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The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. This thesis is a study of the impact of civil-military relations on the place of the Canadian Amy Reserve

(Militia) in Canadian defence policy in the first twenty years after Woxld War Two. During that time, the armed forces conducted three officia1 studies in an effort to define a role for the militia in Cold War defence planning. The Kennedy Report appeared in 1954, the Anderson Report in 1957, and the report of the Suttie Commission in 1964. Each of them recommended a reorganization and teform of the militia to enhance its military utility and cost- effectiveness. However, since none of these succeeded in convincing governments to implement their recommendations, al1 failed to achieve their goals. The question is, why? The question is not one of purely historical curiosity; it has contemporary relevance. In 1995, the Special Commission on the Restmcturing of the Reserves recommended yet another reorganization of the militia in order to forge a stronger working relationship between the regular force and the reserves. Yet, few historians have attempted to answer the question raised by the earlier reports. Those who have suggested an imbalance in the civil-military relationship in Canada; in policy planning for the militia, political expediency frequently overrode military necessity. Although the military planners were able to identify the iii changes they thought were needed to adapt the militia to the nuclear age, the politicians followed a different agenda.

This thesis tests that argument. It breaks new ground by examining the three earlier reports in depth for the first time, and analyzing their reception by the military, the government, and the public. Taking as a starting point the inherent but contradictory position of the militia as both citizens and soldiers, this thesis argues that the root of the problem has been, and continues to be, an imbalance in civil-military relations. Political expediency and non- military considerations consistently have autweighed military requirements and perhaps even cost-effectiveness in the decisions about redefining the place of the Reserve in Canadian defence policy. The preparation of this thesis was facilitated by the following people, to whom 1 owe thanks for their help: my thesis supervisors, Dr. David Charters and Dr. Marc Milner;

Dr. Andrew Johnston; Dr. Steve Harris; Robert Dienesch and Bradley Shoebottom. 1 must also extend my appreciation to the Royal Regiment of Canada and the 48th Highlanders of Canada for having given me the opportunity to experience the militia first-hand as an infanteer. Finally, special recognition goes to my parents, Bernie and Lesia Sherwin, my brother David, and my husband, Aaron Coffey, CD, for their encouragement and support. v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One The Historiography of Civil-Military Relations and the Canadian Army Reserve (Militia) ... Cha~terTwo Reorganizing the Militia for the Postwar Era: The Kennedy Report ...... Cha~terThree The Militia in the Age of H-Bomb Diplomacy: The Anderson Report ...... -.. Chapter Four The Militia on the Periphery of Unification: The Suttie Commission and the Deputy Chief Reserves Study ...... Conclusion Canadian Civil-Military Relations and Militia Reform: An Historical Overview . . Cha~terOne The Historiography of Civil-Military Relations and the Canadian Army Reserve (Militia)

In 1995 a three-member committee which became known as the Special Commission on the Restmcturing of the Reserves was appointed by the Minister of National Defence, the Honourable David Collenette. The committee's members, who included the Right Honourable Brian Dickson, Lieutenant- Charles Belzile (retired) and Professor Jack Granatstein, were given the task of recomending how to increase the reservesf effectiveness while at the same time maintaining their tradition of serving as a link between the Canadian military and the general population.' The report's recommendations were largely political, calling tbeir military value into question. The most striking example of this was the committee's endorsement of the 1994 Defence White Paper's recommendation that the militia, the army component of the reserve forces, retun to its historic role of providing a national mobilization base in the event of war.' Many members of the militia were content with this role in their desire to be respected as true soldiers rather than just "weekend warriors". However, the committee did not elaborate on the operational roles of the reserves, nor did

'Canada, Department of National Defence, Special Commission on the Restructurinq of the Reserves (Re~ortl, (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group Publishing, 1995), p. 6. 2 it comment on the types of conflict for which they would train other than peacekeeping missions in the Balkan and African civil wars. Should this recommendation of the 1995 Special Commission be implemented, the militia will have been given a political "tasking" without a clearly defined military role. The preference for political rather than military recommendations in policy planning for the militia is not

new. An historical analysis of three reports which serve as the foundation of this thesis -- the Kennedy Report (1954)', the Anderson Report (1957)', and the Suttie Report (1964)5 - - demonstrates that the nature of the 1995 report's recomendations is consistent with a trend which manifested itself in the Cold War era, and is indicative of a larger problem in the realrn of civil-military relations in Canada?

'Report of the Board of Officers on the Orqanization of the Canadian Armv (Reserve Force), RFS 200-3/1, 14 January 1954. Directorate of History (D-Hist),Ottawa: 112.043 (Dl)

'A Report on the Orcranization, Emipment and Traininq of the Canadian Armv (Militia). 1957, HQTS 2001-3/1 TD 7122, by W.A.B. Anderson. D-Hist: 73/612.

'The Commission on the Reorsanization of the Canadian Armv (Militia) Part 1, June 1964. D.Hist: 112.043 (D2) 'The first attempt to reorganize and reform the Canadian militia was made by the Otter Committee in 1919. The report is noteworthy for its failure to address "the more fundamental issues of war and peace establishments and preparing the army for the next conflict". Stephen J. Barris states that the commissioners' failings wete not so much their fault, but rather that they had been given narrow terms of reference by the civilian authorities. The "Canadian militia" at the time, however, was the actual Canadian Army, divided into permanent (active) and non- 3 The historical record strongly suggests that the problem of defining a role for the militia is that of a power struggle between the military and the government, as identified by Samuel P. Huntinqton's seminal work on civil- military relations theory, The Soldier and the State: The Theorv and Politics of Civil-Militarv Relations. According to Huntington, the desired civil-military relationship for a liberal-democratic society is one in which civilian controlIt over the armed forces is achieved by the government. In such a case, the military possesses a highly professionalized corps that abstains from interfering in "institutional, class and constitutional politics."' Government alone is responsible for political decision-making, and recognizes the country's armed forces as an independent sphere with its own outlook on national security policy. Yet, the military remains a tool of the permanent (reserve) forces. Therefore, the report of the Otter Committee was actually a reorganization plan for the Canadian Amy as a whole, and not for the non-permanent force exclusively. The three reports that this thesis addresses look specifically at the army reserve force. which was separated from the Canadian Amy regular force in 2906. The antiquated term "militia" was brought into use as the officia1 name for the Canadian Army reserve force due to the recommendations of the Kennedy Report in 1954. It is still recognized as an official name of the Canadian Army reserve force today, although the Latter term is used more frequently. Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Makins of a Professional Amy, 1860-1939 (: University of Toronto Press, 1988), pp. 146-147. 'Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theorv and Politics of Civil-Militam Relations (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 83. state, operating in response to direction from the legally constituted autho~ity.~The antithesis of objective civilian control, states Huntington, is subjective civilian control, in which the military becomes a civilianized "mirror" of the çtate. The rnilitary participates in politics, thereby reducing its professionalism and undennining the statefs military security as a con~equence.~The problem of ffiilitary authority encroaching upon issues which are by tradition and principle the domain of civilian politics is exacerbated when the militia is involved because of its dual nature as a citizen force. The fact that the militia is what sociologist T.C. Willett refers to as a "hybrid" -- an institution that embraces "both military and civilian ideologies and pro cesse^"'^ -- requires a significant degree of authoritative input from both the government and the military when it cornes to policy-making for the militia. Yet, given the militia's historic link with the general population and its status as a citizen force, all policy decisions relating to the militia are inherently political.

The complexity of this matter is compounded further by Canadian society's skepticism of its regular army. Canadians have expressed this sentiment towards professional soldiers

"T.C. Willett, Canada's Militia: A Heritacre at Risk (Ottawa: The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, 1990), p. 100. 5 since the pre-Confederation era, a feeling which is likely to continue for the foreseeable future in light of current events pertaining to our professional army's misconduct on overseas peacekeeping missions, Canadian society's historic skepticism of its professional soldiers makes the

Huntingtonian civil-military relations mode1 even more difficult to attain, as this feeling interferes with the two levels of civil-military relations which are likely to rnaximize military professionalism and objective civilian control: power and ideology." On an ideological level,

Huntington expects the two diametrically opposing beliefs in a liberal-democratic society -- liberalism and the military mind -- to CO-exist in the same govermental structure.12 The Canadian experience shows, however, that civilian society's discomfort with militarism makes any sort of hamony between the two increasingly unlikely, This polarized relationship affects the power level in terms of distribution of authority. If the liberal ethic continues to remain skeptical -- if not fearful -- of military authority, it will grow increasingly reluctarx to delegate power to the military even in areas in which military participation is constitutianally warranted. That is the ultimate problem, and until it is resolved, any attempts to define a clear role for the militia will continue to be hampered by

"Huntington, pp. 85-86.

"Ibid., pp. 90-91. 6 unbalanced decision-making, in which recommendations that are excessively political in nature undemine those having sound military value. Indeed, policy planning for the

Canadian militia is a civil-military relations problem that has ïts roots in Canadian history. Canada's civil-military relations history predates

Confederation, but there is a surprisingly srnall amount of written work on the subject. According to Peter Haydon, one reason which may explain this deficiency is the lack of a strong politico-military culture in Canadian society. Contrary to the conventional arguments on this subject that have been advanced by George Stanley and Charles Stacey who argue that Canada is in fact a nation that was shaped by war, Haydon states that Canada's military heritage has never been a strong feature in Canadian society for two interrelated reasons. First, Canada is perceived to be an unmilitary nation because it "was not created by war, nor has it been tom apart by civil strife"." Second, this "unmilitary" image has revealed itself in the way the state uses the military as an instrument of modern foreign policy. Because the military has been used for "largely idealist rather than defensive reasonsw, this policy has

"Peter Haydon, "The Changing Nature of Canadian Civil- Military Relations in the Aftermath of the Cold War", The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil-Militarv Relations? Proceedinss of the Second Annual Conflict Studies Worksho~,University of New Bruns~ick,eds. David A. Charters and J. Brent Wilson (Fredericton: Centre for Conflict Studies, 1996), p. 51. 7 characterized the Canadian arrned forces with a passive,

Pearsonian image.'' Therefore, what this may suggest is a mistaken belief among Canadians that there has been no argument between the civilian and military authorities in government. This attitude may be changing, however, due to the media's influence in heightening public awareness of current civil-rnilitary relations issues. For example, Haydon

identifies the Mohawk and Persian Gulf crises of August 1990 as the two foremost incidents which shattered the many "long-held illusions" of Canada's military. World-renowned for its peacemaking influence, Canada is identified now as seeking to become an active participant in foreign conflicts where force may be required. But Canadians are troubled by the idea that Canada's military may be growing accustomed to using force.I5 This in turn has led to renewed questioning in both public and political circles of civilian control over the military." Although Haydonfs approach to Canadian civil-military relations is more appropriate to the post- 1945 period, his questions relating to the type and degree of civil control over the military rnay stimulate further

research in civil-military relations history as a means of providing answers to contemporary problems. 8 Despite the small amount of literature that currently makes up the historiographical field in Canadian civil- military relations there are several books and articles which have been instrumental to the development of this thesis. They include Desmond Morton's Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia. 1868-1904;'7 Stephen J. Harrist Canadian Brass: The Makino of a Professional Armv. 1860-1939; Battle E~haustion,~'co- authored by Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew; an essay by Donald F. Bittner, entitled "Canadian Militia Mobilization and Deployment For War: The Iceland Experience of 1940";'' Douglas Blandfs Chiefs of Defence: Government and the Unified Command of the ;" and Peter

Haydonfs essay, "The Changing Nature of Canadian Civil- Military Relations in the Aftermath of the Cold WarN. Each of these works will be discussed in turn following an

"Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia. 1868-1904 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970) . "Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psvchiatrists in the Canadian Armv. 1939-1945 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-QueentsUniversity Press, 1990). ''Donald F. Bittner, "Canadian Militia Mobilization and Deployment for War: The Iceland Experience of 194OV, Armed Forces and Society 18 (1992): pp. 343-361. ''Douglas L. Bland, Chiefs of Defence: Govemment and the Unified Command of the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995). analysis of Samuel Huntington's The Soldier and the State, which provides the theoretical framework for this thesis. Although Huntington's mode1 of objective civilian control over the military was conceptualized using the liberal-democratic principles of American society, it appears to be highly adaptable to Canadian civil-military relations. A strong reason for this may be attributed to the fact that Huntington's theory is firrnly grounded in intellectual history which, when combined with Canadlan historical literature, reveals patallels between American and Canadian liberal-democratic values. The most prominent example of this is the feeling of skepticism by Americans and Canadians of military authority, and the related idea that civilian authorities in goverment are obliged to maintain a firm control over the military, That the degree of skepticism felt by the civilian population towards the military is greater among Americans than Canadians, however, suggests that although these ideas manifested themselves in both societies, their origins were products of different experiences . Huntington's reference to American ideological origins indicates that the Americanst revolutionary political development is responsible for their Machiavellian attitude" towards rnilitary authority. This is best revealed

21Machiavelliwas not cornfortable with the idea of using a standing army, believing instead that "a republic which has its own citizen army is far less likely to be 10 in the American Constitution, which Huntington suggests is a paradox : although it is 'Ifundamental ly consemative" in nature, it espouses at the same time liberal, Lockean ideas." Having borne in mind the oppressiveness of the British, which seemed to manifest itself in the presence of the British regular troops in the Thirteen Colonies prior to the War of Independence, the framers of the Constitution sought to combine the liberal ideology with a conservative attitude "to dictate an inverse relation between political power and military professionali~m~~.~~What this did, States

Huntington, was to make "objective civilian control depend upon the virtually total exclusion of the military £rom political power"." Although Liberalism was adopted by the majority, the school itself became divided in its views on war. The "pacifistN liberals opposed war because it contradicted the liberal belief that men were rational beings who "should be able to arrive at a peaceable solution of difference~".'~Conversely, the liberal "crusaders" justified war as a means of asserting their superior

subjugated by one of its own citizens . . . ". Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. George Bull (London: Penguin, l98l), p. 79. 11 American ideals over others." Yet, the two camps were united in their attitude towards the military profession. Both opposed the military professional because he was perceived to be "an obstacle to the achievement of theix own aims."" The pacifist regarded the professional soldier as a

"warmonger" who went to war to enhance his own prestige. The crusader also rejected the professional soldier, but for the reason that he was "uninterested and unaroused by the ideals for which the war is fought", believing instead that citizen soldiers were the ideal cr~saders.~'The latter is the more important idea insofar as understanding why Americans came to prefer a citizen's rnilitia over a standing army as their nation's defence force. Huntington states that when the

Arnericans did establish a defence force comprised of professional soldiers, it was regarded as a "doubtful necessity" .'' Canada, on the other hand, did not appear ideologically motivated in its preference for a rnilitia over a standing army from the outset. Over the course of history a combination of factors which popularized the militia in Canadian society led to opposition towards the creation of a

"Ibid., pp. 151-152.

29MarcusCunliffe, Soldiers and Civilians: The Martial Spirit in America, 1775-1865 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), p. 101. 12 standing army in Canada. Convenience, suggests George Stanley, is the main reason why the British maintained the French-established citizen's militia in Canada following the Conquest. Upon becoming Governor-General of Quebec in 1766,

Sir Guy Carleton quickly recognized that in addition to providing an inexpensive and pre-organized form of defence,

the militia was an effective tool for local political administration in the colony. Consequently, the militia was

reorganized (and Anglicized) under the Militia Act of 1794

to establish defence forces in both Upper and Lower Canada." National pride, states C.P. Stacey, popularized the militia in Canadian society, providing yet another reason which worked against the establishment of a regular

atmy. Although it was the British regular who actually saved Canada from American conquest in the War of 1812, Stacey argues, Canadians focused more on the Canadian militia's performance in the conflict. The had fought for the King, but the Canadian militiamen had fought for Canada." Ultimately, this led to the creation of the Canadian "militia myth" that was quickly written into history: that is, the erroneous belief in the superiority of

laGeorge F. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954: The Militarv Historv of an Unmilitarv People (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1954), p. 139.

"C.P. Stacey, The Militam Problems of Canada: A Survev of Defence Policies and Stratesic Conditions Past and Present (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1940), pp. 56-57. 13 the militiaman to the regular soldier.'' According to Stephen Harris, a final reason advanced against a professional army was the use of the militia as a tool for patronage." Therefore, because the unlikely triad of convenience, national pride and "political jobberyM3' made the militia a representative institution of Canadian liberal-democratic society, this ultimately led to the belief that a standing army would interfere with the political process. The militia in pre-Confederation Canada had been shaped to mirror society because of the social and political influences upon it; it had become, in Huntingtonian terms, an example of subjective civilian control. A standing army with a professional officer corps would not allow itself to become civilianized in such a manner. The politicians recognized this, and as a result were hostile to the idea of creating a professional defence force when it was first attempted in 1870.35 The manner in which institutional politics affected the development of Canadian civil-military relations is examined in detail by two authors: Desmond Morton in Ministers and Generals, and Stephen Harris in Canadian Brass. Although

"Gwynne Dyer and Tina Viljoen, The Defence of Canada: In the Arms of Empire. Vol. 1. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990), p. 77.

"Harris, p. 218. 14 both authors offer explanations of how the disharmonious relationship between the civilian and military authorities

in Canada began, they differ in their ideas of where the seeds were sown and by whom. Morton believes that the Canadian civil-military relationship has its origins in British imperial policy, which manifested itself through the authority of the eight British officers who were the General

Officers Commanding (GOCs) of the Canadian militia from 1874 to 1904. The fact that these men were British rather than Canadian did much to foster public antagonism towards the establishment of a professional army in Canada. Morton cites

two reasons to explain this. First, although Canadians initially believed that they needed a British officer as GOC to act as "an impartial and external authority in their military administration to Save them from the misdeeds of their political mastersN, repeated experlence demonstrated that a general's defiance of political authority would never be accepted by the public. Moreover, the generals'

"outsider" status gave the politicians a stronger reaçon to arouse the public's disaffection for professional soldiers: because the GOCs were foreigners, it was felt that they had no right to defy the wishes of the Canadian politicians." Second, Morton claims that the conflicts which took place between the ministers and the generals were also the result of a clash between British and Canadian institutional 15 values. Whereas the British generals attempted to transfer the customç of the British War Office to Canada, such as the idea that military matters should be "divorced" from party politics, Canadian politicians fought to keep their military steeped in patronage and political influence. As a result of their failure to follow the British example, the Canadians were left later on "without the means or the position" to separate the military and civilian spheres in go~ernment.~' The actual types of political interference in military matters to which Desmond Morton refers are discussed at length by Stephen Harris in Canadian Brass. Specifically, Harris looks at the civil-military relationship from the professional army's point of view, focusing on the way in which political inroads into military affairs undermined the military's professional character. Political patronage -- the practice of politicians to use military appointments to reward their benefactors -- is identified by Harris as the one factor that was largely responsible for the professional army's stunted growth in Canada, as it interfered with three key attributes which Huntington believes are essential to its development: expertise, corporateness and professionalism.'~ecauseof patronage, military appointments prior to 1914 were based on an individual's economic worth and party affiliation, However, the British

"Ibid., p. 198.

38Harris, pp. 3-5. generals who attempted to organize Canada's professional army during the period 1870-1904 recognized that true professionalism would be achieved among its offices corps only if its members were selected for their military knowledge and experience. That meant, of course, that the politicians would have to abstain from interfering in military af fairs, which proved to be nearly impossible ." The politicians were unwilling to give up the practice of using military appointments as a form of patronage, but the situation became even more problematic when the militia protested the establishment of a professional force. According to Harris, . . . the worst permanent force officess wanted nothing to do with the introduction of merit as a basis for promotion [and] the militia feared any reform that might lead the regulars to usurp the citizen soldier's pride of place in Canada's military establishment. . .40 Consequently, the British generals argued that by not allowing reform, the politicians were guilty of unwarranted interference in military affairse4'

It was not until the 1950s, says Harris, that the professional army began to obtain the credibility and legitimacy that it had been seeking for so long. Yet. political interference in military affairs continued to

- - "Ibid., p. 217. "Ibid., p. 218. "Ibid., p. 219. 17 remain a problem in preparing the army in peace for war. Harris points out that onïy once, in 1939, did Canada have a

pre-existing mobilization plan. As for the other conflicts in which Canadians participated, from 1870 to 1950,

Canadians have made it political policy to respond in an ad

hoc manner. As a result of this preference, Barris infers that the Canadian Amy is characterized to this day for reacting to crisis situations in the tradition of colonial times, when the local militia was called upon to respond with a moment's notice." The consequences of faulty civilian planning for military operations to which Canadian Brass alludes are revealed dramatically in Terry Copp and Bill McAndrew's book Battle Exhaustion, and in Donald F. Bittner's article, "Canadian Militia Mobilization and Deployment for War: The Iceland Experience of 1940". In Battle Exhaustion the authors identify the government's ill-conceived manpower policies as having been largely responsible for exacerbating psychiatrie casualties among the fighting troops. Although the army is held partly responsible for this problem because of its "sloppy manpower allocations", which resulted in tao

few men to do the actual fighting and tao many for administrative duties, the government's decisions which led

to an over-manned air force and two amies (one of which was 18 for home defence only) appear to be the target for most of the authors' ~riticism.'~The resultant situation produced a manpower crisis in the summer of 1944 &en "the lack of trained infantry reinforcements became a quiet national scandai."" Before the Mackenzie King government made the decision to send the NRMA "Zombies" overseas as a solution to the problem, the Canadian Amy did what it could to find replacement troops on such short notice." Troops in rear echelon and "redundant" units, such as anti-aircraft gunnerç, were remustered and given a crash course in infantry techniques and sent to the front lines of battle."

But the lack of training that the replacements received made them, according to Copp and McAndrew, "prime candidates for early burial or hospitalization as physical or psychiatric casualties"." The poorly trained replacements presented a greater problem as well, as their lack of preparedness caused a higher rate of battle exhaustion among the trained

''Copp and McAndrew, p. 100.

''NRMA is the abbreviation for Canada's conscription policy -- the "National Resources Mobilization Act" -- which was brought into legislation by the Mackenzie King govemment in 1942. The tenn "zombieu was used in reference to the conscriptees, who were initially drafted for home service only. The second conscription crisis of 1944 sent roughly 13,000 of these men overseas. Desmond Morton, 4 Militam Historv of Canada (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990), pp. 219-221. ''Copp and McAndrew, p. 101. 19

troops who worried about how the replacements' incompetence would affect them.'' Like Copp and McAndrew's argument, Donald F. Bittner identifies in his article civilian planning deficiencies as

the one factor that was largely responsible for the lack of preparedness among Canadian combat troops early in the war. The subject of Bittner's focus is the unprepared and ill-

trained Canadian militiamen who made up the "2" Force, which was depioyed to Lceland in the summer of 1940." The unit was a composite of two infantry units -- the Royal Regiment of Canada and Les Fusiliers de Mont Royal -- and a machine- gun battalion, the Cameron Highlanders of Canada, which had been hastily organized in response to a British request that

Canada replace the British troops who had occupied Iceland since May 1940. After the fa11 of France, the British needed their troops which had been stationed in Iceland in order to deal with larger problems on continental Europe. The problemç among the Canadian troops who made up the "2" Force quickly became apparent, however, as a result of their having been ill-equipped and ill-trained on such short notice. Morale and behavioral problems soon surfaced, and there were several suicides among the troops. Bittner concludes rhat had it not been for the Canadian government's "general reluctance to readily acknowledge the possibility

4aIbid., pp. 101-102. 49Bittner,p. 344. 20 of committing military forces outside their national boundaries or regional aream, the "Z" Force might have been spared the problems that it suffered as a result of its poor preparation.'O

As Canadian civil-milita- history moves away from the war years and into the postwar era, the historiography reveals a significant character change. What makes the work of Douglas Bland and Peter Haydon different from the authors who focus on an earlier period is their methodology, By linking faulty trends of the past with their consequences in the present, the authors offer warnings for the future, thus giving their work a didactic quality. Specifically, Bland and Haydon examine past defence planning errors, suggesting that unless the civilian and military authorities alter their course of direction, existing problems rnay develop into crisis situations in the future. One such problem is the type and degree of control that has been exercised by the civil authorities over the military which, the authors suggest, may adversely affect the function and structure of both the regular army and the militia unless prescriptive measures are taken. In Chiefs of Defence Douglas Bland examines civilian and military policy-making trends in Canadim history to explain why, in his opinion, "no Canadian bas truly controlled national defence policy" during the period 1964- 21

1994." Bland focusses on the office of the Chief of Defence (CDS) in particular, which he believes has failed in its role to contribute to defence planning from a purely

Canadian perspective. The position of CDS was created by , the Liberal Minister of National Defence in

1964, to pursue defence policy planning independently of foreign influences." But nothing changed, states Bland, as a fllegacyof willing subordination" -- namely the Canadian civilian and military authorities' willingness to allow strategic thought, national command and operation direction to devolve ont0 foreigners (via NATO, NORAD and the UN) -- prevented the CDS from affecting change.'' The collapse of Communism, however, has heralded in a new strategic era for Canada to master its own defence process. But if Canada continues to abrogate its responsibility to make "fundamental policy decisionsflby allowing foreign authorities such as NATO, the United States and the European community to dictate national defence policy, warns Bland,

Canada will risk "unfortunate domestic and partisan implications" .='

'%land, p. xv.

''Prier to the unification of the Canadian Armed Forces, the three service branches were represented by individual administrative heads: the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS), the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS). Ibid., p. ix.

531bid., p. xiii. "Ibid. 22 Like Bland, Peter Haydon examines the possibility of a crisis situation developing within the Canadian militaq's command structure in his essay "The Changing Nature of Canadian Civil-Military Relations in the Aftermath of the

Cold War". Drawing upon Samuel Huntington's theory as a guide and Canadian history for answers, Haydon examines the process of civilian control over the military through several perspectives as a means of determining whether or not the relationship is in jeopardy in light of current military scandals such as the Somalia affair? What Haydon finds is that these problemç are not part of a crisis in command within the military, but rather symptoms of a structural problem which has its mots in a long process of encroaching subjective civilian control over the military. He suggests that a combination of factors which include political immaturity, an uneven evolution in Canadian civil- military relations and a lack of public support for the military has led to a weak and politicized military command str~cture.'~As a remedy to this problem, which amounts to a lack of trust and cooperation between the goverment and the military, Haydon calls for "a clear separation of departmental and military responsibilities within DNDgM5'

Should the problem be allowed to prevail, states Haydon, "it

''Haydon, p. 47. Ybid., pp. 60-61.

"Ibid., p. 61. 23 could grow to crisis proportion through a collapse of command and control . Finally, the task of offering exclusive insight into the problematic civil-military relationship that affected the militia particularly between the years 1954-1964 falls to several collections of primary documents from the Directorate of History in Ottawa and the National Library of Canada. For the Kennedy Report, the first study that was

designed to improve the combat efficiency of Canada's part- time soldiers, the correspondence of the Chiefs of General

Staff during the period 1952-1963 provides the most useful supplementary material to the report it~elf.~~This collection contains the letters and persona1 memoranda of

the various defence chiefs in communication with their

General Officers Commanding and the defence ministers of the period. Specifically, the correspondence chronicles the failures of the Kennedy Report's political-based recommendations, which ultimately led to another attempt at militia reform in 1957. The Anderson Report, a secret one- man study that was produced by Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson at the behest of Lieutenant-General Howard Graham (CGS 1955-

l958), differed from its predecessor in that it represented an attempt to solve the militia's problems with purely

59"CGS Files on the Militia: December 1952 to May 1963", D.Hist: 112.1 (0160). 24 military solutions. Although Anderson's recommer,dations appeared to offer practical and realistic operational goals

for the militia, the report itself was pushed aside by the Diefenbaker government when it was decided that the militia would be better off acting in a national survival and civil defence capacity. The CGS papers are useful to this report as well, as are the House of Cornons Debates for the years 1957-1959 in order to understand the political significance of the role change. In 1964, the Suttie Commission undertook the last attempt to reform the Canadian militia for more than 30 years. The report of the Suttie Commission, like the Kennedy Report, appeared to favour political recommendations for the militia more than those of sound military value, but for different reasons. Whereas the Kennedy Report was concerned with the political implications of foregoing tradition within the militia units, the Suttie Commission's report was concerned primarily with budget-cutting within the Department of National Defence. Two primary documents which provide the best background information for the Suttie

Report are the Glassco Commission Report of 1963" and the

1964 White Paper on Defence", as both are highly reflective of the government's cost-consciousness at the time.

6oThe Royal Commission on Government Organization, Report 20: Department of National Defence. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 21 January 1963, Vol. 4., D.Hist: 80/225. 6'Canada, Department of National Defence. White Paper on Defence. Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964. 25 Collectively, the literature which currently makes up the field of Canadian civil-military relations history has revealed its usefulness to this thesis twofold. Histosically, the authorst varied subject matter provides a coherent background to the prirnary documents upon which this thesis is based. More important, however, is the fact that this body of literature reveals a limited chronological scope, covering the period from 1868 to 1945 only,

Consequently, it exposes a historiographical gap, thereby inviting additional research to close it. It is the intention of this thesis to respond to that challenge; by focussing on the period from 1954 to 1964, it is hoped that a contribution to the field will be made insofar as exploring uncharted territory in Canadian civil-rnilitary relations history. Chapter Two Reorganizing the Militia for the Postwar Era: The Kennedy Report

Eight years after the end of the Second World War, the

Canadian Amy commissioned the first study designed exclusively to improve the combat effectiveness and cost

efficiency of Canada's reserve army, The study was conducted by a three-member board which included two retired militia officers -- Major-General Howard Kennedy and Major-General E.J. Renaud -- and one active militia officer, Major-General H.F.G. Letson. By order of the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General , the board formally convened on 27 May 1953, one year after Simonds first discussed the issue of reorganizing the reserve force with the General

Officers Commanding (GOCs) of the several Canadian commands and the Minister of National Defence, .' The report on the reorganization of the militia comprised a part

of a larger reorganization which affected the Canadian Amy

as a whole. By early 1952, Simonds had recognized the need for change when it had become evident that the regular force

was in a state of "disparate organizationu: its battalions were not fully interchangeable for different military operations, nor were its soldiers subject to the same rules

'"Chronological History - Kennedy Report" f rom the Persona1 and Confidential Correspondence of the CGS to GOC Commands, October 1961 - May 1965. D.Hist: 112.1.009 (D39) 27 and regulations and terms of service.' For example, the soldiers who made up Canada's NATO force in Hanover, Germany (the 27th Brigade), and the Korean Special Service Force were not requiced to serve anywhere other than in their respective theatres of operations. Only the "realt'regular army -- the soldiers who made up the first battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), the Royal Vingt-Deuxième Regiment (R22eR), the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (RCHA), and the two armoured regiments (Lord Strathcona's Horse and the Royal Canadian Dragoons) -- could be sent anywhere without restrictions on their terms of serviceO3The militia had its own unique problems, however, and a special study was required to address the shortcomings and make recommendations for change. The results of the study were compiled formally on 14 January 1954 as the Report of the

Board of Officers on the Orsanization of the Canadian Armv

JReserve Force), otherwise known as the Kennedy Report.' The timing of Simondst request to review militia policy in late 1952 was not coincidental to Canada's participation in the Korean War and European security operations under

'Stephen J. Harris, ''The Postwar Amy in Canada and NATO1', We Stand on Guard: An Illustrated Historv of the Canadian Armv, ed. John Marteinson et al. (Montreal: Ovale Publications, 1992), pp. 377-378.

'Report of the Board of Officers on the Orsanization of the Canadian Armv (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954. 28 NATO command one year earlier. In each situation, the militia alone could not satisfy the operational manpower requirements of those commltments. For the Korean War, the militia simply had not been able to provide an adequate pool of trained manpower that could be mobilized within a short period of time. Consequently, the Korean Special Service Force, which became known as the Canadian Army Special Force (CASF), was created from a mixture of reservists, regular force troops and a large number of Second World War veterans.' Unlike Korea, however, a rapid mobilization was not required for the 27th Brigade. Therefore, the militia on its own was able to provide the initial complement of men that made up Canada's new NATO force. Yet, the militia was unable to maintain the 27th Brigade's numberse6 An examination of the Canadian governmentfs cautious foreign and defence policies of the late 1940s will demonstrate that although the federal government increasingly became more active in international affairs during this time, it failed to give adequate support and guidance to the military component that had become so crucial a part of its foreign policy.

%.M. Urquhart, "The Changing Role of the Canadian Militia, 1945-1975", unpublished M.A. thesis, (University of Victoria, 1977), Appendix Hf "Estimate of the Number of the Canadian Amy Special Force From the Militia", p. 189. %arris, p. 270. 29 During the latter half of the 1940s, Canada was not an active participant in key global events to the same degree as its wartime allies, Great Britain and the United States.

This has been attributed to a "diplomatic hiatus" that affected Canada's Department of External Affairs in the years from 1945 to 1949.' More specifically, this "hiatus" has been linked to Prime Minister W.L. Mackenzie King's supposed ignorance of foreign affairs at the tirne.' However, there is evidence to the contra- that shows Mackenzie King as having been acutely aware of the changing geopolitical environment following the end of the Second World War. Canada had entered into uncharted territory at the end of the war as a "middle power" amongst its Great Power wartime allies -- Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union -- causing Mackenzie King to approach foreign affairs with a great deal of trepidation. Because of its middle power status, the Prime Minister worried about Canada being

"ruled by the great [and] ignored by the great", as well as the lack of diplomatic precedent to follow by e~ample.~ Consequently, Canada's armed forces abstained from participating in crisis situations such as the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) in 1947 and the Berlin Airlift

- - 'Urquhart, p. 1. 'Harris, p. 212.

'James Eayrs, Peacemakinq and Deterrence: In Defence of Canada, Vol. III (Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 1972), p. 140. 30 in 1948, as Mackenzie King wanted to avoid involving the country in dangerous situations that could lead to war. The perceived lack of an impending threat to Canada's national security also explains the Canadian government's retreat from international politics following the end of the Second World War. Although the military planners had recognized the Soviet Union as the new potential enemy in the postwar world, there was little credible information to prove the imminence of a Soviet threat to Canadian national security, even in light of the Gouzenko affair."' Lieutenant-General Charles Foulkes, the first postwar CGS, delivered an address to the officers of Army Headquarters in 1948 in which he made two important predictions. First, he forecast that the postwar world would be divided into two camps between the Soviet Union and the United States. Second, he spoke about the mode of warfare for future global conflicts, referring in particular to the notion of "Super Blitzkrieg Warfaretl based on the "extravagant use of atomic

laIgor Gouzenko was a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa who "defectedt' when he arrived at the office of the Minister of Justice on the morning of 6 September 1945, claiming to have documents containing the detai 1s of an espionage-ring in Canada. An espionage-network was in fact discovered, and it was fomd to extend into the cipher section of the Department of External Affairs, the National Research ~ouncil,the War Information Board and the British Kigh Commission. C-P Stacey, Canada and the Acre of Conflict: A Historv of Canadian External Policies, Vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 394. energy"." Foulkes' predictions of when the Soviet Union would be capable of delivering such a strike against the Western world were very vague; he estimated that the Soviets rnight have atomic bombs sufficient to start a war anywhere from three to 15 years." Furthermore, the Chiefs of Staff stated that Canadian intelligence was not sufficiently developed yet to produce much material from its sources, and that American intelligence on Soviet capabilities was only slightly better .l3

As a result of Canada's withdrawal from foreign affairs, comhined with the lack of a perceived enemy threat in the period immediately following the end of the Second

World War, there was nothing to guide Brooke Claxton, who assumed the defence portfolio in 1946, in defence planning for the future. Instead, writes David Bercuson, Claxton "chose a future that best fitted the budget"." The postwar defence budgets were small and the reductions in defence spending were reflected in the size of the Canadian Army: the active force was reduced to 25,000 men, and the militia

llffExtractsfrom an address by the Chief of the General Staff, Lt-General Charles Foulkes, to officers of Army Headquarters, 28 January 1945 (Foulkes Papers), as cited in James Eayrs, Growinq UP Allied: In Defence of Canada, Vol. -IV (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), pp. 389-90.

"David J. Bercuson, True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), p. 165 . was reorganized into a force consisting of six infantry divisions and four armoured brigades.'' The militia continued to be relied upon to provide a mobilization base for a field force in the event of an emergency, and both forces were assigned three fairly traditional roles to deal with such emergency situations, as defined by the 1947 White

Paper :

1) to defend Canada against aggression; 2) to assist the civil power in maintaining law and order within the country;

3) to carry out any undertakings which by our own voluntary act we may assume in co-operation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United nation^.'^

In spite of Canada's apparent isolationism, its active and reserve armies were not dormant in the years from 1946 to 1949. During this period both the active force and the militia were occupied with regional defence operations that stemmed from Canada's cooperation with the United States on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD)." The militia became involved with both air and ground defence operations

I5Eayrs, Peacemakina and Deterrence, p. 87.

17According to David Bercuson (p. 1551, there was "considerable agreement" between Canada and the United States about the nature of the Soviet ailitary threat. Although neither nation was concerned about the imminence of such a danger (in 1946, the Americans had predicted that the threat to the security of North America would be "slight" over the next five to six years), the PJBD planning during this period may be interpreted as having been defensive "insurance" to counter such a threat in the future. 33 under the aegis of the PJBD. For air defence, a nurnber of infantry and armoured battalions located on flight paths over major cities were converted to anti-aircraft artillery.'' As for ground operations, the militia was encouraged to recruit numberç for the purpose of sending abroad a force to defend against a Soviet ground attack on European soi1.19 The active force's coatribution to the PJBD operations consisted of a special airborne and air- transportable brigade group known as the Mobile Striking Force (MSF), whose principal roles were to target and destroy enemy lodgements within forty-eight hours of being established in northern Canadian territory, to maintain control over the Alaska Highway, and to maintain Canadian sovereignty in the North. However, the MSF exercises soon revealed the first weaknesses in Canada's postwar defence policies. The MSF was roughly 3,000 men understrength and lacked adequate airlift. Thus, it had proved not ta be the "dedicated, quick-reaction force" that had been intended, because the elimination of enemy positions in the north was revealed to be beyond its

"William Johnston and Stephen J. Harris, "The Post-War Army and the War in Korea", We Stand on Guard, ed. John Marteinson, et al. (Montreal: Ovale Publications, 19921, p.

335 0

''David A. Charters, "Five Lost Years: The Mobile Striking Force 1946-1951" Canadian Defence Ouarterly, 7 (1978): p. 45. 34

capabilities. Furthermore, the success of the Soviets' first atomic test on 29 August 1949 meant that they would soon be capable of launching nuclear air strikes at major North American cities rather than sending airborne forces to capture and secure northern airfields for use by Soviet bombers." The MSF now seemed obsolete. By 1950, it had become evident that Canadian defence policy required more clarity and definition consistent with a clear objective of Canada's role in the postwar world. Yet, no other events would expose the weaknesses in Canada's defence policies in the way that the Korean War and NATO security operations did

in 1951. In particular, the two events underxnined the Canadian government's reliance upon the rnilitia in its existing form as the country's first line of defence by exposing the deficiencies which resulted from the vague postwar defence policies that had dictated its size, structure and purpose. When North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel on

25 June 1950, thus initiating the Korean War, Canada watched with concern but did not make an immediate military cornmitment to the conflict other than dispatching three destroyers to far eastern waters." William Lyon Mackenzie King was no longer prime minister, but his successor, Louis St. Laurent, did not initially appear to react differently

"Johnston and Harris, pp. 336-337.

2 2 Bercuson, pp. 207-208. 35 in responding to crisis situations in national defence. The

Canadian government had been reluctant to involve itself in Korea in part because of the country's rnilitary unpreparedness for such an event." Although the Americans were in desperate need of allied troops by the end of July, Canada did not have a special force in reserve that could mobilize quickly enough to help. Canada's few active troops were still assigned to the Mobile Striking Force mission and were needed for the defence of the country itself." The militia had more than enough men to contribute to the Korean war effort, but the government was not particularly interested in asking for the reservists' help. Specifically, the government did not believe that the militia could provide a sufficient field force in the shortest possible tirne.'' Nonetheless, in order to accommodate the Americans' request, approximately 2,600 reservists were included among the 7,000 troops mobilized for Korea.'vhe government understood the reservistsf lack of readiness for such an operation. "Considerable training" was required to bring the participating militia soldiers up to the regular force level of operational fitness. It was noted that it took six months

'%id., Appendix 8, "Estimate of the Number of Men Joining the Canadian Army Special Force From the Militia", p. 189. to train a rifleman to operational standards and "many more" for the majority of other tradesmen. As a consequence of the reservists' unpreparedness, the 25th Brigade was not committed to battle until ten months after its formation." Although Canada resolved its manpower problem in time to make a meaningful contribution to the UN war effort in Korea, problems pertaining to the Canadian Armyfs structure arose once again when Canada made its first military contribution to NATO on 30 January 1951. The Korean War had been perceived as a "prelude to some further Communist initiative in Europet'and had caused the NATO allies to augment their ground troops against Soviet aggression on

European territory." In reaction to allied pressure, the Canadian government realized that it could no longer get away with simply providing surplus matériel and equipment to its NATO partners. As a result, Canada arranged to send naval forces, fighter squadrons and one of ground troops to Europe for NATO security ope ration^.'^ However, finding the troops to do the job proved to be more problematic than organizing the CASF for Korea. Although two

z7Memorandum from Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, to the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, re: Canadian Army Ready Reserve, HQS 2316-1 TDS 5 June 1952, D.Hist: 112.1 (D160), "CGS Files on the Militia: December 1952 to May 1963".

"Stephen J. Harris, "The Post-War Amy in Canada and NATOff, p. 369. 37 active force armies now existed -- the Mobile Striking Force troops and the CASF -- neither one could provide extra bodies for Europe. In addition, there were legal ramifications involving the members of the 25th Brigade, which had been intended initially for NATO operations in Europe once the Korean war came to an end. The CASF soldiers had signed on "for duration" only and therefore were not eligible for general service.30 As a result, the new CGS, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, decided to use the militia to make up the 27th Brigade. However, the mobilization of the militia once again posed a new problem, since very few of its units could raise a complete battalion whose members were prepared for overseas service. The problem was temporarily resolved by

Simonds, who created six composite infantry, rifle and highland battalions from fifteen militia units to form the so-called "PANDA" battalions." But Simonds' composite idea was not wholly successful in the end, given that the men still bore the names and uniforms of their parent militia units. It was difficult for the NATO troops to develop a sense of loyalty towards these ready-made battalions. Furthermore, when the first batch of married men went on

31wP~~DA"was an acronym for "Pacific and Atlantic", as militia units were selected from across the country to contribute men to these battalions. Sean M. Maloney, War Without Battles: Canada's NATO Briqade in Germanv, 1951-1993 (Whitby: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1997), p. 22. 38 leave in early 1953, several of the contributing militia battalions could not generate enough recruits to keep their companies up to ~trength.~'With both Korea and NATO having exposed the organizational weaknesses of the militia, it was time for reorganization. According to Simonds, the main problem lay with the militia, which was ridden with organizational, administrative and training deficiencies. First, he felt that the existing structure produced too many units that were too diffuse, resulting in a large number that were "competing unduly against one another" for rnanpower.33 Second, the number of soldiers per unit was not proportionate to unit size, causing excessive overhead in administrative requirements and training needs. Third, reservists found it increasingly difficult to achieve the

same training standards as their regular force counterparts because of the diminishing number of experienced personnel within the reserve force itself. Consequently, Simonds felt that it was "impractical to demand such a high standard [of training] in light of the amount of time that the average Reserve Force officer and man can devote to his military

3zHarris, "The Post-War Amy in Canada and NATO", p. 376. ''Letter from Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, to the General Officers Commanding swnmarizing the findings of a conference to restructure the army reserve force, "Organization, Adninistration and Training of the Canadian Amy Reserve Force", HQC 2001-3/1 (CGS), 12 December 1952, D-Hist: 112.1 (D160). training", and suggested that it might be better for the militia to have its training standards lowered." These were the challenges that the members of the Kennedy board of officers faced when they were given the task of reorganizing the militia in the spring of 1953. Over the next year the board members assessed the suitability of the existing divisional system in relation to the wartime requirement as reflected by army plans and peacetime training needs. The militia was assigned a new role, which would be a) [to] provide the nucleus of a partially trained and equipped force which may be quickly mobilized and brought up to strength in the case of an emergency . And, should Canada be invaded by an enemy force, the rnilitia would be required b) [to] provide assistance to the Active Force in containing and eliminating them.''

In addition, the officers questioned the numbers and types of units of each corps to be included in the militia's wartime requirements. The militia's faulty administrative practices were examined next, with the board looking specifically at how the militia could overcome recruiting, equipment and accommodation problems. Finally, the board addressed training by looking at the type and level of

"Ibid.

"Report of the Board of Officers on the Orcranization of the Canadian Army (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, Part III, p. 1. 40 instruction most suited to the militia in relation to mobilization requirements In total, twenty-four recommendations were made upon which the militia would be reorganized, including a name change: the reserve force would return to using its traditional title, the "Canadian Army (Militia)", and the active force would becorne known as the Tanadian Army (Regular Force)V7 Although the Kennedy board members -- al1 general officers -- were responsible for the way in which the militia would be reorganized, they were not free from the pressures of the civil and military authorities that competed to influence their decisions. The Minister of National Defence and the Conference of Defence Associations

(CDA)'" represented the civil or political authorities in this case, and the General Officers Commanding (GOCs) of the

"Ibid., Part III, p. 4. ''The previous use of the title "Reserve Force" had drawn criticism from its members who felt that the general public might have seen them as "inactive" and "of little importancet'in comparison to the regular force, which had been known officially as the "Active Force". Ibid., Part III, p. 6.

"The CDA was founded in 1932 as an amalgamation of the individual Corps Associations, such as the Canadian Infantry Association and the Canadian Artillery Association. As a unified body, the CDA hoped to attain more bargaining power for the various branches of the rnilitary that its members represented in their dealings with the federal goverment. Among the vafious activities that the CDA has to its credit is its "refusal to acquiesce quietly to militia reorganizations". Major W. Alexander Morrison, The Voice of Defence (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1982), p. 45. 41 various Canadian commands made up the military authority, largely representing the interests of the regular force. The inclusion of the CDA appears to have been a careful decision on Simonds' part to ensure that al1 the parties who would be affected by the outcome of the reorganization would be able to make a contribution." This had not happened during the postwar reorganization of the army in 1946, as the CDA and the militia had been excluded from the decision-making process by the Army General Staff and the Minister of

Defence.'' As a result of this policy, the CDA, which had lobbied previously on behalf of both the regular army and the militia, appeared to ally itself more with the latter." Given the CDAfs role as a link between the military and civilian communities, it is plausible that Simonds considered how the CDA might turn the public against the regular army and further polarize the relationship between the regular and reserve force soldiers if it were excluded again,

As a consequence of the defence ministerfs involvement, the Kennedy board was instructed to include a provision among its recommendations for the creation of an "immediate reserve" as a result of the militiafs inability to provide a body of well-trained troops that could be mobilized quickly

3gIbid., p. 121. "Ibid., p. 109.

"Ibid., p. 113. 42 for the Korean War.'* The CDA's requests were more numerous,

however, perhaps as a result of its exclusion from the first postwar reorganization effort in 1946. Most of the CDAfs suggestions pertained to administrative matters, such as

increases in pay, promûtions, clothing, vehicles, and funds for recruiting and band instruments. The CDA also addressed the issue of training, and requested that the board make a recommendation to increase the amount of time for militia

soldiers to meet their training standards. Finally, the CDA suggested that the Kennedy board of officers visit t'ail

units and formation commanders of the Reserve Force, and representatives of the various Defence Associationstfto

assist them in their reorganization eff~rt.'~ From the regular force's point of view, the General Officers Commanding of the several Canadian commands had recommended to Lieutenant-General Simonds in writing that the militia be radically overhauled, and that the existing

''The idea of an "immediate reserve" was discussed in detail for the first time at the 526th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 3 July 1952. The defence minister had proposed that this force be made up of former regular force soldiers who would be enrolled for a three-year period and receive twenty-one daysf training per year, as well as a $100 annual retaining fee. The new force was created in 1954 and became known as the Canadian Amy Ready Reserve. The Ready Reserve was unsuccessful, however, due to its failure to attract a sufficient number of members. This led to its cancellation in 1956. Memorandum from Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, to the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, HQS 2316-1 TDS (CGS) 5 June 1952, D.Hist: 112.1 (Dl601 . "ethnic-based" (e-g. units that had a distinct ethnic affiliation, such as the Irish Regiment of Canada and the

Toronto Scottish) regimental system be scrapped in favour of provincial battalions in order to improve training and organizational efficiency." They were not unaware, however, of the political consequences that such a course of action would have. Major-General Chris Vokes, General Officer Commanding of Western Command, told Simonds in a letter that "There will be much heart burning, gnashing of teeth, and political pressure, and it will take great strength of will to produce the required re~ult".~'Yet Vokes also beiieved that it would be "better to endure an upheaval now and get the necessary reforms under way than to endure the present wasteful, top-heavy and outmoded organization" .'" Lieutenant-General Howard Graham supported Vokest cal1 for radical reform of the militia, as he informed Simonds that in its existing state, "The Reserve Force will not be ready

"Simonds had sent a form letter to the General Officers Comanding of the several Canadian conunands on 3 Septenber 1952 to propose a two-day conference in Ottawa to discuss the problems affecting the Reserve Amy. The following correspondence from Major-General Chris Vokes and Lieutenant-General Howard Graham are the letters that they wrote in response to Simonds' proposal, From the file "Material Supplementary to the Kennedy Report", D. Hist, 73/6O6.

"Letter from Major-General Chris Vokes, GOC Western Command to Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, 9 September 1952, Do Bist.: 73/606, 44

for the field on M-Day" ." However, Graham was also aware of

the political consequences, as he added that "Rny proposa1 to abolish a unit, particularly with traditional and

territorial connections, is bound to cause grief".4aGiven

that the Kennedy Report was undertaken only eight years after the end of the Second World War, a significant

percentage of the population had served in the war through the militia, as had many parliamentarians who maintained strong ties with the units they had been affiliated with.

The degree of interest that the public and politicians both expressed towards the militia highlights the fundamentally civilian nature of the organization. Therefore, the generals' anxieties about an anti-regular force backlash from the civilian community in defence of the militia do not appear to have been unfounded. In its final recommendations for the reorganization of the militia, the Kennedy board clearly sided with the political element. The suggestions that the GOCs had made to

the CGS were ignored. Under the broad category of organizational remedies, the board recomrnended that the militia be streamiined, but in such a way as to leave the old regimental system intact. The board sought to eliminate redundancies within the militia at the command level first.

47Letterfrom Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, WC Central Command to Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, 24 Septenber 1952, D-Hist: 73/606. 45

Since the Second World War, the militiafs chain of command

extended from the unit level through to Corps Headquarters. Beyond Corps level, the active force was in command at the Geographical Area and Geographical Command levels in addition to Army Headquarters. '' However, the Kennedy board of officers felt the division and formation headquarters

that had existed since 1946 had become "redundantw and recommended that this structure be scrapped, including its brigade and field headquarters. Twenty-six Militia Group Headquarters were created as replacements, but the militia would retain its level of comand just short of the

Geographical Area level. In numeric terms, the militia would provide individual personnel to fil1 vacant positions in the regular army instead of mobilizing divisions and brigades

for military ope ration^.^' The Kennedy board then narrowed its focus to the militiafs individual units by recomrnending that al1 "anaemicI1 units be eliminated through amalgamation, conversion, and change and with the introduction of the "linked battalionttconcept that had been borrowed from the

"Fol lowing the Second World War, the Canadian Amy' s chain of conunand consisted of Army Headquarters at the top, followed by the Geographical Command and Geographical Area levels which were both administered by active force officers. The militia commanded itself at the Corps, Division, Brigade and Unit levels. Morrison, 159.

''Report OZ the Board of Officers on the Oroanization of the Canadian Amy (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, Part III, p. 2. 5'No further changes would be made to the militia's chain of command until 1964. Morrison, p. 160. British Army. The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) would be the only corps to gain additional units, whereas the Royal Canadian Infantry Corps (RCIC) and the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA) would lose units through deactivation and amalgamation. A total of twenty-six anti-aircraft units would be converted or absorbed to other corps or types of

artillery. As for the infantry, nine reserve force units would be amalgamated with other infantry units; two other infantry units would be converted to the RCAC, and one other would be amalgamated with an armoured unit." The reorganized infantry regiments would then be linked together in twos on the principle that they would train in peacetime as individual units, but upon mobilization one battalion would provide men for the other without itself mobilizing.

This scheme was in fact implemented, but although it appeared to be practical militarily, its efficiency was never tested because the opportunity for these units to mobilize never arase."

Rad the Kennedy board of officers used the GûCs' suggestions for the reorganization of the militia it is likely that the rnilitia's training scheme would have changed

"Report of the Board of Officers on the Orcmnization of the Canadian Arw (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, Part

''~emorandum from C.P. Stacey ta the Director of Staff Duties (DSD), HQ 1200-R3 (D.Hist) 29 January 1954 re: Report of the Board of Officers on the ~rcranizationof the Canadian Amy [Reserve Force) D-Hist: 112.1 (D160). 47 appreciably. However, rather than improving the militiafs training standards and level of combat readiness, the Kennedy Report's recommendations appear to have produced the opposite effect. Having borne in mind the CGS' comment that the militia was finding it increasingly difficult to achieve the same training standards as their regular force counterparts, the Kennedy board of officers stated in their report that the previous training policies and syllabi that had been put together for the militia by Amy Headquarters required "too much in too short a tirne".'' As a result, they did not believe that the "One Amy" concept was practical for the militia insofar as training was concerned. Yet, given that the militia's prestige was a sensitive issue to the politicians, the CDA and the public, the board members decided not to lower the training standards for reservists. Instead, they acted upon the CDA's recommendation that the reservists' training time be extended in order to accomodate them as part-time soldiers. Furthermore, the board members suggested that the reservists' scope of training be red~ced.~'However, these recommendations ultimately would prove to be self-defeating. Although the

Kennedy board of officers wished to narrow the gulf that existed between the regular and reserve army soldiers as a

"Report of the Board of Officers on the Orqanization of the Canadian Amy (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, Part v, p. 1.

Tbid., Part V, p. 2. 48 result of the "vastly different degree of trainingw5', their

decision to do away with the "One Amy" concept only worsened the problem by having the regular army soldiers appear very well trained and the reserve army soldiers seemingly inferior in cornparison. It soon became evident to both the regular force and the militia that the Kennedy recommendations would never allow reservists to attain a useful level of training.

The inadequacy of the Kennedy Report* recommendations

for reserve force training was highlighted first by Brigadier at a meeting between the Corps Directors on 5 April 1954. At this meeting Walsh presented a paper entitled "[An] Examination of Training Requirements for the Reserve Force" which he used to abtain approval to revise the reserve force's training requirements. According to Walsh, the Kennedy Report's training plans for the reserve force were impractical- Even if a reservist were allowed to extend the duration of his training, the soldier would never satisfy the course requirements within a reasonable amount of time. Walsh pointed out that a reserve force recruit needed 640 periods of instruction in order to attain his basic training and trade qyalification. However, even if the recruit were to attend his unit's parade nights regularly, he could receive only 140 to 150 periods of instruction based on the 45 days of local headquartersf training per year, and a week's worth of summer camp training, Essentially, a recruit would not be able to complete his basic training in less than four years." This problem became more pronounced in the mid-to-late 1950s when the Canadian Army began to offes its personnel highly technical trade courses in light of the mounting threat of nuclear war and the defence requirements that were necessary in order to warn of imminent air strikes. The technical skills that were required of some trades were suited almost exclusively to regular force candidates, as they were the only ones who had the time to devote to such training.la In order to rectify the problematic Kennedy recommendations on reserve force training, Walsh simply wanted to modify the training standards so that they would be restricted to what reservists could achieve in a reasonable length of tiae. Specifically, he proposed that the reservists' scope of

"Brigadier G. Walsh, "Examination of Training Requirements for the Reserve Forcev, 5 April 1954, D.Hist: 112.1 (D160). ='The Canadian Armv Manual of Courses. 1957 contains detailed descriptions of the courses that were offered for the various combat trades. Although the introduction of the manual states that the courses were open to militia personnel if approved by Amy Headquarters, many of these courses were very long in duration and highly technical. One of the longest courses, for example, was a Group IV Master Gunnerfs course (Phase One) offered by the RCA School of Artillery which lasted sixty-one weeks and included instruction in tracking guided missiles. An equivalent RCA course that had been designed exclusively for militia personnel was only twelve days in duration by contrast. Canadian Armv Manual of Courses (1 July 1957-amended to October 1960), D.Hist: 112.3M3 (D31). 50 training be limited to nothing more than drill, basic weapons training and peacetime corps subjects, and that the basic training standard be achieved in no more than thirty days .59 The reservists themselves became aware of the inadequacy of the Kennedy Report's training tecommendations when it was realized that by endorsing different levels of training for both the regular and reserve army soldiers, the Kennedy board members had created a situation which could be used to justify the denial of new equiprnent to the militia.

This problem manifested itself in the case of the 13th Armoured Regiment (militia) of Vancouver, , whose members complained that their regular force counterparts were training on the army's newly-purchased Centurion tanks while they were required to continue training on outdated Sherman tanks." The issue was discussed by the CGS, Lieutenant-General Simonds, and the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, in a memorandum of 4 July 1954, in which Simonds told Claxton that there would not be a future provision for the armoured militia units to receive Centurion tanks, and that they

"Brigadier G. Walsh, "Examination of Training Requirements for the Reserve Force", 5 April 1954, D.Hist: 112 .1 (Dl6O). 6aMemorandumto VCGS from DCGS Brigadier R.W. Moncel HQS 7107-Tank Centurion TD 6061 (DWDI) 12 March 1956, "Issue of Centurion Tanks, Armoured Regiments, Canadian Army (Militia)'', D-Hist: 112.1 (D160). 51 would be required to continue training on the Shermans? There were several reasons for this. First, the introduction of Centurion tanks into the militia would require an extension of the Land Headquasters training syllabus for specialists "to a degree which is not considered warranted nor desirable at this tirne, by the user CorpsV2 Second, the maintenance of the Centurion tanks in militia units would present additional problems, as the "scope and workload of the Militia Servicing Sections, RCEME, would be greatly increased". Third -- perhaps the most important reason of al1 -- Simonds claimed that Itit would be uneconornical to maintain in service Centurions, additional to Militia M4A2 entitlexnent~".~~In other words, the Kennedy board of officers implemented training standards for the militia which did not allow for the time and monetary requirements that were necessary to train on the newer and more technical equipment that had been issued to the regular army. The Kennedy Report, therefore, was a clear demonstration of how civilian pressure was used consciously to undermine military effectiveness. However, even the civilian advocates of the militia were not satisfied with the results of the Kennedy Report in the end. G.W. Montgomery (MP, Victoria-Carleton) complained to the defence minister that he was under pressure from the militia unit in his constituency whose members feared that

the Kennedy recommendations would relegate theai to obscure r01es.~' Mr. Montgomery's sentiments were echoed by one of

his colleagues from the opposite side of the country, J.R. Kirk (MP, Antigonish-Guysborough), who claimed to have a

file as thick as his fist from his constituents who complained about the potential loss of their local militia unit, the Pictou Highlanders, to disbandment? The most heated comment of al1 about the Kennedy Report came from George Hees (MF, Broadview): 1 think the treatment of the militia by the goverment at the present time . . . is stupid. Why not leave these fine regiments intact with their traditions and names that mean so much to th-? As a former member of the militia and knowing how much these things mean, 1 appeal to the minister to stop what 1 consider to be this stupid process of destroying the really important things that keep a regiment going, and the only things that do. Leave them intact. Let our regiments remain the fine regiments they are, with the fine traditions they have had for many years past? The Kennedy Report represented an attempt to rectify a previous imbalance between the civilian and military authorities by mapping out a defence structure that directly

64Hansard, 21 June 1954, Vol. VI, p. 6427. 6SHansard, 30 June 1955, Vol. V, p. 5536. 66Hansard, 30 June 1955, Vol. V, p. 5539. 53 correlated to the Canadian goverment's national security objectives. Shortly after they had been implemented, the Kennedy Report's recommendations appeared to be successful.

Attendance at the militia's summer camps rose steadily, as did morale among the reserve troopd7 However, the beneficial results proved to be short-lived once the negative consequences of the recommendations became apparent. Although the board's recommendations initially satisfied the political element within the militia by justifying its existence with a specific role to fulfill, they lacked practicality insofar as providing realistic military goals for the part-time citizen soldiers. The Kennedy Report's recommendations lacked militaxy value because the report only offered political solutions which had been made as a result of political influences upon the board's members. Unfortunately, this problem would become a trend in the years to corne, attributable to the discord in Canadian civil-military relations that the Kennedy board of officers created in their one-sided attempt to formulate militia policy. Chapter Three

The Militia in the Age of H-Bomb Diplomacy: The Anderson Report

Only two years after the Kennedy Report had been completed, the Canadian military establishment believed that yet another study of the militia was necessary due to unprecedented changes that had taken place to revolutionize

Western defence strategy in the mid-1950s. The growing ideological rivalry between the East and the West, combined with dramatic advances in weapons technology and the expense of maintaining large numbers of conventional land forces, had led the Western democracies to favour nuclear weapons over conventional defences to deter the Soviet Union.' Foremost among the proponents of nuclear deterrence was the United States, whose doctrine of "massive retaliation" was formally adopted by NATO in 1956.' Now the regular forces were to serve as a ''trip wirev backed up by the threat of both theatre-level nuclear weapons and the spectre of strategic nuclear annihilation of the Soviet Union.

'Michael Carver, "Conventional Warfare in the Nuclear Age", Makers of Modern Stratew: From Machiavelli ta the Nuclear Aae, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 780-781. 'Robert S. McNamara, "The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions", The Nuclear Controversy, ed. William P. Bundy (New York: New American Library, 1985), p. 81. 55

These changes affected the Canadian Army by enhancing the utility of the regular standing force while at the same time lessening the need for the militia, Canadian politicians soon displayed a preference for "forces-in- being": troops that could react to a crisis immediately without a mobilization period.' In any future crisis speed would be required to support a nuclear deterrent, and only the army's regular force personnel had sufficient training to make them adequate forces-in-being. The new "come-as-you- are" nature of war also had a negative impact on the militia's raison d'être, since it rendered the mass mobilization of troops (for which the militia had always been used) unnecessary. As a result of these defence policy changes which de-emphasized conventional warfare in favour of a "big waP4 outlook, the Kennedy recommendations for the reorganization of the militia became invalid.

In the fa11 of 1956, the CGS, now Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, called for a renewed examination of the militia to ascertain whether or not it would continue to hold a meaningful place within the Canadian defence structure in the nuclear age. The origins of the Anderson

Report (as the new study was informally titled) lay in the rapid and profound changes in the nature of modem war that

'John Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of a Satellite Canada (Toronto: New Press, 1970), p. 126. 56 characterized the 1950s. The adoption of a nuclear-based

strategy of deterrence by the Western democracies was ultimately responsible for the militiats decline in the years that followed the Korean War, as it eliminated the need for a mobilization base from which large numbers of

conventional field forces could be drawn. However, the nen strategy merely served as a catalyst for hastening change within the Canadian defence structure that had begun as early as the late 1940s when Canada first adopted a nuclear

"mindset". When the Soviet Union initially achieved nuclear capability in 1949, the fear of an atomic exchange occurring between the Soviet Union and the United States led the

Americans to push Canada towards greater integration of the defence of North America. By the early 1950s, several major arrangements had been made between the Canada and the United

States in aid of continental defence. These defence arrangements were significant in that the Canadian government eventually accepted deterrence and retaliation as

the basis for North American defence as well. For the Canadian militia, this change of focus represented a major

step towards the loss of a meaningful military role. The first continental defence project undertaken between Canada and the United States following the end of the Second World War was the Canopy Agreement. Before the advent of long-range nuclear delivery systems, Canada's vast territorial expanse (which made up nearly half of the NATO 57 countries' total land mass) was perceived by the Americans to be ideal for the launching of retaliatory atomic air strikes against the Soviet Union.' In the fa11 of 1949, the

Canadian government was asked if it might concede certain air bases to the American govemment for this purpose, and in January 1951 the Americans sent their proposal to Ottawa for ratification. The Canadian reaction was unfavourable at first, as it was felt that the Canopy Agreement "would seem to leave the Canadian government with little, if any . . . control over the use for operational purposes by Strategic Air Command of facilities in Canadav? Furthermore, it was feared that the Canopy Agreement would deprive the Canadian government of the right to influence policy decisions regarding the use of atomic weapons by reason oi Canada's geographical location.' However, some Cabinet members worried that by refusing the Americans, the defence of the continent might be placed in jeopardy. Brooke Claxton expressed such concerns and was joined by Hume Wrong, the Canadian ambassador to the United States, who felt that if

North America was attacked, Canada would be "anxious to see a counter-offensive undertaken with the minimum of delay"." Ultimately, a compromise was reached between the Canadian

'James Eayrs, Growinq UP Allied, p. 244. Tbid. 'Ibid.

'fbid., p. 246. and American governments. Canada ratified the Canopy

Agreement on 4 May 1951, providing that the following conditions be met: that Canada be consulted through diplomatic charnels at the highest level about atomic strikes launched from bases on Canadian soil, as well as the storage of nuclear weapons on Canadian territory and American aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over Canada.' In the same year that the Canopy Agreement was accepted by the Canadian govenunent, preparations were made for yet another continental defence project between Canada and the United States. Under the auspices of the Canada-United States Joint Basic Security Plan, a number of manned radar stations would be constructed along the 49th parallel to detect incoming Soviet bombers."' The Americans originally proposed the idea to the Canadian goverment in 1948, but the idea was temporarily abandoned due to the estimated expense of the project. However, the "enormous increase" in North American defence budgets that occurred following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 and the ensuing increase in the perceived severity of the Soviet threat to

Eiorth America resurrected the radar station project, which

''The Joint Canada-United States Basic Security Plan was the post-war incarnation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. It was drafted in 1946 in order for military planners to formulate CO-operative schemes for the defence of North America. James ~aks,Peacemakins and Deterrence, p. 356. 59 became known as the Pinetree Line." Following the detonation of the Soviets' first hydrotherrnonuclear weapon

(H-bomb) on 12 August 1953, additional warning systems became necessary in order to detect Soviet bombers at higher

latitudes." As a result, plans were made in 1954 to build the Mid-Canada Line, a chain of unmanned radar stations situated along the 55th parallel, and the Distant Early Warning System (otherwise known as the DEN Line), a series of radar tracking, warning and control stations that would stretch from Alaska to Baffin Island along the 70th parallel to reinforce the Mid-Canada Line.I3 The early warning systems were especially problematic for the militia, as they helped to make the the most valuable armed service at the expense of the Navy and the Army. Other developments which took place during the 1950s enhanced the RCAFts role. These included the ill-fated Avro Arrowl' and the consolidation of the Canadian and American

"The Pinetree Line was estimated to have cost approximately $450 million. The American government provided two-thirds of the funds required for the projectts construction. Ibid., p. 358.

"fbid, , pp. 363-364.

131bid., pp. 370-371.

"The Avro Arrow (CF-105) was a supersonic intercepter that had been designed to target and destroy Soviet jet bombers that inight have carried hydrogen bombs. Each aircraft was estimated to have cost in between $2.5 to $6 million, and as much as $12.5 million due to airframe design changes that occurred as the planes were built. A lack of buyers and soaring costs led the Diefenbaker government to cancel the Arrow program in 1959. Desmond Morton, A Militarv 60 defence systems under the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD), which allowed the two countries to utilize their warning and fighter resources in uii~on.'~While billions of dollars were spent on air defence operations during this

period, the Canadian Amy achieved new fame as the "Cinderella service"."

Thus, when the doctrine of massive retaliation became a part of the American government's new defence philosophy in 1953 for achieving "security and solvency"" against the spread of Communism, it acted as the final nail in the coffin for the Canadian militia. For the crucial role of nuclear weapons extended to NATO as well, and undermined (deliberately) the expensive requirement for large scale conventional forces. Defending Western Europe against Soviet aggression was an expensive proposition for NATO, as it was estimated that nearly one hundred divisions of conventional

Historv of Canada, pp. 240-243.

"President Eisenhower used this expression in reference to the astronomical defence costs of the Truman Administration that had accompanied its policy of "containing" the spread of Communism around the world. The doctrine of massive retaliation required smaller quantities of manpower and materiel in cornparison, thereby making it a more economicai defence policy than containment. G~MH. Snyder, "The New Look of 1953", Strate-, Politics and Defence Budsets, eds. Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond and Glenn H. Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962) pp. 389-390. 61 forces would be required for this purpose." The NATO members initially expressed reservations towards a policy of nuclear deterrence because such weapons magnified the risks of destruction and required the use of their territory.lg However, the expense of maintaining large numbers of conventional forces in peacetime and a fear of manpower

shortages were strong mitigating factors that led to the deployment of tactical weapons for the defence of western Europe, as stipulated by a document known as MC 48 at the December 1954 ministerial meeting of the NATO Council in

Paris. 'O

By 1956, Canadian defence policy had changed in a way that reflected the massive retaliation mindset as well,

especially insofar as the militia was concerned. That year, the regular army had 116,350 men among its ranks while the militia's troops numbered only 55,0002', and the Minister of National Defence, Ralph Campney, delivered a speech in the House of Commons in which forces-in-being were recognized

lPAndrew M. Johnston, "A new look at the origins of first-use: Eisenhower, Dulles and NATO nuclear strategy, 1953-195411,unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, 24 June 1995, p. 13, 'OSecond-Lieutenant Sean Maloney, "The Canadian Armv and Tactical Nuclear Warf are oct tri ne" , Canadian ~efencë Quarterly 23 (1993): p. 24. 21Hansard, 20 June 1956, Vol. V, p. 5215. perhaps for the first time as being of greater military value than the militia: The fact is, today, [war] is far too complex and too technical a matter to be left to the amateurs -- only professionally trained and experienced servicemen can cope quickly with the weapons and tactics of modern war. To meet Our commitments, both in creating the deterrent and in being able to react immediately if the deterrent fails, we must provide forces in being, completely trained, equipped and immediately ready .22 Because of the government's preference for air power and forces-in-being as the prima- means with which to defend the country against atomic attack, the militia was finally stripped of its rank and its utility as Canada's first line of defence.

Canadian adoption of a new defence policy simply reflected the collective will of the NATO member states, but these changes did not take place without opposition from former high-ranking military officials. Guy Simonds was the most prominent military personality who led the way in publicly criticizing the Canadian government on defence matters. In 1956, one year after he retired from the post of

CGS, Simonds chose Maclean's magazine as a public forum in which to vent his complaints -- twice -- about what he believed was civil interference in military affairs. In his first article, entitled "Where Wefve Gone Wrong on Defence", Simonds complained that the components of Canada's new first 63 line in defence -- the early warning defence systems and a reliance upon jet interceptors to bring dom Soviet bombers -- were in fact useless against guided missiles, and that their implementation had been "powerfully influenced by a desire to put to use gadgetry evolved in Canada rather than

consideration of what would provide the best defence."" Simonds claimed that "the inherent distrust of the politician for the rnilitary leader" and the fear of a "military juta" that would usurp the power of Canadian politicians were reasons why Canada could not evolve a "sound and comprehensive defense policy"." Simonds expanded upon this argument in his second Maclean's article, entitled "We're Wasting Millions on an Obsolete Air Force", in which he objected to the replacement of conventional land-based strategies by air operations and the doctrine of massive retaliati~n.'~Simonds again complained about the air force, as he did not believe that air power could be relied upon for both defensive and offensive operations; he considered the two tasks to be "beyond the national meansV6 As for massive retaliation, Simonds worried that excessive reliance

"~ieutenant-General Guy Simonds, "Where Wefve Gone Wrong on Defencer',Macleanrs, 23 June 1956, p. 23.

z5Lieutenant-GeneralGuy Simonds, "We're Wasting Millions on an Obsolete Air Force", Maclean's, 4 August 1956, p. 14. 64 upon this concept would lead to such large reductions in conventional land forces that atomic weapons would be used to deal with "marginal and minor aggressions" as ~ell.~'

Simonds was joined in his opposition to Canada's new defence policies by Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, a former

Adjutant-General of the Canadian Amy. In Saturday Night magazine Macklin also criticized the Canadian government's policy of having replaced the army's conventional land-force capabilities with air power as the first line of defence against nuclear attacks. Rowever, Macklin particularized his focus by expressing the militia's point of view in his article, "Do We Still Need The Militia?".'Voncerned with the militia's future in light of the fact that the goverment would no longer train large numbers of men as it had for the last world war, Macklin articulated several reasons which, in his opinion, would continue to render the militia necessary. First, Macklin argued that if large numbers of conventional forces were not maintained, it was possible that the West mîght have to accept "defeat by default" in the event that the next war was initiated using conventional means rather than "super weap~ns".'~Second, Macklin stressed the moral obligation of Canadians to become

"Major-General W.H.S. Macklin, "Do We Still Need the Militia?", Saturday Night, 9 June 1956. 65 involved personally in the defence of the country, and that

the militia was the primary instrument through which the average citizen could exercise his civic duty. The government's reliance upon air power, however, relieved the public of this sense of respon~ibility.~'Finally, Macklin alluded to the army's traditional adage that it would always be the infantry soldier alone who could hold and secure territory, regardless of the means with which it had been conquered.'' For these reasons, Macklin concluded that the militia would continue to be a meaningful element in

Canadian defence policy.

Macklin was not alone in his criticism of the Canadian government's "big war" defence policy and the ensuing second-class treatment of the militia. In the summer of 1956, the Minister of National Defence drew criticism from members of an unofficial "militia lobby" in the House of Commonç when he announced that there still would be an important role for the militia to play in Canadian defence despite the government's preference for the regular army's forces-in-being. The sincerity of Campney's statement was challenged first by George Drew (MP, Carleton), who

"It is likely that Macklin was referring to the primary role of the infantry; that is, its ability as the only combat arm to "close with and destroy the enemyir. Ibid., p. 8. complained about the poor quality of the militia at the t ime : [IJn spite of the billions of dollars we have spent in the years since the Korean War, there is not a single militia unit in Canada fully equipped, even under the limited establishment laid down for these militia units. The infantry does not possess modern infantry weapons; the armoured forces do not possess modern amour; the artillery does not possess up-to-date military equipment .32 Campney was also badgered by Douglas Harkness (MP, Calgary East), who informed the Minister that there were several militia units, to his knowledge, who were "getting a little fed up over the lack of equipment and with what you might cal1 continued promises . . . li .33 These complaints by the members of the militia lobby were not unfounded. An examination of the Canadian Army's annual training directives for both the regular and reserve forces from 1956 to 1958 reveals that as the regular force's training objectives became oriented more towards offensive and defensive tactical nuclear operations, the corresponding training directives for the militia made its personnel increasingly unlike their regular force counterparts. For

Wansard, 21 June 1956, Vol. V, pp. 5248-5249. "Although the members of the militia lobby were Conservative MPs, their criticism of the federal governmenttspolicy towards the rnilitia must be regarded as more than partisan politics. Once the Conservatives came to power in 1957, they also implemented policies that favoured the forces in being concept, as will be discussed later on in the chapter. Hansard, 19 July 1956, Vol. V, p. 6215. 67

example, the aim of the regular army's annual training directive for 1956-1957 was to have its members train defensively against an enemy who had atomic weapons and air superi~rity.~'Training would be done year-round at the sub- unit, unit and brigade levels, and at the divisional level

the army would engage in its first exercise that involved simulated tactical nuclear warfare operations: Exercise MORNINGSTAR, at Camp Gageto~n.'~Individual training would consist of ABCD (atomic, biological and chextical defence) instruction and defence against atomic attacks." Conversely, the militia's 1956-1957 annual training directive emphasized organizational and administrative "housekeeping", in that the militia's aim that year was "to train the personnel required in each unit to enable the unit to mobiiize and provide a sound organization upon which training for war can be completed"." Training would be conducted at the cornand level and at local headquarters, and each soldier would receive no more than 60 and no lesç than 15 days of training that year." For 1957-1958, the regular arrny's training directive expanded its aim, as

""Annual Training Directive for 1956-57", KQS 3200-1 MT 78, 8 November 1955, from the file "Annual Training Forecasts and Directives", D-Hist.: 401.006 (Dl).

36HQS 3200-1 MT 78, 8 November 1955. 68 regular force personnel would train for a war "in which either auclear or conventional weapons would be u~ed".~~In

addition to further ABCD training and defensive exescises against atomic weapons, regular force personnel also would receive instruction on radiation monitoring eq~iprnent.~'

Collective training would include the participation of 1 Canadian Division in the operation of nuclear delivery systems in Exercise EASTERN STAR, again at Camp Gageto~n.~' By contrast, the militia's aim for 1957-1958 simply would be "to provide a trained nucleus in militia units capable of assisting Civil Defence Organizations in the event of a national disaster or emergen~y".'~The training levels and time were the same as for the previous year. However, in 1959, the militia was officially given a training mandate that was consistent with the major defence policy of the day: its main responsibility would be to train for National Survival and Civil Defence operations in the event of atomic attacks upon Canadian territory. The militia's new tasking had its roots in the 1957 Anderson Report, but it represented only half of a plan that the report had recommended as a means by which the militia could make a

'9"Annual Training Directive 1957-58" HQC 3200-1 (DGMT) 26 October 1956, D. Hist.: 401.006(Dl).

"HQC 3200-1 (DGMT), 26 October 1956. 69 meaningful contribution to national defence in the nuclear age . In their existing fom, the militia's training and

organization policies prior to 1957 had become outmoded by the nuclear defence operations which demanded a high degree

of technical efficiency and preparatory speed of al1 participating military personnel. In the hope that the militia might be reorganized to achieve parity with the regular army, Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, as CGS,

wrote to one of his colleagues to inform him that he had been selected as a "committee of one" to undertake a secret reorganization study of the militia. Graham's appointee waç

Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson, a Canadian staff officer who was attending the Imperia1 Defence College in London, England, at the tirne. Since the study was to remain confidential until it had been completed, Graham wanted only to "warn"

Anderson of what lay ahead without disclosing the exact reasons behind the study until he returned to Canada?

Anderson's report was meant to be secret presumably to avoid any political pressure that might have influenced the recommendations, especially given that Graham wanted the recommendations to be purely military in their nature. Anderson worked with military personnel exclusively when he

conducted the research for his report ( and only high-ranking

'Tonfidential letter to Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson from Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, CGS, 27 November 2956, D.Hist: 112.1 (D160). senior officers at that), namely the Vice-Chief of the

General Staff, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Major-General Letson, who had been appointed by the Kennedy board of officers as a special Advisor on the Militia

(AOM)." The only hint that Graham gave to Anderson regarding his new task was that he "have a talk with someone at the [British] War Office concerning any proposals that they may have in mind concening reorganization of the

Territorial Army"." Anderson was then told to rejoin the staff of Army Headquarters in Canada after Christmas, at which time he would receive further instructions.

Upon his return to Canada, Anderson received a memorandum from Graham on 31 Decenber 1956 which outlined the criteria that would rnake up the scope of his examination. Anderson was directed to recommend changes that would render the militia capable of satisfying the following wartime requisiteç: completing the estabishment of the 1st

Canadian Infantry Division on M-Day4&;providing reinforcements for the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry

Divisions and Corps Troops at M plus 30 days, and finally, assisting the Civil Defence organization in the event of

"Ibid. Ibid.

"The term "M-dayf' was the abbteviation for "May Dayw : the day a conflict would begin. Troops that were required for M-day had to be ready to bear the first shock of battle. Eayrs, Growina UP Allied, p. 228. atomic attacks on Canadian cities. Graham then suggested to Anderson that he explore the means with which to hwer the militia's budget, as well as the indirect overhead of

regular army personnel whose duties were "largely taken up with militia rnattersm. Finally, Graham strongly recommended to Anderson that he

should try to work out on a purely military - as opposed to a politico-military - basis, the most efficient organization for the Canadian Militia."

By emphasizing purely military solutions to the militia's problems, Graham was advocating a radical reorganization of the militia that was consistent with his earlier views on the subject in 1952, namely that the regimental system should be sacrificed for the sake of creating an efficient fighting force. Anderson took heed of Graham's suggestions, and compiled in his report recommendations that reflected the CGS' desires. Anderson's report consisted of five sections which included: an outline of the report and a summary of his recommendations; a discussion of the Canadian army's strategic concept; a list of the militia's tasks; an assessment of the aaequacy of the militia in its existing state, and the report's final recommendations. Twelve appendices provided supplementary information to the report's main content, such as manpower and equipment

"Memorandum to Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson from Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, CGS, 31 December 1956, D-Kist.: 112.1 (D16O). 72 requirements for the militia, estimated reorganization expenses, the geographical distribution of militia units in relation to population, and recommendations for an armoury const~ctionprogram- The final section of the Anderson

Report was the most significant, as it included a summary of the militia's weaknesses and the ensuing remedial suggestions that made up Anderson's proposal for reorganization- Foremost among the militia's deficiencies was its existing organization. According to Anderson, the militiafs organizational framework was too cumbersome to allow the rapid mobilization and deplayment of troops to

supplement the regular army on M-day; nor would it enable reinforcements for the 1st and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions to be despatched ta Europe by M plus 30 days. As for the militia's training, Anderson felt that in addition to preparing for field operations, reservists had to become

"progresçively better prepased to assist in civil defence". Raving borne in mind the militia's problematic features, Anderson then proposed a new organization scheme with which the militia would corne as close as possible to satsifying the CGS ' wartime requisites ." Although Anderson had been instructed by Graham to formulate purely military rather than the usual politico- military recommendations for the reorganization of the

''A Re~orton the Orcmnization, Esuiprnent and Traininq of the Canadian Armv (Militia), 1957, pp. 37-38. 73 militia, Graham was not unmindful of the fact that the decision to implement Anderson's ideas ultimately would be in the hands of the civilians within the Department of National Defence. Accordingly, Graham responded to Anderson- progress reports by commenting on whether or not the ideas would be politically acceptable. In a memorandum sent to Anderson on 27 February 1957, Graham discussed Anderson's progress report of 14 February and remarked that the plan he had proposed so far had "much merit". However, Graham intimated that although he found Anderson's work satisfactory, the government might not because it would eliminate the militia's regimental system. "Nown,Anderson was told, "we must go further and propose other plans which may have a better chance of acceptance by the Government and the public"." Consequently, Anderson designed altenate reorganization schemes for the benefit of the civilian elements to give them a choice should one of the proposals seem too radical. In its completed form the Anderson Report consisted of four proposed reorganization schemes, known as Plans A, B, C and D. Plan A called for the militia to be reorganized to make up a ready reserve force alone, whose primary responsibility would be to assist the regular army in the field on M-day. Its members would be young men in between

4gMemorandwnto Brigadier W.A.B. Anderson from Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, CGS, 27 February 1957, D.Hist: 112.1 D(160). 74

the ages of 16 to 24 who would enrol in their local militia

units and be placed on a full-time call-out for one year?

Plan B divided the militia into two components to reflect the need of bath a field force requirement and the "increasing obligation towards civil defenceVL The first

component would be known as the "Regular Army Reserven and was based on the same idea as the defunct Canadian Army

Ready Reserve of the early 1950s. The Regular Army Resenre would be made up of members from the strongest infantry, armoured and artillery units in the reserve force. Those units would be redesignated to become auxiliary battalions of the three armoured and six infantry regiments of the regular force. The primary role of the Regular Army Reserve rnembers would be to assist the regular force field units

immediately on and after M-day.12 The second component of the militia would be made up of the remaining reserve force units who would retain the title of "militia". Its rnembers would be "basically trainedv in order to provide a partly- trained nucleus for home and civil defence ope ration^.'^

Plan C suggested that the militia units be linked in twos, with both units training for field and civil defence

''A Report on the Orsanization, Esuipment and Traininq of the Canadian Ams [Militia), 1957, p. 38. "Ibid., p. 45.

"Ibid., pp. 45-47.

'31b1d., pp. 48-49. operations. One of the two units would be designated for mobilization, but the unit itself would not be informed of this decision until the actual time of mobilization in order to maintain a high standard of training." Plan D would have involved the redesignation of certain infantry units from the militia to become part of the regular arrny in order to provide troops to supplement the field force.55 Anderson recommended Plan B as the scheme most likely to work. His recommendation was based on a belief that the next global war would consist of two phases: a "destructiveff phase, followed by an wexploitationv phase. The destructive phase would be no more than 30 days in duration, in which "weapons of mass destructionw would be used. According to

Plan 8, a total of 18,000 men from the Regular Amy Resenre would be used during this phase to "influence operations". The second "exploitation" phase would require large numbers of troops (two divisions -- approximately 40,000 men) "to ensure the security of friendly territory against the residual strength of the enemy", as well as ta undermine the stability of the enemy government and its means of production." To minimize the loss of tradition among the

- -- 541bid.,pp. 50-51. "Ibid., pp. 51-52.

'6Although these numbers seem contradictory to the premise of massive retaliatoq power, which called for a reduction in the number of conventional land forces that would be required, Anderson's figures are not inconsistent with this idea. It should be borne in mind that during the redesignated Regular Amy Reserve and militia units, the reservists would be allowed to maintain their regimental

dress and customs, even though the Regular Amy Reserve units would lose their names to become nwnbered units of the

regular force units (e.g., a reserve force infantry unit might be redesignated as 3 Royal Canadian Regiment), and the militia would be reorganized into provincial regiments

(e.g,, several units would be amalgamated to become numbered battalions of one regiment, such as the creation of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the Royal New Brunswick Regixnent from the former Carleton and York and North Shore Regiments in

19 54 ) .'' Additional changes included the disbandment of t.he weakest militia units which were badly understrength.

Anderson recognized that this mode1 had its disadvantages, namely that the proposed reorganization was "drastic" and

that the militia wiits would be required to "eventually submerge their identity in the regular regiments or the

Provincial Regi~nents".'~However, Anderson believed that

Plan B was the best mode1 for reorganization because it most closely conformed to the "anticipated strategical requirements" at the time. Furthemore, he believed that it

Second World War, Canada's Amy included six infantry divisions (approximately 120,000 men). In cornparison, therefore, Anderson's manpower requirements seem relatively small. Ibid., pp. 35-36,

"Ibid., pp. 47-49. 77 would "suit the civil defence requirement, the military responsibilities of the GWs, and the sensibilities of the Militia . . .Il .59 Anderson's recommendations appear to have reflected

Graham's desires perfectly. Although Graham was willing to sacrifice tradition for the sake of creating a more efficient force, he was not unsympathetic to the militia. A former member of the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment,

Graham was aware of the militia's history and its "long and brilliant record of a~hievement".~~He acknowledged that it would be "difficult to break from long-established custom and tradition", but that it would be necessary "if we were going to prepare for the next war instead of the last one".b1Graham especially liked the idea of the militia performing both conventional warfare and civil defence operations, as he believed that the militia would be required to reinforce the regular force in protecting territory from the enemy and to assist in restoring order

"out of the dreadful chaos and anarchy that may exist as the result of enemy attacks with long-range nuclear ~eapons''.~~

"Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, Citizen and Soldier (Toronto: MeClelland 61 Stewart, 1987), p. 238. Unfortunately, Anderson's proposed reorganization of the militia was never implemented in its entirety. It is possible that the Anderson Report never had a chance to be implemented, given that the Liberals lost to the Conservatives in the federal election of 1957, which took place only four months after the report was completed. The new Minister of National Defence, Major-General George R. Pearkes, VC, had been a strong supporter of a civil defence role for the militia when civil defence was still the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and Welfare? Following the end of the Second World War, Canada developed an early civil defence program that was the responsibility of the Department of National Defence. In 1951, an Order-in- Council transferred civil defence to the Ministry of Health and Welfare, where it would stay for the next eight years. The Chiefs of Staff considered returning civil defence to the armed services in the mid-1950s in light of the threat of H-bomb attacks upon Canadian cities, but the army was reluctant to become involved with civil defence because of the possibility that it might interfere with training for overseas field ope ration^.^' Civil defence was suited more

"Reginald H. Roy, For Most Cons~icuousBrave-: A Bioqraahv of Maior-General Georse R. Pearkes, VC, Throush Two World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), p. 296. "G.W.L. Nicholson, "The Canadian Militia's Introduction to Civil Defence Trainingv, Policv Bv Other Means, eds. Michael Cross and Robert Bothwell (Toronto, Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1972), p. 222. 79 to the militia than a civilian organization, according to Pearkes, as only military personnel had the discipline to deal with a situation in which "the whole civil power might collapse and martial law would have to be brought inV5 Furthermore, Pearkes was less optimistic than Howard Graham in thinking that the militia would be able to augment the regular army's field force in conventional operations. Pearkes did not believe that there would be enough time, in

any major war, to bring the militia up to a sufficient

standard that would make them ready for battle? It is possible that Anderson's recommendatîons were bound to be rejected by any federal goverment regardless of the CGS' desire to mollify the civilian planners with alternate schemes, given that each of the four reorganization proposals called for the militia units either to be incorporated into the armyfs regular force structure or amalgamated into provincial battalions. After all, the Kennedy Report had drawn much criticisrn from various Members

of Parliament who strongly opposed any sort of change to the organization, even though its recommendations were not nearly as radical as Anderson's. Considering that the politicians, members of the public and the reservists

themselves were so resistant to the Kennedy Report's proposals, it is highly unlikely that such opinions would 80

have changed in such a way to support ideas as radical as Anderson's only three years after the Kennedy Report had been made public. There are additional reasons which may account for the

rejection of the Anderson Report by the government, among them the estimated cost and manpower requirements of

Anderson's recommendations. Anderson believed that in order for the two new reserve force components to perform their duties successfully, they first would need to have their old

equipment holdings replaced and then "keep Pace with future equipment devel~prnents".~'Approximately $17 million alone would be involved in replacing old equipment, and with

additional equipment procurements such as surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, the estimated annual cost of maintaining the new reserve force would be $52 million, exactly twice the amount of the militials old annual budgetO6' Additional manpower would have aggravated the problern of expense. As previously mentioned, Anderson recommended that the militia be capable of mobilizing a force of two divisions (and possibly another two divisions at a later date) to augment the regular army's field force

in the next global war, in addition to providing a force of

18,000 on M-day for the NATO cornitment in Europe and the

67~Report on the Orcranization, Eauinment and Traininq of the Canadian Armv (Militia), 1957, p. 26. 81

defence of Canada.L9 In short, Anderson was not able to find a way to reduce the militia budget as Graham had requested. Finally, the Anderson Report's authorship may provide an additional explanation of why it was not used. Because

Anderson was a regular army officer who had no ties to the militia in any way whatsoever, and because he communicated with other regular force officers, the government may have

been afraid (justifiably) of what might have been seen as the regular amy imposing its will upon the militia. Ultimately, the militia did undergo change. The Diefenbaker government passed an Order-in-Council in 1959

that gave the militia a new role based entirely upon civil defence and national survival duties.'O The Civil Defence

Order of 1959 was based upon a study of the civil defence organization in Canada that had been prepared by Lieutenant- General Howard Graham, shortly after his retirement in 1958. The militia units that were affected most by the Civil Defence Order were those belonging to the infantry, armoured and artillery corps. Although their regimental names and ceremonial traditions remained intact, they no longer

received instruction in the combat arms, and they were required to surrender most of the equipment particular to these trades to the regular army. The general military

recruit training courses were replaced by civil defence and 82 national survival courses, in which candidates received instruction in radiation monitoring and surveying, rescue of the injured, re-entry and decontamination operations, and the maintenance of law and order." On the whole, national sumival and civil defence training was not received well by the militia, whose members may have felt that this lfsnakes and laddersn7*role injured their pride. Possibly as a form of protest, some militia units held final parades with their

heavy equipment (e.g., tanks and machine gus) before it was

taken away ." To the politicians, the Civil Defence Order of 1959 provided the militia with a useful and justifiable role at a

time when the only land forces that mattered were forces-in- being. Moreover, the civil defence role was relatively inexpensive in comparison to what Anderson's recommendations would have cost. This undoubtedly sat well with the Diefenbaker government, which was trying to lower escalating defence costs (the cancellation of the Avro Arrow project was another cost-cutting rnea~ure).~'However, the civil defence role would prove to be a transient one that served

"The term l'snakes and ladders1' referred to the ropes and ladders that were used for rescue operations by the militia. Morrison, p. 146. ''Letter to the Minister of Defence from Lieutenant- General S.F. Clark, CGS, HQC 6001-3/1 TD 9131 (CGS), 11 May 1959, D-Hist.: 112.1 (D160).

"Morton, A Militarv History of Canada, p. 246. 83 only to polarize the regular and reserve forces. By 1961, national survival and civil defence training for the militia were de-emphasized. A combination of factors -- the militia's dislike of the role, the opposition of several defence associations to the role and the growing popularity of "flexible response" among the NATO member states -- led the Canadian government to revert back to an emphasis on conventional rather than nuclear defence training for the armed forces. The Anderson Report had been undertaken to provide a military solution for the problems that had arisen in the training, organization and administration of the militia since the implementation of the Kennedy Report. It recommended radical measures for the training and reorganization of the militia to suit the character of Canadian defence policy at the time. However, political pressure once again overcame military necessity and the

Anderson Report was never used. The militia's existing form of organization was left intact and the reservists were made responsible for civil defence alone. Yet, this new role for the militia, assigned by the civilian authorities in government, would prove to be useful only for as long as the danger of nuclear war remained imminent. Once this role outlived its utility, the matter of reorganizing the militia to suit Canada's ever-changing defence requirements would inevitably arise again. Chapter Four The Militia on the Periphery of Unification: The Suttie Commission and The Deputy Chief Reserves Study

Shortly after their victory in the 1963 federal election, the Liberals began to implement the components of their scheme for Yar-reaching reformN1within the armed forces. The federal government was motivated by several factors that necessitated change. First, it sought to lower def ence costs*, which accounted for approximately 25% of the federal budget under the Conservatives in 1960.3 Second, there was a need to CO-ordinate policy planning among the three arrned services, particularly as each service had been training for three different kinds of war.' The air force had anticipated that the next major war would be a three-to- five day "all-out thermonuclear exchange"; the army expected to fight a protracted ground war, and the navy's emphaçis had been on World War Two-style anti-subrnarine warfare.' Third, the federal goverment believed that it had to

'Stephen J. Harris, "Militia Reform", unpublished paper presented to LFCHQ, 30 March 1995, p. 10.

'Paul Hellyer, Damn the Tomedoes: My Fiqht to Unify Canada's Armed Forces (Toronto: McClelland 6t Stewart, 1990), p. 101.

'Peter C. Newman, Renesade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (1963; Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1986), p. 450.

'Hellyer, p. 33. exercise greater control over the military as a result of independent actions that had been taken without cabinet approval during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962/ When Prime Minister Diefenbaker refused to place the Canadian military on forma1 alert in response to the crisis, Canadian air force and naval commanders took matters into their own hands. Acting out of concern over Soviet military operations in the Atlantic, the commanders increased the levels of readiness of their forces before the crisis became public on 22 October. According to Peter Haydon, although political approval was not technically required "under the prevailing concept of crisis management", the air force and navy were criticized, particularly by the Liberals, who felt that their actions had compromised civil control over the military.' Finally, there was the need to adapt to the "latest changes in strategic thinking".' The most prominent change at this time was a shift in focus ftom the doctrine of massive retaliation to a strategy of graduated or "flexible responseIf. The objective of this new policy would be to reduce one's dependence upon strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and place increased emphasis on conventional forces. In doing so, a nation would thus be "flexible in its

'Peter T. Haydon, The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 3.

'Ibid., p. 4. 'Hellyer, p. 35. 86 ability to respond to either a conventional war or a conflict involving the use of nuclear weap~ns.~Due to an over-dependence on nuclear weapons in their defence

strategies, both east and West faced the possibility of

mutual suicide in the event of hostilities, Ta avoid such a possibility, the American government took the lead in persuading its NATO partners to increase the size of their conventional forces.1° In 1964, flexible response was adopted by the Canadian government "in determining Canada's force structure for the balance of the decade, to build in maximum flexibility". To implement these elenents of reform,

the Pearson government saw the unification of the armed forces as the only solution. In the 1964 White Paper, the Minister of National Defence outlined the governmentts unification plans for the forces, as well as the various international commitments in which they would participate and the roles that they would assume. Under unification, the Canadian military would be commanded by a single Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and a single Defence Staff1' to allow Canada's soldiers, sailors and airmen "to talk with (rather than at) each other about

'White Pa~eron Defence (1964), pp. 12-13. ''Carver, p. 786. "Ibid., p. 19. 87 what was best for the country . . . "." Planning and operations would be integrated as well ta "produce a more effective and CO-ordinated defence posture for Canadat1and

"result in considerable ~avings''.'~Canada's military personnel would train in accordance with the new flexible response defence strategy, which envisaged various types of conflict, including all-out nuclear war, large-scale limited war, insurrection, guerilla activity and political

~pheaval.'~As for the roles that were assigned to the armed forces in the White Paper, they included sovereignty protection, and participation in NATO's deterrent force in

Europe and UN peacekeeping operations." For each of these roles, the White Paper clearly indicated a preference for forces-in-being, but the reserve forces were not forgotten.

Under the heading "Awed Forces Reservestt,the White Paper briefly referred to three ministerial committees that would be responsible for recomending how the reserve forces could be reorganized to fit into the government's unification scheme." The Hendy and Draper Committees would investigate

"Stephen J. Harris, ''The Post-Unification Land Forcet', We Stand On Guard, ed. John Marteinson (Montreal: Ovale Publications, 1992), p. 403.

White Paper on Defence (1964), p. 19. "Ibid., p. 4.

"Ibid., pp. 24-25. 88 the naval and air reserves respettivelyl', while the task of reorganizing the militia was left to militia Brigadier E.R. Suttie and a panel of eight associa te^.^^ Although the decision to reorganize the militia in 1964 was made by the Liberals to coincide with their plans for broader changes within the Department of National Defence, the idea appeared to have been inspired by several reports on defence matters that preceded it. The first two reports were products of the Diefenbaker government: the report of the Special Committee On Defence Expenditures from the spring and suer of 1960, chaired by G.E. Halfpenny19, and the Glassco Commissionfs report on the Department of National Defence, which was published in January 1963.''

After the Liberals came to power in April 1963. Prime Minister Pearson created a Special Committee on Defence in May", and a report on the Reserves by an ad-hoc committee

leThe eight other officers who made up the Suttie Commission were F.T. Jenner, E.G. Eakins, I.S. Johnston, D.G. Cunningham, V. de B. Oland, Paul Triquet, J.P. Carrière and Lt. Col. B.J. Legge. Morrison, p. 142. leCanada, House of Cornons, Special Cornittee on Defence Expenditures, Minutes of Proceedinos and Evidence Numbers 1 to 27, 3 May 1960 to 27 July 1960 (Ottawa: Queen's Prînter, 1960) as cited in Urquhart, p. 102.

"The Glassco Commission was established to make recommendations on improving "efficiency, economy and improved servicew within the 116 departments and agencies of the federal government. Ibid., p. 103. 89

to the Chiefs of Staff Committee followed in November of that year." Al1 of these reports contained ideas that advocated change within the militia, but since their

treatment of the militia was largely incidental to their focus on the armed forces as a whole, a new investigative study would be necessary to deal with the militia exclusively.

Examined collectively, it is interesting to note that these reports appeared to build upon the ideas of one another. As the first body to examine defence ntatters in the new decade, the Halfpenny Committee propagated into the 1960s the notion that the forces-in-being concept was more

practical than the use of the militia as a base for mass

mobilization." G.M. Urquhart recalls that when Tory defence

minister Major-General was questioned before

the Halfpenny Committee on the strategic environment and what it demanded of Canada's army in order to counter the threats that it contained, he reiterated hîs earlier views on the subject ." Pearkes did not believe that the Soviet threat would diminish in the foreseeable future. Therefore, Canada had to prepare itself for a war in which only forces-

in-being would be required. Pearkes also believed that there

"Report of an Ad-Hoc Committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 18 November 1963, "The Continuing Military Requirement for Reserve Forces", D-Bist: 112.1 (D160). would be "little likelihood of forces being built up by process of mobilization and a calling in of a large number of resenre~."'~Urpuhart adds that the Glassco Commission endorsed Pearkes' beliefs in its findings on the Department of National Defence. The Glassco Commission's report criticized the goverment's renewed reliance upon the militia to provide a base for mass rnobili~ation'~because this old concept was no longer valid." There simply would be no tirne for a World War Two-style mobilization. The Glassco Commission also identified troop deployment difficulties as a problem for the militia, which the comissioners believed was a direct consequence of the lack of CO-ordination or "fragmentation" that existed among the three armed services." As a remedy to the overall problem of the Canadian military's fragmented structure, the Glassco Commission recommended that the functions common to al1 three services be integrated, and that if the militia were

''1 bid. "By 1961, national sunival and civil defence training for the militia were de-emphasized. A combination of factors -- the militia's dislike of the role, the opposition of several defence associations to the role and the growing popularity of "flexible responsett among the NATO member states -- led the Canadian governent to emphasize conventional over nuclear defence training for the armed forces once again. Urquhart, pp. 83-85. "The Royal Commission on Government Organization, Report 20: Department of National Defence. p. 67, as cited in Urquhart, p. 105. 91 to function effectively within the proposed new structure, it had to be given a role that was not based exclusively on the concept of a mass mobilization base.29 When the Special Committee On Defence was assembled in May 1963, it appeared to combine the mandates of both the

Halfpenny Committee and the Glassco Commission. Under the chairmanship of Maurice Sauvé, the Special Committee on defence had been instructed to examine both finances and policy planning "to solve defence problems similar to those which had bedevilled the Diefenbaker go~ernment".~~Like the Glassco Commission, the Sauvé Committeets financial recommendations for the military as a whole included "more effective reviews [to] be made of organization, manpower management and utilization to achieve greater efficiency", and that the "Financial Reports of the Defence Department should reflect the cost of defence according to functions and operations".'' The Sauvé Cornmittee's sole comment about the militia was among its policy recommendations, in which it was stated that there should be further study of the militia's role and that of the other reserve forces. Although the militia constituted a relatively small part in their reports, Urquhart points out that the Glassco

Commission and the Sauvé Committee are important for having

I9Ibid. 'OUrquhart, p. 106.

"Ibid., pp. 106-107. been the first to suggest from a political point of view that "if a particular rnilitary unit or role was to exist it should not do so for traditional reasons but because of immediate necessityU3', although this philosophy was the basic assumption of the Kennedy, Anderson and the Suttie reports.

The November 1963 report of an ad-hoc committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) was the last one that influenced the newest reorganization of the militia* At the insistence of the Minister of National Defence, the chairman of the COSC organized a meeting among the Chiefs of Staff "for the specific purpose of discussing the continuing requirement for the Beserve Forces" in light of the new flexible response defence strategy and the types of international commitments in which Canada would be participating? In particular, the COSC members were asked by the defence minister to consider whether or not the reserves would continue to be needed to provide a mobilization base and to participate in national survival and civil disaster operations." An ad-hoc committee to the

3'Memorandum from the Minister of National Defence, Paul Hellyer, to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, Air Chief Marshal F.R. Miller, 14 November 1963. D.Hist: 112.1 (Dl6O).

"It is unknown whether or not some COSC rnembers sat on the ad-hoc comrnittee. Ibid. 93 COSC was subsequently created to investigate and respond to the defence minister's requests. With regard to the first matter, the members of the ad-

hoc committee found it unlikely that the reserves would continue to provide a mobilization base due to the time factor involved. In their opinion, there simply would not be enough time to commit anything more than regular force personnel to future NATO operations. Since neither national nor NATO policy called for plans to provide transportation and stocks of equipment with which to equip the reserves, they would also be redundant to modern war for practical

reasons as well. If the reserve forces were to be used at al1 in such situations, the militia would provide individual replacements for regular army personnel who had to be withdrawn from logistical and training units to bring active field force units up to strength. As for national survival and civil defence, the ad-hoc committee believed that the militia would still be required to provide guards for vulnerable points and internment camps in the event of an invasion by enemy forces, but the threat of nuclear attack was downgraded in light of the shift towards the maintenance of a high conventional threshold once again. Should such an attack occur, the militia would be needed to provide aid to the civil power in maintaining law and order, but it would no longer be responsible for nuclear attack warnings, damage assessment, emergency communications, or maintaining a 94 nuclear detonation and fallout reporting system. Finally, the ad-hoc cornittee concluded its report to the minister with a numerical estimate of militia personnel that would be

required for the taskings above. In total, the militia could withstand a tkubstantial reduction" from 51,000 to 30,000 troops .'' With the information on the militia that he had been given by the ad-hoc committee, Paul Hellyer went before Parliament on 5 December 1963 to publicize the governmentls newest scheme to reorganize the militia. Hellyer did not make any reference to finances in his speech as the motivation behind the reorganization, choosing instead to emphasize the need to improve the reserves' "combat readine~s".~~Although the ad-hoc committee to the COSC had suggested that the reserves would not be needed for combat,

it is possible that Hellyer simply wanted to lessen the amount of criticism that he undoubtedly would receive from the militia lobby. The reduction of the militia's size was also mentioned, as well as the imminent appointment of a "select group of militia officers from across Canada" who would be responsible for the reorganization." Predictably,

35Reportof an Ad-Hoc Committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 18 Novembet 1963, "The Continuing Military Requirement for Reserve Forces", D-Hist: 112.1 (D160). Wansard, 5 December 1963, Vol. VI, p. 5457. members of the militia lobby were quick to protest the government's actions. Douglas Harknesç (MP, Calgary East), who had succeeded Major-General George Pearkes as defence minister in the Diefenbaker cabinet, exclaimed that Hellyer's proposed cuts would destroy the militia.''

Harkness was joined by Gordon Churchill (MP, Winnipeg South Centre), who accused Hellyer of "overlooking the history of Canada and downgrading the militia".39 Churchill then quoted from George Stanley's history of the Canadian Amy, Canada's Soldiers, that

[the militia system] brought home to every adult male and many an adolescent youth the idea that he was by virtue of his citizenship a militiman, to whom the country had the right to look for its defence in time of need and concluded by saying, "what was true in 1840 is true today in 1963".'" In response to this criticism, Lucien Cardin cited two additional reasons to justify the reorganization. First, he explained that Canadians were living in a new era in which science and technology controlled their way of life. Yet, in spite of the changes that took place in international politics and armaments,

"there did not seem to be any comparative transformation within the national defence department", as Canadians were

3aIbid., p. 5483.

IgHansard, 6 December 1963, Vol. VI, p. 5564.

4aIbid. 96

"still preparing to fight a war according to the standards of 1939, or 1914"." Second, Cardin warned that unless

defence expenditures were curtailed they would exceed $2 billion by 1970.42

Regardless of the opposition to the newest reorganization scheme for the rnilitia, the Suttie Commission began its investigation in February 1964 and was expected to

complete its report by the begiming of June." The Suttie

Commission's terms of reference were based on the roles that the report of the ad-hoc committee to the Chiefs of Staff Committee had recommended to the defence minister, as well as the nder of militia personnel that would be required for each one. The primary role of the militia would be to support the regular army based upon an Emergency Defence Plan which called for "the withdrawal of Regular Amy personnel from the Defence of Canada Force and static installations to bring the field force up to war establishment"." In turn, the militia would provide troops to make up logistic and special units (e.g., trained in guerilla warfare) that were not provided in peacetime."

"Ibid., p. 5521.

43The Commission on the Reorcranization of the Canadian Atm (Militial Part 1, June 1964, p. iv.

"Ibid., p. 43. 97 this role." The second role would require roughly 18,000 militia troops for a training force to support the field force in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the militia would contribute three training brigade groups to replace the regular army brigade groups that had been despatched overseas, and to provide a source of trained reinforcements for these forces abroad.'" The militia's third role would be based on interna1 security, according to which 2,500 "trained officers and men for the guarding of Key Points, Internent Camps and like duties" were to corne from the ~nilitia.~'Finally, the militia would be required to provide 1,500 officers and other ranks to the regular army to assist in undertaking national survival operations." Based on the above roles, the Suttie

Commission was instructed by the defence minister to make recommendations on the areas within the militia that could withstand cutbacks. Accordingly, the commissioners' conclusions were expected to mention the numbers, types and locations of units of each corps that should remain on the

Order of Battle, as well as those units and headquarters that should be converted, amalgamated, dormantized or

transferred to the Supplementary Reserve li~t.'~ The Suttie Commission's report consisted of two parts. The first contained 26 recommendations in the following areas: public relations, the authority of commanding officers, training (including programs, equipment and

regular army support), recognition badges, uniforms, reductions in the number of militia units, the creation of a special reserve category for officers, administration, boards of inquiry, accounting, pay, special expenses, contingency allowances, amouries, and the disposa1 of surplus army buildings. The second part of the report contained two additional recommendations: the introduction of the terms "major" and "minor" units when designating the size of militia establishments5', and the reduction in the number of militia Group Headquarters, from 25 to 15." This section of the report also contained the commissioners' estimates on how much would be saved if al1 its recommendations were accepted and implemented. A total of $5 million could be saved based on the recommendations that had

id, Appendix "Aw, p- 44. "The term "majort'would be used to def ine a unit having an establishment of 300 soldiers under the command of a Lieutenant-colonel. A "minor" unit would refer to a unit numbering no more than 100 soldiers under the command of a Major. If a major unit failed to maintain 50% of its membership, it would be relegated to minor unit status. Morrison, p. 152. 99 been made in Part 1, and an additional $700,000 could be

saved if the Militia Group Headquarters were reduced in

number .53 Despite the need to make such cutbacks, the defence minister was not unaware that militia reorganization continued to be a politically sensitive issue, especially in light of the recent protestations by the militia lobby in Parliament. Looking back upon the situation in his autobiography, Hellyer remarked that "there were hundreds of

reserve units with strong emotional ties in every major town and city", and "[alny tampering would be potentially dangerous, and eliminating units could be political dynamitet'." Consequently, twenty-two separate meetings were held to discuss the implementation of the Suttie Commission's recomendations, thus determining the fate of numerous militia units." "We followed the Suttie recornmendations carefully but not slavishlyl', wrote Hellyer,

"and when we had finished, it was clear that well-knom units with battle honours and proud traditions would be eliminated in Montreal, Halifax, Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver -- in almost every major city in Canada."s6 Indeed, the militia underwent several dramatic changes: a

531bid., p. 146.

"Hellyer, p. 102.

Tbid.

S41bid., pp. 102-103. 100 total of 13 regiments were moved from the Order of Battle to

the Supplementary Reserve listS7,and 114 armouries were closed after those units remaining on the Order of Battle were categorized as either major or minor units." In addition, the militia experienced change within its command structure. Although the Suttie Commission had recommended

that the number of Militia Group Headquarters be reduced in number, the defence minister (at the suggestion of the staff officers at Army Headquarters) decided to abolish them altogether so that a "closer relationship between the Regular Army and the Militia" could be f~stered.~'Instead, militia command and administration would be done through 12 regular army District Headquarters, and 19 senior militia officers would act as advisors to the regular Of al1 the changes that were made, this was perhaps the one change that affected the militia most adversely, as it placed the control and command of the militia with the regular army .&' The militia experienced a steady decline in nuabers in the years following the Suttie Commission's report, having dropped from a membership of 46,763 in 1964 ta only 19,855

------''Harris, "The Post-Unification Land Force", p. 410.

''Urquiiart, p. 104. 59Morrison,p. 153.

601bid.

"Ibid. 101

by 1970." However, it is difficult to Say whether this was attributable to the efforts of the Suttie Commission or to the anti-militarism that arose at this time in connection

with the Vietnam War? A more likely consequence of the Suttie Commissionts efforts was the Deputy Chief Reserves Study, which may have been a necessary replacement for the report of the Suttie Commission due to the comrnissioners' failure to reorganize the militia in a manner compatible with the forces-in-being concept. When speaking before the Special Committee on Defence in December 1964, Paul Hellyer mentioned that this in fact had been one of the objectives

of the Suttie C~mmission.~'Yet, only two years after the Suttie commissioners completed their report, General 3.V.

Allard, who had just been appointed as the first CDS, ordered the Deputy Chief Reserves", Major-General M.R.

Dare, to undertake a new study "to review the entire reserves . . . includ[ing] tasking, command and control,

"Harris, "The Post-Unification Land Forceff,pp. 412- 413.

''This position was created in September 1965 in response to the CDA's request that the position of "Advisor on Militia" (AOM) be restored, which the militia had done without since General Letson's retirement in 1957. The position of AOM had been created originally by the Kennedy board of officers to ensure that the militia would be directly involved in the implementation of the board's recommendations. The CDA believed that such a liaison should be continued to facilitate relations between the militia and the regular army. Mortison, pp. 159-163. training, equipment and organizationV6 The puspose of what became known as the Deputy Chief Reserves Study was "to establish realistic tasks for the reserves within the concept of 'forces-in-being', and to meet requirements for the period 1966-1976" ." It was also meant to incorporate the militia into the newly-designed Mobile Commandde,which was responsible for the preparation of a mobile, global force, capable of rapid deplopent anywhere in the world to carry out peacekeeping or peace-restoring tasks or to wage a limited, conventional ~ar.~' This time, the regular force would be in charge of reorganizing the reserve forces, including the militia. Although the Deputy Chief Reserves Study appeared to replace the Suttie Commmission's report, its roles and taskings for the militia did not appear to be very different from the report's recommendations. First, the study established two new roles for the reserves: they would provide a "planned and technical reinforcement potential"

Wnder unification, the Amy command and control organization was divided into six task-related, functional commands: Maritime, Air Transport, Training, Air Defence, Materiel and Mobile. Mobile Command was responsible for three army brigade groups within Canada, the militia and the tactical air forces- Harris, "The Post-Unification Land Force", p. 406.

"9J.V. Allard (with Serge Bernier), The Memoirs of General J.V. Allard (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988), p. 240. 103 for the regular force in emergencies, and they would assist in the creation of a training base if an emergency were to

"extend or e~calate''.~~Additional tasks would require the reserves to provide "a comprehensive back-up for the regular

force (i.e., mabilization base) in the event of a general war" and to assume "increasing reponsibility . . . for the operational commitments in Canada's defence"." Second, the study divided the resenre forces into three categories based upon the above roles and tasks: the Ready Reserve, the Canadian Regional Reserve, and the Mobile Command Reserve. The Ready Reserve would be made up of reservists from the

Army, Air Force and Navy who would be called upon first to fil1 individual vacancies within the regular forces. The Canadian Regional Reserve would be comprised of resenrists who would participate in interna1 security and civil operations for the defence of Canada. The final category, the Mobile Cornand Reserve, would consist of select reserve force sub-units that would be trained to a level that would enable them to supplement the regular force units imediately. Third, the study called for the creation of new cornand anà contra1 arrangements. As far as the militia was concerned, it would be rearranged to make up five geographical regions, known as districts. Each district would be commanded by a militia Colonel, with a Lieutenant- 104

Colonel from the regular force to serve as a Staff Officer. The latter arrangement had been designed for the specific purpose of returning the command of the militia to the

militia itself, which had been taken away when the Militia Group Headquarters were disbanded." This was an important political move to harmonize militia-regular force relations, as the militia would be able to feel in control of its own destiny once again while at the same time relieving the regular force of a potential administrative burden.

Because the Deputy Chief Reserves Study was meant in part to prepare the militia for rapid deplopent as an

element of Mobile Command, it is possible to surmise that the Suttie Commission's decision to ignore the 1964 White Paper was perceived by the CDS as an obstacle towards the

regular and reserve forces working closer togethex; hence, a new reorganization of the militia was necessary. In the introduction to their report, the Suttie commissioners state that they chose not to align the militia's reorganization with the White Paper's unification scheme because of the militia's peripheral location in relation to the position of

the regular forces, which were the intended targets for unification. The Suttie commissioners perceived unification to be a plan that would work from the centre outwards, and that by the time plans had been drawn to accommodate the reserve forces into the unification scheme, the commission

'2 1bid. itself would no longer exist. However, the commissioners mention that they planned to contribute to the militia's eventual integration into the unification scheme by "bring[ing] the orgarrization and unit establishments to an acceptable standard in order to gain the maximum benefit

from integrati~n".'~Yet, the problem was not so much making

cutbacks in the militia's strength, but rather a matter of

devising specific ways in which the militia and the regular army would work closer together. The Suttie Commission's report discusses the militia- regular army relationship in two areas: "Training Programs"

and "Regular Amy Supportt'. In each case, the commissioners acknowledge that the militia needs the help of regular army personnel for training, but the recommendations for assistance from the regular army are vague. Under the heading of "Training Programs", the report recommended That training programs be designed consistent with the stated objectives and full support in equiprnent, training areas and personnel be provided by the Regular Forces.''

Similarly, under the heading "Regular Army Support", the report recommended a) That a complement of Regular Force officers and NCOs should be posted to Militia units, [and]

'=The Commission on the Reorsanization of the Canadian Armv (Militia) Part 1, June 1964, p. vii. b) That Regular units should be responsible for providing courses and attachments for Militia personnel. " The problem with the Suttie Commission's recommendations was that they were not made with specific references to the four roles that the defence minister had ordered the militia to assume. It should be noted that the Kennedy Report made the same kind of recommendations for improving the relationship between the militia and the regular army. For example, it recornmended that improved liaison and CO-operation between the militia and the regular army could be achieved by doing "everything possible . . . to narrow the present gap that exists between these two components of the Canadian Army" .76 However, one year after the Kennedy Report's recommendations had been implemented, the CGS, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, sent a memorandum to the Adjutant-General in which he expresses his doubts about the regular army's assistance to the militia. Simonds wrote : . . . you can be assured that the Regular Army will continue to try to bring the standard of training in the Militia to as high a point as possible consistent with the retention of their good-will, which, as 1 mentioned before, is

"Report of the Board of Officers on the Orqanization of the Canadian Armv (Reserve Force), 14 January 1954, Part 1, p. 2. 107 essential if the Militia is to survive as a voluntary force. "

According to the memorandum, Simonds apparently believed

that the regular army's assistance to the militia was purely

voluntary, and that it was entirely contingent upon the regular army's spirit of CO-operation. Therefore, it is

quite plausible that, ten years later, the CDS had the same concerns and decided that it would be prudent to formulate

more concrete means with which the militia and the regular army could be brought closer together within the forces-in- being concept.

Superficially, the report of the Suttie Commission did

not appear to be very different from the Kennedy Report. Both addressed the same areas in which the militia had experienced difficulties, namely recruiting, administration, training, accommodation and equipment. Furthermore, the investigating officers had been selected because of their

ties to the rnilitia. However, the two reports differed with

respect to their terms of reference. Whereas the Kennedy board of officers had been invited to make recommendations on the future roles of the militia, the Suttie commissioners were instructed simply to refashion the militia to accommodate a set of predetermined criteria established by

the defence minister, including the militia's new roles,

"Untitled memorandum to the Adjutant-General from Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, 29 September 1955. D.Hist: 112.1 (0160). 108 budget and total strength. In addition, the Kennedy board of officers had received input from the General Officers Commanding and the CDA, but the Suttie commissioners had very little contact with such external influences." (It is likely, however, that time constraints prevented the comnissioners from consulting others since they were expected to complete their report in only four ~nonths).'~ Yet, the real problem with the Suttie Commission lay in its tasks, which were defined by the Minister of National Defence alone. The commissioners' recommendations reflected the needs of only the federal government. The militia simply could not be "abandoned" for political reasons, nor could it be modernized because of the cutbacks on defence spending.

As a result, the only option open to the government was to tinker with the militia's structure while spending less and less on it. Like its predecessors, the report of the Suttie

Commission was a civil-military relations failure because of its one-sided effort to formulate militia policy. Conclusion Canadian Civil-Military Relations and Militia Reform: An Historical Overview By 1995, the end of the Cold War had altered the strategic environment enough since the last reorganization of the reserve forces to warrant a new study of their effectiveness and cost-efficiency. In particular, the three-

member panel that became known as the Special Commission on

the Restructuring on the R~s~N~swas instructed by the Minister of National Defence to make its recommendations compatible with the "Total Force" concept': the goverment's plan for the integration of the members of the regular and reserve forces to enhance the military's "ready response"

capability.' The 1995 report may have accomplished this, but its recomntendations for the reorganization of the militia show that little has changed since the 1950s and 1960s

insofar as to who the policy-makers are and the interests that they represent. Like the Kennedy Report and the report of the Suttie Commission, the recommendations of the 1995 report for the militia appear to have been influenced to a large degree by politics rather than by rnilitary necessity. The most striking examples of the 1995 report's politically-oriented recommendations are those which concern

ISpecial Commission on the Restructurinq of the Reserves (Report), p. 6. 'Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Pa~er(Ottawa: Canada Communication Group Publishing, 19941, p. 44. 110 the militia's organization, training and roles. First, as mentioned previously, the commissioners' endorsement of the 1994 White Paper's mobilization plan for the militia3 is impractical because of the lack of a clearly defined role to justify such a scheme. Presumably the commissioners wanted to ensure that the military would not be forced to prepare for war in an ad hoc marner again, as has been the case in the past.' It is unrealistic, however, to endorse the idea of a national mobilization plan without understanding the kinds of conflicts that the military may be involved in, and what the operational requirements might be. Although the commissioners have asked the federal goverment to remedy this problem by articulating a clearly defined role for the militia5, it would make more sense if the role were known first before a plan is forrnulated. However, it is likely that the commissioners' endorsement of a national mobilization plan is in part due to its political attractiveness: the commmissioners state that reservists and militia advocates alike believe that national

'Special Commission on the Restructurinq of the Reserves (Report), p. 20.

'Harris, Canadian Brass, p. 220. 'Special Commission on the Restructurinq of the Reserves (Report), p. 20. 111 mobilization is the militia's one "real" role for which it has tradit ionally trained.

A direct consequence of the commissioners' endorsement of a national mobilization plan for the militia is the politicization of its training policies. Because the mobilization scheme will require reservists to perform both combat and combat support roles, its members may be expected to achieve the same standards as their regular army counterparts. Although the commissioners endorse the idea of uniform training standards for both regular and reserve forces, they nonetheless risk perpetuating the gap between

these " two cultures 'O by tecommending that reservists be

allowed more time to complete their training.' As the Kennedy Report has demonstrated, the result of this recommendation in rnilitary terms will be a collection of partially-trained troops who may require several years to complete their training. Accordingly, the mobilization scheme will have to be structured to accommodate a militia whose rnembers will be at various stages in their training. Finally, an overwhelming degree of political influence is reflected by the commissioners' suggestion that the miLitia be used sparingly -- almost as a last resort -- to assist the civil authorities (e.g., providing disaster

'Ibid., p. 18.

'Ibid., p. 15. 'Ibid., p. 59. relief) in addition to providing assistance in comtering military threats.' Although the commissioners believe that the militia will play a meaningful role by assisting the civilian authorities and at the same time build a bridge between the civilian c~mmunityand the armed forceslO, they caution against the militia being used as "a cheap source of labour".'' The danger of this recommendation is that the militia may be led to believe that tradition alone gives them the right to perform traditional military functions only. Should the militia object to performing such non- traditional roles as providing disaster relief, it is possible that the organization will atrophy if there are no "traditional" roles for it to play. Just as the militia had to accept national survival and civil defence as the only roles that justified its existence in the late 1950s, the situation may arise again in which the militia may be required to adopt non-traditional military roles simply to prove its usefulness within the overall defence structure. Furthermore, contrary to the argument that the civil defence role is "not proper soldiering", it is the only one in peacetime "that involves directly risking one's life and dealing with the unkno~n".~~

'Ibid., p. 21. ''Ibid.

'LIbid., p. 22, "Willett, p. 219. 113

The Kennedy Report, the report of the Suttie Commission and the 1995 Report on the Restructuring of the Reserves

have been shown to share two common problems. First, al1 three were weakened by the degree to which their recommendations reflect political will over military need. Second, the reports appealed too strongly to traditions rather than to their contemporary realities as a reason to justify the militia's existence. However, the problem is not

so much the recomendations but the policy-makers. Since the end of the Second World War, neither the Canadian governent nor the military have known what to do with the militia; specifically, how to maintain it as a useful military force in light of the changing nature of war. As the government desperately tried to find roles for the militia in order to justify its existence at a time when only the regular army's forces-in-being mattered, these futile attempts only served to widen the gulf between the militia and the regular army as their roles became less alike. The efforts that were made to improve the militia's fighting efficiency proved to be problematic as well, as seen by the governmentls rejection of the Anderson report in favour of the civil defence role.

In order to implement a plan such as the one recommended by Anderson for the militia, the government would have been required to spend large sus of money and make reorganization decisions that were politically unattractive. 114 The three studies that were undertaken in 1954, 1957 and 1964 for the purpose of reorganizing the militia did not remedy the problem of providing the militia with practical

roles. The consequences of each have demonstrated that the militia's "traditional" role -- that of providing a base for national mobillzation -- hss become antiquated and irrelevant. For political reasons, however, the goverment could not, and still carmot, openly denounce national mobilization as an impractical role for the militia. As a result, the government's recalcitrance has prevented real reform from taking place that could have produced a useful and efficient ready reserve. Instead, the govemment and the regular army have substituted political compromises for military solutions in an attempt to mollify the militia advocates and keep the cost of the militia dom while appearing to give the it "real" military functions. In conclusion, the type and extent of political control that is exercised over the armed forces as a whole and the militia in particular has led ta a historical pattern of a preference for political solutions and roles rather than military utility, thus calling into question the validity of Canadian civil-military relations. 115 Bibliosraphy

Primary Sources (Department of National Defence, Directorate of History, Ottawa) Memorandum £rom Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, to the Minister of National Defence, Brooke Claxton, re: Canadian Army Ready Reserve, HQS 2316-1 TD5, 5 June 1952. File 112.1 (D160), "CGS Files on the Militia: December 1952 to May 1963".

Letter from Major-General Chris Vokes, GOC Western Command, to Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, 9 September 1952. File 73/606, "Material Supplementary to the Kennedy Report" . Letter from Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, GOC Central Command to Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, 24 September 1952. File 73/606. Letter from Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, CGS, to the General Officers Commanding, summarizing the findings of a conference to restructure the reserve force, "Organization, Administration and Training of the Canadian Army Reserve Force", HQC 2001-3/1 (CGS), 12 December 1952, File 112.1 (D16O)-

Report of the Board of Officers on the Orqanization of the Canadian Am(Reserve Force), RFS 200-3/1, 14 January 1954. File 112.043 (Dl). Mernoranduni from Colonel C.P. Stacey to the Director of Staff Duties (DSD), HQ 1200-R3, 29 January 1954, re: Report of the Board of Officers on the Orqanization of the Canadian Armv (Reserve Force), RFS 200-3/1, 14 January 1959. File 112.1 (D160). Brigadier G. Walsh, "Examination of Training Requirements Eor the Reserve Forcett,5 April 1954. File 112.1 (Dl6O). Memorandum to the Adjutant-General from Lieutenant-GeneraI Guy Simonds, CGS, 29 September 1955. File 112.1 (D160).

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