act out of self- interest, the same is expected of groups of individuals sharing the same interest. Based on this logic of group behaviour, self-interested individuals may collectively succeed in achieving their common goals (Olson, 1965). For those individuals who rely on common pool resources for their livelihoods and well-being, it is in their best interest to sustain these resources to ensure long-term benefits. Fishers are therefore expected to collectively avoid “depleting stocks of natural resources to a level which results in an effectively permanent decline in the rate at which the natural resource base yields useful products or services for livelihoods” (Scoones, 1998:7). In theory, all fishers would be individually better off if common goals were achieved.

Fishers in Tamil Nadu have a long history of self-regulation when it comes to the use of fish stocks, particularly restricting those gears seen as ecologically or socially harmful. According to Bavinck & Karunaharan (2006) the harm caused by new fishing gear is conceptualised in

9 three ways along the Coromandel Coast. The first is in terms of harm to the fish stock on which the fishers’ livelihoods depend. Gear bans are motivated by the self-interest of individual fishers to protect these specific resource categories (ibid:53). The depletion of fish stocks is to be avoided at all costs, for the collective long-term benefit of the group. The second is harm to the majority of other gear users. Although new fishing technologies are often more economically efficient, the increase in yield for its users negatively affects the availability of resources for the rest of the group. The collective regulation or prohibition of such technologies is seen as a way of promoting equality and fairness among individuals and groups of fishers. If the access and opportunities available to each fisher are unequal, this can negatively impact the dynamics within the community. Accordingly, the third dimension of harm relates to the community as a social entity, and harm to the unity of its population (ibid:55).

Despite the separation of the different aspects of harm on paper, it seems very unlikely that one would occur independently from the others in reality. The authors suggest that an “intermingling” of dimensions is to be expected (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006:53). It is possible to imagine a knock-on effect from the depletion of resources and the social difficulties that follow, which I elaborate on in the following paragraph. It is also important to recognise the subjectivity of harm as a concept. As a result of their high levels of interaction with the natural environment, fishers frequently possess extensive knowledge of the ecosystems and available resources (Schlager, Blomquist and Tang, 1994). Gear bans motivated by harm to the fish stock, for example, are based on changes as they are experienced by fishers. So, notions of harm very much rely on perceptions rather than scientific data. Nonetheless, it is clear from the literature that there are both environmental and socioeconomic dimensions of harm involved; the prohibition and regulation of fishing gear is motivated by the principles of social justice, as much as it is by ecological sustainability (Bavinck, 1996).

In situations where the use of a particular gear causes harm to other fishers or to the community as a whole, conflict may be expected. Homer-Dixon (1999) claims that scarcity of renewable resources can contribute to violent conflict, particularly in developing countries where people are more dependent on the environment for their economic well-being. He argues that one of the key sources of scarcity is the depletion and degradation of a resource, fish in this case, where stocks are being depleted at a faster rate than they are being renewed. Implementing a ban on the use of any gear that may be considered unsustainable is presumably in the interest of all users. In contrast, the possibility also exists that a regulatory decision results in conflict.

The assumption of regulatory decisions so far – in response to harm – has been perfect consensus among all group members, which will not always be the case (Olson, 1965). In the context of previous bans, local fishers have protested that adhering to the rules would leave them without livelihoods and sufficient food (Tietze, 2016). When there is such heavy dispute over the prohibition of a particular fishing gear, it can be difficult for local collective groups to take any further action in implementing and enforcing regulations (Bavinck, 2001b). However, if all individuals are in agreement then it is often taken for granted that they will act as a group on behalf of their shared interests.

2.2 Individually Rational Behaviour

Based on general theories of group behaviour, the prohibition of seemingly harmful gear appears to be the simple solution to shared problems and a means to achieving common objectives. Following previous studies, Bavinck (2001a) claims that such decisions are not just decided upon by the panchayat, but are legitimised in village-member gatherings. In her book “Governing the Commons…”, Elinor Ostrom (1990) discusses three popular models of collective action to explain why groups of individuals may not act to achieve their common goals.

2.2.1 The Tragedy of the Commons

Garrett Hardin (1968) argues that each rational being, such as an individual fisher, seeks to maximise his own gain. In other words, a rational fisher will try to catch as many fish as possible on a given day. The logic in doing so is that the individual fisher will receive all of the benefits from fishing without limits, whilst the negative consequences of overfishing a shared resource are shared by all. The nature of fisheries as a common pool resource, means that they are vulnerable to the impacts of overfishing (Homer-Dixon, 1999). When all rational fishers follow the same logic, the tragedy of the commons arises; “Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his… [catch] without limit - in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons” (Hardin, 1968:1,244). Ostrom (1990:3) argues that much of the world depends on natural resources which are subject to this possibility. Hardin’s (1968) model pertains to the idea that individual behaviour – specifically in dealing with common pool resources – has implications on a larger scale, just as village-level actions do for

11 the region as a whole. It may be argued then that the collective action of fishers and panchayats at village level in Tamil Nadu is insufficient for achieving regional-level goals.

2.2.2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma

The prisoner’s dilemma model is conceptualised as a two-person game, where each has the option of cooperating in a management regime or defecting. The “defect” strategy for a fisher would be to catch as much fish as he can possibly sell, and the “cooperate” strategy would be for each fisher to catch only his share of an agreed optimum total amount (Ostrom, 1990:4). If both fishers in the game decide to cooperate, they receive equally beneficial payoffs from the fishery. If both defect, they share the negative consequences of overfishing equally. However, if only one fisher cooperates, his share of the burden will increase whilst the defector receives an even higher payoff (Hardin, 1982). Fishers operating industrialised fishing methods benefit from higher yields, but the resulting losses are distributed amongst all users. The increased losses for small-scale fishers and the unequal distribution of benefits creates feelings of injustice, and causes conflict between different groups (Hoefsloot, 2014). If the dominant strategy is for both fishers in the game to defect – as there is a strong incentive to do so – the model suggests that individually rational behaviour will not lead to collectively rational outcomes (Hardin, 1982). This challenges the fundamental assumptions of group theory. Of course, in prisoner’s dilemmas the strategies are chosen independently and without communication, which is less realistic in real life settings. It is impossible or forbidden for the prisoners to communicate with one another, but the case is not the same in the fishing community where, as I have already discussed, Tamil fishers have historically come to collective agreements on the use of the resources. Bavinck and Karunaharan (2006) in particular highlight the sense of community prevailing in fishing hamlets.

2.2.3 The Logic of Collective Action

The third model presented by Ostrom (1990) to explain why individuals may have difficulty in pursuing their joint interests, is the logic of collective action. The main theoretical assumption made by Olson in this model is as follows: “unless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (1965:2). A key aspect of this model is that the behaviour of individuals is

12 voluntary. The coercion dimension and the intervention of external actors are discussed later in the chapter, but I expand on the topic of group size at this point.

Olson (1965) claims that larger groups of individuals will fail to further their collective interests for three main reasons, which have been summarised by Hardin (1982) as follows. The first reason is that when the benefits are distributed among more members, each member receives a lower share. A central characteristic of common pool resources, such as that of fisheries, is the difficulty of excluding users. Therefore, since a fisher cannot easily be excluded from the benefits of the collective efforts of the group, the incentive for any individual not to contribute increases with group size. The second suggestion made by Olson (1965) is that in a larger group, the efforts of one member will not have a noticeable effect on the situation of the group as a whole, and so he can still enjoy the benefits of improvements without having contributed. The ecological and social effects of defectors in areas with larger fisher populations may go unnoticed, despite the fact that they will still benefit from the regulatory decisions made. In smaller groups where the members come into face-to-face contact regularly, individuals are more likely to be bound by shared norms and socially acceptable behaviours, and are distinguishable in their villages. Thus, they are more likely to be socially affected than those in large groups, if they fail to cooperate when making the decision on how to fish (Olson, 1965). The third reason for failure is simply that the effective organisation of a larger group generates higher transaction costs.

No matter the reasons provided, Olson (1965) concludes that large groups will always fail to act to achieve their common goals. Hardin (1982) claims that the effect of group size on collective action is the most controversial issue in the literature on collective action; both he and Ostrom (1990) argue that the probability of an individual voluntarily acting on behalf of collective interests is determined not by the number of people in the group, but by the relational size of the individual, i.e. how noticeable the individual’s actions are to the other group members, and how much they stand to benefit from the collective good.

All three models introduce the free-rider problem: the motivation for each individual to “free- ride” on the efforts of the other members without having contributed to the collective effort (Ostrom, 1990:6). Olson (1965) suggests that each rational individual would prefer that others pay the whole cost towards achieving collective benefits. He explains that with common pool

13 resources, or collective goods, users cannot be excluded from the consumption of the good even though they do not assist in ensuring the good is provided.

The dominant conclusion often drawn from these models of collective action is that no rational individuals will voluntarily ensure the provision of a common pool resource, and that only government control or privatisation will provide long-term benefits to users. However, Ostrom argues that individuals have the capacity to “escape tragic outcomes” (1990:14). Based on years of research on common pool resources, she finds many communities of individuals successfully governing their resource systems. Evidence from Tamil Nadu shows that fishers have in fact been collectively regulating the use of fishery resources for a long time (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006). As a result of individually rational behaviour, fishing gear bans have been executed with varying degrees of success. When applied at the regional level, it is possible that fishers in some locations are altogether unaware of the decision to prohibit the use of a particular fishing gear, and so it is only banned in parts. In contrast, however, some previous measures have spread from one place to another without fishers ever gathering to make collective decisions (Bavinck, 2001a). Ostrom (1990) suggests that user groups near governance centres have less autonomy than appropriators of remote common pool resources, so in theory are more likely to comply with prohibitions.

2.3 Design Principles for Managing Common Pool Resources

Elinor Ostrom studied a large number of self-governed common pool resource settings, in an attempt to explain why some communities succeed and others fail. In disagreement with the conclusions drawn from the previous three models, she identified a set of design principles that characterise sustainable, robust, and fair common pool resource management via collective action, as an alternative to privatisation or state regulation. Ostrom described the design principles as the fundamental similarities that exist between different successfully community- governed commons (1990:90); several of the conditions are particularly relevant to this study and guide the thesis.

Firstly, emphasis is placed on clearly defined boundaries: “individuals or households who have rights to withdraw resource units from the CPR must be clearly defined, as must the boundaries of the CPR itself” (Ostrom, 1990:91). As previously mentioned, rights can be difficult to assign in such open access resource settings. The fluid nature of water and the mobility of fish,

14 especially where migratory species are concerned, is problematic for the definition of boundaries (Mathew, 2009). Bavinck (2001b) finds that the panchayats of the Coromandel Coast govern over clearly defined groups of people and physical territories, where the boundaries set at sea are an extension of the borders between villages on land. In another study, fishers are reported as stating that “there are no boundaries at sea” (Bavinck, 1996:478) and village panchayats in the region would not exclude other fishers from their adjacent waters as this would also lock their own fishers in. However, they do claim to maintain some control over the fishing methods used there (Bavinck, 2014a). Without closing the fish resources to outside appropriators, the regulatory efforts of local fishers may benefit those who have not contributed, reducing the benefits for locals or destroying the resource itself. For fishers to be interested in coordinating common pool resource provision among themselves, they must have the ability to exclude others from access to and appropriation of the resource (Ostrom, 1990:91). Although specifying clear boundaries and users may be the first step in organising collective action, Ostrom argues that a clearly defined number of appropriators still have the potential to destroy the resource (1990:92).

Ostrom also argues for collective-choice arrangements: “most individuals affected by the operational rules can participate in modifying the operational rules” (1990:93). She suggests that institutions who make collective decisions about rules are better able to tailor the rules to local circumstances, as the resource users are directly involved. Evidence from the Coromandel Coast finds fishers rallying to have resource use regulated at different periods in time. So, as the people who know the characteristics of the resources best, based on their own perceptions of the impacts of certain fishing nets (Bavinck & Karunaharan, 2006) fishers are modifying the rules of the fishery themselves. Furthermore, Thamizoli and Prabhakar (2009) claim that the current decision making system of panchayats along the Coromandel Coast is a democratic one, much more so than earlier systems. They found in their research that decisions are arrived at due to consensus following discussions between all members and that collective-choice arrangements are facilitated particularly when banning certain types of nets. However, attendance at a meeting “implies agreement with joint decisions” made there (Bavinck, 2001b:1090) which may not necessarily be the case.

Following this, Ostrom (1990) says that in robust common pool resource institutions, monitoring and sanctioning are undertaken by the resource users rather than external authorities. She argues that “monitors, who actively audit CPR conditions and appropriator

15 behaviour, are accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators” and “appropriators who violate operational rules are likely to be assessed graduated sanctions (depending on the seriousness and context of the offense) by other appropriators, by officials accountable to these appropriators, or by both” (ibid:94). It may often be assumed that resource users will not spend the time, money, or effort to monitor the performance of others and sanction rule breakers, as this generates high costs for the individual but produces goods available to everyone (ibid:94). However, Ostrom finds evidence of participants doing both. It is in the personal interest of fishers to monitor the use of resources on which their livelihoods depend, and this may also increase the confidence of a fisher that he is not the only user following the rules (Wade, 1987). For those found to be not in compliance with the rules, a system of punishment must be in place. Ostrom (1990) suggests graduated sanctions based on the frequency and severity of the rule breaking, from financial punishments (fines) to social punishments (loss of reputation, banishment). According to previous research on Tamil Nadu fisheries, most punishments within the community consist of monetary fines of varying amounts depending on the rule break. The village panchayats may exercise public shaming methods of punishment, or excommunication from the society (Bavinck, 2014a). Even small penalties can remind the defector of the importance of compliance (Ostrom, 1990:97).

The next important design principle for this study is “conflict-resolution mechanisms: appropriators and their officials have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts among appropriators or between appropriators and officials” (ibid:100). Ostrom (1990) argues here that individuals must have a mechanism for discussing and resolving non-compliance if they are to collectively follow rules over a long period of time. Gear bans may also be seen as a way of resolving conflict between different groups of fishers, if a net is considered to be harmful to other resource users. Conflict-resolution is one of the main responsibilities of the panchayat, and previous research demonstrates that sanctions have actually been imposed on fishers who seek the support of the police rather than panchayats to settle disputes (Bavinck et al., 2015). Furthermore, community members do not pay for this service but the panchayats work on a voluntary basis (Bavinck, 2014a). The presence of conflict-resolution mechanisms does not equal enduring common pool resource institutions, but it is unlikely that such complex systems of rules could be maintained over time without them (Ostrom, 1990:101).

Finally, Ostrom says that “appropriation, provision, monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organised in multiple layers of nested enterprises” for

16 all of the more complex, enduring common pool resources (ibid). In cases where the common pool resource in question is part of a larger, more complex system, users are organised on different levels and in local, regional, and national contexts (Ostrom, 1990). Hardin (1982) suggests that in larger groups and systems, collective action problems might be resolved as a result of smaller, often spontaneous, subgroup interactions. Evidence from Tamil Nadu finds individual fishing villages “loosely embedded” in larger bodies at the taluk level and regional level (Bavinck et al., 2015) all of which are nested within the authority of government actors at different levels. However, there are substantial differences within the small-scale fisheries subsector in different villages – “particularly in gear types and target species” – that may need to be addressed in order for fishers to scale up their collective resource management efforts (Bavinck et al., 2015).

There are additional principles identified by Ostrom (1990), but the ones outlined in this section are relevant to the thesis and have provided theoretical guidance throughout the research.

2.4 External Actors

The theoretical framework has so far focused on the collective action of resource appropriators, but here I will discuss the role of external actors. Following on from her design principles, and the idea of multiple nested governance layers, Ostrom concluded that the community collective management of common pool resources was more likely to be sustainable “if it was nested within a broader system of polycentric governance, one that allowed for multiple mechanisms of collective decision-making and conflict resolution at multiple levels of aggregation…requiring cross-sector collaboration among multiple levels of governance units” (McGinnis, 2016:1). The term “polycentric” is said to refer to “many centres of decision making”, either functioning independently or forming an interdependent governance system (V. Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren 1961:831–32, in Ostrom, 2010:643). Ostrom states that the move away from assuming that only the government can solve common pool resource problems, whilst still recognising the important role of governments in common pool resource management is a “big step forward”; in her work on polycentric governance she says that ideally more national, regional and local officials will learn to work together, alongside nongovernmental organisations and local citizens (Ostrom, 2010:664). She also highlights the need for further research into the conditions that ensure self-organisation within multilevel, polycentric systems (ibid:642).

Evidence from the Coromandel Coast finds that panchayats have difficulty implementing gear regulations beyond the local level, and fisher leaders frequently highlight the need for governmental support for these movements (Bavinck, 2014a). Nonetheless, in areas of limited statehood legitimate governance configurations are still present, as established in the panchayats. Government authorities are just one actor among many, applying different rules and systems, leading to parallel layers of governance (Risse, 2012) and situations of legal pluralism (Bavinck et al., 2015).

Risse says that the state should “at least possess the ability to authoritatively make, implement, and enforce central decisions for a collectivity” (2012:6). Previous research has established that the successful regulation of fisheries must originate from fishermen themselves, and that robust resource settings cannot be achieved without the active participation of fishers in governance at the local, national and regional level (Tietze, 2016). However, when state regulations are formulated the local organisations and traditional fisheries governance actors are rarely consulted.

“The exercise of applying precaution to natural resource management needs to be undertaken against a background of value judgements as to the bounds of ecological acceptability and the socio-economic costs that are justifiably incurred in securing a sustainable level of exploitation.” (Mathew, 2009:106)

Elaborating on this idea, Mathew (2009) explains that over-precautious sustainability measures in fisheries governance may benefit ecosystems but at a cost to fishers and their local communities. On the other hand, under-precaution will be at the cost of ecosystems. Strengthening efforts towards fisheries co-governance could be beneficial for understanding the socioeconomic implications of such prohibitions.

According to Symes (2006) co-governance increases the rationality of regulatory systems. Fisheries co-governance also incorporates the diversity of fishing behaviour at the local level, and the wealth of knowledge held by fishers, in a way that top-down governance systems do not (Symes, 2006). This allows for state intervention in larger scale situations where ur panchayats struggle to implement agreements, and helps to bridge fishers and fisher organisations with other governance actors. It is important to establish the right degree of

18 intervention, as too much interference can be as harmful to organisational development as too little support (FAO, 2014).

2.5 Conceptual Scheme

The diagram below demonstrates the links between the main concepts that guide this thesis, drawn from the theoretical framework in sections 2.1 to 2.4: harm, collective action, and regulation. The three concepts were fully operationalised to assist firstly with the data collection process, and secondly with answering my research questions (see appendix).

OSTROM’S DESIGN EXTERNAL ACTORS PRINCIPLES

FISHER

PERCEPTIONS

SOCIAL HARM

COLLECTIVE PROHIBITION MOTIVATION REGULATION ACTION N

HARM TO FISH STOCKS

INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY

The introduction of a new fishing gear is the starting point for this research. Each net type may cause harm to the levels of fish stocks along the Coromandel Coast, on which the livelihoods of the fishers depend. There may also be issues of social justice if the catch is only reduced for fishers not operating the net, causing harm to specific groups of fishers, or to the community as a whole unit. The potential social and ecological harm caused by overfishing is represented in the left of the scheme. It is unlikely that one aspect of harm would occur independently from

19 the others, and so the impact arrows go in both directions between the two. The dimensions of harm are based solely on the perceptions of fishermen, as it is outside of the scope of this research to scientifically prove or disprove that any net is affecting the fish stock (and I did not set out to do this in my field work).

The collective action of fishers is motivated by the way they perceive the impacts of new gear, as represented by the first red arrow. If the fishers act collectively to prohibit or restrict the use of harmful nets, then the regulation of the common pool resource will be successful, as demonstrated in the right side of the scheme. However, if they all act in their own self-interest then it is thought that any harm to the fish stocks or to the fishing community will continue, and this is where the scheme loops back.

The grey boxes at the top of the scheme show different conditions required for successfully self-governed common pool resources, as highlighted in the literature, including the involvement of external actors. These conditions feed into the main concepts as factors which may impact on the success of collective coastal resource management by Tamil Nadu fishers.

3. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

In this chapter I will present the geographical context of the research location and background information on the thesis topic, based on existing literature as well as conversations and observations in the field. I will first provide information on Tamil Nadu fisheries, followed by the study region of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, and specifically the practice of ring seining.

3.1 Tamil Nadu Fisheries

Tamil Nadu has a coastline that stretches 1,076 km – approximately 15 per cent of the total coastal length of India – and is one of the leading producers of marine fish, ranking fourth in the country (Cacatian, 2010). At the time of the most recent census, the total population of the state was 802,912 within 192,697 marine fisher households, and 96 per cent of these were classified as traditional fishermen families (CMFRI, 2010a:1). At this point, 66 per cent of the population was said to be living below the poverty line (ibid:2). The majority of the fishing population in Tamil Nadu belongs to the Pattinavar caste, classified as a most backward caste, and they rely almost entirely on the sea for their livelihoods (Bavinck et al., 2014:595).

Of the 46,070 crafts in the fishery, 10,692 are mechanised, 24,942 are motorized and the rest are non-motorized (CMFRI, 2010a:3). Prior to India’s independence however, these figures were vastly different. Fishers previously went to the sea in wooden catamarans, with small nets, and practiced traditional fishing methods. After gaining independence from British rule in 1947, the capture fisheries of India underwent a period of rapid industrialisation, following an initiative of the government known as “the blue revolution” (Bavinck, 2014b:37). Although trawler vessels dominated the revolution, small-scale fisheries also continued to grow with modernised equipment and new fishing techniques. The blue revolution has been framed as a development effort by the Indian government to lift the fishing population out of backwardness and poverty (Bavinck & Johnson, 2008). According to Bavinck (2014b:39), Tamil Nadu state was at the forefront of this process. On the one hand, the industrialisation of capture fisheries was a big success; India’s marine landings multiplied, and so did the value of the catches (Bavinck, 2014b:38). On the other hand, fishers along the Coromandel Coast now complain about a reduction in inshore resources. As a result, The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act of 1983 states that trawlers must operate at least three nautical miles from the shore.

However, members of the fishing community claim that this rule is not adhered to. Nonetheless, small-scale fishermen still account for almost half of the annual fish catch in Tamil Nadu (Bavinck, 2014b:40).

In terms of fisheries governance, the Tamil Nadu Fisheries Department is responsible for facilitating development as well as resource management. The Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Act (1983) is in place for the “regulation, restriction and prohibition of fishing by fishing vessels in the sea along the whole or part of the coast line of the State”. Yet all fishing villages of Tamil Nadu also have their own traditional panchayat. Each one has authority over the fishing population and all other organisational bodies in the village. Bavinck & Karunaharan (2006:46) describe the panchayats as non-governmental bodies, “with roots in traditional caste administration”. This used to be a role passed down through generations, but each fishing village now elects their own panchayat from among the male population. An important element of the work of the panchayats is concerned with the regulation of environmentally and socially harmful fishing methods. They also represent the village in matters in the outside world with other actors, from the state for example (Bavinck et al., 2015). For this reason, fishers say that younger, better educated, panchayat members are increasingly being chosen.

3.2 Nagapattinam and Karaikal

Figure 1: location of Tamil Nadu state and Nagapattinam-Karaikal district (Google Maps, 2016)

The study area of Nagapattinam shown in figure 1 stretches 187km of the Coromandel Coast, and accounts for 11 per cent of the fishing community of Tamil Nadu (CMFRI, 2010a). The north of Nagapattinam borders Cuddalore district, the neighbouring district to the west is Thiruvarur, the Bay of Bengal lies to the east, and south is the Palk Strait between India and Sri Lanka. Nagapattinam was the worst affected part of India in the 2004 tsunami, where over 80 villages were affected. As well as a loss of thousands of lives, there were heavy damages to fishing boats and gear (NGO Coordination and Resource Centre, 2005). As a result of post- tsunami development efforts – where fishers were given new boats for free – and the blue revolution, Nagapattinam now has more fishing crafts than anywhere else in Tamil Nadu (Hoefsloot, 2014:20).

Although Karaikal is situated along the Nagapattinam coastline (see figure two), it officially belongs to the Union Territory of Puducherry, which means that it is governed by the central government rather than that of Tamil Nadu. However, the fisheries policy of Karaikal is similar to that of the Nagapattinam district (Bavinck, Vivekanandan & Sajith, 2015) and the fishers say that they are all one community, separate only in political affairs. So, given its geographic position, this area is also included in the research. The combined fishing population of Nagapattinam and Karaikal is 95,663 (CMFRI, 2010a; 2010b).

Figure 2: Taluks of the district (Nagapattinam District Maps, 2016)

The coast of the district is divided into six administrative taluks: Sirkali, Tharangampadi, Karaikal, Nagapattinam, Kilvelur and Vedaranyan. Each one has its own head village. These taluks then collectively consist of 64 individual fishing villages1. The sample of villages that I visited are mapped in chapter four. Nambiyar Nagar is the traditional head village of the entire Nagapattinam-Karaikal district, but is now in competition with neighbouring village Akkarai Pettai for this role. This is partly due to the large, wealthy trawler population of Akkarai Pettai (Bavinck, 2014a); they took over a harbour in a neighbouring small village and have since gained a lot of power in the region, so there is a struggle between the two village panchayats.

1 The marine fisheries census counts 57 villages in Nagapattinam (CMFRI, 2010a) and 10 in Karaikal (CMFRI, 2010b) making 67 villages in the study region altogether. However, fishers refer to the 64-village community of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, so 64 is the figure that will officially be used in this thesis.

3.3 Ring Seine Fishery

Ring seining is very much a post-tsunami phenomenon along the Coromandel Coast. Each ring seine unit requires approximately 50 operators. One mechanised boat will go to the sea with ten to fifteen smaller fibreglass boats, as shown in images one and two. They work by moving to different areas along the coast in search of fish shoals, locally referred to as mobs of fish. Fishers previously relied on their experience of shoal behaviour, wind and current patterns, movement of sea birds, and so on to locate the target species. Now echo sound technology and global positioning systems (GPS) are increasingly used to locate and identify the shoals (Abdussamad et al., 2015).

The large net, shown occupying the mechanised boat in image one has buoys at the top to keep it afloat, and weights at the bottom to pull it down. The fibreglass boats will all separately help to position the net in a circle, creating a vertical wall surrounding the shoal of fish in the water. A mechanism on the large boat then pulls a rope threaded through the weighted end of the net, enclosing the fish inside from the bottom. The catch is distributed over the fibreglass boats and transported back to the shore or harbour (Hoefsloot, 2014:27-28). They will do this every day, leaving at approximately 4am. On a good catch day, they may return with fifteen fibreglass boats full of fish, like the one shown in image two.

Image 1: A group of ring seine fishers with their net and mechanised boat

Image 2: One fibreglass boat full of oil sardine

Previous research in other parts of Tamil Nadu finds a system where ten to fifteen local fishermen come together to invest in a ring seine unit, and hire the rest of the labourers to work alongside them, including immigrant workers from agricultural communities. The profits are split 50:50 between the joint owners and crew members (BOBLME, 2015). In Nagapattinam however, equal shareholder groups are in place where 50 small-scale fishers jointly own the nets and boats required for ring seining. Each one is required to invest an equal amount, on average between INR 50,000 and INR 1.2 lakhs, for a total investment of INR 80 lakh to INR 1 crore (Hoefsloot, 2014:29). Any remaining amount may be taken as a loan by the group.

Image 3: Fish drying in the sun

The main species targeted by ring seiners is Indian oil sardine – a highly migratory pelagic fish – which has emerged as a major resource along the east coast over the last twenty years. Since the local consumption of oil sardine is low in Tamil Nadu, most of the catch is marketed elsewhere, predominantly in Kerala (Jayaprakasah, 2004). A small amount is kept and dried in the sun for preservation or to make fish meal for other animals, as can be seen in image three. The oil sardine fishery fluctuates widely on a seasonal, annual and decadal scale, making it difficult to manage. In addition, the small mesh size of the nets used results in high numbers of

27 juvenile fish being caught, which can impact on the fishery in the following season (Mohan Joseph & Jayaprakash, 2003).

As a result of the controversy surrounding the impacts of the ring seine, panchayats have made several efforts to regulate its use along the Coromandel Coast, and fishers have engaged in protests, even going as far as burning ring seines (BOBLME, 2015). Furthermore, it has been officially illegal to operate the net in the region since the year 2000. In May 2013, a meeting was held with members from all 64 panchayats of Nagapattinam and Karaikal. A collective decision was made to ban ring seining at the regional level; as a result of the large investments made by fishers, they were given three years to phase out their operations to cover their costs. Some groups were also given permission to start up new ring seine units, providing that they ended their operations at the time of the three-year deadline, but new units continue to emerge. The ban has only been successfully maintained in certain villages and the results are compromised by the use of ring seines in adjacent villages (Bavinck, 2014a).

4. METHODOLOGY

4.1 Research Questions

Based on the theoretical framework and the contextual information provided in the previous chapters, I aim to answer the following questions in my thesis.

Main question:

Why is the collective action of fishers difficult to realise in prohibiting ring seine fishing in the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region?

Sub-questions:

1. What is the geographical distribution of the use of the ring seine in Nagapattinam and Karaikal? 2. How have fishermen’s perceptions of the ring seine motivated the decision to prohibit the net in the region? 3. How has ring seine use been regulated by the panchayats since the decision to ban it in 2013? 4. How is the ban of the ring seine supported by the government of Tamil Nadu?

4.2 Units of Observation

The units of observation are individual members of the fishing community. This includes panchayat members, who are responsible for the self-governance of fisheries and have previously attempted to regulate the use of the ring seine. The need for a broad understanding of the ring seine situation, from different perspectives, encourages the inclusion of both ring seine fishers and other fishers when it comes to data collection. Individual women of the community are also included in this unit of observation, for their different (primarily financial) role within the fisheries. The unit of analysis is the regional fishing community of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, and the analysis of collective action in the region is based on data collected from individuals.

4.3 Selection of Villages

It became apparent early in the field that the use and prohibition of the ring seine is a sensitive issue, and one that people are wary of discussing with strangers. Therefore, I had to choose villages to visit where I could establish local connections beforehand. I was lucky enough to be living in the family home of a panchayat member and SIFFS employee, named Baskar. He was able to provide contact details for participants in several villages, and to verify who I was, which improved access to target respondents. The villages of Akkarai Pettai, Nambiyar Nagar and Karaikal Medu were prioritised as I was initially told that they are considered to be the head villages. The rest were selected based on geographical spread (within feasible proximity to my village of residence). I did not visit any villages in the far south of the region because I was told that there is no ring seine presence here, and it would have been difficult to reach there and return in the same day. The remaining villages were Keezhakasakudimudu, Kalikuppam, Akkampettai, Kilinjal Medu, T.R. Pattinam, Tharangambadi, Samandhanpettai, Chandrapadi and Poompuhar. The locations of all of these are mapped in figure three. Several villages were selected to get a regional sense of the issue at hand, and to ensure that the participants were spread out across Nagapattinam and Karaikal. It should be made clear that the purpose of this was not to carry out a comparative study between the different villages.

Poompuhar

Tharangambadi

Chandrapadi

Kilinjal Medu Kalikuppam Keezhakasakudimudu Karaikal Medu Akkampettai

T.R. Pattinam

Samandhanpettai

Akkarai Pettai

Figure 3: Mapped locations of sample villages

4.4 Sampling

In the initial stages of data collection, a purposive sampling approach was adopted. The sample of participants was selected for their relevance to the research questions (Bryman, 2012) and I obtained their contact details in advance. This technique ensured that (i) there was variety and equal representation of different members of the fishing community, and (ii) current or recent panchayat members were interviewed in all chosen villages. Most active fishermen – members of the panchayat, in particular – are busy and are unlikely to be found sitting around on the beach in the middle of the day. This approach therefore saved wasted bus journeys to other villages.

Thereafter, snowball sampling was used to reach more participants with relevant knowledge or characteristics to the research (Bryman, 2012). Some respondents provided me with the contact details of potentially useful participants known to them. Others called further respondents to ask them to join us, or to arrange further interviews later in the day. The topic of the ring seine was often a sensitive one to discuss, and some participants were suspicious of the research. Snowball sampling helped towards developing a level of trust with these participants, as they were aware that their peers had already been interviewed before referral.

4.5 Methods of Data Collection

4.5.1 Participant Observation

The first stage of my research was participant observation. I visited harbours and beaches to see the boats used for ring seining and the amount of fish caught by the net, and to observe the people involved in processing the catch. I also went to open spaces where fishers were mending their equipment, to get an idea of the size of the nets and how the mechanisms work. In these early stages when I was with the local supervisor, we began speaking to people about the ring seine as we stopped in different villages, to gain a sense of the general feelings towards the net across the district. Living with a local family helped me to establish a degree of trust within the different villages. It also allowed me to understand better the close relationships within the fishing community. Observational methods continued throughout. I kept full field notes to reflect on my observations, including my own initial interpretations and impressions, and I took photographs as supporting data where possible and necessary (Bryman, 2012).

4.5.2 Interviews

The majority of the field work period was spent conducting semi-structured interviews with individuals or groups of participants, with the assistance of a translator. In each case, I asked a question in English and the translator asked the same question to the participant(s) in Tamil. He then translated the response from Tamil to English. Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) suggest that such qualitative methods are useful for studying collective action, especially in cases like Nagapattinam fisheries, where all the manifestations and institutions of collective action are not understood. Although the interviews all followed a loose structure (see operationalisation in appendix), the questions varied depending on whether or not the participant takes part in ring seine fishing, and whether they are, or were, in the panchayat. The open nature of semi- structured interviews allowed me to ask further questions where I felt like the information being provided was of particular relevance to the research (Bryman, 2012). This process also allowed participants to elaborate on rules, norms, and attitudes that may have a strong influence on collective action but are not outlined in the design principles already discussed (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). Most of the interviews were recorded using an iPhone; for those that were not audio recorded, I took notes throughout the interview and then typed them in full the same evening.

In total, I conducted 38 interviews; 18 of the interviews were with an individual participant, and 20 were conducted in a group setting (referenced as i1-i38 in chapters five to seven). I have categorised any interview with more than one person present as a group interview. Although one participant may have answered all or the majority of the questions in some cases, it is possible for their answers to have been influenced by the presence of others. There were 71 individuals involved in the research altogether, some of whom were interviewed more than once.

During the interviews, several participants provided figures for the number of households or families in their village. However, the numbers used in the results are taken from the Marine Fisheries Census 2010 for Nagapattinam and Karaikal, as I considered this data to be more accurate and consistent throughout the region. Participants throughout the region provided information on the distribution of ring seine units, and I made a point of asking Baskar, interviewees, and community members in conversation, about their knowledge on the number of units in other villages. When visiting the mentioned villages, I then asked for the same

33 information from local participants for triangulation purposes. In each case, the reported number of ring seine units in each village matched the data I collected when visiting myself; the same figures were confirmed by the people fishing in those villages.

4.6 Data Analysis

All interviews were transcribed and analysed in Atlas.ti, for organisation purposes. I assigned codes to help me identify themes and develop an argument, generally informed by the questions I am trying to answer. During the interview process, several closed questions were asked, regarding the number of ring seine units in different villages, the number of years they have been using the net, and population figures throughout the region. A quantitative strand is thus embedded in the research design, with numerical data that addresses sub-question number one (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Elements of this were analysed in SPSS.

4.7 Methodological Limitations

Two main factors made data collection more difficult than expected. The first, and perhaps most obvious, was the language barrier. Although I conducted all interviews with a translator, there were difficulties in understanding between him and myself. Some questions were lost in translation, had to be oversimplified, or skipped altogether. At other times, the translator would elaborate on the answers given based on conversations we had had previously, rather than translating what the participant said. I am aware that these realities – along with limited English vocabulary – have an impact on the strength of the data and the level of detail obtained. In addition, informal conversations frequently occurred outside of data collection procedures where interesting additional points were made. However, I cannot understand Tamil, and it was not appropriate to interrupt, so I had to rely on the translator to relay the information afterwards.

The second limitation was the political sensitivity of the ring seine situation at present. Although it is common knowledge that this net is widely used in the region, it is still legally banned and is difficult to discuss openly with some people. This was problematic at times when trying to get honest answers from the respondents. The Assistant Director of Fisheries in the south of Nagapattinam, for instance, agreed to a meeting but then would not answer any questions about the ring seine – even in a more general sense. In an interview with the panchayat members from the head village, one respondent would not answer any of the

34 questions openly but would also not let the others speak. Future data collection opportunities were then limited in a key area of the region. There were a few respondents who wondered why I was asking so many questions about the ring seine and thought that I might be working for the government, but this was rare and easily overcome.

Another issue that arose was arranging an interview with an individual and repeatedly being faced with a group interview setting. I conducted the majority of interviews in respondents’ homes, panchayat offices, or community spaces. Passing friends and family members would want to know who we were and what was happening, and – after being informed about the research – many people would then join the interview part way through or stay to listen. Other individual contacts had simply invited others to join upon organising the meeting. Although this increased the number of participants, and viewpoints, the presence of one may have affected the answers of another. Furthermore, it is harder to translate the responses when several people are speaking at once, so there are more likely to be missing details from group interviews. Similar problems applied particularly when trying to include women in the study, as the translator would automatically direct questions to any man present, and – though I was looking for a different perspective – both male and female would look to the man as possibly more qualified to answer.

Despite my intentions to go to the field without any preconceptions, I do not believe that any researcher is truly objective in their study; I am aware that my world views and personal values are likely to have influenced my interpretation of the research setting (Bryman, 2012). Subjectivity limitations should also be extended to the translator, as long answers from respondents were, at times, summarised in a couple of sentences. Thus, my results depend upon which information was, or was not, considered to be important by the translator.

4.8 Ethical Considerations

When considering the ethical implications of my research, there were four main things to avoid; harm to participants, lack of informed consent, invasion of privacy, and deception (Diener & Crandall, 1978 in Bryman, 2012:135). As a result, all records have been kept confidential and will not be used outside of the purposes of this study. As much identifying information as possible has been removed when referring to participants in the thesis. Respondents were fully informed about the research before they decided whether or not to participate, and were aware

35 that they could withdraw their consent or information at any time. I obtained verbal consent, rather than written, from all participants.

5. THE REGIONAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE RING SEINE

In order to understand the challenge of ring seine regulation, it is important to examine the extent of the use of the net in the study region (sub-question one). This chapter opens with data on existing numbers of ring seine units and discusses how the net has been introduced and spread across the region over time. Following this is an attempt to understand the size of the ring seining population in relation to the overall population of the fishing villages of Nagapattinam and Karaikal. The geographic boundaries of the fishery are then discussed. I aim to illustrate the extensive distribution of the ring seine within the district, and how this is influenced by the use of the net outside of the region. I argue that a regional-level ban does not solve the ecological and social issues associated with the ring seine whilst the resources are open to access by fishers at the state level.

5.1 Numbers of Ring Seine Units

Village Units Poompuhar 25 Tharangambadi 3 Chandrapadi 11 Kalikuppam 2 Akkampettai 2 Keezhakasakudimudu 1 Kilinjal Medu 0 Karaikal Medu 1 T.R. Pattinam 2 Samandhanpettai 0 Nambiyar Nagar 9 Akkarai Pettai 0 Table 1: Units of ring seine currently in operation in each of the sample villages

Table one shows all figures collected with regards to the number of ring seine units in each of the villages where I carried out data collection. Although people may have been using the same techniques in the past to target oil sardine, the data refers specifically to the large ring seine units currently owned and operated by 50-60 individuals. Of the twelve villages listed in the table, only three are reported to have no ring seine units. As this is based on a sample only, it

37 is not possible to generalise this ratio at the regional level. However, it is suggested that the majority of villages in the region are now using the net.

“There are only a few villages that don’t have surukkumadi … but people from there go to other villages to be a partner in that” (i20)

In communities where no ring seine units have formed, some fishers have chosen to join those in neighbouring villages, with permission from the panchayat.

The two villages with the highest numbers of ring seine units recorded, Poompuhar and Chandrapadi, are in the north of Nagapattinam. Ring seine figures for villages in the south of the region are significantly lower. Nambiyar Nagar appears to be an exception in the south of Nagapattinam, as there are currently nine ring seine units operating here. The village of Akkarai Pettai lies marginally north of Nambiyar Nagar and has no ring seine units. These two villages are considered joint – or are in competition for the status of – head village. There are clear differences in the current use of the ring seine in the north of the region when compared to the south, and fishers are aware of this, but they do say that units are beginning to emerge in southern villages.

5.2 The Spread Over Time

The data from table one is illustrated alongside the number of years of ring seine use in the bar graph below.

The ring seine season typically begins in April, so for members who began operating their units in 2016, a value of one year or less has been assigned. When reporting on a time period exceeding ten years, respondents’ memories became less clear and the figures provided were more approximate. For these villages, I have assigned a value of ten or greater than ten, and so the bars representing years in the graph reach a maximum height of ten. The villages with the most units are generally those who have been practising ring seining for the longest periods of time, in the north of the region and in Nambiyar Nagar. In Chandrapadi, ring seine use has increased at a quicker rate with eleven units beginning in only a five-year period.

Units Years

Figure 4: Bar graph showing units of ring seine and years of use in sample villages

“It started in Kerala state first … they taught us how to fish, and then after learning our people started it here” (i26)

“By seeing the Cuddalore and Pondicherry people, our people are using it, and we can’t say no to that” (i23)

The higher values for years as well as units show that the ring seine was introduced in the north of the region before spreading south, and suggest steady growth in the years since. Fishers on the south-west coast, in Kerala state, were using the net before the technique was adopted by those in Tamil Nadu, in districts north of Nagapattinam. Upon seeing the success of fishers there, ring seining began in the northern villages of Nagapattinam. With the exception of Nambiyar Nagar, fishers in the south have only begun ring seining in the last one to three years, and are yet to begin in the far south of the region.

One third of all villages included have been operating ring seine units for three years or less. This means that the members began fishing with the nets in 2013 or later, after the decision

39 was made by panchayats to phase out the use of all existing ring seining in the region. In the process of collecting data, I did not visit or hear of any villages that had phased out ring seining; there are no parts of the region where units were previously successfully operating, but have since refrained from doing so. Likewise, no fishers using the ring seine plan on voluntarily stopping the practice, either individually or as a whole unit:

“Here in Karaikalmedu there is one unit started from last year, now it’s going to be three units by adding two in the next season” (i13)

“Here in Samandhanpettai, there is no surukkumadi at the moment, but there are some efforts going on to start a unit here … in the next season, in February, and they also informed the panchayat” (i26)

“In Nagapattinam south, they are also having it … it may not be as much as here but there are units coming there” (i38)

Contrary to a phasing out of ring seining, respondents spoke regularly of units which may – or will definitely – be starting in several locations next season. This could be an extra five in Karaikal alone (i24), or an extra fifteen units in the whole district by next year (i21).

5.3 Group Size

Table two contains figures for the population, by number of families, alongside the number of ring seine units in each village. The number of active fishers may vary between families, but this figure is taken as a consistent average. In Chandrapadi for example, the population of families seems small to account for eleven ring seines. Respondents in Chandrapadi claimed that around 200 families from other villages may be involved in the ring seine process in the village (i16). Fishers from Samandhanpettai – where there is no ring seine – confirmed that others in the village have joined units in Chandrapadi (i15).

Village Units Families Poompuhar 20 1,028 Tharangampadi 3 1,076 Chandrapadi 11 347 Kalikuppam 2 170 Akkampettai 2 103 Keezhakasakudimudu 1 214 Kilinjal Medu 0 555 Karaikal Medu 1 730 T.R. Pattinam 2 524 Samandhanpettai 0 426 Nambiyar Nagar 9 450 Akkarai Pettai 0 1,101 Table 2: Ring seine units and population size by number of families in sample villages

There is no significant relationship between the two sets of data across the region. Focusing on the region as a whole, however, there are almost 100,000 fishers in Nagapattinam and Karaikal according to the most recent census, and respondents express the difficulty of controlling such a large group. Previous attempts to regulate the fishing gear have been undermined by fishers in several villages increasing the number of ring seine units, and now “the control has been lost slowly” (i11).

The relative size of the ring seining population within the fishing community brings importance to the group size discussion. When a new ring seining unit starts to operate, it is not one deviant fisher going against the collective efforts of the community, but is the formation of a large group of fishers. In some parts of the region, ring seiners now form the majority of the fishing population.

“If it takes 50-60 members and there are 10 units in one village, that could mean that the whole village of fishers is using the ring seine” (i31)

In a smaller village, it only takes one or two units to start before the majority of its population is ring seining. In Akkampettai for example, there are 103 families and 2 ring seine units, and respondents say that all able fishers are members – “in the village, everyone is” (i24). The rest “go to the government jobs as school teachers, and other companies” (i8). As a result of this process, ring seining has become normalised across the region.

5.4 “There is no boundary”

The panchayats and fishermen of Nagapattinam and Karaikal attempt to regulate the use of the fish stocks as a region, but fish is a common pool resource. A successful ring seine ban in the district would not necessarily prevent fishers from other districts using the net here. As fishermen are granted their license by the state, they are able to fish anywhere in Tamil Nadu and not just in local waters; to the north they can go as far as Chennai and the border with Andhra Pradesh, and to the south they can fish up to the Sri Lankan border (i26). This means that fishers from other regions within Tamil Nadu can also come to fish in adjacent waters. The findings of my research indicate that the number of appropriators of the resource is unclear and unrestricted to the local community.

“When we want to control it in Karaikal, and Nagapattinam people come fishing here, we are not able to control that. But for Nagapattinam people, the next district is Cuddalore, and if Nagapattinam people don’t use the surukkumadi then Cuddalore people come and do it here … there is panchayat-level coordination between Nagapattinam district and Karaikal, but they wouldn’t be able to control it because Cuddalore people are also interfering here and doing surukkumadi” (i5)

This is a concern that many respondents expressed. Although there are villages not using the ring seine, they feel that their regulatory efforts are wasted as other fishers come and use the net in the same waters. If one division of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region decides to ban the ring seine altogether, the oil sardine will still likely be caught here by units from other locations. The same problem applies at the state level between different districts. Ring seine fishers only go to the sea for one day at a time, so they have a limited amount of diesel on the boat and will generally not travel too far. However, local fishers claim that it is common for units from Cuddalore to come south and fish here.

For ring seine fishers, the lack of boundaries is highlighted as a positive.

“Wherever we go we can fish. There is a new friendship that comes from the surukkumadi. If there is no catch in our area, we will talk to others and go there to do the fishing. It’s not restricted to any district; by walky-talky we can talk to anyone else” (i14)

The possibility to fish outside of local waters increases their chance of getting a good catch. On occasions where a unit locates a large school of oil sardine – too large for one unit to carry – they will call members from other villages to come and share the catch. On other days, they can communicate with ring seiners further north or south and, if the oil sardine is there, will travel up to two hours to get a share in the catch.

5.5 Discussion

Despite attempts to regulate the use of the ring seine, the number of nets has continued to increase in recent years. The ban was agreed by panchayats at the regional level, but at this point the ring seine was already in use in several villages and was adopted by others for a number of reasons. Continued growth indicates i) a lack of recognition by fishers of region- wide rules as proposed by panchayats, and ii) insufficient regional-level reinforcement by panchayats of said rules. I elaborate on these difficulties in chapter seven. In the first instance, fishers in the north of Nagapattinam witnessed groups of small-scale fishers in neighbouring districts increasing their catch and earning more money using new fishing techniques. The development of villages in Cuddalore and Pondicherry encouraged small-scale fishers in Nagapattinam to also invest and become partners in ring seine units (i24).

The same process of influence then applies to other parts of the district. Ring seining may have started in northern areas, but the use of the net is now so widely spread that villages without ring seine units are in the minority. By seeing the economic growth of one fisher, others also try to earn more through the same means. As one respondent said, “that’s usual human nature” (i16). Ring seine fishers are not only experiencing financial success, but are continuing to do so without consequences following the prohibition of the practice. I discuss this further in chapter seven. As there is so far no punishment for rule-breakers, the sense of injustice deepens among those who conform.

“When we were not using surukkumadi and people from other villages were and getting more benefits, so why can our people not enjoy it?” (i11)

Ongoing and increasing use of the ring seine, particularly in northern villages, legitimises the establishment of new units in other parts of the region where fishers had previously refrained

43 and illegal practices were under control. In most of the district, ring seining is no longer considered a defective fishing technique; it is not something that fishers feel they would have to – or be able to – hide from the rest of the village or the panchayat. In villages with small populations in particular, it is easy for ring seiners to become the majority. This legitimacy has implications for the further spread of ring seining to villages in the far south of Nagapattinam in the future. An additional and important factor in the geographic spread of the net is the undefined boundaries and appropriators of the resource, combined with migratory fish stocks, making the collective prohibition of the ring seine more difficult.

“If all the villages are doing it, but we are not doing it in our village, we are not going to change much. So why not also go and get the benefits?” (i11)

In posing such questions, small-scale fishers indicate awareness that the fishing practices of their neighbours impact on the resources available. The regulatory efforts of one village are weakened by the use of the ring seine in surrounding villages, in terms of preserving the fish stocks. As ring seining has grown in popularity throughout the region, fishers in individual locations see less worth in their attempts to regulate the use of the ring seine. Not using the net locally does not necessarily mean that there will be more oil sardine available for everyone in the community. Instead, the findings indicate that ring seine fishers from elsewhere will come and catch the school of fish. Any social and ecological issues caused by the net go beyond the regional level; successfully prohibiting Nagapattinam-Karaikal fishers from using the ring seine does not entirely solve the problem. The wide spread geographic distribution of ring seine use, in and around the region, is a challenge facing those trying to control it locally. Since the resource is open to appropriation by all ring seiners in the state without the successful application of boundaries or limits, regulatory efforts should be considered at the same scale.

6. PERCEIVED HARM: MOTIVATIONS FOR A COLLECTIVE BAN

In this chapter I focus on understanding why the decision was made to ban the ring seine in the first place, based on how the impacts of the net are perceived by different members of the fishing community (sub-question two). The perceptions of ring seiners and other fishers will first be compared, followed by a discussion of how particular perceptions can influence decisions to regulate the fishery. I attempt to show how the apparent motivation for a gear ban can influence the likelihood of conforming by different user groups. I argue that since the prohibition of the ring seine is believed to be for the benefit of mechanised boat owners – rather than small-scale fishers or for the benefit of the community as a whole – members are less likely to agree to a collective ban.

6.1 Perceptions of the Ring Seine

For fishers involved in ring seining, perceptions of the net and the impacts it has on their lives are seemingly entirely positive. The most obvious positive impact is the financial success they are experiencing. As the units are made up of groups of small-scale fishers, members were generally previously fishing on fibreglass boats or were labourers on mechanised trawler boats. On an individual fibreglass boat, the catching capacity is considerably lower than that of a ring seine unit so the potential earnings are much less, despite the fact that the profit is being shared with less people. One ring seine member might earn INR 5,000-10,000 per day, compared to INR 500-1,000 on a smaller boat.

Although mechanised boats and trawl nets have the potential to yield high catches, those working previously on trawler boats speak of similar economic situations.

“When you go in a mechanised boat as a worker, you will get per day salary as INR 500 something like that. Whereas, if they go by surukkumadi, they get INR 1 lakh rupees catch” (i13)

At the heart of labourers’ dissatisfaction with previous earnings is not so much the amount they were paid, but the frustration of receiving such a small share of the profit compared to that of the boat owner. By all accounts, the mechanised boat owner takes the majority of the profit –

45 whether he is there fishing or not – and the workers are each paid a small salary. One ring seine fisher, who was previously working on trawler boats, elaborated on this in our interview:

“The boat owner is one person and one family, whereas others are all workers, ten to fifteen people…only one member trawler boat, ten people slaves. They keep slaves the ten people. Whatever says the owner, they have to follow without questioning, without clarifying…his interest will be maintained, he earned a lot and the others very less” (i10)

Now instead of working on the boats of others, small-scale fishers are becoming boat owners themselves. By becoming members of a ring seine unit, fishers are collectively investing in boats which they would not have been able to afford alone.

“Here in surukkumadi, 50 members are owners. They are equal shareholders, and whatever benefit they get on the day, after deducting expenses, will be divided equally. You can’t see this anywhere else in the fishing community” (i16)

Since switching to ring seining from other methods, the fishers feel that they are rewarded more fairly for their work. The majority of groups take out a loan together to cover part of the initial costs of starting a unit. Some individual members also have to borrow money to pay for their share of the investment. However, consistently high profits for many units mean that the loans are paid back in two fishing seasons or less. They also have the potential to save more money to provide for the family in the off-season. Ring seiners insist that the financial benefits are distributed throughout the community, and not just among those directly involved in fishing, as explained by this respondent:

“When the surukkumadi goes, 50-60 families gain from it at a bigger level. Apart from that, there are a lot of people working loading and unloading the fish. That’s another 20-30 families getting benefits from it. Then when the loading van goes some distance, there may be 200 families selling it in the area. So, a lot of families are getting benefits out of it, hundreds instead of five or six” (i21)

To elaborate, ring seining is seen to provide a sufficient income for one member to support his family, but also provides employment opportunities for others. When the fishermen return with a catch, their relatives – usually female – are involved in the unloading and loading of the fish

46 for sale. Each successful returning unit carries high volumes of fish and a large number of fishers, so entire families are earning money as a result. A group of women in Karaikal Medu told me that prior to the introduction of ring seining, only educated or qualified women could go to work and earn a living for themselves. Now the rest of them no longer have to stay at home (i35). Another family in the same village explained that the ring seine creates a division of labour between men and women, and allows them to have two incomes in the household (i34). Their increased knowledge on the fishery and ability to earn their own money improves the women’s independence, and they feel more involved in the fishing community.

“Even some other community people, those who are not fishing people, are also coming and working here” (i21)

Image 4: Large number of people unloading the catch of one ring seine unit

Two workers waiting on a beach turned out to be examples of these “other community people”. Both were from villages further inland. One was involved in agriculture and said he may typically get a salary of INR 300 or less per day for his work; the other was a painter who would earn INR 500 per day, but he was experiencing a seasonal shortage of work. These

47 labourers come from their own villages each day to help with the loading and unloading of fish and ice from ring seining boats to boxes in vans. Although the work is very difficult, they can earn over INR 1,000 per day – a salary which they say you could not even imagine in an agricultural village (i22). The ring seine has become a main source of income and support for entire families outside of the fishing community.

The other positive impacts of ring seining that members highlight are predominantly social, and centre around the amount of time spent with their families. Not only can fishers earn more money, but they can do so without staying at sea for extended periods of time.

“In surukkumadi you go in the morning and come in the evening, and you will be with the family. If you go in trawler boats, you have to be five to seven days there and wake up in the night, you don’t get proper sleep” (i24)

Although they leave very early in the morning and often return late in the evening, ring seine fishers never stay in the sea overnight. The wife of one fisherman said that she used to fear for her husband’s safety when he was gone for five or six days at a time; now that he has joined a ring seine unit he can return to the home every evening. She described this as “the happiest thing in the family” (i35).

But what about those who cannot or do not want to join a ring seine unit? There appear to be three main reasons why fishers do not become members: i) the net is banned and they disagree with its use, ii) they are too old or unfit to take part, or iii) they cannot afford their share of the investment. The first reason is a choice that many fishers claim to have made, but the second and third reasons show that the opportunity to join a ring seine unit is not available to everyone, whether or not they have negative perceptions of the net. How does the use of the ring seine affect those who are not directly benefitting from it?

When it comes to the ecological impacts of the fishing gear, ring seiners maintain that the practice causes no harm to the resources of the sea. The general consensus among users is that since they target only oil sardine which inhabits the pelagic zone of the sea, and they operate for only four months out of the year, the net is not harmful to the resources or habitats. Whereas “the trawler boats will clean all the fish and resources from the sea, even from the sand and the sea bed” (i25). A surprising number of small-scale fishers, not involved in ring seining, echo

48 the same sentiment. I spoke to a retired fisherman who had previously owned a mechanised boat, and he suggested that this opinion was standard along the coast.

“The government says that it’s destroying the resources of the sea, the surukkumadi, but it’s not true. That’s what my heart says. Not only me, if you go and enquire anybody in the coastal area, they will say like this” (i13)

This is a common perception of the ring seine in the fishing community, not just among those involved in the practice. Many say that the net does not interfere with their livelihoods as they are fishing in different waters, or are targeting different species. A group of small-scale fishers in Samandhanpettai – where there are no units – said that the catch for ring seine fishers is increasing but that this is not harmful to their livelihoods.

“Our resources are not affected…if our resources were reduced and we were affected, then we would make a complaint” (i15)

Despite being common, however, this perception is not undisputed in the district. It is already clear from the attempted phase-out of the net that its effects are controversial. Several trawler boat owners and labourers on these mechanised boats claim to have noticed negative impacts on the resources in recent years, even though they tend to fish in deeper waters.

“We are fishing people and our life is in the sea, so we know the amount of fishing is reduced due to the surukkumadi…After tsunami I have noticed a difference, but tsunami is not the reason for that. Surukkumadi is the reason. When the other nets go there are some fish left out, still living in the sea. But when the surukkumadi goes it gets all the fish” (i5)

This view seems to emerge predominantly in villages with lots of mechanised boats, where the ring seine is still strictly banned, and where there are therefore no units operating. They have been told by the government that the ring seine destroys the resources of the sea, and that they should not use it, so they follow this rule. Trawlers express concerns about the future of the fishery based on their perceptions, claiming that people will face a lot of problems in the future if ring seining continues, and that there will be no livelihoods for their children in the sea. A fisherman mending a trawl net said that the ring seine is spoiling the resources, “but equally this trawling also” (i23). Another trawler overheard this remark, and they had a fight between

49 themselves about which net is more harmful to the resources. Although one maintained that only the ring seine should be banned, the other explained “even our boat also has some damages for the natural resources, but if we also close this thing, then we have to sleep in the home without food” (i23).

Central to the concerns of small-scale fishers is not so much sustainability or the impact on future resources, but the day-to-day effects of ring seining on their livelihoods and their ability to earn a reasonable income. One small-scale fisher and his son said they do not believe that the ring seine destroys the resources of the sea (i26). However, they went on to explain that when they go in their fibreglass boat, they use nets which cover around 50-100m; when the ring seine fishers go, their net is ten times this size. As a result, one ring seine unit has the potential to catch maximum amounts of oil sardine that could otherwise be shared by ten or fifteen smaller boats. While the same number of people benefit in either scenario, the equipment of the ring seine fishers gives them an advantage each time and is thus destroying the income of others. For many, not only has the size of the catch reduced, but so has the value of their catch due to an increasing supply of oil sardine. This puts small-scale fishers in a difficult position. A similar story was told by a fibreglass boat fisher in Karaikal Medu, who started the interview by saying that the ring seine catches only the upper level of fish, and so is not harmful to his livelihood. However, he later said that the increase in large boats causes a lot of problems for smaller boats within the fishery.

“When the small net fishers go, for 20km there is no resources at all. Their mechanism is not enough to catch the fish in the upper levels of the sea, whereas the mechanised launchers will go for deep sea fishing. This is not possible for them, so they change to the surukkumadi” (i14)

To elaborate, the coastal waters of Nagapattinam and Karaikal are so overfished by those in large mechanised boats that the equipment used by small-scale fishermen is becoming inadequate for making a living. As a result, this fisher has now invested in a ring seine unit which will start next season. Others are facing the same fate:

“We are bothering about the future generations, but at the same time what we need is other opportunities. To survive with the present life, fishers are using surukkumadi. Let the

government give other employment opportunities for all of us…until then, why should we struggle, when there is a viable way to earn money and live a good life?” (i27)

6.2 The Motivation for the Ban

Based on the perceived impacts of the ring seine, it makes sense to assume that the prohibition was suggested out of respect for small-scale fishers. The government has officially banned the ring seine in response to the requests of the fishing community, and in several parts of the region fishers follow this decision in order to increase the resources available to everyone.

“When you have surukkumadi, say 2 or 3 units, only 150-200 people will get big benefits. Likewise, the trawler boats, if they have 5-10 then only they will get the benefits from the sea. Whereas now, all 1,000 families can go to the sea to catch fish, and they are somewhat surviving” (i26)

Where everybody is satisfied with their income from the sea, and all groups get their fair share of the resources, they do not deem it necessary to introduce new extensive fishing techniques. Ring seining is thus prohibited in order to maintain harmony among fisher populations. Alongside this reasoning, a significant fear of the Sri Lankan navy emerges as a motivation for the prohibition of the ring seine, particularly among trawlers. If they do not use the ring seine here, many believe that the coastal resources will be improved, and then they can avoid going deep-sea fishing where they are at risk of conflict near the Sri Lankan border. According to several members of the fishing community, the introduction of the ring seine in the district induced losses for those still fishing with traditional gear in coastal waters and so a ban was proposed. One suggested that the ban “was not based on complaints, but rather a general feeling of reduced catches and earnings” (i28).

However, the vast majority of fishers tell a different story. The fishing community is now divided into three sectors: traditional fishers, ring seiners, and trawlers (i20). Each ring seine unit requires approximately 50 operators; as more and more people have joined ring seine units, there are less fishers available to work on the trawler boats. This is widely thought to be causing problems for the boat owners.

“If you have a boat, you need 10 people at least as labourers for your boat. If we are all not coming to work on your boat, then it will be in the shore only and you will not get any profit” (i25)

So, this is also seen to create a loss of income for trawler boat owners. As a result, members of the fishing community throughout the region claim that trawler boat owners are spreading false information about the negative impacts of ring seining on the resources. Fishers believe that these boat owners have requested a ban on the ring seine because they are experiencing a labour shortage.

“If 50 people join, fewer people come and work on the mechanised boats. Because of the loss, they have said to the panchayats to ban surukkumadi. But now they can’t because in almost every village it has started” (i16)

One mechanised boat owner told me that – although he personally had no problem with the ring seine – the ban had been initiated by big boat owners, rather than small-scale fishers. He said that they have a compromise to use different techniques in different seasons, “and everyone should be equal” (i20), but the trawler boat owners are complaining that they do not have labour regularly. I later asked the respondent if the increase in ring seine units had actually created a labour shortage for him, but he said this has not been a problem so far:

“The ring seine method is seasonal, and the fishers always need work outside of that season. The trawlers go all year, and they always need labourers” (i30)

For boat owners in other villages, the labour shortage is not a real issue as there are still only small numbers of units. However, they have been told by trawlers in neighbouring villages that the increase in ring seining is problematic. This emerges as a valid motivation for the prohibition of the ring seine.

6.3 Discussion

Although the perceived impacts of the ring seine by its users are positive, such extensive use of the net undeniably has repercussions for other user groups, and to the unity of the fishing community. Divisions have appeared not only between different user groups, but within the

52 small-scale fisher community itself, where an increasing number of members are choosing to switch to ring seine fishing, and the rest are trying to implement a ban on the gear. On the one hand, fishers are motivated to prohibit the use of the ring seine based on the harm to other resource user groups that they perceive. On the other hand, the positive impacts that other fishers observe on the lives of those using the net are encouraging more people to join in. Whatever the ecological implications of ring seining may be in the future, they are not immediately experienced by users, so the benefits currently far outweigh the costs of ring seine fishing for users.

Opinions on whether or not the ring seine negatively affects the resources available in the future are highly conflicting; the uncertainty of the impact on the fish stocks is a major factor in this issue. However, this conversation generally turns to social justice, rather than sustainability. Fishers are not suggesting that the oil sardine should remain in the sea, but that it should be equally available and beneficial to everyone. Even if it is the case that ring seining does not affect the resources, is it fair that one unit takes all of the oil sardine on any given day? There is a sense that fishers are being backed into a corner, and have no choice but to get involved in ring seining if they want to continue their livelihoods in the sea. It is easy to believe that the ring seine is regulated for the benefit of small-scale fishers, but these regulations become tougher to implement as more small-scale fishers join in the practice.

To a large extent, difficulties in phasing out ring seining stem from the belief that the ban is being implemented for the personal benefit of trawler boat owners, and not for the collective benefit of the fishing community. This belief leads to the potentially negative impacts of ring seining being always compared to that of trawling, rather than being considered individually. The focus of the issue has somewhat shifted in favour of a power struggle between trawlers and ring seiners. Although they all report that there are no difficulties or conflicts within the fishing community when asked, there is, to some extent, a ‘blame game’ among the different groups of fishers. Ring seine members believe that trawling causes more harm to the fish stocks than their practice does, so it is hard to see how one net can be banned whilst the other continues. Since members believe that the prohibition of the gear is motivated by the personal interests of mechanised boat owners, they are less likely to cooperate.

7. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BAN

The disparity between the making of a central decision and its implementation is highlighted in the continued use of the ring seine in the study location. In the first part of this chapter, I explain the governance structure of Nagapattinam and Karaikal. I then discuss the implementation of ring seine regulations in the region, firstly regarding the actions of the 64- village community, followed by the role of the government (sub-questions three and four). I aim to show the difficulties facing state and non-state actors in encouraging collective resource regulation. I argue that government officials have a bigger role to play in resource management than fishers recognise, as the ring seine is now out of the control of the community.

7.1 Governance Structure of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal Fishing Community

There are organisational structures at different levels within the region. Traditionally, members of the same family would remain in the panchayat for generations. Now they are selected by the community based on their behaviours and values, and their willingness to act for the benefit of the majority. If there is a conflict within a village, i.e. between two local families or fishers, then the panchayat members of that village will hear from both parties and help them to resolve the issue among themselves. Often this process will occur in a village meeting, where the panchayat will make a decision based on the opinions of other members of the community. In any case, they have authority over each village and people are expected to report to the panchayat, not to any government officials. Likewise, outside authorities will enter the village only after approaching the panchayat.

“No police will just enter. The panchayat is the decision-making person, and with their permission only they will come. The control over the sea is still the panchayat. It’s the peculiar phenomenon here, you can’t find it in other villages, only fishing villages” (i8)

If there is an issue between members of two different villages, they will still try to settle it among themselves but both panchayats will be involved. The 64 villages of Nagapattinam and Karaikal are then divided into different organisational groups. Officially there are six coastal administrative taluks, but when fishers talk about decision making and organisation within the region, they do so in terms of three “zones” or “units”: the north of Nagapattinam, Karaikal,

54 and the south of Nagapattinam. Tharangampadi is considered the head of the northern villages, in Karaikal it is Karaikal Medu and Kilinjal Medu, and Akkarai Pettai and Nambiyar Nagar are the head villages in the south. Any dispute that cannot be resolved by the village panchayat should be referred to the head panchayat of the relevant zone. For instance, if any of the eleven villages of Karaikal have a problem which they cannot amicably settle, they will request for the panchayat of Karaikal Medu or Kilinjal Medu, or both, to “do the judgement on the issue” (i13). The head of each one is therefore also responsible for organising meetings of all local villages when there is a collective issue at hand.

“They will try to settle problems within their own zone. If they cannot, they will call all the 3 together” (i15)

Certain situations concern all members of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal fishing community and must be addressed as a district, so there is some level of co-ordination between the 64 villages. The regional plan to prohibit ring seine use is one example of this. Akkarai Pettai is generally considered to be the head village of the region by fishers, though a number of respondents suggest that the role is shared with the panchayat of Nambiyar Nagar. When I interviewed two members of the Nambiyar Nagar panchayat, they claimed that their village is the head of the region, and that the other panchayats “have to give respect in all aspects when they have a district meeting” (i20). Everybody else said that they would expect Akkarai Pettai to be in charge of regional-level organisation, or at least suggested it was a joint responsibility; fishers place the Akkarai Pettai panchayat at the top of the governance structure of the district. Within the 64 villages of Nagapattinam and Karaikal, there is no central or independent governance body. The fishing community of the region relies on the village panchayats to make collective decisions for the benefit of the community as a whole, and the monitoring of decided rules depends upon the panchayat members themselves.

7.2 Meetings

The modernisation of fisheries along the Coromandel Coast has altered the regularity of meetings in the district. Each village panchayat has its own system. In some villages, there is a fishing holiday on a set day every week so that a meeting can be held when people are not at sea. In other villages, the same meetings occur once or twice per month. In Kilinjal Medu, a village meeting officially takes place only once every two months. However, community

55 members may still approach the panchayat in between these dates. Now that many fishers are operating mechanised boats, and going to the sea for up to seven days per trip, they are unable to attend a meeting on the same day every week. Furthermore, as a result of a general decline in catch levels over time, fishers cannot afford to take a holiday every week. In the case of an emergency meeting – if there is a death in the village, for example – only those going on daily fishing trips will take a holiday, so it will be a loss of income for them.

Beyond the village level, such a system does not seem to exist. There is no regular date for multiple-village meetings, as a zone or as a whole district. Of all interviewees, only two claimed that a 64-village meeting has previously been held in the rough season each year. Otherwise it appears that district meetings are held on an issue basis only. One fisher explains:

“Based on the issues of fishing, and problems related to disputes with the government they can call all the panchayats” (i19)

If the members of any village would like to discuss anything with the rest of the community, they can approach Akkarai Pettai or Nambiyar Nagar to request for a regional meeting to be called; by all accounts, the panchayat of Akkarai Pettai is responsible for organising these regional meetings. They provide an opportunity to make collective decisions where everyone’s opinion can be voiced. All present panchayats sign the minutes from the meeting, and those who are not present agree to follow whatever decisions are made in the meeting on their behalf. Although invitations will come to the 64 panchayats only, if the meeting is about the ring seine in particular, then 2 members from each unit will also be asked to attend.

The regional-level meeting in 2013 is well remembered by fishers for the decision to ban the ring seine (as discussed in chapter three). However, it was difficult to get any clear information – from current or previous panchayat members – on meetings about the ring seine that have occurred in the years since. When asked about the date of the most recent meeting on the topic of ring seining in the region, all respondents gave different answers, ranging from one month to one year ago. I was told that the most recent Nagapattinam-Karaikal meeting was held in Akkarai Pettai, but that the ring seine was not a main focus. Meetings called specifically about the regulation of the ring seine since 2013 have been met with some resistance:

“Too many villages didn’t support it. Some people didn’t turn up to the meeting, no response from some villages where they have more units” (i19)

In Nambiyar Nagar, two panchayat members showed me a letter that had been sent to them from the Karaikal district fishing panchayats and administrators. Sekar read the letter out to me in English (translated from Tamil):

“Based on the May 31, 2016 meeting, as we decided in the entire Nagapattinam-Karaikal district to ban the surukkumadi, people are overruling the rules and creating new surukkumadi units. So, based on the request of some villages to have sustainable fishing in the villages, we need to request people not to increase any more new units. Please make arrangements to see that no more new units are coming up in the villages” (i20)

The letter was signed by the village panchayats of Kilinjal Medu and Karaikal Medu. When I asked the Nambiyar Nagar panchayat members for more information about this meeting in May 2016, they said that it never actually happened. One of them explained that there was a request sent for a meeting to be called on the issue, but that the Nambiyar Nagar panchayat did not organise a meeting because they have ring seine units in their own village.

“Why would we plan it when it is not in the interest of the village people?” (i20)

The lack of clarity around the occurrence of meetings made it difficult to obtain further details about them, the decisions that were made, who was present, and so on.

7.3 Panchayat Rules and their Implementation

Alongside the decision in 2013 to phase out ring seining in the region, the panchayats have taken other collective decisions in order to try to control the use of the net. Fishers mentioned several rules which may or may not be successfully implemented. Firstly, a system has been agreed at the regional level whereby different nets go to sea at different times. The season allocated for ring seining is from April to September, and following this the pair trawl may be used for approximately three months. Although both nets are officially banned, they have agreed on a system within the fishing community which has been in place since 2010/2011. Traditional crafts and standard trawler nets operate all year round. According to a SIFFS

57 employee in Chandrapadi, the ring seine season previously continued until October, but this has been altered following a meeting earlier in the year (2016).

“They said small boat owners are suffering losses because of surukkumadi and rettamadi, so they have to reduce the surukkumadi. They have decided they have to stop the surukkumadi by September this season and start again next year only, for the benefit of the small-scale fishing people” (i16)

From April 15 to May 31 every year, all mechanised boats are prohibited in order for the resources to regenerate. At this time, only small-scale fishing techniques will be used, but this is a ban by the government of Tamil Nadu and not an initiative of the fishing community.

Secondly, there are claims that the mesh size of the ring seine equipment has been altered to avoid harm to the resources. When the mesh size is too small, the proportion of juvenile fish in the catch increases and jeopardises the future of the oil sardine resources. A fisher in Poompuhar said:

“Previously, the mesh size was too small, 10mm-12mm, and that was banned. Now they made it to 40mm-120mm, so they are making it without problems for the resources” (i17)

Fishers say that they are able to compromise in such a way as a community so that a total ban need not be enforced. However, of all the ring seine nets I saw in Nagapattinam and Karaikal during the field work period, I did not see any with a mesh size above 40mm. Without having gone to the field to measure the mesh size of the equipment, I saw only mesh of the “previous” dimensions: 10mm-12mm. Upon visiting harbours or sites where fishers were mending their nets, the translator and I had several conversations about the surprisingly small size of the gaps in the net and how it would be difficult for any species to be left out.

What emerges as the panchayat’s most recent regulatory decision on the ring seine is for no additional units to form in the district. Those already operating ring seine units have invested money in the equipment and are unwilling to stop using it. As a result, the panchayats have no choice but to let the existing members continue, but they argue that the number of units in the 64 villages should not increase.

“Now the culture going on is ‘don’t increase the surukkumadi’. Let’s maintain and balance this which is available at the moment, and not go further with new things” (i14)

As is evident in chapter five, this rule has not been implemented and the number of units is continuing to grow in several parts of the district. If one group of fishers can see the success of another, how can they be denied the opportunity to progress in the same way? As one respondent questioned:

“Every village is using it and getting good benefits, so why should we not also?” (i26)

For those that are already ring seining, the panchayats apply two main conditions. One is that any fish caught must be brought to their own village and sold there, so as not to disturb the work of other groups, by increasing the supply of oil sardine and affecting the market. Because there are no ring seine units in Akkarai Pettai, they say that the catch is not allowed in Nagapattinam fishing harbour, and that only empty boats should go to the shipping harbour. A respondent in Karaikal said it is common knowledge that ring seine fishers bring the fish to Karaikal harbour and sell it there (i32). If fishers go far from their own village, it may take them hours to get back there with a heavy catch, so they use walky-talkies to ask for permission from a local panchayat to unload the fish in their village. In places where there is no ring seining, the panchayat will not give permission for this, so the fishers go to other villages where there are units. The other condition is that, since the net is banned by the government, if the ring seiners get into trouble with any officials, they have to deal with it for themselves without the help of the panchayat. The involvement of state actors will be discussed further in section 7.4.

When asked how the panchayats monitor these rules in Nagapattinam and Karaikal, the response was the same from all members of the fishing community: they do not.

“No, their work is personal; they do not interfere in the day to day life of the fishing” (i20)

As far as fishers and panchayat members are concerned, the panchayat cannot dictate the type of nets to be used or the fish to be caught. They may discuss with all villagers the most effective ways to manage the resources, but if people are willing to opt for more intensive techniques – and have invested in the equipment – then the panchayat cannot say no to this. In villages where

59 the panchayat maintains that there should be no ring seining, this is seen to be in compliance with the government ban rather than a rule enforced by members of the 64-village community. A respondent in Akkarai Pettai explained:

“In so many places they have surukkumadi, but here because the government says no, the panchayat also takes the decision not to have it” (i18)

The same panchayat member told me that “the panchayat is the entire control of the village” but in the same conversation said, “different people use different nets, they do not control that” (i18). In Kilinjal Medu, the lack of ring seine units is said to be down to the strong control of the panchayat. However, an interviewee here remarked:

“So far there are no efforts made to start a unit here, but if it did come they cannot simply stop because almost all villages have surukkumadi here. You cannot only stop in our village” (i23)

So, the panchayats can make suggestions for ways to reduce the ecological and social harm caused to the fishery, but they cannot enforce any rules on the community. Although fishers in some parts of the region have been in agreement with the panchayats thus far, if they wanted to form a new ring seine unit, the panchayat would not be able to refuse this request. Panchayats may administer punishments for misconduct, in the form of monetary fines or fishing bans, but no punishments apply to the use of different fishing gear. This means that collective rules may be decided upon in the region, but the panchayats do not monitor the fishery following these decisions, so there are no consequences for those fishers breaking the rules.

The responsibility of the panchayats to act in favour of the majority of the community became clear throughout the region. Any decisions of the panchayats should therefore be made for the benefit of the village members, and not out of self-interest. As one fisher said, the role of the panchayat is not to control the community, but to have a “brotherly relationship” with them (i15). As people select their own panchayats, the members have to act in support of the village or the community may select a new panchayat mid-term.

“People elect their own representatives…today you could be a panchayatar, and tomorrow you may be removed and it will be someone else… The people are more powerful than the panchayatars” (i15)

Since the initial attempts to phase out ring seining, use of the net has grown in the region (the extent of this was discussed in chapter five). Many of the members of ring seine units currently operating are also in the panchayat. Alternatively, relatives of the panchayat members in several villages are earning a living this way. Consequently, implementing a ring seine ban in many parts of the region is no longer seen to benefit the majority of the community, and it is not in the interest of these panchayats to encourage it. A retired fisher stated:

“The banning of the surukkumadi was done some years back…now it is the decision of the entire people that it will go ahead” (i14)

7.4 “Only the government can say no to this thing”

The panchayats form the main governing body of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region and have authority over the fishing community. However, across the district fishers are in agreement that the only way for ring seine use to stop is for the government to enforce a strict ban. So far, state regulations regarding this have been written but not put into practice. Since the existing ring seine units in 2013 were given extensions on the use of the net, and new units were allowed to start up, the communities have lost control of the situation. A number of panchayats – particularly members in Akkarai Pettai – have repeatedly approached officials for assistance with the implementation of the ban, but no practical steps have been taken towards this. During a particularly difficult interview in Akkarai Pettai, panchayat members said:

“We will support the government if they take action, but we cannot do anything now” (i36)

One of the respondents told me that he, and the other members, would not answer any more questions about the ring seine. He went on to say that I was wasting my time asking them questions about the ring seine as it is not their issue.

“It is a government issue, and the livelihood of the fishing people is in the hands of the government” (i36)

It is not difficult to find evidence of illegal fishing practices in the region; you can often spot ring seine units at sea from the shore, and new boats are constructed in plain sight in the harbour, with the specific mechanisms for ring seining. Although the focus of this thesis is on the collective action of the 64-village community, there are questions to be asked about the role of the government in implementing the ring seine ban. If the net is officially banned, why do state actors not take action? My time in the field provided me with a number of possible answers.

Firstly, there are allegations of corruption within the fisheries department. A panchayat member showed me a petition that he had given to the district collector, signed by himself and three others. It stated that the ring seine and the pair trawl are having a negative effect on small- scale fishing, and asked for the officials to order larger boats to go deep-sea fishing, as the area nearest the shore is most affected. In the context of previous bans, the respondent said that fishers used to be arrested for using illegal nets. Now he claims that instead of enforcing the ring seine ban, the “assistant director of fisheries just takes money” (i31).

Secondly, there is a chance that anybody sent to monitor illegal fishing off the Coromandel Coast will face a violent backlash from the fishers. Interviewees in Chandrapadi told me a story:

“An inspector of fisheries went to the sea and caught people using surukkumadi, and the people of the village beat him to run away from the place. The fisheries department is supposed to give a report to the government saying ‘we have banned this, and done this and that’ and show some accounts of it. If the government does this kind of thing, then people gather together and smash him and turn him away from the area” (i16)

I asked about the panchayat response to these behaviours, and they said that often the panchayat members are ring seining so they are there in the boats when this happens. In the village, fishers are also protesting against the ring seine ban; many claim that this is a wrongly focused issue of the government, as a result of complaints from the trawler boat owners (as discussed in chapter six). Ring seine members have invested a lot of money in the boats and nets that they use, and some borrowed money to do so. They argue that the government cannot ban the net

62 without offering them alternative employment opportunities and full compensation – firstly for the equipment, and secondly for the loss of income experienced by fishers.

“Without that at the moment it would be very hard to live life here” (i16)

Finally, the self-interest of government officials emerges as a significant reason for not regulating the fishery.

“The government looks at it not as a people issue, or the resources of the sea issue, but they are looking at it as a vote bank issue” (i19)

The number of people benefitting from the ring seine, both directly and indirectly, has grown rapidly in recent years (see chapter six). This means that the number of people opposing a ban on the net is also increasing. Ring seining is a sensitive issue within the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region, and any government actor who takes decisive action is likely to lose the support of the fishing community in large numbers. By not approaching the subject, local fishers claim that the present ruling political party hopes to retain the vote.

7.5 Discussion

The main thing to highlight in this chapter is the confusion of the ring seine situation in the region. The problems in encouraging collective action largely stem from a lack of organisation and clear control measures. Authority is unclear beyond the individual village level. In the zones of Karaikal and Nagapattinam south, there are two contenders for the role of head village which is problematic because i) if the two are in disagreement, it is unclear who gets the final say on important decisions, and ii) fishers can potentially undermine one by approaching the other if they do not get the solution they are looking for. In the Akkarai Pettai-Nambiyar Nagar and Karaikal Medu-Kilinjal Medu situations, both have one village with ring seine units and one without, so it is clear that they are not in agreement on their approach to ring seine regulation. Furthermore, fishers widely acknowledge Akkarai Pettai as the head panchayat of the district, responsible for settling disputes or organising regional-level government requests. However, their power is limited in terms of resource regulation as fishers follow the decisions of their own panchayat only. Since the panchayats are expected to make decisions based on the

63 majority of the village population, the contrast in ring seine use between different villages makes it difficult for regional collective decisions to be made.

Opinions on resource regulation are divided throughout the region, between and within villages, and many individuals are contradictory in their beliefs. The present role of state and non-state actors in gear regulation is unclear. The community is torn between the belief that the regulation of the fishery is nothing to do with the government, and the belief that the ring seine prohibition is a government issue. Often both sentiments are echoed by the same person. Although it is understood that the panchayats should not interfere in the livelihoods of the fishers, some are keener than others to enforce the rules of the government. The government of Tamil Nadu, though deciding on a ring seine ban, is far removed from implementation in the local fishing villages. Government officials appear to have their own reasons for not implementing the rules, revolving around fears of the repercussions they may face for their actions in the fishing community.

If the panchayat is in control of village matters – not the government – but the panchayat has no say over fishing methods, then there is no one assigned to monitor resource use, other than the fishers themselves. As one respondent said, “the panchayats are strong when the government is strong, and they have support” (i32). Currently, the use of the net is too wide- spread for the panchayats to control, and the government has a bigger role to play in the fishery than has initially been suggested.

8. CONCLUSIONS

The research conducted for this thesis aimed to answer the question: why is the collective action of fishers difficult to realise in prohibiting ring seine fishing in the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region? I begin the concluding chapter by providing answers to the sub-questions of the research, and indicating the implications for the main research question above. The following sections discuss theoretical reflections, areas for further research, and recommendations for policy and future practices.

8.1 Answers to Research Questions

What is the geographical distribution of the use of the ring seine in Nagapattinam and Karaikal? Two key findings emerge in relation to the geography of ring seine use. The first is that the use of the ring seine is clearly more concentrated in the north of the region than the south; this is common knowledge among the fishing population. The net was first introduced in the north, where fishers witnessed the success of ring seiners in districts bordering Nagapattinam and decided to form units themselves. The extent of the growth of ring seining within the district is such that the number of villages with operating units is said to exceed the number without, and in some villages the ring seiners now form the majority of the fishing population. Secondly, the ring seine targets migratory species so users will fish along the coast of the state without boundaries. This means that ring seiners are operating in waters adjacent to villages with and without units. Collective action problems occur when trying to ban the ring seine because the use is now too wide-spread, and members no longer form a minority group of fishers. Since fishers are aware that the techniques used by one village may have ecological and social impacts further along the coast, many question the purpose of their efforts to sustainably and fairly manage the resources when others are acting only out of self-interest. Furthermore, collective regulatory efforts at the regional level feel wasted when it is so difficult to prevent outside appropriators from ring seining in Nagapattinam-Karaikal waters.

How have fishermen’s perceptions of the ring seine motivated the decision to prohibit the net in the region?

Ring seining appears to have improved the lives and livelihoods of all those involved, but the increasing use of the net does have some negative impacts on other fisher groups. Reports on why panchayats decided to try to phase out the ring seine are divided. Some members of the fishing community say that the ban was suggested to protect the livelihoods of small-scale fishers. There is uncertainty around the ecological impacts of the ring seine, in terms of resource sustainability. However, social justice issues emerge when one group catches so much fish that others are unable to make a living. The rest of the community believes that the ban was suggested for the benefit of trawler boat owners, who experience a labour shortage as more fishers join ring seine units. Further social harm is caused as divisions grow between different fisher groups and the unity of the regional community is compromised. The lack of definitive evidence on any harm caused to the fish stocks makes collective action more difficult, as fishers do not know for sure that banning the ring seine will improve the condition of the common pool resource. Ring seine fishers claim that trawling has a worse impact on the resources, so they argue that the regulation of ring seining is a wrongly-focused issue. The prohibition is not seen to be in place for the benefit of the majority of fishers, but for the benefit of a small group of boat owners, and for many is therefore not considered to be furthering a collective interest of the regional fishing community.

How has ring seine use been regulated by the panchayats since the decision to ban it in 2013? In recent years, the panchayats have lost any control they had over ring seining in Nagapattinam and Karaikal. Some minor restrictions have been put into place as a sort of compromise, but are also largely unmonitored. Controlling the different types of fishing methods is actually not considered to be a role of the panchayat members; they are primarily responsible for acting on behalf of the majority of the village members. In villages where ring seine fishers are the majority group, it is therefore not in the interest of the panchayat to encourage a ban on the net. However, other village panchayats are still suggesting that this is the best course of action to take. The divide between the different panchayats makes it difficult to come to collective decisions at the regional level. Furthermore, even when collective rules are made, the panchayats are responsible for the implementation at individual village level. Nobody within the fishing community has the responsibility or the power to enforce rules across the district, so there are no punishments for those fishers going against the rules of the panchayat.

How is the ban of the ring seine supported by the government of Tamil Nadu?

The state government supports the panchayat by declaring the ring seine officially banned in Tamil Nadu, but there is no implementation of this rule in practice. There is plenty of evidence of ring seining in Nagapattinam and Karaikal – at sea, on land, and in the harbour – but the findings suggest that government workers do not enforce the ban out of fear of backlash from the fishing community, in the form of physical violence or a loss of political support. The difficulties in establishing collective resource management therefore come back to a lack of monitoring and punishment, but this time by external actors. Fishers are unclear throughout the region on the role that they assign to the government in resource management, divided between the idea that the government has no role to play, and the belief that only the government can take control of the issue. Panchayats are said to be stronger when they have the support of the government, and vice-versa. However, government actors cannot implement any rules if too many members of the fishing community are against the decision, and collective action problems emerge from here.

8.2 Theoretical Reflections and Suggestions for Further Research

The definition of collective action requires those involved to have a shared interest, which presents a crucial problem in the Nagapattinam-Karaikal fishing district. Although the assumption may be that fishers are interested in maintaining the resources for a sustainable livelihood, in the reality of the study location their actions do not reflect this theory. Trawler boats and ring seines are both accused of causing harm to the fish stocks; even small-scale fishers who say they are concerned for the future of the resources are switching to industrialised methods to be able to make a decent living. The longer this process continues, the more difficult it will be to make a living using traditional techniques. Many community members do not believe that the prohibition of the ring seine is being suggested in the interest of the collective community, but rather under the influence of trawler boat owners who are experiencing a labour shortage. Although many individual villages have their own agreements on common pool resource management, the requirement for a shared interest at the regional level creates a collective action problem in the initial stages.

Ostrom (1990) outlines several design principles required for sustainable and robust common pool resource management. Based on these, one of the main difficulties that emerges in Nagapattinam and Karaikal fisheries is the lack of defined boundaries and users of the resource. Previous research by Bavinck (2001b) on the Coromandel Coast has previously found evidence

67 of the village boundaries on land extending to the sea, at least within eye view, where panchayats may not exclude fishers but will control the techniques that may be used in their waters. Research on ring seine fisheries in particular strongly supports this aspect of Ostrom’s theory, and challenges Bavinck’s findings for two reasons. Firstly, the ring seine is operated by 50 fishers, may consist of a group of 15 boats, and the net spans a large distance. Although local panchayats have previously claimed to have control over the nets used in waters adjacent to their village, it is difficult to stop a ring seine unit from doing so – predominantly because they would be approaching a large group rather than one boat, so the power has been shifted. Secondly, the Indian oil sardine that ring seiners target is highly migratory, requiring members to move along the coastline in search of the shoal of fish, and making it difficult to exclude outsiders.

With regards to collective-choice arrangements, fishers are represented by their village panchayat members at the regional level, and have the opportunity to contribute their suggestions for the rules and regulations of the fishery. Community members also legitimise the decisions made by panchayats, so rules are not enforced without collective agreement. However, problems arise at the implementation level. There is nobody specific highlighted as being responsible for this: it is not the business of the panchayats to dictate the livelihood practices of fishers, the fishers themselves do not have the power to do so without the support of the panchayat, only the government can control ring seine use, but the issues of the fishery are to be brought to the panchayats and not to government officials. Furthermore, only the panchayat members have the ability to issue sanctions, but would not do this for the use of a fishing gear. This means that the conflict resolution mechanisms in place in the Nagapattinam- Karaikal fisheries are not utilised for this purpose. The ring seine presents an issue in the monitoring and sanctions aspect of collective action, as outlined by Ostrom (1990), as they are operating in plain sight. Again, the fact that there are 50 fishers considered to be breaking the rules at the same time is an issue for anyone attempting to challenge them.

The ‘nestedness’ that Ostrom (1990) refers to in her design principles is a key factor in the governance structure of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal fishing community. Fishers are indeed organising at multiple levels, but the panchayats have the most influence at the village level. Beyond this, it is difficult for taluk, zone, or regional-level decisions to be collectively implemented. How well common pool resources are regulated by regional governance actors depends on the willingness and capabilities of those nested within (Ostrom, 1990). For the ring

68 seine ban to be successful, each individual village would have to agree to stop the use, but they do not collectively act on this. These findings, along with the unclear roles for panchayat and government actors, have bigger implications for polycentrism. No one actor has been assigned the responsibility of common pool resource management or gear regulation, and to do so would evoke power struggles between state and non-state actors. As Ostrom (2010) suggests, the important role of the government should be acknowledged but they should not be solely relied upon to govern the resources. Instead, efforts should be made so that the structures and process of fisheries governance are defined and legitimised at multiple levels, improving relationships and cooperation between the different actors. This includes panchayats at the village, taluk and regional level, and public and private actors at all levels, up to the state level of Tamil Nadu.

The cultural dimensions of harm conceptualised by Bavinck and Karunaharan (2006) are important in understanding the ring seine ban, and have provided a crucial theoretical element throughout this thesis. The way that one dimension of harm can have a knock-on effect to others is also clear in the Nagapattinam-Karaikal region. One thing that should be emphasised further within this concept, is that a solution to one dimension of harm will not necessarily reduce harm in other ways, and may actually worsen the situation. Specifically, addressing the social injustice caused by ring seining by ensuring that everybody has the ability to catch the same amount of fish may increase the harm caused to the resources, as will likely be the case as more small-scale fishers engage in ring seining.

A key area for further research is in establishing the ecological impacts of intensive ring seine fishing over time. Many of the issues surrounding the ring seine at the moment stem from the uncertainty of the implications of the net for the future of the resources. The belief among fisher populations that the ring seine catches only pelagic fish, and therefore causes no harm to the fish stocks, is justification for many to start or continue with the practice. However, this is not based on any definitive evidence.

In the process of data collection and analysis I aimed to gain a regional-level perspective of the ring seine issue, but – due to time and transportation restraints – this is based on a sample of villages only. Further research should include respondents from more, if not all villages, to complete the profile of the region and create a fuller picture. A specific focus on the far south part of the Nagapattinam-Karaikal district would be of particular interest, to understand the reasons for a significantly lower ring seine presence here.

8.3 Recommendations for Policy and Practice

First and foremost, there is no scope for the gradual phase out of fishing gear, and I would not recommend this approach in the future. If a net is to be prohibited, this decision should be made as soon as possible after its introduction, and the ban should be implemented with immediate effect. This way, if compensation must be offered to fishers who have already invested money in the gear, then the costs are minimal. The permission granted to ring seiners to continue the practice for a further three years paved the way for new groups of fishers to invest in equipment throughout the district, to a point that is now uncontrollable within the 64-village community.

There is a need for more effective governance systems to be established between community and state actors at multiple levels so that each has a clear role, particularly with regards to common pool resource management. It is important that all actors are held accountable for their responsibilities, but also that they can more effectively support one another. Fishers need a platform to express their concerns, and officials and policy makers must take seriously the perceptions of fishers on the impacts of potentially harmful fishing gear. Failure to take decisive action on ring seining has reduced the amount of oil sardine available for other fishers to harvest on a day to day basis, and has thus caused further division among fisher populations.

Some practical steps also need to be taken to limit the ecological and social harm caused by the ring seine. Possible restrictions include a larger mesh size, a reduction in the overall size of the net, stricter regulations on the distance that ring seine units operate from the shore, and a suggested extension on the 45-day ban period to improve the replenishment of the fish stocks. Banning the trade of juvenile fish in the oil sardine market may also ensure long term prosperity in the industry.

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1: operationalisation of main concepts and rough interview guide

Concept Dimension Variable Indicator Collective Action N/A Definition of Are fishers limited to certain boundaries areas? Are external actors excluded from resources? Collective-choice Who participates in rule arrangements making? How do they participate? Rules monitored and How are behaviours enforced monitored? Who is responsible? Graduated sanctions How are violations punished? Who is responsible? Conflict resolution Accessible to all? mechanisms Affordable for all? Nested enterprises Are fishers organising at multiple levels? Do the same rules apply locally and regionally? Group size How many people in different user groups? How many fishers involved at regional level? Space How has use and/or ban of ring seining spread? Spatial distribution of fisher groups? External intervention Lobbying to influence external actors Collective protests Perceived role for government? Harm Ecological Harm to resources Perceived impact on resource stocks Social Harm to livelihoods Impact on catch levels Impact on income levels Nature of interaction between fishers Social justice Distribution of access Distribution of opportunities Distribution of benefits Regulation Actors N/A Who is regulating fishing gear and techniques?

How are fishers organising at the regional level? Frequency of meetings? Processes Decision making Has ring seining been banned? Implementation Is ban on ring seining successfully implemented? Enforcement Is the ban on ring seining monitored and enforced?