Homeservices - When those dark clouds all disappear

12/10/2019 @icebergdevalor Investment summary

• HomeAdvisor is the largest home services marketplace in the US • A still-nascent online transition in the industry should be a multi-year tailwind for ANGI • Recent missteps in performance advertising have increased fears of Google • However, compared to usual Google prays, ANGI is a much more defendable business • Additionally, the company is transitioning to an on-demand platform, changing its business profile • ANGI is the leader of its industry and it is led by IAC, one of the most capable operators • Despite its many qualities, ANGI is still a forgotten controlled company; always in the shadow of its grown-up brother MTCH.

Execution in fixed price services, loyalty improvements and the short pressure relief from the MTCH spin should set ANGI as a powerful platform with years of growth ahead

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 2 Description

ANGI consists of a series of businesses

• HomeAdvisor • Formerly ServiceMagic, it is the biggest home services marketplace in the US • People search for a given service and (pre-fixed price) they receive the call of up to 4 contractors • HA collects a fee for each lead it provides the contractors + other subscription payments • The equivalent take rate of the lead is around 4% of the GMV (services can be big and complex) • Angie’s List • A marketing company for contractors, it was the original public company • After years of growth (but not profitability), Angie’s loyalty rates fell dramatically • IAC offered a purchase price of $500M (<2x revenue) and reverse-merged HomeAdvisor with ANGI • Angie’s List monetization has been de-emphasized while increasing its references to HA. • • Fixed-price focused home services startup recently acquired by ANGI • International • A series of international investments in the home services sector • Others • ANGI has acquired/disposed various related business: Fixd (warranty), mHelpDesk (SaaS), Felix (leads), etc.

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 3 On-Demand Millennial Home Attractive market Economy Ownership • ANGI sits in the middle of a market with attractive characteristics • On-demand economy trend • The wave of millennial home ownership • Flywheel-type, two-sided network • Its relative size is much bigger than competitors • Despite the many startups, the space isn’t still flooded with VC/PE/Megacap money. • The market is • Hyperlocal and fragmented • 2/3 of requests are not discretional • +80% of the transactions are offline • Pro’s still skeptical about online

Competent execution could translate into a multiyear +15% GMV CAGR on the back of Two-sided network massive offline-to-online shift

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 4 MyHammer Holdings 16 25% Home services sector 14 20% 15% 12 10% • Extremely fragmented, small and often offline 10 5% 8 0% 6 -5% • Incumbents: Homeserve, Frontdoor, FSV -10% 4 -15% • New wave (reminiscent of pre-Tinder in dating) 2 -20% 0 -25% • No clear winner 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

• Lots of startups which can attract critical mass and be profitable Revenue FCF % • Margins, even with small revenues can be very good (+20% FCF)

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 5 Marketplace vs SaaS/Organic

• Many service contractors don’t like online lead generation companies. Hence, the “HomeAdvisor is a fraud” comments. • These kind of dynamics are common with marketplaces: for example, hotels hate Booking and, still, this has not prevented BKNG from being a tremendous compounding story: • Contractors would prefer to create their own brand and organic traffic (Google/Facebook campaigns, ServiceTitan type of software). • On the other hand, consumers would prefer having a transparent platform that integrated all the service providers where they could get the best value. • This SaaS/Organic vs Marketplace tension will always exist but should not pose an existential risk to ANGI. • Compared to Booking, ANGI has various advantages at this battle: • The service request process is much more complex and involves friction. This prevents Google from offering a comparable search process. • Contractors are smaller/more fragmented and often more “traditional” (meaning they often don’t have good digital skills).

The fragmented and complex nature of the industry has made home services more difficult for Google to crack, even in the current state (lead-gen based) of the business.

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 6 Fixed Price + App

• However, the lead-gen model has its limits • Contractors don’t like it • It involves a lot of hassle on the request side • 40% of requests don’t get any answer • The take rate is only 4% of GMV • Google is a real threat • ANGI is currently transitioning to a fixed price model • An UBER-like system where the price of the service is shown upfront • ANGI does the payment processing • Although this transition has been in the works from 2017. It has accelerated lately: • 10/11/2018 - ANGI purchases Handy – A start-up that offered fixed-price home services for house cleaning and others • 8/7/2019 - Oisin Hanrahan (Handy founder) is named Chief Product Officer at ANGI • 2019Q3 – Fixed price services number go from 33/500 beginning 2019 to 133/500. • These services are still around 5% of total revenue. • Currently FP services are money losing, dragging the P&L for some quarters. • This transition makes ANGI to have more organic traffic (app) • Equally, solved the main painpoint from the contractor side “they only offer leads”. • The app is being pushed vs web – Loyalty improvement

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 7 Take rate and GMV

• In 2019, ANGI will do around $46B requested GMV, $28B serviced GMV at around 5% overall take rate. • There is $18B in requested GMV that isn’t serviced. This slack is expected to be reduced due to FP services. • Generally, for marketplaces, take rate depends on the standardization of the job: • Standardized (low price) jobs – High take rate: i.e. Food delivery, Ride-sharing • Complex (high price) jobs – Low take rate: i.e. Upwork, ANGI • For ANGI, the more jobs become fixed price • Take rate improves • Customer satisfaction improves – Less friction (“Uber-like”) • Contractor retention improves – They get real jobs instead of leads (main pain point) • Current take rate for fixed-price (mid-teens) could be pushed to 3-year Growth above-twenties like peer companies have achieved, without 60% sacrificing GMV growth (i.e. LYFT 27%, FVRR 25%) 50% 40%

30%

As fixed-price as share of rGMV increases, sGMV and take 20%

rate, increase. ANGI becomes top-of-the-funnel and 10%

demand/supply LTV/CACs improve. 0% LYFT FVRR UPWK TKWY

Take rate GMV

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 8 The ANGI Iceberg

Requested GMV • For a company at $4B, ANGI’s rGMV is around $46B $46B • Companies that have such a big influnce are often awarded big revenue multiples; this is not the case for ANGI. • Although a different business, Frontdoor will do around 1.4B in Serviced revenue GMV • However, this figure doesn’t compare to ANGI’s revenue but, actually, to ANGI’s Serviced GMV $27.5B • This shows how two companies with similar market cap and revenues can widely differ in the amount of business they influence

• It is a matter of execution to bridge the gap between total influence Revenue and actual business turnover. $1.35B

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 9 IAC – Digital Buy and Build

• ANGI is managed by one of the savvyest online business operators • As with other IAC franchises, ANGI is a product of years of IAC buying, building and spinning businesses • Including ANGI, IAC has been able to successfully balance creating in-house companies while buying new assets.

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 10 ANGI Special Situation

• HomeAdvisor was being public was premature for the company and only happened due to the ANGI reverse merger • Even today, the company is not a full grown-up • They don’t have their own IR or even a quarterly slide deck • They don’t report many typical marketplace metrics: GMV, take rate, LTV/CAC • Selling and marketing is still a huge part of the P&L • It’s a controlled company – IAC owns 87% of the float. • A significant portion of the free float is short due to arbitrage reasons • For these reasons ANGI is often forgotten behind it’s successful brother MTCH • It is usual for MTCH bulls to be long IAC and short ANGI in order to gain exposure the IAC stub

The MTCH full spin should alleviate many of the non-fundamental pressure against the ANGI stock price

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 11 Selling and Marketing

• Currently around 55% of ANGI revenue is used for marketing expenses • Just the TV spent for HA is much greater than other bigger brands • This shows poor return on current advertising dollars (lack of loyalty) • This expense is equally spent in demand weighted (36%/19%) - • A shift to fixed-price + app should gradually allow to leverage ad spend • A SCM-focused company like Booking spends a third of its revenue in marketing (BKNG organic traffic is undisclosed, but should be below 40%) • ANGI’s organic traffic is around 60% (+20% SEO, +20SCM) • Demographic tailwind: younger users tend to prefer app vs web • HA is being used 1.8 times/year per user from a potential 8 times/year: r repeat usage increase improves loyalty. • Nextdoor/Reology-type partnerships help lower CAC

Selling and Marketing is ANGI’s biggest P&L burden. None of the comparable companies, even small home service webs, come close to this. Minimal loyalty improvements should yield better ad-dollar efficiency.

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 12 ANGI Valuation

• ANGI’s valuation depends on a variety of factors • Requested/Serviced GMV, Fixed-Price share, FP take rate and marketing efficiency • Conservative metrics on those parameters yield an attractive return for a company priced at $4B (@7.9 a share) 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E Total Request GMV 41.7 45.8 51.3 57.2 63.5 70.5 77.9 TR GMV Growth % 10.0% 12.0% 11.5% 11.0% 11.0% 10.5% Total Serviced GMV 25.0 27.5 31.1 34.9 39.1 43.7 48.7 60% 60.0% 60.5% 61.0% 61.5% 62.0% 62.5% Lead Model Take Rate 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% 4.3% Lead Model GMV share % 98.0% 94.0% 91.0% 88.0% 85.0% 82.0% 79.0% Fixed Price - Take Rate 13.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.5% 15.7% 15.9% 16.2% Fixed Price GMV share % 2.0% 6.0% 9.0% 12.0% 15.0% 18.0% 21.0% Overall - Take Rate 4.5% 4.9% 5.3% 5.6% 6.0% 6.4% 6.8% Net Revenue Total 283.5 361.0 499.0 736.4 1,132.0 1,355.0 1,634.5 1,970.6 2,348.3 2,793.0 3,311.4 Revenue Growth % 27.3% 38.2% 47.6% 53.7% 19.7% 20.6% 20.6% 19.2% 18.9% 18.6% GM 261.2 338.1 473.2 702.3 1,076.3 1,307.6 1,578.9 1,905.5 2,270.8 2,700.9 3,202.1 GM % 92.1% 93.7% 94.8% 95.4% 95.1% 96.5% 96.6% 96.7% 96.7% 96.7% 96.7% Selling & Markerting - Supply 70.8 85.9 109.9 181.7 206.8 487.8 302.4 364.6 434.4 502.7 596.0 Selling & Markering - Supply % 25.0% 23.8% 22.0% 24.7% 18.3% 19.0% 18.5% 18.5% 18.5% 18.0% 18.0% Selling & Markerting - Demand 90.0 140.0 196.8 282.3 334.7 400.0 547.6 620.7 692.7 782.1 861.0 Selling & Markering - Demand % 31.7% 38.8% 39.4% 38.3% 29.6% 36.0% 33.5% 31.5% 29.5% 28.0% 26.0% Selling & Markering - Total 56.7% 62.6% 61.5% 63.0% 47.8% 55.0% 52.0% 50.0% 48.0% 46.0% 44.0% General & Administrative 71.8 86.7 110.0 300.0 323.5 338.8 375.9 433.5 528.4 586.5 695.4 General & Administrative % 25.3% 24.0% 22.0% 40.7% 28.6% 25.0% 23.0% 22.0% 22.5% 21.0% 21.0% Development & Other 27.0 26.5 32.0 47.9 61.1 63.7 76.8 90.6 105.7 125.7 145.7 Development & Other % 9.5% 7.3% 6.4% 6.5% 5.4% 4.7% 4.7% 4.6% 4.5% 4.5% 4.4% D&A 16.0 10.5 11.5 37.7 86.5 93.5 114.4 137.9 164.4 195.5 231.8 D&A % 5.6% 2.9% 2.3% 5.1% 7.6% 6.9% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 7.0% EBITDA 1.6 -1.0 24.5 -109.6 150.2 17.3 276.2 396.1 509.6 703.8 904.0 EBITDA growth -162.5% -2550.0% -547.3% -237.0% -88.5% 1493.0% 43.4% 28.7% 38.1% 28.4% EBITDA margin 0.6% -0.3% 4.9% -14.9% 13.3% 1.3% 16.9% 20.1% 21.7% 25.2% 27.3%

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 13 Considerations Risks • Google is a (the) real competitor. Going against Google doesn’t end well usually. • ANGI markets are hyperlocal. A well-funded competitor could win over ANGI one market at a time. • Fixed Price is only 5% of revenue and money-losing. ANGI’s success partly depends on it. • Contractors still don’t like ANGI • There is a limit to the GMV you can make fixed price due to complexity. This caps the take rate. • Part of the 40% unmet demand is a natural slack of the marketplace

Upside • Economic cycle protection: 2/3 of ANGI’s demand are non-discretionary, the other part is R&R. Additionally, if the current tight job market loosens, it attracts more contractors to the platform. • If the fixed-price transformation is achieved, ANGI margins could be above 35% EBITDA (more food- delivery-like margins) • A possible VC winter would be a tailwind for ANGI (SCM dollars + contractor retention).

12/10/2019 ANGI Homervices Pitch | @icebergdevalor 14