Written evidence from A1 (RCC26)

Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee Responding to Covid-19 and the Coronavirus Act 2020 inquiry

I’m a UK citizen living and working in London. Like many other people, my normal life has been affected by COVID-19 and the lockdown.

I’m responding to this call for evidence because I share a concern with others about the UK government’s delayed response to the pandemic. I believe that had the government acted sooner, many deaths may have been prevented. In fact, various risk experts were already calling for swift precautionary action to the outbreak as early as January 2020.

There are many unanswered questions, which belong within the remit of an independent, statutory public inquiry, such as:

• How could earlier government action have prevented deaths and lessened the impact of other adverse consequences from coronavirus?

• Who was responsible for making key decisions and when?

• What lessons can we learn to make sure the UK is prepared for extreme risks like pandemics in the future?

I will comment on questions related to the UK government’s handling of COVID-19 but not the questions related to the Coronavirus Act 2020 as I do not know enough about the legal background to the Act to usefully comment.

There are two key elements I want to add, that go beyond the questions asked:

• Could one minute of silence be observed before the start of every session/hearing as a sign of respect for those who have suffered and died?

• I would like to suggest Prof Nassim Nicholas Taleb1 (or one of his colleagues) is asked to be an Expert Witness. He (and his colleagues) have consistently been proven right on coronavirus before it became a global pandemic and he has relevant expertise in systemic risks.

I will start by giving some background to my concerns about the UK government’s delayed response and then answer each question on the form and remit of a formal public inquiry into the handling of Covid-19.

Thank you for you time.

1 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/uk-coronavirus-policy-scientific-dominic- cummings Why am I concerned?

On 26 January 2020, Prof Nassim Taleb and Prof Yaneer Bar-Yam along with applied complexity scientist Dr Joseph Norman, published a note urging a robust precautionary response to the outbreak of coronavirus in Wuhan, China: “Policy- and decision-makers must act swiftly and avoid the fallacy that to have an appropriate respect for uncertainty in the face of possible irreversible catastrophe amounts to ‘paranoia’, or the converse a belief that nothing can be done.” 2

When the three authors wrote their January note,“the virus had reportedly infected fewer than 2,000 people worldwide and fewer than 60 people were dead. That number need not have been so high.” 3

Investigations by Reuters4 and the Guardian5 as well as a detailed timeline from Rupert Read and others6 show that the UK government did not act quickly or decisively enough to avoid catastrophic harm. Deaths could have been prevented. Evidence suggests the UK government were already aware of how serious the threat was as early as mid-January.

There were multiple early warnings the UK could’ve acted on. Already at the end of February, several Italian towns went into lockdown7 following the deaths of two people and more than 100 infections. Other European countries soon followed with their own measures but the UK lagged behind.8

The scientific advice given to UK policymakers wrongly assumed COVID-19 could be treated the same as a flu pandemic. As the Guardian notes, ”Covid-19 is lethally different, new, its properties more uncertain, and the idea of addressing it by allowing it to move through the population and attain herd immunity was widely condemned for risking far too many lives.” 9

For example, research from Imperial College examined how effective less stringent ‘mitigation’ measures would be. They assumed that demand for intensive care units would be

2 http://necsi.edu/systemic-risk-of-pandemic-via-novel-pathogens-coronavirus-a-note 3 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/uk-coronavirus-policy-scientific-dominic- cummings 4 http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-britain-path-speci-idUSKBN21P1VF 5 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/revealed-the-inside-story-of-uk-covid-19-coronavirus-crisis 6 https://bylinetimes.com/2020/04/11/a-national-scandal-a-timeline-of-the-uk-governments-woeful-response-to- the-coronavirus-crisis/ 7 https://bylinetimes.com/2020/04/11/a-national-scandal-a-timeline-of-the-uk-governments-woeful-response-to- the-coronavirus-crisis/ 8 https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-what-are-the-lockdown-measures-across-europe/a-52905137 9 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/29/revealed-the-inside-story-of-uk-covid-19-coronavirus-crisis the same for flu and coronavirus. However, that changed when “Data from China soon showed this to be dangerously wrong, but the model was only updated when more data poured out of Italy, where intensive care was swiftly overwhelmed and deaths shot up”.10 11T his leads to questions such as: Who knew what information and when? Why was earlier action not taken?

On the 16th March, Boris Johnson announced stringent new measures to contain coronavirus. A report from Imperial College researchers showed that the UK government’s ‘mitigation’ response (including ‘herd immunity’) would overwhelm hospitals with demand for intensive care beds and an estimated 250,000 people would die.12 This raises questions such as: How influential was the Imperial College report on decision making? Was ‘herd immunity’ actual government policy? At what point did policymakers realise the NHS would be overwhelmed?

On 23rd March 2020, at least two and a half months after the first reported outbreak in China, the Prime Minister announced a strict national lockdown, ordering people to stay at home.13 By that point, the pandemic had grown exponentially, across the globe.

Nassim Taleb and others criticise the UK government’s response

On 25th March, Nassim Nicholas Taleb and Yaneer Bar-Yam, who both wrote the 26th January note, criticised the UK government’s response on two levels:14

• Policymakers reliance on flawed epidemiological modelling

• Failing to act quickly enough in the face of a systemic threat

Modelling: The assumptions used to support the predictions were flawed with different assumptions leading to vastly different conclusions. Nassim Taleb and Yaneer Bar-Yam ask: “What if these assumptions are wrong? Have they been tested? The answer is often no. For academic papers, this is fine. Flawed theories can provoke discussion. Risk management – like wisdom – requires robustness in models.” This makes the words of British statistician George Box insufficient: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.” Nassim Taleb gets to the point: "All models are wrong, many are useful, some are deadly." 15

10 https://www.theguardian.com/science/2020/mar/25/coronavirus-exposes-the-problems-and-pitfalls-of- modelling 11 https://www.imperial.ac.uk/media/imperial-college/medicine/sph/ide/gida-fellowships/Imperial-College- COVID19-NPI-modelling-16-03-2020.pdf 12 https://www.ft.com/content/249daf9a-67c3-11ea-800d-da70cff6e4d3 13 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/mar/23/boris-johnsons-address-to-the-nation-in-full 14 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/uk-coronavirus-policy-scientific-dominic- cummings 15 https://twitter.com/nntaleb/status/882665721716781056 Decision-making: More importantly, you don’t need a complicated model to make life- saving decisions, as Taleb and Bar-Yam write:“Our research did not use any complicated model with a vast number of variables, no more than someone watching an avalanche heading in their direction calls for complicated statistical models to see if they need to get out of the way [emphasis added].” 16

They conclude: “when one deals with deep uncertainty, both governance and precaution require us to hedge for the worst. While risk-taking is a business that is left to individuals, collective safety and systemic risk are the business of the state. Failing that mandate of prudence by gambling with the lives of citizens is a professional wrongdoing that extends beyond academic mistake; it is a violation of the ethics of governing [emphasis added].

The obvious policy left now is a lockdown, with overactive testing and contact tracing: follow the evidence from China and South Korea rather than thousands of error-prone computer codes. So we have wasted weeks, and ones that matter with a multiplicative threat.” 17

A Public Inquiry: Accountability and Learning Lessons

The UK public, at the very least, deserve answers to the questions raised and a statutory public inquiry would be the first step to accountability.

What form is the most appropriate for an inquiry into the UK response to the Coronavirus pandemic?

I believe their should be a full, independent, statutory public inquiry into the government’s handling of COVID-19. Given the severity of the pandemic and seriousness of the allegations of UK government inaction, the inquiry should have the power to summons witnesses for oral evidence or to produce documents, while witnesses should be sworn in under oath.

How should the balance between comprehensiveness and timeliness be managed?

Once the key issues have been identified, the inquiry could be broken down into more manageable areas, focussing on key questions, rather than having a single, large scale public inquiry. This allows the inquiry to respond flexibly to changing circumstances, while being able to deliver interim conclusions on specific questions.

Should the purpose of the inquiry be on accountability or more forward-looking, focussed on lesson learning and improving policy?

The inquiry should focus on both aspects and could be usefully split into two parts, focussing on accountability and learning lessons to improve policy.

16 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/uk-coronavirus-policy-scientific-dominic- cummings 17 https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/25/uk-coronavirus-policy-scientific-dominic- cummings How wide should the inquiry range? Should it include the devolved administrations?

The inquiry should include devolved administrations. Perhaps the inquiry should be devolved itself, with separate inquiries for Scotland, Northern Ireland, England and Wales. For example, Scotland’s response differed from England’s in some respects. The findings from each area could then be aggregated later.

What experience and qualities should the Chair have?

The Chair should be an experienced, impartial and independent member of the judiciary, supported by a diverse panel with the relevant expertise.

Should the Chair be supported by a panel? If so, what knowledge and experience must the panel include?

The panel must include someone with experience of systemic and extreme risk equivalent to the experience of these experts: Prof Nassim Taleb (US), Prof Yaneer Bar-Yam (US), Dr Joseph Norman (US) or Dr Pasquale Cirillo (The Netherlands).18

As a minimum, I recommend calling Nassim Nicholas Taleb to give evidence as an Expert Witness. If any of those named above are not available, I would ask them to suggest competent UK based counterparts. All four have consistently demonstrated they understand extreme risks like coronavirus.

How should the Terms of Reference be agreed? Should consultation be undertaken first and, if so, how should this be conducted?

Given this inquiry affects everyone who lives in the UK, the terms of reference should be open to public consultation first, widely advertised and made accessible to large numbers of people.

The inquiry should meet people where they are at. For example, many people may not be digitally literate, so the inquiry must be designed with people’s diverse needs in mind. If necessary, the inquiry should go to the regions worst affected by the virus to hear directly from people’s lived experience.

Further, I would ask the four specialists mentioned above to help shape the terms of reference.

What role should Parliament play? How much input should it have and how far should it have an oversight role?

The inquiry should be accountable to the general public as well as parliament. For example, a citizens assembly could be setup to give the necessary oversight.

18 https://www.nature.com/articles/s41567-020-0921-x What mechanisms are there to ensure that the recommendations of any inquiry are implemented?

There should be robust mechanisms to ensure recommendations from the inquiry are implemented. However, I don’t know the most effective way to ensure recommendations are implemented so here are a few ideas:

• All information should be made publicly available for everyone to scrutinise

• A citizens assembly should be regularly convened to check progress and how recommendations are being implemented

• A recommendations tracker should be setup that is reviewed regularly over the next few years

• Is there any way for policy makers to incur civil liability for failure to implement recommendations?

• More broadly speaking, could local communities be more involved in contingency planning for extreme events like a pandemic? Documents like the National Risk Register of Civil Contingencies are used to identify extreme risks like a pandemic. What would it look like to involve local communities in these kinds of exercises? This could be an opportunity to build more resilient communities.19

July 2020

19 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/national-risk-register-of-civil-emergencies