Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

01 Acknowledgements

The 2015 Annual State of Corruption Report: Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 was made possible due to the support of the Swedish Embassy and the European Union.

We also wish to thank our contributors Dr Mungai Lenneiye, Professor Lloyd Sachikonye, Dr. Sandra Bhatasara and Dr. Prosper Chitambara for their comprehensive input into this report. This Report would not have been possible without the support and assistance of the entire staﬀ at the TI Zimbabwe 2015 secretariat. In addition we also thank Dr Ndlela, Dr Chiweshe, Dr Matyszak and Mfundo Mlilo for providing expert Annual State of Corruption review comments to the chapters and proposed policy recommendations. TI Z appreciates and acknowledges all the authors cited in this report. We are particularly grateful to David Mungoshi for his indispensable copy editing input and Sean Ukomba for the Book Design. Mutondoro. F, Ncube M.S, Chitambara.P, Sachikonye.L, Bhatasara.S Edited by Mungai N Lenneiye Published by Transparency International Zimbabwe ISBN 978-0-7974-7366-9 First published 2016 Copy editing by David Mungoshi Book Concept by Sean Ukomba Printed by PrintWorks Zimbabwe

2015 Annual State of Corruption Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

01 Acknowledgements

2015 Annual State of Corruption Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 03 Acronyms

ADB African Development Bank AEI Automatic Exchange of Tax Information ASCR Annual State of Corruption Reports ASPEF Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility AUCPCC African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption BACOSSI Basic Commodities Supply-Side Intervention Facility CAG Comptroller and Auditor General CHRA Combined Harare Residents Association Table of contents CPI Corruption Perception Index 02 CPIB Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau DA District Administrator page DCEC Directorate of Corruption and Economic Crime 01 Acronyms EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative 02 Foreword FDI Foreign Direct Investment 03 Executive Summary FPR Fidelity Printers and Reners 06 Chapter 1: An Overview GDP Gross Domestic Product GIS Geographical Information System 18 Chapter 2: Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Zimbabwe GNU Government of National Unity 36 Chapter 3: Corruption and the Political Landscape in Zimbabwe HDI Human Development Index 56 Chapter 4: Understanding Corruption in Social Service Delivery in HMWU Urban Planning Services and Harare Municipal Workers Union Zimbabwe ICAC Independent Commission Against Corruption 70 Bibliography IMF International Monetary Fund IPC Integrity Perception Index JOMIC Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee MDC Movement for Democratic Change MSA Municipal Sales Agreement NCCG National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council NFA National Framework Agreement OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PDI Private Domestic Investment PLARP Parastatals and Local Authorities Reorientation Programme PPADB Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board RBZ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe RDCs Rural District Councils SADC Southern African Development Community TI Transparency International TI Z Transparency International Zimbabwe UN United Nations UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa USD United States Dollars WB World Bank WDI World Bank's World Development Indicators WEF World Economic Forum ZAAC Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission ZANU- PF Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front ZBC Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation ZEC Zimbabwe Electoral Commission ZIMRA Zimbabwe Revenue Authority

2015 Annual State of Corruption 2015 A nnual State of Corruption 1 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 03 Acronyms

“The real voyage of discovery does not consist in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.” 04 Foreword Marcel Proust, A la Recherche du temps perdu 05 Executive Summary

Present day Zimbabwe remains trapped in a development impasse which judging by this Report by Transparency International Zimbabwe and other research publications is highly attributable to the growing The 2015 Zimbabwe Annual State of Corruption Report (ASCR) set out to understand “the cost of problem of corruption than any other variable. Clearly corruption in Zimbabwe is a topical developmental, corruption on the economy, politics and social service delivery in Zimbabwe 2000-2015”. The underlying political and economic governance issue because of its interrelatedness and inter-linkages with key challenges approach assumes that a presentation of empirical evidence on corruption can lead to increased that the country continues to face. The challenges that include unemployment, poverty, poor social service awareness of its dimensions, and that would, in turn, lead to change of behaviour by individuals – to delivery, capital flight, de-industrialization and low investment rates can be blamed on the collapse in either tackle the problem or join in its perpetuation, depending on the cost of either actions. The economic governance that is correlated with the escalation in corruption. In developmental terms, this means evidence presented in the three case studies paints a mixed picture of the last fteen years, one where that a reduction of corruption in Zimbabwe should translate to improved ease of doing business, increased citizens have resisted corruption, but also one in which there are instances where they have enjoyed the investment opportunities and economic growth leading to a reduction in unemployment among many other benets that come with corruption. In this regard, the balance sheet is a product that starts the process of developmental indicators. providing a deep dive into the roots and origins of corruption in Zimbabwe. In that respect, ASCR 2015 has outlined an agenda for future studies that has a potential to equip Zimbabwean society with tools to Contrary to bringing out 'new landscapes' on the subject of corruption, the Publication looks into the subject better understand the underlying drivers of corruption beyond its manifestations as projected in the with 'new eyes' – a pro-active role of the citizenry through the media and non-state actors transmitting popular media. messages and information into the public domain so that power and corruption become contested space between the state and citizens' actors. That way citizens can assert their space and hence build a social The three position papers presented here provide a good understanding of post-colonial foundations of contract with the state through engendering accountability on economic governance. The reader is corruption, while recognizing that Zimbabwe is no more corrupt than other African countries. The papers converted to look at corruption at a new level where it has evolved into network corruption 'which involves provide an argument for students of corruption to expand their horizons and seek to better understand its highly connected politicians and elites plundering national resources because of their status and class' as one historical contexts. Lloyd Sachikonye sketches out how political decisions have had economic of the ingredients of state capture. This publication by TI Z is a mind provoking study which serves the purpose consequences; and Prosper Chitambara ably shows what these consequences have meant for service to encourage a serious relook and rethink of the present day political and governance system. delivery – itself well-dissected by Sandra Bhatasara who takes a close look at the Local Government sector. The result is a body of knowledge that points to the critical role the state and its institutions play in Due to corruption Zimbabwe has scored and continues to score very badly on key governance and human creating the conditions for corrupt practices, and nurturing them while at the same time protecting the development measures such as the Ease of Doing Business, Human Development Index, inter alia. The perpetrators. The papers also present emerging evidence that increasingly, citizens are paying the price of growing problem of corruption seems to confront politicians, policy makers, academics, civil society, think corruption, be it in the new politics, the economy, or in the social service delivery frameworks. tanks and above all citizens with the question; “How can we move from this dire situation and be a better economically competitive and development-oriented country like our peers and neighbours such as South The political decision in the 1990s to wage a war in the DRC and the unplanned pensions and allowance Africa, Botswana, Mauritius and Namibia?”. From the cost of corruption perspective the scourge signals a pay-outs for war veterans set the stage for the land invasions of 2000. The political governance patterns downward shift in resources and revenue from the legally intended and enshrined public and state coffers to that Zimbabwe entered the new Millennium with had far-reaching economic consequences: framed by individual pockets at the detriment of the poor. As shown in this publication, the nation is viciously confronted hyperination, deindustrialization, and informalization driven by rising levels of unemployment. The by poverty faces such as unemployment, homelessness, hunger, sick and inability to access health services. resulting economic decline and depressed performance deprived the state of the revenue needed to The manifestation of corruption in our state machinery has shaped our present day political economy and in maintain the kind of service delivery level that the country had experienced during the rst fteen years the ultimate inevitably eroded the role and integrity of the state. after independence in 1980. As urban residents shifted their political support from the party of liberation to new opposition parties, political leadership shifted in urban local authorities to these parties; and This has to a great extent eroded fiscal capacity which has manifested itself through an accelerated shrinkage central government shifted its attention to rural service delivery. The resulting tension between ZANU-PF of developmental opportunities, erosion of public goods /service delivery capacity. The field of social service central administration and MDC local government management is shown to be at the heart of declining delivery being a twilight showing the delivery of social contract promised political goods (such as education, economic performance and service delivery, with corrupt practices taking on the semblance of legitimate housing, health facilities) has been hard hit by corruption and the result has been zero delivery of such political tools of political contestation between an elite leadership seeking to exert political, economic, and goods. Unemployment level continues to increase while the economy collapses on the shoulders on the delivery hegemony in various spheres of national life. informal sector as the industrial infrastructure diminishes in potency and capacity. This publication therefore, is a reminder to all progressive elements of this dying society and institutions that the remedy to most of our The three papers paint a picture of extensive institutional decay, collapse, and capture by different groups challenges lies in undoing corruption which has housed itself in our political, bureaucratic and private sector in the state – in turn sucking in parts of the private sector into corrupt practices that transfer public pinnacles as well as the day to day citizen, state and business transactions. resources from services for the general population to channels that support personal consumption by those with access to state power – be it central or local. With Central Government revenues Daniel. B Ndlela predominantly going to meeting the wage costs of its employees (less than 5% of the population), intense competition has developed between groups within the state trying to control the remaining small (often less than 15% of central government revenue) quantum meant to meet the needs of over 90% of the population.

2 2015 Annual State of Corruption 2015 Annual State of Corruption 3 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

“The real voyage of discovery does not consist in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes.” 04 Foreword Marcel Proust, A la Recherche du temps perdu 05 Executive Summary

2 2015 Annual State of Corruption 2015 Annual State of Corruption 3 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

Executive Summary Continued...

The papers demonstrate that perpetrators of corruption also wield political power, act with impunity, operate in small political groups (factions), and lack the political will to end corruption. In return, citizens rationally calculate the cost of confronting well-connected and powerful corrupt groups and adopt the view that corrupt practices are the price of securing services for individuals and their family in the market.

The commercialization of corruption has become a means for securing more resources for the state from an increasingly impoverished population that considers the Police, the City Council, the Vehicle Inspection Department, and Education as the most corrupt institutions in Zimbabwe: these are the institutions citizens frequently come into contact with when seeking services, and where individual state agents collect revenue on their own behalf. Service delivery has become the face of corruption that is visible to most of the population. On the other hand, the Judiciary is considered least corrupt, followed by Registry and Permits (consistent with an economy where economic liberalization after 2009 reduced the number of such instruments in the regulation of economic activities). Citizen trust in state institutions described in the pre-2000 period has given way to cynicism in the post-hyperination and economic liberalization period (post-2000). Accordingly, petty corruption has become accepted as the “cost of doing business” and corrupt practices are now “the new normal” as citizens seek a new equilibrium in their dealings with state institutions. In this respect, citizens were seen as making a choice between paying bribes to get services or to avoid the cost of contravening regulations and laws enforced by agents of the state.

The three papers also explore the roles of governance and patronage in fostering corruption under conditions of limited political will to tackle the problem. The conclusion that corruption denies citizens access to services led to arguments about the role media and non-state actors could play in putting information on state actions onto the public space so that power and corruption become contested space between state and citizen actors. Improved measures of state performance were identied as possible tools for showing what could be done to stop the state from “turning on its citizens”. With regard to the interaction between politics, economics, and service delivery in tackling corruption, the roles of policy- making and institution-development were identied as critical. Changes in politics were seen as drivers of economic change, which in turn were identied as changing the parameters of as well as the means for service delivery.

The cultural dimensions of corruption are both country and society-specic. In the case of Zimbabwe, corruption cannot be understood by just looking at the post-2000 or even post-1980 periods; it needs to go further into the foundations laid by a colonial administration interacting with a population that was resisting colonial laws and regulations. It is culturally signicant that a Zimbabwean would consider it a bigger insult to be called a “sell-out” (a term used to describe those perceived to be collaborating with colonial rulers) than to be called “corrupt”. Delving into the social, political, and economic past of the country could help future students of corruption gain a deeper understanding of the cultural roots of corruption. Such a scenario would be useful in starting to inform the anti-corruption strategies that tackle the under-lying causes of “legitimized corruption”. This is a challenge facing many countries in Africa and beyond, a challenge whose outcome can be changed by the public dissemination of evidence on corruption and its consequences as done in these papers.

Mungai Lenneiye

4 2015 Annual State of Corruption Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

Executive Summary Continued...

Mungai Lenneiye

4 2015 Annual State of Corruption Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

The cost of Corruption on the Economy, Politics and Social Service Delivery in Zimbabwe (2000- An Overview An Overview 2015) An Overview, Mutondoro F, Ncube M.S 06 Continued... Resources are needed for generating empirical evidence that allows us to better understand what has driven the corruption that is weighing down Zimbabwe's development; be it structural, systemic, The state is the most precious prize in Zimbabwe because its power can be used to generate opportunities for historical, socio- economic, or the political dynamics. Grand corruption as a national problem began to private gain. The private sector employment opportunities are limited; therefore, the occupation of the public manifest itself in Zimbabwe in the period immediately preceding the year 2000. It is thus possible that the office remains the most dependable means of accumulating wealth (Bratton and Masunungure 2011). contributory factors and context of the previous two decades were different or the same as those for the period cited. The analysis of this 2015 ASCR limits itself to understanding the contributory factors and Introduction context that have prevailed in the period 2000 - 2015 in order to help explain how corruption has in these There is a global recognition that corruption is a problem that negatively impacts on the attainment of 15 years become so endemic that critical governance pillars are crumbling under its weight. developmental outcomes such as ending poverty and hunger, the provision of quality and universal health and education, achieving gender equality, and development of sustainable cities and communities Background (DFID, 2015 and Komori, 2015). The consequence of corruption, and how it impacts on development Generally, there is a consensus, judging from narratives from all sections of society including academic outcomes, is the motivation behind Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16 on Peace, Justice and Strong 1 and policy narratives that corruption has in the 15 years under review progressively become an endemic Institutions as well as SDG targets 16.5 and 16.6 respectively. Transparency International (2007) notes an 2 3 problem in Zimbabwe. Increasingly, the everyday language used by most Zimbabweans conforms with increasing global consensus on the importance of conceptualizing corruption as one of the major 4 the Shona adages “Mbudzi inodya payakasungirirwa” (“a goat eats from where it is tied”), “kudhiza” and or impediments to development as reected in the ratication of the UN Convention against Corruption “kugura”.5 These adages show the extent to which corruption has become culturally accepted. While public (UNCAC) which Zimbabwe is a signatory to. Zimbabwe is ranked amongst the most corrupt countries in and private sector corruption has been more systemic in its progression over many years, it has been more Southern Africa with a low Corruption Perception Index score of 21 (compared to an average of 44 in four amorphous in society – though seemingly in response to the breakdown of a culture of good corporate other SADC countries in table 1). This is a reection of high levels of perceived corruption in the public governance in both the public and private sectors. Now in all sectors, corruption is becoming accepted as sector. Corruption in post-independence Zimbabwe has a long history with such major corruption cases the way things are done. as the Paweni and Willowvale scandals being traceable back to 1982 and 1988 respectively. In analysing corruption in Zimbabwe, a number of scholars have attempted to problematize Zimbabwe's Corruption takes a variety of forms in Zimbabwe, from petty and bureaucratic to grand forms of colonial past and structural dysfunctional issues that have arisen from it post the colonial era. Mhone corruption involving high-level officials (Chene, 2015; Mwatwara and Mujere, 2015). Corruption manifests (2000) for instance argued that Zimbabwe's socio-economic and colonial political background created itself through a deeply entrenched system of political patronage, a tight grip by the ruling party over the allocative and distributive inefficiencies that were compounded by post-independence policies of security forces, and a history of political violence, repression and manipulation (ibid). The resulting commission and omission implemented through a divisive political architecture and increasingly captured institutionalisation and systematization of corruption in Zimbabwean political and economic spheres has administration. Colonialism set a bad precedence of bureaucratic corruption when public office was been extensive. Against this backdrop, TI Zimbabwe recognized a need after the 2014 Annual State of attained through favour as a reward for one's loyalty to the settler state rather than on the basis of merit or Corruption Report (ASCR) to provide a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the social, political and qualication (Moyo, 2014). Gatsheni (2009 and 2011) and Tizor (2009) as cited in Moyo (2014) point to the economic costs of corruption in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 to 2015. Such a meta-narrative on the colonial legacy as having generated a culture of bureaucratic corruption, patronage, and clientelism that cumulative cost of corruption on key governance institutions remains missing in Zimbabwe, thereby was inherited by the post-colonial state and which allowed current levels of corruption to ourish after limiting the depth of anti-corruption dialogue. independence. During the colonial era, both patronage and bureaucratic corruption were manageable because they were directed at serving a small privileged population of white Zimbabweans. Post- An analysis such as that proposed here is important, particularly at a time when corruption has become independence patronage and bureaucratic corruption served a larger population and extended its such a topical public policy concern epitomised by citizen-led social movements like the #ThisFlag and tentacles far and wide assisted by the traditional extended family co-dependency that is prevalent in #Tajamuka Campaign. These and other campaigns are a sign of citizens rising up against corruption, African societies, thereby unleashing unprecedented levels of corruption. misrule, bad governance, poverty, and injustice. At the same time, traditional civil society groups have continued to work with willing and accessible government departments on interventions that support Whether when the nation tears at the seam it will result in a reformed society that is able to produce a the ght against corruption; e.g. drafting the new Public Sector Corporate Governance Bill, moving the generation with a culture that is repulsed and not celebratory of corruption shall depend on the present Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the Office of the President generation's ability to accurately interpret today's corruption, and quantify the social, political, and and Cabinet, and the launch of the Against Corruption Together (ACT) Campaign by the Judicial Service economic damage it has caused, and then convince the next generation on the need for change. Commission. There is a growing convergence on the urgency of the need to tackle corruption, but divergent views persist on what solutions to apply. Zimbabwe at independence inherited underdeveloped institutions which provided a fertile platform for the escalation of corruption (Sibudubudu 2002 and Szeftel 2000a). Mandaza's analysis on corruption in Zimbabwe problematizes the post-colonial state, and its actors by arguing that:

4 The implied meaning is that everyone should derive beneﬁts from the position that he or she holds 5 Mutondoro (2015) Daily Lives and Corruption in Zimbabwe: Transparency International Zimbabwe National Corruption Barometer

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An Overview Continued...

Table 1. Corruption perception ranking for select SADC countries

Country Zimbabwe South Botswana Zambia Mozambique Africa 2000 CPI score 3.0 5.0 6.0 3.4 2.2 2001 CPI score 2.9 4.8 6.0 2.6 - 2002 CPI score 2.7 4.8 6.4 2.6 - 2003 CPI score 2.3 4.4 5.7 2.5 2.7 2004 CPI score 2.3 4.6 6.0 2.6 2.8 2005 CPI score 2.6 4.5 5.9 2.6 2.8 2006 CPI score 2.4 4.6 5.6 2.6 2.8 2007 CPI score 2.1 5.1 5.4 2.6 2.8 2008 CPI score 1.8 4.9 5.8 2.8 2.6 “...the long years of colonial domination and deprivation, not to mention imprisonment and the hard 2009 CPI score 2.2 4.7 5.6 3.0 2.5 days of the struggle, became almost the license- albeit for only a few among the many who might claim 2010 CPI score 2.2 4.7 5.6 3.0 2.5 such a license – to accumulate quickly; and the state ... appeared the most viable agency for such accumulation” (Mandaza 1986: 57).” 2011 CPI score 2.2 4.1 6.1 3.2 2.7 2012 CPI score 20 43 65 37 31 This analysis resonates with that of Bratton and Masunungure (2011) who argue that the state is the most 2013 CPI score 21 42 64 38 30 precious prize in Zimbabwe because its power can be used to generate opportunities for private gain. Since private sector employment opportunities are limited, the occupation of public oﬃce, therefore, 2014 CPI score 21 44 63 38 31 remains the most dependable means of accumulating wealth (ibid). Shana (2006) is of the view that from 2015 CPI score 21 44 63 38 31 1980 to 1987, the predominant forms of corruption were largely either opportunistic or driven by greed, but changed during the 1997 – 2001 period into network corruption which involves highly-connected politicians and elites plundering national resources because of their status and class. Shana (ibid) further The scores in the table above are indicative of the fact that corruption in the public sector is perceived to argues that corruption evolved into systemic or managed corruption from 2002 onwards. In view of these be high and on the increase. The 2014 National Corruption Barometer by TI Z and the Afro barometer analyses, corruption is presented as both a colonial legacy as well as an outcome of power dynamics in corroborated this, as a majority of citizens (68-74%) in Zimbabwe believed that corruption is on the the post-independence Zimbabwean political economy. increase, with bribery being the common form of corruption that citizens experience and relate to within their day to day lives when interacting with public institutions. As cited in Chene (2015), Zimbabwe also Currently Zimbabwe is ranked among some of the most corrupt countries in Southern Africa. (See table 1 performs well below the regional average in the 2015 Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, below for Zimbabwe's ranking on the TI Corruption Perception Index 6(CPI) in contrast to that of its especially in terms of freedom from corruption (21 out of 100), and is placed at the bottom of the regional neighbours).7 In 2000, Mozambique was ranked the most corrupt of the ve countries cited, but rankings. The country also performs extremely poorly in all six governance areas assessed by the 2013 Zimbabwe became the most corrupt after 2003 and has stayed there ever since. World Bank worldwide governance indicators, scoring 2.87 (on a 0 to 100 scale) in terms of freedom from corruption; 2.37 in terms of rule of law; 2.39 in terms of regulatory quality; 12.92 in terms of government eﬀectiveness; 9.95 in terms of voice and accountability; and 24.17 in terms of political stability and absence of violence (ibid). Corruption in Zimbabwe is therefore interwoven into all facets of daily life (Chiweshe, 2015).

Corruption in Zimbabwe: forms, actors, power bases and interests The denition of corruption as abuse of power for private gain (TI, 2012) shows the centrality of power to corruption transactions. Corruption is therefore an outcome of power dynamics in the absence of eﬀective mechanisms and institutions for transparency and accountability, and taking place where there are goods and services valued by a polity. A deeper understanding of corruption in Zimbabwe should seek to correlate the dominant corruption typologies with the actors involved in order to understand their 6 The Corruption Perception Index tracks and measures perceived levels of public sector corruption in countries and territories around the world. The CPI score ranges from 0 to 100. The lower the score the higher the perceived levels of corruption in the public sector while the higher the score the less perceived levels of interests. corruption in the public sector. 7 Initially the CPI score ranged from 0 to 10 with 0 being a highly perceived level of corruption and 10 being a highly corruption-free or less corrupt level. The CPI scale changed from 0 to 10 to 0 to 100 starting in 2012 to date. In this new scale the lower the score is indicative of higher levels of corruption while the higher the score the more clean or corruption-free the country is perceived to be.

8 2015 Annual State of Corruption 2015 Annual State of Corruption 9 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

An Overview Continued...

Table 1. Corruption perception ranking for select SADC countries

Zimbabwe has both grand and petty levels of corruption which operate in a mutually re-enforcing way, 8 making it hard to nd a prognosis of one without dealing with the other. Grand corruption consists of acts committed at a high level of government that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, An Overview enabling leaders to benet at the expense of the public good9. Grand corruption involving the political elites is indicative of the decay in national politics and governance systems and sets a precedence for Continued... petty corruption involving low-level bureaucrats. Petty corruption refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens trying to access The Mujuru case is not the only one demonstrating how grand corruption in Zimbabwe is shaped by basic goods or services from hospitals, schools, police departments, and other agencies10. Grand corruption factional political ghts. Most recently, William Mutumanje otherwise known as Acie Lumumba who is a in Zimbabwe: Actors involved, their power base and interest former ZANU-PF youth activist and short-lived chairman of the steering committee for youth With grand corruption in Zimbabwe, the stakes are very high as the scandals involve millions of dollars empowerment strategy, was unceremoniously expelled from his ve-day appointment on allegations of lost and not recovered. Grand corruption in Zimbabwe has the following four distinct characteristics: misappropriating funds and conict of interest. The political system and political actors have, therefore, only paid lip service to the ght against corruption in this country, when in reality being the main (a) Perpetrators wield political power: the majority of perpetrators of grand corruption in Zimbabwe are perpetrators and drivers of corruption in society. This means that grand corruption is not considered a political actors with political backing and inuence. The dominant scandals that Zimbabwe has witnessed crime or corruption in the eyes of political actors. The independence of the judiciary has been since the 1980s show a trend of multiple perpetrators of corruption wielding political power. For instance, compromised by their engagement with politicians and their machinations, and thus failed to rein in the case of US$ 15 billion lost from Marange/Chiadzwa diamond mining suggests that the actors corruption by failing to secure convictions that are deterrent on the politically elite. implicated are often powerful politicians belonging mainly to the ruling ZANU PF party, although in some instances the actors are members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). In most By allowing impunity of the politically elite to persist, the justice system has been complicit the spawning cases, these perpetrators wield powerful positions both in government and in their political parties. of rampant corruption by creating an environment where those with money and power or access to MDC's complicity in high level corruption scandals was most apparent during its participation in power go unpunished. government. This indicates that corruption is also a crime of opportunity. d) Absence of political will: The term “political will to ght corruption” has gained currency in Zimbabwe (b) High impunity: In most of the grand corruption scandals cases, the alleged actors are rarely as in many other countries over the years as society grapples with nding the missing link between prosecuted. It is on record that the President pardoned some of the perpetrators of the Willowvale effective detection and punishment. Political will in the context of this discussion is dened as the scandals of 1988.11 The Anti-Corruption Commission together with the Judicial Service Commission has commitment of political actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives – in this instance, proved to be too weak to go after or investigate some of the high cases of grand corruption; largely reduced corruption – and to sustain the costs of those actions over time. It is worth noting that in because of lack of independence from directives coming from the Executive over who to convict, Zimbabwe, the dominant form of corruption is “political corruption,” involving political actors who abuse prosecute and convict. In 2013 for instance, the commissioners belonging to the Zimbabwe Anti- publicly-entrusted power. Political corruption is dened as the use of power by government officials for Corruption Commission who were investigating the National Indigenization and Economic Empowerment illegitimate private gain. An illegal act by an office holder constitutes political corruption if it is an act Board (NIEEB) scandal that the media popularized as the NIEEBgate scandal were blocked from entering directly related to their official duties, done under the auspices of the law or involving trading in inuence. the offices of NIEEB despite the fact that they had obtained a warrant of search.12 Later, the same ZACC 13 This form of corruption, therefore, requires political responses. In most narratives on corruption in officers were arrested on allegations of corruption in what seemed like a calculated move to prevent the Zimbabwe, the main recommendation to the problem of corruption is for authorities to exercise political investigation of the “NIEEBgate scandal” from proceeding. will to ght corruption. Thus, political will is a missing element given that most of the perpetrators of grand political corruption are the same individuals entrusted with upholding the rights, policies, and laws (c) Factional links: Grand corruption in Zimbabwe also needs to be understood from the context of which they violate for personal gain. Beyond political players those known perpetrators seem to have the factional and predatory politics. Due to factional ghting in Zimbabwe's ruling party ZANU-PF, a series of protection of political parties to avoid arrest or conviction. Grand corruption in Zimbabwe, therefore, scandals have been exposed by political players to discredit one another. These scandals and allegations thrives because it is located in the political culture of the country, and those wielding political power will have only surfaced as a result of political inghting. For instance, after the then Vice President of understandably not demonstrate any political willingness to curb it since their continued stay in power is Zimbabwe, Joice Mujuru, was booted out of ZANU-PF, it was alleged that during her tenure in office as a mutually dependent on the manifestation of this political corruption. Minister and Vice President she had been involved in a number of corruption scandals14. The Herald of 30 October 2014 reported that during her tenure as the Vice President and prior to being booted out of ZANU-PF, Joice Mujuru had received and signed for thousands of dollars in illegal cash payments from Petty Corruption: actors involved and their interest Kenyan and Indian nanciers who had invested in the Mujuru family-owned duty free shops at the The collapse and capture of public institutions: An analysis of bribery in Zimbabwe shows that International Airport in Harare15. Furthermore, Joice Mujuru reportedly received cash payments in violation corruption is not so much about the actors, but rather an indication of systemic institutional aws and of the Companies Act and income tax regulations, and was further accused of abusing her office and weaknesses. While bribery is committed by individual actors, it is more important to go beyond the political status to compel the lawyers of the aggrieved party to unethically renounce agency in addition to individualistic act and see the network of power relations endorsed by institutions from which such actors running the investors out of town soon after they had invested over $1 million in capital and made tens of derive their power bases. Bribery, therefore, mirrors the decay and disintegration of key public and private thousands of dollars in cash payment to the VP's daughter.16 During the time she was still in ZANU-PF, all institutions - ones with monopoly and control over key political, economic and social services that citizens these allegations were never exposed or reported and only came to light after she had been expelled and business require. Such services include education, justice, housing, regulation inter alia. from the party. These incidences have raised suspicion that the media in Zimbabwe is not journalistically investigating corruption, but is being fed stories by rival factions. Implications of this point to a need for further scrutiny, but not in this 2015 ASCR.

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Bribery is, therefore, a reection of how public institutions have been captured by the self-interest of their agents and citizens and business, more so when citizens are asked to rank the most corrupt institutions in Zimbabwe, citizens use bribery as the basis of assessing how corrupt such institutions are. In a recent An Overview Business Transactional Corruption survey by the Zimbabwe Chamber of Commerce for instance, small- Continued... scale and large- scale business operators in Zimbabwe indicated that the police, followed by the State Procurement Board, are deemed the most corrupt (81% and 64% respectively), followed by ZIMRA and the City Health Department (48% each), the Department of Works and Building Inspectorate, the Licensing The police are, for instance, perceived by citizens as the most corrupt entity in Zimbabwe mainly because of their chronic habit of soliciting bribes from motorists as well as the documented disappearance of Oﬃce at the Municipality, the National Social Security Authority (NSSA) and the Registrar of Companies. 17 Of the fourteen agency departments about which respondents were asked, the least often rated as critical dockets and evidence in their custody in corruption cases. The regular public outcry over police corruption is consistently been reported in the media, and conrmed by various studies including oﬃcial corrupt was the Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund (ZMDF). The Chart below which was extracted 18 from the 2014 National Corruption Barometer also shows some of the most cited institutions demanding Government reports. Perceptually and legally, the police have proved to be compromised by systemic and accepting bribes from citizens and business in Zimbabwe and political corruption. Corruption in the police as an institution therefore shows the extent to which such an institution is not only weak, but has also been captured by the self-interest of the bureaucrats.

(a) Bribery, costs of compliance and rational Interest of actors: Bribery in Zimbabwe reects that the costs of legal compliance are higher than the costs of bribing both in terms of monetary value, time and ease of obtaining a service. It is important to note that cost is not only in terms of the money that one has to pay, but also includes the time one has to wait to get a service that might be a permit, clearance, certicate or licence. Cost implications as calculated in terms of time and money determine whether an individual or entity will choose to bribe or not to bribe when weighed against a cost- benet analysis. Corruption is a factor when delaying tactics become either the push or pull factor forcing service seekers to voluntarily pay bribes or be forced to pay bribes in order to speed up delivery. The Afro Barometer (2016) indicates that 81.1% of Zimbabweans pay bribes to the police to avoid various problems.

From a perspective of rational choice, people would rather bribe in order to avoid losses, arrest for operating without a regulatory requirement, or to get a service on time. For instance, a poor vendor in Harare or similar urban setting would rather bribe municipal police to avoid arrest for selling tomatoes in a non-designated spot. The situation is not different from a cross border trader who would rather bribe Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) officers to smuggle their illegal second-hand clothes from Mozambique for resale than declare these and pay substantial import tax to ZIMRA or lose the products altogether. Jobless and educated youth would rather bribe a Vehicle Inspection Department (VID) officer to get a driver's licence than be deliberately failed for as many times as one refuses to bribe and remain without a license. This analysis shows that a bribe is an easier and cheaper cost-liability option required in Zimbabwe to sustain a livelihood or guarantee or obtain a service compared to the higher cost of complying. For the ordinary Zimbabwean, corruption has a totally different meaning from the way it is (Source: 2014 National Corruption Barometer) conceptualized by those with political power. Bribery and pay structure: This report seeks to show that bribery which is quite common in Zimbabwe The data from the Business Transactional Corruption and the TI Z National Corruption Barometer therefore also reects an anomaly or dysfunctionality of government in the pay structure of public servants where show that: the motivation of demanding bribes is often to supplement the infrequent, and low salaries. While there is no consensus between economic considerations and empirical evidence on whether an increase in Ÿ A number of public institutions have been captured by the individual and personal accumulation salaries would reduce petty level corruption in the form of bribes or not, it is still important to note that interests of bureaucrats colluding with citizens and business. petty-level corruption and bribery involving bureaucrats is quite peculiar in the Zimbabwean context. Ÿ These institutions are also in a weak state because they no longer have capacity for self-introspection, Civil servants in Zimbabwe who usually demand or accept bribes go for long periods without salaries, and regeneration, and reform. bribery, therefore, seems to be tacitly encouraged if not approved by the employer (the state). Ÿ Vertical accountability without corresponding horizontal accountability has also made public service institutions and regulatory bodies more opaque.

17 18

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At a meeting organized by the International Council of Jurists (ICJ) at Victoria Falls to discuss Traffic Police An Overview bribe-seeking and taking behaviour during the Government of National Unity, Deputy Minister of Home Continued... Affairs Mrs. Theresa Makoni openly stated that while government did not condone the bribe-seeking and taking of the police, they accommodated it because the Police Service had only received 7% of its requested annual budget. An additional factor that may predispose civil servants to corruption is the fact Key Findings that civil servant salaries are not subjected to cost-of-living adjustments as they used to be in the past. While on average most low-level civil servants earn about US$ 500 or below19 this amount is not enough to Corruption and the Political Landscape of Zimbabwe by Sachikonye cover crucial monthly expenses such as: This chapter on 'Corruption and the Political Landscape of Zimbabwe explores the political context and dimensions of the development process and their impact on overall patterns of corruption during the Ÿ rental which in Harare is on average $80.00 to $120 a month, period 2000 to 2015.The chapter notes that corruption has become deep-seated in Zimbabwe's body Ÿ family grocery $+-100, politic and economy. The process of its build-up was gradual from the 1980s into the 1990s becoming Ÿ transport $100 more pervasive between 2000 and the present. Moreover, the chapter paints a picture of corruption in Ÿ accounts and bills ( water bill, electricity) $100. Zimbabwe as the product of structural forces manifest in, rstly, the dependence of accumulation and Ÿ Medical cover, educational fees and other essential social safety nets such as funeral cover class formation on state power and public resources in the post-colonial development era. Sachikonye's Ÿ Meeting other individual and social obligations such as securing a permanent home and saving enough to analysis brings into context the dynamics between corruption and factional politics in Zimbabwe through provide nancial security for dependents in the form of insurance in case of death highlighting that political corruption has been a means for ensuring that the political reproduction of power among various political groupings and actors is entrenched. The chapter highlights how the This situation makes it very difficult for the majority of workers to put aside monthly savings (see Chapter patterns of patronage of the Zimbabwean state have been sustained through the state's stranglehold 2 by Chitambara which shows how the savings rate in Zimbabwe have continued to decrease since 2000). over resources such as land, mines, and means of regulating acquisition such as contracts, permits, Hypothetically, one can assume that the real income of most civil servants in Zimbabwe is not more than licences and concessions. In terms of recommendations, the author argues that the Zimbabwean political $80. Moreover, going for lengthy periods without being awarded these low salaries incentivises civil system can borrow anti-corruption reforms that have worked in other contexts and such reforms include: servants to solicit bribes from citizens using their positions as the vehicle by which to sell services that are already part of public good or interest. Furthermore, civil servants feel entitled to act with impunity in Ÿ Determination and commitment to ght the scourge of corruption from the government and looting the state because their superiors display the same impunity. Examples are numerous, including leadership; the impunity displayed by CEOs of state-owned enterprises who are documented as recipients of hefty Ÿ Strong anti-corruption strategies focusing on effective laws under the guardianship of an salaries for a bankrupt government.20 Such an environment becomes the motivation and justication for independent judiciary and strong enforcement, bureaucrats to engage in petty corruption. The dysfunctionality of the pay structure is, therefore, Ÿ Robust anti-corrupt institutions; compounded by grand political corruption perpetrated with impunity by those who should provide the Ÿ Reducing the incentives for corruption by providing good remuneration, bonuses and conducive yardstick for ethical and moral rectitude (political leaders and Senior Executives), but who, instead, are the working conditions to politicians and public servants and civil servants (UNECA, 2015:20). biggest drivers of corruption in the public services. Interestingly, Sachikonye's analysis concludes that recommendations on the ght against corruption, on Study Objectives their own, cannot lead to overcoming corruption in Zimbabwean society and economy. The only This analysis of social, political, and economic cost of corruption in Zimbabwe set out to attain the sustained long-term effect on political corruption and clientelism is likely to come from economic following objectives: development which is likely to result in a growing scal capacity of the state to respond to political demands in open and transparent ways. Development is also likely to lead to a moderation of the Ÿ Establish and understand the impact of corruption on politics, the economy, and social service demands coming from competing groups demanding redistribution so that economic viability is delivery. disrupted to a lesser extent over time by corruption. Ÿ Document the cumulative cost of corruption in Zimbabwe from 2000 – 2015. Ÿ Identify the drivers of corruption in Zimbabwe. The Economic Cost of corruption in Zimbabwe: Evidence and Lessons for Zimbabwe By Chitambara. Ÿ Provide empirical evidence as a basis for policy dialogue and discussion of the Anti-Corruption While measuring the actual costs of corruption is difficult owing to the varied nature of corruption, the Agenda in Zimbabwe paper gives detailed empirical evidence of the detrimental effect of corruption on the economy. The chapter notes that the endemic corruption in Zimbabwe has resulted in an increase in the cost of doing business. The high cost of doing business in Zimbabwe has seriously eroded the country's internal and external competitiveness. The country scores very badly on the major business competitiveness indices. The chapter also makes reference to the revenue loss from corruption through illicit nancial ows. For instance the chapter makes reference to the report known popularly as the Thabo Mbeki Report authored by ADB and the Global Financial Integrity on 'Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004- 2013'released in December 2014 that shows that Zimbabwe lost a cumulative US$2.8 billion over the period 2004-2013 through illicit nancial ows.

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The chapter also makes reference to data from the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (2014) Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-201523 and Fidelity Printers and Reners(2015) indicating that the country is losing more than $50 million worth of gold every month through smuggling and an estimated US$180 million worth of gold lost annually through smuggling into neighbouring countries.

The chapter also connects the economic cost of corruption in Zimbabwe to corporate governance. Chitambara comments that bad corporate governance contributed to a culture of insider loans that the nation has now inherited through the RBZ Debt Bill. He argues that poor corporate governance in the nancial sector has led to the collapse of a number of banks. Most bank failures occurred during the period 2003/4, when 10 banking institutions were placed under curatorship, 2 under liquidation, and one discount house was closed. For example, according to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) report on the failure of the Renaissance Merchant Bank in 2011, the collapse of the bank was the biggest pillaging scandal where the bank owners, working in cahoots with a pliant management, looted the bank to a shell. In addition, a total of six banks — AfriAsia Bank Zimbabwe, Intern, Trust Bank, Allied Bank, Capital Bank and Royal Bank — have closed operations since dollarisation in 2009 due to poor governance structures and bad loan books. The chapter concludes that higher levels of corruption in Zimbabwe have led to much lower FDI inows, less private domestic investment, the lowering of domestic savings, lower levels of institutional quality and lower levels of life expectancy. Other factors straining the positive development of Zimbabwe are the large amounts of illicit nancial ows and poor corporate governance in the nancial sector, which have led to a collapse of a number of banks.

Understanding Corruption in Social Service Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case studies from Local Government sector by Bhatasara

In her contribution, Bhatasara establishes the dimensions and dynamics of corruption in social service delivery in the local government sector and examines the social impacts of corruption. Drawing from the Faucaultian conceptualization of power, Bhatasara argues that the problem of corruption in the delivery of and access to social services is about power. Her case studies show that power is used by government officials as a strategy for accumulation. Closely tied to this, she stresses that general citizens also play their role to fuel corruption, as they are neither passive recipients of social services nor are they powerless. Citizens exercise their power by making claims to relationships or people that can inuence decisions in their favour. The study analyses the various spaces in which corruption comes into play, the different types of social actors involved and the strategies deployed to deliver and access social services in a corrupt manner. Bhatasara's case studies show that there are no checks and balances that limit power and undue Evidence on the inuence. Instead of preventing corruption, current legislative, policy and institutional frameworks promote corruption. She identies the decline in resources for the public services and administration, Economic Costs complex procedures, malfunctioning institutions and policies as well as self- enrichment as priority by officials as major drivers of corruption. Further, the chapter looks at the social impact and how corruption is socially reproduced. By giving examples from the effects of corruption in different social service delivery of Corruption sectors (e.g. health and education), the devastating effect of corruption becomes clear. First, it undermines the credibility of democratic institutions and counteracts good governance. Second, people pay bribes to council officials to get the services to which they have a democratic right to access and enjoy. However, in Zimbabwe only those who can afford to pay the bribes are able to receive the services. Hence, it is usually the poor who suffer the most- in particular women and children. In this way corruption aggravates inequality and injustice. Bhatasara concludes by stating that corruption reproduces itself across generations. The more corruption develops, the more it becomes engrained in social habits and the easier it is to be passed on from one generation to the next. In a certain sense, the reproduction of corruption in society produces a kind of 'corruption culture' with a tendency to permanence.

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Understanding Corruption in Social Service Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case studies from Local Government sector by Bhatasara

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the Economic Costs of Corruption in Zimbabwe Evidence on Prosper Chitambara Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in 07 Continued...

Introduction Empirical Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption Corruption is generally understood as everything from the paying of bribes to civil servants and the simple theft of public purses, to a wide range of dubious economic and political practices in which There is a growing consensus in both empirical and theoretical literature that corruption has a negative businesspeople, politicians and bureaucrats enrich themselves (Amundsen, 2000). Corruption manifests effect on growth and development in developing countries (Tanzi 2002; Svensson 2005; Gyimah- itself in a number of forms: bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion (Andvig et al. 2000), illicit payments, Brempong 2002). This nding is particularly relevant for developing countries in general and African money laundering, smuggling, evasion, the sale of public property by government officials, kickbacks in countries in particular for a number of reasons. Firstly, governance standards are generally lower in public procurement, and misuse of government funds (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). Corruption is the developing than in industrialised countries and worse in African countries (Ndikumana, 2007). Secondly, outcome of weak institutions. Sub-Saharan Africa performs poorly in terms of growth, relative to other regions (UNECA, 2008). These reasons suggest that bad governance combined with corruption may be one explanation of poor There is a growing consensus among scholars and policymakers that corruption has an adverse effect on economic performance in many African countries. economic performance. The high levels of corruption in African economies have been cited as one of the Wei (1999) reviewed empirical work and provided evidence on the relationship between corruption and factors accounting for the lack of development as they increase the cost of doing business and the level of growth, and found that countries with high levels of corruption tend to record poor economic uncertainty in an economy, lower competitiveness through the crowding-out of resources away from performance. The channels through which corruption negatively affects economic performance include production to rent-seeking (illegal accumulation of wealth) activities, discourage investment, divert reduced domestic investment, discouraged foreign direct investment, overspending in government, and government spending away from public goods such as education and health, reduce government distorted composition of government spending. Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) examined the effects of revenue from taxes, and entrench poverty (Mauro, 1998). corruption on investment, schooling, trade policy and political stability, and estimated the contribution of the various channels to the overall negative effects of corruption on growth. They concluded that the Corruption has also been found to affect the poor disproportionately as they are often deprived of effects of corruption on growth are both direct and indirect through negative impacts on investment, essential government services. The World Bank (2004) has estimated that globally, more than US$ 1 trillion schooling, trade openness, and political stability. Tackling corruption can, therefore, have a positive is paid in bribes each year and that countries that tackle corruption, improve governance and the rule of impact on FDI and domestic capital formation. law which helps to improve per capita incomes by 400 percent. Ndikumana (2007) nds that corruption slows down the growth of the income of the poor, reduces public expenditures that benet the poor, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) examined the impact of corruption on the quality of investments and found that causes congestion in social services and shifts resources away from labour-intensive sectors which corruption lowered the quality of infrastructure as measured by the condition of paved roads and power reduces the employment impact of growth. outages. Bray (2007) noted that corruption tends to increase the cost of doing business, alter the resource allocation process and potentially results in higher prices of goods and services. Woo (2010) found that Corruption also increases inefficiency in government expenditure as well as in investment projects as corruption deters foreign investment and suggested that countries should ght corruption not just for corrupt officials choose investment projects not on the basis of their usefulness to the economy, but on political reasons, but to also facilitate economic growth. Avnimelech and Zelekha (2011) found strong the opportunity for bribes and kickbacks the projects present (Hope, 2000). Corruption may also have a supportive evidence that corruption has a signicant negative impact on entrepreneurship, and thus, by negative effect on economic growth due to its adverse effects on the enforcement of property rights, implication, on economic growth. leading to obstacles to doing business, to innovation, and to technology transfer. Secure property and Studies by scholars such as Mauro (1998) and Gupta et al., (2000) found that corruption negatively affects contract laws ensure lower costs for investors and allow the private sector to retain their prots, leading to the share of public spending on education and health, while increasing the share on military spending. sustainable economic growth (Mijiyawa, 2008). Corruption may also reduce tax efficiency by boosting the The net effect of all these mechanisms is to entail a sub-optimal performance of the public sector both on size of the informal business sector, as entrepreneurs try to avoid dealing with corrupt officials (Dreher the revenue and expenditure sides. This not only affects the overall efficiency of the economy directly, but and Herzfeld, 2005). may also impact on people's perception of government performance and their willingness to cooperate, making it more difficult for a government to assume its proper function in regulating the economy and The state of corruption in Zimbabwe has been described as systemic and endemic and is often cited as supplying public goods. one of the biggest obstacles to economic growth and development. This chapter analyses the economic costs of corruption in Zimbabwe from 2000 to 2015. However, measuring the full economic cost of Corruption is positively correlated with lower life expectancy and school enrolment, two variables which corruption is difficult owing to the variegated nature of corruption and the fact that most of it remains in addition to income per capita (Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005) are used in the construction of the Human unreported. Development Index (HDI). Apart from deepening poverty by reducing the rate of output growth, corruption tends to increase income inequality by lowering social spending (Gupta et al., 2002). Available evidence suggests that bribes extorted from the poor tend to be a larger percentage of their incomes due to the higher frequency with which they confront corrupt officials as well as the proportionately higher level of bribes charged (Recanatini, 2013). Matthew and Idowu (2013) found that political corruption adversely affects economic growth and increases poverty as well as unemployment.

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the Economic Costs of Corruption in Zimbabwe Evidence on Prosper Chitambara Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in 07 Continued...

Corruption diverts resources away from productive activities thereby harming economic efficiency. Murphy et al. (1991) demonstrate that corruption by government officials is likely to hurt innovative Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in activities more than everyday production. This is because corruption and illegal accumulation of wealth (rent-seeking) is likely to target the innovation sector, which is more vulnerable than already established Continued... producers. The latter group does not need as many 'government goods', as it has already bought them. Corruption in Zimbabwe manifests itself in many ways and sectors and also harms the economy. Some of Innovators, however, need government-supplied goods such as permits, licences, import quotas etc. Since these manifestations of corruption include bribery, embezzlement, fraud, and favouritism, exorbitant innovation drives economic growth, corruption hampers growth severely even if it leaves the established salaries for public officials, extortion, illicit payments, money laundering, smuggling, poor corporate producers untouched. This argument nds support in Rivera-Batiz (2001), who concludes that corruption governance and tax evasion. Poor corporate governance has become systemic in public enterprises, local undermines the protability of innovations, lowers the rate of return on capital and reduces the rate of authorities and the nancial sector. Audit reports by the Auditor General have continued to expose poor technological change. corporate governance, fraudulent activities, nancial irregularities and weaknesses in the internal control systems at most of the parastatals and government departments. The 2014 and 2015 reports of the State of Corruption in Zimbabwe Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) detailed the outing of procurement procedures by parastatals Zimbabwe is a signatory to a number of international conventions aimed at combating corruption and (resulting in the loss of millions of dollars), payment of board fees and management salaries that are not corruption-related offences. These include: the United Nations Convention against Corruption (ratied on approved and not reected on the payroll to avoid paying tax in contravention of the Income Tax Act. 8 March 2007); the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (ratied on 12 Parastatals have remained a major drain on Zimbabwe's scal resources and negatively affected the December 2007); the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic standard of living of citizens. Substances (acceded to on 20 July 1993); the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (ratied on 17 December 2006); and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) A substantial share of administrative corruption in Zimbabwe is practised by tax and customs officials, Protocol against Corruption (ratied on 8 October 2004). The country also has established an anti- resulting in lower tax and customs payments by rms who have to make unofficial payments to these tax corruption commission. In spite of these conventions and interventions, corruption in Zimbabwe has and customs officials. Such corruption represents a substantial indirect private transfer in many countries reached endemic levels and has been identied as a major obstacle to growth and development. from the budget to public officials. Table 2 is a comparative analysis of the prevalence and incidence of Table 1 below shows Zimbabwe's performance on major indicators of corruption perceptions. The corruption in Zimbabwe compared to two country groupings. Zimbabwe does better than both SSA and Corruption Perception Index (CPI) score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by all Countries in all the indicators except two indicators namely the percent of rms expected to give gifts business people and country analysts, and is ranged between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) for to get a construction permit and also the percent of rms expected to give gifts to get a water connection. the period up to 2011. As from 2012 the CPI score is on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean). This conrms the fact that corruption is a global phenomenon. Zimbabwe ranks as the most corrupt country in Southern African with Botswana ranking as Africa's least corrupt country according to the 2015 Corruption Perception Index. The country has, however, slightly Table 2: Comparative Analysis of Prevalence and Incidence of Corruption, 2011-12 improved from the 2014 ranking. Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys

Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 (Source: Transparency International and World Bank)

Year Corruption Corruption Perceptions Index Perceptions Index (CPI) Ranking – Transparency (CPI) – Transparency International International 2000 3 (out of 10) 65/90 2001 2.9 (out of 10) 65/91 2002 2.7 (out of 10) 71/102 2003 2.3 (out of 10) 106/133 2004 2.3 (out of 10) 114/145 2005 2.6 (out of 10) 107/158 2006 2.4 (out of 10) 130/163 2007 2.1 (out of 10) 150/179 2008 1.8 (out of 10) 166/180 2009 2.2 (out of 10) 146/180 2010 2.4 (out of 10) 134/178 2011 2.2 (out of 10) 154/182 2012 20 (out of 100) 163/174 2013 21 (out of 100) 157/175 2014 21 (out of 100) 156/174 2015 21 (out of 100) 150/168

20 2015 Annual State of Corruption Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 (Source: Transparency International and World Bank)

Drivers of Corruption in Zimbabwe Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Corruption in Zimbabwe is a function of economic, political, and cultural factors. A major driver of Continued... corruption in Zimbabwe is the widespread poverty and low incomes, especially the low level of public and private sector wages. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Ali and Isse (2003) argue that in a country where economic conditions are poor, there is a tendency for such a country to experience high levels of corrupt Poor and ineffective institutions are a major driver of corruption in Zimbabwe. Mauro (2002) and Rose- practices that further worsen economic growth rates. They also argue that a country with good Ackerman (2004) show that corruption is especially prevalent in countries that have a large public sector, macroeconomic performance stands to experience lower levels of corruption and develops more rapidly. poorer governance systems and inefficient institutions, such as is the case in Zimbabwe and other In a study of less developed countries, it was found that there is an inverse relationship between the level developing countries. Strong institutions are an important driver of growth. Conversely, inefficient of public sector wages and the incidence of corruption (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). Rose- institutions as measured by corruption, weak enforcement of contracts and a large bureaucracy, deter Ackerman (1999: 72) points out, 'if public sector pay is low, corruption is a survival strategy'. foreign investment (Wei, 2000). By reducing uncertainty, strong institutions reduce transaction costs, Table 3 shows the trend in real average earnings index for the period 2009 to 2014 (for the whole information costs and risks for private rms (Gwenhamo, 2009). Table 4 shows the performance of economy and the key sectors in the economy), including all costs related to employing workers beyond Zimbabwe on the major indicators of institutional quality. the wage in Zimbabwe. The average real earnings index for the whole economy) has markedly declined from 159 in 2010 to 95.7 in 2014. This means that the purchasing power of wages has diminished implying Table 4: Indicators of Institutional Quality that the workers' standard of living has gone down. This trend also conrms that real average earnings in Source: Freedom House, Fraser Institute and Mo Ibrahim Foundation Zimbabwe have been more downwardly exible than previously thought and have been surprisingly responsive to unemployment rates and the weakening economy in general. Year Freedom Fraser Ranking Mo Ibrahim Average Housing Institute Governance Score For Table 3: Real Average Earnings Index (2009-2014) Freedom Economic Score (out Africa Source: ZIMSTAT Rating Freedom of 100) (1=Best, Rating 7=Worst) (out of 10)

2000 N/A 4.6 119/123 36 46.5 2001 5.5 3.6 123/123 36.3 47.5 2002 6 3.5 123/123 36.6 47.8 2003 6 3.7 126/127 36.7 48.1 2004 6 3.2 130/130 36.3 48.4 2005 6.5 3.4 141/141 34.8 48.9 2006 6.5 3.4 141/141 34 49.4 2007 6.5 3 141/141 33.8 50 2008 6.5 4.1 139/141 31.5 50.4 2009 6.5 4.1 141/142 32.4 50.3 2010 6 4.35 142/144 33.6 50.4 2011 6 4.59 149/152 35.8 49.8 2012 6 4.92 149/152 36.8 50.1 2013 6 5.33 149/152 38.7 50 2014 5.5 40.4 50.1 2015 5.5

Another driver of corruption in Zimbabwe is the lack of accountable, effective and ethical leadership. Hope (2000) observes that the lack of exemplary ethical leadership exhibited by politicians and senior public officials fuels corruption in most African countries, primarily because personal and private interests take precedence over national interests (Hope, 2000). When top political leaders fail to lead by example, either because they engage in or condone acts of corruption to the benet of relatives, friends, political associates; employees in the public administration, they cannot be expected to behave differently (Tanzi, 2002).

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Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Other scholars argue that a society is corrupt, tribalistic, nepotic, extravagant and ridden with violence because its aristocrats and its leaders and rulers and the middle-class are corrupt, sectionalistic, violent Continued... and roguish. Once leadership destroys the cankerworm within itself, the rank and le of society will be frightened to indulge in questionable practices. Therefore, if we want to reform society, we must rst Poor and ineffective institutions are a major driver of corruption in Zimbabwe. Mauro (2002) and Rose- reform the calibre of the aristocracy (Kupedeh, 1995). Ackerman (2004) show that corruption is especially prevalent in countries that have a large public sector, poorer governance systems and inefficient institutions, such as is the case in Zimbabwe and other Lack of political will and an unstable policy environment have also rendered Zimbabwe's anti-corruption developing countries. Strong institutions are an important driver of growth. Conversely, inefficient strategy ineffective. Other causal factors that promote corruption in Zimbabwe include excessive institutions as measured by corruption, weak enforcement of contracts and a large bureaucracy, deter regulations governing the doing business regulations, bureaucracy and red tape, a regressive tax regime, foreign investment (Wei, 2000). By reducing uncertainty, strong institutions reduce transaction costs, and lack of transparency and accountability. Table 5 shows the shows the number of days and procedures information costs and risks for private rms (Gwenhamo, 2009). Table 4 shows the performance of required to start a business in Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa over the period 2004-2016. The Zimbabwe on the major indicators of institutional quality. country is currently undertaking doing business reforms and this process needs to be expedited. 6 Figure 1: Per Capita GDP and Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in Zimbabwe, 1998-2014 Table 5: Starting a Business Source: World Bank Doing Business Reports (various) 20 Zimbabwe Zambia South Africa Time Procedures Time Procedures Time Procedures

(days) (number) (days) (number) (days) (number) 15 2004 122 10 40 6 38 9 0

2005 96 10 35 6 38 9 1 2006 96 10 35 6 38 9 2007 96 10 35 6 35 9 5 2008 96 10 33 6 31 8 2009 96 10 18 6 22 6

2010 96 10 18 6 22 6 0 300 400 500 600 700 2011 90 9 18 6 22 6 Per Capita GDP

2012 90 9 18 6 19 5 CPI Fitted values 2013 90 9 17 6 19 5 2014 90 9 6.5 5 19 5 2015 90 9 6.5 5 14 13 2016 90 9 7.5 6 46 Figure 1 shows that there is a negative relationship between per income levels and corruption in Zimbabwe. Higher levels of corruption induce much lower per income levels and FDI inows. There is a Corruption and Economic Performance in Zimbabwe: Channels of Causation negative association between Private Domestic Investment (PDI) and corruption in Zimbabwe according to Figure 2. This implies that corruption seems is detrimental to private domestic investment in In this section we analyse the relationship between corruption and a number of indicators of economic Zimbabwe. performance in Zimbabwe. We use two measures of corruption, namely the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International, and the World Bank's Control of Corruption Index (Corruption). The other measures of economic performance are derived from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) database.

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(days) (number) (days) (number) (days) (number) 15 2004 122 10 40 6 38 9 0

2005 96 10 35 6 38 9 1 2006 96 10 35 6 38 9 2007 96 10 35 6 35 9 5 2008 96 10 33 6 31 8 2009 96 10 18 6 22 6

2010 96 10 18 6 22 6 0 300 400 500 600 700 2011 90 9 18 6 22 6 Per Capita GDP

Figure 2: Private Domestic Investment (PDI) and CPI in Zimbabwe, 1998-2014 Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Continued... 20

15 Figure 4 shows the relationship between economic freedom as measured by the Fraser Institute and corruption in Zimbabwe. Economic freedom is an indicator of institutional quality. Quite clearly, lower levels of institutional quality are associated with higher levels of corruption. 0 1 5

Figure 4: Economic Freedom and CPI in Zimbabwe, 1998-2014 Source: Data is from the World Development Indicators database, World Bank 0

-5 0 5 10 15 PDI

CPI Fitted values 20 15

Figure 3 shows that there is a negative relationship between savings and corruption in Zimbabwe. Thus,

the higher the level of corruption the lower the domestic savings. 0 1 Figure 3: Savings and CPI in Zimbabwe, 1998-2014 5 20 0

5 5.5 6 6.5 Freedom

15 CPI Fitted values 0 1 5 6.0 Costs of Corruption in Zimbabwe

0 It is generally accepted that corruption, regardless of its shape or form is inimical to long-term, sustainable -20 -10 0 10 20 development. However, measuring the economic cost of corruption is diﬃcult due to the hidden nature of Savings corruption unless corruption is brought into the public domain. High levels of corruption in Zimbabwe CPI Fitted values have resulted in an increase in the cost of doing business. The high cost of doing business in Zimbabwe has acted as a strong disincentive for local and foreign investment and seriously eroded the country's internal and external competitiveness, with the country scoring poorly on all the major business competitiveness indices - as shown in Table 6.

26 2015 Annual State of Corruption 2015 Annual State of Corruption 27 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

Figure 2: Private Domestic Investment (PDI) and CPI in Zimbabwe, 1998-2014 Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Continued... 20

Figure 4: Economic Freedom and CPI in Zimbabwe, 1998-2014 Source: Data is from the World Development Indicators database, World Bank 0

-5 0 5 10 15 PDI

CPI Fitted values 20 15

Figure 3 shows that there is a negative relationship between savings and corruption in Zimbabwe. Thus,

the higher the level of corruption the lower the domestic savings. 0 1 Figure 3: Savings and CPI in Zimbabwe, 1998-2014 5 20 0

5 5.5 6 6.5 Freedom

15 CPI Fitted values 0 1 5 6.0 Costs of Corruption in Zimbabwe

Table 6: Competitiveness and Ease of Doing Business Rankings Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Reports and World Bank Doing Continued... Business Reports

Year World Economic Forum (WEF) World Bank (WB) Ease of Corruption has also contributed to a signicant increase in the levels of informalisation and underground economic activities in the country. Moreover, corruption has discouraged production and provided strong Global Competitiveness Doing Business Rankings incentives for rent-seeking and conspicuous consumption. This has had the effect of undermining Rankings economic growth as well as the ability of government to mobilise resources domestically. As shown in 2008 129/131 154/183 Table 8 endemic and systemic corruption in Zimbabwe is associated with economic slowdown associated with weak per capita incomes, low FDI inows, dwindling public and domestic investments, and negative 2009 118/121 160/183 savings. 2010 132/134 156/183 2011 136/139 157/183 Table 8: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators 2012 132/142 170/183 Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 2013 132/144 172/185 Year GDP Per Inflation FDI Public Domestic Savings 2014 131/148 170/189 Growth Capita (% of Investment Investment (% of 2015 124/144 171/189 GDP GDP) (% of (% of GDP) 2016 125/140 155/189 GDP) GDP) 2000 -3.1 675.8 55.9 0.3 10.5 11.1 15.8 2001 1.4 679.9 76.7 0.1 10.0 10.1 12.3 Corruption in Zimbabwe has resulted in a marked increase in levels of scal decit and domestic indebtedness as central government has bailed out and taken over the debts of a number of parastatals 2002 -8.9 615.1 140.1 0.4 7.4 8.1 1.9 including the central bank through the Debt Assumption Act which saw the government assuming the 2003 -17.0 507.3 431.7 0.1 11.6 11.7 2.3 RBZ's US$1.4 billion debt. Consequently, according to the IMF (2016), total public domestic debt increased from US$1,124 million in 2013 to US$1,960 million in 2015 (See Table 7). As a percent of GDP, total public 2004 -5.8 474.3 282.4 0.1 -0.3 - -2.6 domestic debt rose from 8.3 per cent in 2013 to 13.8 per cent in 2015. Unfortunately, this has had the 2005 -5.7 443.2 302.1 1.7 -3.3 - -7.4 negative effect of crowding-out resources from the private sector. Debt repayment will also crowd resources away from social expenditures. There has been a reduction in government revenues as receipts 2006 -3.5 423.2 1096.7 0.7 -1.3 - -9.3 from the sale of minerals have not been properly accounted for through the treasury. Government has 2007 -3.7 402.5 24,411.0 1.1 1.5 3.8 -1.5 also been prejudiced of signicant revenues through the smuggling of commodities into the country. The 2008 -17.7 326.6 - 0.9 1.1 3.0 -21.5 ination of the cost of projects has resulted in an increase in the cost of services and a reduction in the quality of services rendered. 2009 6.0 340.4 -7.9 1.3 6.5 11.2 -9.3 2010 11.4 372.3 -3.1 1.8 4.0 17.2 -2.8 2011 11.9 408.4 -3.3 3.5 0.1 15.9 -14.3 2012 10.6 441.9 -3.9 3.2 1.7 14.2 -16.7 2013 4.5 451.4 -1.6 3.0 1.5 10.1 -16.9 2012 2013 2014 2015 2014 3.8 458.1 -0.3 4.0 1.3 9.8 -12.2 Total Public Domestic Debt 1,110 1,124 1,660 1,960 Total Public Domestic Debt (% of GDP) 8.9 8.3 11.7 13.8

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Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Continued...

Corruption in Zimbabwe has also worsened external imbalances by increasing the current account decit Several civil service audits have documented the existence of ghost workers. The civil service audit of through capital outows and other nancial leakages. A joint report by the African Development Bank February - April 2015 was to establish the number of legitimately-employed personnel; and to weed out (AfDB) and the Global Financial Report of May 2013 revealed that between 1980 and 2009, Zimbabwe 'ghost workers' from the civil service payroll. The audit recommended reforms to help government meet a cumulatively lost US$11.8 billion due to illicit resource transfers (illicit nancial outows). Illegal nancial target of reducing the wage bill from 80 percent to under 40 percent of revenue. The government could outows involve the transfer of money earned through corruption, tax evasion, criminal activities, and improve on its audit methods by using modern identication technologies which capture biometric data other illegal business activities. The report also found that during the thirty years covered by the study, to improve payroll administration and weed out 'ghost employees.' Africa cumulatively provided net resources to the world of up to US$1.4 trillion, far in excess of inows over the same period. The illicit haemorrhage of resources from Africa is about four times Sub-Saharan Fighting Corruption: Best Practices Africa's external debt and almost equivalent to Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP. The direct and indirect consequences of illicit nancial ows (i.e. reduced investment and revenues for health, education, South Korea has implemented a number of institutional reforms to check corruption and these include employment, income etc.) are major constraints to Africa's transformation. High corruption, coupled with mandated asset declaration for high-level officials, revision of the public service act, expanding the range the risk and uncertainty of the domestic economy, weakens the economic and social measures put in of public officials subject to asset registration and post-employment restrictions. Following a major place, thereby limiting the prospect for more inclusive growth. The incentives for illicit nancial campaign by civil society a Freedom of Information Act was promulgated in 1998 and a comprehensive transactions are closely related to the high rates of savings and investments, particularly the private Anti-Corruption Act was passed in 2002. The Anti-Corruption Act introduced a national-level Anti- sector. Even the estimates of illicit nancial ows – large as they are – are likely to understate the problem corruption agency and a President's Special Committee on Anti-Corruption developed a new system to as they do not capture money lost through drug trafficking and smuggling. assess and monitor corruption. A code of conduct for public officials was enacted in 2003. The open system - introduced in 1999 – allows the public administration to provide services to citizens online, to Boyce and Ndikumana (2012) found that capital ight in Zimbabwe reached an annual record high of reduce interference. The Government introduced the e-government system that also includes a nation- US$3.1 billion in 2006. A report by Global Financial Integrity on 'Illicit Financial Flows from Developing wide Government Procurement System, which allows public institutions to submit offers for bids or Countries: 2004-2013'released in December 2015 revealed that Zimbabwe lost a cumulative US$2.8 billion contracts and to obtain information on companies that want to bid. This online system also allows the over the period 2004-2013 through illicit nancial ows. Furthermore, according to the Minerals public to track civil applications and obtain data. In addition, these comprehensive anti-corruption efforts Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (2014), the country is losing more than $50 million worth of gold have been accompanied with extensive investigation and punishment of any corrupt elite (World Bank, every month through smuggling. In October 2015 Fidelity Printers and Reners (FPR) reported that the 2013). country was losing an estimated US$180 million worth of gold annually through smuggling into neighbouring countries. A report titled 'Reap What You Sow: Greed and Corruption in Zimbabwe Marange Anti-corruption efforts in Rwanda have focused on strengthening the legal and institutional framework, Diamond Fields', produced in November 2012 by the Toronto-based pressure group Partnership Africa improving government effectiveness, building a strong and competent public service, reforming public Canada highlighted that diamonds worth US$2 billion had been looted since 2008. Speaking in a belated nance management systems, and prosecuting corrupt officials at all levels of the public sector. A number interview to mark his 92nd birthday celebrations on the state-run Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation of anti-corruption measures were introduced between 1997 and 2004. The government has adopted a (ZBC) on 3 March 2016 President Mugabe stated that Treasury received less than US$2 billion in diamond code of conduct and rules of disclosure for public officials, and assets declaration requirements for revenues despite earning over US$15 billion. politicians were integrated into the 2003 Constitution. Strong oversight institutions have also been created – e.g. the Auditor General Office in 1999 and an effective Ombudsman Office in 2004 which Poor corporate governance in the nancial sector has led to a collapse of a number of banks, most of operates as an Anti-corruption agency, but without prosecution powers. The country has also embarked them having failed during the period 2003/4 when 10 of them were placed under curatorship, 2 were on judicial reforms to promote more independent and competent courts, including inspection placed under liquidation, and one discount house was closed resulting in a loss of jobs. In addition, a total mechanisms and disciplinary sanctions to ght internal corruption. The government has adopted a zero of six banks — AfrAsia Bank Zimbabwe, Intern, Trust Bank, Allied Bank, Capital Bank and Royal Bank — tolerance policy at all levels of the public sector. In 2004 for example, all 503 members of the Rwandan have closed operations since dollarization in 2009 due mainly to poor corporate governance. Depositors judiciary were dismissed, allegedly for corruption and incompetence related matters. In 2007, 62 police are currently struggling to recover funds amounting to more than US$115 million after the collapse of officers were dismissed for soliciting bribes (AfDB, 2008). The Rwandese government has since 1997 Trust Banking Corporation, Genesis Investment Bank, Royal Bank, Intern, Capital Bank and Allied Bank. introduced public sector reforms that included rapid downsizing of the civil service by dismissing 6,000 Intern, whose banking licence was cancelled in 2012, owes depositors more than US$60 million. Trust, inadequately qualied employees, and removal of 6,500 ghost workers. Rwanda has streamlined shut down in 2013, owes depositors US$2.5 million while Genesis, whose licence was revoked in 2012, administrative procedures, reduced bureaucratic controls and registration requirements in order to reduce owes more than US$1.4 million to depositors. both red tape and opportunities for petty bribery. As a result, Rwanda has one of the most effective bureaucracies and civil services in the region (Transparency International, 2008). Deposits trapped in Royal Bank total more than US$11.4 million. As a result of this there has been a loss of condence in the nancial sector which has affected the capacity of banks to mobilise long-term deposits. Botswana introduced the Directorate on Economic Crime and Corruption in 1994 to ght corruption. The Directorate adopted a three-pronged approach that entails investigation, prevention and education, in the effective execution of its mandate. While the Directorate has no powers to prosecute, it has achieved an 83 percent conviction rate for all investigated cases that it forwarded to the Attorney General for prosecution. The Directorate's success is attributed to a number of factors, including political support,

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Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Continued...

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria which was established in 2003 is another There is a need to expand and strengthen the national institutional framework for broad-based moderate success story. The Commission combines both investigative and prosecutorial powers. The stakeholder participation in decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This would Commission has succeeded in investigating, prosecuting and getting high prole individuals (including help improve transparency, accountability, ensure ownership of policies and encourage social cohesion. state governors) convicted of corruption and other economic crimes. A number of convicts have also had Inclusive institutions also level the playing eld and provide all citizens with opportunities to participate their illicitly acquired wealth conscated by the state and blacklisted from running for public office. in and shape public policy (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). A national framework for social dialogue that Anti-corruption reforms in Liberia have included ensuring the independence of the General Auditing is inclusive along the lines of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) in South Commission, establishing the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission, reforming nancial management Africa, or Economic and Social Councils implemented in other countries, should be created with through a Public Finance Management Act, promoting transparent budget processes, and assuring participation broadened to cover all key stakeholders, including youths and communities. Liberia's compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (TLC Africa, 2010). Steps were also taken to strengthen the Public Procurement Commission, improve the governance of state-owned enterprises, and address capacity challenges in the public sector (IMF, 2010). New Zealand, which is Biometric Payroll Registration of Public Sector Workers and Pensioners consistently one of the top performers in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, is a pioneer in creating transparent budget processes, having approved in 1994 the Fiscal Responsibility Act In 2015, the Zimbabwe Civil Service Commission successfully completed a physical head count of all civil and providing a legal framework for transparent management of public resources. servants as part of the staff audit. The process is, however, open to human manipulation and fraud. Accordingly, Government might not deal effectively with the problem of ghost workers or be able to Recommendations and Way Forward remove them from the payroll. The use of modern identication technologies like biometrics could be more effective in cleaning up the payroll and improving its administration. Government should Successfully dealing with corruption involves eliminating the opportunity for corruption by changing undertake a biometric payroll registration of all public sector workers and pensioners, as has been incentives, removing loopholes and getting rid of rules and regulations that encourage corrupt behaviour. successfully implemented in a number of African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya to effect An approach that focuses on changing the rules and the incentives, accompanied by appropriately harsh salary payments. This system captures for each public sector employee details of national identity, penalties for delinquent behaviour is likely to be far more effective if it is also supported by efforts to complete biometric data, academic and professional certicates, letters of appointment, and current improve the moral and ethical behaviour of citizens. payslip. The system helps to identify genuine public sector workers and pensioners and ush out ghost ones from the payroll. Harmonization and simplication of the regulatory framework Mainstreaming integrity and establishing Code of Ethics for Public Servants The government should expedite the simplication and streamlining of the doing business environment (including the tax administration process), and provide policy clarity, consistency and certainty with Integrity is a vital ingredient to the effective working of any public institution. There is a strong positive regard to economic policies. To combat the widespread corruption within the tax and customs service, the relationship between people's perception of government corruption and their trust in political number of taxes and tariffs should be reduced and simplied. The government should consider adopting institutions. The government should prioritise strengthening the integrity, openness and credibility of a progressive income tax regime with a uniform tax rate. both government institutions and policy-making processes. This requires institutionalised mechanisms for Government should embrace e-governance to make service provision and governance more efficient and disclosure, monitoring and enforcement, as well as for complaint resolution. Maintaining the public's trust effective. This can help ght corruption by raising accountability through digital footprints, raise in government also entails ensuring that the integrity of government decisions is not compromised by transparency by publicizing regulations and fees, and reduce face-face interaction where most requests conicts of interest. Measures such as the disclosure of private interest, transparency over political party for bribes take place. To speed up company registration, the government should also adopt an online nancing and lobbying, minimising inuence on nominations of public officials can help to avoid conicts company registration system. of interest and enable a more equal distribution of political power across society (OECD, 2015).

Strengthening the quality of institutions A code of ethics to guide public servants and the holders of other positions of responsibility in society is one major factor responsible for putting a check on corrupt practices. Government should craft and Corruption ourishes where national institutions and guarantees of basic economic rights are weak enforce a code of conduct to govern the behaviour of its employees. To promote ethics in the civil service, (Knack and Keefer, 1995). Institutional reforms are thus indispensable ingredients in any sustainable clear rules governing conicts of interest, expected behaviour, and obligatory disclosure of assets should anticorruption strategy. The reforms should be designed to enhance accountability and transparency in be enacted and enforced through the code (Shihata, 1999). All public servants, including the President, state operations and in major economic institutions. These measures facilitate the creation of more Vice Presidents, Ministers, ordinary Members of Parliament and other high ranking civil servants should do transparent procedures; the strengthening of internal and external accountability systems; improvement annual declarations of their wealth. This should also apply to spouses and any dependent children of in recruitment, compensation and training for public and private sector officials; and the creation of these officials to circumvent attempts to hide stolen assets by registering them under a spouse or a child's channels of appeal for clients (Johnston, 1998). name. High level public officials should declare their incomes; assets, investments and any nancial obligations on an annual basis. Failure to comply with such requirements should lead to disciplinary action and possible prosecution. In addition, those who give misleading information about their wealth should also be liable for conviction and/or ne.

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Evidence on the Economic Costs of Corruption in Continued...

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42 Corruption and the Political Landscape in Zimbabwe

Endorsement and implementation of EITI

To promote resource transparency, the country should adopt and implement the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). To address the issue of tax evasion, the country should enter into Automatic Exchange of Tax Information (AEI) with destination countries where the proceeds of tax evasion are deposited.

Public Enterprise and Parastatals' Reforms

Public enterprises and parastatals, especially those responsible for enablers like infrastructure, energy and food security play an important role in the economy. Their state of dysfunction cripples economic recovery and growth, and hence their rehabilitation and resuscitation is a critical pillar in Zimbabwe's economic development. The worsening governance and performance of PEs, in particular those entities that have failed to pay salaries to their workers, and where executives pay themselves excessive salaries out of line with the performance of their entities should be addressed. An inclusive process that involves labour unions in the restructuring of public enterprise would ensure that the restructuring process is broadly owned, and is undertaken in a socially-sensitive manner. By taking a leaf from South Africa, the Government and public enterprise and parastatal unions could develop and adopt a National Framework Agreement (NFA) on the Restructuring of Parastatals and Public Enterprises to make the restructuring process sustainable. Past annual national budgets have targeted key public enterprises and parastatals for reforms, yet progress remains very slow. Government needs the political will and courage to see these reforms undertaken within the spirit of consultations given the policy trade-oﬀs necessary for successful Corruption and execution.

Strengthen regulation and supervision of the banking sector the Political

Banking sector regulation and supervision needs to be improved so as to deal with issues of indiscipline. Landscape in The new banking act which came into eﬀect in May 2016 is a step in the right direction. In addition the central bank must increase the frequency and depth of its on-site supervisory inspections or examinations. On-site and risk-based examination of banks must be timely, intrusive, proactive and Zimbabwe forward-looking implying that on-site examiners must conduct in-depth, on-site examination and reviews of bank records and documentation. In addition the examination should not overemphasise banks' historic nancial results and conditions in assessing risks. On-site reviews should form the basis for comprehensive and direct interactions with banking oﬃcers and directors to understand strategies, transactions and the bank's risk prole. These discussions will also provide insights on the capacity of the banking executives in managing risks (Zamorski and Lee, 2015).

Enacting the national code on corporate governance framework

A corporate governance framework governing companies, parastatals and local authorities must be enacted. The National Code on Corporate Governance of Zimbabwe (NCCG) was launched in April 2015 providing a corporate governance framework for governing companies, parastatals and non- governmental organisations. The code needs to be enacted into a law along the lines of the King Code, Cadbury Code or Sarbanes Oxley Act to make it more binding. Finally while government must take the lead in the ght against corruption it is, however, a collective responsibility.

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42 Corruption and the Political Landscape in Zimbabwe

Endorsement and implementation of EITI

Public Enterprise and Parastatals' Reforms

Strengthen regulation and supervision of the banking sector the Political

Enacting the national code on corporate governance framework

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and the political landscape in Zimbabwe. Corruption Lloyd Sachikonye Corruption and the political landscape in 08 Continued...

Abstract An ambitious attempt at analysis of corruption distinguishes between 'petty' corruption and 'systemic' This chapter explores the political context and dimensions of the development process, and their impact corruption (Ross-Ackerman, 1999). While it may be prevalent in scope, the value of bribery, extortions and on overall patterns of corruption during the period 2000 to 2015. Without an insightful understanding of theft in petty corruption are relatively small. On the other hand, systemic corruption involves a larger the wider political landscape, it is more diﬃcult to explain the dynamics of various forms of corruption in number of public sector or private sector oﬃcials, and an element of organization and conspiracy (ibid.). It contemporary Zimbabwe. The chapter assesses how corruption is linked to accumulation, predatory is corruption at higher levels of bureaucracy involving senior decision-makers and large volumes of tendencies and governance processes, and to the reproduction of economic and political power. Finally, it resources such as in large public procurements by government departments and private sector rms, recommends possible measures that could be taken to address corruption. state-owned enterprises, and aid programmes (Ibid.).

Introduction Systemic corruption occurs when corruption becomes a system of government (Ross-Ackerman, 1999). Its Corruption is a scourge on society, the economy and politics. It is debilitating and retarding. In Zimbabwe, extreme version is kleptocracy or government by theft. Further, a distinction may be made between its prevalence and scale have grown over thirty years but especially since the late 1990s with the onset of kleptocracies where corruption is organized at the apex of Government, and states where corruption is a major economic crisis. Despite widespread reportage and publicity, the level of corruption has the province of a large number of middle and low-level officials. increased, and not diminished. In its many forms, corruption has become ingrained in the social, economic and national fabric (see endnote 1). Often described as a cancer, it has spread through the country's body Political corruption is a variant of systemic corruption. Germane for our present purposes, this type of politic and economy. Although its various tentacles of 'grand', 'systemic' or 'petty' corruption are widely corruption takes place at the highest level of the political system when politicians and state officials use known and documented, there has so far been little evident will and momentum to root it out. their authority to accumulate wealth and sustain their power (Chimbganda, 2013). This form of corruption manifests itself in electoral fraud as well as a tendency by the incumbent party to exploit state resources in In this contribution, an attempt is made to explore the political context and dimensions of the electoral processes. Political corruption can assume the form of patronage that dispenses political and development process as well as their impact on the overall patterns of corruption during the period 2000 material resources to members of a particular party to the exclusion of those of other parties and groups. to 2015. Without an adequate understanding of the wider political landscape, it becomes more difficult to Nepotism and cronyism are manifestations of political corruption. explain the dynamics and push factors of the various forms of corruption in contemporary Zimbabwe. This chapter addresses several key questions as follows: Corruption and Accumulation The processes of development and governance in developing countries often entail a certain amount of Ÿ How is corruption linked to accumulation and governance? political corruption. The drivers of this corruption derive from the imperatives of political stabilization in a Ÿ How has corruption evolved and affected politics and development in the period 2000 to 2015? context of underdevelopment (Khan, 2006:14). Political stabilization in any country entails redistribution Ÿ What links corruption, predation and reproduction of political and economic power, and of incomes. In advanced industrialized countries, the process through which this redistribution is achieved Ÿ What can be done about corruption in a developing society like Zimbabwe? has characteristics that are different from those of a typical developing country. As Khan observes:

The chapter begins by setting out the analytical foundations for the assessments that try to answer these “two of these are signicant, and together, they help explain why political stabilization in advanced countries questions in subsequent sections. can typically be achieved through transparent mobilizations through the scal process. In contrast, political stabilization in developing countries typically involves oﬀ-budget transfers that usually involve political Analytical Framework corruption…” (Khan, 2006:14).

Dening corruption With large productive sectors, richer countries nd it easier to collect a signicant share of national How corruption is dened and how its relationship with governance and development is understood is income in taxes, enabling them to respond to political organizations demanding redistribution with a central to our analytical framework. To do this, we draw on literature developed in recent years. range of transparent and legal transfers and public service delivery. In contrast, in most developing countries, the national income is relatively small and hence, only a small amount of tax revenue can be Previous TIZ Annual State of Corruption Reports (ASCR) have explored the political economy of corruption made available for nancing redistribution. in terms of its foundations and manifestations. No social class or group has avoided some form of corruption in Zimbabwe or elsewhere globally. Some classes or groups engage in 'grand corruption' that Most developing countries have sought to achieve stability by selecting the most powerful or dangerous involves huge resources such as millions of dollars of public money or illicit transfers of proceeds from sale factional groups and transferring resources through patron-client networks to accommodate these of natural resources as candidly acknowledged by top African decision-makers (AU/ECA Conference of groups. The result is political corruption because most of the resources transferred through these Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2015). It is fashionable to distinguish between networks are oﬀ-budget resources often raised through corruption. In some cases, governing factions this 'grand corruption' by top political and state functionaries and 'petty corruption' by middle or low- engage in corruption or predation and use the proceeds to accommodate powerful clients (Khan, ranking echelons in both the public and private sectors to avoid conating the two types or 2006:16). In other cases, powerful clients may be allowed to raise resources for themselves through underestimating the larger scale of resources involved in the former. corruption with the state turning a blind eye on these resources.

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and the political landscape in Zimbabwe. Corruption Lloyd Sachikonye Corruption and the political landscape in 08 Continued...

Corruption and the political landscape in Continued...

The thrust of Khan's argument is that it is rare for accumulation to occur without some level of corruption The foregoing analytical discussion allows us to see the nexus between corruption and the development in a political and economic system and at least in its formative stages. However, as a country achieves process (through accumulation) on the one hand, and corruption and the political or governance process, more development, and its scal capacity increases, safeguards against corruption become stronger, as on the other. Far from being merely a matter of personal choice or predilection, corruption has a structural redistribution of resources becomes more transparent through the national budget. However, not all basis that feeds its systemic roots. As we observe in a later section of this chapter, without countries make a successful transition to a self-sustaining accumulation that leads to a reduction in levels acknowledgement of the historical and structural dimensions as well as the political manifestations, the of corruption. The level of development, cohesion in the ruling elite and development coalition, policy strategies aimed at addressing corruption are bound to fall short. This phenomenon is the subject of the coherence as well as quality of political leadership contribute to capacity for self-sustaining accumulation sections that follow as we explore how it applies to Zimbabwe.

Corruption and Governance Zimbabwe's Political Economy and Corruption, 2000 -2015 There is a nexus between corruption and governance – with corruption being linked to bad governance. Although Zimbabwe was relatively industrialized with a diversied economy at independence in 1980, While the pressure to reduce corruption and promote good governance is necessary and desirable, these and had comparatively better prospects for a development takeoff, during the late 1980s it fell into the ends cannot be achieved unless attention is also given to other governance capacities required for pattern of the African politics of clientelism. During the 1980s, the economy was relatively stable but sustaining growth (Khan, 2006). growth was slow. Perception of corruption levels was low until the Willowgate car scandal in 1988. Although Willowgate involved several cabinet ministers, its scale was perceived as being limited and According to one perspective, Africa operates mainly through informal and weak institutional structures relatively benign. This corruption scandal should have, nevertheless, been treated with utmost seriousness and processes that allow corruption to thrive. The decit in good governance in Africa reects weak to provide an example to deter future scandals (Interview with an ex-Cabinet Minister, January 2016). institutions, ineffective checks and balances, inadequate regulatory and legal frameworks and poor enforcement mechanisms (UNECA, 2015). A combination of these factors incites corruption. This is not to During the phase of economic structural adjustment between 1991 and 1996, the scale of corruption was ignore the cultural factor in explaining the prevalence of corruption. While gift-giving from an African also limited against a background of sluggish growth. However, the second half of the 1990s witnessed principle of social solidarity and loyalty is often interpreted as a corrupt practice in a Western setting, it is growing social and economic pressures and contractions. Corruption within the state became more done in African societies to maintain harmony or in response to services rendered (UNECA, 2016). serious when evidence emerged on the pillaging of the War Victims Compensation Fund when ministers Nevertheless, the cultural factor should not be overstretched to justify or condone corruption. and politicians, senior bureaucrats and military officials were named as beneciaries of the “looting” as it Furthermore, corruption occurs in a system in which the authority and practices of government officials popularly came to be known. The demand by war veterans in 1997 for compensation in the form of are not monitored (Carnegie, 2014). State legitimacy is adversely affected by corruption to the extent that gratuities directly led to a run on the state scus, and produced unprecedented devaluation of the it distorts development-planning as well as the implementation of policies. When scarce resources are Zimbabwe dollar in November 1997. diverted by corrupt elements, state capacity to provide basic services to its citizens is compromised. As the 1990s drew to a close, stagnant growth and rising social discord formed the background to the Low development levels tend to drive the politics of patronage in Africa. In a context of military intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. While the campaign proved a major underdevelopment, local accumulation rests heavily on political office and the ability it provides to drain on limited state resources, it also provided new opportunities for accumulation and corruption by appropriate public resources (Szeftel, 2000:429). Africa's development crisis has intensied the the ruling elite primarily, senior politicians, military officials and well-connected business leaders. dependence of the emergent national bourgeoisie and ruling class on the political domain, specically on the state, and increased conict as rival factions compete for a diminishing pool of resources. Arguably, far A concerted challenge from a rapidly growing opposition movement grouped in the Movement for from arresting the upward spiral of corruption, economic liberalization and attendant governance reforms Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999-2000 created panic within ZANU- PF. An electoral process riddled with have sometimes intensied it (ibid.). Thus corruption is the product of structural forces and often violence, and a land reform programme hastily implemented without requisite planning and expresses itself through political patronage or clientelism. Clientelism is dened as the exchange of goods coordination, created a political and economic crisis that also adversely affected Zimbabwe's international and services for political support, often involving an implicit or explicit quid pro quo. It has been a widely relations, especially with the West. This was the background to the upsurge of corruption rstly between employed mode of political mobilization in societies where peasant or migrant or otherwise excluded 2000 and 2008, and secondly during the period of the Government of National Unity (GNU) between 2009 communities are integrated into electoral political competition. At the same time, clientelism is and 2013. In particular, it should be noted that the period 2000 to 2008 witnessed the largest contraction characterized by widespread corruption as competing patron-client networks form factions that ght to of the economy by about 40 to 50 per cent, and the worst hyperination that the country had ever gain privileged access to public resources. According to this argument: experienced (over 2 million per cent). This period was also an era in which selective sanctions were placed on some government, military and business officials for propping the Mugabe government. “corruption is thus a symptom of intense factional competition, indeed, it could be argued that the more intense this competition becomes (as the result of economic crisis) the more endemic corruption is In the setting of a declining economy and rising unemployment, corruption thrived partly as a coping likely to become too. The nature of this malaise was built into the fabric of the post-colonial state at its very strategy. Petty corruption spread by leaps and bounds as state bureaucrats sought bribes for public inception” (ibid.). services like access to birth certicates, passports and a myriad of licenses and permits. As the government faltered in making regular and sustainable salaries to public servants, the latter increasingly relied on bribe payments as currency for survival. As one doctoral study covering this period observed:

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Corruption and the political landscape in Continued...

Box 1: Select Forms of Corruption, 2005 “given the low salaries public servants received in the period 2000 to 2009, corruption was used as way to subsidizing the state. If the public servants were not corrupt, perhaps the country could have collapsed totally 1. Payment of bribes to law enforcement agents by fugitives in order to have their economic and to a level worse than was experienced. In this light, corruption was perhaps a positive force that was created by other forms of crimes quashed; policy and economic failure, but prevented total economic collapse…” (Moyo, 2014:300). 2. Paymentof bribesb y traders– individualand corporate- to ZIMRA officialsf or underpayment of taxes and import duties, as well as under-invoicing of export shipments; It is rare to come across studies that provide justication for corruption but there may be some grain of 3. Misrepresentation of facts by some Ministers with the effect of misdirecting public opinion and realism in the conclusion that some element of corruption was necessary for the continued functioning of sentiment, which in turn created a false sense of security, particularly in the food and energy certain state structures at that time. At the same time, corruption in the land reform process reached sectors; worrisome levels by 2003 while the nancial crisis threatened to destabilize the economy (Utete, 2003; 4. Outright diversion of resources from purposes for which they were provided into own use. This Davies, 2004). included productive sector funds, foreign exchange, and other support in kind such as machinery and equipment, which was being diverted to kick-backs and bribes; No less an institution than the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) expressed anxiety and discomture about 5. Smuggling of precious minerals and basic commodities including sugar, grain, cooking oil, soap, the rapidly rising level of corruption in the early 2000s. In this section, we draw extensively from an and many others which are sold into regional economies on the strength of bribes being paid assessment of broad corruption trends as they spread through the economy and society. Box 1 provides a to inspectorate arms of Government to turn a blind eye to the leakages; list of the main forms of corruption in 2005 as diagnosed by the RBZ. It is scarcely surprising that the RBZ 6. Flouting of tender procedures and biased awarding of contracts even to costly suppliers and was seized with the debilitating spread of corruption: between 2003 and 2008, under the mercurial contractors on the back of patronage, kick-backs and bribes; leadership of Gideon Gono, it played an uncharacteristic interventionist role that overshadowed the 7. Patronizing and wasteful publicity and advertisement campaigns by parastatal and municipal Ministry of Finance. However, this did not prevent the RBZ from shady interventions that fanned sectors aimed at swaying government policy into condoning their under-performance; corruption itself. Some of those questionable interventions involved use of public resources including 8. Nepotism in keysector sand institutions where ef ficiencynor msw ere setaside f or considerations savings and earnings in politically oriented interventions and measures. They included the following other than productive efficiency and signicant funds without adequate targeting, management, accounting, and monitoring mechanisms: 9. Insider dealing, for instance on the Stock Exchange, as well as ‘interested party effects’ on formulation of key government policies such as the setting of producer prices. Ÿ the Productive Sector Finance Facility in 2003 (to assist rms in various sectors to boost production), Ÿ the Agricultural Sector Productivity Enhancement Facility (ASPEF) in 2005 to resuscitate the agricultural Source: RBZ, 2005: 10-12 sector, Ÿ the Parastatals and Local Authorities Reorientation Programme (PLARP) in 2005 to remove structural and During the period of the Government of National Unity (GNU) (2009-2013), policy changes provided relief supply rigidities, to the economy and citizens. Growth was dynamic during the period 2009 to 2011. There was currency Ÿ the Troubled Bank Fund in 2003 to assist distressed and solvent banking institutions with temporary stabilization with the institution of a multi-currency regime in place of the Zimbabwe dollar. liquidity support and Hyperination disappeared. However, stabilization did not necessarily mean a reduction in corruption. Ÿ the Basic Commodities Supply-Side Intervention Facility (BACOSSI) in 2007 to assist producers and suppliers Both systemic and petty corruption persisted, and even deepened in certain instances. in specic sectors to have access to concessional production-linked nancial support for working capital requirements (Gono, 2008). Several distinctive features were prominent in the corruption forms and scale during the GNU phase. The rst related to the growing prominence of natural resources mainly diamonds and gold as well as land As we can observe from the extensive range of interventions, not only the public sector but the private including wildlife conservancies in corruption patterns. The ruling elite and business and small operators sector was drawn into at web that was not immunized against corruption. No sooner had these various were drawn into diamond mining following the discovery of deposits in eastern Zimbabwe at Marange in programmes and funds been established by the RBZ than loopholes were exploited for self –enrichment 2006. As the TIZ ASCR report of 2012, explains in some detail, the scramble for diamonds, and that for and aggrandizement by politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen and citizens. gold in other regions of the country, entailed a web of corruption in which state companies, foreign rms and the military were involved (TIZ, 2012). There was little transparency in the awarding of contracts to Box 2 provides a summary of instances of corruption in various sectors ranging from agriculture to develop the mines and in the marketing of the minerals. manufacturing, and from mining to parastatals. It demonstrates again how both the private and public sectors were drawn into collusive corruption whose impact on the economy had dire consequences and came to a head between 2006 and 2008. The backlash against ZANU-PF in the March 2008 elections was a clear message to the ruling elite that the economic conditions were unsustainable, and that pervasive corruption was excessive and unpalatable.

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Corruption and the political landscape in Continued...

Corruption and the political landscape in Box 2: Forms of Corruption and Sector-Speciﬁc Corrective Mechanisms, 2005 Continued...

Sector Issues Agriculture • Abuse of concessionary funds Finally, a sector that became prominent in corruption was the parastatals where salaries and allowances • Under-invoicing of agricultural exports for executives reached staggering levels. Drawing on USD-denominated salaries and allowances pegged on earlier unrealistic Z$ denominated salaries regardless of the performance of a parastatal, the executives • Non-payment of loans were amongst the highest earners in the economy, as shown by the ASCR report of 2015 (TIZ, 2015). Not • Un-productive and speculative use of land only was the gap between these high executive salaries and those of the general staff huge, but most Mining • Smuggling of minerals outside the country parastatals were in decit and often unable to pay their workers regularly. Local urban and district • Parallel market trade in metals and other minerals authorities were riddled with similar challenges of corruption and mismanagement. Parastatals and town councils were the metaphorical cash cows of this era. Manufacturing • upply of products to the black market at the expense of the formal market Two developments that were consequences of institutional decisions during this period may be recalled. • Under-invoicing of exports The widespread interventions of the RBZ listed above had far-reaching effects on the economy. Its quasi- Tourism • Hoteliers and booking agents externalizing foreign scal interventions resulted in a bill of about USD 1.2 billion, which was beyond the resources available to the Bank in 2014. A law was subsequently passed in Parliament in 2015 for Government (or rather tax currency payers) to pay this amount whose beneciaries included elites who had beneted from the subsidies and • Smuggling of trophies and wild life outside the country equipment distributed by the RBZ. A second development was the recruitment of up to 15 000 officers Public sector and Parastatals • Subverting the national interest for personal gain through onto the civil service payroll to carry out the programmes of the incumbent party ZANU-PF. The dispute bribery over the auditing of the civil service staffing during the GNU era revolved around these party-aligned staff that drew from the public purse. In sum, the economic costs of political corruption were quite signicant, Energy Sector • Abuse of fuel intended for farmers as these two developments, amongst others, show. • Fuel importers holding on to product to influence price • Bogus fuel traders externalizing foreign currency Politics of Predation and Accumulation The wide publicity given to corruption scandals in the media is often accompanied by a supercial assessment of the patterns of predation and accumulation of the past fteen years (see endnote 2). Source: RBZ, 2005:61-64 Although individual faces illustrate specic cases of corruption, the class and party dimensions of graft are not provided in the popular media discussion. Beneciaries and participants in corruption have some The consequence of opaque deals in the diamond market was that the Ministry of Finance did not receive anchorage in class and party, in ethnic group and region. the expected amount of revenues from the companies during the period 2009 to 2013. A report alleged that some of the revenues were diverted to other branches of the state for the nancing of the 2013 One insightful attempt assessed the predatory aspects of politics during the period under review. It election campaign of ZANU PF (Global Witness, 2012). Instead of anticipated tax revenues of up to USD argued that while developmental coalitions seek to deliver public goods, to exercise state power with 600 million annually, less than USD 100 million were remitted creating a large hole in the national budget restraint and to respect human rights, predatory coalitions rely heavily on political coercion and narrowly (Ministry of Finance, 2012). Leakages in revenues from gold mining also occurred with some politicians focus on the extraction of resources for factional or personal gain (Bratton and Masunungure, 2010:10). and business syndicates securing huge gains during this period. For instance, in an interview with the According to this perspective, when President Mugabe pardoned his party allies involved in corruption in Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) to mark his 92nd birthday in February 2016, President Mugabe 1988 and later, he gave the signal that the rule of law would be sacriced to predation (Interview with an stated that: ex-Cabinet Minister, January 2016). “We have not received much from the diamond industry at all, I don't' think we have exceeded USD 2 billion, yet The basis of predation was set when the political leadership gave priority to the consolidation of state we think more than USD 15 billion has been earned. Lots of smuggling and swindling has taken place…” (The power by installing party loyalists in the armed forces, the civil service and local government (Bratton and Standard, 14 March 2016). Masunungure, 2010:10). Predatory leaders rely on coalitions. In Zimbabwe, the top echelons of the ruling party and state have always been deeply fused with leadership from military and intelligence Since the broadcast of that statement, there has inevitably been a debate on the accuracy of the USD 15 backgrounds, a legacy of the liberation war (ibid, v). However, as governments mismanage the economy, billion gure, but the general sense that a huge amount of diamond proceeds cannot be accounted for and as patronage resources shrink, so political elites tend to coalesce around a smaller and smaller set of cannot be disputed. players. In Zimbabwe, a civil-military coalition coalesced over the years without the participation of business and labour in a wider developmental coalition. Indeed, an opportunity to form such a Corrupt deals in land transactions were another form of corruption during the GNU period. The developmental coalition between the ruling party, business and labour had been missed in the 1990s. phenomenon of 'land barons' appeared during this period – with considerable fortunes made in land transactions in urban and peri-urban areas. There was also a scramble for ownership of wildlife Concluding their discussion on the context of predatory rule, Bratton and Masunungure argue that: conservancies. The conservancies were sought after for revenues derived from tourists and hunters. Inevitably some of the land-related conicts that ared up during this period related to ownership of conservancies in such provinces as Masvingo and Manicaland (JOMIC, 2011).

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Corruption and the political landscape in Box 2: Forms of Corruption and Sector-Speciﬁc Corrective Mechanisms, 2005 Continued...

“had Zimbabwe's top leaders chosen to build on the legacy of a strong and capable state to expand and reorient an already diversied private economy, Zimbabwe could have registered broad-based Corruption and the political landscape in economic growth and social development…” (2010:1). Continued...

Instead a predatory coalition of party and security elites used the coercive and extractive powers of the An important study on patterns of consumption by the predatory elites observed that the real costs of the state to consolidate their political control and self-enrichment. The deepening of corruption during the 'personal wealth acquisition' project have been imposed on ordinary Zimbabweans in terms of economic period under review is explained by the structure and orientation of this predatory coalition of politicians, contraction and foregone growth: bureaucrats, military and business elites that cut across the public and private sectors. Its orientation was not for a broad national development project, but for a narrow self-serving one. This needs to be “… this could well be a cost that they would nd worth paying if the beneciaries were an emergent capitalist explained. The vision of this myriad of elites was not geared towards using assets or capital acquired or class that might provide the basis for better growth in the future. But as yet we do not see evidence of conscated from other social groups for investment or re-investment. The proceeds from newly- this…Instead it appears that previously accumulated capital has been destroyed or, in effect, converted into conscated farms were not productively used to generate more re-investment to improve farm private wealth. This has happened largely with the blessing of the government. productivity and output. Surpluses were not directed to improvement of infrastructure and maintenance. Its policies have created the conditions for rentier capitalism, creating greater incentives for rent seeking and Considerable amounts of rents were directed not into domestic investment but expatriated. While the speculation than for accumulation of productive capital…” (Davies, 2004; 39-40). economy received little foreign investment, the proceeds from corruption were channeled out of the country through various forms of money laundering. For instance, illicit capital ows were estimated at What was apparent when Davies was making his analysis more than a decade ago has not changed USD 500 million annually (RBZ Governor Mangudya, The Herald, 14 December 2015). substantially. As we observed above, the loss of revenues from mining and other resources has not generated a sustained form of accumulation and job opportunities for Zimbabweans. To that extent, With the exception of investments in real estate, most of the corruption proceeds were utilized in corruption and predation have represented a double loss – to citizens and the national economy. conspicuous consumption. Expensive vehicles, travel and recreation were the dening symbols of the elite, and not investment into new industries to reverse de-industrialization, infrastructure deterioration, Yet some exceptional cases in entrepreneurial accumulation without corruption have been possible. poor services and job losses. The conspicuous amassment of assets such as land and houses as well as top Despite obstruction from the state and its bureaucracy, the case of the Econet telecommunications of the range vehicles have become distinguishing features of this nouveau riche. The extraordinary wealth company under Strive Masiyiwa demonstrated that it was possible to create signicant wealth in the accumulated by members of the ruling elite was illustrated in court records of the divorce cases of some economy without resorting to corruption and predation (African Business, 2015); but there was a price to of the Ministers – where one such minister had amassed about 70 properties in different cities and towns be paid for his success without state patronage. He has felt too insecure to visit his own country of birth as well as 14 vehicles (ACT-Southern Africa, 2012). It was observed that this level of accumulation was 'a for many years. Zimbabwean entrepreneurs that have excelled have often been discouraged from tip of the iceberg since there could be many other senior officials who have similar or more wealth' (ibid). physically operating their companies from home. Accordingly, their businesses continue to be managed The leaders of opposition parties also joined in this accumulation and during the GNU period, some of by others on their behalf. their luminaries took advantage of their positions in city and town councils to amass housing stands and other property to the anger of supporters and voters who had higher expectations of their conduct in Although state patronage in business is actively encouraged for purposes of political control, it is not office. efficient or effective or coordinated. In most instances, it results in drawing scarce resources from the state, or results in mediocre performance. State fear of independent entrepreneurs is strong but unnecessary – a It would be too sweeping to state that all resources gained through land conscation or asset stripping fear that comes from perceived possible loss of control and power if such a class of entrepreneurs were frittered in consumption. There were some exceptions. There were politicians who used the proceeds emerged independently. This is another distinctive feature of a predatory state. to diversify into livestock production, banking, tourism and transport business as Obert Mpofu did in Matabeleland North and Bulawayo (Partnership Africa Canada, 2012). Others had ambitious projects in In sum, the Zimbabwean state has actively used its patronage through its hold over resources such as dairy production. However, it is still too early to conclude whether the trajectory of this type of land, mines, contracts and tenders to reward or penalize companies and entrepreneurs. The payback accumulation will prove to be sustainable in the medium and long term. sought from the companies and parastatals has included donations to the ruling party between and during elections. The criteria used to reward companies have not featured competence and protability The 'one person, one farm' policy enunciated in 2003 was honored more in breach than compliance by highly and this has been to the detriment of economic growth. Innovation and efficiency have not been this elite. Until 2016, Government resisted a comprehensive land audit that would have provided a base key criteria. Corruption and opaqueness have characterized this mode of state-business relations. It is line for how land had been allocated, and how transparency and fairness in that allocation could be scarcely surprising that some of the businesses were party-related companies and others connected to tested. Commitment to fair compensation to white commercial farmers whose land had been seized was the military (Southall, 2013). The majority became a drain on the state rather than successful 'champions' only formally expressed in 2016. in their eld of operations. The debate on the merits and demerits of Zimbabwe's land reform will continue for some years to come Impact on Petty Corruption and Human Development (Raftopoulos, Hammar and Jensen, 2003; Scoones et. al., 2010; Moyo and Chambati, 2013). That it led to The thrust of this contribution has so far focused on the forms and consequences of systemic or grand decline in production of certain commodities after 2000 is not in doubt despite the increased corruption. But what has been its impact on petty corruption particularly, and on human development opportunities that became available to small farmers. That the reform process witnessed signicant asset more generally? Dened as 'small time corruption', petty corruption is the more common type that stripping is also not in doubt (TIZ, 2013). While personal wealth may have accrued to some elites as a involves more people and volumes of transactions. As its name implies, the type of corruption involves consequence, signicant investment and growth in agriculture have not been the outcome. Consumption, 'palm greasing' in forms of small bribes in exchange for a quick provision of a service or for queue- rather than sustained accumulation involving signicant outlays of capital and commitment of other jumping where a bureaucratic process or service is long and cumbersome. Petty corruption can take the resources, has been the major focus. Where corruption played a part in economic development as in the form of payment for a bribe to avoid paying a ne for committing an offence. Petty bribes have often been Asian Tigers, the elites focused on domestic investment, and not consumption. paid in order to obtain a passport, birth or marriage certicate, a driver's license, a place in an educational

institution, a visa, residence permit, import license or customs rebate.

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institution, a visa, residence permit, import license or customs rebate.

The most fertile environment for the proliferation of petty corruption is a 'shortage economy' (especially where basic commodities are in short supply), and where the bureaucratic process is long and cumbersome. Such an Corruption and the political landscape in environment existed in Zimbabwe particularly between 2000 and 2008, as we have already observed above. Continued... Against the background of an economic crisis, petty corruption to obtain maize meal, fuel, travel documents, foreign currency and various licences became a 'new normal' on an unprecedented scale (Interviews with a Researcher and an ex-Cabinet Minister, January 2016). This type of corruption became endemic with police and The diversion of resources to corruption has signicant implications for human and socio-economic low-level and middle-level public sector (government and parastatal) officials often involved. It also drew in development in Zimbabwe. These aspects are examined in the chapter on social and human development private sector participants as bribers and bribe takers. elsewhere in this ASCR Report. It suffices here briey to underline the wider effects. First, resources such as taxes and fees that should have owed into the public purse are diverted into individual pockets; as a consequence, development programmes are starved of resources. Key social services like health and Admissions and favours in clinics, hospitals and educational institutions have drawn more officials into the education, and job creation are adversely affected. Infrastructure does not receive requisite funding. web of petty corruption. Although the amounts of bribes paid may not be high, they are still signicant at Corruption also discourages domestic and foreign investment (GAN Integrity, 2014). The combined effect a personal level. In the hyper inationary environment of that era, the rise of a 'parallel market' in of these factors is a slower development process. currencies and basic goods contributed to the explosion in the volumes of petty corruption. Precisely because it was under cover, it is next to impossible to quantify the monetary volumes of the petty Second, slow or contracting development creates unemployment conditions and reduced demand for corruption of that era. goods and services. Outmigration of between 2 million and 3 million Zimbabweans has been one of the consequences of the economic crisis during the period under 2000 and 2008. The departure of some of While the 'shortage economy' in basic commodities receded in 2009, petty corruption associated with the most educated, skilled and experienced Zimbabweans for the Diaspora has signicantly affected bureaucratic and law enforcement processes continues to thrive. Amongst its active participants are the institutional performance and memory (Crush and Tevera, 2010). An estimated 2 million Zimbabweans are police with the 'road block' symbolizing the common site of bribery exchange but also the judiciary and in South Africa, with some 200,000 in Botswana and another 200 000 elsewhere in other African countries bureaucratic processes that issue government documents, licenses and permits of one type or another (Kanyenze and Makina, 2009). Finally, the levels of petty and systemic corruption could not fail to have an and customs rebates. Citizens and rms are caught in this web of petty corruption as they seek to obtain impact on moral values and standards in Zimbabwean society. There has been an erosion of trust, those documents and permits as well as vacancies. Due to the existence of systemic corruption and its credibility, accountability and transparency. This has adversely affected the reputation of leaders, spread and the lack of regulation and control, low and middle-ranking officers in public and private institutions and communities. sectors feel fewer inhibitions in participating in this part of the 'corruption chain'. To that extent, there is some symbiosis between petty and systemic corruption. Reproduction of Political and Economic Power Interestingly, a number of surveys throw some light on the patterns of petty corruption in Africa, including Although most parties (including governing parties) denounce corruption, they are beneciaries of specically, that in Zimbabwe. Across 34 countries that were surveyed, the police were perceived as the corruption to a greater or lesser extent. Corruption is intrinsic to their political reach, base and survival. most corrupt public institution; on average, about 42 per cent of citizens said that 'most' or 'all' police This makes their response to corruption a contradictory one. On the one hand, it is an illicit practice that were corrupt (Afrobarometer, 2015). Some 62 per cent of Zimbabweans interviewed in that survey should be eradicated yet simultaneously it is an important resource for their political survival especially believed that most or all police were corrupt. Signicantly, public perceptions of police corruption showed during elections. This explains the schizophrenic attitude to corruption by parties and elites. the greatest increase with a 20-percentage point jump between 2002-2003 and 2011-2013 (Afrobarometer, 2015:5). A related survey established that across Africa the police and business executives The electoral politics infused with patronage and corruption that was shaped in the rst Independence were seen as having the highest levels of corruption (Afrobarometer and TI, 2015:3). It added that 22 per elections has inuenced the approach to political mobilization in subsequent polls in most African cent of people who had come in contact with a public service in Zimbabwe in the previous 12 months had countries, including Zimbabwe. According to Allen (1995: 304), the parties that achieved electoral success paid a bribe (ibid.). Out of six key public services, people who came into contact with the police and courts were most likely to have paid a bribe (ibid.). In that survey, it was signicant that about 80 per cent of “had two strategies for party building and creation of electoral support: a reliance on individuals who Zimbabweans surveyed believed that the Government was doing 'badly' in ghting corruption; and to the already had considerable local followings, and the use of clientelist ('patronage') politics to bind notables majority of citizens in Zimbabwe, petty corruption is pervasive and the government has been unable to to the party and local voters to the candidates. In essence, voters were offered collective material benets curb it. (roads, schools, clinics, water, etc.) for their votes, while candidates and notables were offered individual benets (cash, access to licenses, credit or land etc.) The impact of both systemic and petty corruption on human development has been negative, although the impact is difficult to measure just as it is a challenge to quantify the cost or the losses arising from The objective was to have a set of locally based parliamentarians or senators who were responsive to local both forms of corruption. If it were possible, it would be very useful and illuminating to establish and needs and demands, and loosely organized into parties whose leaders had access to private or public compare the volume and value of both petty and systemic corruption. It would be surprising if the value resources. Political mobilization thus rested on clientelist politics in which local and regional power were less than 1 USD billion annually (or about 25 per cent of the annual national budget). For instance, brokers were incorporated into national political movements and electoral support was exchanged for ZIMRA was quoted as estimating that corruption losses amounted to about USD 2 billion in 2012 alone access to state resources (Szeftel, 2000:433). Support was exchanged for access to state resources, and the (Zimbabwe Situation, 23 October 2013). citizens of the new state were integrated into electoral politics on the basis of the access to public resources that political competition afforded.

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Zimbabwean electoral politics have not been an exception. A close perusal of elections during the period from 2000 to 2015 show clientelism was an important feature despite allusions to ideologies of liberation and anti- Corruption and the political landscape in imperialism, human rights and democracy by respective contending parties. Some of the key resources that Continued... featured during election campaigns included access to land (in the 2000 and 2002 and 2005 elections), to food in the (2002 election), to jobs and livelihood opportunities (in the 2008 election), to mining opportunities and informal economy as well as credit and housing stands (in the 2013 election). In sum, the emergence of patronage economics linked to ZANU-PF control should be viewed as partly a historically grounded state-making project (Alexander et.al., 2014). Over the GNU period, ZANU-PF When a government lacks resources to deliver the 'development goods' necessary to satisfy mass capitalized on control over land to consolidate its power in rural resettlement areas and the countryside expectations, popular disappointment exerts pressure on faction leaders to intensify their demands for an more broadly, and used its control over peri-urban land to build support and control in the towns. increased share of resources for their region or support base (ibid.). Those who cannot not deliver are replaced. For example, during the 2000 and 2008 elections, a considerable number of ruling party The reproduction of political and economic power requires both clientelist patronage and direct candidates were thrown out for failure to meet the socio-economic expectations of the electorate. manipulative intervention in the electoral process. The intervention was visible at key stages of the delimitation of constituencies, voter registration and counting of ballots. A constant theme in most Incumbent parties often draw upon public resources to gain electoral advantage. ZANU-PF has amassed reports was that of allegations of tampering with these stages of the electoral process during the 2000, considerable experience in how state resources can be protably used to gain electoral advantage. It has 2002, 2005 and 2008 polls (Masunungure, 2009). Intimidation and violence often marred the electoral used old-fashioned clientelism especially in rural areas where traditional chiefs represent an important process further (Sachikonye, 2011), and a combination of these manipulative strategies skewed the pillar of authority. Chiefs are conduits of public resources to rural constituencies and are key recipients of ground in favour of the incumbent party. public resources for distribution at local level. These resources range from land, agricultural inputs, food to infrastructure and various services that bind local constituents to them. This explains why chiefs and The 2008 election debacle threatened the power base of the incumbent party but also other power other local elites are viewed as crucial gatekeepers in the electoral and development processes. When an centres in the state. There was a systemic shock resulting from the strong electoral showing of the incumbent bloats their conditions of service (through salaries, vehicles and electrication) this is another opposition parties during that election, which explains the swift and concerned response of the entire form of solidifying clientelism. state apparatus that used various resources and strategies including political violence. The shock related to the threat posed by the election outcome to the functioning of networks for systemic corruption that There have been opportunities for partisan approaches to the allocation of public resources such as land, had been thriving since the beginning of the decade. It was, therefore, scarcely surprising that key inputs, food and other resources before and during election processes (Zamchiya, 2014; Mawowa, 2014). branches of the state, the military, police and intelligence played an active part during the presidential The incumbent party has often highlighted that party membership is an important criterion for eligibility run-off election in July 2008 (Masunungure, 2009). of access to the resources. While ruling party members were provided agricultural input support, ordinary villagers with weak political inuence were abandoned with no access to agricultural inputs and Although the 2013 election campaign was more peaceful, the groundwork for it included corrupt marketing opportunities (HRW, 2002). recourse to use of public resources to the advantage of the incumbent party. State media was manipulated in brazen ways through disproportionate award of airtime to the ruling party. Other state During the 2008 election campaign, the RBZ distributed farm implements prompting a complaint by resources at central and local levels were used to maximum advantage by the governing party. As we saw Tendai Biti, an opposition leader, that: 'two weeks before the election, the RBZ is aiding ZANU-PF to buy above, allegations of opaque sources of external donations were made as the ruling party showed that it votes through the distribution of tractors and farm implements' (as quoted in Zamchiya, 2014). This had considerable campaign resources that could not be met from the annual subvention that it received distribution was against the letter and spirit of the Electoral Act that prohibits such partisan exploitation from Parliament. of public resources during an election campaign. The dangling of food aid as a carrot during elections is another corrupt practice especially in food decit provinces such as Matabeleland and Masvingo This section closes with a reiteration of the linkages between corruption, patronage and reproduction of provinces (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006). In addition, the control of access to natural resources is another political and economic power. Not all patronage amounts to corruption if it does not violate the existing mechanism whereby an incumbent party uses patronage to extend and consolidate its electoral base. For legal framework. But the interconnections between them are close especially in instances of political instance, this patronage was skillfully deployed by ZANU-PF during the 2013 election campaign when corruption as observed earlier. Corruption and patronage can lead to stable conditions in which the ruling diamond revenues were converted into considerable cash that facilitated the purchase of campaign elite can be reproduced in economic and political terms. In conditions of sustained accumulation, the equipment (Global Witness, 2012; 2014). The phenomenal growth of small-scale artisanal mining (ASM) growth of the economy and middle and working classes could result in suitable conditions for such a during the period under review (2000-2015) witnessed up to 500 000 operators involved in the sector. stable process of reproduction and consolidation. According to one analyst: However, where conditions for accumulation are either weak or non-existent, political and economic “associating this sector only with informality and casting it as a survival strategy for the poor is clearly reproduction processes become unstable. An example of such conditions would be when corruption and inadequate in the Zimbabwean context as senior civil servants, ZANU-PF politicians and military gures play a patronage degenerate into factionalism within the ruling party and elites. At the heart of such critical role in it. ASM should be conceptualized as part of the development, sustenance and reproduction of a factionalism would be intense competition over limited resources. Clientelism promotes a form of patronage system controlled by those with state and/or party positions” factional competition that encourages the plundering of the state because: (Mawowa, 2014:922). “the intensity which ethnicity gives to factional competition tends to make questions about the entitlements of There was pervasive corruption in this mining sector but it was allegedly tolerated and even abetted by the group the only issue in which factions are interested – to the exclusion of broader questions concerning the state officials and the police; access to the sector by hundreds of thousands of participants boosted the efficacy of the overall political system or stability of the state” (Szeftel, 2000:437). electoral base of the party that dispensed patronage and protection (ibid.).

48 2015 Annual State of Corruption 2015 Annual State of Corruption 49 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015 Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-2015

If faction leaders and supporters are disappointed by the results of their efforts to appropriate public resources, they are likely to intensify their efforts to appropriate spoils regardless of the consequences. Of Corruption and the political landscape in interest in the Zimbabwean context is the growth of intense factionalism in both ruling and opposition Continued... parties. In ZANU-PF, there are both economic and political drivers of factionalism. Originally, the Mujuru and Mnangagwa factions thrived on competition for economic resources within the state and private sector, and sought to use political power to protect and consolidate those resources they had secured for Ÿ Determination and commitment to ght the scourge of corruption from the government and their faction members. The expulsion of the Mujuru faction in 2014 was an indication of irreconcilable leadership; ambitions between the two sides and the entry of an equally ambitious faction allegedly grouped around Ÿ Strong anti-corruption strategies focusing on effective laws, an independent judiciary and strong Grace Mugabe whose rise to senior party position was meteoric. As state resources remain limited and enforcement; economic growth continues to be sluggish, the motivation for intense competition between factions will Ÿ Robust anti-corrupt institutions under the aegis of Corrupt Practices Investigations Bureau (CPIB) and remain high; and the uncertainty regarding presidential succession will continue to fuel inter-factional Ÿ Reduced corrupt incentives by providing good remuneration, bonuses and working conditions that rivalries. are conducive to honest work by both politicians and public servants (UNECA, 2015:20).

Factionalism in opposition parties often has short-term political objectives. However, it can be Similarly, Hong Kong represents a 'good practice' case. It overcame the pervasive corruption of the 1960s debilitating. It has weakened the Zimbabwe opposition parties in their contest with ZANU-PF while and 1970s through strong government commitment exemplied in the setting up of an Independent making their access to state resources and use of patronage more remote as long as they remain out of Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) and harmonized and effective strategies against corruption power. At the same time, the conditions for reproduction of political and economic power remain shaky in including investigation, prevention and community education. Like in Singapore, a successful ght the absence of sustained accumulation and growth. against corruption required adequately funded anti-corruption institutions with well-remunerated staff (UNECA, 2015:20). Good Practices in Eradicating Corruption This contribution has argued that systemic corruption has become deep-seated in Zimbabwe's body Conclusion and Recommendations politic and economy. The process of its build-up was gradual from the 1980s into the 1990s, becoming In Zimbabwe, there has been no shortage of specic and relevant recommendations in how to tackle more pervasive between 2000 and the present. Consequently, due to its pervasiveness, a major risk is that corruption. Both Government and private sector institutions have made recommendations, but what has corruption has now become a new 'normal' to which citizens and corporations have adjusted with been conspicuously missing is the commitment and tenacity to implement them. The following set of cynicism (Interview with a Researcher, January 2016). The prospects for its eradication have become more recommendations feature highly in the discourse on anti-corruption and although they are not presented difficult and bleak unless lessons from around the world are learned, and learned quickly. in a hierarchical order, an anti-corruption strategy should include these approaches and measures: -

There are examples of countries that once experienced the scourge of corruption, but fought it Political Will and Strong Leadership tenaciously and eradicated its foundations. Their experience of 'good practices' in combatting corruption There should be determined political will in government and the private sector to provide strong is worth highlighting in a discussion of recommendations that should be considered in the Zimbabwean leadership to combat corruption. If there is no political will and leadership, the anti-corruption ght will case in the next section. remain empty rhetoric. This has been the destiny of anti-corruption campaigns in many developing countries, and Zimbabwe currently falls into this category of countries. Botswana has been consistently ranked as one of the least corrupt countries in the past two decades. Its government is committed to “zero tolerance” of corruption on the resolve that corrupt practices should Follow up on Reports, Policy and Law remain a 'high-risk low-return undertaking' (Botswana Government, 2016). The institutional framework for Each year a comprehensive report on nancial improprieties in government ministries and parastatals is anti-corruption was strengthened with the setting up of the Directorate of Corruption and Economic compiled by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The report carries detail of specic transgressions that Crime (DCEC) in 1994. The DCEC has powers to investigate corruption cases and to implement should be rectied, but there has been little follow-up on the ndings and recommendations of those preventative strategies as well as carry out public education on the issue. Its Director reports directly to reports. This should change. Effective anti-corruption strategies require a vigorous follow-up on policy the President, with decisions on prosecution taken by the Attorney General, a position constitutionally decisions and recommendations. For instance, the criminalization of corruption is a priority. Substantive independent of government. deterrent penalties should be exacted against those who engage in corruption. The present bias of giving the 'big sh' light penalties, and the 'small sh' heavier sentences should be removed. However, it is not Other oversight institutions that contribute to the anti-corruption ght are the Public Procurement and sufficient for the criminal law to search for bad apples and punish them (Ross-Ackerman, 1999:226). The Asset Disposal Board (PPADB), the Competition Authority and the Financial Intelligence Agency. As an goal of such prosecutions is to attract notice and public notice, not solve the underlying problem. Anti- upper middle-income country, the increase in general prosperity and relatively well-paid civil service corruption laws can only provide a framework for more important structural reforms. combined to limit the extent of corruption. In 2013, Botswana was ranked by Transparency International (TI) as less corrupt than many countries in Europe such as Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece (ibid). Review Institutional and Regulatory Frameworks Tax and customs revenues may be far below the level needed to carry out basic government services in Another often-cited case of 'good practice' is post-independence Singapore. It made a decisive shift from Zimbabwe, and the pattern of payments may be inequitable due to payoffs. The response should be to high levels of corruption to very low levels; made possible through: simplify tax laws to reduce bureaucratic discretion and to reorganize the bureaucracy to improve oversight (Ross-Ackerman, 1999:227). Where regulation of business is complex, time-consuming and intrusive, there should be a critical review of regulatory laws to see which laws can be eliminated, simplied or supported with improved enforcement.

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The institutional mandate and regulatory capacity of some of the institutions that deal with one form of corruption or another are vague and weak. Institutions such as Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZAAC) need to have their enforcement mechanisms Corruption and the political landscape in strengthened ('sharp teeth') if they are to become more eﬀective in combating corruption in their specic areas of mandate. Similarly, codes of conduct such as the Electoral Code should be strengthened to deal Continued... with issues of access to public resources during election campaigns.

Review of Conditions of Service in key Institutions Strong Partnership in Anti-Corruption Strategies Poor conditions of service, especially relatively low salaries, were identied as one factor behind the There should be stronger coherence in anti-corruption strategies. Often there tends to be a silo approach soliciting of bribes and kickbacks by public officials. When these are raised to become competitive, their by different branches of the state and in the private sector. The Executive branch and Parliament need to incentive to engage in corruption is supposed to be reduced. In key institutions such as the Zimbabwe work more closely especially given the increased active role by portfolio committees including the Public Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), ZEC, Police, the Judiciary and Immigration, conditions of service should be Accounts committee in the latter institution (interview with chair of a Parliamentary Committee, January, improved (in addition to the enforcement of provisions recommended in this section). In particular, the 2016). Together with the Judiciary and the Commissions such as the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption investigations sections should be independent and adequately remunerated. Commission (ZAAC) and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) they would constitute a formidable front against corruption provided they work closely together. Accountability of Parties and Civil Society Organizations There should be a mechanism to ensure transparency and accountability for political parties and civil Post-note society organizations. Although they are often vocal in their denunciation of corrupt practices, they are None of the above Recommendations, on their own, can lead to the overcoming of corruption in not always clean themselves. Auditing of these organizations by non-partisan professional institutions to Zimbabwe's society and economy. The only sustained long-term effect on political corruption and ensure probity in the use of their resources would be useful for the credibility and transparency of the clientelism is likely to come from economic development which is likely to result in a growing scal political and electoral processes, and in their lobbying and advocacy activities. capacity of the state to respond to political demands in open and transparent ways. Development is also likely to lead to a moderation of the demands coming from competing groups demanding redistribution Disclosure by Parties, Elected Officers and Senior Officers so that economic viability is disrupted to a lesser extent over time. There should be legal provisions that require parties to disclose their sources of campaign nance and elected officials to state their assets on taking up and leaving office. Disclosure of assets would be in the Endnotes public interest to the extent that citizens can judge if there has been abuse of office through accumulation of assets beyond what was possible through official remuneration. If enforced, the 1. “It might be you or a group of people assigned to negotiate with the other side we want to work with, be it in disclosure requirement would go some way in deterring politicians, councilors and other public officers building a bridge or constructing roads, you then go and demand a cut before the construction is even done.. from abuse of office through shady accumulation fuelled by corruption. They say if the actual cost is $10 million, they peg it at $13 million and tell the Chinese that the project costs have risen yet the $3 million will be theirs for sharing…” (President Mugabe as quoted in December 2015. This Protection of Whistle blowers on corruption was in reference to tendency of government bureaucrats to solicit kickbacks when negotiating terms of state Reporting acts of corruption is a highly risky enterprise in an organization or community. There needs to projects). be legislation that provides whistle-blowers with protection from culprits and any consequences that may arise. Citizens should be informed about this protection mechanism. 2. The corruption scandals include those at the ZISCO steel company, Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO) bus company, National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), and the Harare Airport Extension Anti-Corruption awareness campaigns scandal to mention a few. There should be efforts to build a strong anti-corruption movement that draws citizens, CSOs and other sectors in society. The movement together with the private sector should work closely with government to spread awareness of the cost and other consequences of corruption on society and the economy. Amongst others, the media could play a useful role in raising awareness through its reporting and commentary. A vital step in such a campaign would be to survey the public to nd out how corruption affects their daily lives. This provides a way to set priorities that reect popular grievances (Ross- Ackerman, 1999:227). However, the survey evidence may not be sufficient, as the corruption that is most visible to the population may not be doing the most harm. A second emphasis should be on high-level corruption in public sector contracting, privatizations and concessions that introduce serious economic distortions and undermine the scal health of the state (ibid.).

Awards for Good Corporate Governance and Anti-corruption It would be useful to set up awards for institutions in the public and private sectors that excel in anti- corruption eﬀorts. They would be showing by example how corruption can be reduced or eradicated in society and economy. In South Korea, they have drawn up an Integrity Perception Index (IPC) under which citizens are surveyed on what they think of the performance of public institutions in issuing licenses and permits, control, supervisory tasks, use and management of government subsidies. The exercise has improved service delivery in that country as public institutions give due attention to the index and strive to improve their rankings through deliberate eﬀorts in addressing integrity challenges. Introducing a national integrity perception index in Zimbabwe along similar lines could spur public and private institutions to avoid corruption so as to improve their reputation and brands.

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Understanding Corruption in Social Service Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studiess from the Local Government Sector Political Economy of Corruption and the Battle for Accountability in Zimbabwe 2000-201563

Understanding Corruption in Social Service Corruption in Social Service Delivery in Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the Understanding Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the Local Local Government Sector 09 Government Sector Sandra Bhatasara Continued...

Introduction Ÿ Establish the dimensions and dynamics of corruption in social service delivery in local government Corruption remains a key governance and development challenge confronting Zimbabwe. This chapter sector; explores issues around how corruption in the social sector has negatively affected social development Ÿ Review existing legislation, policies and institutional frameworks that govern local government; using the local government sector as an example. Local government, especially the urban sub-sector, is highlighting their strengths and loopholes in promoting and preventing corruption; the vehicle through which central government delivers social services such as water, sanitation, housing Ÿ Examine the social costs of corruption; and education to most citizens of Zimbabwe; but these local authorities have of late become notorious for Ÿ Proffer recommendations for possible reforms that would provide greater transparency and poor service delivery and 'hyper corruption' (Wafawarova 2011), hence the focus on them in this chapter. accountability in local government service delivery as a whole. The discussion focuses on the nature of corruption in social service provision, how legislative, institutional and policy frameworks are implicated in corruption, the social costs of corruption, and possible solutions Local Government Structure and Social Service Delivery to address corruption in Zimbabwe. The study is primarily based on a critical and reective review of The study uses the local government sector as an entry point. Therefore, the study is not about corruption literature – which incorporated perspectives of citizens, especially reports by Residents Associations, TIZ in the local government sector, and the selection of the sector is just a methodological consideration. (e.g. the Youth and Corruption baseline report), case studies on various cities/towns, and media sources Based on relevant legislation and practice, Zimbabwe's local government exists to provide, maintain and that quoted citizens' perspectives. expand public goods and services within the areas under their control. Zimbabwe's local government sector is a relatively well- established one and consists of 92 Councils (60 rural and 32 urban) and a Background to the Study Ministry with national, provincial and district presence (Chatiza et al. 2013). The sector includes a Ministry The provision of social services in Zimbabwe has been negatively affected by the protracted economic responsible for local government, a parliamentary portfolio committee for local government, a provincial crisis that the country has suffered since the beginning of 2000. The crisis has resulted in a signicant and metropolitan tier as well as urban, and rural local authorities. The Ministry responsible for local decline in the capability of both central and local governments to deliver essential services such as government has officials at provincial and local level while 10 Ministers of State responsible for Provincial housing, water and sewer reticulation, refuse removal, street lighting, primary health, and basic education Affairs (Provincial Governors until the 2013 Constitution) also make up a visible cog at provincial and (Government of Zimbabwe 2010; Kamete 2009: Musekiwa et al. 2013). Between 2000 and 2008, Zimbabwe metropolitan tiers. Under the Constitution that prevailed until 2013, local authorities were established in experienced severe macro-economic challenges, with ination reaching an all-time high of 230,000,000% terms of Acts of Parliament (the Urban Councils Act, 29:15 and Rural District Councils Act, 29:13) and their per annum in July 2008 (Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe 2011). The height of the crisis was in 2008-09 when operations were equally regulated by sector and allied legislation. Other relevant sector legislation drinking water of low quality caused a cholera epidemic that coincided with a collapsed health delivery includes the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act, the Traditional Leaders Act, the Communal Lands system, leading to '98,592 reported cases and 4,288 deaths' (Government of Zimbabwe 2010:36). Act and the Provincial Councils and Administration Act while allied legislation includes mining, water, Although the socio-economic crisis subsided somewhat in 2009 following the inauguration of an inclusive environment, forestry and related instruments (Musekiwa and Chatiza 2015; Chatiza et al. 2013). government, the recovery in basic services has taken a long time, and local authorities still face service delivery decits (Musekiwa and Chatiza 2015, Chatiza et al. 2013); especially after the debt-write off by The 2013 constitution provides for local government and denes a devolved governance framework. central government in the run-up to elections in 2013. Section 3 (2) (i) the constitution recognises devolution and decentralisation of governmental power and functions as one of the principles of good governance. Section 5c denes provincial and local authorities Furthermore, local government authorities are plagued by a lack of resources such as skilled staff and as a tier of government and states that Councils represent and manage affairs of the people. Section 8:1 nancial management systems. These problems provide incentives and opportunities for corruption denes the national vision of '…a sustainable, just, free and democratic society in which people enjoy (Chene 2015). Nonetheless, the number of studies that focus specically on corruption in the provision of prosperous, happy and fullling lives', which shapes the focus of governance (Government of Zimbabwe social services in the country is inadequate. Most studies (see Makochekanwa and Kwaramba 2010; 2013).1 Sections 274:1 and 275:1 confers on Councils the power to govern, on own initiative. Also, the Mundawarara and Mapanda 2010; Bonga et al. 2015) dwell on the daunting challenges faced by various Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) provides for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that are pertinent to social sectors particularly from the early 2000s, which although not directly related to corruption, may be social service delivery. They include the right to education (Section 75), the right to health care (Section a consequence of the high levels of corruption pervading the country. There are also only a few sources 76), right to food and water (Section 77) and environmental rights (Section 73). systematically analysing corruption at the local level in Zimbabwe. Despite such gaps, some case studies (see Sithole 2013; Combined Harare Residents Association [CHRA] 2014; Mukonza 2013) in specic Local governments, like other public institutions, are established to aggregate citizens' capacities and municipalities can be used to gain a better understanding of the challenges and risks of corruption at the deploy them to address public affairs. The conceptualization of services is in relation to the functions of local level. In this context, this chapter seeks to: local authorities and specically applies to roads, education, health, water and sanitation, land and housing services. From a human rights perspective (Ratsauka 2015), social service delivery includes the following:

1 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013

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1 Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 20) Act 2013

Understanding Corruption in Social Service a) Construction and maintenance of drains, sewers, bridges, parking and street lighting – right to Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the security/health/life Local Government Sector b) Provision of parks, public places, recreation grounds and open spaces – right to leisure / clean air Continued... c) Water for domestic and commercial areas – the right to clean water/adequate standard of life d) Hospitals, clinics, ambulances, maternity and child welfare – the right to health e) Schools and libraries – right to education Corruption is, therefore, not limited to one group/class. Neither is it a preserve of the elite or politicians, f) Provision of housing and public transport facilities as well as refuse collection – right to shelter/health, etc. but is embedded in everyday practices. It is also recognized that power circulates through networks rather than being applied at particular points (Foucault 1979); and is a relationship rather than an entity; it ows Service delivery has been poor due to a variety of reasons, including socio-economic and institutional in multiple directions. Hence it is possible to locate the social relationships, social institutions and social challenges. Historically, local government authorities in Zimbabwe received minimal scal transfers from networks of corruption (Chiweshe 2015) – leading to the argument that 'corruption can be seen not so central government and met most of their expenditure from local revenue (Musekiwa and Chatiza 2015). much as an objective practice existing in a vacuum, but as a social act whose meaning needs to be However, after the post-2000 economic and political challenges and international isolation, reduced understood with reference to social relationships' (Harrison 2006: 20). central government and local authority ability to leverage external nance at a time when the economy was weak led to a dramatic decline in local revenues (ibid). The chapter, therefore, argues that the problem of corruption in the delivery of and access to social services is about power. The study analyses the various areas where corruption comes into play, the Conceptualizing Corruption in Social Services Delivery different types of social actors involved and the strategies deployed to deliver and access social services in Corruption has many contested denitions, but for purposes of this study we have utilized a denition a corrupt manner. The chapter also looks at the social impacts of corruption and how it is socially that is broad enough and contextualized enough to capture the multifaceted and complex nature of reproduced. The greater the corruption, the more it becomes engrained in social habits (i.e. the more corruption. An understanding of the denition's various facets is necessary for effective management and deeply it becomes inscribed in the 'moral economy') and the easier it is to be passed on from one control of corruption (Clammer, 2012). generation to the next. In effect, the reproduction of corruption produces a kind of 'corruption culture' that becomes permanent in society. This chapter regards contextualizing corruption denitions as critical if it is to be understood in its correct space. Transparency International (TI 2012) denes corruption as the abuse of public or entrusted power Corruption in the Local Government Sector for private gain. Other scholars conceive corruption as mis-performance or neglect of a recognized duty or Corruption in the local government sector is not a recent phenomenon. Taking the City of Harare as an unwarranted use of power with the motive of gaining some advantage directly for personal gain (Alatas example, Solomon Tawengwa was involved in gross mismanagement of rate- payers' money and land 1990). In Africa, for instance, Olivier de Sardan (1999) argues that the notion of corruption may be scandals in the late 1990s. CHRA (2004) reported that the ZANU-PF led Council had been for years broadened into what may be termed a 'corruption complex' to include nepotism, abuse of power, characterised by opaque practices, nepotism and corruption that went unpunished. In 2006, the embezzlement and various forms of misappropriation, inuence-peddling, prevarication, insider trading, Makwavarara-led Commission running the City was also involved in a series of highly irregular and abuse of the public purse. In Zimbabwe, the general tendency is to describe these as corrupt expenditure and characterized by a lack of accountability.2 Again in 2011, it was reported that Harare's practices. For instance, Bonga et al. (2015) observe that corruption is found in the award of contracts, worst problem was corruption (from the municipal police who clamp wrongly parked vehicles only to be promotion of staff, dispensation of justice, and misuse of public offices, positions, and privileges and bribed to release them, to business managers running down once-viable enterprises like Rufaro embezzlement of public funds. In addition, the word corruption is referred to in the 1st schedule of the Marketing).3 Likewise, former ZANU-PF mayor, Tony Gara, gave his own company a contract to collect Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission Act [9.22]; with the understanding being derived from offences garbage without going to tender and against all ethical norms (ibid). The MDC-led Councils have also related to: “giving or receiving a bribe as an inducement or reward; corruptly using a false document; the deepened the crisis of corruption. In 2010, an MDC probe team raised corruption allegations against intentional non-disclosure of/or concealment of a transaction from one principal in order to deceive; the Mutare city fathers; In 2011, MDC-T councillors in Victoria Falls were accused of politicising council deceitful non-disclosure or concealment from one principal of a personal interest in a transaction; criminal business, whilst mayors in Bindura and Chinhoyi were suspended and; In 2012, the Mutare mayor was abuse of power by a public officer”. accused of misconduct by the then Minister Ignatius Chombo. Evidently, corruption in the local government sector has evolved over time and with adverse consequences for social service provision and Notwithstanding the above denitions (and the context in which they are used), what resonates with this society development as a whole. paper's conception of corruption in most of the denitions is the abuse of power; and it is from this vantage point that this chapter maps a sociological understanding of corruption and draws from Michel Overview of Everyday Corruption in the Local Government Sector Foucault's conceptualization of power. From this Foucauldian perspective, the study of power should: Everyday corrupt tendencies and practices in the local government sector take many forms as shown in begin from below, in the heterogeneous and dispersed microphysics of power; explore specic forms the list below: of its exercise in different institutional sites, and; consider how, if at all, these are linked to broader and more persistent societal congurations (Jessop 2006). Power is everywhere and is not a possession but a relational a strategy deployed for accumulation even at the most basic level (Foucault, 1980). As such, if power is relational corruption is social rather than an individual phenomenon, having not only political origins and impacts but social ones as well. Consistently, corruption is interwoven in all facets of life (TIZ 2014). Similarly, it is trans-systemic and inherent in all social systems (Alatas 1990). Thus, corruption is a complex social phenomenon, which in addition to political and economic factors, has also deeply rooted cultural causes and social traditions which largely determine its existence and extent (Bonga et al. 2015).

2 http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/old/apr27b_2006.html 3 http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/06/harare-where-did-the-sunshine/

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2 http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/old/apr27b_2006.html 3 http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2011/06/harare-where-did-the-sunshine/

Ÿ Central government, unscrupulous land barons (with backing from ZANU-PF) and some council officials Understanding Corruption in Social Service implicated in Harare land scandals and demolitions. Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the Ÿ Citizens can be asked for bribes to circumvent complex4 processes or secure access to services (Chene, 2015). Local Government Sector Ÿ In Harare and Masvingo, residents complained about rampant corruption in the housing departments, Continued... claiming that those on the waiting lists had to pay bribes in order to receive preferential treatment in the allocation of houses (Murimoga and Musinga 2014). Ÿ Massive corruption and nepotism were unearthed at the Chiredzi Town Council in the allocation of about 700 stands. The mushrooming of illegal settlements in different cities and towns also occurred under Chombo's watch; and history will also remember him as the minister who presided over Operation Murambatsvina in Ÿ In the city of5 Gweru, Sithole (2013) noted that the forms of corruption cited by the respondents included 2005, which left more than 700 000 homeless, while 2,4 million were affected indirectly (see United bribery, embezzlement, nepotism and misuse of council assets, selling of council assets like stands and 9 vehicles to some council officials at very low values. Nations reports). Many illegal land deals took place when unelected commissions appointed by Chombo Ÿ Bribing of council workers for illegal water reconnections in many of the cities, with Gweru and Harare cited were in office (see table below summarizing some of the perceptions that support this view that the by Sithole (2013). former minister was a prominent actor in shaping how corruption evolved in the local government sector Ÿ The bribing of local councillors for illegal water connections is widespread (Sithole 2013). between 2000 and 2015). Table : Actors in corrupt practices and engagements In these instances, council officials generally use their power to either provide or withhold a service until residents pay a bribe. This highlights how power in specic interactions is exercised by those in positions of authority in order to inuence the conduct of others (Chiweshe 2015).

The scourge of corruption exists in all places and spaces, just like power. Corruption in the education service delivery chain for instance, occurs during school planning and management, student admissions, examinations, as well as dealing with teacher management and professional conduct (Chene 2012). In human resources and recruitment, the images of well-paid Municipal executives alongside declining service provision in the public authorities are in the public domain (Mundawarara and Mapanda 2010). Planning services have also experienced delays caused by ineﬃciency and corruption, actual and perceived (Chatiza et al. 2013). In 2015, the local government permanent secretary admitted that the Ministry had thousands of unqualied personnel who were corruptly employed in councils across the country.6

In a recent report, it was noted that City of Harare allegedly bought US$ 50 000 worth of Geographical Information System (GIS) gadgets from South Africa without going to tender.7 In Gweru, the District Administrator (DA) highlighted the existence of gross mis-management of Council funds, with the council being deprived of money that it could use to fund and improve its service delivery projects. As a result, the costs of public services are inated to make up for the mismanaged funds (Sithole 2013). Corruption as a social practice implicates many actors. In general, the players in social service delivery corruption are the general public, politicians, bureaucrats and rms. The most commonly identied perpetrators of corruption include tax and revenue collectors the administrative head, the councillors, and even the Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development (Manyukwe 2010). These are actors from both MDC and ZANU PF political parties.

Service delivery in MDC-T dominated councils has gone haywire — with residents going for months without water.8 In Gweru and Mutare MDC run Councils, police and the judiciary, politicians, teachers and lecturers as well as nurses and doctors (Bonga et al. 2015). In the local government sector, a multiplicity of actors (provincial administrators, district administrators and ministers of state) are engaged in corruption. At some point, corruption in Chitungwiza Municipality implicated the Town Clerk who is condemning reports on corruption and mismanagement have emerged. However, a number of corruption cases have mostly implicated the former ZANU-PF Minister Ignatius Chombo as the main culprit, although the cases differ. The role of the former Minister of Local Government, Public Works and Urban Development Hon. Ignatius Chombo (2000 – 2015) in producing, reproducing and bequeathing a legacy of corruption has been documented extensively. Arguably, this is a clear case of how power is used as a strategy for accumulation by government officials. Jonga (2013) described him as a 'political bandit', who sought to serve his own interests at the expense of rural and urban communities. During his tenure, service delivery declined to an all-time low as evidenced by the poor state of roads, erratic water supply situations, uncollected garbage, and other poor services. 4 http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/02/05/demolitions-sign-of-gross-corruption/ 5 http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2014/07/chiredzi-council-tackles-corruption-nepotism/ 9 6 http://allafrica.com/stories/201510280266.html 10 7 http://www.herald.co.zw/city-council-flouts-tender-procedures/ 8 http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/1mdc-t-councils-have-equally-failed/

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Understanding Corruption in Social Service The above list of irregular deals should, however, not exonerate the role of general citizens in fuelling Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the corruption. Citizens are neither passive recipients of social services nor are they powerless. The payment of Local Government Sector bribes for water connection is sometimes initiated by citizens themselves. In its ndings on corruption in Continued... Chitungwiza Municipality, a committee from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) concluded that “corruption is generally rampant and footloose” (MDC, 2010). It is located along the whole chain of service provision hence implicating citizens as well. Hardoon and Heinrich (2011) reported that 52% of Zimbabweans have paid a bribe to a service provider – hence it is not uncommon for parents to make Table 3 : Summary of Corruption in Harare City Council informal payments to access education services that are supposed to be free of charge (Tizora 2009). Other corrupt practices in accessing education include paying teachers and headmasters fees of as high as US$200 for them to write examinations on behalf of other people (Chene 2015; Mapira and Matikiti 2012; Togongara, 2013). Sex can also be used as payment by young women to get good grades, pass an exam, or be admitted to educational programmes (Mapira and Matikiti 2012; TIZ 2014).

Nepotism is another practice that shows that residents are active social actors. It is now diﬃcult for one to access some social services unless a certain relationship exists. These relationships allow people to avoid long queues to access housing (Chiweshe 2015) and other services such as water and education. Hence citizens exercise power by making claims to relations or other people that can inuence decisions in their favor. Major corruption scandals in the local government sector: the cases of Harare and Chitungwiza City Councils

Corruption remains a key governance challenge faced by local governments seeking to deliver services eﬀectively the world over. Tackling corruption can, however, help Local Authorities become more eﬀective service delivery vehicles. The cases from Chitungwiza (Table 2) and Harare (Table 3) demonstrate some of the major housing, land, and other corruption scandals in the recent past.

Table 2: Summary of Corruption in Chitungwiza

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Table 2: Summary of Corruption in Chitungwiza

Understanding Corruption in Social Service Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the Local Government Sector Continued...

What gives rise to corruption? The economic crisis, political instability and the calibre of leadership in Zimbabwe are important when seeking to understand why corruption in general and in the local government sector has become pervasive. Arguably, political leaders have been implicated in the 'institutionalization' of corruption. There are claims that President Robert Mugabe institutionalized corruption when he pardoned government ministers implicated in the Willowgate scandal in the late 1980s1.1 Amongst those top leaders pardoned included the then Local Government Minister, Enos Chikowore. One lesson was drawn from this: “It dawned upon those in government that they too, could loot national resources and get President Mugabe's protection from prosecution” (ibid). Therefore, the failure by the Head of State to take stern measures against corrupt elements started breeding corruption within other government circles and the corruption later spread to private institutions12. This also marked the progressive disintegration of the national moral bre (ibid). Since then, local authorities have been reduced into feeding troughs for politicians and top council oﬃcials, many of whom have presided over the infrastructural collapse of the cities and towns13.

The collapse of the economy after 2000 resulted in a decline of resources for public services and administration. Low salaries in Zimbabwe's bloated public service, ineﬃcient bureaucracy and the opacity of the overall regulatory environment fuel bureaucratic corruption. The government is unable to control and monitor the action of civil servants and business; and poor remuneration has made it easier to bribe poorly-paid civil servants (Bonga et al. 2015). This is not peculiar to Zimbabwe. In Africa in general, the 'under-payment' of civil servants has obliged them to look elsewhere for the resources which are no longer provided in their salaries (Olivier de Sardina, 1999); and as a result corruption is seen as a survival strategy by government workers (Chiweshe 2015). The TIZ Youth and Corruption Baseline (2014) also revealed that youths engaged in corrupt activities due to poverty and unemployment.

Apart from the above, the most common reasons for paying a bribe for a service in Zimbabwe is to speed up things and to ensure that one gets services (TIZ Corruption Report 2012). People have a tendency of resorting to paying bribes due to the complex procedures that they have to go through before they can get the services that they need without delays (Sithole 2013). People are often simply told, 'sit there while we try to sort out your problem' and they are made to wait until business hours are over, and then they are told to come back the next day and the day after that (ibid). This waiting only often ends after a bribe has been paid. For instance, most departments in local authorities (e.g. the engineering) take long to approve housing plans and applicants resort to paying bribes to council oﬃcials in order to speed up the approval process.

Non-functioning institutions and poor policies have also been implicated in corruption. For instance, The cases tabulated above (Table 3 and Table 4) show legislative power sometimes being used by the residents in Chitungwiza expressed concern over the non-implementation of various commissions' Minister to protect sectional interests. Tendencies of political banditry are also evident because the 14 ndings that have been instituted by the Minister of Local Government. Other related reasons included Minister's approach subverted legally elected urban councils and replaced them with hand-picked the lack of operationalization of Provincial Councils as well as the slow process of reviewing the local councillors and commissioners (Jonga 2013). The Minister unilaterally usurped the power of the voters government legislation in line with the constitution, which requires the decentralisation of service and urban councils. There are no checks and balances that limit the power and undue inuences of a provision (CHRA 2014). The Zimbabwean Local Government legislation (while it remains misaligned with sitting Minister of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development within local authorities, hence the the new Constitution) allows the Minister of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development to string of corruption cases in land deals and the awarding of major contracts for road construction. One intervene in the day-to-day running of local authorities, and this has often been viewed as fuelling local government expert, Kudzai Chatiza, further noted that Central government has for the past 15 years corruption (Sithole 2013). been disabled by a focus on political control of councils and destabilizing those controlled by opposition political parties to be eﬀective at holding councils to account. In some cases, what we call 10 11 mismanagement was/is sanctioned by central government. 12 13 14

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Understanding Corruption in Social Service Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the Local Government Sector Continued...

As resources are drained from health budgets less funding is available to pay salaries and fund operations At times officials simply ignore legislative and police frameworks. For instance, the Urban Councils Act and maintenance, leading to de-motivated staff, lower quality of care, and reduced service availability and (Chapter 29:15) requires local authorities to audit their nancial statements within 180 days of a particular use (Lindelow and Sernells 2006). In addition, Biegelman and Biegelman (2010:4) state that “corruption nancial year-end to ensure that regular checks can be made. Nonetheless, the Comptroller and Auditor- promoted socio-economic ills such as poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy and resulted in people being General's 2013 Report exposed that nearly 90 percent of Councils are breaching this legal requirement. disillusioned by the failures of government”. Corruption causes citizens to stay poor and illiterate, and to Lack of auditing between 2009 and 2013 resulted in local authorities losing over US$50 million through suffer from high infant and child mortality rates, low birth-weight babies; it also causes high dropout fake payment receipts and unspecied cash withdrawals (ibid).In a related manner, the Poverty Reduction rates in primary schools (see Kaufmann et al. 2008). Bribery also deters the poor from seeking basic Forum blamed the absence of public accountability systems for the sharp increase in cases of entitlements and other public services; while corruption in the administrative realm results in the unequal mismanagement of resources at public institutions, especially local authorities (ibid). This is further provision of services. This is evidence of how corruption aggravates inequality and injustice. Likewise, supported by the following: corruption has a negative impact on socio-economic rights as it denies development and a better quality of life to the most vulnerable members of society (Wafawarova 2011). Weak monitoring by citizens, local institutions and central government sustains much of the mismanagement. In Zimbabwe, corruption in the health sector, for example, compromises service delivery, and this has It grew at a time when councils had access to considerable resources from both local sources and through endangered the lives of citizens as money, which should be used to nance effective health service government grants. As citizens, our local government literacy is low so we have been unable to follow processes delivery, lines the pockets of some officials. Theft of medical supplies and budget leakages lead to drug in our councils closely. Even when audits (e.g. the Harare land audit of 2009/2010) revealed irregularities no shortages and poor quality services (Chene 2015) while drugs meant to be given for free to patients are ordinary citizens, local organizations and central government took the matter up. The Councillors involved in sold to them at high prices, leading to lower utilisation of drugs – often by patients who cannot afford the investigation were harassed out of council and we did not defend them (Chatiza Kudzai). them (Tizora 2009). There are also reports of drugs being stolen in hospitals thereby exacerbating drug shortages (Chene 2015). In addition, there are some MPs, councillors and government bureaucrats who act in a corrupt manner in order to maximise benets during their political term of office as there is no guarantee they will be re- Corruption in the education sector has devastating impacts. Global Trends, released recently by elected in the next election (Wafawarova 2011). In the city of Gweru, respondents gave reasons like poor Transparency International (TI), cited corruption in education as among the most signicant barriers to supervisory mechanisms, greed, poor remuneration and lack of motivation as some of the causes for attaining Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and realising the universal right to education. The corruption (ibid). Some local authorities and Ministries always complain of inadequate budgetary selling of entrance exams in advance in Zimbabwe contributes to the deterioration of learning and allocations. However, poor water and sewer reticulation systems are a result of the mismanagement of examination standards (Mambo 2012). In addition, corruption, inequitable distribution and misuse of nances and also prioritising personal incomes over service delivery.15 funds in the education sector may worsen inequality between groups in fractionalised societies and fuel favouritism of specic social, ethnic or geographic groups over others, potentially triggering discontent, The Social Costs of Corruption protest and social unrest (Miller-Grandvaux 2009). In these situations, parents are forced to hire private Certainly, the costs of corruption are not measured just in the amounts of money that are squandered or tutors, with high risks of manipulation and distortion of mainstream curricula, making free primary in stolen government resources, but in the absence of basic services that could have been provided with education prohibitively expensive for poor households (UNESCO 2003). that money and would have improved the lives of families and communities (UN Secretary General 2012). From a population welfare perspective, corrupt practices increase inequality and perpetuate poverty Specic to the local government sector in Zimbabwe, Mukonza (2013) reported that corrupt officials in (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2016). Reduced investment in social services also Chitungwiza Municipality deny the poor in the community access to houses and other opportunities to disproportionately affects the, poor and perpetuates inequality and poverty whilst administrative participate in the economic development of the municipality. People pay bribes to council officials to get corruption is highly correlated with poverty as poor people have to dispose of their income in order to services to which they have a democratic right, and only those who can afford to pay bribes get services access services, thus further limiting social mobility (ibid). on time. The result of this is social exclusion for many (Sithole 2013). Corruption reduces the effectiveness of public administration and impedes a local authority's ability to use its available resources to Social sector-specic studies show that corruption harms poor people more than other groups and diverts progressively attain better service delivery (ibid). For instance, when tenders are awarded to unqualied or desperately-needed funds from education, healthcare and other public services. For illustration, inadequately qualied constructors, the result is poor workmanship and buildings of a shorter life. More corruption in the health sector can be a matter of life and death, especially for poor people in developing so, the demolition of houses (that had been allowed by corrupt officials in the rst place) in Harare mostly countries (Hussmann 2011), and can have severe consequences for access, quality, equity and affected impoverished home-seekers, some of whom genuinely thought they were making a lifetime effectiveness of health care services (Chene 2015). Similarly, corruption effectively reduces the resources investment. available for health, and lowers the quality, equity and effectiveness of health care services, decreases the volume and increases the cost of services provided (Anti-Corruption Resource Centre 2008).

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Understanding Corruption in Social Service Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the Local Government Sector Continued...

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Understanding Corruption in Social Service Delivery in Zimbabwe: Case Studies from the The social impacts of corruption are not limited to one age group, class or ethnic group; nor are they the Local Government Sector same across these social categories. As reported by the TIZ Youth and Corruption Baseline (2014), Continued... corruption affected the youths so much because this denied them livelihoods. Young women are more vulnerable to corruption than their male counterparts, and this has implications for their access to health, education and justice. Women suffer corruption in two ways, rstly they are victims of bribe corruption and secondly they suffer sexual extortion,” says the report (ibid). This observation is similar to that made Ÿ Formal and informal spaces should be created for residents associations, ordinary people, and communities by Chatiza et al. (2013) who note that the victims of verbal abuse, bribery, corruption, and arrogant denial to claim their rights to social services and information. of services are normally women, children and poor people seeking social services. Ÿ There is a need for further empirical research on the social costs of corruption and more involvement of the media to expose corrupt practices. From a gender perspective, corruption increases the burden on women and girls (for instance when corrupt officials misuse funds for water provision) as women are responsible for fetching water in households (Chimanikire 2015). Corruption also hits women the hardest because they have to deal with Conclusion 17 problems of food security in households and the community at large. Paradoxically, the notion of From the foregoing, it can be seen that corruption is an everyday practice in providing and accessing corruption provokes images of people getting rich, yet the gender-corruption-poverty nexus is very social services in the context of the current local government sector. As noted above, corrupt practices by strong. For instance, poor women pay daily bribes, penalties and other illegal payments to municipal local government officials range from outing tender procedures, embezzling funds, demanding bribes, police to conduct street vending (ibid). For many poor women who survive on street vending, this drains to nepotism. For citizens, especially the poor, it is increasingly difficult to access services such as housing, their already paltry resources and further entrenches their poverty. health and education without paying bribes, getting into nepotistic interactions and corruption networks. Fundamentally, local government officials are the main culprits in fueling corruption, but this does not Finally, available studies in Zimbabwe argue that corruption has become institutionalized, and it ignore the fact that citizens also actively participate in corruption. Importantly, a coalescence of factors, reproduces itself across generations, breeding a culture of corruption – which has become more socially among them the protracted socio-economic crises and administrative inefficiencies, have given riven rise acceptable, normative, internalized, and perceived as a way of life (TIZ 2014, Chiweshe 2015). This erodes to corruption. the social and moral bre of society as corrupt and dishonest members are rewarded with a good life while honest and hardworking citizens live modestly (Mukonza 2013). This effectively holds up the corrupt The social costs of corruption are multifaceted and uneven across various social groups and they create as role models for youths in society, thus promoting such ill-practices at the expense of virtues such as inequalities and injustices in service provision. Evidently, it is the poor, vulnerable, women, and youths honesty and excellence (ibid). Consequently, corruption has since bred a culture of laziness where youths who disproportionately bear the burden created by corruption. These vulnerable groups are denied opt to 'make a quick buck' rather than work to earn a living (TIZ 2014). access to basic social services such as housing, education and health in cases where they cannot pay bribes or enter into nepotistic relationships. Citizens are forced to pay for services that are clearly spelt out Policy Options and Policy Recommendations as rights in the Constitution and paid for from public resources. This is evident in land scandals where Corruption in the local government sector has become endemic and thus eroded the social and moral housing land is concentrated in the hands of a few officials and those who are part of their corruption bre of society (Chatiza et al. 2013). It is with this in mind that this chapter makes the following networks whilst ordinary citizens are marginalised. Without sounding alarm bells, the chapter has also recommendations: shown that corruption is shaking the moral bre of society and threatening to reproduce a generation of dishonest youths. Any policies to ght corruption must, therefore, contend with these aspects and other Ÿ The Minister of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development has too much power that needs to be pertinent issues raised in the chapter. capped/regulated through checks and balances as provided for in the Constitution and through Parliament. Ÿ There is a need to enforce the 'publish what you pay principle' to ensure disclosure and transparency by local authorities in the use of resources. Ÿ Strengthening internal processes for accountability should be done in the areas of planning and budgeting, performance management, public integrity and oversight. Ÿ There is a need to lobby the government to adopt an Executive Mayoral System to allow mayors to operate without external interference. Ÿ Mandatory disclosure/declaration of assets by employees should be enforced as a means to monitor corrupt accumulation during the course of their employment. Ÿ The realignment of the Urban Councils Act and other Acts that govern the local government sector with the Constitution is critical in addressing on-going accountability challenges hence needs to be given serious attention. Ÿ Local authorities should be capacitated on e-governance and Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) to keep track of employees (institute biometric payroll), keep track of revenues and deal with debt collection. Ÿ All local authorities in the country must institute anti-corruption strategies. Ÿ The role of citizens in ghting corruptions needs to be emphasized, for instance, citizens can be capacitated to conduct social audits.

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76 2015 Annual State of Corruption 2015 Annual State of Corruption 77