Paradoxes in Aulus Gellius Alessandro Garcea
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Paradoxes in Aulus Gellius
ALESSANDRO GARCEA
Dipartimento di Filologia, Linguistica e Tradizione Classica Università di Torino Via Sant’Ottavio 20 I-10100 Torino (Italy) E-mail: [email protected]
ABSTRACT: The noctes Atticae of Aulus Gellius contain almost all the ancient paradoxes. Nevertheless, in comparison with his philosophical sources, the author shows a shift in the perspective of his approach. He analyses the ‘master argument’ of Diodorus Chronus only from an ethical point of view and, among the seven paradoxes attributed to Eubulides of Milet, he quotes the ‘heap’ as an absurdity (absurdum), the ‘horned one’ and the ‘not- someone’ as a trap (captio), the ‘liar’ as a sophism (sophisma). Following the advice of Cynics, Gellius mistrusts deceptive manoeuvres, which highlight gaps in binary logic. At the same time, however, he is interested in argumentative structures, which lead one of two opponents on to victory. The extensive report of the quarrel between Protagoras and Evathlus, and many observations of Gellius on convertible forms of reasoning in literary texts fall within this rhetorical field.
KEY WORDS: Aulus Gellius, fallacy, Megarics, paradoxes, Protagoras, sophism
0. PREFACE
In this paper I will focus my attention on all the passages of noctes Atticae of Aulus Gellius,1 where some enigmas and linguistic games are exposed. My aim is not to discuss their specific interpretation (see Garcea, 2000, pp. 61–118), but to show how the author introduces them, in order to under- stand what function paradoxes fulfil in Latin culture of the second century A.D. In the next paragraphs I will examine the ‘master argument’ of Diodorus Chronus (§ 1), the Megaric paradoxes (§§ 2.1 and 2.2), the recog- nition of a tertium between two premises of an argument (§ 2.3) and the convertibles arguments (§ 3).
1. THE ‘MASTER ARGUMENT’ OF DIODORUS CHRONUS
In noctes Atticae 1,2 Aulus Gellius narrates that Herodes Atticus had invited him and other friends to his villa in Cephisia. Among them there was a young student, who declared himself to be the world’s greatest authority on Stoic logic (§ 4) and ethics (§ 4f.): with regards to the former subject he claimed to be unrivalled in the capacity to solve the most
Argumentation 17: 87–98, 2003. 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 88 ALESSANDRO GARCEA difficult dialectical enigmas, such as the ‘master’, the ‘quiescent’ and the ‘heap’. The ‘master’ falls within the section perì dynatôn (‘on possibles’) of dialectics, the other ones within the section perì lógon (‘on arguments’). 1. atque interea uocabulis haut facile cognitis, syllogismorum captionumque dialecticarum laqueis strepebat kyrieúontas et hesykházontas et soreítas aliosque id genus griphos neminem posse dicens nisi se dissoluere (Aulus Gellius 1,2,4). ‘As he spoke, he rattled off unfamiliar terms, the catchwords of syllogism and dialectic tricks, declaring that no one but he could unravel the “master”, the “quiescent”, and the “heap” arguments, and other riddles of the kind’. Herodes Atticus answers the arrogant fellow, reading some paragraphs of dissertationes of Epictetus (2,19,12–17), where the philosopher rebukes those young men who, though calling themselves Stoics, do not show virtue but merely cast the soot of their verbiage before the eyes of their hearers. It seems interesting to observe that this very chapter, 2,19, starts with the most complete formulation of the ‘master argument’, the origin of which is referred back to Diodorus Chronus. The leader of the Megaric school would have used this form of reasoning in order to justify his theory of modalities, where the propositions both true in the present or in the future (possible) and false in the present or in the future (not necessary) were excluded. In other words, he refuted the counterfactual possibility (see Bobzien, 1998, pp. 102–108). Aulus Gellius does not develop these subjects: he prefers to dwell upon the consequences of the logical theory in ethical domain. In the philosophical systems of Diodorus Chronus and Chrysippus, necessity and impossibility may assume some deterministic features which concern the problem of human responsibility towards action and more in general destiny: an action depends on human deliberation, only if this action or the proposition expressing it are both possible and not necessary. Aulus Gellius consecrates the two former chapters of the seventh book of noctes Atticae to the relationship between fatum (‘fate’) and human initiative. He takes this matter from the treatise perì pronoías of Chrysippus (according to whom every event is linked to a precedent cause, even if not necessitating), from the de fato of Cicero and from the dialéxeis of Epictetus: all these texts hold logical sections, but Aulus Gellius employs only their parts on ethics and ontology.
2. MEGARIC PARADOXES
The most complete list of Megaric paradoxes to which the young stoic alludes in noctes 1,2, can be found in Diogenes Laertius 2,108, who con- siders Eubulides of Miletus as the author of the ‘liar’, the ‘disguised’, the ‘Electra’, the ‘veiled figure’, the ‘heap’, the ‘horned one’, the ‘bald head’. PARADOXES IN AULUS GELLIUS 89
As we will see, Aulus Gellius knows the majority of these dialectical argu- ments, but he quotes them in rather changed contexts.
2.1. Antinomies of vagueness: the ‘heap’ The mention of the ‘heap’ and of the ‘quiescent’ in noctes 1,2,4 refer respectively to the paradox which is based on the imprecision of common expressions, showing the absence of a definite limit between contrary predicates, and to the answer to it according to Chrysippus (see Barnes, 1982, pp. 27–32; pp. 51–53; Sainsbury, 19952, pp. 23–51). In fact, the philosopher recommended not to answer the paradoxical question (hesykházein ‘to become quiescent’), when the person being questioned is invited to express his opinion on not clear-cut or not evident cases. The ‘heap’ recurs also in Aulus Gellius 18,1 in the aceruus ruens ‘dwin- dling pile’ variant, i.e. the one who implies a progressive subtraction of units. Walking along the shore of Ostia, the philosopher Favorinus umpires a debate between a Stoic and a Peripatetic on how virtue avails in deter- mining a happy life. While the Stoic thinks that man could enjoy a happy life only through virtue, the opponent believes that health, physical aspect, wealth, reputation and the other advantages of body and fortune also seem to be necessary. According to him, the identity of virtue and happy life defended by the Stoics, is similar to the identity between two measures of capacity, the ‘congius’ and the ‘amphora’ (which is made of ten congi). Nevertheless, as this identity can only be demonstrated by means of a soritical argument, Favorinus decides that both the Peripatetic point of view and the paradox are untenable. 2. tum Peripateticus perquam hercle festiue ‘rogo te – inquit – cum bona uenia respondeas, an existimes esse uini amphoram, cum abest ab ea unus congius?’ 10. ‘minime – inquit – uini amphora dici potest, ex qua abest congius’. 11. hoc ubi accepit Peripateticus ‘unus igitur – inquit – congius amphoram facere dici debebit, quoniam, cum deest ille unus, non fit uini amphora et, cum accessit, fit amphora. quod si id dicere absurdum est uno congio solo fieri amphoram, itidem absurdum est una sola uirtute uitam fieri beatam dicere, quoniam, cum uirtus abest, beata esse uita numquam potest’ (Aulus Gellius 18,1,9–11). ‘Thereupon the Peripatetic, in truth very wittily, said: “Pray pardon me, and tell me this, whether you think that an amphora of wine from which a congius has been taken, is still an amphora?” “By no means,” was his reply, “can that be called an amphora of wine, from which a congius is missing.” When the Peripatetic heard this, he retorted: “Then it will have to be said that one congius makes an amphora of wine, since when it is lacking, it is not an amphora, and when it is added, it becomes an amphora. But if it is absurd to say that an amphora is made 90 ALESSANDRO GARCEA
from one single congius, it is equally absurd to say that a life is made happy by virtue alone by itself, because when virtue is lacking life can never be happy” ’.
2.2. The ‘horned one’, the ‘not-someone’, the ‘liar’ The following chapter of noctes Atticae, 18,2, holds the text of some enigmas, which Aulus Gellius and his friends had discussed at dinner during the Saturnalia. A book of an ancient author, Greek or Latin, and a crown of laurel were the prizes: the participants had to try to solve a paradoxical question, passing their turn in the case of a wrong answer. Among the captiones sophisticae three paradoxes are enunciated, in their order the ‘horned one’, the ‘not-someone’, the ‘liar’. 3. tertio in loco hoc quaesitum est, in quibus uerbis captionum istarum fraus esset et quo pacto distingui resoluique possent: ‘quod non perdidisti, habes; cornua non perdidisti: habes igitur cornua’; item altera captio: ‘quod ego sum, id tu non es;
2.2.1. Paradoxes of presupposition: the ‘horned one’ The argumentation of noctes Atticae 18,2,9 is presented in a more complex form in 16,2, where Aulus Gellius observes that answering always and only in positive or negative terms to every sort of question (according to the main dialectical rule) may engender some problems, especially when it obliges the person being questioned to accept false propositions. In replying to ‘Do you, or do you not, have what you have not lost?’, the interlocutor is forced to admit, in the case of a positive answer, that he has horns, because he has not lost them; in the case of a negative answer, that he has no eyes, since he has not lost them. This passage shows that the extension of negation not only to the utterance with ‘lose’, but also to its consequence, produces a splitting of the paradox in two. At the end of his discourse, Aulus Gellius thinks it is more correct to limit himself to the assertion: ‘I have whatever I had, if I have not lost it’. It affirms both that the person being questioned still possesses what he has always had and rejects the PARADOXES IN AULUS GELLIUS 91 paradoxical presupposition that he can still possess what he has lost, but never had. 4. nam si ita ego istorum aliquem rogem: ‘quicquid non perdidisti, habeasne an non habeas, postulo ut aias aut neges’, utrum- cumque breuiter responderit, capietur. 10. nam si non habere se negauerit, quod non perdidit, colligetur oculos eum non habere, quos non perdidit; sin uero habere se dixerit, colligetur habere eum cornua, quae non perdidit. 11. rectius igitur cautiusque ita respondebitur: ‘quicquid habui, id habeo, si id non perdidi’ (Aulus Gellius 16,2,9–11). ‘For if I should ask any one of them: ‘Do you, or do you not, have what you have not lost? I demand the answer “yes” or “no”,’ whichever way he replies briefly, he will be caught. For if he says that he does not have what he has not lost, the con- clusion will be drawn that he has no eyes, since he has not lost them; but if he says that he has it, it will be concluded that he has horns, because he has not lost them. Therefore it will be more cautious and more correct to reply as follows: “I have whatever I had, if I have not lost it”.’ Likewise, at the beginning of the same chapter Aulus Gellius had solved the ‘many questions fallacy’ (Hamblin, 1970, pp. 38–40; van Eemeren et al., 1987, pp. 85–87) ‘Did you give up committing adultery or not?’. He avoided giving a direct answer: nam qui facere non desinit, non id neces- sario fecit ‘for one who has not given up a thing has not of necessity even done it’ (§ 7).
2.2.2. The paradox of the ‘liar’ The words cum mentior et mentiri me dico, mentior an uerum dico (Aulus Gellius 18,2,10) express the well-known paradox of the ‘liar’ (see Rüstow, 1910; Sainsbury, 19952, pp. 111–133) in a neutral form, which does not take a position on the truth or the falsity of the utterance. Rather, the contrast between the truth of the utterance that the speaker is lying and the lie in itself is concerned.
2.2.3. Paradoxes of generic terms: the ‘not-someone’ The example of the ‘not-someone’ in noctes 18,2,9 recurs in a more detailed form in 18,13,5 and 7f., in a chapter where the author and his friends discuss again some enigmas during the Saturnalia. The prize for solving a problem is a single sestertius, in order to collect enough money to provide a dinner. When a Platonic dialectician asks ‘You are not what I am, are you?’ (implying ‘Then you are not a man’), the cynic Diogenes of Synopes, being questioned, replies that the paradox is false and that it can be con- verted into a true one simply reversing the ‘I’ with the ‘you’ in the major premise. This answer does not concern the nature of the terms which are 92 ALESSANDRO GARCEA used in the paradox (individual and general, substrate and predicate at the same time), as Aristotle explained in his Categories (3b10; see also the ‘fallacy of accident’: Hamblin, 1970, pp. 26–28; van Eemeren et al., 1987, p. 81): it is rather based on the recognition of the fault of reciprocity, as we will see in the following paragraphs. 5. nam cum ita rogasset dialecticus: ‘quod ego sum, id tu non es?’ et Diogenes adnuisset atque ille addidisset: ‘homo autem ego sum’, cum id quoque adsensus esset et contra dialecticus ita conclusisset: ‘homo igitur tu non es’, ‘hoc quidem – inquit Diogenes – falsum est, et si uerum id fieri uis, a me incipe’ (18,13,8). ‘For when the logician had asked: “You are not what I am, are you?” and Diogenes had admitted it, he added: “But I am a man.” And when Diogenes had assented to that also and the logician had concluded: “Then you are not a man,” Diogenes retorted: “That is a lie, but if you want it to be true, begin your proposition with me”.’
2.3. The philosophical origin of the mistrust of paradoxes
2.3.1. The Cynic influence As we have seen (see supra, § 1), Aulus Gellius gets the enunciation of puzzles from Stoic influenced sources (heirs, in their turn, of the school of Megara), which considered this subject to be more central to formal logic than to other areas (see Hamblin, 1970, pp. 92–93). At the same time, the analysis of the paradox of the ‘horned one’ (see supra, § 2.2.1) has shown a situation in which the general dialectical principle must be rejected, because in a dialogue it is not always possible to answer only in a positive or a negative way. From a philosophical point of view, it seems reason- able to attribute this form of mistrust of dialectical rules to a Cynic influ- ence, which has been handed down by means of a reinterpretation of the character and the teaching of Socrates. In accordance to the memorabilia of Xenophon, the master philosopher admits, instead of his ignorance, the impossibility of reaching the knowledge and tries to abide by the ethical idea of Cynic life. The noctes witness this tradition, for example when the entire teaching of Socrates is resumed in a Homeric verse (Od. 4,392), which stands for an exclusive ethical preoccupation, to the detriment of logic and physics.
6. nam meae noctes, quas instructum ornatumque isti, de uno maxime illo uersu Homeri quaerunt, quem Socrates prae omnibus semper rebus sibi esse cordi dicebat: ‘hótti toi en megároisi kakón t’ agathón
‘For my Nights, which you wish to assist and adorn, base their inquiries especially on that one verse of Homer which Socrates said was above all other things always dear to him: “What ill and good have happened in your halls”.’
2.3.2. The tertium in the premises Aulus Gellius not only demonstrates the lack of foundation of the most famous paradoxes, but also analyses the unacceptability of other argu- mentative structures, when they are outside the bi-conditional logic. In 2,7 he discusses the problem of the obedience of children to their parents, observing that the evaluation of human behaviour cannot follow a rigid disjunction: in fact, actions are not always only honourable or base, but frequently not honourable nor base, as the well-known topos of adiáphora (‘indifferents’) shows. 7. non ergo integra est propositio dicentium ‘aut honesta sunt, quae imperat pater, aut turpia’, neque hygiès et nómimon diezeugménon uideri potest. 22. deest enim diiunctioni isti tertium: ‘aut neque honesta sunt neque turpia’. quod si additur, non potest ita concludi: ‘numquam est igitur patri parendum’ (Aulus Gellius 2,7,21f.). ‘Hence the premise of those who say that “the commands of a father are either honourable or base” is incomplete, and it cannot be considered what the Greeks call “a sound and regular dis- junctive proposition.” For that disjunctive premise lacks the third member, “or are neither honourable nor base.” If this be added, the conclusion cannot be drawn that a father’s command must never be obeyed’. In 5,11 Aulus Gellius mentions the syllogism of Biantes, one of the seven sages of Greece: he considers marriage with a beautiful woman as an exposure to adultery and marriage with a ugly woman as a form of punishment. Again, the disjunction which the argument points out is not valid, because there are many intermediate typologies between a beautiful and a ugly woman (which are referred to by Ennius Melanippa frg. 5 Vahlen2 = 118 Jocelyn as stata ‘normal’). 8. sed Fauorinus noster, cum facta esset forte mentio syllogismi istius, quo Bias usus est, cuius prima prótasis est: étoi kalèn áxeis è aiskhrán, non ratum id neque iustum diiunctiuum esse ait, quoniam non necessum sit alterum ex duobus, quae diiun- guntur, uerum esse, 9. quod in proloquio diiunctiuo necessarium est. [. . .] 11. inter enim pulcherrimam feminam et deformis- simam media forma quaedam est, quae et a nimiae pulcritu- dinis periculo et a summae deformitatis odio uacat (Aulus Gellius 5,11,8f. and 11). 94 ALESSANDRO GARCEA
‘But our countryman Favorinus, when that syllogism which Bias had employed happened to be mentioned, of which the first premise is ‘You will marry either a beautiful or an ugly woman,’ declared that this was not a fact, and that it was not a fair antithesis, since it was not inevitable that one of the two oppo- sites be true, which must be the case in a disjunctive proposi- tion. [. . .] For between a very beautiful and a very ugly woman there is a mean in appearance, which is free from the danger to which an excess of beauty is exposed, and also from the feeling of repulsion inspired by extreme ugliness.’ Finally, in 7,13 Aulus Gellius shows certain examples of apparently trivial discussions, which the platonic Taurus animated after the dinner: if a dying man must be considered a dead man or someone still living; if a rising man is still seated or is already standing; if one who is learning an art becomes an artist when he is still learning or after having learned. 9. quaesitum est, quando moriens moreretur: cum iam in morte esset, an cum etiamtum in uita foret? et quando surgens surgeret: cum iam staret, an cum etiamtum sederet? et qui artem disceret, quando artifex fieret: cum iam esset, an cum etiamtum non esset? (Aulus Gellius 7,13,5). ‘The question was asked, when is a dying man dead – when he is already in the grasp of death, or while he still lives? And when does a rising man rise – when he is already standing, or while he is still seated? And when does one who is learning an art become an artist – when he already is one, or when he is still learning?’ Taurus says that every answer, be it positive or negative, hides an error and specifies that this kind of argument is conceived in order to broach philo- sophical subjects, not quaestiunculae. In his Parmenides, Plato solved similar problems with a third kind of entity, the ‘moment of sudden sepa- ration’ (156d).
3. THE CONVERTIBLE ARGUMENTS
In the noctes Atticae paradoxes are presented in a way in which each question is doubled in an overturned form: this way of presenting argu- ments in a ‘convertible’ interrogative form is typical in the field of rhetoric, especially in order to turn upside-down the thesis of the opponent and to demonstrate control over language, ability to amaze. The well-known polemic between Protagoras and Euathlus represents the masterpiece of this technique: following the extensive report of Aulus Gellius 5,10, Euathlus paid Protagoras in advance for the first half of the teaching fee and PARADOXES IN AULUS GELLIUS 95 promised to give him the remaining half after winning his first case. He waited for the moment when Protagoras brought a suit against him and tried to demonstrate, exactly as his teacher had done to his own advantage, that in any case he should not pay (see Goossens, 1977).
10. PROTAGORAS ‘disce – inquit –, stultissime adulescens, utroque id modo fore, uti reddas quod peto, siue contra te pronuntiatum erit siue pro te. 10. nam si contra te lis data erit, merces mihi ex sententia debebitur quia ego uicero; sin uero secundum te iudicatum erit, merces mihi ex pacto debebitur quia tu uiceris’ (Aulus Gellius 5,10,9f.). ‘PROTAGORAS “Let me tell you, most foolish of youths, that in either event you will have to pay what I am demanding, whether judgment be pronounced for or against you. For if the case goes against you, the money will be due me in accordance with the verdict, because I have won; but if the decision be in your favour, the money will be due me according to our contract, since you will have won a case”.’
EVATHLUS ‘disce igitur tu quoque, magister sapientissime, utroque modo fore uti non reddam quod petis, siue contra me pronuntiatum fuerit siue pro me. 14. nam si iudices pro causa mea senserint, nihil tibi ex sententia debebitur quia ego uicero; sin contra me pronuntiauerint, nihil tibi ex pacto debebo quia non uicero’ (Aulus Gellius 5,10,13f.). ‘EVATHLUS “So let me tell you in turn, wisest of masters, that in either event I shall not have to pay what you demand, whether judgement be pronounced for or against me. For if the jurors decide in my favour, according to their verdict nothing will be due you, because I have won; but if they give judgement against me, by the terms of our contract I shall owe you nothing, because I have not won a case”.’ Moreover, in 9,15 Aulus Gellius distinguishes on one side this kind of lógoi and on the other the aporetic or unsolvable argument, which contains an utterance leading to a contradictory conclusion: usually they were identi- fied in rhetorical treatises, such as in the section on asy´ stata zetémata of the ars of Fortunatianus (1,3f.: see Calboli Montefusco, 1979, pp. 342–344) or in the scolia to the On issues of Hermogenes by Markellinos (4,156,2–18 Waltz). The control of the technique illustrated by the anecdote of Protagoras and Euathlus is shown in two other chapters. In 5,11 Aulus Gellius denies the possibility of overturning the argument of Biantes, which we have already seen. 11. sed minime hoc esse uidetur antistréphon, quoniam ex altero latere conuersum frigidius est infirmiusque. [. . .] 6. qui conuertit 96 ALESSANDRO GARCEA
autem, non ab eo se defendit incommodo, quod adest, sed carere se altero dicit, quod non adest (Aulus Gellius 5,11,4 and 6). ‘But this syllogism does not seem to be in the least convert- ible, since it appears somewhat weaker and less convincing when turned into the second form. [. . .] But he who converts the proposition does not defend himself against the inconve- nience which is mentioned, but says that he is free from another which is not mentioned.’ In 9,16 Aulus Gellius quotes the studiosorum libri of Plinius and discusses the case of a woman, which was promised in marriage to a man as the prize of a brave deed. At the same time, her husband, having also done a brave deed, demands the return of his wife. Aulus Gellius considers that the proposition affirming that the husband can claim his wife can be overturned also in favour of the other suitor. 12. nihil enim minus conuerti ex contrario id ipsum aduersus eundem potest atque ita a priore illo uiro forte dici: ‘si placet lex, non reddo; si non placet, non reddo’ (Aulus Gellius 9,16,7). ‘For that very argument may just as easily be turned about and used against the same man, and might, for example, be put thus by the former husband: “If the law is valid, I do not return her; if it is not valid, I do not return her”.’
4. THEORETICAL REMARKS
At the end of this excursus, we can try to find some features common to all examples quoted by Gellius, in order to characterise his approach. First of all, we must observe that the majority of paradoxes are discussed in a dialogical context, ruled by the dialectical principle of answering questions with a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (see 16,2, supra, § 2.2.1). Those who do not respect this rule ‘are thought to be both uneducated and unobservant of the customs and laws of debate’ (16,2,1f.). Nevertheless, as paradoxes represent a wrong use of this general procedure, the purpose of Aulus Gellius is a normative one: he tries to show errors, transgressions and mistakes (5,10,1 uitia argumentorum ‘faults of arguments’; 16,2,7 falsa . . . species istius captionis ‘false appearance of this catch-question’), i.e. to solve fallacious forms of argumentation (see the use of soluere ‘to solve’ and etymologically related expressions in 1,2,4; 18,2,6. 9. 10; 18,13,3). In order to fulfil this task, he is obliged to violate standard expectations in dialogue, answering more than is asked or being silent when questioned (16,2,11–13). The main problem he must tackle is that paradoxes give the illusion of correctness, whereas they hide a deceptive intention (see 18,2,9, supra, § 2.2): this illusion, defined as a uitium insidiosum et sub falsa laudis specie latens ‘insidious fault, which lies concealed under a false PARADOXES IN AULUS GELLIUS 97 appearance of truth’ (9,16,7), is a psychological element, linked to a persuasive purpose (see in general van Eemeren et al., 1987, pp. 92–93; Walton, 1995, pp. 240–244; on the persuasive purpose of paradoxical for- mulations see also Kienpointner, this volume). In fact the main aim of the person who asks questions is to trick or defeat his opponent. As the lexical group of captio ‘trick, act of deception’ (1,2,4; 5,10,11 and 16; 7,13,7; 16,2,4. 5. 7. 8; 18,1,12; 18,2,6 and 9; 18,13,2 and 3) and the loan word griphos (1,2,4: in the proper sense ‘fishing net’; see Atenaeus 2,142b–144e Kaibel) show, the dialogues of noctes Atticae represent forms of contentious argumentation, whether they are presented as sophismata et enigmata oblectatoria ‘amusing sophistries and enigmas’ (18,2, lemma) or as true disputationes ‘discussions’ (18,1, lemma). The interlocutors have recourse to ‘convertible’ expressions (see supra, § 3) as a usual verbal tactic of defeat: thanks to the importance of this formal pattern in the field of rhetoric, many paradoxes, which are used in quarrels, are ‘doubled’ or turned against their original author. Finally, the recognition of fallacies in conversations between two partners, who try to get the better of each other, drives Aulus Gellius to detect also invalid inferences in the field of syllo- gistic logic, independently of any dialogical context (see supra, § 2.3.2): in these cases he corrects patterns which are not ‘sound and regular’ (2,7,21: neque hygiès et nómimon and 5,11,8: non ratum id neque iustum; on fallacies as invalid arguments: see van Eemeren et al., 1987, pp. 90–91; Walton, 1995, pp. 237–240; van Eemeren et al., 1996, pp. 56–74). To sum up, the text of Aulus Gellius lies between different traditions: the rhetorical-eristic and the philosophical-dialectical one; it also shows interest in both dialogic and monologic contexts (for these terms see van Eemeren et al., 1987, p. 85; Walton, 1995, p. 5). The author and his friends, in spite of the admonitions of Taurus (7,13,7f. nolite . . . haec quasi nugarum aliquem ludum aspernari. grauissimi philosophorum super hac re serio quaesiuerunt ‘Do not despise such problems, as if they were mere trifling amusements. The most earnest of the philosophers have seriously debated this question’), seem to appreciate above anything else the amusing aspect of paradoxes, the surprise and the unexpected. After Cynic criti- cism (see supra, § 2.3.1), puzzles have a new, favourable reception not so much as violations of a dialectic rule or of an argumentation, but as rhetor- ical tactics.
NOTE
1 Aulus Gellius was born in around 130 A.D. He became the pupil of the grammarian Sulpicius Apollinaris. Fronto introduced him to his company; Antonius Iulianus and Titus Castricius instructed him in rhetoric, and Favorinus of Arelate in philosophy. After having practised the profession of judge in private suits, Aulus Gellius went to Athens, where he stayed for one year: there he met the middle Platonist L. Calvenus Taurus, the neosophist Herodes Atticus and the Cynic Peregrinus. During this stay, he started to write his miscel- 98 ALESSANDRO GARCEA laneous book called Attic Nights, in remembrance of the winter evenings spent reading and writing notes in the country of Athens. Aulus Gellius ended the twenty books of his work in Rome, where he died shortly after their publication, probably in around 180 A.D. See Holford-Strevens, 1988.
REFERENCES
Edition: Marshall, P. K.: 19902, A. Gellii noctes Atticae, Clarendon, Oxford. Translation (sometimes adapted): Rolfe, J. C.: 1927, The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius, W. Heinemann & G. B. Putnam’s Sons, London & New York (The Loeb Classical Library).
Secondary literature: Barnes, J.: 1982, ‘Medicine, Experience and Logic’, in J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M. Burnyeat and M. Schofield (eds.), Science and Speculation. Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 24–68. Bobzien, S.: 1998, Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy, Clarendon, Oxford. Garcea, A.: 2000, ‘Gellio e la dialettica’, Memorie dell’Accademia delle Scienze di Torino (Classe di Scienze Morali) 24, 53–204. Goossens, W. K.: 1977, ‘Eulathus and Protagoras’, Logique et analyse 77–78, 67–75. Hamblin, C. L.: 1970, Fallacies, Methuen & Co., London. Holford-Strevens, L.: 1988, Aulus Gellius, Duckworth, London. Quine, W. V.: 19762, The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass. & London. Rüstow, A.: 1910, Der Lügner. Theorie, Geschichte, und Auflösung, Diss. Leipzig. Sainsbury, R. M.: 19952: Paradoxes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. van Eemeren, F. H., R. Grootendorst and T. Kruiger: 1987, Handbook of Argumentation Theory, Foris, Dordrecht/Providence. van Eemeren F. H., R. Grootendorst and F. Snoeck Henkemans: 1996: Fundamentals of Argumentations Theory, Erlbaum, Mahwah, N.J. Walton, D.: 1995, A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy, University of Alabama Press, Tuscaloosa/ London.