Cornell University ILR School DigitalCommons@ILR

Articles and Chapters ILR Collection

2008

The U.S. Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy

Kate Bronfenbrenner Cornell University, [email protected]

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles

Part of the Collective Bargaining Commons, International and Comparative Labor Relations Commons, and the Unions Commons Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. Support this valuable resource today!

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact [email protected].

If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an alternate format, contact [email protected] for assistance. The U.S. Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy

Abstract Excerpt] There is no question that some unions, such as the UAW in auto-transplants and auto-parts, CWA/IUE in high tech and electronics, USWA in metal production and fabrication or the UFCW in food processing, face much greater challenges organising in their primary jurisdictions because they are confronted with more mobile, more global, and more powerful and effective employer opposition, and, in some cases, a workforce less predisposed to unionisation. Yet, as we have seen, even in the most adverse organising environments, union organising success can dramatically improve when unions utilise a comprehensive campaign strategy. Given these differences, what is perhaps most striking about our findings is how ewf unions are actually running comprehensive campaigns, or even consistently using any of the ten elements of our comprehensive campaign model. Most significant of all, only a smattering of unions today see themselves as global unions taking on global employers. They are not doing the strategic corporate research necessary to develop the kind of critique of the company needed to launch a truly multifaceted comprehensive campaign. They are not developing lasting labour and community networks, locally, nationally and internationally to help them build and leverage their power in the company and the industry. And they are not getting out in front on the issues that resonate with workers and the public ranging from universal health care, to the war in Iraq, global outsourcing, to affordable higher education.

Keywords unions, organizing, globalization, labor movement, labor rights

Disciplines Collective Bargaining | International and Comparative Labor Relations | Unions

Comments Suggested Citation Bronfenbrenner, K. (2008). The U.S. experience of organising in the context of the global economy [Electronic version]. In T. Hastings (Ed.), The state of the unions: Challenges facing organized labour in Ireland (pp. 185-217). Dublin: The Liffey Press. http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/247/

Required Publisher Statement ©2008 by The Liffey Press. Reprinted with permission of the publisher.

This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/247 Chapter 10

THE US EXPERIENCE OF ORGANISING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

Kate Bronfenbrenner

In late January of 2008 the US Bureau of Labor Statistics issued their annual report revealing that US unions had added approximately 310,000 new members in 2007, resulting in an increase in union density from 12.0 per cent in 2006 to 12.1 per cent in 2007 (BLS, 2007). A 12.1 per cent figure is a shockingly low density rate and a . 1 per cent increase is indeed very small. However, across the US unions celebrated the news as a clear signal they had turned a corner. Economic policy experts Ben Sipperer and John Schmitt explain the significance of the news:

The increase is small, and may well reflect statistical variation rather than an actual increase in the union membership share, but the uptick is striking because it is the first time since the BLS be­ gan collecting annual union membership rates in 1983 that the union share has increased (Sipperer and Schmitt, 2008).

And the response from unions to the news was swift. No sooner had the report been released than the Service Employees' International Union (SEIU) issued a press release headlined 'SEIU Drives Growth as Union Workforce Increases for First Time in Years', followed by:

Seeking to improve their lives and the wide range of services they provide in their communities, 114,158 workers voted to unite in the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) in 2007. 186 The State of the Unions

SEIU's growth last year accounted for nearly 25 per cent of the total union growth across the country, solidifying SEIU's role as America's fastest-growing union (SEIU, 2008).

While there is no question that SEIU can lay claim to a significant share of the nation's recent organising gains, the fact remains that what is be­ ing celebrated here is that the US labour movement eked out one-tenth of a percentage point more than standing still. This year for the first time in twenty-five years unions managed to both organise more union members than are lost each year to plant closings, outsourcing, layoffs, contracting out, privatisation, technological change and decertification, and also keep pace with job growth in the unorganised sectors of the economy. As shown in Figure 10.1, union membership in the US has remained fairly stable for the last sixty years as density started its decline from its peak of 35.4 in the mid-1940s. The overall decline would have been much steeper if there had not been the rapid growth of public sector union den­ sity between 1960 through 1980, which has averaged around 36 per cent since 1985. In contrast, union density in the private sector began a steady decline dropping more rapidly in the 1980s until 1999, the first time that density held steady since 1980. In that highly celebrated year, unlike this year, unions were able to point to large victories: 75,000 homecare work­ ers organised in California by SEIU, tens of thousands of teachers organ­ ised by AFT in Puerto Rico, several large hotels in Las Vegas by HERE, two large white collar units (CWA at US Airways and LAM at United) under the Railway Labor Act, and perhaps most dramatic of all, after more than twenty years and multiple elections, UNITE's victory at Pillowtex, formerly Cannon Mills, in North Carolina (Bronfenbrenner, 2000,2001). That year the labour movement talked about having organised 500,000 workers, turning a corner, reversing the decline. But it was also the last year of an expanding economy and the year before an election. The next year in 2000, as in every other election year, organisers were pulled off organising campaigns to work on the Gore-Lieberman cam­ paign. Few campaigns were started that winter and instead of a resur­ gence there was a drop in density each year, worsened by the fear that followed 9/11. It would not level out again until 2007 when once again catching up, or standing still, is cause for celebration. ~TW

The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 187 for nearly 25 per cent of the y, solidifying SEIU's role —as IV, 2008). 5 5 s «j

Q lay claim to a significant share the fact remains that what is be- movement eked out one-tenth of ill. This year for the first time in th organise more union members 01

.11 decline would have been much o CM o Is.' owth of public sector union den- »- CM a> as has averaged around 36 per cent i 55 8 0\ the private sector began a steady o -• SOs until 1999, the first time that ighly celebrated year, unlike this -s: ;: «- « Si t\ victories: 75,000 homecare work- 5 of thousands of teachers organ- $ 8 8'» e hotels in Las Vegas by HERE, s: § ^ a JS Airways and IAM at United) I s most dramatic of all, after more 1 £ «•> £2

•&> ;, UNITE's victory at Pillowtex, « p> j: . (Bronfenbrenner, 2000, 2001). Q talked about having organised s: 5 *.£ o sing the decline. But it was also I 8 8 mom and the year before an election. § i i! T election year, organisers were k on the Gore-Lieberman cam- Hi t winter and instead of a resur- till year, worsened by the fear that ;ain until 2007 when once again celebration. 188 The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising I

Yet the fact is, 'standing still' in 1999 required a great deal more work trate their organising resource; for unions than it did in 1989, and standing still in 2008 requires even paigns, albeit with limited succt more effort. For, each year, the challenge for unions became even more Even with new organising i difficult, as job growth expanded ever more rapidly in industries and sec­ had hovered between 3,000 pei tors where union density was lowest, and outsourcing and plant closings to drop down in the last five ; combined to devastate industries where unions predominated (Bronfen- time in 2006. Although NLRB brenner and Luce, 2004). Thus, by my estimates, where in the late 1980s cent in 1997 to 61 per cent in 2 and early 1990s unions needed to organise at least 300,000 workers to an indicator of organising suc< keep up with job expansion in non-union jobs and job loss in union jobs win rates have increased, the pe they continued to organise under 300,000 in the public and private sector union won the election remair combined. As the 1990s moved forward the magic number increased to When we factor in an average i 500,000 and in 1999 they finally reached that number. But today, when this means that less than a thh hundreds of thousands of union jobs are shifted out of the country due to under the NLRB are able to g* global outsourcing alone (Bronfenbrenner and Luce, 2004), unions need gaining agreement (Bronfenbrei to be organising hundreds of thousands more workers each year, and can ill afford to celebrate gains as insignificant as . 1 per cent. Table 10.1: NLRB Representatit

Year Number of The Organising Numbers - The Last Decade Elections Ra Starting in the late 1990s, some unions, such as SEIU, UNITE HERE, UAW, AFSCME, and CWA began increasingly to focus their efforts on 2002 2,724 56.: organising outside the NLRB. Public sector unions, such as AFSCME 2003 2,351 58.: and AFT, stepped up their organising efforts, most notably in Maryland 2004 2,363 58.( and Puerto Rico, which part way through the decade gained collective bargaining protection for public sector employees. In another innovative 2005 2,137 6i.: effort, SEIU and AFSCME began to work with state and local govern­ 2006 1,657 61.^ ments to set up special authorities to bring home care and child day AFL-CIO, 2006 768 60.: workers under the aegis of a single large public employer, and under a CTW, 2006 732 56/ campaign neutrality agreement, to make workers that were heretofore some of the most difficult to organise because of their isolated agency Source: BNA Plus, 2007. employee status into large, safe public employee campaigns. Because of the scale of these efforts, in recent years the net number As shown in Table 10.1, one nc of new workers organised through NLRB elections has been entirely Change to Win are not only run overshadowed by the much larger number of workers organised in a se­ but their success rate is remari ries of major non-board victories in homecare, building service, wireless win rate but is winning in largei communications, laundry services, health care, hotels and the public sec­ ers a year through the NLRB tor. Still, the overwhelming majority of US unions continue to concen- NLRB are notably higher in sei The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 189 equired a great deal more work trate their organising resources and efforts in traditional NLRB cam­ ding still in 2008 requires even paigns, albeit with limited success. ;e for unions became even more Even with new organising initiatives, the number of elections, which )re rapidly in industries and sec- had hovered between 3,000 per year since the late 1980s, slowly began i outsourcing and plant closings to drop down in the last five years, reaching below 2,000 for the first unions predominated (Bronfen- time in 2006. Although NLRB election win rates increased from 51 per >timates, where in the late 1980s cent in 1997 to 61 per cent in 2006, it would be premature to see this as lise at least 300,000 workers to an indicator of organising success and membership growth. For while 1 jobs and job loss in union jobs win rates have increased, the per cent of eligible voters in units where the ) in the public and private sector union won the election remains much lower, still only 53.9 per cent. the magic number increased to When we factor in an average first contract rate of less than 70 per cent, d that number. But today, when this means that less than a third of workers who endeavor to organise shifted out of the country due to under the NLRB are able to gain representation under a collective bar­ iv and Luce, 2004), unions need gaining agreement (Bronfenbrenner and Hickey, 2004; BNA Plus, 2007). nore workers each year, and can nt as . 1 per cent. Table 10.1: NLRB Representation Elections, 2002-2006

Year Number of % Win Number of Number in % of Voters st Decade Elections Rate Eligible Elections in Elections , such as SEIU, UNITE HERE, Voters Won Won ;asingly to focus their efforts on 2002 2,724 56.8% 189,863 81,364 42.9% sctor unions, such as AFSCME 2003 2,351 58.3% 150,047 77,427 51.6%

forts, most notably in Maryland 2004 2,363 58.6% 166,525 84,838 50.9% gh the decade gained collective 2005 2,137 61.3% 125,305 64,502 51.5% mployees. In another innovative >rk with state and local govern­ 2006 1,657 61.4% 112,598 60,087 53.4% ing home care and child day AFL-CIO, 2006 768 60.2% 50,049 23,101 46.2% ;e public employer, and under a CTW, 2006 732 56.4% 52,299 26,245 50.2% e workers that were heretofore >ecause of their isolated agency Source: BNA Plus, 2007. aployee campaigns. , in recent years the net number As shown in Table 10.1, one noteworthy factor is that the AFL-CIO and RB elections has been entirely Change to Win are not only running equal numbers of NLRB campaigns er of workers organised in a se- but their success rate is remarkably similar. CTW has a slightly lower ecare, building service, wireless win rate but is winning in larger units so has brings in 3,000 more work­ l care, hotels and the public sec- ers a year through the NLRB than the AFL-CIO. Win rates under the US unions continue to concen- NLRB are notably higher in service sector industries such as health care 190 The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising i

(69.7 per cent) than in manufacturing (46.1 per cent), communications while incomplete, the prelimin* (31.8 per cent) or retail 53.2 per cent) (BNA Plus, 2007). insights into the nature and e> employers, unions and workfon Organising Outside the NLRB What these data reveal is th As mentioned earlier, NLRB certification elections are one of several hide through which workers < mechanisms under which new workers are organised in the US each tantly, outside of construction a year. Workers in the railway and airline industry organise in elections majority of the these campaign supervised by the National Mediation Board. Public sector workers em­ communities of colour, in part ployed in state and local government entities organise through certifica­ care, retail sales, warehouse a tion elections supervised by more than forty different labour relations social services. agencies in the thirty-seven states that have collective bargaining legisla­ Public sector campaigns or tion covering at least some public workers in the state. In several states, trated among two groups: hom< including Washington, New York, Minnesota, and Ohio, there are also ees, primarily in non-professioi state-supervised card check certifications. Although they have limited female, including many womer collective bargaining rights, federal workers organise through govern­ cant activity include state an ment supervised certification elections. In recent years there has also workers and graduate students been a wave of public sector organising in Puerto Rico following the sector higher education. Once passage of public employee collective bargaining legislation in 1998. concentrations of women worke Unfortunately, because there is no centralised database tracking organis­ For several unions, includin ing activity and outcomes in state and local elections, we have no sys- and SEIU, the number of work temised national data on public sector organising activity and outcomes. far outweighs those organised In the last decade, as the environment for organising in the private primary industries. Notably, the sector became increasingly challenging, more and more unions focused CWA, UNITE HERE and AF! their efforts on organising outside the traditional NLRB process through hotels, home care, wireless or card check recognition and, to a lesser extent, community supervised eluding many women of colou elections. Because there is no government mandated reporting require­ suggest that many of the unic ment for private sector organising that occurs outside of the NLRB, data gains, both inside and outside tl on the nature and extent of these campaigns is also very limited. We are where women of colour pred( currently in the process of compiling the first ever national database of NLRB and non-board campaig non-board campaigns. To date we have gathered data from nearly every coming not just the majority, bi service sector, public sector and industrial union, but are still missing the workers organising each year. bulk of the building trades and entertainment unions data because they The Organising Environme themselves have difficulty compiling their organising numbers. So, Over the last 20 years I have co understanding of the factors d 1 See Bronfenbrenner and Juravich, 1998 for a more comprehensive analysis of organis­ ing in the public sector. failure in organising in the glol J The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 191

46.1 per cent), communications while incomplete, the preliminary non-board findings provide important NA Plus, 2007). insights into the nature and extent of these campaigns, the industries, employers, unions and workforce. What these data reveal is that the NLRB is no longer the primary ve­ on elections are one of several hicle through which workers organise in the US today. More impor­ ; are organised in the US each tantly, outside of construction and some security units, the overwhelming ie industry organise in elections majority of the these campaigns are concentrated service sector units in oard. Public sector workers em- communities of colour, in particular building services, wireless, health tities organise through certifica- care, retail sales, warehouse and distribution, laundries and privatised forty different labour relations social services. ive collective bargaining legisla- Public sector campaigns on the other hand were primarily concen­ :rs in the state. In several states, trated among two groups: homecare workers and public school employ­ nesota, and Ohio, there are also ees, primarily in non-professional units. Both groups are almost entirely ns. Although they have limited female, including many women of colour. Other industries with signifi­ >rkers organise through govern- cant activity include state and local government employees, airline In recent years there has also workers and graduate students and adjunct faculty organising in public ig in Puerto Rico following the sector higher education. Once again, these are all industries with high bargaining legislation in 1998. concentrations of women workers (Bronfenbrenner, 2005). alised database tracking organis- For several unions, including UNITE HERE, CWA, AFSCME, AFT, local elections, we have no sys- and SEIU, the number of workers organised outside the NLRB process ganising activity and outcomes. far outweighs those organised through NLRB elections, even in their 3nt for organising in the private primary industries. Notably, the workers being organised by SEIU, AFT, more and more unions focused CWA, UNITE HERE and AFSCME, whether in healthcare, laundries, aditional NLRB process through hotels, home care, wireless or public schools are primarily women, in­ r extent, community supervised cluding many women of colour. Thus, when taken together, these data ent mandated reporting require- suggest that many of the unions that have made the most organising ccurs outside of the NLRB, data gains, both inside and outside the NLRB process, are targeting industries igns is also very limited. We are where women of colour predominate. In combination, the data from ie first ever national database of NLRB and non-board campaigns also suggest that women are fast be­ gathered data from nearly every coming not just the majority, but perhaps as much as 60 per cent of new al union, but are still missing the workers organising each year. riment unions data because they their organising numbers. So, The Organising Environment Over the last 20 years I have conducted a series of studies to gain a better understanding of the factors determining union organising success or tore comprehensive analysis of organis- failure in organising in the global economy. While we are currently up- 192 The State of the Unions dating our research, the findings from our 1998-1999 study make clear that even a decade ago unions were operating in a much more global, mobile, and rapidly changing corporate environment. While a majority of private-sector organising campaigns continue to be concentrated in relatively small units in US-owned for-profit compa­ nies, these companies are increasingly subsidiaries of larger parent com­ panies (84 per cent), including many multinationals (62 per cent). This trend occurs not because unions are targeting large multinational compa­ nies, but because the US private sector economy is increasingly domi­ nated by multinational firms. Only one-third of all campaigns occur in for-profit companies with all sites and operations based in the US, while 23 per cent take place in non-profit companies such as hospitals, social service agencies or educational institutions. Fifty-four per cent of all NLRB elections are concentrated in mobile industries where production can easily be shifted out of the state or out of the country. Not surprisingly, win rates average just 34 per cent in campaigns conducted in mobile industries compared to a 54 per cent win rate in immobile industries. Organising win rates average as high as 58 per cent in non-profit companies, compared to a 40 per cent win rate in for-profit companies. Among for-profit companies, win rates are highest for US-based companies with all sites in the US (45 per cent), and lower for foreign-based multinationals (29 per cent) and US-based multination­ als (39 per cent). Win rates are also much higher (63 per cent) in the 16 per cent of the companies that are not a subsidiary of a larger parent company, compared to a 41 per cent win rate for companies that are sub­ sidiaries.

2 All of the data in the text, charts, and tables from this point forward was compiled as part of a study commissioned by the bi partisan Congressional US Trade Deficit Review Commission (USTDRC) in 2000. See Bronfenbrenner and Hickey 2004 and Bronfen- brenner 2000 for an in-depth discussion of the research method used in conducting the research for the USTDRC study. The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 193 r 1998-1999 study make clear -ating in a much more global, vironment. anising campaigns continue to # JP # 0> CO CM n US-owned for-profit compa- i >sidiaries of larger parent com- anies such as hospitals, social 2

<^ $z s? p ; yf i to 00 . subsidiary of a larger parent ate for companies that are sub- s: IJiili I 5 il s- • ! • ~ a 2 6 c c £ if &• Q this point forward was compiled as ill ngressional US Trade Deficit Review nner and Hickey 2004 and Bronfen- earch method used in conducting the 194 The State of the Unions

Company Characteristics As would be expected, given that all of these elections occurred during the period of high corporate profitability in the late 1990s, 65 per cent of the companies in our sample were in good to excellent financial condi­ tion at the time the petition was filed (Figure 10.3). Overall, win rates are lower in companies in good to excellent financial condition (43 per cent) than in units in fair to poor financial condition (47 per cent), reflecting the fact that more profitable companies have greater resources to im­ prove conditions for workers and to devote to an aggressive anti-union campaign. Fifteen per cent of the elections take place in firms with other organ­ ised units at the same location as the unit being organised. A much larger percentage of companies (60 per cent) have other organised units at other sites and locations of the company, either in the US or abroad. For nearly half of the campaigns in our sample (46 per cent), there was a previous, unsuccessful, attempt to organise the unit. Figure 10.6 also presents findings on company practices before the organising campaign took place. Nearly a third of the units already had an employee involvement or team system in place before the election, while 21 per cent had had threats of full or partial plant closure, and 18 per cent reported changes in company ownership. Both pre-campaign employee involvement programs and pre-campaign plant closing threats are associated with win rates 7 to 12 percentage points lower than in units where they are not present. In contrast, changes in company owner­ ship are associated with win rates 13 percentage points higher than in units where there had been no change in ownership prior to the cam­ paign. This may be because a change in company ownership is more likely to be associated with practices such as job combinations, wage and benefit reductions, and increases in the pace of work which, in combina­ tion, may motivate workers to initiate a union campaign and vote for a union. 1 The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 195

hese elections occurred during n the late 1990s, 65 per cent of •d to excellent financial condi- ire 10.3). Overall, win rates are nancial condition (43 per cent) dition (47 per cent), reflecting have greater resources to im- )te to an aggressive anti-union lace in firms with other organ- )eing organised. A much larger e other organised units at other in the US or abroad. For nearly >er cent), there was a previous,

company practices before the . third of the units already had i in place before the election, }r partial plant closure, and 18 >wnership. Both pre-campaign s; campaign plant closing threats rcentage points lower than in »S2 st, changes in company owner- rcentage points higher than in S3 -s: I ownership prior to the cam- U company ownership is more as job combinations, wage and ZQ of work which, in combina- mion campaign and vote for a

Ct, 196 The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising

Our findings on bargaining uni ing is increasingly concentrate people of colour (Figure 10.4). jority of white men, while won the units and workers of colon the units. Win rates increase $ and workers of colour increase units with a majority of white with a majority of workers of c per cent workers of colour, . women, and 62 per cent in un highest win rates are 82 per women workers of colour. The not only are women and work* our, participating in union elec cause win rates are so much r new workers coming into the people of colour. Recent immigrants and un in many of the largest organisi: tries such as home care, hotel asbestos removal. However, m I of the NLRB process. In conti our sample were in units with \ only 7 per cent of the campaig I The win rate averages as high cent recent immigrants, but dr documented workers. This refl ers to use the threat of depor undocumented workers and al check neutrality campaigns are a. a. large numbers of undocumente

.&0 Employer Behaviour Consistent with earlier researc of employers aggressively op

J The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 197

Our findings on bargaining unit demographics also confirm that organis­ ing is increasingly concentrated in units with a majority of women and people of colour (Figure 10.4).Only 35 per cent of the units have a ma­ jority of white men, while women make up the majority in 44 per cent of the units and workers of colour make up the majority in 39 per cent of the units. Win rates increase substantially as the proportion of women and workers of colour increases. While they average only 35 per cent in units with a majority of white men, win rates are 53 per cent in units with a majority of workers of colour, 56 per cent in units with at least 75 per cent workers of colour, 58 per cent in units with a majority of women, and 62 per cent in units with at least 75 per cent women. The highest win rates are 82 per cent for units with 75 per cent or more women workers of colour. The higher win rates in these units mean that not only are women and workers of colour, in particular women of col­ our, participating in union elections in ever increasing numbers; but, be­ cause win rates are so much higher in these units, the vast majority of new workers coming into the labour movement today are women and people of colour. Recent immigrants and undocumented workers have been involved in many of the largest organising victories in the last five years in indus­ tries such as home care^ hotel, laundry, building services, drywall and asbestos removal. However, most of those campaigns have been outside of the NLRB process. In contrast, only 8 per cent of all the elections in our sample were in units with 25 per cent or more recent immigrants and only 7 per cent of the campaigns had undocumented workers in the unit. The win rate averages as high as 58 per cent in units with at least 25 per cent recent immigrants, but drops down to 36 per cent in units with un­ documented workers. This reflects the ability and willingness of employ­ ers to use the threat of deportation to thwart organising efforts among undocumented workers and also suggests one of the reasons why card check neutrality campaigns are so important in organising industries with large numbers of undocumented workers.

Employer Behaviour Consistent with earlier research, we find that the overwhelming majority of employers aggressively oppose union organising efforts through a 198 The State of the Unions combination of threats, discharges, promises of improvements, unsched­ uled unilateral changes in wages and benefits, bribes and surveillance. Figure 10.5 presents data on the most commonly used employer anti­ union tactics, listed in order from those tactics used most frequently by employers in NLRB certification elections to those tactics which are used least frequently by employers. As Figure 10.5 shows, the use of traditional employer anti-union tactics has become quite pervasive, and, both individually and in combination, these tactics are extremely effec­ tive in reducing union election win rates. Fifty-two per cent of all employers and 68 per cent of those in mo­ bile industries made threats of full or partial plant closure during the or­ ganising drive. Approximately one in every four employers (26 per cent) discharged workers for union activity, while 48 per cent made promises of improvement, 20 per cent gave unscheduled wage increases, and 17 per cent made unilateral changes in benefits and working conditions. Sixty-seven per cent of the employers held supervisor one-on-ones with employees at least weekly, 34 per cent gave bribes or special favors to those who opposed the union, 31 per cent assisted the anti-union com­ mittee, and 10 per cent used electronic surveillance of union activists during the organising campaign. Employers threatened to refer undocu­ mented workers to the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) in 7 per cent of all campaigns and in 52 per cent of cases where undocu­ mented workers were present. Consistent with previous research, we find that for the most aggres­ sive individual employer anti-union tactics, win rates average ten to twenty percentage points lower in campaigns where the tactic is used compared to campaigns where the employer does not use the tactic. For just two tactics, promoted pro-union activists and used the media, the win rate is actually higher in units where those tactics are used compared to the win rate where they are not used. One possible explanation is that employers only bother to promote union activists out of the unit or run a media campaign when there is a strong chance the union will win. The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 199 is of improvements, unsched- sfits, bribes and surveillance. mmonly used employer anti- :tics used most frequently by is to those tactics which are igure 10.5 shows, the use of become quite pervasive, and, e tactics are extremely effec-

1 68 per cent of those in mo­ il plant closure during the or- four employers (26 per cent) le 48 per cent made promises luled wage increases, and 17 fits and working conditions. supervisor one-on-ones with v^e bribes or special favors to assisted the anti-union com- lrveillance of union activists s threatened to refer undocu- uralisation Service (INS) in 7 }ent of cases where undocu- kq s: ~ind that for the most aggres- ;s, win rates average ten to gns where the tactic is used T does not use the tactic. For ists and used the media, the

3se tactics are used compared faq e possible explanation is that tivists out of the unit or run a ice the union will win. # # o? fo >o #o o? OBI/t ^ « (V T- 200 The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising

As described in Figure 10.6, tion of tactics. Forty-eight pei gressive anti-union campaign: the employers ran extremely tactics, but only 23 per cent rc union tactics. Employers ran i in only 3 per cent of the case union won. Overall, the win employers used one to four < used five to nine tactics, and I The fact that there is only a si aggressive and extremely agg I in some units aggressive anti- point of diminishing returns, ] ning more aggressive and sop corporations is declining.

Union Organising Tactics We have shown just how ch 5 become for unions organising O every industry face more sop "a ing coupled with dramatic in § trade and investment, and shii nies and other countries. Yet .> state of union organising toda some unions have been able •2 most formidable anti-union en CD global industries. This raises a- > strategies play in determining U ing large numbers of new wor .PC When we first conducted late 1980s, we found that uni tions if they used rank-and-file contact, active representative The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 201

As described in Figure 10.6, the majority of employers use a combina­ tion of tactics. Forty-eight per cent of the employers ran moderately ag­ gressive anti-union campaigns using five to nine tactics, 26 per cent of the employers ran extremely aggressive campaigns using ten or more tactics, but only 23 per cent ran a weak campaign using one to four anti­ union tactics. Employers ran no campaign whatsoever against the union in only 3 per cent of the cases in our sample, 93 per cent of which the union won. Overall, the win rate drops to 55 per cent for units where employers used one to four anti-union tactics, 39 per cent where they used five to nine tactics, and 34 per cent where they used ten or more. The fact that there is only a slight drop in win rates between moderately aggressive and extremely aggressive employer campaigns suggests that in some units aggressive anti-union behavior by employers may reach a point of diminishing returns, particularly at a time when unions are run­ ning more aggressive and sophisticated campaigns and workers' trust in corporations is declining.

Union Organising Tactics We have shown just how challenging the organising environment has become for unions organising in the private sector. Workers in almost every industry face more sophisticated employer opposition to organis­ ing coupled with dramatic increases in corporate restructuring, foreign trade and investment, and shifts in work and production to other compa­ nies and other countries. Yet that does not tell the entire story about the state of union organising today. National organising data also show that some unions have been able to win even against some of the nation's most formidable anti-union employers, even in the most mobile and most global industries. This raises the critical question about what role union strategies play in determining whether or not unions succeed in organis­ ing large numbers of new workers in their primary industries. When we first conducted research to examine these questions in the late 1980s, we found that unions were more likely to win NLRB elec­ tions if they used rank-and-file-intensive tactics such as person-to-person contact, active representative committees, member volunteer organisers, 202 The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organism solidarity days, and building for the first contract before the election. faceted campaign. Most sigi This research also found that union tactics as a group had a more signifi­ effort at 'changing to organic cant impact on election outcomes than other groups of variables such as in the use of these tactics, b election environment, bargaining unit demographics, organiser back­ 1995, far from what is requir ground, and employer tactics. power. This process did not happen all at once. By the early 1990s tradi­ What the data on organis tional organising approaches and the isolated use of innovative tactics is that in the current organis gradually decreased in effectiveness as the organising climate became utilise as many union tactics more complex and employer opposition more sophisticated. Yet, when Instead, for unions to make these variables were combined into a comprehensive union-building tac­ vate sector they will have to tic variable, adding one unit for each additional union-building tactic aggressive, comprehensive, c used, the probability of the union winning the election increased by as recruit and train enough orga: much as 9 per cent for each additional tactic, suggesting that individual prehensive campaigns. Based union tactics had become less important in determining election outcome ful union organising over tii than a comprehensive union building campaign that incorporated person- strategies emerges that is bas to-person contact, leadership development, escalating internal and exter­ is that union success in certi: nal pressure tactics, and building for the first contract. sive union-building strategy t Unfortunately, although we found many unions were running more each of which is a cluster of effective and aggressive organising campaigns than they were a decade organising success: ago, the majority of unions continue to run relatively weak campaigns. 1. Adequate and appropriate Even unions that do use more innovative and rank-and-file intensive tac­ tics tend to use them piecemeal rather than as part of a sophisticated, 2. Strategic targeting and re; comprehensive, and consistent strategy. What is most striking about 3. Active and representative these results is the inconsistency in the use of the tactics both within campaigns and over time. Although organiser training programs and ma­ 4. Active participation of m» terials have been emphasising the importance of these tactics for more 5. Person to person contact i than a decade, these data suggest that, even today, only a small number 6. Benchmarks and assessi of unions are using these tactics in a consistent way, and even those that thresholds for moving ah do, tend to use them in isolation, not as part of a comprehensive multi- 7. Issues which resonate in t For more information see Bronfenbrenner and Juravich's earlier research on union or­ 8. Creative, escalating intei ganising strategies. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, 'The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB Certification Elections.' Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50(2): 195-221 and Kate the workplace Bronfenbrenner and Tom Juravich, 'It Takes More than House Calls: Organising to Win with a Comprehensive Union-Building Strategy,' and Tom Juravich and Kate Bronfen­ 9. Creative, escalating exter brenner, 'Preparing for the Worst: Organising and Staying Organised in the Public Sec­ . side the workplace, local! tor' in Kate Bronfenbrenner and Sheldon Friedman, et al. (eds.), Organising to Win: New Research on Union Strategies. Ithaca: NY: ILR Press, 1998. 10. Building for the first cont The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 203 contract before the election. faceted campaign. Most significantly, in light of labour's much touted as a group had a more signifi- effort at 'changing to organise', there has been only a minimal increase 2r groups of variables such as in the use of these tactics, both individually and in combination, since mographics, organiser back- 1995, far from what is required to increase union density and bargaining power. ce. By the early 1990s tradi- What the data on organising tactics and organiser background reveal ited use of innovative tactics is that in the current organising environment it is not enough to simply e organising climate became utilise as many union tactics or recruit as many organisers as possible. lore sophisticated. Yet, when Instead, for unions to make any significant organising gains in the pri­ •rehensive union-building tac- vate sector they will have to mount organising campaigns that are more ditional union-building tactic aggressive, comprehensive, creative, and strategic and they will need to ; the election increased by as recruit and train enough organisers to effectively mount these more com­ tic, suggesting that individual prehensive campaigns. TBased on our analysis of the evolution of success­ determining election outcome ful union organising over time, a new model of comprehensive union aign that incorporated person- strategies emerges that is based on two fundamental principles. The first escalating internal and exter- is that union success in certification elections depends on a comprehen­ ;t contract. sive union-building strategy that incorporates the following ten elements, ly unions were running more each of which is a cluster of key union tactics that are critical to union igns than they were a decade organising success: a relatively weak campaigns. 1. Adequate and appropriate staff and financial resources id rank-and-file intensive tac- in as part of a sophisticated, 2. Strategic targeting and research tVhat is most striking about 3. Active and representative rank-and-file organising committees se of the tactics both within ;er training programs and ma- 4. Active participation of member volunteer organisers Qce of these tactics for more 5. Person to person contact inside and outside the workplace i today, only a small number 6. Benchmarks and assessments to monitor union support and set tent way, and even those that thresholds for moving ahead with the campaign irt of a comprehensive multi- 7. Issues which resonate in the workplace and in the community vich's earlier research on union or- 8. Creative, escalating internal pressure tactics involving members in Role of Union Strategies in NLRB ns Review, 50(2): 195-221 and Kate the workplace lan House Calls: Organising to Win d Tom Juravich and Kate Bronfen- 9. Creative, escalating external pressure tactics involving members out­ aying Organised in the Public Sec- side the workplace, locally, nationally, and/or internationally t al. (eds.), Organising to Win: New , 1998. 10. Building for the first contract during the organising campaign. 204 The State of the Unions The US Experience ofOrganisi

These strategic elements, which we will call comprehensive organising individual unions operate, t tactics, may each be associated with higher win rates and/or have statisti­ ment would play the primal cally significant positive effects on election outcome. However, given ing success between union: the hostile climate in which unions must operate, the use of these indi­ their organising victories to vidual comprehensive organising tactics will not be enough. Instead, un­ siveness of their campaigns ion gains will depend on a multi-faceted campaign utilising as many of bargaining units and emplo; the ten comprehensive organising tactics as possible and that the likeli­ win rates lose more election hood of the union winning the election will significantly increase for comprehensiveness of the c; each additional comprehensive organising tactic utilised by the union. environment in which they c The second principle underlying the comprehensive organising Each of the ten element: model is that differences in the quality and intensity of the campaigns hances the union's organisii between unions are a better predictor of differences in election outcomes cate adequate staff and final for those unions than employer opposition, bargaining unit demograph­ tional commitment to be mc ics, or company or industry characteristics. We do not suggest that indus­ and organising of staff th< try, corporate structure, unit type, worker demographics, or employer workers they organise, and opposition do not matter. All of these factors have a very powerful and strategic targeting tend to a significant impact on union win rates. Indeed, it is more difficult to or­ gaining power within certa ganise mobile industries, such as metal production and fabrication, gar­ non-strategic 'hot-shop' org ment and textile, food processing, and call centers, in the current global Perhaps the single mos trade and investment climate. It is also more difficult to organise subsidi­ campaign is an active, rep aries of large multinational corporations that have the resources to launch unit members ownership o a full-scale counterattack against the union campaign. Furthermore, acting like a union inside higher paid, primarily white male, blue collar, white collar, and profes­ among the workforce and < sional and technical occupations are more difficult to organise in the cur­ employer campaign. rent climate because they tend to be more affected by threats of job loss The use of member vol or blacklisting that are typical in employer campaigns today. Although fleets a combination of gr< industry, unit type, worker demographics and employer characteristics potential new members, ai and tactics matter, union tactics matter more, because unions have so far proach to organising. Perso: to go before they live up to their full potential. While the majority of un­ the workplace enhance the ions today run very weak campaigns with no underlying strategy, the intensive one-on-one conte majority of employers run very strategic campaigns, taking full advan­ commitment to unionisatior tage of the range of effective anti-union tactics available to them, and election environment at woi adapting and tailoring those tactics depending on the organising envi­ The combination of be ronment and the union's campaign. evaluate worker support for If all unions were running aggressive comprehensive campaigns and in order to better adjust thei win rates continued to vary across the organising environments in which ise and to set thresholds to The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 205

1 comprehensive organising individual unions operate, then these differences in organising environ­ /in rates and/or have statisti- ment would play the primary role in explaining the variance in organis­ I outcome. However, given ing success between unions. Instead, the more successful unions owe erate, the use of these indi- their organising victories to the nature, quality, intensity and comprehen­ not be enough. Instead, un- siveness of their campaigns, across a diversity of industries, companies, npaign utilising as many of bargaining units and employer campaigns. Similarly, unions with lower possible and that the likeli- win rates lose more elections because of the lack of intensity, quality and II significantly increase for comprehensiveness of the campaigns they run rather than the organising ;tic utilised by the union. environment in which they operate. comprehensive organising Each of the ten elements of the comprehensive organising model en­ intensity of the campaigns hances the union's organising power in a unique way. Unions that allo­ ;rences in election outcomes cate adequate staff and financial resources, for example, make an institu­ bargaining unit demograph- tional commitment to be more intensely engaged in the campaign, recruit /e do not suggest that indus- and organising of staff that is demographically representative of the demographics, or employer workers they organise, and run more campaigns. Unions that engage in s have a very powerful and strategic targeting tend to approach organising as a means to build bar­ d, it is more difficult to or- gaining power within certain sectors and industries, in contrast to the luction and fabrication, gar- non-strategic 'hot-shop' organising model. enters, in the current global Perhaps the single most important component of a comprehensive difficult to organise subsidi- campaign is an active, representative committee that gives bargaining have the resources to launch unit members ownership of the campaign, allows the workers to start m campaign. Furthermore, acting like a union inside the workplace, builds trust and confidence ar, white collar, and profes- among the workforce and counteracts the most negative aspects of the iFicult to organise in the cur- employer campaign. fected by threats of job loss The use of member volunteers to assist in organising campaigns re­ campaigns today. Although flects a combination of greater institutional integration of current and nd employer characteristics potential new members, and an emphasis on a worker-to-worker ap­ , because unions have so far proach to organising. Person-to-person contacts made inside and outside il. While the majority of un- the workplace enhance the union's organising power by providing the no underlying strategy, the intensive one-on-one contacts necessary to build and sustain worker mpaigns, taking full advan­ commitment to unionisation both at home and in the increasingly hostile ces available to them, and election environment at work. ing on the organising envi- The combination of benchmarks and assessments allows unions to evaluate worker support for the union at different stages of the campaign mprehensive campaigns and in order to better adjust their strategy to the unit they are trying to organ­ ising environments in which ise and to set thresholds to determine when, and whether, they are ready 206 The State of the Unions The US Experience ofOrganis to move on to the next stage of the campaign. A focus on issues that All of the comprehens resonate with the workers and the community, such as respect, dignity, used in winning campaigns fairness, service quality and union power and voice, is essential both to larly striking for the three build worker commitment to withstand the employer campaign and to appropriate resources (use< gain community support. only 9 per cent of losing c Internal pressure tactics allow the union to start acting like a union (33 per cent of winning car before the election takes place, building solidarity and commitment ing campaigns), and bench among the workers being organised and restraining employer opposition. ning campaigns compared t External pressure tactics that exert leverage on the employer both in the As described in Figure local community and in their national and/or international operations are model are associated with essential to organising in the increasingly global corporate environment. centage points higher thar Finally, building for the first contract before the election helps build con­ Once again the most dran fidence in the workers being organised, showing them what the union is with adequate and appropr all about and signaling to the employer that the union is there for the per cent when not present), long haul. when present, 41 per cent While each of the ten elements of the model are important in them­ sessments (66 per cent whe selves, their ultimate effectiveness depends upon them being integrated The smallest difference as part of a larger comprehensive campaign using as many of the ten the workplace and commu elements of the model as possible, with each tactic enabling and amplify­ when not present) and ext< ing the effectiveness of the others. At the core are the three building sent, 44 per cent when not blocks of any organising campaign upon which all the other comprehen­ calating external pressure t sive tactics depend: adequate and appropriate staff and financial je- aggressive employer oppo sources, active representative committee and benchmarks and assess­ highly dependent on the tac ments. In the absence of adequate and appropriate resources, unions will In our survey of organ be unable to staff and finance the labour-intensive, grassroots tactics that crease dramatically for eacl a comprehensive organising campaign requires, from conducting in- for no comprehensive orgai depth research on company ownership, to recruiting and training staff, for one to five tactics, 68 p member volunteers, and organising committee members, to engaging in cent for the 1 per cent of t escalating pressure tactics in the workplace and the community. Simi­ At the same time, the per c larly, a representative and active committee is necessary to develop rank- steadily declines as the nui and-file leadership, build the union inside the workplace, and make con­ teen per cent of all campai nections between workers and the community outside the workplace. 54 per cent use fewer thai And, without benchmarks and assessments, the union is flying blind, un­ campaigns use more than fl able to evaluate the effectiveness of the campaign tactics they have cho­ sen and when, whether, and how best to move forward with the cam­ paign. The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 207 ign. A focus on issues that All of the comprehensive organising tactics are more likely to be ty, such as respect, dignity, used in winning campaigns than in losing ones. The results are particu­ d voice, is essential both to larly striking for the three core comprehensive tactics - adequate and employer campaign and to appropriate resources (used in 21 per cent of winning campaigns but only 9 per cent of losing campaigns), active representative committees to start acting like a union (33 per cent of winning campaigns compared to only 21 per cent of los­ jolidarity and commitment ing campaigns), and benchmarks and assessments (35 per cent of win­ aining employer opposition. ning campaigns compared to only 14 per cent of losing campaigns). 3n the employer both in the As described in Figure 10.7, each of the individual elements in the international operations are model are associated with win rates that average between 4 to 28 per­ )bal corporate environment. centage points higher than in campaigns where they are not utilised. :he election helps build con­ Once again the most dramatic differences in win rates are associated ning them what the union is with adequate and appropriate resources (64 per cent when present, 41 t the union is there for the per cent when not present), active representative committee (56 per cent when present, 41 per cent when not present), and benchmarks and as­ odel are important in them- sessments (66 per cent when present, 38 per cent when not present). iipon them being integrated The smallest differences are associated with issues that resonate in i using as many of the ten the workplace and community (49 per cent when present, 43 per cent tactic enabling and amplify- when not present) and external pressure tactics (48 per cent when pre­ core are the three building sent, 44 per cent when not present). This is to be expected given that es­ ch all the other comprehen- calating external pressure tactics tend to be only used in campaigns with ate staff and financial ,re- aggressive employer opposition, while the effectiveness of issues is id benchmarks and assess- highly dependent on the tactics unions use to get their message across. >riate resources, unions will In our survey of organising campaigns we found that win rates in­ isive, grassroots tactics that crease dramatically for each additional tactic used, starting at 32 per cent aires, from conducting in- for no comprehensive organising tactics, and then increase to 44 per cent jcruiting and training staff, for one to five tactics, 68 per cent for more than five tactics, and 100 per je members, to engaging in cent for the 1 per cent of the campaigns where unions use eight tactics. and the community. Simi- At the same time, the per cent of campaigns where the tactics were used ; necessary to develop rank- steadily declines as the number of tactics increases (Figure 10.8). Four­ : workplace, and make con- teen per cent of all campaigns use no comprehensive organising tactics, ity outside the workplace. 54 per cent use fewer than three tactics, while only 10 per cent of all le union is flying blind, un- campaigns use more than five tactics and none use more than eight. >aign tactics they have cho- Dve forward with the cam- O 00

Figure 10.7: Per cent Win Rate in Campaigns Using or Not Using Comprehensive UnionjTactics

7CP/o

Afecjjateand /totive hfartsr Ba tii rate Beaming Ch&avcne Iseuesurtch' Escatatirg aicingfcr appropriate repneaertaSve vdinteer and esterd oontad resonate iirternel tadics fcst contract resources 3 ocrrrritiae i aganiaErs assessments tadics TO •TadJcieed 64% 51% 53% I 52% 53% < 66% 49% SQP/o 48% 50% •Tadic notified 41% 40% 41% ! 42% 42% ! 38% 43% 41% 44% 42% Hi

6' 3 to

3 TO s Figure 10.8: Per cent of Elections and Election Win Rate by Number of Comprehensive Tactics Used 3TO. TO 3 TO 100% TO 90% - 80% • 3 70% ~ t''Ji-SK ii-AtL"-£Z«..,*'t SL &Ji^.AJMO^ik^l^^S^^h&^^Mu^^k\• 0% AJequatearl Alive rvfenter Bertrrrarks Escalating Srateg'c Cheorwre Issueswh'di Escalating ! EUdngfor appropriate repress tative vdirteer and ©demsl targeting resonate irtemeltacrjcs! first ocrtract resources cnmitlee crgaiajs assesaTBte talks re3 BTacBcified 64% 51% SB% 52% 53% 66% 49% 50% 43% 50% I •Tactic noticed 41% 40% 41% 42% 42% 39% 43% 41% 44% 42% re

5 5* Co

Figure 10.8: Per cent of Elections and Election Win Rate by Number of Comprehensive Tactics Used re re' re re

•8

3^ re 9 3

3-

re

I Percent win rate o

•Percent of all elections o 3 O I

O 210 The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organic

Across all industrial sector tions where unions use a c< ing more than five comprer they use five or fewer tac1 rate averages only 20 per ( prehensive organising tact when they use between one in the campaigns where th sector the unions win 44 pe o 57 per cent in campaigns v cent in campaigns where rr In all other sectors combine 5 tion, retail/wholesale, and o paigns where they use no ( Si O ing to 45 per cent where < a: .o where more than five comr. •»«* a comprehensive organisir stantially, across all sectors s: global industries. While these data are 1 with organisers and union 1 through card-check neutra .=2 unions that have brought i s: outside the traditional boar< I wireless, UNITE HERE i have only succeeded in the >• 3 ing a more comprehensive < appropriate staff and fina if volunteer organisers, a foe o O and the broader communit building for the first cont have been least successfu cused on external leverage tative committee, person-t munity, and escalating int failed to do the strategic The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 211

Across all industrial sectors, per cent win rates are much higher in elec­ tions where unions use a comprehensive organising strategy incorporat­ ing more than five comprehensive tactics, compared to campaigns where they use five or fewer tactics (Figure 10.9). In manufacturing the win rate averages only 20 per cent in campaigns where unions use no com­ 5'8 # .# prehensive organising tactics, increasing only slightly to 29 per cent when they use between one and five tactics, but then jump to 63 per cent in the campaigns where they use more than five tactics. In the service sector the unions win 44 per cent of campaigns where no tactics are used, 57 per cent in campaigns where one to five tactics are used, and 68 per cent in campaigns where more than five comprehensive tactics are used. # # # O) (O tf> In all other sectors combined, (communications, construction, transporta­ tion, retail/wholesale, and utilities) the win rate associated with cam­ paigns where they use no comprehensive tactics is 29 per cent, increas­ ing to 45 per cent where one to five tactics are used, and 75 per cent where more than five comprehensive tactics are used. Thus, we find that # # # a comprehensive organising strategy improves election outcomes sub­ stantially, across all sectors of the economy, even in the most mobile and global industries. While these data are limited to NLRB campaigns, our interviews with organisers and union leaders who have been successfully organising # # # through card-check neutrality agreements, paint a similar picture. The O 0> CO N N O unions that have brought in the most new members through organising outside the traditional board process (SEIU in building services, CWA in wireless, UNITE HERE in hotels, distribution centers and laundries) have only succeeded in these endeavors because they have been follow­ ing a more comprehensive organising strategy, in particular adequate and it appropriate staff and financial resources, strategic targeting, member volunteer organisers, a focus on issues that resonate with the workplace and the broader community, internal and external pressure tactics, and fi building for the first contract during the organising drive. Those that IS have been least successful in winning non-board campaigns have fo­ IS cused on external leverage at the expense of building an active represen­ tative committee, person-to-person contact in the workplace and com­ munity, and escalating internal pressure tactics. Often they have also failed to do the strategic research or commit sufficient resources to 212 The State of the Unions mount the kind of campaign necessary to make the cost of fighting the union greater than the cost of voluntarily recognising the union and bar­ gaining a first agreement.

Comprehensive Organising Tactics and Employer Behaviour As we described earlier in the chapter, the overwhelming majority of employers aggressively oppose union organising efforts through a com­ bination of legal and illegal anti-union tactics designed to dissuade work­ ers from voting for the union. Yet, union win rates associated with all of the individual aggressive employer tactics increase between 10 and 40 percentage points when unions use a comprehensive organising strategy using more than five tactics in our model compared to campaigns where they used fewer than five tactics. The smallest differences in win rates are in campaigns where the employer institutes an employee involvement program, and where the employer threatens to bring in INS in units with undocumented workers. This is consistent with previous research that the use of these employer tactics is particularly effective at undermining worker support for the union. When employers use these tactics it requires that the union use a much more comprehensive campaign than those run by the unions in our sample, one that uses eight, nine, or even all ten elements of the model, rather than just five or six. In addition to examining win rates associated with comprehensive organising tactics and individual employer tactics it is important to as­ sess the impact of more aggressive comprehensive union campaigns rela­ tive to the overall intensity of the employer campaign. Figure 10.10 com­ pares win rates in campaigns with weak employer opposition, moder­ ately-aggressive employer opposition, and aggressive employer opposi­ tion in elections where the union ran a comprehensive campaign using more than five comprehensive organising tactics versus elections where the union used five or fewer comprehensive organising tactics (no com­ prehensive campaign). The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 213

ike the cost of fighting the )gnising the union and bar- 5 o Employer Behaviour o s: overwhelming majority of ;ing efforts through a corn- designed to dissuade work- rates associated with all of "3 icrease between 10 and 40 lensive organising strategy ipared to campaigns where s: e in campaigns where the it program, and where the 1 ith undocumented workers. the use of these employer ng worker support for the I :quires that the union use a a »se run by the unions in our ten elements of the model, to O

:iated with comprehensive ictics it is important to as- # isive union campaigns rela- mpaign. Figure 10.10 com- iployer opposition, moder- 1 ;gressive employer opposi- )rehensive campaign using tics versus elections where >rganising tactics (no com- 214 The State of the Unions The US Experience ofOrganis

The results are striking. In elections with moderately aggressive em­ comprehensive campaigns, < ployer campaigns, win rates average 93 per cent when the union runs a ments of our comprehensive comprehensive campaign but drop to 35 per cent when the union fails to a smattering of unions toda run a comprehensive campaign. Even in campaigns with aggressive em­ global employers. They are ployer opposition, win rates average 52 per cent overall in elections essary to develop the kind c where the union ran a comprehensive campaign compared to only 29 per truly multifaceted comprehe cent in campaigns where the union failed to run a comprehensive cam­ ing labour and community n paign. to help them build and lever; Overall, unions are running comprehensive campaigns in 20 per cent try. And they are not gettinj of elections with aggressive employer opposition, 7 per cent of elections workers and the public ran£ with moderately aggressive employer opposition, and 5 per cent of elec­ Iraq, global outsourcing, to a tions with weak employer opposition. These data confirm that while the But while the US laboi majority of employers run aggressive campaigns taking full strategic ad­ great deal of progress as it vantage of a broad range of anti-union tactics, the majority of unions ther and further out of read continue to run fairly weak campaigns, even when faced with aggressive labour movement of 2008 employer opposition. Indeed, there were only two campaigns in our They are no longer sitting < sample, where, when faced with aggressive employer opposition, unions selves and waiting to be res used more than six comprehensive organising tactics. Both of those elec­ may not be having great su tions were won. Thus, consistent with our model, although employer most of them are trying to f anti-union campaigns can and often do have a devastating impact on un­ for independent academic n ion organising success, unions can increase their win rates, even in the ing and try to help figure oi face of the most aggressive employer opposition, if they run comprehen­ very good at taking criticisn sive campaigns. ing to step out of the cold i over the world who have a s Unions and Comprehensive Organising Tactics Yet, they also are holdii As we have discussed so far, there is no question that some unions, such fort, the single greatest ban- as the UAW in auto-transplants and auto-parts, CWA/IUE in high tech day may be internal divisi( and electronics, USWA in metal production and fabrication or the resulting from restructuring. UFCW in food processing, face much greater challenges organising in CTW and the AFL-CIO and their primary jurisdictions because they are confronted with more mo­ are dominating the news, : bile, more global, and more powerful and effective employer opposition, making it more difficult to 1 and, in some cases, a workforce less predisposed to unionisation. Yet, as risks that it takes to organis we have seen, even in the most adverse organising environments, union come work with the labour organising success can dramatically improve when unions utilise a com­ new strategies and effort wi prehensive campaign strategy. Given these differences, what is perhaps themselves will not have th« most striking about our findings is how few unions are actually running strategy nor solidarity alom The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 215 noderately aggressive em- comprehensive campaigns, or even consistently using any of the ten ele­ ;ent when the union runs a ments of our comprehensive campaign model. Most significant of all, only ent when the union fails to a smattering of unions today see themselves as global unions taking on )aigns with aggressive em- global employers. They are not doing the strategic corporate research nec­ • cent overall in elections essary to develop the kind of critique of the company needed to launch a pi compared to only 29 per truly multifaceted comprehensive campaign. They are not developing last­ run a comprehensive cam- ing labour and community networks, locally, nationally and internationally to help them build and leverage their power in the company and the indus­ e campaigns in 20 per cent try. And they are not getting out in front on the issues that resonate with ion, 7 per cent of elections workers and the public ranging from universal health care, to the war in on, and 5 per cent of elec- Iraq, global outsourcing, to affordable higher education. iata confirm that while the But while the US labour movement is in crisis and has not made a ms taking full strategic ad- great deal of progress as it chases a bar that seems to keep moving fur­ cs, the majority of unions ther and further out of reach, there is something very different about the vhen faced with aggressive labour movement of 2008 than the labour movement of a decade ago. ily two campaigns in our They are no longer sitting on the sidelines blaming everyone but them­ nployer opposition, unions selves and waiting to be rescued by labour law reform alone. US unions tactics. Both of those elec- may not be having great success at organising growth but today at least nodel, although employer most of them are trying to figure out how to get it right. They are paying devastating impact on un- for independent academic research to critically look at what they are do­ heir win rates, even in the ing and try to help figure out how to do it better. And while they aren't on, if they run comprehen- very good at taking criticism from each other, they have been more will­ ing to step out of the cold war restraints and meet with unions from all over the world who have a stake in a common employer. Tactics Yet, they also are holding themselves back. Because for all their ef­ ion that some unions, such fort, the single greatest barrier to union organising success in the US to­ ts, CWA/IUE in high tech day may be internal divisions within unions and the movement itself, n and fabrication or the resulting from restructuring, mergers, raids, both between and within the r challenges organising in CTW and the AFL-CIO and affiliates. Because it is these issues now that confronted with more mo- are dominating the news, sapping morale, distracting their focus and ctive employer opposition, making it more difficult to both inspire unorganised workers to take the ;ed to unionisation. Yet, as risks that it takes to organise, and a new generation of young people to lising environments, union come work with the labour movement. If they are not resolved, all the vhen unions utilise a com- new strategies and effort will be in vain because unions divided against fferences, what is perhaps themselves will not have the power to organise in this economy. Neither nions are actually running strategy nor solidarity alone is sufficient to organise today, but instead 216 The State of the Unions The US Experience ofOrgani

US, China, and Around the G both are necessary. And of late, it seems within some unions, one or the and Security Review Commis other or both are in short supply. Juravich, Tom, and Kate Bro References ganising and staying organist Friedman, R. W. Hurd, R. A AFL-CIO (2003). January 6, 1997-January 6, 2003. Work in Progress. Paged win: New research on union s electronic document. Retrieved November 2003 from http://aflcio.org/ abou- taflcio/wip/. Milkman, Ruth (2006) L.A. S; Labor Movement New York: ] Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) (2003). 'Online database for the Current Em­ ployment Statistics from the Monthly Establishment Survey.' Unpaged elec­ SEIU (2008). 'SEIU Drives C tronic document. Retrieved 10 June 2003 from http://data.bls.gov/ lab- Time in Years' Press Release, java/outside.jsp?survey=ce. Schmitt, John and Ben Sipp< Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). (2008). 'Online database for the Current Em­ Uniform Extracts of the CPS- ployment Statistics from the Monthly Establishment Survey.' Unpaged elec­ Available online at http://cepr tronic document. Retrieved 1 April 2008 from http://data.bls.gov/labjava/ out­ Sipperer, Ben and John Schn side jsp?survey=ce. Press Release. 25 January/ 200 BNA Plus (2003). 'Database of NLRB certification elections 1997-2003.' Pre­ Uchitelle, Louis (2005). 'Lab pared specifically for the Cornell Office of Labor Education Research by BNA York Times, 23 October. PLUS, the research division of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washing­ ton, DC. BNA Plus (2007). 'NLRB Election Statistics: Mid-Year 2007 Report' BNA PLUS, the research division of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washing­ ton, DC. Bronfenbrenner, Kate (1997). 'The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB Certifica­ tion Elections.' Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 50(2): 195-221. Bronfenbrenner, Kate (2001). 'Uneasy Terrain: The Impact of Capital Mobility on Workers, Wages, and Union Organising.' Commissioned Research Paper and Supplement to The US Trade Deficit: Causes, Consequences and Recommenda­ tions for Action by the US Trade Deficit Review Commission. Washington, DC: US Trade Deficit Review Commission. Bronfenbrenner, Kate (2005) 'Organising Women: The Nature and Process of Union Organising Efforts among US Women Workers since the mid-1990s.' Work and Occupations, Vol. 32, No. 4, November. Bronfenbrenner, Kate and Robert Hickey (2004). 'Changing to Organise: A National Assessment of Union Strategies.' in Ruth Milkman and Kim Voss, eds., Rebuilding Labor: Organising and Organisers in the New Union Move­ ment. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bronfenbrenner, Kate and Stephanie Luce (2004). 'The Changing Nature of Corporate Global Restructuring: The Impact of Production Shifts on Jobs in the

k The State of the Unions The US Experience of Organising in the Context of the Global Economy 217

US, China, and Around the Globe.' Report submitted to the US China Economic in some unions, one or the and Security Review Commission, 14 October 2004. Juravich, Tom, and Kate Bronfenbrenner (1998). 'Preparing for the worst: Or­ ganising and staying organised in the public sector'. In K. Bronfenbrenner, S. Friedman, R. W. Hurd, R. A. Oswald, and R. L. Seeber (eds.), Organising to D3. Work in Progress. Paged win: New research on union strategies. Ithaca: NY: ILR Press. from http://aflcio.org/ abou- Milkman, Ruth (2006) L.A. Story: Immigrant Workers and the Future of the US Labor Movement New York: Russell Sage. database for the Current Em- SEIU (2008). 'SEIU Drives Growth as Union Workforce Increases for the First lent Survey.' Unpaged elec- Time in Years' Press Release, 25 January 2008. om http://data.bls.gov/ lab- Schmitt, John and Ben Sipperer (2007), 'Unpublished Analysis of the CEPR database for the Current Em- Uniform Extracts of the CPS-ORG', Center for Economic and Policy Research. tient Survey.' Unpaged elec- Available online at http://ceprdata.org. tp://data.bls.gov/labjava/ out- Sipperer, Ben and John Schmitt (2008). Center for Economic Policy Research Press Release. 25 January 2008. )n elections 1997-2003.' Pre- Uchitelle, Louis (2005). 'Labor's Lost; For Blacks, A Dream in Decline,' New Education Research by BNA York Times, 23 October. tional Affairs, Inc., Washing- lid-Year 2007 Report' BNA tional Affairs, Inc., Washing- Strategies in NLRB Certifica- >iew, 50(2): 195-221. le Impact of Capital Mobility nissioned Research Paper and sequences and Recommenda- ommission. Washington, DC:

:n: The Nature and Process of orkers since the mid-1990s.'

>. 'Changing to Organise: A ith Milkman and Kim Voss, ers in the New Union Move-

\). 'The Changing Nature of xluction Shifts on Jobs in the