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Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith on Freedom and Futurity City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 6-2016 Claiming Time: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith on Freedom and Futurity Jennifer Corby Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1276 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] CLAIMING TIME: THOMAS HOBBES, JOHN LOCKE, AND ADAM SMITH ON FUTURITY AND FREEDOM by JENNIFER CORBY A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2016 © 2016 JENNIFER CORBY All Rights Reserved ii Claiming Time: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith on Freedom and Futurity by Jennifer Corby This manuscript has been read and accepted by the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Susan Buck-Morss Date Chair of Examining Committee (Print) Chair of Examining Committee (Signature) Alyson Cole Date Executive Officer (Print) Executive Officer (Signature) Supervisory Committee Susan Buck-Morss Gary Wilder Uday Mehta THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract Claiming Time: Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith on Freedom and Futurity by Jennifer Corby Advisor: Susan Buck-Morss This dissertation engages the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith through the lens of time. By first analyzing their earlier works on the nature of self- consciousness, it demonstrates that each offers a theory of subjectivity that, despite important differences, shares a singular point of distinction from those that typified early modern thought. Against the predominant view that human freedom necessitates immaterial agency, each theorizes a materialist agent that is able to overcome the determinism of the material world by way of the temporal nature of subjectivity. Each understands self-consciousness to be constituted by an extension of memory into the past and imagination into the future, which, they argue, allows humans to act beyond, or in spite of, the present that would otherwise determine behavior. In conceiving subjectivity materially and temporally, their theories of freedom center equally on the futurity that makes freedom possible and the social context of its expression. As such, rather than simply being the implicit foundations for political thought, this dissertation demonstrates that their theories of subjectivity are necessarily political concepts—political concepts that are foundational to liberal thought. Through analyzing the particular methods each employs in theorizing the relationship between freedom and futurity, this dissertation offers new interpretations of their work, while charting movements between their ideas in the interest of opening the historical, neoliberal present to temporal analysis. iv Acknowledgements In the process of writing this dissertation, I learned a great deal about Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Adam Smith. But I also learned a good deal about the generosity of the human spirit. Without the time and support of my colleagues, family, and friends, this project would not be what it is. I would like to thank, first and foremost, my committee, each of whom spent hours helping me to rethink, revise, reframe my work. I would particularly like to thank my chair and mentor, Susan Buck-Morss, who is a continual source of personal, professional, and intellectual inspiration. Her perceptive questions and keen ability to synthesize my work, regularly allows me to see new possibilities within it, and to become a better mentor to my own students. Gary Wilder also deserves special thanks, as I could not have asked for a better reader. If you ever have the opportunity to have Gary read your material, take it. His ability to hone in on key insights lurking within broad themes has played no small role in the structuring of this work. I am also incredibly grateful to have had Uday Mehta on my committee, as his forceful criticisms and words of encouragement are always delivered at just the right time. Collectively, I have Susan, Gary, and Uday to thank for making me a braver, bolder writer. Writing this dissertation was also made possible by the financial support and academic opportunities I received from the CUNY Graduate Center. In my first years of study, I was awarded a Graduate Teaching Fellowship, and placed at City College. It was there that I met John Krinsky, then chair of the political science department. My years at City College were wonderful, in no small part because of John’s support. He granted me the freedom to develop new courses, including one focusing on my dissertation research, The Politics of Time. I also have to thank my City College students; in working through this material with them, I likely learned as much from them as they learned from me. City College also holds a special place in v my heart, because that is where my friendship with Marshall Berman also developed. Marshall was an enduring source of patience, sensitivity, and kindness, and I like to think that a small part of him lives on in the impact he has had on my own teaching and writing. It was through my friendship with Marshall that I was introduced to Michael Sorkin, of Terreform. A small portion of the research in this dissertation has been published with Terreform’s Urban Research imprint, in Adventures in Modernism: Thinking with Marshall Berman, a book which I also edited. My research also benefited from the Mellon Foundation Dissertation Fellowship I was awarded with the Committee on Globalization and Social Change at the Graduate Center. The annual theme during my fellowship was temporality, and the opportunity to meet weekly with an international, transdisciplinary cohort to share and discuss ideas about time was singularly enriching. I am truly grateful to each of the committee members, who generously shared their own work and helped me to develop my own. My work was further facilitated by the Instructional Technology Fellowship which I was awarded with the Macaulay Honors College. In addition to providing generous funding, this fellowship also introduced me to a cohort of amazing and dedicated colleagues. Our fearless leader, Joe Ugoretz, will forever be the standard bearer for what a supportive and trusting professional mentor should be. And though I have learned much from each of the ITFs, I am especially thankful for Gwen Shaw, whose interruptions into my late night writing were always a welcome reprieve. Beyond financial and professional support, the Graduate Center has also been a wonderful place for finding a supportive network of friends. I am incredibly grateful to Dr. Daniel Rothenberg and the students of the dissertation completion seminar. Their patience, generosity, and insights were an unparalleled source of support. I have to thank Alec Magnet, in vi particular, for helping me to see my work and my life through new (and kinder) eyes. My time at the Graduate Center also brought me to my life gurus, Shawna Brandle, Janet Reilly, and Tricia Stapleton, each of whom are rock stars, professionally and personally. I am also thankful for my family, which has been an incredible and abiding source of love and support. My mother, Susan Seymour, has been a lifelong source of encouragement, not only in words, but in deeds. Her entrepreneurship, ingenuity, devotion, and determination, have taught me to be independent, creative, and caring. I also have to thank her husband, Jim Seymour, for bravely diving in to the cacophony and chaos that is the “Corby Clan,” and for his kindness, patience, and humor. I am also grateful to my brother Chris Corby, not only because he is the great diplomat of the family, but because playing hours of Dr. Mario with him is a lifelong outlet for stress relief. And I am thankful for my youngest brother, Tyler Corby, who has grown into an amazing, adventurous, thoughtful young adult, and who now mentors me just as much as I mentor him (#truecorbs). I am also incredibly grateful to my husband’s family, who have become my own in the truest sense. Dan and Susan Aroosi have shown me the power of patience, compassion, and perseverance. My sisters-in-law, Lauren and Mallory, have taught me the importance of laughing, loyalty, and a stash of good candy. And last, but only because she is not least, I want to thank my best friend, Melanie Cassels. Through teenage shenanigans, cross-country moves, crises, and conquests, she has been a constant source of advice, comfort, companionship, and when I need it, a good push. We have often been told that each of us are fuel to the other’s flame. And it’s true—together we burn bright. vii For Jamie. This leap of faith is for, and because of, you. viii Table of Contents Introduction 1 Project Inspiration 1 The Materialist Turn of the Early Modern Moment 2 Chapter Outline 8 Paradoxes of Possibility: Empowerment and Anxiety in Thomas Hobbes’s Materialist Subject 14 Introduction 14 Hobbes’s Break with the Past: The Annihilation Hypothesis 21 Finding Common Ground 25 Hobbes’s Modern Mechanism 31 Materialist Subjectivity: The Temporal Subject 34 Locating Materialist Agency: Supplanting the Will with Imagination 39 Of Futures Insecure:
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