Jennifer Nagel University of Toronto Department of Philosophy, 170 St

Updated August 5, 2021

CV: Jennifer Nagel University of Toronto Department of Philosophy, 170 St. George Street, Toronto, Canada M5R 2M8 (416) 978-3311 Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto at Mississauga, Maanjiwe nendamowinan 6148 E-mail: [email protected]

EDUCATION Ph.D. in Philosophy (2000) University of Pittsburgh M.A. in Philosophy (1994) University of Pittsburgh B.A. in Philosophy (1990) University of Toronto

EMPLOYMENT Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto (2018-present) Research Lead, Schwartz Reisman Institute, University of Toronto (2020-2021) Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto (2007- 2018) Associate Chair, Graduate Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto (2013-2016) Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto (2000-07) Assistant Professor, University of New Mexico (1999-2000) Visiting Lecturer, University of New Mexico (1998-99)

FELLOWSHIPS AND DISTINCTIONS President, Canadian Philosophical Association (2021-22) President, American Philosophical Association Central Division (2018-19) Visiting Fellow, Australian National University (July – August 2019) Chancellor Jackman Humanities Institute Faculty Fellow, University of Toronto (2018-19) Invited Professor, École Normale Supérieure, Paris (May 2018) Visiting Fellow, All Souls College, Oxford (January – July 2012) Visitor, Institute for Advanced Studies, Jerusalem (September – December 2011)

RESEARCH INTERESTS Main areas of research: epistemology, philosophy of mind

PUBLICATIONS

Books • Knowledge: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2014. Arabic translation by Marwa Hashem, Abu Dhabi: Kalima Press, 2019; translations into Chinese and Romanian under contract.

Journal articles, commentaries, and book chapters 1. “The Distinctive Character of Knowledge”, forthcoming in Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2. “Mindreading in Conversation” (with Evan Westra), Cognition 210 (2021), 1-15. 3. “Losing Knowledge by Thinking about Thinking”, in Reasons, Justification and Defeat, Jessica Brown and Mona Simion, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021, 69-92. 4. “The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox”, in Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox, Igor Douven, ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021, 48-73. 5. “The Psychology of Epistemic Judgement” (with Jessica Wright), in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology, John Symons, Paco Calvo and Sarah Robins, eds. New York: Routledge, 2019, 746-765. 6. “Epistemic Territory”, The Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 93 (2019), 67- 86. 7. “Epistemic authority, episodic memory, and the sense of self”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences (2018), 35- 36. 8. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Mind & Language 32 (2017), 525-544. 9. “The Psychological Context of Contextualism” (with Julia Jael Smith), Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, J. Ichikawa, ed. New York: Routledge, 2017, 94-104. 10. “Knowledge and Reliability”, in Alvin Goldman and his Critics, Hilary Kornblith and Brian McLaughlin, eds. Oxford: Blackwell, 2016, 237-256. 11. “Armchair-friendly Experimental Philosophy” (with Kaija Mortensen), in A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter, eds. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2016, 53-70. 12. “Sensitive Knowledge: Locke on Skepticism and Sensation”, in the Blackwell Companion to Locke, Matthew Stuart, ed. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2016, 313-333. 13. “The Social Value of Reasoning,” Episteme 12 (2015), 297-308. 14. “The Meanings of Metacognition”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89:3 (2014), 710-718. 15. “Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 88 (2014), 217-39. 16. “The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions” (with Kenneth Boyd), in Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2014), 109-127. 17. “Authentic Gettier Cases: a reply to Starmans and Friedman” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition 129 (2013), 666-669. 18. “Lay Denial of Knowledge for Justified True Beliefs” (with Valerie San Juan and Raymond A. Mar), Cognition 129 (2013), 652-661. 19. “Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86:1 (2013), 179-199. 20. “Motivating Williamson’s Model Gettier Cases”, Inquiry 56:1 (2013), 54-62. 21. “Knowledge as a Mental State”, Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013), 275-310. 22. “Intuitions and Experiments: a Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85:3 (2012), 495-527. 23. “The Attitude of Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84:3 (2012), 678-685. 24. “Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases”, in Knowledge Ascription: New Essays, Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2012), 171-191. 25. “The Psychological Basis of the Harman-Vogel Paradox”, Philosophers’ Imprint 10:15 (2011), 1-28. 26. “Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism,” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010), 407-435. 27. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error” Philosophical Quarterly 60:239 (2010), 286-306. 28. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008), 279-294. 29. “Epistemic Intuitions”, Philosophy Compass 2:6 (November 2007), 792-819. 30. “Contemporary Skepticism and the Cartesian God,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (September 2005), 465-497. 31. “The Empiricist Conception of Experience”, Philosophy 75 (July 2000), 345-376.

Conference proceedings, encyclopedia entries and book reviews

1. Review of Hilary Kornblith, Second Thoughts and the Epistemological Enterprise, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, May 2020 2. “Classical Indian Skepticism: Reforming or Rejecting Philosohy?” Comparative Philosophy 10:2 (2019), 113-118. 3. “Gendler on Alief”, contribution to a book symposium on Tamar Gendler’s Intuition, Imagination and Philosophical Method, Analysis Reviews 74:4 (2012), 774-788. 4. “Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Problem of Mind-Independence”, Proceedings of the X International Kant Congress (Berlin: Walter DeGruyter 2008, 699-709). 5. “Empiricism”, in the The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia, Sarkar and Pfeifer, eds. (Routledge 2006), 235-243. 6. Review of Albert Casullo, A Priori Justification, The Philosophical Review (April 2006) 115:2, 251-255. 7. Review of Joel Pust, Intuitions as Evidence, Philosophy in Review (August 2001), 282-285. 8. Review of Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, ed. Sarah Hutton. Philosophy in Review (February 1998), 19-21.

2 WORK IN PROGRESS • Recognizing Knowledge: Intuitive and Reflective Epistemology, book manuscript (in preparation)

PAPERS PRESENTED AT MEETINGS AND SYMPOSIA 1. “Sharing States of Knowledge”, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology (delivered remotely), December 5, 2020 2. “The Hidden Primacy of Knowledge (and its limits)”, University of Geneva workshop on Knowledge and its Limits at 20 (delivered remotely), November 6, 2020 3. The Epistemic Backchannel”, Swedish Congress of Philosophy, Umeå, Sweden, June 16, 2019 4. “Philosophical and empirical methods in the study of mental state attribution”, Philosophical Methodology Workshop, Barcelona, Spain, March 15, 2019 5. “Epistemic Territory”, Presidential Address, American Philosophical Association Central Division, Denver, CO, February 22, 2019 6. “The first contexts of belief attribution”, Belief in context workshop, Hamburg, Germany, February 8, 2019 7. “The epistemological interest of conversational epistemics”, Midwest Epistemology Workshop, Notre Dame, IN, October 15, 2018 8. “The Psychological Dimension of the Lottery Paradox”, European Epistemology Network Conference, Amsterdam, June 30, 2018 9. “Methods in Epistemology,” Workshop on Philosophical Methodology, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, May 17, 2018 10. “Knowledge and Belief Attribution,” Logic and Cognitive Science Initiative Conference on Higher- Order Cognition, Raleigh, North Carolina, September 23, 2017 11. “Paradoxical Patterns of Intuition,” Urbino Summer School in Epistemology, Urbino, Italy, September 1, 2017 12. Factive and non-factive mental state attribution” Epistemology & Cognition Conference, William and Mary College, Virginia, September 10, 2016 13. “Attributing Knowledge versus Attributing False Belief”, European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, St. Andrews, UK, August 12, 2016 14. “Attributing Knowledge versus Attributing False Belief”, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, UT Austin, Texas, June 3, 2016 15. “Intuition and Replication,” at the 15th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Helsinki, Finland, August 8, 2015 16. “Implicit Bias, Explicit Bias, and the Hazards of Reflection,” Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Duke University, June 5, 2015 17. “Closure and Defeat,” Graduate Epistemology Conference, Edinburgh University, May 28, 2015 18. “Intuition and Replication,” Workshop on Methodology, Lingnan University, Hong Kong, May 15, 2015 19. “On the Boundary between Philosophy and Psychology”, Buffalo Annual Experimental Philosophy Conference, September 19, 2014 20. “Intuition, Reflection, and the Command of Knowledge,” Joint Sessions of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, Cambridge, UK, July 13, 2014. 21. “Distinctively Intuitive Judgments,” American Philosophical Association meetings, Chicago, March 1, 2014 22. “Intuition and Reflection,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Charleston, SC, February 8, 2014 23. “The social value of reasoning in epistemic justification”, Episteme Anniversary Conference, San Juan, Costa Rica, January 3, 2014 24. “Knowledge and Fallibility”, Midwest Epistemology Workshop, November 8, 2013. 25. “Gettier Cases and the Limits of Cognitive Agency”, Gettier at 50 Conference, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, June 21, 2013. 26. “Variations in Evidence Collection”, Formal Epistemology Festival, Toronto, June 4, 2013. 27. Knowledge and Human Fallibility”, Sources of Knowledge Conference, University of Vienna, Austria, May 2, 2013 28. “The Powers of Stipulation”, Experimental Philosophy Conference, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, April 6, 2013.

3 29. “Intuitions about Gettier cases: a cross-cultural approach”, American Philosophical Association meetings, Atlanta, December 30, 2012. 30. Disagreement and variation in epistemic intuitions”, Empirical Data and Philosophical Theorizing Conference, University of Barcelona, Spain, October 7, 2012 31. “Epistemic Intuitions as Evidence”, NEH Summer Institute on Experimental Philosophy, University of Arizona, July 6, 2012 32. “Robust Intuitions”, Arche Methodology Workshop, St. Andrews, Scotland, July 1, 2012 33. “Armchair-friendly experiments (and experiment-friendly armchairs)”, Philosophical Insights Conference, University of London, June 22, 2012 34. “Metacognition and the problem of binary and graded belief”, Epistemic Feelings and Metacognition Workshop, Bochum University, German, October 29, 2011 35. “Can there be progress in Philosophy?” Harvard Conference on Philosophical Progress, Cambridge, MA, September 16, 2011 36. “Intuitions and Experiments”, Rutgers Epistemology Conference, New Brunswick, NJ, May 6, 2011 37. “Armchair-friendly experiments”, APA mini-conference on Experimental Philosophy and Epistemology, San Diego, CA April 20, 2011 38. “Gettier and skeptical pressure cases: common mechanism, different value”, Knowledge Ascription Workshop, Arché Institute, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, October 17, 2010 39. “Epistemic Anxiety”, Interdisciplinary Workshop on Epistemic Norms; Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, October 8, 2010 40. “Stakes and the Special Value of Epistemic Intuitions”, Pragmatic Encroachment Workshop, Orange Beach, Alabama, May 2010 41. “The Strange Value of Intuitions about Knowledge”, Intuitions and Methodology Workshop; Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 2010 42. “Gettier Intuitions: Performance and Competence”, Arché Institute, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, October 2009 43. “A dual-systems account of the Harman-Vogel Paradox”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Ottawa, May 2009 44. “Automatic and Controlled Intuitions”, Toronto Workshop on Thought Experiments, University of Toronto, May 2009 45. “Empirical and Philosophical Approaches to Paradoxical Patterns of Intuition”, Arché Institute, St. Andrews, Scotland; April 2009 46. “Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”, Pacific Division APA, Vancouver, April 2009 47. “Evidentials and the Development of Social Reason”, Self and Other: a conference on social reason at Queen’s University, Kingston, December, 2008. 48. “Knowledge Ascriptions, Thoughts of Error, and Cognitive Bias”, Western Canadian Philosophical Association meetings, Edmonton, October 2008. 49. “Ascribing Knowledge and Thinking About Error: A Two-Systems Account”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Vancouver, June 2008 50. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking about Error”, Central Division APA, Chicago, April 2008 51. “Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes”, Central Division APA, Chicago, April 2007 52. “A Narrowly Kantian Objection to Broadly Kantian Epistemology”, International Kant Congress, São Paulo, Brazil, August 2005 53. “Epistemic Compatibilism in Normal Worlds”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, London, Ontario, June 2005 54. “Broadly Kantian Epistemology and the Limits of Mind-Independence”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, Chicago, April 2005 55. “Epistemic Compatibilism”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, San Francisco, March 2005 56. “Flexibility, Fallibility, and the Neo-Kantian A Priori” Conference on the A Priori in Contemporary Epistemology, Sherbrooke, PQ October 2004 57. “Coherence, mind-independence and objectivity”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Halifax, NS, May 2003 58. “Reichenbach’s Relation to Naturalism”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, San Francisco, CA, March 2003

4 59. “Quine and Foley on the Norms of Inquiry”, American Philosophical Association Meetings, Seattle, WA, March 2002 60. “The Reichenbach/Carnap Conception of the A Priori”, Assessing the Age of Analysis: 20th Century Philosophy in Retrospect, a conference on the history of analytic philosophy at SUNY Buffalo, November 2001

INVITED LECTURES AND COMMENTS 1. “Knowledge and knowledge attribution in neural networks”, Oxford Epistemology Group talk (delivered remotely), April 27, 2021 2. “Intuitive Knowledge Attribution: Lessons from Deep Learning”, Cogito epistemology series, University of Glasgow (delivered remotely), April 15, 2021 3. “Intuitive Knowledge Attribution: Lessons from Deep Learning”, University of Southern California Philosophy Department Colloquium talk (delivered remotely), March 26, 2021 4. “Gettier case recognition in humans and other animals”, Brown University Philosophy Department Colloquium talk (delivered remotely), February 26, 2021 5. “Gettier case recognition in humans and other animals”, New York City SWIP Colloquium talk (delivered remotely), December 18, 2020 6. “Initiating Common Knowledge”, University of Zurich colloquium talk, Switzerland, March 4, 2020 7. “Initiating Common Knowledge”, Princeton Cognitive Science Colloquium talk, Princeton, NJ, USA, November 21, 2019 8. “Epistemic Interaction”, a series of six lectures (the 2019 Frege Lectures), University of Tartu, Estonia, September 17-19, 2019 9. “World-oriented mindreading,” Monash University Seminar talk, Melbourne, Australia, August 9, 2019 10. “Epistemic Cooperation,” University of Melbourne Seminar talk, Melbourne, Australia, August 8, 2019 11. “The Epistemic Backchannel”, Macquarie University Seminar talk, Sydney, Australia, July 30, 2019 12. “The Epistemic Backchannel”, Australian National University Colloquium talk, July 18, 2019 13. “The Epistemic Backchannel”, University of Helsinki Colloquium talk, Finland, May 16, 2019 14. Comments on Ethan Mills, Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, Vancouver, BC, April 17, 2019 15. “The Epistemic Backchannel”, University of Connecticut Colloquium talk, March 29, 2019 16. “Conversational epistemics and epistemology”, University of Maryland Colloquium talk, College Park, MD, October 31, 2018 17. “Conversational epistemics and epistemology”, Stanford University Colloquium talk, October 5, 2018 18. “Losing knowledge by thinking about thinking”, UMass Amherst Colloquium talk, April 6, 2018 19. Symposium session commentator, Pragmatic Approaches to Skepticism, Pacific APA, San Diego, CA, March 30, 2018 20. “Losing knowledge by thinking about thinking”, Ohio State University Colloquium talk, February 9, 2018 21. Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception, APA Eastern Division Meetings, Savannah, January 3, 2018. 22. “The Natural Basis of Skepticism”, Washington University at St Louis, April 20, 2017 23. Comments on Michael Lynch, The Internet of Us: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data, APA Pacific Division Meetings, Seattle, April 2017 24. “Attitudes and Biases: Implicit and Explicit”, New York University, March 24, 2017 25. “Closure, Skepticism, and Defeat”, Mind & Language Seminar, New York University, February 28, 2017 26. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, University of Calgary, Alberta, February 3, 2017 27. “Extracting belief from knowledge,” Rutgers University, NJ, January 26, 2017 28. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Arizona State University, January 20, 2017 29. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Western University, December 2, 2016 30. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, MIT, November 19, 2016 31. “Factive and non-factive mental state attribution”, Indiana University, October 14, 2016 32. “Knowledge and Belief in Development,” Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, March 14, 2016 33. “Attitudes and Biases, Implicit and Explicit,” University of Oxford, November 26, 2015

5 34. “Epistemic standards across types of processing”, University of Southern California Colloquium, April 24, 2015 35. “Epistemic standards across types of processing”, University of Antwerp, March 26, 2015 36. “Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of Washington Colloquium, April 10, 2015 37. “On the Boundary Between Philosophy and Psychology,” Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, March 4, 2015 38. “Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of Pennsylvania, February 27, 2015 39. “Epistemic Self-Consciousness”, University of British Columbia, January 30, 2015 40. “Knowledge and Defeasibility”, University of Delaware, October 17, 2014 41. “Knowledge and Luck”, Cornell University, May 2, 2014 42. “Intuition and Reflection”, Claremont McKenna College, April 21, 2014 43. “Knowledge and Luck”, University of Michigan, April 4, 2014 44. “The Social Value of Reasoning”, University of Waterloo, January 10, 2014. 45. “Knowledge and Fallibility”, University of Rochester, December 6, 2013 46. “Knowledge and Fallibility”, McMaster University, November 22, 2013. 47. “Knowledge and Fallibility”, Johns Hopkins University, October 24, 2013. 48. “Model Gettier Cases and Metacognition”, Caltech University, Pasadena, February 15, 2013 49. “Model Gettier Cases and Metacognition”, Carleton University, Ottawa, February 1, 2013 50. Comments on Tamar Szabo Gendler, Chapel Hill Colloquium, November 2, 2012 51. “Disagreement and variation in epistemic intuitions”, University of Cincinnati Colloquium talk, October 26, 2012 52. “Disagreement and variation in epistemic intuitions”, McGill University Colloquium talk, September 21, 2012 53. Comments on Lara Buchak, Harvard University Belief Workshop, September 15, 2012 54. Intuition and introspection in epistemology”, University of Leeds, April 20, 2012 55. “Naïve and systematic theories in physics and epistemology”, University of Groningen, April 11, 2012 56. “Intuitions and Experiments”, Sheffield University, February 24, 2012 57. “Knowledge as a Mental State”, Van Leer Institute, Jerusalem, September 2011 58. Comments on Lee Iacono, “Psychological Answers to Contextualist Cases”, Central APA, Minneapolis, March 31, 2011 59. “The Intuitive Appeal of the KK Principle”, Stockholm University Colloquium talk, February 24, 2011 60. “Trustworthy and tricky intuitions about knowledge”, York University, January 24, 2011. 61. “Gettier Case Recognition”, UC Berkeley Colloquium talk, February 25, 2010 62. Comments on Jacob Caton, “Is ‘Justification’ an Ordinary Term?” Central APA, Chicago February 19, 2010 63. “Skepticism and the Hindsight Bias,” McMaster University, February 2009 64. “Knowledge Ascription and Epistemic Egocentrism”, University of Victoria, November 2008 65. Comments on Patrice Philie, “Entitlement as a Response to I-II-III Scepticism”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Vancouver, June 2008 66. Comments on Victor Kumar, “Knowing-How and Knowing-That”, Canadian Philosophical Association Meetings, Saskatoon, May 2007 67. “Intrusive thoughts, blind hunches, and belief-forming mechanisms”, University of Alberta, October 2005 68. “Objectivity and the Constitutive A Priori”, Warwick University, UK, February 2005 69. “Internalism and Externalism in the Good Case”, Bowling Green State University, Ohio, October 2004 70. Some Aspects of the Relation between Internalism and Externalism” Toronto M&E Workshop, September 2004 71. “Stroud’s Skepticism and the Cartesian God”, April 2003, Toronto Early Modern Philosophy Group 72. “Descartes on the difference between knowledge and comprehension”, Colloquium Talk, Carleton University, November 2000. 73. Comments on Daniel Flage’s “Hume’s Systematic Skepticism”, Conference: Reason and Rationality (Inland Pacific Northwest Philosophy Conference), April 1999 74. “Detection, Projection, and Knowledge of Necessity”, University of Toronto February 1999, University of New Mexico, January 1999 75. “Revising One’s Notion of Revision”, University of New Mexico, March 1998

6 76. “Two Dogmas of Naturalism”, University of Pittsburgh February 1997, University of Alberta, March 1997 77. “The Role of Knowledge of God in Descartes’ Epistemology”, Kansas State University, November 1995

SELECTED GRANTS AND AWARDS

• SSHRC Insight Grant: Knowledge first, then belief: the emergence and application of core epistemic concepts, April 2017 – March 2022, $127,250 • SSHRC Insight Grant: Intuitive Knowledge Ascription, April 2012 – March 2017, $104,920 • SSHRC Standard Research Grant: Metacognition and epistemic assessment, April 2009 – March 2012, $38,220 • Philosophers’ Annual: “Intuitions and Experiments: a Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology” ranked as one of the top ten philosophy articles of 2012

WORKSHOPS ORGANIZED

• “New Work in Indian Epistemology”, November 8, 2019. An interdisciplinary workshop on Indian Epistemology, highlighting the work of Gangesa. • “New Perspectives on Mental State Attribution”, December 10-11, 2018. A workshop bringing together researchers in artificial intelligence, social cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, linguistics and philosophy, on the topic of mental state attribution. • “What we all think about knowing”. An interdisciplinary workshop on cross-cultural uniformity and diversity in epistemic assessments, May 17, 2008.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

At the University of New Mexico (1998-2000): Undergraduate courses taught: Introduction to Philosophy Early Modern Philosophy Theory of Knowledge Seminar on Locke Independent Study on Epistemology Graduate courses taught: Graduate Seminar on Epistemological Naturalism Independent Study on Plato’s Theaetetus

At the University of Toronto (2000-present): Undergraduate courses taught: Philosophy of Cognitive Science 17th and 18th Century Philosophy Introduction to Philosophy Topics in Epistemology: The Rise and Fall of Logical Positivism Epistemology Later Analytic Philosophy Senior Seminar in Philosophy: Scepticism Seminar in Metaphysics and Epistemology: Intuitions in Philosophy

Graduate Courses taught: Seminar in Epistemology: Graded and Binary Epistemic States Seminar in Philosophy of Mind: Self-Knowledge Independent study course on implicit attitudes Seminar in Epistemology: Contemporary Theories of Knowledge

7 Philosophy Proseminar: Skepticism, Old and New Seminar in Epistemology: Evidence and Justification Seminar in Philosophy of Language: Contextualism Seminar in Epistemology: A Priori Knowledge in Recent Epistemology Independent study course on the metaphysics and epistemology of necessity Seminar in Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism Seminar in Epistemology: A Priori Knowledge and Objectivity Seminar in Epistemology: Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Responsibility Seminar in Epistemology: Basic Knowledge Professional Development Seminar

Graduate and post-doctoral supervisions: • Postdoctoral co-supervisor: Travis LaCroix, Game theory and social cognition (2020-21) • Postdoctoral supervisor: Evan Westra , The action-prediction hierarchy: An integrative framework for social cognition (2018-2020) • Postdoctoral supervisor: Jane Friedman, Suspension of Judgment (2011-2012) • Postdoctoral supervisor: Chris Lepock, Metacognition and Epistemic Virtue (2008-2010) • PhD supervisor: Kenneth Boyd, Epistemically Responsible Belief (defended July 2014) • PhD co-supervisor: Jessica Wright, Owning Implicit Attitudes (defended May 2020) • PhD supervisor: Mason Westfall, Understanding Minds (defended June 2020) • PhD supervisor: Evan Taylor, Knowledge and Anxious Thought (defended June 2020) • PhD supervisor: Julia Smith, Unacknowledged Permissivism (defended July 2020) • Daniel Munro (current), Liang Zhou Koh (current). • PhD Thesis Committee Member for Tom Rand (PhD awarded 2008); Michael Lachelt; Scott Howard (2011); Charles Repp (2013), Matthew Siebert (2014), Zachary Irving (2015), Lisa Doerksen (current), Kayla Wiebe (current), Catherine Rioux (current), Melissa Rees (current), Eliran Haziza (current). • PhD Oral Committee member for Francisco Gomez-Holtved (Russell on Logical Form); Jack Kwong (An Individualist Theory of Concepts); Shelley Weinberg (Consciousness in Locke’s Essay), Matt Fulkerson (The Sense of Touch); Sean Smith (The Affective Point of View: Cross-Cultural Philosophical Investigations of Embodiment, Feeling, and Consciousness) • At University of New Mexico: Kevin Olbrys (MA) “The Problem of False Judgment in Plato’s Theaetetus” secondary supervisor; defended April 2001.

UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS

Provostial Assessor, Dalla Lana School of Public Health (2021-22) Provostial Assessor, Faculty of Applied Science and Engineering (2020-21) Associate Chair, Graduate Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto (July 2013-June 2016) Member, Graduate Executive Committee (2007-08; 2009-2010; 2017-present) Member, UTM Campus Affairs Committee (July 2013-2016) Search Committee Member (Nine searches from 2001-present) Member, UTM Program Review Committee (2012-2013) Member, Planning and Policy Committee (2010-2011) Member, Banting Fellowships Committee (2010) Member, UTM Resource Planning and Priorities Committee (2010-2012) Member, UTM Committee on Standing (2005-08) Member, Graduate Admissions Committee (2009; 2011) Departmental colloquium co-coordinator (fall 2000-fall 2003; fall 2004-2005) Teaching Excellence Awards Selection Committee, UTM (Spring 2003) Undergraduate Steering and Curriculum (fall 2000-fall 2003) UTM First Year’s Instructors’ Council Member (2000-2002)

8 OUTREACH AND POPULAR MEDIA

Producer and director, “Free and Easy Conversing” (2020) Theory of Knowledge: a series of videos for Wireless Philosophy, Khan Academy (2016) Series of posts on epistemology and philosophy of mind for Brains Blog (2016) Daily Nous Blog Post: “Effective Altruism and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: A Canadian Approach” (2015) OUP Blog Post: What Commuters Know About Knowing (2014) Philosophy Bites interview/podcast with Nigel Warburton (2014) Webcast debate with Joshua Alexander on experimental philosophy for Philosophy TV (2014) Co-organizer of The Aristotle Canadian National High School Philosophy Essay Competition (2007-2010).

PROFESSIONAL

Referee for Analysis, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Canadian Philosophical Association, Cognition, Dialogue, Episteme, Erkenntnis, European Journal of Philosophy, European Science Foundation, Fonds québécois de recherche sur la société et la culture, Formal Epistemology Workshop, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Mind and Language, National Endowment for the Humanities, National Science and Engineering Research Council, Noûs, Oxford University Press, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Psychology, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Psychology Press, Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Society for Exact Philosophy, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, South African Journal of Philosophy, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Studia Philosophica Estonica, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Synthèse, Teorema, Thought, WIREs Cognitive Science.

President, Canadian Philosophical Association (2021-22) Member of the Board, American Philosophical Association, 2017-2020 President, APA Central Division 2018-19 Vice President/President-Elect, APA Central Division 2017-18 Advisory Committee, APA Eastern Division 2015-18 APA Lectures, Lectures, Publications and Research Committee, 2015-18 Executive Committee, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 2015-18 Area Editor, Epistemology, for Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy, 2013-present Nominating Committee, APA Central Division 2015-16 Program Committee, APA Central Division 2015, 2021 Editorial Board, Mind, 2015-present Editorial Board, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 2014 - present Adjudicator, SSHRC Insight Grants panel, 2012 Adjudicator, SSHRC Standard Research Grants panel, 2010