The Accidental Admiral: a Sailor Takes Command at NATO Christopher Nelson
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Naval War College Review Volume 68 Article 12 Number 4 Autumn 2015 The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO Christopher Nelson James G. Stavridis Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Nelson, Christopher and Stavridis, James G. (2015) "The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO," Naval War College Review: Vol. 68 : No. 4 , Article 12. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/12 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Nelson and Stavridis: The Accidental Admiral: A Sailor Takes Command at NATO BOOK REVIEWS 117 pages of endnotes� Uniquely, the book officer, a colonel on Eisenhower’s staff, also develops practical recommenda- insulted a British officer by calling him tions for implementing the strategy a British bastard� Ike wasn’t pleased� with serious attention to timelines and Ike threatened to bust him down to regional nuances� Where Layne’s Peace private� Being a bastard, he said, was not of Illusions traces historical failings of a national characteristic� All were equal the hegemonic approach, Restraint is in the eyes of the allies� But admittedly, a timely, fleshed-out policy proposal� handling NATO has not gotten any Ultimately, many policy makers will nev- easier over the years� Secretary Gates, er get past page 1, where Posen defines prior to his departure, had some choice American national security interests as words for the alliance, urging more the traditional sovereignty, safety, terri- NATO members to meet the required 2 tory, and international power position� percent of their GDP on defense spend- Threats to those are modest and Posen ing� America, he noted, continues to makes a compelling case they are best pick up the slack—from Afghanistan managed through limited overseas com- to Libya� Yet the alliance remains� mitments� On the other hand, many in Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret�), Washington believe American hegemony most recently Supreme Allied Com- —euphemized as “leadership”—is in mander Europe (SACEUR) and and of itself a fundamental interest, and commander of U�S� European Com- that no economic and physical risks are mand (EUCOM), and unofficially, the acceptable� That one televised beheading Navy’s advocate of the well-known five thousand miles away can so alarm John Adams quotation—“Let us America suggests this will not change tenderly and kindly cherish, therefore soon� For those willing to think criti- the means of knowledge� Let us dare cally about America’s security needs, to read, think, speak and write”—has however, Restraint offers a deeply logical written an enjoyable memoir of his challenge and a thoughtful blueprint� time in Eisenhower’s old chair� DAVID T� BURBACH Stavridis’s memoir stays away from criti- cism of U�S� officials and discussions of contentious closed-door meetings� This is in contrast to two other high-profile, former administration officials’ memoirs Stavridis, James G� The Accidental Admiral: A —those of Ambassador Christopher Hill Sailor Takes Command at NATO. Annapolis, Md�: and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta Naval Institute Press, 2014� 288pp� $32�95 —which were published around the In the early days of the Second World same time to much hoopla� While War, General Eisenhower, the first Stavridis was dual hatted as SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and EUCOM his reputation around the struggled to keep the alliance together� headquarters was one of civility and One of the more interesting anecdotes intelligence, certainly not a bad combi- about this struggle is when he almost nation� Stavridis says he wants to show fired a member of his staff because the the reader not what happened during his officer was, shall we say, culturally insen- four years, but rather why it happened� sitive� The story goes that an American He proceeds to take the reader on a tour Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2015 1 NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb 117 8/13/15 3:06 PM 118 NAVAL WAR COLLEGENaval REVIEW War College Review, Vol. 68 [2015], No. 4, Art. 12 of challenges: from the toppling of Qad- what was, by many accounts, a success- hafi to the civil war in Syria, Israeli secu- ful tour as the supreme allied command- rity, a resurgent Russia, the Balkans, and er� This was not to be� He describes, finally, of course, Afghanistan� Thus the plainly, that some of his official travel first few chapters are a whirlwind of in- was not properly paid for, and a single dividuals, meetings, and events� Among trip was deemed questionable by the all this, he often pauses within chapters inspector general� He accepted respon- to highlight some of the more important sibility for his and his staff’s mistakes, senior military and political officials and made reparations� Although he was that make up the NATO alliance� cleared by the Secretary of the Navy Stavridis spends considerable time from any wrongdoing, the long inves- in these early chapters setting up the tigation was enough to complicate the facts—stating what happened—and political winds that are Washington, and then trying to balance it against why the Secretary of Defense had to remove it happened and what he learned from his nomination� While certainly not ris- it� The first part of the book, however, ing to Orwell’s definition of disgraceful, feels rushed and compressed, and even nonetheless, it was not his shining hour� in his best efforts the balance tilts For this reader, the stories of his days toward more numbers and facts and commanding USS Barry, beautifully away from a deep exploration of the captured in his book Destroyer Captain, why� If there was one weakness, this is remain my favorite� Its style, written in it� You are left wanting more discus- a journalist’s hand, is intimate and mov- sion on how the policy was shaped ing—a man that loves the sea yet knows in Washington and in Brussels� What he is human and only can go as far as his was the dialogue during these many crew takes him� Still, his new memoir meetings? And why was it persuasive? is a refreshing dose of honesty, intel- The second part of the book shines� ligence, and reflection—much needed Here he discusses leadership, strategic in today’s Navy and tomorrow’s leaders� planning, innovation, and strategic CHRISTOPHER NELSON communication� All of these chapters are excellent and well worth the price of the book� In one chapter, Stavridis talks about the actions that led to Generals McChrystal’s and Petraeus’s resigna- Winklareth, Robert J� The Battle of the Denmark tions—and his own stumbles� It is here Strait: A Critical Analysis of the Bismarck’s Singu- he almost passes the George Orwell test� lar Triumph� Havertown, Pa�: Casemate Publish- Orwell once said, “Autobiography is only ers, 2012� 336pp� $32�95 to be trusted when it reveals something From Johnny Horton’s 1960 ballad disgraceful� A man who gives a good “Sink the Bismarck” to James Cameron’s account of himself is probably lying, Expedition Bismarck for the Discovery since any life when viewed from the Channel in 2002, the sole sortie of the inside is simply a series of defeats�” And German battleship in May 1941 has for Stravridis it is not all good� Stavridis held the attention of both the general explains that he was nominated to be public and naval historians� The latter the Chief of Naval Operations, following mainly concentrate on the destruction of https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol68/iss4/12 2 NWC_Autumn2015Reivew.indb 118 8/13/15 3:06 PM.