The Eastern Dimension of America's New European Allies
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THE EASTERN DIMENSION OF AMERICA’S NEW EUROPEAN ALLIES Janusz Bugajski October 2007 Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted. ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Research for this monograph was conducted primarily in Washington DC, including a thorough reading of all relevant literature in the United States and Europe. It also entailed regular visits to most of the Central-East European capitals for meetings with local analysts and government officials involved in the evolving Eastern Dimension. I would like to extend special thanks to Milena Staneva, my irreplaceable research assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), as well as invaluable research help from my interns at CSIS, including Ieva Vilutyte, Adrienn Petrovics, Daniel Vajdic, Rossen Tsanov, Besian Bocka, and Ruben Elsinga. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications are available on the SSI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered from our homepage. SSI’s homepage address is: www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on our homepage at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army. mil/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-313-2 ii CONTENTS Foreword . v Summary . .ix I. Introduction.................................1 II. Widening Europe and Enlarging NATO: Perspectives from Central-Eastern Europe ... 7 Central-East European Eastern Policy .......... 7 Divergent Central-East European Approaches . 17 Leveraging the United States . 24 III. Impact of NATO and European Union Policies . 29 NATO’s Eastern Policy...................... 29 U.S. Eastern Policy . 42 European Union Eastern Policy . 47 The East’s Western Dimension ............... 70 IV. Eastern Dimension: Country Focus .......... 75 Ukraine ................................... 75 Belarus.................................... 94 Moldova . 102 Georgia .................................. 111 V. Dealing with Russia . 117 Russia’s Neighborhood Policy . 117 The United States and Russia . 121 NATO and Russia ......................... 123 The European Union and Russia . 126 Central-East Europe and Russia . 130 iii VI. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations . 149 The Eastern Dimension . 149 Policy Recommendations . 152 Endnotes . 165 About the Author ............................ 185 iv FOREWORD This monograph is intended to contribute to a more comprehensive debate on the Wider Europe and how the United States and the European Union (EU) can more effectively shape a successful Eastern Dimension. The Central-East European (CEE) capitals contend that without a realistic prospect for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and EU accession, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will increasingly become sources of domestic and regional instability and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions. Such developments will negatively impact on U.S. strategic interests and have serious security implications for America’s new European allies. Washington needs to be closely engaged alongside the EU to prevent the most destabilizing scenarios from materializing and to consolidate trans-Atlantic security. Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia face serious obstacles to their Euro-Atlantic integration, including internal political divisions, Moscow’s resistance to further NATO and EU expansion, and the hesitation of EU and Allied capitals in offering clear membership prospects. In this inauspicious environment, the new members of both NATO and the EU have sought to develop credible policies for consolidating democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing their prospects for trans-Atlantic inclusion, and contributing to containing a resurgent and assertive Russia. The CEE governments have also endeavored to more closely involve the United States in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement, as this will expand the zone of democratic security. v There are several reasons why the Black Sea and trans-Caucasian region are important for the security of the European continent and the Atlantic Alliance. First, weak, divided states, or authoritarian states are a threat to their own security and to the security of their neighbors. Moldova, Georgia, and potentially Ukraine are politically polarized and divided states where the absence of territorial integrity and elite consensus corrupts state institutions, undermines economic development, and prevents regional cooperation. These states are also susceptible to Russian government manipulation, economic blackmail, and political pressure precisely because they remain weak and divided. Second, a variety of military and submilitary threats challenge the region, including a spillover of armed conflict from the Moscow-sponsored separatist entities in Moldova and Georgia; and Russian military involvement among neighbors in preventing state integration. A potential escalation of armed conflict between Georgia and the two separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia may also precipitate a wider conflict by drawing in neighboring powers and even the United States and the EU into the conflict. Third, major energy supplies to Europe from the Caspian Basin will increasingly traverse the Caucasus and Black Sea regions, and their transit needs to be secured from potential disruption, whether as a result of blockages by suppliers or transit countries or sabotage by substate actors and international terrorists. Reliable supplies are best guaranteed by diversifying suppliers and routes and bringing the entire region under a more secure NATO umbrella. And fourth, the East European-Black Sea region connects the EU and NATO with the Middle East, the vi Caspian zone, and Central Asia—three areas that will be critical for U.S., NATO, and EU security interests over the coming decade. As a result, the region will remain a battleground between Atlanticism and Eurasianism, in essence between the West and Russia, as both sides will seek to project and defend their influences. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute vii SUMMARY This monograph provides a set of recommendations to the United States, NATO allies, and EU institutions in promoting a more consequential Eastern Dimension. Above all, the U.S. administration needs to clearly make the argument that progress toward stable states and secure democracies in a widening Europe and an expanding trans-Atlantic community that encompasses the Black Sea zone is in America’s national interests and serves its strategic goals. The eventual inclusion of all East European states that are currently situated outside NATO and the creation of a wider Alliance would help expand and consolidate democratic systems, open up new markets, stabilize Washington’s new allies, and increase the number of potential U.S. partners. Russia is not a reliable partner for Washington as it has its own ambitions to restore its regional dominance and to undercut the U.S. policy of democratic expansion. Contingencies for a potentially unstable post-Putin era also need to be drawn up as we cannot assume that Putinism has created a stable authoritarian system. Russia confronts several looming crises: demographic ethnic, religious, economic, social, and political, especially if power struggles become manifest between the new Kremlin oligarchs and security chiefs who have gained control over large sectors of the economy. Although the United States has few tools to influence Russia’s internal development, it can deploy its economic, diplomatic, and military capabilities to contain any instabilities emanating from Russia that could challenge the security of neighboring countries. NATO Allies must be prepared for a long and arduous struggle if they want to ensure that Moscow’s ix neighbors become America’s and Europe’s partners with closer political, economic, and security ties. In particular, a sustained package of incentives and assistance must be provided for Ukraine to consolidate the advantages of democratic reform. Targeted assistance is necessary for the Belarusian opposition and elements of the establishment that may seek an alternative to the Lukashenka regime. A more activist policy can be pursued to reintegrate the divided Moldovan and Georgian states, promote democratization, combat criminal networks, and give both countries the prospect of a U.S. alliance. NATO itself should devise a more coherent, consensual, and long-range approach toward the aspirant