DOCSLIB.ORG

Written Evidence from A1 (RCC26)

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Written Evidence from A1 (RCC26) Written evidence from A1 (RCC26) Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee Responding to Covid-19 and the Coronavirus Act 2020 inquiry I’m a UK citizen living and working in London. Like many other people, my normal life has been affected by COVID-19 and the lockdown. I’m responding to this call for evidence because I share a concern with others about the UK government’s delayed response to the pandemic. I believe that had the government acted sooner, many deaths may have been prevented. In fact, various risk experts were already calling for swift precautionary action to the outbreak as early as January 2020. There are many unanswered questions, which belong within the remit of an independent, statutory public inquiry, such as: • How could earlier government action have prevented deaths and lessened the impact of other adverse consequences from coronavirus? • Who was responsible for making key decisions and when? • What lessons can we learn to make sure the UK is prepared for extreme risks like pandemics in the future? I will comment on questions related to the UK government’s handling of COVID-19 but not the questions related to the Coronavirus Act 2020 as I do not know enough about the legal background to the Act to usefully comment. There are two key elements I want to add, that go beyond the questions asked: • Could one minute of silence be observed before the start of every session/hearing as a sign of respect for those who have suffered and died? • I would like to suggest Prof Nassim Nicholas Taleb1 (or one of his colleagues) is asked to be an Expert Witness. He (and his colleagues) have consistently been proven right on coronavirus before it became a global pandemic and he has relevant expertise in systemic risks. I will start by giving some background to my concerns about the UK government’s delayed response and then answer each question on the form and remit of a formal public inquiry into the handling of Covid-19. Thank you for you time. 1 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/uk-coronavirus-policy-scientific-dominic- cummings Why am I concerned? On 26 January 2020, Prof Nassim Taleb and Prof Yaneer Bar-Yam along with applied complexity scientist Dr Joseph Norman, published a note urging a robust precautionary response to the outbreak of coronavirus in Wuhan, China: “Policy- and decision-makers must act swiftly and avoid the fallacy that to have an appropriate respect for uncertainty in the face of possible irreversible catastrophe amounts to ‘paranoia’, or the converse a belief that nothing can be done.” 2 When the three authors wrote their January note,“the virus had reportedly infected fewer than 2,000 people worldwide and fewer than 60 people were dead. That number need not have been so high.” 3 Investigations by Reuters4 and the Guardian5 as well as a detailed timeline from Rupert Read and others6 show that the UK government did not act quickly or decisively enough to avoid catastrophic harm. Deaths could have been prevented. Evidence suggests the UK government were already aware of how serious the threat was as early as mid-January. There were multiple early warnings the UK could’ve acted on. Already at the end of February, several Italian towns went into lockdown7 following the deaths of two people and more than 100 infections. Other European countries soon followed with their own measures but the UK lagged behind.8 The scientific advice given to UK policymakers wrongly assumed COVID-19 could be treated the same as a flu pandemic. As the Guardian notes, ”Covid-19 is lethally different, new, its properties more uncertain, and the idea of addressing it by allowing it to move through the population and attain herd immunity was widely condemned for risking far too many lives.” 9 For example, research from Imperial College examined how effective less stringent ‘mitigation’ measures would be. They assumed that demand for intensive care units would be 2 http://necsi.edu/systemic-risk-of-pandemic-via-novel-pathogens-coronavirus-a-note 3 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/uk-coronavirus-policy-scientific-dominic- cummings 4 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-path-speci-idUSKBN21P1VF 5 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/revealed-the-inside-story-of-uk-covid-19-coronavirus-crisis 6 https://bylinetimes.com/2020/04/11/a-national-scandal-a-timeline-of-the-uk-governments-woeful-response-to- the-coronavirus-crisis/ 7 https://bylinetimes.com/2020/04/11/a-national-scandal-a-timeline-of-the-uk-governments-woeful-response-to- the-coronavirus-crisis/ 8 https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-what-are-the-lockdown-measures-across-europe/a-52905137 9 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/revealed-the-inside-story-of-uk-covid-19-coronavirus-crisis the same for flu and coronavirus. However, that changed when “Data from China soon showed this to be dangerously wrong, but the model was only updated when more data poured out of Italy, where intensive care was swiftly overwhelmed and deaths shot up”.10 11T his leads to questions such as: Who knew what information and when? Why was earlier action not taken? On the 16th March, Boris Johnson announced stringent new measures to contain coronavirus. A report from Imperial College researchers showed that the UK government’s ‘mitigation’ response (including ‘herd immunity’) would overwhelm hospitals with demand for intensive care beds and an estimated 250,000 people would die.12 This raises questions such as: How influential was the Imperial College report on decision making? Was ‘herd immunity’ actual government policy? At what point did policymakers realise the NHS would be overwhelmed? On 23rd March 2020, at least two and a half months after the first reported outbreak in China, the Prime Minister announced a strict national lockdown, ordering people to stay at home.13 By that point, the pandemic had grown exponentially, across the globe. Nassim Taleb and others criticise the UK government’s response On 25th March, Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Yaneer Bar-Yam, who both wrote the 26th January note, criticised the UK government’s response on two levels:14 • Policymakers reliance on flawed epidemiological modelling • Failing to act quickly enough in the face of a systemic threat Modelling: The assumptions used to support the predictions were flawed with different assumptions leading to vastly different conclusions. Nassim Taleb and Yaneer Bar-Yam ask: “What if these assumptions are wrong? Have they been tested? The answer is often no. For academic papers, this is fine. Flawed theories can provoke discussion. Risk management – like wisdom – requires robustness in models.” This makes the words of British statistician George Box insufficient: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” Nassim Taleb gets to the point: "All models are wrong, many are useful, some are deadly." 15 10 https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/mar/25/coronavirus-exposes-the-problems-and-pitfalls-of- modelling 11 https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College- COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf 12 https://www.ft.com/content/249daf9a-67c3-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3 13 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/23/boris-johnsons-address-to-the-nation-in-full 14 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/uk-coronavirus-policy-scientific-dominic- cummings 15 https://twitter.com/nntaleb/status/882665721716781056 Decision-making: More importantly, you don’t need a complicated model to make life- saving decisions, as Taleb and Bar-Yam write:“Our research did not use any complicated model with a vast number of variables, no more than someone watching an avalanche heading in their direction calls for complicated statistical models to see if they need to get out of the way [emphasis added].” 16 They conclude: “when one deals with deep uncertainty, both governance and precaution require us to hedge for the worst. While risk-taking is a business that is left to individuals, collective safety and systemic risk are the business of the state. Failing that mandate of prudence by gambling with the lives of citizens is a professional wrongdoing that extends beyond academic mistake; it is a violation of the ethics of governing [emphasis added]. The obvious policy left now is a lockdown, with overactive testing and contact tracing: follow the evidence from China and South Korea rather than thousands of error-prone computer codes. So we have wasted weeks, and ones that matter with a multiplicative threat.” 17 A Public Inquiry: Accountability and Learning Lessons The UK public, at the very least, deserve answers to the questions raised and a statutory public inquiry would be the first step to accountability. What form is the most appropriate for an inquiry into the UK response to the Coronavirus pandemic? I believe their should be a full, independent, statutory public inquiry into the government’s handling of COVID-19. Given the severity of the pandemic and seriousness of the allegations of UK government inaction, the inquiry should have the power to summons witnesses for oral evidence or to produce documents, while witnesses should be sworn in under oath. How should the balance between comprehensiveness and timeliness be managed? Once the key issues have been identified, the inquiry could be broken down into more manageable areas, focussing on key questions, rather than having a single, large scale public inquiry. This allows the inquiry to respond flexibly to changing circumstances, while being able to deliver interim conclusions on specific questions. Should the purpose of the inquiry be on accountability or more forward-looking, focussed on lesson learning and improving policy? The inquiry should focus on both aspects and could be usefully split into two parts, focussing on accountability and learning lessons to improve policy.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Are We Fooled by Randomness? 1 Are We Fooled by Randomness— by Steve Scoles by Steve Scoles
    s s& RewardsISSUE 52 AUGUST 2008 ARE WE FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS? 1 Are We Fooled By Randomness— By Steve Scoles By Steve Scoles 2 Chairperson’s Corner aul Depodesta, former assistant general By Tony Dardis manager of the Oakland A’s baseball team P tells a funny story about the news media: 7 An Analyst’s Retrospective on In 2003, the A’s star shortstop and previous Investment Risk year’s league MVP Miguel Tejada was in Management his final year of his contract. Being a small By James Ramenda market team with relatively low revenue, the A’s decided that they simply did not have 11 Quarterly Focus the money to sign Tejada to a new contract. Rather than have season-long uncertainty around the Customizing LDI contract negotiations, they decided to tell Tejada and the media during spring training that while they By Aaron Meder would like to have Tejada on the team after the end of the season, they were simply not in a position to sign him to a new contract. 17 The Impact of Stock Price Distributions on Selecting So, for the first six weeks of the season, Tejada’s overall performance is poor and he has a a Model to Value batting average around .160. The media starts asking Depodesta if it’s because Tejada doesn’t Share-Based Payments under FASB Statement have a contract. After being pushed several times, Depodesta tells the media that Tejada’s No. 123 (R)1 performance likely has nothing to do with the contract and that he bets that by the end of the By Mike Burguess season, Tejada will have about the same production numbers as he did the last couple of years.
    [Show full text]
  • Nassim Taleb: You Cannot Become Fat in One Day, but You Can Become Enormously Wealthy!
    Interview: NASSIM TALEB: YOU CANNOT BECOME FAT IN ONE DAY, BUT YOU CAN BECOME ENORMOUSLY WEALTHY! On November 7 the Controllers Institute will hold it’s annual conference. One of the more interesting, but maybe less well-known keynote speakers will be Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of bestsellers Fooled By Randomness and more recently The Black Swan. Taleb divides our environment in Mediocristan and Extremistan; two domains in which the ability to understand the past and predict the future is radically different. In Mediocristan, events are generated by an underlying random process with a ‘normal’ distribution. These events are often physical and observable and they tend to cluster in a Gaussian distribution pattern, around the middle. Most people are near the average height and no adult is more than nine feet tall. But in Extremistan, the right-hand tail of events is thick and long and the outlier, the wildly unlikely event (with either enormously positive or enormously negative consequences) is more common than our general experience would indicate. Bill Gates is more than a little wealthier than the average. 9/11 was worse than just a typical bad day in New York City. Taleb states that too often in dealing with events of Extremistan we use our Mediocristan intuitions. We turn a blind eye to the unexpected. To risks, but also, all too often, to serendipitous opportunities. Editor Jan Bots talks with Taleb about chance, risk and how to cope with it in the real world. Professor Taleb, how would you introduce yourself specialized in complex derivatives on the one hand, to our readers? and probability theory on the other.
    [Show full text]
  • Nassim Taleb's
    Article from: Risk Management March 2010 – Issue 18 CHAIRSPERSON’SGENERAL CORNER Should Actuaries Get Another Job? Nassim Taleb’s work and it’s significance for actuaries By Alan Mills INTRODUCTION Nassim Nicholas Taleb is not kind to forecasters. In fact, Perhaps we should pay attention he states—with characteristic candor—that forecasters are little better than “fools or liars,” that they “can cause “Taleb has changed the way many people think more damage to society than criminals,” and that they about uncertainty, particularly in the financial mar- should “get another job.”[1] Because much of actuarial kets. His book, The Black Swan, is an original and work involves forecasting, this article examines Taleb’s audacious analysis of the ways in which humans try assertions in detail, the justifications for them, and their to make sense of unexpected events.” significance for actuaries. Most importantly, I will submit Danel Kahneman, Nobel Laureate that, rather than search for other employment, perhaps we Foreign Policy July/August 2008 should approach Taleb’s work as a challenge to improve our work as actuaries. I conclude this article with sug- “I think Taleb is the real thing. … [he] rightly under- gestions for how we might incorporate Taleb’s ideas in stands that what’s brought the global banking sys- our work. tem to its knees isn’t simply greed or wickedness, but—and this is far more frightening—intellectual Drawing on Taleb’s books, articles, presentations and hubris.” interviews, this article distills the results of his work that John Gray, British philosopher apply to actuaries. Because his focus is the finance sector, Quoted by Will Self in Nassim Taleb and not specifically insurance or pensions, the comments GQ May 2009 in this article relating to actuarial work are mine and not Taleb’s.
    [Show full text]
  • An Affront to Dignity, Inclusion and Equality: Coronavirus and the Impact of Law, Policy and Practice on People with Disabilities in the United Kingdom
    Report Recommendations - An Affront to Dignity, Inclusion and Equality: Coronavirus and the impact of law, policy and practice on people with disabilities in the United Kingdom In the following areas our Report urges the government to: On reforming the Coronavirus Act 2020, disability rights and mitigating effects of the pandemic 1. Undertake an immediate review of legislation passed during the coronavirus crisis and communication thereof. In doing so, we ask that the government change this legislation and all related policymaking to meet its duties under the Equality Act 2010, and commitments to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and take steps to avoid or mitigate any potential disadvantage for disabled people. 2. Implement recommendations made by the 2016 House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Equality Act 2010 and Disability, and by the Women and Equalities Committee, on enhancing the enforcement of the Equality Act 2010, both by removing deterrents to individuals bringing disability discrimination cases; and by measures which embed the monitoring and enforcement of relevant duties in the work of regulatory and inspection bodies. 3. Undertake an inquiry on the impact of COVID-19 on disabled people to examine why this group has carried such a heavy burden for the pandemic, including the scale of Covid-19 related deaths. 4. Establish a Covid-19 Disability Inclusive Response and Recovery Group, of experts by experience with disabilities and Disabled People’s Organisations, to ensure disabled people are central to decision-making on the economic and social recovery to the pandemic and guidance. 5.
    [Show full text]
  • COVID-19 and the Use and Scrutiny of Emergency Powers
    HOUSE OF LORDS Select Committee on the Constitution 3rd Report of Session 2021–22 COVID-19 and the use and scrutiny of emergency powers Ordered to be printed 2 June 2021 and published 10 June 2021 Published by the Authority of the House of Lords HL Paper 15 Select Committee on the Constitution The Constitution Committee is appointed by the House of Lords in each session “to examine the constitutional implications of public bills coming before the House; and to keep under review the operation of the constitution and constitutional aspects of devolution.” Membership The Members of the Constitution Committee are: Baroness Corston Baroness Fookes Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury Baroness Doocey Lord Hennessy of Nympsfield Baroness Suttie Baroness Drake Lord Hope of Craighead Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Chair) Lord Dunlop Lord Howarth of Newport Lord Faulks Lord Howell of Guildford Declarations of interests A full list of Members’ interests can be found in the Register of Lords’ Interests: https://members.parliament.uk/members/lords/interests/register-of-lords-interests/ Publications All publications of the committee are available at: https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/172/constitution-committee/ Parliament Live Live coverage of debates and public sessions of the committee’s meetings are available at: http://www.parliamentlive.tv Further information Further information about the House of Lords and its committees, including guidance to witnesses, details of current inquiries and forthcoming meetings is available at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/lords Committee staff The current staff of the committee are Michael Torrance (Clerk), Ava Mayer (Policy Analyst) and Dan Weedon (Committee Assistant).
    [Show full text]
  • Building and Sustaining Antifragile Teams
    Audrey Boydston Dave Saboe Building and Sustaining Antifragile Teams “Some things benefit from shocks; they thrive and grow when exposed to volatility, randomness, disorder, and stressors and love adventure, risk, and uncertainty.” Nassim Nicholas Taleb FRAGILE: Team falls apart under stress and volatility ROBUST: Team is not harmed by stress and volatility ANTIFRAGILE: Team grows stronger as a result of stress and volatility “Antifragility is beyond resilience or robustness. The resilient resists shocks and stays the same; the antifragile gets better” - Nassim Nicholas Taleb Why Antifragility? Benefit from risk Adaptability and uncertainty Better outcomes Growth of people More innovation Can lead to antifragile code Where does your team fit? Fragile Robust Antifragile Prerequisites for Antifragility Psychological Safety What does safety sound like? Create a safe environment Accountability Honesty Healthy Conflict Respect Open Communication Safety and Trust Responsibility Radical Antifragile Candor Challenge Each Other Love Actively Seek Differing Views Growth Mindset Building Antifragile Teams Getting from Here to There Fragile Robust Antifragile “The absence of challenge degrades the best of the best” - Nassim Nicholas Taleb Fragile The Rise and Fall of Antifragile Teams Antifragile Robust Eustress Learning Mindset Just enough stressors + recovery time Stress + Rest = Antifragile Take Accountability I will . So that . What you can do Change your questions Introduce eustress + rest Innovate Building and Sustaining Antifragile Teams Audrey Boydston @Agile_Audrey Dave Saboe @MasteringBA.
    [Show full text]
  • Mild Vs. Wild Randomness: Focusing on Those Risks That Matter
    with empirical sense1. Granted, it has been Mild vs. Wild Randomness: tinkered with using such methods as Focusing on those Risks that complementary “jumps”, stress testing, regime Matter switching or the elaborate methods known as GARCH, but while they represent a good effort, Benoit Mandelbrot & Nassim Nicholas Taleb they fail to remediate the bell curve’s irremediable flaws. Forthcoming in, The Known, the Unknown and the The problem is that measures of uncertainty Unknowable in Financial Institutions Frank using the bell curve simply disregard the possibility Diebold, Neil Doherty, and Richard Herring, of sharp jumps or discontinuities. Therefore they editors, Princeton: Princeton University Press. have no meaning or consequence. Using them is like focusing on the grass and missing out on the (gigantic) trees. Conventional studies of uncertainty, whether in statistics, economics, finance or social science, In fact, while the occasional and unpredictable have largely stayed close to the so-called “bell large deviations are rare, they cannot be dismissed curve”, a symmetrical graph that represents a as “outliers” because, cumulatively, their impact in probability distribution. Used to great effect to the long term is so dramatic. describe errors in astronomical measurement by The good news, especially for practitioners, is the 19th-century mathematician Carl Friedrich that the fractal model is both intuitively and Gauss, the bell curve, or Gaussian model, has computationally simpler than the Gaussian. It too since pervaded our business and scientific culture, has been around since the sixties, which makes us and terms like sigma, variance, standard deviation, wonder why it was not implemented before. correlation, R-square and Sharpe ratio are all The traditional Gaussian way of looking at the directly linked to it.
    [Show full text]
  • COVID-19: Implementation of Easements
    COVID-19: Implementation of Easements This resource has been prepared for tri.x customers. Its purpose is to support practitioners and managers on the frontline when the local authority has decided to implement some or all of the easements to the Care Act 2014 set out in sections 14 and 15 of the Coronavirus Act 2020. It provides information about carrying out revised adult care and support duties and functions, and which procedures this is likely to have an impact upon. Use the Contents list on the following page to find the information you are looking for. Updated 13.10.20 NOTE: If your local authority is managing to sustain all duties under the Care Act this guidance does not apply. Key decision makers should see Care Act easements: guidance for local authorities for guidance on deciding whether/when to apply the easements. Contents 1. Making Decisions-key section to be read by all 2. General Responsibilities of the Care Act 3. Safeguarding and Risk Assessment 4. Referrals and Assessment 5. Eligibility 6. Meeting Needs 7. Review/Revision of Plans 8. Transition 9. Financial Assessment & Charging 10. NHS Continuing Healthcare 11. Hospital Discharge 12. Continuity of Care Arrangements 13. Protecting Moveable Property and Belongings 14. End of Life 15. No Recourse to Public Funds 16. AHMP Appendix 1: Government Guidance Links 1. Making Decisions Local authorities will still be expected to do as much as they can to comply with their powers to meet needs during any period of easement and the duty of care they have towards an individual’s risk of serious neglect or harm still remains.
    [Show full text]
  • William Wragg MP Chairman Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee House of Commons 26 August 2020
    Edward Argar MP Minister of State for Health 39 Victoria Street London SW1H 0EU 020 7210 4850 William Wragg MP Chairman Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee House of Commons 26 August 2020 Dear William, Thank you for your letter of 16 July with some follow-up questions, further to the appearance of the Paymaster General and myself, along with senior officials from the Department of Health and Social Care and the Cabinet Office before your committee on 14 July. May I apologise for the delay in responding to your letter, however, there were a number of detailed questions within it, and we have used the time to give you answers which are as detailed as possible. I have provided a response to your further points below, covering the matters for which my Department are responsible. I understand The Paymaster General has replied separately. Ministerial responsibilities I know that Paymaster General has responded to your question about ministerial responsibilities across government as a whole. In addition to the strategic direction provided by the Secretary of State, I have attached a list of DHSC ministers’ Covid and non-Covid ministerial responsibilities at Annex A. Exercise Cygnus Question 103 was about Exercise Cygnus which as the committee will be aware was conducted in 2016, with its findings circulated to relevant Ministers in 2017. The release of the Exercise Cygnus report is currently under review and Ministers will be making a decision shortly – for this reason, I am not currently able to share a copy with the committee. I can, however, confirm that Government accepted the lessons identified by Exercise Cygnus which, along with learning from previous pandemics, infectious disease outbreaks and incidents, and other preparedness exercises, continue to inform work undertaken by Government and a range of stakeholders, including expert advisory groups and local emergency planners.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of the Pandemic on Disabled People
    Prynhawn da - Good afternoon!1 The impact of the pandemic on disabled people So much more than Covid-19 Ann N.James 2 Crossing the Rubicon(1) ➢ 30th January 2020 WHO declares Public Health Emergency of International Concern ➢ 3rd March 2020 Covid Plan published by UK Government and Devolved adminsitrations (1) Increasingly apparent – UK Nations are not equipped for a pandemic ➢ Weak Public Health Services - Decimated by austerity and organisational changes - Essential Equipement for a Respiratory Virus not available - Depleted NHS workforce - Fragmented Social Care workforce 3 Crossing the Rubicon(2) “We prepared for the wrong pandemic”(2) Jeremy Hunt Former Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, UK. 4 Crossing the Rubicon(3) Welsh Government in lockstep with UK Government Divergence limited by devolution settlement and geography Consequently, Covid-19 impact similar across the nations of the UK Highest death rates per 100,000 5 Crossing the Rubicon(4) UK Strategy one of containment and delay not suppression Strategy exacerbated by indecisiveness Results in catastrophic loss of life and illness Death rates from SE Asia, New Zealand and Australia tell us this was not inevitable 6 Legislating for Coronavirus Coronavirus Act 2020 receives Royal Assent on the 25th March Four nations suspend a raft of legilslative duties and powers Described as the ‘most draconian legislation in peace time’(3) In relation to social care, it allows for the relaxing of duties and powers relating to assessment, and meeting needs for care and
    [Show full text]
  • The Time the Children Didn't Go to School
    THE TIME THE CHILDREN DIDN’T GO TO SCHOOL ANNABELLE HAYES FOREWORD ......................................................... 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................. 4 APRIL 2020 ............................................................ 5 MAY, 2020 ............................................................ 33 JUNE, 2020 .......................................................... 63 JULY, 2020 ......................................................... 102 AUGUST, 2020 .................................................... 110 SEPTEMBER, 2020 ............................................ 114 OCTOBER, 2020 ............................................... 129 NOVEMBER, 2020 ........................................... 152 DECEMBER, 2020 ............................................ 166 JANUARY, 2021 ................................................. 176 FEBRUARY, 2021 .............................................. 202 MARCH, 2021 .................................................... 223 AFTERWORD ................................................... 230 2 FOREWORD In March 2020, schools, nurseries and colleges in the United Kingdom were shut down in response to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. By 20 March, all schools in the UK had closed to all children except those of key workers and children considered vulnerable. After a month of numbness at having all the children home, I started these diaries to document the unprecedented time when the children didn’t go to school. When the world stopped, the children didn’t – this records their
    [Show full text]
  • Written Evidence from S.J. Groenewegen BEM (RCC20)
    Written evidence from S.J. Groenewegen BEM (RCC20) Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee Responding to Covid-19 and the Coronavirus Act 2020 inquiry I am providing evidence as a private citizen who is currently self-employed as a freelance author, but who has 25 years of experience in the public administration arena. I was employed as a Civil Servant from January 2005 to September 2019, specifically at the National Crime Squad of England and Wales, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the National Crime Agency (NCA), and HM Prison and Probation Service (England and Wales). I worked in a variety of roles at practitioner and middle management levels. Prior to migrating to the UK in 2004, I worked in the Australian public service as a government policy officer in the areas of occupational health and safety, and then policing and national security. My concerns about how the UK Government responded stem from my experience in risk assessment and management, national security and public safety as they relate to the criminal justice system. My evidence draws on my broad experience in these fields but does not refer to any specific example. In my capacity as a private citizen, I am responding to the additional questions on the nature of an inquiry and not the original set of questions posed about the legislative framework. What form is the most appropriate for an inquiry into the UK response to the Coronavirus pandemic? Should it be a statutory inquiry and, if not, what form of non- statutory inquiry should be held? Statutory, under the Inquiries Act 2005.
    [Show full text]