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Violence in : ARTIGO ARTICLE oil rent and political crisis

Violência na Venezuela: renda petroleira e crise política

Roberto Briceño-León 1

Abstract This article analyzes the changes in vi- Resumo O presente artigo analisa as mudanças olence in Venezuela during the last forty years. It na violência ocorridas na Venezuela nos últimos links the ups and downs of the oil revenues and quarenta anos, relacionadas com os altos e baixos the political crisis of the country to the changes in da renda petroleira e com a crise política no país, the homicide rates, which increased from 7 per fatos que contribuíram para um aumento nas ta- 100 thousand inhabitants in 1970 to 12 in 1990, xas de homicídios: de 7 por cada cem mil habi- 19 in 1998 and 50 in 2003. The article character- tantes em 1970 a 12 em 1990, 19 em 1998 e 50 no izes Venezuela as a rentist society and shows its ano de 2003. O artigo caracteriza a Venezuela co- trajectory from rural violence to the beginning of mo sociedade rentista e, a partir daí, faz uma re- urban violence, the guerilla movements of the trospecção cobrindo desde a violência rural até os 60s, the delinquent violence related to the abun- inícios da violência urbana, o movimento guerri- dance of oil revenues and the violence during the lheiro dos anos sessenta, a criminalidade resul- popular revolt and the sackings of 1989 in Cara- tando da abundância dos recursos petroleiros e a cas. After this, we analyze the coups d’état of 1992 violência em decorrência da revolta popular e dos and the influence the political violence exerted saques ocorridos em 1989 em Caracas. Em segui- upon criminal violence. We describe the political da são analisados os golpes de Estado de 1992 e o and party changes in the country, their influence impacto que a violência política exerceu sobre a upon the stabilization of homicide rates since the violência criminal. Descrevemos as mudanças po- mid-90s and their remarkable increase during the líticas e partidárias no país e sua influência sobre H. Chávez government. The article finishes with a estabilização das taxas de homicídios em mea- an analysis of the current situation, the official dos dos anos noventa, assim como, seu considerá- prohibition to publish statistics on homicides and vel aumento durante o governo Chávez. O artigo with some thoughts about the perspective of conclui com uma análise da situação atual, fala greater violence in Venezuela. sobre a proibição de publicar dados estatísticos so- Key words Violence, Venezuela, Public health, bre homicídios e faz uma reflexão sobre a perspec- Homicides, Oil, Politics tiva de ainda mais violência na Venezuela. 1 Laboratario de Ciencias Palavras-chave Violência, Venezuela, Saúde pú- Sociales (Lacso). blica, Homicídios, Petróleo, Política Av. A. Codazzi, Quinta Lacso, Santa Monica, 1041. Caracas, Venezuela. [email protected] Briceño-León, R. 316 fied Law gotforti- tions appeared andtheState of institu- inwhich themodern also theperiod Thiswas health care andlaboropportunities. andinthecitieshadaccessin thecountry to were undercontrol andthepoorer populations thegreat epidemics thisperiod, During ulation. thepop- thehealth conditions of provement of increasing socialmovement andim- of period bia andElSalvador. recent with countries internal warslike Colom- violent traditionally place with itissharing honorable notvery a intheregion, countries Venezuela isamongthemostviolent tants, 100thousandinhabi- 50deathsper of in turn With ahomiciderate different. isvery century tiplied by ten the populationdidnoteven while mul- thehomiciderate two decades, course of In the more instableandmore violent. poorer, became Thesociety still notcome to anend. thathas changes andcrises ated a process of was different. try played intheeconomytry indus- thepetroleum the increasing income of madepossibleby thedominatingrole systems, thesocialandhealth andimprovementty of stabili- political economic growth, a process of entered thecountry the19thcentury, il warsof after thebloody independence warandtheciv- because It wasthisway, orviolence. no guerilla indigenouspopulation, noimportant poverty, there wasnoremarkable pean research centers: sponsorsorEuro- researchers, the attention of diditcall neither thatproducedcountry news, For decades Venezuela wasnota . theneighbor low incomparison to thoseof were they extremely gentina andCosta Rica, Ar- were incomparisonthey to high thoseof Although 100thousandinhabitants. deaths per homicide rates oscillated between sixandten the and since reliable statisticswere available, several decades During the20thcentury. of lem forpublichealthin Venezuela untiltheend Violence didnotrepresent prob- animportant Introduction tries intheregion tries public healthinto anexample for many coun- process the struction thatturned Venezuelan andresulted inaninstitutionalcon-country the of causedaremarkable transformation try thisincome from thepetroleum indus- tion of The greater part of the 20th century wasa the20thcentury of The greater part thenew of The situationinthebeginning ic h 0,the Venezuelan initi- society Since the80s, 6 nteedo h etr,thesituation thecentury, In theendof . 5 . ,2 ,4 3, 2, 1, . The distribu- The . the face othecountry years hadchanged sixty which during model, society theoilexport of thecrisis the result of public healthproblems in Venezuela andthisis 13,000assassinations. passes thenumber of years twenty later itsur- year; 1,300 deathsper the80sdidnotreach thenumber of of ginning that were committed inthebe- inthecountry homicides Thenumber of grow to thedouble. democracy occupydemocracy society intheoilexport sible dueto thesingularpositionState and Thiswaspos- ing profits fortheentrepreneurs. better wagesfortheworkerssuring andgrow- concomitantly en- condition of extraordinary decades hadbeenableto create andsustainthe ordinary quality ordinary extra- very of wine theexample of when giving profit Karl to Mark theterm attributed “rent”, thesurplus of ithasthecharacteristic hand, Ontheother dred years present inthecountry. perceives itasarent forbeingalmostonehun- butsociety anasset, sents theliquidationof a notrenewable resource natural repre- rather tions experienced by the society and forms part tions experienced andforms by the society shows thetransforma- andsuccessful, artificial awarin theMiddle East. of themaspoliticalathreat many of variables, processesduction orcosts onother butrather theproduct doesnotdependonpro- of price the because to increase productivity, dustry) by the Venezuelan (workers society andthein- nothing specialhadbeendone although 2005, and 1974orquintupledbetween 1998and 1973 between ittripled when to thenextas, sogreatly from could oneyear vary the society the oilcompanies market andtheglobal itonlyneeds foritseconomical survival, society State a that doesnotneed view, nomical pointof iscompletely independentfrom theeco- ings, sustainedby earn- theoilexport the State, ciety, In thisso- uses themaccording to itsjudgment. which government, thecentral to thehandsof thetotal laborforce. employs only2%of butwhich revenue, export for more than80%of its gross domesticproduct (36%in2005)and which accounts forathird of petroleum sector, The Venezuelan economy isdominated by the ilt lie yD Ricardo claimedby D. niality peren- really arent of becauseitlacksthetrait itisnot Ononehand, itscharacteristics. two of resulting from arentearnings theoilexport for We callthe a rentist State andarentist society. ilnebcm n fthemostimportant Violence becameoneof h rsso hsmdl to thesameextent this model, of The crisis The earnings from sector thepetroleum The earnings go 11 . This iswhy This theincome of . 7 oe,which during A model, . 10 andthesaleof , 9 It is . 8 . Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 11(2):315-325, 2006 317 The guerilla was fought by the Venezuelan The guerilla was fought the by guerilla movement with veryguerilla urban few movement expres- sions. democracy born was in the Venezuelan end oftime of the 50s (1958) nearly at the the triumph of (1959). revolution the Cuban In 1957, the military with forged a referendum a few but perpetuate their power to the intent months later, in January 1958, a general strike the country. withdraw from them to forced The fight against the military of dictatorship M. violence, by marked was never Jiménez Pérez it and union movement was a political and labor the govern- by although repression it suffered ment, and murders, tortures it did not trigger armed confrontations. However, some groups of people that had participated in the young against the dictatorial resistance underground in the focused guerilla warfare,regime saw as it had been used in , be fol- the model to the power. over take to in their ambition lowed The political orientation of was this movement not clear, movement, it was not a communist in the be understood must but these changes ofcontext war and of the cold by the process and decides communist becomes Cuba which American guerilla impel move- the Latin to “one, create ment with to the intent two, three fractionVietnams”.A of social- Venezuelan the democratic party that made part of the govern- Democratica) leaders of took ment (Accion the partyyoung guerilla members to activities; con- comitantly, in the strategy a change ofVe- the party the sprout- nezuelan communist leads to ing of guerilla different fronts, sup- receiving government. port and training the Cuban from was very short. however Their breath Their po- Venezuelan the did not convince litical project population. in improv- interested were People ing their quality of social- life and in ascending ly; policies of the reformist therefore the gov- ernment, with financed the oil revenue, were these groups, isolate able to them deprive to their social supportfrom basis. no were There instigate landowners and civil leaders to more ofthe hatred farmers, as was the case in Co- lombia, struggling and the few who continued the first impact ofafter the petroleum were witheliminated the agrarian or lost reform with the new ruraltheir power emigration that at that time. place took army, that their defeat do not believe we but the militarywas basically due to actions, but to place. that took the social reforms The agrarian reform, of the devolution the land, the agricul- tural loans, the primary and graduate schools, .The caudil- 12 . 14 . 13 This process was interrupted in the begin- was interrupted This process With these changes,With rural violence decreased Venezuela, urbaniza- with its accelerated This modernization process also transformedThis modernization process and large landowners, turn only to himself Between 1926 and 1979,Between Vene- the people in a period ofzuela lived social inclusion. great During this period, in- lived Venezuelans the better,creasingly during the decades several obtain gains which, to able were workers in con- terms,crete year to year from increased of history of recent the Vene- public health in zuela. rural urbanFrom to violence wages paid in Venezuela were during decades were Venezuela wages paid in higher than those paid in Europe ning of the 60s, with ofappearance the a rural radically. On one hand, the individuals feeling at risk migrated the cities and, to on the other hand, the institutionalization, of the State Law and its agents (malaria inspectors, and police the most distant margins of reached army) the territory. The country was unified and found itself in the migrations in the strengthen- and ing of the State. J. The dictator V. Gómez, who ruled the country during the first thirty years of the 20th century, put an to had promised and struggles the revolts between end to the 40s and 60s oftion between the 20th cen- tury, was at the same time constructing a soci- ety without violence. was a country It believing ofin the State to response as the adequate Law the needs of social life and for the solution of ofthe conflicts the modernizing society. los landowner and the only cau- the greatest into dillo of the nation. the conflictivity; traditional the rural violence and other forms arose,decreased the armed like wealth. to guerilla fights related and the violence ofThe change Venezue- transformed territories a rural from years la in less than one hundred country,90% of about where the population was living in the country, a clearly urban into country, than 80% of more where the popula- in the cities.tion lives also This spatial change social change.implied in a great The families ac- houses and had better in better live could public services. to cess born were Their children public with and frequented medical assistance schools. an important The country insti- lived allowing a strengthen- tutionalization process ing of political and civil citizenship Briceño-León, R. 318 Perhaps were thesecrimes eye-catching very homicide rates hadnotincreased significantly. becausethe rates but notmortality, crime It hadincreased the lethal. not particularly higher. wasthesamebut thebenefitwasmuchThe risk represented much more money. the moment, exchange atthedollar of rate an amountthat, Venezuela for100thousand Venezuelan bolivars lombian pesos my for100thousandCo- lifeinBarranquilla an impeccable explanation: gave atthattime, to interview the opportunity Aminorbank robber we had too much money. there was delinquents: domestic orimported number agreat of interest of came thefocusof Venezuela suddenlybe- but from abundance. from didnotarise poverty This violence banks. stores and assaultsto families, the property, related violence against to crimes of atype of theappearance witnessed thecountry ter 1975, Af- anothertype. from thismomentonwere of “Saudi Venezuela”? Theproblems thatappeared there while wassomuch in money guerrilla Who would beinterested the insupporting cy. allowed sustainingthepacificationpoli- ment, govern- thecentral theincomeyear of tripling inonlyone 1973, of after theoilcrisis country the country. peace in apolicyof lowed theconsolidation of changed the activity Venezuelan leftandal- leadersto political legal and democratic rilla guer- important of Theincorporation lombia. or concealed revenge like itoccurred inCo- out beingsubjectto openpoliticalrepression with- inelections andparticipated parties form be considered successful cameto becausethey Theirpacificationcan politicallife. democratic into the guerrillas theformer of incorporation yearsfollowing andgovernments allowed asafe The pacificationprocess thattook place inthe hadbeendefeated.that thepoliticalviolence clearforthecountry itbecamevery another, passed pacificallyfrom oneelected president to andthegovernment forthefirsttimewas 1963, tempt to sabotagethepresidential in elections warfare. not guerilla theirwork andgovernmentallife with support, allowed to farmers achieve abetter programs, theoilincome spentinsocial inshort, gram, habitationpro- therural communities, rural the environmental inthe sanitationprograms eetees hskn fdelinquencywas thiskindof Nevertheless, The immenseoilrevenue thatflewinto the After groups failedintheirat- thearmed hesaidto us, , I prefer todoitin I prefer nta frisking Instead of , economic retrocession allover Latin America; in1983wasaccompaniedvisible of by aperiod thatbecame crisis The happen in Venezuela. something thatcould not ing to thatcountry, belong- but like something external, an omen, like aconflict, understood astheforeshadow of and intheirpockets several years later. people onlybeganto feelthisintheirbones vestment stopped inthecountry foreign private in- after theoilnationalization, in1977when, wasoriginated authors thecrisis For some anever-ending begin they decline. the80sandfrom then freeze of atthe beginning had beencontinuously since the50s, rising tral a,according to thepolice records it really was, to bemuch therisk people imagined greater than that we observed thecountry of in theinterior out butinastudy we carried money, amounts of were byand people theinvolved surprised sustainable development they hadnourished sustainable development they a the dreams of andof society this modelof itrevealed of to thecitizens thefragilities ports, much more thanameasure forcontrolling im- inthismomentrepresented expressed itself that crisis The revenuesport wasimplemented. im- controlcy wasdevaluated andastrict of thecurren- baptized the country Friday” “black tion becameunsustainableandontheday the 1983thesitua- In February the domesticones. becoming lessexpensive than from year to year, theresult products thatimported were, with ue, thecurrency conserved itsval- nally however, Exter- year. existed every small, although that, nally thecurrency lostvaluedueto inflation becauseinter- thenationalcurrency, ment of exchange rate meantacontinuous readjust- Thisfixed change bolivars). rate (one dollar/4.3 freely convertible currency andafixed ex- Venezuela hada For nearly20years, nezuelans. changed forthe thecountry Ve- From 1983on, 1983 The broken dreams: was outthatit itturned littleafter, A in thecountry. problem wasanimportant them thatviolence becauseitdidnotseemto subject forthisstudy, Venezuela wasanappropriate much indoubtif theinternational committee wasvery olence, amultinationaldecided to study perform onvi- catholicuniversities directed by theJesuits of whenagroup stillinthemid-eighties, Anyway, h eia rsso August 1982wasnot The Mexican of crisis which the Venezuelans, The real wagesof 16 . 18 .However, 15 17 . . Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 11(2):315-325, 2006 319 . 20 2003 2002 for the years referred. for the years 2001 27 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995 and the National Institute for Statistics Institute and the National 1994 Social violence: 1989 campaignThe electoral of 1988 was a fictitious discussion trying of the years revive to wealth. all efforts for carry- employed The government model, and State ing on the same distributive but without of availing the financial resources that had made this possible. The government of J. a policy of followed (1984-1989) Lusinchi corrup- that encouraged artificial price control tion, monopolization and caused a remarkable For Venezuela this is the period ofVenezuela For social sur- prise, on but people something new was going it. interpret to very how well did not know Some crisis that a greater to was about understood migratory not only the happen and therefore ceases,Venezuela towards pressure but many well as immigrants Europe old ones from – the – and the Southern Cone as the new ones from the country.their capital started leave to Oth- the hope of keeping ers preferred this being pass and that would only a difficult moment not the deep crisis that was announcing itself However, for 1988, the country maintained the withsocial peace of a homicide rate only one digit: 9 homicides per one 100 thousand inhab- itants. 26 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988 1987 1986 , social by it was not characterized 19 1985 1984 We understand these years as an incubation understand these years We In 1983,In a rate of registered Venezuela eleven Maybe this is the reason why the violence why is the reason this Maybe 1983 period of violence because, although during ofthis space of process time the inclu- social of ascension sion and constant the population had ceased homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.homicides per 100,000 it can be As observed in graph 1,declined this number to slightly and dropped in the following years homicides in 1984 and 1985, ten around and eightsoon to in 1986 and 1987. homicides those very similar to were These homicide rates of States the United shown by America, al- shown as the rates not as low though they were , or Rica Costa by in fact they were very inferior those of to or El Sal- Colombia vador. years ofyears in- analysts are stagnation that many “lost decade”. call the clined to rates do not increase in Venezuela as early as in Venezuela in do not increase rates American countries,other Latin they where rise if no matter these countries had passed a periodthrough of violence – like intense – or ofColombia Brazil. little violence – like crisis or violence.had their savings still People transitory were and hoped that the problems and that soon everything the to return would times of plentifulness of the end-seventies. 0 60 50 40 30 20 10 Source: LACSO: the Ministry Data assembled from of and Justice Affairs Internal Graph 1 1983-2003.Venezuela per 100,000 inhabitants. rate Homicide Briceño-León, R. 320 etduhe,hitby alostbullet. cent daughter, when shesuddenlyfelldeadnext to heradoles- abuilding, inthe13thfloorof her apartment aconfrontation fromserving thebalcony of wasquietlyob- who thelady, like theoneof andthere were alsofatalities, thearmy; with peoplediedintheconfrontations traumatisms; to escapeanddiedfrom multiple stairs trying common the peoplethatsimplyfell down loot; disputingsomevaluable fessional criminals pro- there were homicidesbetween plunderers, to defendtheirproperty; trying shop owners There were were peoplewho killedby ways. oneweek isextremely high. of hundred inthecourse deathsonlyinCaracas five number a of year, afull during country yearsin theprevious around 1,500allover the but incomparison to ahomiciderate istered, somedeathsnothaving beenreg- of possibility There isalways the were they high. very less, neverthe- but, speculations madeby thepress, ple sackingwhatever wasinreach shopsbroke by down force andpeo- doors of notonlyintheirexpression were violent, left. thelittlethatwas hadtothey take possessionof onlyafewandthattherefore in thehandsof ple feltthatthewealth hadgoneorthat itwas Many peo- thecentury. socialrevoltportant of causedthemostim- taken by thegovernment, tive candidate andthefirsteconomic measures theirpopulistanddistribu- the voters hadof aswell asthecontrast between theimage ucts, prod- of causedby shortage thepermanent ciety so- Thediscontent of conflicts. wasfullof ever, theoilindustry. and therentist economy of thebureaucratic apparatus of theparties er of thepow- was determined to thepast: break with thathe andalready inthegovernment, soon, But thepresident very demonstrated tions. wealth theelec- usedasatacticto win times of of happy memories impressive invocation of Carlos Andr reelection The of towels. feminine sanitary sugar or products asbasicmilk, of shortage days revealed those Caracas 534deathsduring of themorgue out basedonA study dataof carried this revolt wascalculated inseveral thousand. forces. andthearmed authorities ty thesecuri- the repressive of answer onthepart The deathsoccurred inthemostdifferent h aknso eray2 n 8 1989, 27and28, February of The sackings how- hisadministration, of The beginning The number of deaths during thedays deathsduring of The number of 21 Ourresults were much lower thanthe . é s Perez (1988)represented avery – butalsoin – n h aso h tak.Teatmt fthe The attempts of theattacks. and thedays of theyear thathadoccurredthe violence during farbeyondshould increase violence criminal that lence aninstitutionalcrisis andgenerated politicalvio- ber 1992showed face of theugly caudillist mentality thatprevailed inthecountry.caudillist mentality wasdefeated by therentist and however, posal, economy andthe pro- That Venezuelan society. the the government change proposed of atrue itwastheonlytime boasts notwithstanding, rsn ie Ch present time, butto the viewpoints, icized from of aseries proposal The could and canbecrit- tist society. andnon-sta- non-distributionist ing anon-oil, construct- rentismture of with andapossibility It wasarup- by thegovernment (1989-1993). proposal foritstransformation only important presented fifteen years later the (1974-1979), the social pact and of the symbolic order. thesymbolic the socialpactandof thesefearsare expressing arupture of Thus, madness. control isakind of outof plundering because thefearfrom madness, fear, symbolic itwasalsoa atthesametime, real fearbut, It wasa aswell. plundering of coming victims be- low incomethe familieswith were scared of and werethe city intimidated by thedisorder, Even of thepeopleinpoorneighborhoods whoputanendto it. themselves, the people however Ihave theimpression thatitwas army, the think thatitwere therepressive actionsof represented? thesesackings pact Onemight thesocial thatsuddenrupture of orgy, strange 1988. level of but itdidnotreturn to the 12.4 respectively, to 12.5and 1990and1991, years, the following in thehomiciderate decreased slightly 1, graph As canbeseenin year. lation to theprevious 50%inre- thiswasanincrease of inhabitants; reaching 13.5deathsper100thousand points, craino h ets i oe,CA P C.A. therentist oilmodel, of acerbation hadconducted theex- inthe70s, public who, consequences.violent important alsowith represents, der democracy or- thepoliticalpactandsymbolic ture of we are talkingabouttherup- In thiscase, 1992. acoup d resented by theattempts of thepactisrep- rupture of Another important 1992 The coups d’état: The coups d ooeak:whatwasitthatstopped that So oneasks: The homiciderate in1989increases 4.5 aaoial,tesm rsdn ftheRe- thesamePresident of Paradoxically, ’é tat of February andNovem- February tat of á vez andhisrevolutionary ’é tat in é rez Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 11(2):315-325, 2006 321 .The 23 Total ofTotal Population per 100,000 Rate Homicides (in millions) inhabitants data forbidden The government ofThe government Caldera (1994-1999) Since 1995,Since a transitory stability place took Table 1 1990-2003. Venezuela in Homicides 1990199119921993 2,4741994 2,5021995 3,3661996 4,2921997 4,733 19.71998 4,481 20.11999 4,961 20.62000 4,225 21.12001 4,550 21.5 12.53 2002 5,974 22.0 12.38 2003 8,021 22.9 16.29 2004 6,432 23.4 20.32 9,244 23.4 21.92 of Publication 13,288 23.8 20.32 Source: LACSO. of the Organism assembled from Data Scientific Penal for Statistics. Institute and the National and Criminal Investigations 24.3 22.04 24.7 18.40 25.2 19.43 26.0 25.02 32.99 25.97 36.65 50.96 course chosen by the country by chosen elections in these course was very strange. for a vote decided to People a very in political change twisted manner, see- of candidates ing that for defeating the young for parties the power the two that had shared 40 years, of they a candidate chose older age ofand best representative the traditional policy of the country: R. Caldera. Shall say, the candi- who,date viewpoint, an objective from more the past, other represented than any was adopt- a messenger of the population like ed by the come.times to vote to The population wanted against the parties, and for this theyad- took vantage of of the best living representative the traditional parties and founder of one of them. no important social change, brought political or stability the country. to but it restituted The so- include Venezuela in the multicentric study be- multicentric in the study Venezuela include for establishing normsing developed and atti- violence.tudes towards During these years, the ofnatives be frightened Caracas began to even the noise ofby firework, an innocent thinking be a new militaryit could rise. in the country. The elections of showed 1994 and that the democratic pact was still effective ofthat a pacific change by the government means of elections was possible, but the politi- in a verycal parties deep crisis were tat originated was ’é . . This was the moment, when the tat 22 ’é tat caused violenttat caused the deaths among tat of the beginning 1992 and of the tat exerted on violence went still be- on violence went tat exerted ’é ’é ’é In summary,In the that between say one can In 1992,In the rate of the homicides reached During this period the limit of 4,000 homi- government ofgovernment R. Caldera (1994-1999), the in- ofcidence in ab- homicides almost duplicated in the country. numbers solute ac- into Taking the population growth,count that can say we 22 victims 12 to passed from the homicide rate per 100 thousand inhabitants. not This could be a coincidence. The political crisisof those of and the rupture years the social pact of democracy, to the armed attempts by expressed the government,change had very serious con- violence. for day-to-day sequences only a In ofcouple years, of President one the Republic pro- and two presidents was deposed and two instituted, were visional governments in a cli- ofmate uncertainty of and under the threat a d new coup coups d coups yond. when the military did not stop Violence and put in jail but contin- defeated were rebels in the following years, increase ued to seeing that, in 1993, registered, were 4,292 homicides a rate of 20.3 homicides per 10,000 inhabitants. Shall say, 4 points again, increased the rate and again in 1994 when 4,733 murders increases committed,were of a level reaching 22 homi- cides/100,000 inhabitants. number ofnumber deaths per 16.3 100 thousand in- habitants, than in the previous 4 points more year. 1990 and 1991, In and 2,502 homi- 2,474 in the country registered respective- cides were ly, shall say, number. identical an almost 1992 In however, 3,366, to jumps the rate shall say, 866 cases ofmore homicides, an in- representing ofcrease and the other. one year 34% between But, can see in table 1, as we the impact the d coups too great,too symbolic the pact broken and once felt more people criminals as common as well at ease with violence. using coups d coups military who participated in the confrontations and among the civil population, but the homi- the crisis because of there cides did not finish d legitimacy that the coups Pan American Health Organization decided to American Health Pan cides per year in the countrycides per year was surpassed and the alarm lights lit because of a new social phe- Venezuela. up in nomenon coming Violence punc- that was no longer a problem turned into tual, of it was no longer a moment or a day rage and revolt, the daily life of but affected the peo- ple regularly Briceño-León, R. 322 a oeti neeypsil a.Beitinten- possibleway. has donethisinevery and ment hindered itscontrol andrepression, thegovern- ontheotherhand, and, violence What happenedintheseyears? tendency. normal impossible to be characterized technically asa thecurve abysmal increase andabehavior of isan This war. of declaration aformal without points twenty anincrease of say, shall in 2003, rose to 51homicides/100thousandinhabitants 19.5/100thousandinhabitants, in 1998wasof homiciderate that The most three times more. al- there were 13,288homicides, government, Six years after his mitted allover thecountry. 4,550homicideswere com- in1998, campaign colonel Ch While lieutenant analyst could have imagined. homicides have increased to anextent thatno thisperiod During sis beganin Venezuela. canalways make worse. things course, of leaders, The good andthebadmomentsonway. politicsandeconomy thatdetermine the of theleadersandnothard realities of the will itwere asif forthegoodoldtimes, nostalgia thepresent by tempt of to substitute theevils at- (1994-1999)wereCaldera anillusionary Perez (1989-1993)andR. C.A. governments of could explain thiselectoral choice? Thesecond What else thenovel. challenges andfears of dare ordidthey to face the andfailure, sibility society forallsectors of this istrue social division wasalreadysocial division done. and democracy of the damageto thelegitimacy the coups d of hadovercome Thecountry thetraumas 1998. reduction inthehomiciderates in1997and we findeven aslight mal populationgrowth, When considering thenor- exception to 1996). (with theperiod year of clined innearlyevery murders de- andthatthetotal number of riod, lates around 20homicidesthroughout thepe- itoscil- thatthedeathrate stabilizes, observe onecan Returning 1, to graph cal conflictivity. socialrelations andpoliti- in astabilizationof cial pactwasrecovered andthiswastranslated for a savior for asavior hadbeenlooking It seemedthatthecountry 1999 revolution: The beautiful oil model because they couldoil modelbecausethey notaccept the a figure ableto restitute theadvantages of peoplewere lookingfor theirheart, the deepof On one hand, the political crisis unleashed thepoliticalcrisis On onehand, ongoingpoliticalcri- still a From 1999on, á caudillo vez wasengaged inhiselectoral ’é a n ftebn rss but thebankcrisis, tat andof ic h 0.Pras in Perhaps, since the80s. – itsunfea- – and al occasions thatitwas saidonsever- andthepresident himself crime, tolerant andeven permissive policytowards a oneobserves onehand, On the government. change. of behavior thepossibility revolutionary andhis forsuch alongtime, ple hadsought thehard measures peo- favoreditary theideaof amil- His imageof sures thecriminals. against that hewould andtake ensure safety hard mea- hoped they atthesametime, while, the country transforming of thepossibility hope fororder, represented theirdesire forchange andtheir formany he people thisseemsillogical, though al- and, arevolutionary andof amilitary of theimages herepresented amixture of elected, When Ch maintained two policies. Onecould say thatithas andviolence. to crime respectambiguous discourse andpolicywith people rob are they inneed when have seen. theresults we it anundesired consequence, orbe beitasapoliticalstrategy ornot, tionally thousand thepolice hadeliminated more thantwo year, thatparticular during to declare proudly that, publicsafety policy thatledavice-minister of repressive there isaviolent, er handhowever, film with thetitle film with repeatedly anadvertisement forthe Venezuelan the government systematically and transmitted channel of thetelevision In 2002, police force. the butalsoto measures of fordisarmament es, aggressions andverbal offens- led to awave of that notonly pute thepolice wasexposed to, thesepolicieswas thesystematic disre- One of legislation. inexistent inthe Venezuelan law, in criminal ae aewsfxd but neither thatday nor later adate wasfixed, months the date thefilmwould beexhibited; butnever announcing casted foralongtime, advertisement This wasbroad- government. the thepoliticaloppositionof ganda against thechannel propa- transmitted advertisement, Murderers! Before andafter the the policemen: calling thevictim themotherof ate scream of onecould hearthelonganddesper- ashot, of After thenoise by apoliceman corner. inadark Onesaw beingcommitted thecrime borhood. repression inapoorneigh- manding anactof promoting thefilmshowed apolice officer com- Thescenes selected for dience foranopening. sion channels always theau- do for preparing This duality wasreflectedThis duality inthepoliciesof The Ch u,there are policiesthatfavor violence. But, “ á pre-delinquents vez government hasmaintainedan Shoot tokill “ understandable that ”– anovel concept theway televi- , ” Ontheoth- . á vez was Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 11(2):315-325, 2006 323 . 24 %% 3.0 24.6 91.7 35.0 The disappearance ofThe disappearance statistics homicide Table 2 shows the results of the results 2 shows Table the survey. One Some close relative Some close relative victim you of Where was assassinated in was assassinated robbery or violence in the last 12 months? the last 12 months? ply do not know what the field of happened in know ply do not homicides in these years. is some there Perhaps public servantwill who thinks that homicides ifstop and in the press not published they are researchers. by not investigated must Everyone build his own judgment this respect. to us To the confirm seems to personally this measure worst, that is, been a very im- have must there portant increase, otherwise hide the data? to why the victimization higher an even level, takes to greater submit the victims an even it wants to to silence, than them more make it wants to anonymous:lost their life and they already their names, to allowed not even they are now be numbers. Nevertheless, some nonof- have we 2004,ficial data for the year per- obtained from interviewedsons we among others on victimiza- tion, of in the course survey a carried we out fourth of the population with than 18 more ofyears been victim having age declared of a robbery or some other act of violence (kidnap- ping, extortion, months in the twelve threats) previous the survey, to that and 3% declared assassinated. had been some relative The num- high,ber is quite details call for atten- but two tion: one hand, on re- almost all homicides are a public are ported this is because murders and issue, the po- for be denounced not needing to action; to coming lice the other hand, on the ofsurvey that only a third shows non-fatal vio- the authorities, to is reported lence demon- strating the lack of trust system in the police and justice. aspect deserving A second atten- oftion is the composition of the group offend- ers, the because in both homicides as robberies is not “ . ” .has The expression ” violence is the weapon “ beautiful revolution “ , that violence suggesting can be used and ” This does not seem to be casual. be to This does not seem several At Thus, cannot be surprised one that, in 1999, A friendA relativeA strange person Guard or National Police 16.7 55.6 19.4 5.6 1.7 72.8 22.8 2.0 Source: LACSO. Survey on violence and criminal justice; 2004. Victimization (% positive answer) positive (% Victimization or the offender? was the murderer Who inform the authoritiesDid you answer) (% positive Table 2 2004.Venezuela Victimization, identity of the offender and registry of ocurrence sample,(National no. 1202). The silence ofThe silence the dead: 2004-2005 will reader ask himself:The attentive and why the homicide rates to the author does not refer of is simple 2004 or 2005? The answer the years and sad: the official data of were those years the authorities. by not made available the For history,first time in the recent the homicide the public opinion, to not available are rates researchers. to nor the press neither to sim- We opportunities, of the President the Republic engaged himself contradict popular and old to saying.Venezuelan Venezuelan the decades For taught, were children in the following days the film was shown. the film in the following days The one. a different was apparently intention of those, wrong who are been used for preventing young people in the young been used for preventing violence, by solving their conflicts from schools use violence, to adults discourage but also to mainly during the passage of a rural society to urban life. was surprising observe It how, to in ofhis speeches all hours transmitted by several radio and television stations, sev- the president eral said that this affirmation times ofthe number 5,974, homicides reached in- 9,244 in 2002, to creased exceed and came to ofthe number victims 13 thousand in 2003. In other words, homicides tripled of in six years the so-called true trying be deeply to an idea he knew change to in the population. rooted Briceño-León, R. 324 an important increase inpolicean important violence. itemphasizes theideaof Anyway, gal actions. le- orinthecourse of theirduty fulfillment of thesefactsoccurred in not allow to conclude if do thissurvey butthedataof publicsafety), of the ForcesArmed incharge Guard of (abranch ted by orby police theNational authorities cases inwhich thehomicidehadbeencommit- percentagefact thatstandsoutisthehigh of a Ontheotherhand, cases. of part important inan violence of thenearness showing tims, themwere acquainted thevic- with of fifth part stantial change becausethemodelcontinues butthisdoes notimplyinany sub- increased, thesociety directly offered of to thepoorpart increasedcorruption remarkably. that It isnosurprise begranted. contracts will decides according to to hisfree the whom will eliminated andtheMinister orofficer incharge theinvitations to bidwere Presently, contracts. for competition between companies forpublic law thatregulated andestablishedthenorms in Venezuela there wasa to theState; or services offerproductsfor companies who andpeople are countries almost all theinvitations to bid governmentala transparent in administration institutionalprocedure animportant in ample, For ex- improving have gotten worse. instead of Government institutions procedures. but notof names, of actors, There wasachange of better. which however didnotshow to be new one, in power before wasdeposedandreplaced by a thattheelite It istrue claim somereal changes. nezuela into more poverty andmore violence. itisthesameonethatbrought Ve- not new, Themodel is ceived by thecentral government. utionism andthesecond thepresident; tions of ambi- andtheauthoritarian by thepersonality Thefirst won newforce. model Thestatistanddistributionist in 2003. thepetroleum prices the remarkable increase of 80s andthatsuddenlyreceived newbreath with thesamethatcameto languishsince the model, therentist oil more step intheexacerbation of more in violence Venezuela. now? It are scenarios seemsthatall pointingto What isgoingto happen? What are therisks Where is Venezuela going? One may alsorecognize thattheresources Ch H. Perhaps thedefendersof The Ch – b h bnatfo frevenue re- by theabundantflow of á vez government represents one – statism – wasfavored – á distrib- vez can Ch the presents insideandoutsidethecountry guage. andusing adifferent lan- different sums, fering of- hoistingdifferent symbols, regime, military onlyunderanauthoritarian had inthepast, theoilrent thatwe of same distributionism butitisthe because there were lessresources, to asmallerextent isted several decadesbefore, Thepopulistmechanisms already ex- the same. metric andestablishesplansforawarcalled my, ified soasto includetheUSAasmainene- The Venezuelan wasmod- doctrine military ca. Ameri- theUnitednounced warwith States of thean- inspecial othercountries, tion with anopenwarlike confronta- of the possibility Defense. theRepublic andnotto theMinister of dent of directly subordinated to thePresi- nal safety, inter- incharge of reserves, of armed of branch the Venezuelan ForcesArmed foresees a law of thatthenew But surprising itisvery anticipate. opposition andthesocialprotest isdifficultto to contain benecessary thepolitical lence will How much vio- governmental administration. theprecarious andunsatisfiedwith promises, tions enhanced by thecontinuous presidential whoclaimtheirexpecta- some poorsectors, and pression againstasociety andviolence canonlytakeregime place through more re- nezuela. Ve- of inthehistory andthehighest ernment hisgov- thaninthefirstyear of times higher which meansabudgetsix passed 50dollars, 2006itsur- of andinthebeginning barrel the dollars waseight theoilprice campaign, theelectoral during was dueto thefactthat, feetos lhuhntipsil,doesnot notimpossible, although elections, of A transition by means action. through amilitary or beitthrough elections power, change of whatcould result ina andcontrol, support loosing theregime, lence isadestabilizationof contains it. arebecause they breaking thesocial pactthat thesemessages areactually fomentingviolence but politicaldistraction, of astrategy of part making Probably talk, allthisisonlyempty with seen toAk47 guns. amillion civilians arm itisfore- the President 2006, madeinJanuary according to theannouncement of purpose, á With the populist strategy of giving money giving With of thepopuliststrategy Another aspect of violence hasto violence dowith Another of aspect consolidationBut thetrue asahegemonic Another suggestingvio- politicalscenario e oenetcudsaiieisl.This vez government could stabilize itself. ” ro the or of “ fourth generation fourth ” for which “ asym- Ciência & Saúde Coletiva, 11(2):315-325, 2006 325 ” n la ó ó n Po- ó stico: hacia í n y Desarrollo. lvarez AE,lvarez coor- ó Á n Francisco Herrea n Francisco ó ticos venezolanos en el venezolanos ticos í stica. de de Proyecciones Lolita Aniyar de Castro Aniyar Lolita í “ n del Delito. Caracas: MIJ; a ó í n extranjera en Venezuela de Venezuela n extranjera en , to wanted we here but ó tat in 1992, and this is al- 25 ’é vez. In:Venezuela Las inmigraciones a n R. de la muerte. Contabilidad In: El n R. violence and public health Urban á ó ó n de Prevenci tica venezolana: la desinstitucionalizaci í ó n. Caracas:MPD; 2004. de Publica 2005; 21(6):1629-64. ó ú o-Le o-Le ñ ñ n pol ó un nuevo balance del poder. balance un nuevo Caracas: Fundaci lar; 2004. the 1980s. In: N, Lustig editor. with Coping austeri- ty: povertyAmerica.Wash- and inequality in Latin ington, DC: Institution; Brookings The 1995. a Ch Castro en el siglo XX. Caracas: Fundaci Luque; 2005. p. 35-50 dinadores. Los partidos pol y sus consecuencias. In: JE, Molina siglo XXI. Caracas: Editores; Vadell 2004. p. 9-56. Venezuela, Central de de la Universidad cias Penales de Criminolog Instituto de la Universidad del Zulia.de la Universidad Vi- de Encuesta Nacional Penal. de Justicia y Sistema olencia Urbana Caracas; 2004. de Direcci 2004. de Estad Nacional Instituto poblaci Nacional, organizador. la muerte tom Cuando Calle. Caracas: Editorial Ateneo; 1990. ciones y realidades. Ciencias Econ Venezolana Rev Soc 1997; 3(2-3):215-54. luci in Latin America:in Latin a sociological explanatory model. Cad Sa emphasize two macrosocial aspects, macrosocial two emphasize the fluctu- ations of and the political crisis, the oil rent for compo- fundamental two them considering nents for understanding the dramatic increase of society. Venezuelan homicides in the action and that is whataction and in the last has happened years. of the revolt This is whathappened after February 1989, of when the first increase homi- occurred,cide rates the what happened after ofattempts d a coup in vio- increase for the great so the explanation 1999. after Venezuela in lence be- The links multiple violence are and public health tween ofand the explication violent involves behaviors other variables many Article presesented in 28/03/2006 Article presesented in 31/03/2006 Approved in 14/04/2006 presented Final version 18.A. Baptista del capitalismo rent El relevo 19. G.Venezuela: Marquez poverty and social policies in 20. Berglund S. La poblaci 21. Brice 24. Sociales, Laboratorio de Ciencias de Cien- Instituto 25. Brice 26. Venezuela. y Justicia. de Interior Ministerio Archivos 27. Venezuela. de Planificaci Ministerio 22.A M. Sanjuan La criminalidad en Caracas: percep- 23. JE. Molina de partidos y sistema en la evo- Partidos - s- ó í a y í leo. a ve- ó í mico de mico ó stico. Ca- fica Vene- í í mico. Cara- dition 1821]. ó é fica Venezolana, ier í mica tradicional y el ó xico: de Cultura Fondo conomie politique et de conomie é n 1867]. ’é mica del desarrollo econ mica del desarrollo ó á mica del capitalismo rent lica Andres Bello;lica Andres 1990. nea de Venezuela.nea de Caracas: ó ó á tica sanitaria. Caracas: Minis- leo y desarrollo econ leo y desarrollo edici í ó a n industrial de Venezuela.n industrial de Cara- ó a econ í n R. Venezuela: clases sociales e indivi- n R. perversos del petr Los efectos n R.Vene- and democracy in Petroleum ó ó ó n A. pol Una ó o-Le o-Le t. Paris: Flammarion; 1977. [1 o-Le mica; 1968. [1 ñ ñ ô ñ ó imp ’ In a context of a context In the violence political like Econ torial Ateneo;torial 1980. Caracas: Cient Acta Editorial Fondo Venezuela. Caracas:Vivo; Ediciones Pensamiento 1962. mance and prospects.mance In: Martz JD, DJ, Myers edi- tors. Venezuela: the democratic experience.York: New Publishers;Praeger 1986. p. 437-67. terio de Sanidad y Asistencia Social;Asistencia de Sanidad y terio 1965. cas: Cen- de la Universidad Ediciones de la Biblioteca Venezuela;tral de 1969. de Ediciones Capriles;Consorcio 1991. mico venezolano.mico 1965; Latinoam Econ Rev 17:45-68. tico. Caracas: Ediciones Iesa; 1997. zuela. 2005; Soc Forces 83(1):1-30. Ciencias Sociales 1963.Ciencias 5(1):7-28. Banco Central de Venezuela; CentralBanco de 1990. p. 165-206. Venezuela. en petrolero impacto Econom Revista nezolana. In: H, Valecillos Bello O, compiladores. La contempor economia racas: de la Historia; Nacional Academia 2005. teavila Universidad Cat Universidad teavila duos. Caracas: Cient Acta Editorial Fondo zolana, Capriles; de Ediciones Consorcio 1992. cas: BCV; 1975,1985, 2004. l 11. K. Marx 1968. El capital. M 2. Mata Malave H. Petr 1. C. Irazabal Venezuela, y feudal. esclava Caracas: Edi- References References one we have described, have one we criminal violence, the the po- bands and by by violence committed lice, because considerably increase will to tend the violent individuals will for easy find space seem easy under the political circumstances in circumstances under the political seem easy Venezuela. a military from resulting A change action is not desirable impossible but also not closed and dis- are ways in case the electoral increase. and political segregation content Both scenarios, however, po- more us predict make what other means litical violence because by resists that than a military a government revolt the hand over to can be convinced elections to power? 12. Baptista A. Teor 3. Carrillo Batalla TE. La din 7. Brice 6. Martz JD, DJ. democracy: Myers Venezuelan perfo- 5. Gabald 8. Brice 4. Araujo O. Situaci 13. Furtado C. de la econom El desarrollo reciente 9.A. Baptista El estado y el capitalismo rent 17. Venzuela. Central. Banco econ Informe 15. Brice 14.A. Cordova La estructura econ 10. D. Ricardo Des principes d 16. L. Ugalde Venezuela. La violencia en Caracas: Mon-