No. 117 19 September 2012

russian analytical digest

www.res.ethz.ch www.laender-analysen.de

PUBLIC OPINION POLLS AND POLITICAL CULTURE ■■ANALYSIS Popular Support for Democracy and Autocracy in Russia 2 By Ellen Carnaghan, Saint Louis ■■OPINION POLL Conceptions of Democracy 5 ■■ANALYSIS Trends in Russian Views on Democracy 2008–12: Has There Been a Russian Democratic Awakening? 9 By Henry E. Hale, Washington ■■OPINION POLL Democracy and/or a Strong State? 12

Institute for European, Research Centre Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies Institute of History for East European Studies Security Studies East European Studies The George Washington University of Zurich University University of Bremen ETH Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 2

ANALYSIS

Popular Support for Democracy and Autocracy in Russia By Ellen Carnaghan, Saint Louis Abstract The high levels of popular support for Putin have sometimes been interpreted as public acceptance of the moves toward greater autocracy that occurred during his first two terms as president and that continued when he served as prime minister. The results of some Russian public opinion surveys seem to confirm that impression, but these survey results may give an impression that there is less support for democracy than actually exists. Measuring support for democracy in societies where democratic institutions are not present, or do not function well, is a challenge. In societies moving either toward or away from democracy, the very meaning of “democracy” is often in question and institutions and practices that go by the label of “demo- cratic” often vary widely from accepted norms. Interpreted in this light, survey results provide evidence of perhaps more passive support for democracy among ordinary Russians than is generally imagined, but lit- tle willingness to engage in political action.

n May 7th, 2012, started his third of popular support have sometimes been interpreted as Oterm as president of Russia. Unlike the previous public acceptance of the moves toward greater autocracy. times that he took the oath of office—in 2000 and in Some Russian public opinion surveys seem to con- 2004—this time he did so in the face of significant pop- firm the impression that ordinary Russians see little use ular opposition. Huge demonstrations arose following for Western-style democracy. According to polls con- accusations of vote-rigging in the December parliamen- ducted by the Levada Center, a respected Russian sur- tary elections, and reappeared around the March presi- vey organization, only about 20 percent of respondents dential election, continuing into Putin’s third term. Does think Russia needs the kind of democracy found in this emergent opposition indicate a popular defense of Europe and America, and that percentage seems to be democracy in the face of Putin’s increasingly autocratic declining over time. Russians are quite a bit more likely tendencies? Or is the opposition just a small group at to think that what is happening in Russia is the devel- odds with dominant trends in popular political orien- opment of democracy than that it is the approach of tations? In this article, I use the results of public opin- dictatorship. They are more satisfied than not with the ion surveys and interviews that I conducted with ordi- fairness of Russian elections. They tend to favor “order” nary Russian citizens between 1998 and 2011 to show and a ruler with a “strong hand.” that, while ordinary Russians may be more supportive Public opinion surveys also indicate little popular of democracy than generally imagined, at the moment interest in opposition politics. Polls conducted by the few are willing to do much to advance it. Russian public opinion organization Fond Obshchest- Putin’s first two terms—and his tenure as Prime vennoe Mnenie show minimal public recognition of the Minister under President —saw a names of opposition leaders, and leaders who are better slow but steady contraction of democratic practice. The known tend to be regarded negatively. The population’s media—especially television—was brought increasingly support for opposition activities is also limited. When under government control; elections became steadily less asked whether fines for violating the government’s condi- competitive as the regime learned how to manage out- tions for sanctioned demonstrations should be increased, comes; people bold enough to try to take a stand against only 12 percent of respondents defend the right to pro- these trends found themselves in exile, jail, or in the case test as an essential element of democracy. Few Russians of a number of unlucky journalists, dead. Putin devel- are ready to join protest demonstrations. In their new oped what he called a “power vertical” that facilitated consumer economy, many Russians have been willing central government control over local politics and elec- to ignore political life and go shopping instead. tions. This meant government officials could be counted But such survey results may give an impression of on to do what the people above them demanded, not less support for democracy than actually exists. Measur- necessarily what citizens wanted. Though parts of the ing support for democracy in societies where democratic political system remain democratic in form, practices institutions do not exist, or do not function very well, are increasingly autocratic. While there are many things is a challenge. Even in stable societies in which citizens that citizens might like about the Putin regime—eco- have considerable experience with democracy, survey nomic expansion and the curtailment of the chaos of respondents may not completely understand the mean- the Yeltsin years chief among them—Putin’s high levels ing of the questions that they are asked, and researchers RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 3

may not accurately interpret the meaning of the answers that ordinary citizens can always do this, or that the dif- that they receive. In societies moving either toward or ferences they see are the same as the ones survey research- away from democracy, the very meaning of “democracy” ers have in mind. Some of my respondents, for instance, is often in question and institutions and practices that thought a tsar, a president, and a Soviet-era commissar go by the label of “democratic” often vary widely from were pretty much the same thing. It is not surprising, accepted norms. Having learned about their political then, that Russians understand their own system to be institutions since they were schoolchildren, citizens of more democratic than most outside observers think it is. stable political systems are equipped with a set of words Another problem with questions about particular and concepts that they can use to understand and to talk institutions is that respondents may answer in terms of about their government. In societies undergoing political the specific—and often flawed—institutions of their change, citizens do not have that advantage. As a result, own experience, instead of in terms of how those insti- respondents are likely to interpret survey questions on tutions are supposed to work in the abstract world of democratic concepts in unpredictable ways, and their perfect democracy. Polls show, for instance, that Rus- answers may miscommunicate the intended meaning. sians are not very supportive of representative legisla- This tendency toward miscommunication is not merely tures. Since the legislature is usually considered one of a question of translation or interaction across cultures; the lynchpins of democracy, Russians’ hostility to their it is an inherent by-product of the difficulty of talking State Duma can look like hostility to the principle of about democracy in contexts where it does not fully exist. representation or to competition between various polit- This problem is particularly profound for questions ical forces. Yet it was clear in the interviews that I con- containing the word “democracy.” As part of two dif- ducted that respondents’ complaints arose from the way ferent research projects, I have conducted a series of their own State Duma operated. They labeled deputies systematic, intensive interviews with ordinary Rus- “swindlers” and “parasites” and accused them of being sians between 1998 and 2011. These were interviews only concerned with their own personal welfare, with in which the respondents were free to answer at length feeding at the public trough. My respondents did not instead of fitting their opinions into pre-determined want to be without representation. They just wanted multiple choice responses. Their answers illustrate the representative institutions to work better, to serve the variation of meaning that might be attached to the word needs of ordinary people like themselves. “democracy.” Some people described what democracy Survey researchers use phrases like “a strong hand” had meant in their own experiences: leaders who evaded or “strict order” as code words indicating authoritarian their responsibilities to the nation; closed factories and rule and limits on personal freedom, but it is not clear economic hardship. Others talked about democracy in all respondents successfully crack the code. My respon- terms of single pieces of a complex system—personal dents, for instance, were in favor of “strict order,” but freedom, elections, or the observance of law. As a result, they understood that to mean that everyone—including when Russians answer survey questions about the need government officials—would be bound to obey the law. for Western style democracy in Russia, it is hard to know For many of my respondents, order was not the oppo- what they have in mind. site of democracy or any practical concept of freedom. Survey researchers are of course aware of this prob- Rather, order—along with democracy—occupied a mid- lem and try to avoid it to the degree that they can. One point between autocracy on the one hand, and chaos, strategy to minimize the problems associated with varia- random violence, and social collapse on the other. As tion in the meaning of the word “democracy” is to avoid one young man explained, “order supports the major- using the word itself, asking instead about various aspects ity of spheres. But nothing will come of anarchy, which of democratic systems, usually elections, institutions, and is what you get without order.” individual liberty. My respondents show that even these The upshot of all this is that survey responses prob- less abstract questions rely on words that mean different ably underestimate the degree to which ordinary Rus- things to different respondents. Survey questions some- sians favor democracy. In non-democratic or partly- times ask about particular institutions—presidents, par- democratic countries like Russia, real world referents liaments, elections, courts—that are the vehicles for the for words like “democracy,” “freedom,” or “elections” participation, competition, or the protection of individ- are likely to be less than wholly savory and not what ual rights that are at the heart of democracy. But this strat- researchers have in mind. In political systems undergo- egy depends on respondents recognizing the significance ing uncertain transitions, respondents may need a great of specific institutions—for instance, that presidents are deal of political knowledge to answer questions well, but different than kings or that legislatures embody the prin- these are just the places where knowledge acquired in ciple of representation of diverse interests. It is not clear the past may not help people understand the present. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 4

And there is much in Russians’ survey responses expanding steadily in Russia, and information that the that indicates considerable support for many aspects official press does not provide is available to Russians on of democracy. Although ordinary Russian citizens can opposition websites and blogs. Indeed, polls indicate that be somewhat hazy about the expected organization of some parts of the opposition’s message are beginning to democratic institutions, they are much more consistent get through. , an anti-corruption blog- in their support for individual rights. This feeling may ger, led a campaign to link Putin’s party be most intense in regard to personal liberties—like with the slogan, “The Party of Swindlers and Thieves.” the right to travel freely—but it also extends to politi- Between April 2011 and January 2012, the percent of cal rights. Generally, citizens do not think the interests the population who agreed that the name fit rose nine of the state take precedence over the rights of individu- percentage points. So far, however, the majority has not als. A large majority of citizens think opposition groups bought the opposition’s claims that elections are rigged should exist, and they do not support the use of force or that better government is possible. against such groups, even though they do not person- Although the proportion of the population that ally expect to find themselves at a protest rally. believes the country is going in the wrong direction is That only a very small proportion of Russians report down from its highs during the Yeltsin administration, themselves to be ready to join demonstrations or other at around 40 percent it is still substantial. It is possible forms of protest is not surprising. In most countries, that that, during Putin’s third term as president, these dis- level of political activity is very much the province of satisfied citizens will remain content to complain pri- the few, and it is probably something that individuals vately, convince themselves that the regime ultimately become ready for unexpectedly, in the face of quickly has their best interests in mind, and continue to provide changing circumstances. To the degree that Russians active support neither to the government or its oppo- rely on state-controlled media sources, they do not nec- nents. It is also possible that they will gradually find rea- essarily have the kind of information they would need sons to move into more active opposition. That opposi- in order to be able to articulate the sources of their dis- tion could come from many directions—communists satisfactions or to figure out how to turn dissatisfaction and exclusive nationalists retain significant pockets of into action. Indeed, the state-controlled press tends to support—but supporters of the basic tenets of democ- present all regime opponents as violent extremists, and racy probably outnumber either of these groups. What local government officials loyal to (or dependent upon) remains to be seen is whether these people will choose to Putin make it difficult for the opposition to organize defend democratic practices or, alternately, to mind their events. But surveys show that internet usage has been own business and go shopping as autocracy intensifies.

About the Author Ellen Carnaghan is Professor and Chair of the Political Science Department at Saint Louis University in Saint Louis, Missouri, USA. She has published articles on popular attitudes in Russia and Eastern Europe in Comparative Poli- tics, Democratization, Post-Soviet Affairs, P.S: Political Science and Politics, and Slavic Review. Her recent book, Out of Order: Russian Political Values in an Imperfect World (Penn State University Press, 2007) examines how the politi- cal values of Russian citizens have been shaped by the disorderly conditions that followed the collapse of communism. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 5

OPINION POLL

Conceptions of Democracy

Figure 1: What Kind Of Democracy Does Russia Need?

60 Like in developed countries of Europe and America 50

Like in the 40

30 Own unique type following national traditions

20 Russia doesn't need democracy 10 Don't know 0

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, www.russiavotes.org

Figure 2: On What Path Do You Think Events In Russia Are Developing?

70 Development of democracy 60

50 Return to old Soviet ways

40 Approach of dictatorship

30 Rise of anarchy 20

Don't know 10

0 January January October October January January October January 1999 2000 2005 2006 2009 2010 2011 2012

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, www.russiavotes.org RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 6

Figure 3: In Your Opinion, How Fair Were The Elections for the State Duma?

Absolutely fair Generally fair No answer Not very fair Completely unfair

January 2012 8 35 19 23 14

December 2011 5 30 20 30 15

December 2007 16 45 18 15 5

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, N=1600, www.levada.ru

Figure 4: What Kind Of President Does Russia Need Now?

A leader with a strong hand to direct the work of the government, parliament, judicial organs, and regional 51 political institutions

A leader who strictly observes the constitution and knows how to work together with all social and political 39 groups in Russia, including the opposition

Hard to say 9

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, www.levada.ru RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 7

Figure 5: What Do You Think Is Most Important To Be Able To Speak About Democracy In This Country?

Freedom of speech, the press, religion 35 Order and stability 29 Economic prosperity of the country 26 Strict observance of laws 21 Direct elections of all the highest state leaders 13 Empty talk 9 Anyone can do whatever they want 8 Guaranteeing the rights of minorities 7 The minority obeys the majority 5 Anarchy and disorder 4 Other 1 Don't know 6

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, 17–21 December 2010, N=1611, www.russiavotes.org

Figure 6: Willingness To Join Demonstration

70 I support neither those opposed to nor those on the 60 side of the current authorities 50 I would go to the demonstration protesting 40 against the authorities I would speak against the 30 government, but I wouldn't go to a demonstration 20 I would speak in support of 10 government, but I wouldn't go to a demonstration 0 I would go to a demonstration in support of the government

Source: representative opinion poll by Fond Obshchestvennoye Mneniye, www.fom.ru RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 8

Figure 7: Do You Agree Or Disagree With the Opinion That the United Russia Party Is the Party Of Swindlers and Thieves?

Definitely yes and probably yes Hard to say Definitely no and probably no

January 2012 41 16 43

November 2011 37 19 44

June 2011 33 20 47

April 2011 32 23 46

Source: representative opinion poll by Levada Center, N=1600, www.levada.ru RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 9

ANALYSIS

Trends in Russian Views on Democracy 2008–12: Has There Been a Russian Democratic Awakening?1 By Henry E. Hale, Washington Abstract With the surprising outbreak of the largest street demonstrations of the Vladimir Putin era against widely perceived election fraud in the December 2011 Duma elections, many observers have speculated that a dem- ocratic awakening might be afoot in Russia. Comparison of original public opinion surveys of the Russian citizenry just after the parliamentary-presidential election seasons of 2008 and 2012 reveals little evidence of an awakening and finds broad support for democracy to have remained steady during this period. Survey evidence also shows that the idea of an “awakening” might be misplaced, however, since the “democracy” that many Russians tend to support is fully compatible with a “strong leader” who rules without checks and balances. That is, they support what Guillermo O’Donnell famously called a “delegative democracy” where people freely and regularly elect leaders who are then expected to wield broad powers without constraints to solve problems and promote development.

Russians and Democracy in Europe-Asia Studies in October 2011, I reported con- A debate has long raged over what Russians think about firmation that an overwhelming majority of Russians democracy. The older view is that Russians are some- “think that to solve its problems Russia needs a head of how culturally authoritarian, that they have long been state with a strong hand”—a finding that Pew Associates conditioned to believe that autocracy is the optimal and others have interpreted in their surveys as an indi- form of government for their particular land and peo- cator of support for authoritarianism. But the RES sur- ple. Other scholarship has challenged this argument, vey did not stop there, and asked where people thought condemning it as cultural determinism that essentially this “strong hand” should come from, and it turns out blames the people for the governments that have victim- that all but 4 percent of those who supported a strong ized them. Even these challengers, however, are divided hand thought that “the people should have the right to on exactly what Russians do think of democracy. Some choose who becomes this head of state,” and almost all see them as democrats at heart who just do not think of those (87 percent) thought that this should happen it can work in Russia at the present time. Others think through “free and fair elections” among “several can- of them as “contingent autocrats,” people whose hopes didates with different views.” that democracy would usher in prosperity got too high This reconciles widely reported findings that Rus- as communism collapsed, setting them up for bitter sians tend to support powerful and largely unconstrained disillusionment. Still others see them as little different leaders with equally consistent evidence that they also from people in other countries, preferring democracy support democracy, want to choose their leaders in but willing to sacrifice some freedom for vital goods like free and fair elections, think that political competition overcoming collapse or restoring economic growth. A makes the state stronger, and do not think leaders should famous Russian pollster, Yury Levada, even articulated violate basic human rights—all of which was also con- the idea that Russians themselves were essentially con- firmed in the 2008 RES survey. fused on the question. Many of these positions can in fact be reconciled if Fresh Survey Evidence from 2012 one thinks of Russians as “delegative democrats.” That In the wake of the massive protest movement that began is, they do widely favor “strong hand” leadership that in December 2011 and continues to mobilize tens of does not have to bother with checks and balances in thousands in the streets periodically to this day, many order to solve problems, but they also want to collec- now say that Russians are less and less willing to accept tively decide who this strong hand should be. I sought Putin’s strong hand, increasingly able to see through the to test this idea using the 2008 wave of the Russian regime’s manipulations of the political system, and are Election Studies (RES) survey, conducted just after the more insistent on demanding change. Some have pre- presidential election of that year. In an article published dicted that this will even lead to the regime’s demise in the near future. Are such suppositions correct, and has 1 Numbers reported in the text might differ slightly from those there been a significant change in Russians’ attitudes in the following section of graphs due to rounding. to democracy between 2008 and 2012? RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 10

To help answer this question, we can turn to results In 2012, 62 percent tended to agree that “gubernato- that are just in from a new wave of the RES survey, rial elections should be restored” with only 14 percent this one conducted among a nationally representative being opposed. While the slightly different angles taken sample of 1,682 adult citizens of the Russian Federa- in wording these questions complicates direct compar- tion between April 1 and May 18, 2012, just after the ison, the findings are consistent with a rise in support 2011–2012 national election season concluded with the for electing provincial heads of state. March presidential voting. Carried out by the - based Demoscope group of survey specialists based on Democracy and a “Strong Leader” their time-tested and academically rigorous methodol- Another approach used in the RES surveys has been to ogy, the questionnaire was designed by myself and Tim- ask people about different political systems and whether othy Colton, who has co-led every iteration of the RES they were a “very good,” “fairly good,” “fairly bad,” or since its inception in 1995. “very bad” way to govern Russia. Here we find what on the surface appears to be some evidence for an increase in Support for “Democracy” in 2008 and 2012 support for democracy: In 2008, those generally think- First, let us examine findings when people are simply ing democracy was good for Russia outweighed those asked straight up: “Do you agree or disagree that Russia thinking it was bad by 58 percent to 23 percent, while should be a democratic country?” As in 2008, we find in 2012, the share of democrats had bumped up to 63 in 2012 that approximately three quarters of the pop- percent while the share of their opponents held steady ulation supports democracy in Russia. While the per- at 23 percent. centage of “democrats” in 2012 (77 percent) is slightly What complicates the simple “democratic awaken- higher than it was in 2008 (74 percent), so also is the ing” interpretation here is the second political system share of people who disagree (up to 14 percent from 12 that the RES asked Russians about: “a strong leader percent). What is happening here is that the share of who does not have to bother with parliament and elec- Russians who were unable to give an answer has shrunk tions.” It turns out that the share of Russians telling from 14 percent to 9 percent. What this suggests, then, survey researchers that this was generally a good idea is that there has been no significant net rise in the share also increased, from 49 percent in 2008 to 56 percent of the population supporting democracy in Russia, and in 2012, with the share of those opposing it declining that on balance people who have only recently started to from 34 percent in 2008 to 30 percent in 2012. formulate opinions have been nearly as likely to break Here, however, we must keep in mind what was men- toward opposition to, as much as support for, democracy. tioned above and documented more extensively in my Of course, it is also well documented that the par- Europe-Asia Studies article using 2008 data: Many Rus- ticular wording of survey questions can have a big effect sians want both a strong leader operating without con- on the answers one gets, so the survey also asked a num- straints for long periods of time and the right to deter- ber of related questions using different wording. Just to mine who this leader will be in free and fair elections. make sure that using the term “democracy” was not Some other follow-on questions also show they want throwing things off, the RES also includes a number the right to remove such a leader should he or she start of questions that capture attitudes to core attributes operating against the interests of the public. This is the of democracy without mentioning the term “democ- logic of delegative democracy, and helps explain why a racy” itself. On balance, the evidence reveals no strong full 26 percent of the population in 2008 could actually upsurge in support for democracy. In one case, there support both a “democratic system” and a “strong leader” was a decline even as a majority still could be consid- in the same survey. Interestingly, the share of such peo- ered “democratic”: Asked whether they tend to agree ple rose to nearly 35 percent in 2012. This cautions that or disagree that “competition among political parties even where one might observe a rise in Russian support makes our political system stronger,” the percentage of for democracy, the kind of democracy they actually want those agreeing went down from 60 percent in 2008 to may not be of the ideal-typical Western variety. 53 percent in 2012, with the share of people disagree- ing rising from 29 percent in 2008 to 38 percent in Trading Off Democracy 2012. Asked about whether regional governors should The RES also includes a series of questions, originally be elected, however, the answers seemed to reflect an introduced more than a decade ago by Colton and upturn in democratic attitudes. In 2008, 45 percent had Michael McFaul, designed to explore the extent to which backed Putin in ending such elections while only 35 per- people understand the tradeoffs involved in advocat- cent came out clearly for restoring them, with 9 percent ing democracy with regard to other high-priority val- expressing indifference and 10 percent unable to answer. ues. Comparing answers in 2012 with those in 2008 RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 11

reveals no clear evidence of a trend toward emphasiz- think growth and democracy should be equally valued. ing democracy more with respect to other values like a The share of Russian citizens who think that growth and strong state or economic growth. democracy are not compatible and would choose growth When asked whether it is possible for Russia to be was essentially unchanged between 2008 and 2012, ris- both democratic and have a strong state, 56 percent in ing only from 22 percent to 23 percent. 2008 and 53 percent in 2012 believe that they can have both, and only 33 percent in 2008 and 38 percent in Implications 2012 think that one must choose. The distribution of Overall, this first cut into fresh findings from the April– priorities between these two values has hardly changed May 2012 RES survey finds little evidence of a sea between 2008 and 2012: 43 percent in 2008 and 41 change in Russia regarding attitudes toward democ- percent in 2012 would prioritize the strong state, while racy. While responses to some questions show a slight 10 and 11 percent (respectively) would opt for democ- rise in the share of supporters of democracy, others indi- racy and 43 and 42 percent aver that they are equally cate either no change or even a slight decline in the prev- important. The share of people who thought that there alence of democratic values. Nevertheless, it at least was a tradeoff between these values and would choose appears to be the case in 2012 as much as in 2008 that a a strong state over democracy has held fairly steady, but majority of Russian citizens can be considered support- only at 22 percent of the population in 2008 and 23 ers of some kind of democracy. Importantly, however, percent in 2012. these “democrats” often tend to be “delegative demo- Answers regarding perceived tradeoffs with eco- crats” rather than “liberal democrats” or Western-style nomic growth are highly similar: 62 percent in both democrats. This will make it harder for a strong leader years think that they can have both, with 27 percent ever to “go all the way” and completely eliminate oppo- and 29 percent disagreeing in 2008 and 2012 respec- sition and elections. But at the same time, it will also tively. As for how the population prioritizes these val- tend to facilitate the acquisition by leaders of the power ues, 49 percent in 2008 and 52 percent in 2012 would to do so and to promote the rise of leaders who display favor growth, 2 and 3 percent respectively would put tendencies disregardful of the procedural niceties of lib- democracy first, and 44 and 42 percent respectively eral democracy.

About the Author Henry E. Hale is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and the author of Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State (2006) and The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World (2008). He is currently finishing a new book manu- script, tentatively titled Great Expectations: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective.

Further Reading • Henry E. Hale, “The Myth of Mass Russian Support for Autocracy: Public Opinion Foundations of a Hybrid Regime,” Europe-Asia Studies, v. 63, no. 8, October 2011, pp. 1357–1375. • Guillermo O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, v. 5, no. 1, January 1994, pp. 55–69. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 12

OPINION POLL

Democracy and/or a Strong State?

Figure 1: Distribution (percent) of answers to: “Many people in Russia today talk a lot about democracy. Do you agree or disagree that Russia should be a democratic country?”

Agree Non-answer Disagree

2012 77 9 14

2008 74 14 12

Source: Russian Election Studies (RES) surveys 2008 and 2012 (Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Sociology, Demoscope Group)

Figure 2a: Distribution of answers (percent) to: “What do you think, to what degree are the po- litical systems that I mention here a good fit for our country? A democratic system…”

Fits well Tends to fit Non-answer Tends not to fit Does not fit at all

2012 14 50 14 18 5

2008 13 46 19 16 7

Source: Russian Election Studies (RES) surveys 2008 and 2012 (Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Sociology, Demoscope Group)

Figure 2b: Distribution of answers (percent) to: “What do you think, to what degree are the po- litical systems that I mention here a good fit for our country? A strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections…”

Fits well Tends to fit Non-answer Tends not to fit Does not fit at all

2012 21 35 14 22 8

2008 19 30 17 24 10

Source: Russian Election Studies (RES) surveys 2008 and 2012 (Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Sociology, Demoscope Group) RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 13

Figure 3a: Distribution (percent) of answers to: “What do you think, is it possible for Russia at the present time to be simultaneously a democratic country and a country with a strong state or must we choose one or the other: either a strong state or democracy?”

Can have both Non-answer Must choose

2012 53 9 38

2008 56 11 33

Source: Russian Election Studies (RES) surveys 2008 and 2012 (Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Sociology, Demoscope Group)

Figure 3b: Distribution (percent) of answers to: “And what, in your opinion, is more important for Russia right now, to have a strong state or to be a democratic country?”

Strong state Equally important Non-answer Democracy

2012 41 42 5 11

2008 43 43 4 10

Source: Russian Election Studies (RES) surveys 2008 and 2012 (Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Sociology, Demoscope Group)

Figure 4a: Distribution (percent) of answers to: “What do you think, is it possible for there to be in Russia at the present time both democracy and economic growth, or must we choose one or the other, either economic growth or democracy?”

Can have both Non-answer Must choose

2012 62 9 29

2008 62 11 27

Source: Russian Election Studies (RES) surveys 2008 and 2012 (Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Sociology, Demoscope Group) RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 14

Figure 4b: Distribution (percent) of answers to: “And what, in your opinion, is more important for Russia right now, economic growth or democracy?”

Economic growth Equally important Non-answer Democracy

2012 52 42 3 3

2008 49 44 4 2

Source: Russian Election Studies (RES) surveys 2008 and 2012 (Russian Academy of Sciences, Institute for Sociology, Demoscope Group) RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 117, 19 September 2012 15

ABOUT THE RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST

Editors: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder, Aglaya Snetkov The Russian Analytical Digest is a bi-weekly internet publication jointly produced by the Research Centre for East European Studies [Forschun- gsstelle Osteuropa] at the University of Bremen (www.forschungsstelle.uni-bremen.de), the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich (ETH Zurich), the Resource Security Institute, the Institute of History at the University of Zurich (http://www. hist.uzh.ch/) and the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at The George Washington University. It is supported by the German Association for East European Studies (DGO). The Digest draws on contributions to the German-language Russland-Analysen www.laender-( analysen.de/russland), the CSS analytical network on Russia and Eurasia (www.css.ethz.ch/rad), and the Russian Regional Report. The Russian An- alytical Digest covers political, economic, and social developments in Russia and its regions, and looks at Russia’s role in international relations. To subscribe or unsubscribe to the Russian Analytical Digest, please visit our web page at www.css.ethz.ch/rad Research Centre for East European Studies at the University of Bremen Founded in 1982, the Research Centre for East European Studies (Forschungsstelle Osteuropa) at the University of Bremen is dedicated to the interdisciplinary analysis of socialist and post-socialist developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The major focus is on the role of dissent, opposition and civil society in their historic, political, sociological and cultural dimensions. With a unique archive on dissident culture under socialism and with an extensive collection of publications on Central and Eastern Europe, the Research Centre regularly hosts visiting scholars from all over the world. One of the core missions of the institute is the dissemination of academic knowledge to the interested public. This includes regular e-mail news- letters covering current developments in Central and Eastern Europe. The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich The Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich is a Swiss academic center of competence that specializes in research, teaching, and infor- mation services in the fields of international and Swiss security studies. The CSS also acts as a consultant to various political bodies and the gener- al public. The CSS is engaged in research projects with a number of Swiss and international partners. The Center‘s research focus is on new risks, European and transatlantic security, strategy and doctrine, area studies, state failure and state building, and Swiss foreign and security policy. In its teaching capacity, the CSS contributes to the ETH Zurich-based Bachelor of Arts (BA) in public policy degree course for prospective professional military officers in the Swiss army and the ETH and University of Zurich-based MA program in Comparative and International Studies (MACIS); offers and develops specialized courses and study programs to all ETH Zurich and University of Zurich students; and has the lead in the Executive Masters degree program in Security Policy and Crisis Management (MAS ETH SPCM), which is offered by ETH Zurich. The program is tailored to the needs of experienced senior executives and managers from the private and public sectors, the policy community, and the armed forces. The CSS runs the International Relations and Security Network (ISN), and in cooperation with partner institutes manages the Crisis and Risk Network (CRN), the Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP), the Swiss Foreign and Security Policy Network (SSN), and the Russian and Eurasian Security (RES) Network. The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, The Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies is home to a Master‘s program in European and Eurasian Studies, faculty members from political science, history, economics, sociology, anthropology, language and literature, and other fields, visiting scholars from around the world, research associates, graduate student fellows, and a rich assortment of brown bag lunches, seminars, public lectures, and conferences. The Institute of History at the University of Zurich The University of Zurich, founded in 1833, is one of the leading research universities in Europe and offers the widest range of study courses in Switzerland. With some 24,000 students and 1,900 graduates every year, Zurich is also Switzerland’s largest university. Within the Faculty of Arts, the Institute of History consists of currently 17 professors and employs around a 100 researchers, teaching assistants and administrative staff. Research and teaching relate to the period from late antiquity to contemporary history. The Institute offers its 2,600 students a Bachelor’s and Master’s Degree in general history and various specialized subjects, including a comprehensive Master’s Program in Eastern European His- tory. Since 2009, the Institute also offers a structured PhD-program. For further information, visit at http://www.hist.uzh.ch/ Resource Security Institute The Resource Security Institute (RSI) is a non-profit organization devoted to improving understanding about global energy security, particularly as it relates to Eurasia. We do this through collaborating on the publication of electronic newsletters, articles, books and public presentations.

Any opinions expressed in Russian Analytical Digest are exclusively those of the authors. Reprint possible with permission by the editors. Editors: Stephen Aris, Matthias Neumann, Robert Orttung, Jeronim Perović, Heiko Pleines, Hans-Henning Schröder, Aglaya Snetkov Layout: Cengiz Kibaroglu, Matthias Neumann, Michael Clemens ISSN 1863-0421 © 2012 by Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Bremen and Center for Security Studies, Zürich Research Centre for East European Studies • Publications Department • Klagenfurter Str. 3 • 28359 Bremen •Germany Phone: +49 421-218-69600 • Telefax: +49 421-218-69607 • e-mail: [email protected] • Internet: www.css.ethz.ch/rad