Written evidence from S.J. Groenewegen BEM (RCC20)

Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee Responding to Covid-19 and the Coronavirus Act 2020 inquiry

I am providing evidence as a private citizen who is currently self-employed as a freelance author, but who has 25 years of experience in the public administration arena.

I was employed as a Civil Servant from January 2005 to September 2019, specifically at the National Crime Squad of England and Wales, the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), the National Crime Agency (NCA), and HM Prison and Probation Service (England and Wales). I worked in a variety of roles at practitioner and middle management levels. Prior to migrating to the UK in 2004, I worked in the Australian public service as a government policy officer in the areas of occupational health and safety, and then policing and national security.

My concerns about how the UK Government responded stem from my experience in risk assessment and management, national security and public safety as they relate to the criminal justice system. My evidence draws on my broad experience in these fields but does not refer to any specific example.

In my capacity as a private citizen, I am responding to the additional questions on the nature of an inquiry and not the original set of questions posed about the legislative framework.

What form is the most appropriate for an inquiry into the UK response to the Coronavirus pandemic? Should it be a statutory inquiry and, if not, what form of non- statutory inquiry should be held?  Statutory, under the Inquiries Act 2005. This is for it to be able to compel witnesses to attend and for documents to be produced with criminal sanctions for non-compliance, to make it a statutory duty to take steps to secure public access to documents, and to ensure Maxwellisation takes place.  I am concerned that a non-statutory inquiry runs the risk of relevant documents and witnesses not being produced.  The inquiry should opt by default for public engagement as far as it is able to. Trust in the British government, public institutions and the mass media has eroded over the last decade or so and the inquiry being transparent would reduce accusations of ‘cover-up’.  The politicisation of elements of the Government’s response to COVID-19 means there is also a risk individuals and organisations may be unfairly criticised in public; having Maxwellisation procedures in place will mitigate that risk.

How should the balance between comprehensiveness and timeliness be managed? Can a single inquiry be both comprehensive and timely?  I believe that a single inquiry can be comprehensive and timely if it is adequately resourced and if the political will is there to support such scrutiny. However, there are indications that the current government does not have that will to welcome scrutiny of its decision-making.  There is an urgency to conduct an inquiry into the immediate legislative and public administrative response by the UK Government driven by the fact that we are in the midst of a pandemic with no vaccine (despite promising advances) and current resurgences in many parts of the world. While impossible to predict, it is more likely than not that the UK will see a resurgence of COVID-19 infections. An urgent question would be whether or not the legislative and public administrative response is able to adjust quickly to changing circumstances.  There is also a need for a comprehensive inquiry into the UK Government’s overall handling of the COVID-19 pandemic as it has progressed. This would be better served by a separate inquiry, or series of inquiries into specific elements.

Should the purpose of the inquiry be on accountability or more forward-looking, focussed on lesson learning and improving policy?  Lessons can and should always be learned, but in this case the purpose of the inquiry should focus on ministerial accountability because of the key decisions made by Cabinet Ministers in relation to the Coronavirus Act 2020 and beyond it. Key questions about the UK government’s decisions made in its response to the COVID- 19 pandemic include: o Current UK government information and procedures on a variety of national security issues are publicly available on gov.uk, which for all their brevity are comprehensive and included components highly applicable to guide the response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, it seemed that these were not referred to, or if they were, they were not uniformly applied. An obvious public administration question for an inquiry to answer is why. The key document I refer to is the UK National Risk Register, last published in September 2017, which included a section on Human Diseases that covered flu pandemics and other respiratory diseases. It linked to the UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy – including devolved plans – and noted the policy to engage in international collaboration with the World Health Organisation (WHO).1 o There is also an obvious public administration question about why the UK Government seemed to de-prioritise WHO guidance and advice from January and continuing through July, particularly in terms of adopting fundamental and well-established public health measures to find, isolate, test and treat cases, and to trace and quarantine contacts. Matching the timelines of WHO guidance2 with that of the UK government’s response in terms of policy, guidance, and legislation, will show numerous examples of divergence. The reason for the departure from these basic public health measures needs to be scrutinised, especially as those countries that followed WHO advice on COVID-19 have suffered far lower illness and death rates than the UK. o Evidence-based public policy and administration needs data from which to make decisions. In a pandemic situation, an effective as possible testing regime becomes paramount in order to understand transmission rates and geographic spread to inform decisions to contain infections. The testing regime in the UK remains alarmingly poor even allowing for improvements over the course of the pandemic to date. There are multiple questions as to

1 I was not involved with the development of the National Risk Register but was aware of it while I was employed as a Civil Servant. I do not draw on any special knowledge of it. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/644968/UK_ National_Risk_Register_2017.pdf - accessed 8 July 2020. 2 See https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline - accessed 8 July 2020. I have no connection with WHO, either now or in the past. why, but also detailed questions arising from the lack of transparency in both the selection and operations of the companies involved. These provisions were not included in the Coronavirus Act 2020, but perhaps this could be considered in future to mitigate the risks of confusion and potential for corruption. o Issues more generally to do with fast-time government procurement and outsourcing need to be scrutinised if only to address public concerns about a lack of transparency. I note the concerns raised by both Good Law Project and Every Doctor about PPE provision.3 Note that need for adequate supplies of PPE in case of a pandemic was identified in the 2017 National Risk Register. Provisions for this type of government procurement were also not included in the Coronavirus Act 2020, but perhaps this could be considered in future to mitigate the risks of confusion and potential for corruption.  Note that WHO Member States have agreed to an independent and comprehensive evaluation of lessons learned from the international response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

How wide should the inquiry range? Should it include the devolved administrations?  The focus should be on the UK Government response but it would be instructive to examine where this affected the devolved administrations.  There are also lessons to be learned from the devolved administrations where their performance was poorer than, the same as, or in line with established UK and international methods to limit spread of the virus. It would also be of use to see where there were differences of interpretation of the legislation, and also whether the Coronavirus Act helped or hindered the devolved administrations (and local authorities) to act in the interests of their people. Anecdotally, the devolved administrations’ communication strategies appeared more coherent than the UK government’s through ‘lockdown’. Again anecdotally, the UK Government often spoke to the UK but meant England.

What experience and qualities should the Chair have?  A good strategic understanding of the range of areas covered in the provisions of the Coronavirus Act and related legislation, and national emergency policies of the last five to ten years. An understanding of the National Risk Register and national security processes would be advantageous, as would an understanding of international mechanisms to respond to such pandemics.  They should be as inclusive as possible of the UK’s diverse population, and have an understanding of the devolved administrations and their interaction with the UK government.  Trust is vital in this role. They need to be politically independent, not a donor to political parties, and appointed through a transparent mechanism. They should not be appointed by the Prime Minister.

Should the Chair be supported by a panel? If so, what knowledge and experience must the panel include?  Yes. The Coronavirus Act and related legislation cover a broad range of areas. At least one of the panel members would need to have a good understanding of viruses

3 I have no connection with the Good Law Project and Every Doctor, either now or in the past. https://goodlawproject.org/news/the-ppe-fiasco/ - accessed 9 July 2020. and epidemiology. It would be useful to have knowledge and experience of international mechanisms to respond to global emergencies, particularly in health.  The main areas where an inquiry would throw light and therefore need a level of expertise on the panel are education, transport (public, logistical, international and national), government procurement, childcare, as well as public health (mental and physical) and social (aged) care.  The UK government’s communications strategy and delivery had failings in terms of coherence between legislation and guidance as time progressed. The impact of poor communication – in terms of delivery methods, timeliness and content – on adherence to legislation such as the Coronavirus Act is a factor worth considering.

How should the Terms of Reference be agreed? Should consultation be undertaken first and, if so, how should this be conducted?  Draft Terms of Reference should be prepared and then put out for a short but reasonable consultation period.  In addition to obvious stakeholders guided by the provisions in the Coronavirus Act, consultation should be actively sought out from marginalised groups. One example is chronically ill and disabled people who have a wealth of lived experience of relevance and months ago were raising likely issues of long-term health impacts for a proportion of COVID-19 survivors.  Noting the question on whether the ‘lockdown’ regulations should have come under the Coronavirus Act, there would be scope to include the needs for disabled people, caregivers4, etc., in scrutiny of plans to ease or amend restrictions.

What role should Parliament play? How much input should it have and how far should it have an oversight role?  Parliament itself, and through its cross-party Select Committees, has a vital role in the development of legislation suitable for dealing with a national emergency, and in scrutinising the performance of the Government in dealing with a national emergency. When dealing with a longer-term national emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic there is the opportunity to adjust legislation when needed and if a Statutory Instrument is unable to be used.

What mechanisms are there to ensure that the recommendations of any inquiry are implemented?  The Institute for Government in 20185 published a discussion paper on issues with accountability in government and a follow up report that presented ways to tackle the problems identified in their discussion paper. Many of their findings have come to the fore in the Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, for example the relationship between central government and local authorities. On that basis, I strongly suggest that their recommendations be considered when developing mechanisms to scrutinise implementation of inquiry recommendations. In particular, those recommendations tackling the culture of secrecy and ambiguity through

4 I use the term ‘caregivers’ widely; it refers to people involved in providing care to elderly people, sick and disabled people, and children. 5 I have no connection either now or in the past with the Institute for Government. However, their conclusions in these matters broadly ring true to me from my experience as a Civil Servant at practitioner and middle management levels. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/summary-accountability-modern-government- recommendations#:~:text=%20Seven%20recommendations%20for%20stronger%20accountability%20%201,pr actice%0AThere%20are%20many%20examples%20of%20instances...%20More%20 - accessed 9 July 2020. improving transparency in decision-making by Ministers, senior civil servants and Special Advisers.

July 2020