FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES
The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security
Master's Thesis
PAVEL FAUS
Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Tomáš Vlček, Ph.D.
Department of International Relations and European Studies International Relations and Energy Security Studies
Brno 2021
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Bibliographic Record
Author: Pavel Faus Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University Department of International Relations and European Studies Title of Thesis: The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security Degree Programme: International Relations and Energy Security Studies Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Tomáš Vlček, Ph.D. Academic Year: 2021 Number of Pages: 45 Keywords: Nuclear Energy Akkuyu Power Plant Turkey Russia
The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security Abstract
This diploma thesis examines the impact of the Justice and Development Party’s nuclear energy policy on Turkey’s energy security. Given Turkey’s limited domestic sources of energy and long-standing dependence on imported energy sources, reduction of foreign energy imports via the construction of nuclear power plants has been one of the country’s energy strategy priorities. After decades of planning and several failed attempts, the current leadership plans to have Turkey’s first nuclear power plant operating by 2023. The Akkuyu nuclear power plant is presented as a success story by the Turkish government due to its purported potential to alleviate dependence on foreign imports of energy. At the core of the project, however, lies a unique bilateral arrangement between Turkey and Russia. The Akkuyu nuclear power plant is to be financed, constructed, owned, and operated by Russia’s state-owned company ROSATOM. Rather than introducing the desired element of import diversification, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant will only provide one additional energy source while deepening Turkey’s dependence on the Russian energy supply. The Akkuyu project enjoys direct support from Russia’s top leadership, and the Russian government is known to use energy partnerships to pursue its foreign policy agenda. In reality the Akkuyu project contributes to the uneven relationship between Ankara and Moscow, enables Russia to exert political influence on Turkey and further complicates Turkey’s policy options vis-à-vis Russia for decades to come.
2 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security
Statutory Declaration
I hereby declare that I have written the submitted Master’s Thesis concerning the topic of The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security independently. All the sources used for the purpose of finishing this thesis have been adequately referenced and are listed in the Bibliography.
In Istanbul 28 May, 2021
Pavel Faus
1 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security Acknowledgements
Throughout my university studies and in the process of writing this thesis I have received a great deal of support and assistance from many people. My sincere words of gratitude go to my supervisor Tomáš Vlček, for his valuable advice and for guiding me throughout the whole process. Without his persistent help, the goal of this project would not have been realized. I would also like to thank the whole department and lecturers at the Masaryk University. I wish to show my gratitude to my family. To my mom Martina for her everlasting support and encouragement and to my girlfriend Aydan for her inspiring ideas and her patience. In addition, I am indebted to all the friends and colleagues I have met while at home or abroad and whose ideas and opinions taught me many things. Thank you all.
2 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security Content
1 Introduction ...... 4 1.1 Research objectives and questions ...... 5 1.2 Literature review and scope of research1 ...... 6 2 Research Framework...... 7 2.1 The concept of energy security ...... 7 2.2 The logic of subsistence in energy security ...... 10 2.3 Turkey’s energy strategy ...... 10 2.4 Methodology ...... 12 4 Turkey’s energy mix, electricity production and nuclear energy ...... 15 4.1 Energy profile of Turkey ...... 15 4.2 First advances towards nuclear energy ...... 16 4.3 Nuclear energy in Turkey’s domestic politics ...... 17 5 Justice and Development Party (AKP) and nuclear energy ...... 19 5.1 New visions under the AKP ...... 19 5.2 AKP’s views on nuclear energy ...... 19 5.3 Maintaining the momentum ...... 21 5.4 The ultimate bid ...... 22 6 Turkey’s Allies and partners ...... 23 6.1 Bilateral relationships and potential vulnerabilities ...... 23 6.2 Energy security - between strategic considerations and market approach ...... 25 6.3 Energy as a foreign policy tool ...... 27 6.4 Compartmentalization of mutual differences – a solution? ...... 23 6.5 Russia’s hand in Turkey ...... 31 7 Conclusions ...... 33 List of abbreviations ...... 37 Sources used ...... 38
1 Names of places and people which contain letters foreign to the English language have been kept in their original (Turkish) way. In case of quotations and references, the form originally used by the cited piece or author is used.
3 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security 1 Introduction
For decades, Turkey has been planning to build a nuclear power plant to decrease the country’s reliance on imported energy sources and improve its energy security. The aim of this study is to examine the issue of nuclear energy in Turkey under the current government, led by the Justice and Development Party, and explore its long-standing efforts at energy diversification.
Turkey, a country of 82 million people, is highly dependent on foreign energy imports (IAEA 2020). In total, up to 76% of the country’s total energy consumption is supplied via imports (IAEA 2020, Ergun and Kasapoğlu 2015: 6, Coşkun & Tanrıöver 2016: 2). According to Ergun and Kasapoğlu, “Almost all of the oil and natural gas Turkey consumes is imported“ (Ibid 2015: 6). Significantly, around 20% of the country’s electricity comes from natural gas (IAEA 2020). The Russian Federation is Turkey’s largest supplier of natural gas. Currently, it provides around 35% of the country’s share (Hellenic Shipping News 2019). In 2014, Russia even accounted for 58% of Turkey’s gas imports, which makes Turkey Moscow’s second largest market for Russian gas after Germany (Ibid 2019, Telli 2016). Such high levels of single-source gas imports, combined with a high share of gas in electricity generation and significantly growing electricity consumption, which at around 5,5% is the largest growing among OECD members, poses serious security challenges and has created the need for diversification (Telli 2016: 155, IAEA 2020, Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2020, MFA Turkey 2020).
To decrease the use of fossil fuels, tackle growing energy demand and limit dependence on foreign energy imports, countries often seek to gain new sources via investments in either renewable energy or nuclear power plants (NPP) which are considered complimentary parts of the energy mix (Fuhrmann 2009: 7, Vlček 2016). Turkey, like many other countries, has followed this path. Its first nuclear power plant projects date back to 1965 (IAEA 2020, Martin 1997). Several governments since then, however, have failed to build an NPP in Turkey. Those failures are attributed to financial constraints, lack of political will and proliferation concerns articulated by the international community (Udum 2010: 365).
Since 2002, Turkey has been ruled by the Justice and Development Party (AKP - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi). AKP made the construction of an NPP in Turkey one of its key modernization tasks (Ergun and Kasapoğlu 2015: 6). The AKP’s modernization agenda, called Vision 2023, goes even further envisioning the construction of no less than 3 NPPs in total.
4 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security Ankara justifies its aim to add nuclear power to Turkey’s energy mix as a way “to reduce its energy import dependency” (MFA Turkey 2020, AKP 2020). To avoid encountering the difficulties that caused the failure of previous nuclear power plant projects, Turkey’s governing party opted for an unorthodox solution. The AKP is allowing Russia to build a Russian-owned NPP on Turkish soil. The Akkuyu NPP will not only be the first nuclear power plant in Turkey, but also a first nuclear power plant completely owned and operated by a foreign country on the territory of another sovereign state (IAEA 2018b:8). This unique arrangement with a country that already provides a significant amount of Turkey’s energy seriously undermines the logical coherence of the proclaimed rationale of reducing Turkey’s dependence on energy imports.
1.1 Research objectives and questions
Through AKP’s policy, a new economic and political relationship between Moscow and Ankara is being formed around the Akkuyu project. What is yet to be seen is whether this new dynamic at the heart of Turkish-Russian relations will benefit both parties equally, and if Akkuyu will fulfil the stated aim of reducing Turkey’s dependence on energy imports (AKP 2020, Anadolu Agency 2016, MFA Turkey 2020). With two other power plant projects halted and acknowledging Turkey’s substantial reliance on Russia’s energy supplies as a potential vulnerability, the current AKP policy direction may not be conducive to the country’s primary long-term objective of decreasing dependence on foreign suppliers and securing Turkey’s energy independence.
This study puts forward the following hypothesis, the current AKP’s energy policy does not support the goal of reducing dependence on energy imports. Instead, it transforms the situation and even potentially exacerbates existing issues vis-à-vis energy security. Furthermore, the current Akkuyu NPP project threatens to increase the susceptibility of Turkey to manipulation through political blackmail or supply interruption.
In this context, the aim of our study is to investigate the following questions:
• What is Turkey’s long-term policy towards nuclear energy?
• Why is the Akkuyu project being realized while other proposed NPPs are on hold?
• In what way will Akkuyu NPP influence Turkey’s dependence on foreign energy imports?
In conclusion, our study will provide a comprehensive analysis of:
“What is the impact of AKP’s nuclear policy on Turkey’s energy security?”
5 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security 1.2 Literature review and scope of research The topic of energy security in Turkey has been approached from several perspectives. Erat, Telli, Ozkendir and Demir (2020) have focused on Turkey’s energy transition policies related to its rapid industry development and efforts to meet domestic and global climate goals. Kibaroglu (1997), Udum (2010) and Telli (2016) have focused on Turkey’s nuclear energy development and the country’s goal of reducing dependence on foreign imports. Ülgen et al (2012 and 2015) have focused on the security of potential NPP projects in Turkey. Researchers Coşkun and Tanrıöver (2016) have investigated Turkish public opinion vis-à-vis nuclear energy issues. There are a number of studies of Turkey’s existing role as a key transit country for the energy sources in the Middle East and Caspian Sea regions destined for consumers in Europe. From a wider nuclear perspective, Fuhrmann (2009 and 2012) has provided a comprehensive overview of current trends and related political developments in the global development of nuclear energy, while Jirušek and Vlček et al (2015) have studied the activities of Russia’s state-owned energy enterprises in South Eastern Europe.
Our text focuses on the period between 2002 and early 2021. Though we touch upon Turkey’s previous experiences with nuclear development, we primarily focus on the era of the AKP governance. During this period, a major progress towards building a NPP was made. This is relevant mainly in the context of Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies and with Russia, because the energy cooperation framework between Russia and Turkey is often overlooked and underappreciated in the wider context of cooperation and confrontation between the two countries. This particular project, and the cooperation scheme chosen by Turkey, is also relevant in the context of Russia’s broader activities in other regions such as Central and Eastern Europe. Here, several NATO Allies expressed concerns about Russian involvement in the construction of strategic infrastructure (including NPPs), highlighting the potential risk of Moscow gaining substantial political influence as a consequence of their investments of political and financial capital. In this sense, the Akkuyu project in Turkey can serve as a case study.
Turkey’s geopolitical importance within the region cannot be understated. The country sits at NATO’s south-eastern flank, with access to both the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, where Russia seeks to project its influence. Turkey’s size, economic ties to the rest of Europe, exposure to migration flows, domestic polarization, and decline in democratic indexes, coupled with its proximity to resource-rich and conflict-prone areas, further demonstrates the importance of the country’s enduring ties with its western allies. Turkey’s geopolitical
6 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security circumstances also make it susceptible to become a target of influence operations by their competitors.
2 Research Framework
A stable and reliable energy supply, the diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks are of critical importance and increase our resilience against political and economic pressure.
(NATO Brussels Summit Declaration 2018, para 78: Energy security)
2.1 The concept of energy security
Security is a nebulous concept with an ambiguous meaning. Various actors often have different understandings of what security is (Baldwin 1997). Baldwin investigated whether national, economic, environmental and energy security represent different aspects of a shared concept of security or are fundamentally different topics. He concluded that, in fact, they represent individual aspects of the security concept (Baldwin 1997: 23). To Baldwin, such intellectual exercises are important because security as a concept “has been used to justify suspending civil liberties, making war, and massively reallocating resources”. Having ‘security’ then can be defined as “the absence of threats to acquired values”, or as a “low probability of damage to acquired values” (Wolfers 1952 quoted in Baldwin 1997: 13). The concept of security needs to be further unpacked by exploring the following questions: Security for whom? Security for which values? And from what threats? (ibid.:13).
Not unlike security more generally, energy security has been broadly used but often imprecisely defined. It works as an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth, and political power (Ciuta 2010). The International Energy Agency defines energy security as “Reliable, affordable access to all fuels and energy sources” (IEA 2021). Others see it as “reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable prices” or as “securing adequate energy supplies at reasonable and stable prices in order to sustain economic performance and growth” (Bielecki, 2002: 237, APERC, 2003: 4, both quoted in Ciuta 2010). The aforementioned definitions approach the energy security topic from a consumer perspective, but energy security may be viewed differently from the production side of the supply chain. In Russia for instance, “energy security strategy is explicitly focused on the
7 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security security of demand and acknowledges the threats caused by low carbon energy transition and economic sanctions” (Novikau 2021).
A very useful framework for viewing different aspects of energy security side by side is provided by Chester (2010: 891). Noting that “Energy security is an evolving concept because it now ‘includes’ a range of energy sources other than oil, a wide range of risks along the supply chain, and price as well as supply availability”. There are multiple aspects of the term energy security which suggest that:
(1) Energy security is about the management of risk(s).
(2) Energy security can refer to energy use ‘mix’, abundance of local resources, and/or the reliance on imports.
(3) Energy security is a concept, not a policy, with strategic intent.
(4) Policies are implemented to improve energy security.
(5) Energy security can hold a temporal dimension.
(6) Energy security will differ between across energy markets.
(7) Energy security will differ between energy market stakeholders’.
While the energy security literature is marked by a very dominant focus on securing supplies of two primary energy sources, oil and gas (Chester 2010: 899), energy security concerns all sources of energy including electricity production, which is the main focus of our text.
Now that we have established what areas the concept of energy security covers, we also need to define a suitable approach to address the relationship between the strategic role of energy sources, lack of availability of local sources, and policies which seek to improve energy security and manage the risk emanating from reliance on imports.
Felix Ciuta (2010) identifies three approaches, which he labels as ‘logics’, that constitute the energy security concept:
(1) Logic of war,
(2) Logic of subsistence, and
(3) Logic of total energy security.
The logic of total security provides the broadest framework of analysis which includes energy- related threats to states, societies and the environment. It also analyses a broad range of actors
8 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security including individuals. Its wide scope is not compatible with the aforementioned aim to study an uneven, energy-driven relationship between a consumer and a provider, both of whom are state actors. Under the logic of war, energy is a security issue because it is either a cause or an instrument of war or conflict. Energy is either the instrument that states fight their wars with, or the cause for which wars are fought. Within this framework, energy security is assumed to be a dimension and potential battleground of geopolitical interests. The defining parameters of this traditional security logic are therefore an understanding of security focused on the use of force, war and conflict, and a focus on states as the subjects and objects of energy security (Ciuta 2010).
Using the logic of war framework is tempting because several of its core assumptions are in accordance with premises of our text. Logic of war views states as both subjects and objects of energy security, it transfers energy related issues into a geopolitical dimension, and it views energy as a weapon (instrument or tool) in conflict. At first glance, these premises seem applicable to our text which deals with Turkish-Russian relations, as well as Russian-NATO relations, within the framework of their energy partnership. Nevertheless, the logic of war in its entirety is not well suited to capture the complexity of the political and security dimensions of the Turkish-Russian relationship because, among other reasons, there is no war taking place.
In the context of the Euro-Atlantic community and its relations with Russia, crises, including those related to energy, tend to manifest themselves below the threshold of an armed conflict (NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg quoted in Nicholls 2020, Dupuy et al 2021). The use of energy as a tool of foreign policy by Russia does not necessarily imply use of energy as a weapon of war, rather as a tool of political coercion or influence, functioning in the grey zone between war and peace. A cut in energy supply does not necessarily equate to a threat to a state’s survival. This is in line with the caveat Ciuta makes when asserting that, “There is, it must be underlined, some resistance to the pull of the logic of war, as attested for example by NATO’s insistence that its focus on energy security ‘will not trigger a classical military response’” (De Hoop Scheffer, 2008: 2 quoted in Ciuta 2010). For this reason, the logic of subsistence framework seems most relevant, with the precondition of borrowing the state-centric focus from the logic of war framework.
9 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security 2.2 The logic of subsistence in energy security
Within the logic of subsistence, “The need for energy is not driven by the imperative to survive, but by the functional demands of various sectors of activity, which means that its absence does not lead to extinction, but to dysfunction” (Ciuta 2010). Furthermore, the security concept is derived from exposure to various influences such as market failures, price volatility, investment risks, network disruptions and import dependency. When referring to those influences, the labels ‘risk’, ‘challenge’ or ‘threat’ are used interchangeably (ibid.).
In Ciuta’s logic of subsistence, energy security is therefore not uniformly structured, “The logic of subsistence draws on the general need for energy and the linkages between various sectors of activity this creates, in order to constantly disintegrate energy into different elements, isolating where necessary sector-specific dynamics – for example, the impact of energy consumption patterns on the environment, the domestic political effects of energy shortages or the impact of terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure.” (ibid). In our work, we also draw on the general need for stable and reliable energy supply embedded in the logic of subsistence, its linkage to the state’s economic growth and the risks associated with import dependency which, in the case of dysfunction (or a threat thereof), makes the country and its leadership susceptible to political or economic pressure.
While the focus of our study is nuclear energy and its use for electricity generation, it needs to be noted that the production of electricity takes place by consuming sources available in the energy basket (gas, oil, coal, renewables, nuclear) and is therefore inherently linked to overall needs (and in our case imports) of those sources. This entanglement adds to the complex nature of the concept of energy security. On the link between energy security and import dependence, foreign policy specialist and former member of Turkey’s Foreign Service, Sinan Ülgen, notes that in Turkey, “energy security” or “energy independence” is generally used in the context of reducing dependence on Russian natural gas (Ülgen 2011). This is also evident from the Turkish government’s public communications concerning the country’s energy strategy.
2.3 Turkey’s energy strategy
The reliable and adequate supply of energy at reasonable prices concerns Turkey due to the fact that, “To date, around 72% of energy demand is met through imports” according to the IAEA (IAEA 2020). Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) notes that “Turkey has a high import dependency in energy” (MFA Turkey 2020).
10 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security Turkey’s Energy Profile and Strategy, published by the country’s MFA, declares the following: “Turkey continues its efforts to increase the share of renewable energy sources and to add nuclear power to its energy mix in order to reduce its energy import dependency, to maximize the use of indigenous resources, and combat climate change.” The MFA’s publication also states that, “Turkey aims to add nuclear power into its energy mix in order to decrease negative environmental effects of energy production, to meet its energy demand increase as well as to reduce its energy import dependency. To this end, construction of two nuclear power plants (NPPs) in Akkuyu and Sinop are on the agenda”.
Turkey’s Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources explains that: “In order to meet the rapidly increasing demand for electric power and to reduce the risks arising from import dependency, it is planned to commission 2 nuclear power plants by 2023 and start the construction of the 3rd power plant” (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2021). Furthermore, at the ground-breaking ceremony of the first nuclear power plant project, “Turkish Minister of Energy Taner Yildiz highlighted the widespread use of nuclear energy around the world and Turkey’s need for self-sufficiency in electricity generation” (Presidency of Republic of Turkey – Investment Office 2015).
Additional details on Turkey’s energy security goals can be found at the official site of Turkey’s Presidency and in the statements of the current head of state, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as well as in the policy proposals of his political party. The Presidency’s Investment Office claims: “Looking to diversify its sources of energy and reduce dependence on imports, Turkey plans to have three operational nuclear power plants by 2023” (Presidency of Republic of Turkey – Investment Office 2015). The Presidency’s presentation of its 2023 goals and investment opportunities in Turkey also included “Commissioning Nuclear Power Plants (Two Operational Nuclear Power Plants, with a Third Under Construction)” among the measures of the 2015-2019 Strategic Plan “to ensure energy supply security, quality and affordability across the population while ensuring environmental sustainability” (Presidency of Republic of Turkey – Investment Office 2020).
On a party-level, AKP’s 2018 declaration promised that: “efforts are being made to enrich the national energy basket with nuclear energy with increasing energy demand, reduction of energy external dependency and environmentally positive effects” (AkParti 2018:15). It was also claimed that: “We [(the AKP)] will implement 2 nuclear power plants by 2023, start construction of one of it and reduce our import dependency” (AKP 2020). Its head describes
11 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security “Turkey’s decision to add nuclear power to its national energy infrastructure as a strategic step towards energy supply security” (Erdoğan 2021, Sözcü 2021).
To Ankara, the concept of energy security is understood in terms of the supply of energy sources. Energy security then means reducing import dependence. Turkey approaches the development of nuclear energy and renewable sources (RES) as complementary efforts to secure the sufficient generation of electricity free of reliance on outside energy sources, which is viewed as a factor reducing the country’s energy security. By introducing new domestic sources, diversifying energy supplies and its portfolio of suppliers, Turkey’s policy seeks to improve its energy security. This sits within the boundaries of the concept of energy security drawn from Chester (2010) and Ciuta (2010), who both identify import dependency and/or reliance on imports as an aspect of the energy security agenda. With the view that existing reliance on imported energy has been identified as an energy security issue in Turkey (Udum 2010:367), we will investigate what contribution AKP-sponsored nuclear energy projects make to the overall goals of Turkey’s energy strategy of reducing import dependency, providing and accessing indigenous energy sources as well as improving the country’s energy security.
The energy security of the Republic of Turkey is, of course, our primary focus in this study. Energy security can be understood as having been achieved when a stable supply of energy with limited reliance on foreign imports is consistently available. Potential foreign influence generated and enabled through dependence on energy-imports is then viewed as a security threat.
2.4 Methodology
This thesis is a case study of a bilateral partnership focused on the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in a specific region. The overall aim is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the energy security policy of Turkey’s ruling political party and place it within the wider context of Turkish-Russian security relations, with all its economic, geopolitical and security implications. It is a qualitative case study of Turkey’s development of nuclear energy with the proclaimed goal of reducing dependence on foreign imports. We first introduce Turkey’s long-term energy policy and its lasting efforts to bring nuclear energy to its electricity generation portfolio. The execution of this policy goal by the current governing party is then examined, with the goal of assessing the benefits of the chosen cooperation and partnership
12 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security model for the country’s long-standing policy objectives. Our aim is to answer the following questions: how does the nuclear energy policy of AKP contribute to the long-term goal of reducing dependence on energy imports, and consequently what is the impact of AKP’s chosen policy on Turkey’s energy security?
The study follows the framework introduced by Jirušek, Vlček et al. (2015) and Dráb and Vlček (2016), who provide a structure for studying risks associated with the construction of nuclear power plants at various stages of an NPP’s life cycle. Authors who specifically focus on the activities of Russian state-owned companies provide theoretical assumptions as well as methods of assessment for various tools used for exerting political pressure on recipient countries. Their work is therefore highly relevant for our analysis as it helps us understand how an energy partnership translates into a security policy consideration. AKP’s policy regarding Turkey’s first NPP under ROSATOM’s Build Own Operate scheme will not be assessed only in terms of its influence on the country’s energy import dependence, but also as a political and strategic issue given Turkey’s already existing energy dependence and its turbulent relationship with Russia.
Globally, there are only a handful of countries and companies that are currently capable of completing the construction of a nuclear power plant on their own. States commonly cooperate with each other via joint platforms (Fuhrmann 2012: 37, Vlček 2016). Such cooperation is not only a matter of market endeavours and energy security but also a product of broader foreign policy considerations within countries’ governments. The supply side of nuclear power plant construction is of key political importance insofar as it has the potential to serve political objectives. “Nuclear suppliers provide assistance to gain influence over recipient states” (Fuhrmann 2012: 37). Furthermore, “countries transfer nuclear technology to maintain the strength of their military alliances and constrain the influence of their adversaries by forging closer ties with strategically important states” (ibid.).
Building partnerships for NPP projects is a necessity due to the financially and technologically demanding nature of the nuclear sector. Various modes of financing introduce different responsibilities and liabilities for parties concerned. When assessing the risk of susceptibility to foreign political influence, domestic financing appears to be the least problematic, whereas with growing participation of foreign private and state enterprises, political risks and vulnerabilities grow (Dráb and Vlček 2016: 312).
Accordingly, bilateral state partnerships in NPP projects carry following political risks:
13 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security - Growth of dependence on foreign power;
- Reduction of mutual interdependence vis-à-vis foreign power;
- Increase of susceptibility to foreign power’s political influence;
- Decrease of energy security;
- Foreign ownership of nuclear power plant.
(Dráb and Vlček 2016: 310)
The lifecycle of a nuclear power plant as well as the security and political relationship tied to its existence happens in three stages. Researchers assess the risks of potentially exerted political influence in the following phases:
(1) Initial stage, when the plant is being planned and financing is being secured;
(2) Three sub-stages of the nuclear fuel cycle;
(3) Final stage, which is the decommission phase.
(Vlček, 2015: 346)
Furthermore, research shows that external influence can be exerted especially at the early stages of construction. The initial stage when the NPP is being planned and negotiations over its financing are being discussed is considered the most sensitive phase. In this stage, governmental officials often participate in official state visits and political support for partnership building programs or state guarantees are being offered. However, once the contract is granted and the financing is agreed, very little room remains for exerting further pressure. Thanks to competition in the global uranium market, fuel supply doesn’t pose a direct vulnerability and the second stage is therefore not problematic. The same is true for the terminal, decommissioning phase, which is usually handled as a domestic issue (ibid.).
In the Build Own Operate (BOO) scheme, however, the inherent exploitable ties identified above stay in place, while checks and balances are not generated because the NPP is not to be handed over to the recipient.
Under the BOO contract, the supplier builds and runs the facility, generating profit via electricity sales for a price, which is set in advance (Dráb and Vlček 2016: 298). The bilateral agreement in BOO is often negotiated on a state level and can benefit from the use of government-to-government financing. Similar arrangements are often used by countries with limited resources and know-how in the nuclear field. From the state-supplier’s
14 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security perspective, such cooperation may hold a promise of future cooperation in upcoming projects or in other fields (ibid.), which brings us back to the initial finding of Fuhrmann who contended that nuclear suppliers provide assistance to gain influence over recipient states (2012:37). In this way, the Turkey-Russia deal is different from the standard nuclear cooperation because Ankara decided to sign this novel type of contract. One that keeps Russia involved throughout the life cycle of the project.
4 Turkey’s energy mix, electricity production and nuclear energy 4.1 Energy profile of Turkey
To cope with growing energy demand, limit dependence on foreign energy imports and decrease dependence on fossil fuels, countries often seek to gain new sources of energy through the construction of either renewable energy or nuclear power plants. In his comprehensive research of nuclear development, Matthew Fuhrmann (2012: 23) describes common motivations for the construction of new NPPs as growing energy demand resulting from economic growth, dependence on foreign energy imports and risk of energy shortages. Furthermore, NPPs are viewed as a way of partially combatting global climate change and attaining sustainable development goals (Fuhrmann 2009: 7, OECD 2000).
Turkey faces most of these challenges due to its limited domestic resources and steady growth of energy needs. “Turkey aims to add nuclear power into its energy mix in order to decrease negative environmental effects of energy production, to meet its energy demand increase as well as to reduce its energy import dependency” (MFA Turkey 2020).
As of summer 2019, Turkey has met 15,2% of its electricity needs through natural gas, 33,2% through coal, 36,6% through hydropower, 7,2% through wind, 3,0% through geothermal, 3,0% through solar energy and 1,7% through other sources (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2019). Turkey’s consumption of electricity is growing at the fastest pace among OECD countries and Ankara also anticipates a 50% growth in renewable sources by 2024 (Erkul 2019, MFA Turkey 2020). Consequently, Turkey needs to add additional stable sources alongside renewables that may not be operational 24/7. In recent years, Turkey has rapidly invested in renewables while it continues seeking options to harness the power of nuclear energy.
15 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security Since the late 1960s, several Turkish governments have tried to develop nuclear power plants to tackle the country’s long-standing reliance on outside energy sources (Coşkun & Tanrıöver 2016: 3, Ülgen et. al 2015: 3, Udum 2010: 366). In the following chapter, we will investigate why various governments failed to introduce nuclear energy to the mix, and what steps the current leadership took to achieve its goal of building Turkey’s first NPP.
4.2 First advances towards the use of nuclear energy
Turkey, which was among the first countries in the world that allowed private participation in the electricity sector (Sirin 2010), had already made several attempts at building a nuclear power plant. Its plans did not materialize for decades.
Ankara first considered nuclear energy in 1955 when it signed a bilateral cooperation agreement with the United States. Given Turkey’s substantial natural uranium reserves, the prospect of harnessing nuclear energy seemed promising (Kibaroglu 1997:34) and the very first proposal for a power plant came in 1965. The project ended, however, due to technical, political, and economic factors (Martin 1997, Udum 2010: 365).
In 1973, a small prototype power plant was supposed to be built, but the project was cancelled in favour of a larger power plant in southern Turkey - Akkuyu. In 1976, the Akkuyu site near the Mediterranean port of Mersin was licensed for construction. The contract was awarded to Swedish companies (IAEA 2020), but in 1980 the project failed because the government was not able to provide financial guarantees (IAEA2019, World Nuclear Association 2020) and a military coup took place that very same year (Martin 1997).
During Turkey’s ambitious third attempt in 1980, a new location in Sinop was considered and three companies were awarded contracts to build four nuclear power plants of various designs under the BOT2 scheme. Firms from Allied countries took the lead. A German company was supposed to build a pressurized water reactor unit at the Akkuyu site, two US- based companies were tasked with producing boiling water reactor units in Sinop, and a fourth project was planned for a Canadian company (IAEA 2020, Martin 1997). According to Martin, the Sinop project was eventually ruled out due to the need for further research of the Black Sea basin and its susceptibility to earthquakes. The German company withdrew from its part of the project due to Ankara’s reluctance to provide loan guarantees (IAEA 2020) and ultimately,
2 Build Operate Transfer model
16 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security the Canadian firm withdrew amid allegations of corruption, concerns of possible proliferation of nuclear technology from Turkey and disagreements with Ankara over financial guarantees (Martin 1997).
The last major attempt to keep the Akkuyu project afloat was in 1993 which was followed by the issuing of a tender in 1996. Bids for the construction contract(s) for the 2000 MWe plant at Akkuyu were made by three joint multinational private consortia which included: (1) A US- Japanese-Turkish consortium, a Canadian-Korean-Japanese-Turkish consortium, and a German-French-Turkish consortium (IAEA 2020, Martin 1997). However, in June 2000 plans were once again abandoned after several delays and economic constraints (IAEA 2020).
From 1965 until 2000, various cabinets with various power configurations attempted to introduce nuclear energy to Turkey without success. Proposed projects and their contractors represented leading actors in the field of nuclear energy. Within the framework of the then bi- polar confrontation, Turkey’s Allies and Western partners applied to bring nuclear technology to Turkey. Political obstacles such as weak and unstable governments, financial constraints, and domestic security reasons as well as proliferation concerns of the international community all played a role in the inability of Ankara to successfully acquire a nuclear power plant (Aydın 2020: 10, IAEA 2020, Udum 2010: 365, Martin 1997).
4.3 Nuclear energy in Turkey’s domestic politics
Our text focuses primarily on the energy projects launched by the governing AKP party, however, for a comprehensive account of the country’s position towards nuclear energy, public opinion as well as the views of domestic political actors will also be briefly addressed.
Nuclear energy has been a part of Turkey’s domestic debates from at least the early 1970s, when possible locations of power plants were determined. Consequently, large-scale social mobilization has been taking place in major cities and at proposed locations for decades (Schneider and Frogatt et. al. 2020). The choice of certain sights has also been criticized for their vulnerability to seismic activity, which is present across Turkey. Popular opposition was also fuelled by nuclear accidents, notably the Chernobyl nuclear accident which negatively impacted Turkey’s northern regions on the Black Sea. Despite the contemporary government’s assurances that the accident had no impact on public health, citizens still widely believe the number of nuclear-related deaths and diseases increased after the accident (Daily Sabah 2014).
17 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security AKP does not like loud opposition voices (Freedom House 2021, Reporters Without Borders 2020), which has impacted the intensity of public debate over the Akkuyu NPP and its economic, environmental, security and political implications. Still, widespread opposition to the current nuclear policy exists in Turkey (Aydın 2020: 6). Strong anti-nuclear mobilization against both the Akkuyu and Sinop projects brought about some of the largest environmental protests the country had ever witnessed (Aydın 2020: 6). Furthermore, the negative perception of nuclear energy increased since the AKP negotiated deal was signed. A poll shows that negative views on nuclear energy in Turkey grew from 57% in 2011 to 66% in 2018 (Schneider and Frogatt et. al. 2020). The dissatisfaction with the project moving forward, as well as lack of transparency from government officials crystalized in January 2021, when several workers got injured and a number of homes near the Akkuyu site got damaged in what the authorities called a controlled blast (Sokolski 2021, Hurriyet 2021).
AKP’s policies are also criticized by its political opposition (Aydın 2020: 5). The current Akkuyu NPP project is strongly opposed by Turkey’s main opposition and previously long- term ruling Republican People’s Party (CHP). While the main opposition party is not inherently anti-nuclear and would support Turkey’s nuclear development (Avundukluoglu 2018), it has pledged to halt the construction of Akkuyu under the BOO scheme (Erdil 2015). CHP’s leading figure in the 2018 presidential elections promised to kill the project (Daily Sabah 2018), though the AKP’s minister of energy claims the Akkuyu contract cannot be cancelled (Erdil 2015). Currently, the project is under constant attack by the opposition’s representatives from Mersin region (Sokolski 2021) who cite potential damage to the environment and damage to local infrastructure and property caused by the construction process as reason enough to oppose it (Evrensel 2021, Yeni Şafak 2021). Ultimately, the European Parliament has called on Turkey to halt the construction and involve, or at least consult, the governments of the neighbouring countries, such as Greece and Cyprus (European Parliament 2019). Construction of Akkuyu has continued as planned despite these diplomatic concerns (Temizer 2020).
18 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security 5 The Justice and Development Party (AKP) and nuclear energy 5.1 New visions under the AKP
The Justice and Development Party decisively won the 2002 elections and came out as a dominant player in Turkish politics for years to come. After 2002, the party held a majority in the Turkish Parliament for the next 13 years, and it has ruled Turkey without interruption since. Initially, AKP was praised for empowering democracy, strengthening the rule of law, and for bringing Turkey closer to joining the EU. More recently, however, due to the party’s increasingly authoritarian policies, its commitment to plurality and democracy has been questioned (Gürsoy 2017: 152-153).
AKP’s political agenda has had a transformative effect on Turkey in many ways. Its so-called 2023 vision is a large-scale reformist project under AKP leadership, which seeks to change Turkey both politically and economically. For instance, having been ranked as the 17th largest economy in the world already in 2011, AKP pledged to make Turkey a member of the 10 largest economies in the world by 2023 (Gros and Selcuki 2012). As part of the 2023 vision, the Justice and Development Party together with the Presidency of Turkey, which after the constitutional changes in 2017 holds executive powers and is headed by AKP’s founder Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has initiated a number of often polarizing and controversial megaprojects.
Among them are a rapid increase in highway connections across Turkey, opening a third bridge connecting Europe and Asia just north of Istanbul, building the world’s largest airport in Istanbul, connecting the Marmara sea with the Black sea via a new Canal Istanbul sea-route, building transnational energy pipelines such as TANAP and Turkish Stream, and also a constructing three NPPs, two of which, according to the Presidency, should be operational by 2023 (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2015).
5.2 AKP’s views on nuclear energy
From the outset, AKP members cherished nuclear energy. To them, it represents a cheap, sustainable, environmentally friendly source of energy and a powerful way to diversify Turkey’s energy portfolio and reduce energy dependence (Udum 2010: 367). Building several NPPs has been a long-standing policy priority of the AKP’s energy department (Sağlam 2016). In 2005, then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan presented AKP’s ambition to build three NPPs by 2015 (Hurriyet 2005). In early 2006, AKP had chosen the port city of Sinop to host the first commercial nuclear power plant and reaffirmed its decision to have three NPPs
19 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security operating by 2012-2015 (World Nuclear Association 2020). Upon ratification of a new Law on the Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and the Sale of Energy Generated, in November 2007, Turkey entered into several civil nuclear cooperation agreements. These agreements were made with the US in 2008, South Korea in 2010 and China in 2012 (ibid.). Turkey’s first bid under AKP rule came in September 2008.
The competition was organized by the Turkish Electricity Trading and Contracting Company (TETAS) and the construction was supposed to take place at the Akkuyu site, which was the only site approved by the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEA) (IAEA 2020, Udum 2010:
366). Only one consortium of Russian companies bid for the contract. The Nuclear and Mining Research Authority (TENMAK) responsible for licensing approved their bid. The tender was eventually cancelled by TETAS in November 2009 due to the proposed costs being too high (IAEA 2020, Udum 2010: 366). According to Udum, however, price was not the only issue playing against the unsuccessful bid, “another concern was the inconsistency between Turkey’s goal of reducing its energy dependence on Russia and hiring a Russian company to jointly operate the nuclear power plant” (Udum 2010:366).
Undeterred by previous setbacks, the AKP government did not give up on its nuclear ambitions. In February 2010, Ankara entered direct negotiations with the Russian Federation. These negotiations concluded with an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) with Moscow concerning the construction of an NPP under the Build Own Operate model with Russia’s VVER-1200 power units. With a total installed capacity of 4,800 megawatts, the planned project accounts for approximately 10% of Turkey`s power need (IAEA 2020, Erdoğan 2018). Paradoxically, while the 2008 bid by TETAS was rejected due its obvious incompatibility with the diversification goal articulated by the AKP government, the 2010 IGA delivered the Akkuyu project to a Russian consortium free of charge and with a fixed price at which TETAS would purchase electricity for the next 15 years (IAEA 2020). The construction of Akkuyu started in April 2018 (World Nuclear Association 2019: 6) and Ankara set a goal of bringing the Akkuyu NPP online by 2023, in accordance with its long-term transformative goals (Daily Sabah 2020). The 2023 deadline set by president Erdoğan has an important role in his party’s domestic political agenda. To him, according to IKV, the launch of Akkuy’s operation in 2023 is going to mark the centennial anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, when Turkey will join the family of nations with their own nuclear power industry (IKV 2018:8).
Once completed, the electricity produced at Akkuyu will be counted among imported sources regardless of the claims that NPPs in Turkey are built to reduce dependence on foreign import.
20 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security This constitutes the first obvious economic issue with the Turkey-Russia deal. Within the AKP negotiated agreement, Turkey guaranteed the price of electricity purchased by TETAS at the rate of 12.35¢ USD/kWh for the first 15 years of each unit’s operation. This price applies to 70% of electricity generated for the first and the second units and to 30% for the third and the fourth units. Half of the electricity produced in Akkuyu has a set price of 12.35 Dollar cent per kWh for the next 15 years (Aydın 2020: 5, IAEA 2020).
When AKP negotiated with Russia in 2010, one USD was worth around 1,5 Turkish lira (TRY), at the time of writing this text in spring 2021, one USD oscillates between 7 and 8,5 TRY (XE Currency 2021). The current challenges faced by the Turkish economy, which have included currency fluctuation and the fall in the value of the Turkish lira, which lost 40% of its value in the past two years (Goodman 2019), have made this portion of the agreement particularly problematic (Schneider and Frogatt et. al. 2019: 185, Karlidag and Idrisova 2019). Before delving into the Akkuyu deal, developments concerning two other NPP projects, whose failures further highlight how important the implications of Akkuyu NPP project may be, both for Turkey’s domestic politics and energy security, will be discussed.
5.3 Maintaining the momentum
Before the construction of the Akkuyu NPP even began, AKP had also moved forward with two other NPP projects.
The location at Sinop has been under consideration since 1980 (IAEA 2020). In 2013, Turkey signed an IGA with Japan for its development (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources 2020). At around $22 billion USD, the project was supposed to involve a French-Japanese consortium (Schneider and Frogatt et. al. 2019: 183-184). Despite the Ministry’s claims that the NPP at Sinop will be operational by 2023, the project is very unlikely to be completed by then due to similar challenges faced by its predecessors. The initial price of the construction nearly doubled amid concerns of site suitability due to seismic activity in the area, the project struggled to obtain funds and the main investor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, eventually withdrew from the project at the end of 2018 (World Nuclear Association 2020, Schneider and Frogatt et. al. 2019: 184). Nevertheless, the Turkish side still considers the Sinop project viable, and Ankara is searching for a new partner (Temizer 2020).
The third planned NPP project is called İğneada. The energy ministry originally intended to announce the project in 2013 together with an invitation for expressions of interest,
21 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security which did not happen (World Nuclear Association 2020). In November 2014, Turkey’s state- owned electricity generation company EÜAS entered negotiations with China and the United States and announced multi-party negotiations to develop and construct Turkey’s third nuclear power plant (Erdoğan 2018). It has been reported that while Chinese companies continue to make efforts to continue the project, the economic collapse of the American nuclear giant Westinghouse made its involvement in the 22–25 billion USD project unfeasible (Schneider and Frogatt et. al. 2019: 185). According to Turkey’s Energy Minister, Fatih Dönmez, applications have been made in 2020 for the construction license at the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Temizer 2020). Although all its projects are challenged by both economic constraints and domestic opposition, AKP has continued to reiterate its goal of constructing these three NPPs.
5.4 The ultimate bid
In 2008, the government was still not allowed to independently build new power plants or enter into new electricity purchasing contracts under Turkey’s energy legislation (Sirin 2010). That year’s Russian bid for building a NPP was abandoned due to the intervention of regulatory authorities. To them, awarding a Russian consortium with the contract did not align with the underlying goal of diversification. With an adjustment of the country’s regulatory framework, AKP entered into intergovernmental negotiations with Russia in a globally unique contract scheme. The Build Own Operate model is a unique way of nuclear cooperation which only ROSATOM provides. Turkey has so far been the only country to accept such an arrangement. What reasons may have contributed to the decision? Is the Turkish-Russian deal an example of a new attractive arrangement, or is Ankara compromising the country’s energy security by ceding control of the power plant to a foreign government?
22 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security 6 Turkey’s Allies and partners
“We share a strong will with Mr. Putin to deepen our cooperation through new projects. The close dialogue between me and my treasured friend plays a key role not only in the bilateral relations but also in the protection of regional peace and stability. We have had the opportunity to see the results of the Turkish-Russia dialogue on the ground in many issues from Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh to Syria and others. We are determined to expand this cooperation in the period ahead.”
(President R. T. Erdoğan, Speaking at the groundbreaking ceremony of Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant’s third unit, March 2021)
6.1 Bilateral relationships and potential vulnerabilities
Turkey has chosen to work with Russian state-owned company in a bilateral agreement. The decision was most likely influenced by variety of considerations. As the previous chapter has shown, Turkey has found it very difficult to finance NPP projects through standard open tenders. There have also been concerns about security and proliferation which has prevented old projects from moving forward. Clearly, Russia was not the first option. At the same time, it would be wrong to think that cooperation with Russia was Turkey’s last resort.
The Russian nuclear industry dominates the global export market for new reactors (World Nuclear Association 2019: 5). ROSATOM claims it ranks 1st in the world in terms of the number of simultaneously implemented nuclear reactor construction projects. It currently lists 35 units at various implementation stages abroad and claims a share of 17% of the world’s nuclear fuel market (Rosatom 2021). Importantly for our case, it is also the only company that handles the whole nuclear fuel cycle, giving it a unique position in the market (Vlček 2016). This factor might have helped Turkey to avoid proliferation-related objections from the international community which supposedly prevented some of the previous projects (Udum 2010, Kibaroglu 1997). Furthermore, it is also the only company that offers and implements the Build Own Operate scheme, which allowed Ankara to build the power plant despite having to contend with financial challenges that prevented other projects from proceeding. The success of ROSATOM’s Akkuyu bid seems to have been helped by the direct engagement of the heads of state of both countries.
23 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security The fact that the project was directed3 and supported by the Russian government (Ülgen 2012: 22) was celebrated during the opening ceremony in 2018 by then-Turkish Energy and Natural Resources Minister, Berat Albayrak. In his remarks, he noted that “the project’s implementation would have been impossible without strong support from Russian and Turkish leaders Vladimir Putin and Tayyip Erdoğan” (TASS 2018).
Furthermore, Turkey’s presidential office has been able to influence the Akkuyu project not only in the realm of diplomacy but also on the domestic stage through the use of the country’s regulatory bodies. With the transition to a presidential system in 2018, regulatory activities previously performed by TENMAK (now responsible for research and development and handling radioactive waste) were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NDK) which serves as “an independent nuclear regulatory body”. As of 2019, duties and authorities of the NDK are defined by regulations issued by the President of the Republic, who also appoints the President of the NDK/Chairperson and other members of NDK’s Nuclear Regulatory Board (IAEA 2020).
As of spring 2021, the only nuclear power plant under construction is the Akkuyu NPP. The Turkish government is determined to complete the project despite criticism from political opposition and popular mobilization (Aydın 2020: 4-5, Erdil 2015), technical seatbacks encountered during the construction (Sokolski 2021, Karlidag and Idrisova 2019) and the state of the Turkish economy, which have collectively resulted in the reluctance of foreign investors to invest and increased cost of imported goods (Pitel 2020, Goodman 2019). Although the cost of the project has continued to grow, this is not uncommon for the construction of nuclear power plants. Conditions change, prices adjust and unexpected problems cause delays. Due to their complexity and inherent path-dependency, NPP projects are inevitably long-term investments, rather than one-time deals.
A few months before construction had begun on the Akkuyu plant, Turkish partners, who were to hold a 49% share in the project, withdrew. ROSATOM stated it would be able to complete the project even without local investors, yet in 2019 it entered into talks with state-owned and private companies in order to sell the minority share. With the Turkish consortium having pulled out of the acquisition of the 49% minority share in Akkuyu, the project is currently fully owned by ROSATOM (Anadolu Agency 2018, Schneider and Frogatt et. al. 2020).
3 On this point, Ülgen (2011:131) notes that “Rosatom may have undertaken such a project which is political in nature because of the obligation of the government and not through its own will. So, in this case, there is a potential conflict of interests between Rosatom and the Russian government“.
24 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security There seems to have been no progress on the other two NPPs pursued via standard open tenders. Turkey’s, as well as global economy faces unprecedented burden caused by the global pandemic, yet the Russia-funded project continues (Daily Sabah 2021).
Meanwhile, Russian state-owned companies seem to be gaining valuable foothold in Turkey’s Mediterranean coast. According to Turkish reporting, there has been a change to the contract in 2019 which affects the infrastructure supporting the Akkuyu site. With this change, a Russian company has reportedly been allowed to build factories, warehouses, shipping ports, terminals, storage, loading and unloading facilities and to conduct transportation activities (Toker 2019). While such activities seem logical for construction of such complex venture, it is unclear why the need for shipping, port, storage-loading-unloading and transportation activities has not been considered in the original contract back in 2010. Is the contract adjustment (and the extent of Russia’s political and financial involvement in the project) of strategic or commercial nature?
Researchers point out two conflicting views on the political impact of the Build Own Operate scheme. On the one hand, they explain the potential danger of the sovereign client becoming a hostage of the contractor operating the strategically sensitive facility. On the other hand they note that such an abuse of power by the supplier would have a negative impact on the attractiveness of the BOO scheme to future potential clients (Jirušek and Vlček et al 2015: 344). Either way, a new economic and political relationship between Moscow and Ankara has been forged as a consequence of the Akkuyu project. The NPP has already introduced new considerations and dynamics for Turkey-Russia relations, which are not always harmonious and have sometimes been disrupted by live combat.
To explore the possible aspects of their cooperation, and in accordance with the two diverging views on ROSATOM’s behaviour, we will categorize the two perspectives into best case, commercial, and worst case, strategic, scenarios. Ultimately, we will address main arguments of compartmentalization logic which Turkey uses to reconcile the two perspectives.
6.2 Energy security - between strategic considerations and market approach
The BOO scheme under which Akkuyu is set to operate essentially delivers the Turkish site into the hands of ROSATOM for several decades, during which the nuclear plant will be built, run and decommissioned. The Russian side currently holds full control of the project. The Akkuyu NPP is the first use of BOO in practice (IAEA 2018b). There is no comparison
25 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security with other cases and many practical elements of the arrangement are still unclear. Turkish expectations are nevertheless grand.
At the opening event of the ground-breaking ceremony of the Akkuyu NPP, the project was praised as “an important development for Turkey to be able to diversify its energy resources” by Ayhan Zeytinoğlu, the Chairman of Istanbul’s influential IKV business association (IKV 2018:3). Similarly, the Istanbul-based Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) claims that the scheme is quite affordable for Turkey, with ROSATOM taking responsibility for construction, operation, fuel provision and waste disposal, and dismantling of the plant, and Russia providing financial guarantees for the project and handling its risks while providing Turkey with the desired degree of diversification (Aydın 2020: 5).
Other researchers however point out the political implications of the project and possible strategic leverage Russia has gained over Turkey. For example, Sinan Ülgen claims that “this project is highly “political” in nature and has been directed and supported by the Russian government. In other words, even if it is economically nonviable for the Russian side, it has to be considered in the context of the developing energy partnership between Turkey and Russia” (Ülgen 2012: 22). Noticing the already existing dependence in the field of natural gas and recurring security issues in Turkish-Russian relations, the project also has a negative side for Turkey. According to Telli (2016), it “will allow Russia to become more powerful within the scope of this interdependent relation with Turkey, which gives rise to serious geopolitical and geo-economical risks” (Telli 2016: 151). Furthermore, Turkey will depend on Russia for the technology, labour force, nuclear fuel and operational expertise necessary to build the plant. As a result, a double-dependency will have been formed by the project and “Turkey’s room for manoeuvre against Russia will be weakened in every aspect of national security, especially energy” (ibid: 165). The strength of the diversification argument proffered by Turkey’s leadership appears to be very weak given the fact that nuclear fuel needs to be imported from a subsidiary of ROSATOM and the electricity produced by the plant will have to be purchased in USD, making it difficult to predict costs in the midst of an already serious economic crisis in the country (ibid 166). Before the Turkey-Russia deal was conceived, Emre Iseri from Istanbul’s Kadir Has University warned that “Turkey is 70 percent dependent on Russian natural gas,” and “Giving the nuclear tender to Russia would mean a double dependency. One has to take into consideration that Moscow is using energy as a foreign-policy tool. So accepting the outcome of last year's tender [would have meant] that Turkey would have
26 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security a hard time making policy without Russia’s approval.” (Bilgic 2009 quoted in Stulberg and Fuhrmann 2013: 60).
The conclusions reached by authors critical of the arrangement are very similar to those reached by Fuhrmann (2012:37), who claims that nuclear assistance comes with a political cost and renders the recipient vulnerable to foreign influence. Furthermore, because the ownership of and control over the Akkuyu NPP is not planned to be transferred to Ankara’s hands, the political risks associated with foreign involvement in the ownership and operation of a national strategic asset (Dráb and Vlček 2016, Vlček 2015) will remain in place even after the project has been completed.
It is important to make a distinction between a risk and vulnerability and the willingness to exploit it. Yet, if AKP claims that the high-level of single source imports gave rise to the need for diversification in the first place, then the current policy of introducing nuclear energy to the mix does not contribute to the country’s source diversification or supply security. Indeed, the government appears to be transforming and exacerbating the country’s uneven dependence on Russian imports. In recent years, Turkey has decreased the amount of natural gas imported from Russia (from 58% in 2014 to 35% in 2019), as well as the role of natural gas in electricity generation due to the rapid development of renewable energy sources (down from 29,8% to 18,6%) (IAEA 2020, IEA 2021b). With Akkuyu coming closer to achieving its full operational capabilities, Russia’s NPP will supply some 10% of Turkey’s electricity needs (Daily Sabah 2021) and the progress achieved by diversification will have been reversed.
6.3 Energy as a foreign policy tool
The statement that Moscow has used energy as a tool of foreign policy became a popularly repeated phrase featured in works of many energy security scholars and analysts. This forthright statement requires further elaboration.
An analysis shows that foreign operations of Russian state-owned enterprises are a balance of strategic and economic considerations (Robinson 2015: 25). In the case of ROSATOM, its operations are primarily market-driven because any obvious political abuse of its products would hurt its reputation in the global marketplace (Vlček 2015: 346, Vlček 2016). The same research nevertheless points out the need to discipline ROSATOM’s behaviour, “which is often more strategic, under Kremlin oversight, than it is commercial”, via a firm
27 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security institutional framework (Vlček 2015: 353). As we have shown, in the case of the Akkuyu deal, a firm institutional framework or public oversight was for the most part lacking.
The possibility that the Kremlin’s strategic agenda could influence otherwise market-driven dynamics remains present especially in energy infrastructure projects, which are built with a life span of many decades. To be precise, up to 60-100 years in the case of the Akkuyu project (Akkuyu 2019, Anadolu Agency 2014b).
Europe’s recent history is a testimony to the fact that relations among nations can fundamentally change over time and not everyone is content with Russia’s role in their energy sector. Several allies of Turkey have refused to allow ROSATOM and its subsidiaries to make bids for the construction of critical infrastructure and participate in nuclear development. Poland and Lithuania for instance have explicitly excluded Russian designs for its potential projects (Jirušek and Vlček et al 2015: 178 and 215). Concerns of Moscow gaining leverage via its nuclear energy dominance have also been expressed in the case of Hungary (Ibid.). Most recently, the Czech Republic also expressed strong reservations concerning the participation of ROSATOM in expanding its Dukovany nuclear power plant (Reuters 2021). In an effort to limit Russia’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe, the EU has allocated funds for a diversification project aimed at developing an alternative source of fuel for Soviet/Russian- built VVER reactors (Vlček 2015: 357). These belong to the same reactor-family that Akkuyu will have. Turkey’s long-term nuclear development policy was initially driven by efforts to limit dependence on energy imports. Should Ankara be concerned about the supply of fuel when AKP’s deal with Moscow stipulates that Russia’s SOE will handle the whole fuel cycle for Akkuyu?
Researchers point out that “it would be short sighted to underestimate the weight of strategic considerations in Moscow’s management of its premiere state-owned energy enterprises” (Robinson 2015: 25). Turkish decision makers are not uninformed about this, they do not deal exclusively with ROSATOM only. Turkey has already joined several other Russian-led energy infrastructure projects in the past (Beat 2019). Turkish analysts such as Telli (2016) Iseri (2009) Çelikpala (2018) and other researchers from Istanbul-based think tanks such as SETA (2020) and IKV (2018) are aware of this unequal dependence, but they differ in their views on what its consequences will be.
28 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security 6.4 Compartmentalization of differences – a solution?
Ankara and Moscow do not always get along well. Their disagreements have been especially visible in Syria, Libya and Nagorno Karabakh, where they stand on opposite sides of those conflicts (SETA 2020, Gafarli 2020). Turkey’s official policy in neighbouring Syria has been the removal of the Assad government (Stein 2015: 97), while Russia came in to keep it in power. Clashes between Russia and Turkey over Syria led to an armed conflict between their forces in the region. In 2016, the downing of a Russian jet by Turkey’s Air Force resulted in Russia imposing sanctions that severely affected Turkey’s productive enterprises and tourism industry4 (Girit 2016). In early 2020, Turkey lost more than three dozen soldiers in Syria in what appears to have been a Russian airstrike (Gurcan 2020). Furthermore, Turkey is currently developing a closer political relationship and coordinating greater defence cooperation with Ukraine (Yavuz 2021, Lapaiev 2020), whose territory is partly occupied by Russia.
When asked about its participation in conflicts surrounding Europe, Ankara reminds its allies that in Syria, Libya and Nagorno Karabakh, Turkey’s efforts contradict those of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, Turkey seems confident that the logic of the concept of compartmentalization can be put into practice, that negotiations and deals concerning energy can be handled separately from other bilateral issues (Çelikpala 2018, Onis and Yilmaz 2015 quoted in Busygina 2018: 210).
According to Çelikpala, the structural design of Turkish-Russian relations allows for economic cooperation with Russia to be managed separately and stay immune from geopolitical disagreements (Çelikpala 2018: 117). Compartmentalization logic suggests that geopolitical issues and economic cooperation concern different agendas. The 2016 Russian sanctions, which targeted production, agriculture and tourism but didn’t affect energy ties, is an example of this practice. This experience led some researchers to make the assessment that ”energy is arguably the safest field of cooperation between Turkey and Russia” (SETA 2020). Such a view is at best optimistic. Russia did not hesitate to punish Turkey through the use of economic tools and by brute military force when the two clashed over Syria.
While Turkish analysts view compartmentalization as a tool to secure the relationship and protect it from geopolitical disagreements concerning the fate of neighbouring states, Daniel Yergin warns that “Energy and energy security cannot and should not be compartmentalized,” (Yergin 2008: 42) since energy security depends on the overall relationship among countries
4 According to BBC, Russian tourist annually bring roughly $3.5bn to Turkey (Girit 2016).
29 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security involved (ibid.). Essentially, the unresolved question between proponents of the compartmentalization concept, and those who warn against over-dependence on Russia (such as Telli 2016 and Iseri 2009) is who has the decisive vote on the parameters of individual compartments when relations deteriorate?
On the compartmentalization of Russian-Turkish relations, a Russia-based author from Moscow’s MGIMO University proposes the following: “The strategy necessarily implies that both sides consistently follow this “principle of compartmentalization,” but Russia has few incentives to do so” (Busygina 2018: 210). Indeed, Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its preparedness to allow geopolitics to influence economic considerations in what the author refers to as a “carrot and stick” policy through the use of selective coercion (Ibid: 201-210). Though Russian media claims that Akkuyu “significantly binds the two countries together, making them rely on a steadier course towards each other" (quoted in Karlidag and Idrisova 2019), when the two countries clash, it is ultimately Russia who determines the conditions and achieves what it wants, to the detriment of the Turkish presidency, in exchange for the restoration of good relations (Busygina 2018: 209).
Personalities matter and it was the president Putin who quickly expressed support to (then) Prime Minister Erdoğan shortly after coup plotters were defeated on the 15th July, 2016. Currently, Moscow and Ankara are engaged in negotiations regarding the fate of Syria, where Russia plays a decisive role and possesses the ability to help Turkey realize its interests there (Çelikpala 2018: 128). Beyond collaborating on energy projects together, Turkey recently purchased Russian S-400 air/missile defence systems. This decision caused a rift within the Alliance and resulted in Turkey’s removal from the fifth-generation fighter F-35 programme, despite Turkey’s role in the production of some of the plane’s components. Not only did this precipitate the loss of billions of lira for Turkish firms involved in the project, it also caused a headache for Turkey’s air force, whose aging F-16 fleet was supposed to be augmented by the addition of F-35s (Stein 2020, SETA 2020: 35). To make matters even more complicated, if not worse, Moscow is now luring Turkey into the cockpit of its own fighter jets (Isachenkov 2019). Russian planes have even flown over Istanbul at the AKP-organized Teknofest exhibition (Sputnik 2019). Due to concern over Moscow’s apparent success at courting the Turkish leadership, Western policymakers have been engaging in debate over Turkey’s future in NATO (Vernum and Kasapoğlu 2020, Pry 2019, Vandiver 2019).
In the current atmosphere, it is easy to forget that Turkey is strongly bound to Western security, political and economic structures. Turkey is the EU’s 5th largest trading partner, and the
30 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security EU is by far Turkey`s number one import and export trading partner (European Commission 2020). Russia does not figure in Turkey’s top 10 export destinations, but it ranks among the country’s top three importers (Yinanç 2018). While the share of direct investments in Turkey from Russia has reached 3-4%, the EU has reached up to 73% in the period from 2007 to 2015 (Presidency of the Republic of Turkey 2019, Power Technology 2018).
Turkey’s troubled relationship with its Allies, its recent rapprochement with Russia and its policy in Syria, which are inherently intertwined, have attracted broad attention in Western media. While many seek to provide constructive insight on the current issues between Turkey and its Western allies, noting that “Neither [(NATO)] country’s interests, however much they fail to align otherwise, would be well-served by watching a permanently weakened NATO bleed out at the hands of Russia” (Vernum and Kasapoğlu 2020). Various politicians, as well as some think-tank policy "experts”, have made ill-advised public assertions, such as the suggestion that Turkey could and should be expelled from NATO (Sen. Graham quoted in Pry 2019, Hokovský 2019). Many have demonstrated their belief that the NATO debate regarding Turkish membership of the Alliance should be held with the a priori assumption that the conversation is about an enemy as opposed to a current ally (Hokovský 2019). Such misconceptions ignore the roots of policy friction between the US and Turkey over Syria (see Abadi 2019, Stein and Foley 2016) and provide little to no improvement to the damaged relations between Turkey and its western partners in general. Contrary to that, it serves to antagonize the AKP and inadvertently encourages them to conduct backroom deals with Moscow, which are against the interests of Euro-Atlanticism. Since AKP`s second term in power (and its obvious authoritarian shift) authors have asked how to revive partnership between America, Europe and Turkey (Gordon et al. 2008). Meanwhile, Russia continues finding creative ways to weaken it.
6.5 Russia’s hand in Turkey
Moscow takes a clear position, it “is much more interested in encouraging Turkish buy-in on Russian-offered solutions to regional problems” (Gafarli 2020). It continues to play a strong and decisive role in shaping Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East (Çelikpala 2018: 105) and it does not seek to form a lasting alliance, even though many scholars are trying to find one (Busygina 2018: 210). With regards to Turkey, “No one can guarantee that the restored
31 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security relationship will not collapse once again, with selective use of coercion and the rise of ideological hatred instead of statements of mutual respect.” (Ibid).
The inequality of the relationship is best signalled by Moscow’s rejection to open Syrian air space to Turkish helicopters to airlift dozens of wounded troops, which had to be transported by road after the devastating airstrike conducted by the combined forces of the Syrian Republic and Russian Federation on February 28, 2020 (Gurcan 2020). It was the Turkish president who immediately travelled to Moscow to negotiate a rapid ceasefire (France 24: 2020) and not the other way around. In the face of Moscow’s pressure, Turkey also sought the backing of its NATO Allies, who “condemned the indiscriminate air strikes by the Syrian regime and its backer Russia in Idlib province” (NATO 2020). They expressed strong solidarity with Ankara and agreed to boost Turkey’s air defences. This recent episode of violence demonstrates the clear limits of the purported Turkish-Russian rapprochement, which is strongly based on personals relationship developed by the foremost leaders from both nations who have managed to concentrate foreign policy-making in their own hands.
This unequal relationship with Russia is soon to be reinforced by the development of a piece of critical energy infrastructure with a lifespan that means it will constrain the ability of Turkish governments and administrations to come. The Akkuyu Nuclear power plant, conceived in a backroom deal with little to no independent oversight, very limited public debate, and in a tight media-controlled environment, has delivered critical infrastructure into the hands of the Russian government. The Akkuyu NPP, with its 60 to 80 years lifespan, has made an already asymmetric relationship even more imbalanced between Russia and Turkey. If Akkuyu and Moscow’s potential new leverage turns into a tool of coercion it threatens to be equally Turkey’s own issue, as well as a collective issue faced by all NATO Allies.
32 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security 7 Conclusions What is Turkey’s long-term policy towards nuclear energy?
AKP has not made unprecedented contributions to the development of nuclear energy in Turkey. The country has sought to introduce nuclear energy for over half a century. There has been an institutional and political consensus on the benefits of nuclear energy for Turkey’s energy mix for decades. Furthermore, several tenders, albeit unsuccessful, for NPP projects were held under different governments with different political backgrounds. Currently, both the ruling party and its main opposition party share favourable views on nuclear energy, yet they dramatically disagree on the current policy course chosen by the governing AKP. The opposition routinely criticizes the current form of the project and has publicly promised to revoke the AKP-negotiated deal. Nuclear power plant projects have caused some of the largest popular demonstrations in recent years. Furthermore, a large segment of the public across the political spectrum hold increasingly negative views of nuclear energy.
Why is the Akkuyu project being realized while other proposed NPPs are on hold?
Nuclear powerplants are unique enterprises that require a complex set of safeguards. It is important to note that tenders which took place under the AKP government suffered from similar difficulties to earlier bids. These issues have included problems with financing and lack of confidence on the part of investors, environmental concerns caused by the high risk of seismic activity in Turkey and security concerns regarding Turkey’s capacity for handling nuclear materials in accordance with non-proliferation treaties. While consortiums comprised of companies from the private sector withdrew from AKP planned projects at Sinop and İğneada, the Russia-sponsored Akkuyu project has continued to move forward.
The Turkish-Russian deal addressed most of the nuclear-related security issues and difficulties via transfer of responsibilities for Akkuyu’s operation entirely to Russia’s hands. From a security perspective, the Russian company will be in charge of the construction, operation and decommissioning of the plant and it will also, via subsidiaries, handle the fuel-cycle thus limiting proliferation concerns. Implementation of all standard security procedures is also the responsibility of the contractor. Since any failure to do so would hurt its reputation on the global market, safeguards are anticipated to have been put in place before the completion of the NPP. Financing has been secured from Russian sources and the price for a significant part of the electricity has been firmly set.
33 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security Progress on the completion of the Akkuyu NPP, although it has been significantly delayed, has been of immense value for the AKP. After decades of unsuccessful negotiations, AKP has made tangible progress in building the country’s first nuclear power plant. Through mainstream media the Akkuyu project is presented mainly as a necessity in Turkey’s efforts to increase its energy security by limiting dependence on imported energy sources. AKP highlights its success in the light of failures of previous governments to introduce nuclear energy to Turkey. Realization of the project has been of immense symbolic value and shown in practice the partial authenticity of the AKP’s transformative agenda. To receptive audiences, the project is presented as yet another success story of the AKP. Failure to complete the project would hurt its narrative.
To achieve this aim, AKP has had to change the rules of the game in Turkey, which initially limited the government’s role in the procurement of NPP projects. Currently, the ruling party has tools and capabilities to directly influence the outcome. Under changes in domestic laws and regulations, it could enter into direct intergovernmental negotiations, which had not been possible before. As a result, the Turkish-Russian contract is a backroom deal negotiated by the respective heads of state of both countries. Furthermore, AKP-led Presidency now appoints positions in key institutions such as the new Nuclear Regulatory Authority, who are responsible for oversight of NPP development in Turkey.
AKP has governed Turkey for nearly two decades and its gradual authoritarian shift has led to a decrease in democratic standards. This has impacted the ability of most media organizations to scrutinize the government’s actions free from intimidation or violence. Examples of this reality are the unresolved environmental concerns on the side of public and political opposition, controversial changes to the contract, or the recent explosion during the construction. While all of this raises concerns among those opposing AKP’s political agenda, such concerns are not thoroughly addressed by the government and its affiliated media. In sum, the ruling party managed to create an environment which allows it to pursue its policy goals with little independent institutional or public oversight.
In what way will Akkuyu NPP influence Turkey’s dependence on foreign energy imports?
The Akkuyu NPP was, just like other nuclear projects in Turkey, conceived out of the need to diversify Turkey’s sources of electricity and limit the country’s dependence on imported sources of energy. As described above, Turkey already imports most of its energy sources which also impacts electricity production.
34 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security In 2018, around one third of the country’s electricity came from natural gas. This amount decreased to some 20% by 2020. As far as diversification of electricity production is concerned, the NPP project would serve its purpose and involvement of Russia’s SOE would not be inherently problematic, if the standard procedures were followed. This includes the transfer of ownership of the project to a state or private entity, freedom to purchase fuel via the global market and suspending direct ties to a foreign government once the project is completed. Research shows that once NPPs are completed, the global market for fuel allows for the desired degree of diversification to be achieved. Furthermore, supplier state’s options for exerting political influence are then limited as well. The case of Akkuyu differs from other NPP projects around the world in the unique ownership scheme which the AKP government decided to pursue. To build the plant, AKP sacrificed the element of energy security and agreed to import electricity through Russia’s NPP. Such a step is contradictory to the logic of Turkey’s aim of decreasing foreign energy imports, particularly those coming from Russia.
From the energy security perspective, the Akkuyu project is only electricity source diversification. Contrary to claims of the Turkish government, the NPP does not solve the issue of foreign energy imports. While decreasing the use of imported gas in electricity production, Turkey will import electricity from Akkuyu. Furthermore, the lack of transparency and independent oversight in Turkey, unconventional ownership scheme and the complex political- security relationship with Russia raises Turkey’s susceptibility to political influence from Moscow.
What is the impact of AKP’s nuclear policy on Turkey’s energy security?
Since 2002, the AKP has made the introduction of nuclear energy to Turkey one of its priorities, with the overarching goal of reducing energy imports. Its ambitious plans of having three NPP by 2015 or 2023 have not materialized, with only one NPP scheduled to be built before 2023. The Akkuyu NPP will be built, owned and operated by Russia’s state-owned company and has a life span of at least 60 years. The direct bilateral agreement negotiated by the AKP leadership does not appear to serve the foreign import diversification aim which all previous NPP projects were originally intended to meet. The Akkuyu NPP will change import dependence from gas to nuclear fuel and electricity. Turkey’s dependence on foreign imports will remain unchanged while Russia’s direct involvement in Turkey’s energy production will grow. Furthermore, fluctuation of the Turkish lira together with the obligation of Turkey to purchase Akkuyu’s
35 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security electricity at a price fixed to the US dollar is likely to cause great uncertainty concerning the final price for Turkish consumers.
Directly supported from both the presidential palace in Ankara and Moscow, the Akkuyu project also has a distinct political dimension. Internally, AKP leveraged its partnership with Russia to achieve a significant domestic goal and support its political narrative. From a foreign policy perspective, the project directly impacts political ties between Russia and Turkey. All things considered, the project enables Russia to increase her influence over Turkey by cementing Turkey’s reliance on Russian energy sources.
36 The Impact of AKP’s Nuclear Policy on Turkey’s (Energy) Security List of abbreviations AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) ANRTC Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Center CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi CNRTC Cekmece Nuclear Research and Training Center EUAS (State-owned) Electricity Generation Joint Stock Company IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDK Nuclear Regulatory Authority (since 2018 responsible for licensing) NPP Nuclear Power Plant SOE State Owned Enterprise TAEA Turkish Atomic Energy Authority TAEC Turkish Atomic Energy Commission TEAS Turkish Electricity Generation and Transmission Company TEK Turkish Electricity Authority TENMAK Nuclear and Mining Research Authority (1982-2018 responsible for licensing)
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