DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 3 and the more Important aspects of the NATO NATO the of aspects Important more the and 3 7 Enclosures 1, 2 and 3. and 2 1, Enclosures is 7 subject this on h report II Section detailed 6 at the While 1958. 5 during 4 13 reported to the appropriate national and/or NATO authorities. NATO and/or national appropriate the to reported 13 rep this of purpose The 1. I I I 10 9 8 2 endatwt yteM.o AO omnes o ae been have or Commanders, Ma.jor NATO the by with dealt been 12 intereste £ as reported by the Major NATO Com NATO Major the by reported as . h cletv ad niiul betvs f the of objectives individual and collective The 2. reporting, reporting, in f hs eecss ad hi fl nlss and analysis full their and exercises, these of tion ITIUIN A BJ , , , , , I J, l L Kl, Jl, HI, G, F, E, D, C, J B A, DISTRIBUTION: 3 S INTRODUCTORY MEMORANDUM INTRODUCTORY C 43/5 MC SECRET - NATO NATO - SECRET Pages 43/6 MC 1958 0 Ma.y 20 1959 E E . Ch. 3. . HP G I AG SHAPE 1. 2 CRET - NATO COPY COPY NATO - CRET NCLOSURES . SACLANT Ser. N-378 N-378 Ser. SACLANT . eecss ee eeal civd Sne h comple- the Since achieved. generally were exercises T E R C E & § H l f § § & L * H 1-6,, dated 11 Mar Mar 11 dated 4 Apr Apr 4 Apr 16 dated 01316/14 d NATO and national authorities with t with authorities national and NATO m 59 Pg rvsdb Corrig.No.2,l by revised (Page A R A ost of the deficiencies requiring action have action requiring deficiencies the of ost EFFECT,LONGER p Incl. E 7 e APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE O OAN OO ae - . - dated POR eo te ute eal o tee exercises these on details further the reto, APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D NATO EXERCISES 1958 R E G R A D E D NATO UNCLASSIF NATO D E D A R G E R 1958 EXERCISES NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE COMMITTEE MILITARY 59 59 T BY THE STA THE BY D ETO I SECTION T T S U to the the to MMARY -1- SECTION I SECTION -1- o n N DING GROUP GROUP DING o A' m rt is to acquaint the the acquaint to is rt I anders anders SCLOSURE y Date .■?*-# By Per Authority iMSM-431-99 8 a D G C O M F K T D E S T R U C T I O N Jun Jun re contained at contained re e xercise h N 59 scop e . O ) ______s held e 7 c J- 1'WVou.tol I ED DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 10 respect to NATO's readiness for war. The remedy of this of remedy The war. for readiness NATO's to respect 10 11 outstanding deficiency lies not only in increased in only not lies deficiency outstanding 1 11 4 rae s o lxbe peragd operatio prearranged, flexible, of use greater 14 12 16 4. The Standing Croup re Croup Standing The 4. 16 5 1 8 1 5 owr hs eot o h Nrh Atlantic North the to report this Forward information. a for Council defici t the 26 Commanders, NATO Major 25 24 23 22 20 : Committee 17 19 Commanders' reports attached at at attached reports Commanders' 21 19 hs entknb te ao NT Cmadr, through Commanders, NATO Major the by taken been has 4 3 the the Sta The 3. 3 2 1 8 b_. In In b_. the during experienced 8 appropriat the 7 5 eiiae smn o h deficiencie the of many as eliminate 6 tos otne t rmi h ao defi major the remain to continues tions 9 3

procedures. also in the reduction of the communications communications the of reduction the in also _ Ug ter epcie ainl uhrte to authorities national respective their Urge b_. .a take the appropriate action, In conjunction with the with conjunction In action, appropriate the take SECRET ~ NATO NATO ~ SECRET CONCLUSIONS EOMNAIN . RECOMMENDATIONS C 43/6 MC S ECR E c m m T T 3 pct, eiblt, n sed f omnctos but communications, of speed and reliability, apacity, ; i i P D § ® ^ a i K ] y [ i » c - NATO NATO 8 5 9 1 a. h cletv a collective The . ae oe fti rpr, n o h Major the of and report, this of note Take xrie wr ge were exercises ( Pa e ge revised by Corr. No. 1, 27 May May 27 1, No. Corr. by revised ge ce/ifclis eeldb h exercises] the by revealed ncies/difficulties n APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLI ding Group concludes th concludes Group ding s ® i M g S / L © « ie fipoeet, ndqae communica- inadequate improvements, of pite e APPROVED FOR APPROVED P ainl n/r AOatoiis to authorities, NATO and/or national 2 ~ 2 ~ 8 5 9 1 o ETO I SECTION vi h rcrec of recurrence the avoid n n c U idvda ojcie of objectives individual d erally erally exercises a exercises med ht h Military the that ommends BLIC DISC C DISC L E OSURE coue 1 2 and 2 1, nclosures a L hee, n action and chieved, OSURE a s t: /difficulti s possible. c iency with iency l oad through oad 9 5 n al ) 0 [ e s DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 7 rep takin exercise 1958, 5 detailed during held exercises 4 NATO 3 2 1 T aqan te in the acquaint To 1. 1 NT cmad tutr ad raiain an o te forces the a,nd of organization, earm and or structure assigned command NATO 9 B 6 1 NT' pot NATO's - 11 6 1 0 1 4 , Tann fr ad etn o, omn organiza- command of, testing and for, Training a,. 15 14 13 provided, inter alia,: inter provided, 13 2 1 21 cl. Testing of communications plans and procedures; and plans communications of Testing cl. 21 8 1 17 22 e_. Testing of logistic procedures in support of of support in procedures logistic of Testing e_. 22 0 2 9 1 2.3 NA.TO naval operations. NA.TOnaval 24 2.3 5 2 7 2 6 2 8 fNT combat NATO of 28 authorities with th with authorities is to improve the combat readiness and capabilities of the the of capabilities and readiness combat the improve to is . xrie betvs Te ai amo AO exercises NATO of aim basic The Objectives. Exercise 2. in, n asge n erakd forces; earmarked and assigned and tions, same time, the achievement of the the of achievement the time, same wa.s achiev aim basic oprto ad oto o fre o different of forces of n control and cooperation c Tsig f prtoa pas poeue and procedures plans, operational of Testing _c. _ Ipoeet i sadrs f coordination, of standards in Improvements b_. otie, n systems; and doctrines, eiinisdfiute ecutrd adte oe important more the and encountered, deficiencies/difficulties . civn te ihs psil sae f readiness of state possible highest the Achieving a. esn learn lessons H PROBLEM THE ICSIN . DISCUSSION m NATO T A N - T E R C E S S nes atce hrt a hereto (attached anders NATO T A N - T E R C E 3 a Oeainl rcdrs Dcrns n Spot The Support. and Doctrines Procedures, Operational . inlte workin tionalities e ta cma effectivenes combat ntial e d, have reinforced the need for: need the reinforced have d, a APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUB APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D This Commanders. NATO Major the to rked AOEECSS 1958 EXERCISES NATO e a cp admr iprat set o the of aspects important more and scope e t forces; nt o d through the exercises conducted in in conducted exercises the through d SECTION II II SECTION t sbitdb te ao AO Com- NATO Major the by submitted rts 3 - 3 - g t to Enclosures 1, 2 and 3). and 2 1, Enclosures t erest g ether; L )r IC D e d national and NATO and national d 8 5 9 1 I SCLOSURE I SCLOSURE g xrie objectives exercise s a Ipoe. t the At Improved. was it acco into II N O I T C E S ■^r u t the nt 8 5 9 1 DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 7 4 10 10 9 8 6 5 3 2 1 aaiiis priual I NrhNra n uky between Turkey, and Norway North In particularly capabilities; 31 20 8 1 17 15 14 13 12 11 1 25 24 23 22 21 19 6 1 0 rbe n ciia f.tr limitin fa.ctor critical and problem 30 2 3 Communicat 4. 9 2 8 2 27 6 2 ad edures a headquarters land lack i.e., communications, reliability of capacity, of inadequacy field, this in noted C M SECRET - NATO - SECRET SECRET - NATO - SECRET

'5375 l services; all enemy- heavy under areas the in shipping the to defense by defense air priate i threat; air messages; Hour the provision of reconnaissance information on strike strike on information results; reconnaissance of provision the determining the best defense measures for dispersed dispersed for measures defense best the determining operations; SSK a.tomic attacks a.gainst newly disclosed targets of of targets disclosed newly a.gainst attacks a.tomic communications the of reduction to lead may as procedures convoy anti-me convoy prtoa orders; operational odwtot os f flexibility; of loss without load improved sonar capability in the submarines assigned to to assigned submarines the in capability sonar improved an capabilities., cla.ssifica.tion opportunity or fast moving targets. moving fast or opportunity c Rdcn ti Reducing _c. £. Improving anti-submarine warfare detection and and detection warfare anti-submarine Improving £. Ipoig reactio Improving . b . mrvn te vrl ardfne plan; defense air overall the Improving d. h. Greater simplification and conciseness of of conciseness and simplification Greater h. f _. Improving the protection of ships a.t sea by by a.t sea ships of protection the Improving f_. . Getrue f su of use Greater j.. ( Improving cross-servicing capabilities by by capabilities cross-servicing Improving mrvn oeainl rcdrs o launching for procedures operational Improving P a.ge APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D APPRovrn APPRovrn eie y orgN., l Corrig.No.2, by revised g n i tn omtos n ypoiig appro­ providing by and formations aton d na.val forces at sea, and between and sea, at forces na.val d progress some been has there Although ons. m r o f e a n d speed, continues to be a major a be to continues speed, d n g d piiri enerally improved means for air air for means improved enerally elay between atomic strikes and and strikes atomic between elay n c time to General Alert/R- Alert/R- General to time

h prearranged operational operational prearranged h io nisoi I SCLOSURE g NT' operational NATO's d the provision of an an of provision the dsljrf SECTION II SECTION 8 Jun Jun 9 5 ) DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE wl ipoe h stain I ti cneto, rjcs have projects connection, this In situation. the improve will 5 elendes wti AO ad t s xetd ht h oeal com- overall the that expected is it and NATO, within s e d n e l e communications, 7 voice all by handling those problem this of particularly awareness personnel, genuine a of short 4 Nothing 3 be netkn o lmnt sm o te omnctos defi- communications the of some eliminate to undertaken been 6 an below well still is security tions 2 sbaie ad icat n u-i codnto, Co coordination, sub-air in aircraft and submarines 1 mnctos aaiiywti AO a b epce t Improve to expected be can future. NATO the in within capability 9 munications 8 10 a. Projects HOTLINE and DOUB and HOTLINE Projects a. 10 1 n i te otenErpa rgo, epciey have respectively, region, European southern the in and 11 3 . si-osoe omnctos rjc hs been for has project completed being are communications plans present ship-to-shore at A and areasj b. these established in communications improve to undertaken been 14 13 12 5 1 16 16 8 1 7 1 9 1 1 , Eecs FAEIE a ag-cl exercise, large-scale a FLAMETIDE, Exercise a,. situation: International and/or political 21 casted 20 2 ceue fr 21 Spebr n h Esen Mediterr Eastern the in September 12-19 for scheduled 3 2 22 4 . xrie RSETHNE a on aoi strike, atomic joint a HINGE, CRESCENT Exercise b. 5 2 24 8 2 26 27 6-1O Octob 6-1O 27 9 f hs xrie ht a cancelled; was that exercise this of 1 3 0 3 29 al implementation. early xrie cnutd n 98 te olwn tre xrie were exercises three the following of the result 1958, the in as conducted occurred have to exercises known are implications atal o ttly acle eas o te xsig r fore- or existing the of because cancelled totally or partially a cancelled; was i spot n n mhbos adn eecs, scheduled exercise, landing amphibious an and support air was Phase II, the air support and amphibious landing porti landing amphibious and support air the II, Phase was ess umrn eecs, ceue t tk pae n the in place take to a scheduled THREE, PLAY exercise, PISH submarine Exercise _c. versus SECRET - NATO - SECRET C 3t . 43/t> MC SECRET - NATO - 5 - SECTION II SECTION - 5 - NATO - SECRET 5 t w m tk pae n etr Tre n ajcn wtr during waters adjacent and Turkey Western in place take o . oiia Ipiain. hl n naoal political unfavorable no While Implications. Political (Page revised by Corrig.No.2, Corrig.No.2, by revised (Page e , a prily acle - pcfcly It specifically, - cancelled partially was r, APPROVED F APPROVED ® l E M H S M APPR O VED VED FOR PUBLIC DISCLOSURE O R R PUBLIC DISCLOSURE a L cpal standard. cceptable E J E . ml-cl submarine small-scale U 8 1 MP in North Norway North in MP u 59) Jun m munica- a nean, o n DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE 6 SeScin , paragr I, Section See 6. 3 2 was terminated prematurely. terminated was 2 sea 1 SECRET - NATO - SECRET CONCLUSI SECR E m m T T MLfiMdlil® l i l d M i f L M t i B - . ae ot f h Ieln-are Gp 71 July* 7-15 Gap, Ice the land-Faeroes of north area O NT -- SECT -6- NATO NS AND RECOM AND NS tg rvsdb Cri.o2 1 Jn 59) Jun 18 Corrig.No.2, by revised (tage APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ) E i o » y s M APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D M ENDATION S a phs 3 and 4. and 3 phs I SCLOSURE I N II ON DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE C 43/6 MC ls ocs aeavial fo xenl omns pa.rticipa.ted In commands, external from a.vailable made forces plus SECRET SECRET h eecss itd nprgah aoe . above. 2 paragraph in listed exercises the areas. adjacent in together working nationalities different aa cnrl f hpig omn ps exercises. post command shipping of control naval cellation of Exercise "FLAME TIDE" and a portion of Exercise Exercise of portion a and TIDE" "FLAME Exercise of cellation CECN IG" . HINGE". "CRESCENT standard of coordination, cooperation and control of troops of of troops of control and cooperation coordination, of standard for the future land battle, small small battle, land future the for Procedures. throu to be of greatest interest to the Standing Group, and reports on on reports and Group, Standing the to enclosed: are interest these greatest of be to March 7 Revised Exercise Exercise Revised TO: G 7O OANDT 170O AG SUBJECT: ERT- NATO - SECRET . oiia Ipiain pae rm.y oe n h can­ the in role prima.ry a played Implications Political SACEUR, to 5. earmarked or assigned forces air and naval Land, 4. 3. Exercise objectives and training aims for 1958 were: 1958 for aims training and objectives Exercise 3. g 2. Of these the following exercises are considered by SHAPE SHAPE by considered are exercises following the these Of 2. 1. h 31 Dece 31 h - NATO NATO 1958 w n r _c . Continued practice and develop and practice Continued _c. b . Testing and developing:SACEUR*s Atomic Policies and and Policies Atomic developing:SACEUR*s and Testing . b g. CLEAR LINE - Appendix G Appendix - LINE CLEAR g. 7. e _ . Sufficient live exercises to continue to improve the the improve to continue to syste exercises live defence air the Sufficient e_.developing and Testing d. concept. strategic SACEUR’s Testing a.. B Appendix - PLAY FULL £. e " . HOSTAGE BLEU - Appendix E Appendix - BLEU e". HOSTAGE a . CPX VIII - Appendix A Appendix - VIII CPX .a . MEDFL C. N T xrie hl uig t during held exercises ATO SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE EUROPE POWERS ALLIED HEADQUARTERS SUPREME NT CONFIDENTIAL). (NATO CRESCENT HINGE - App - HINGE CRESCENT HOSTAGE NOIR - Appendix D Appendix - NOIR HOSTAGE . . A. S. U. ahntn 5 D.C. 25, Washington Pentagon The The Standing Group Standing The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Treaty Atlantic North Secretary 1958 Exercises NATO on Report m ber 1958 are a,s shown in the Allied Command Europe Europe Command Allied the in a,s are shown 1958 ber a E nd Manoeuv nd OT Apni C Appendix - FORT X ERDCDB H TNIG GROUP STANDING THE BY REPRODUCED APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ".Mai a M . " ae 1 4 Incl. 4, - 1 Pages ai, France Paris, NLSR 1 ENCLOSURE e r Schedule 1958, file AG AG file 1958, Schedule r -1- e ndix F ndix s cale live naval exercises and and exercises naval live cale h I e period 1 January 1958 1958 January 1 period e SCLOSURE m ent of tactical doctrine doctrine tactical of ent NLSR 1 ENCLOSURE 1 Ma.rch 11 1808 9 5 9 1 m O, dated OT, . DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE m Emergency"^Defenee Emergency"^Defenee SECRET - NATO -2- ENCLOSURE 1 ENCLOSURE -2- NATO - SECRET additional these obtain to endeavor must we and resources, present noted noted et ao a ln adwud nie h fiue f hs plans. these of failure the invite would and plans war major ment supervisors. their with contact of absence in periods able resources which are critical to the requirement to survive and and survive to requirement the to critical readin of are state which possible resources highest the for strive which could compromise portions of operational plans. operational of (EUSEC) portions Europe Agency compromise PLAY could Evaluation "FULL and which Exercise Security during Communication between' Group and Turkey, In and Norway North in particularly problem, ndqae e.ies ol srosyipi te blt t imple­ to ability the impair seriously could rea.diness Inadequate integration. of principle consider­ the on over act base^ to Plan required be will commanders subordinate that retalia.te. retalia.te. osdrto te omnctos iiain, p limitations, communications the consideration cancelled. was II PHASE East, Middle the and Mediterranean Ea,stern adhaqatr adhaqatr afloat. headquarters and headquarters land F. Appendix at is I PHASE on Report The xcto f xrie were: exercises of execution exercises. was phase first the of aim The October. 10 f^to period the during maximum benefits from participation and planning, national authori­ derive to national order in planning, and However, participation from exercise. the benefits cancel to maximum decided SACEUR prtos ad na.apiiu lnigoeain . a.ir support operation. direct pha.se was landing joint second in an. the in units amphibious and and plans; strike operations, headquarters atomic of exercise to execution practice to O T A N - T E R C E S upcs Priiain yNT comm NATO by capacity. observer Participation an to auspices. ree n uks hae o mlmn SCU» lr Sy reconnaiss Alert render to Northern in SACEUR»s I- stationed implement EDP to forces Thrace ground LANDSOUTHEAST the Turkish of and Greece capability the CPX and ties conducted appropriate portions of the exercises under national national under exercises the of portions appropriate circumstances, conducted existing ties then the under Mediterranean Eastern the in Plan; also to determine the capability of SIXATAF and STRIKFORSOUTH STRIKFORSOUTH and SIXATAF of capability the determine to also Plan; throu test to was exercise the of aim The September. of Hell of -ÏT3/5 . esn land Tems iprat esn were: lessons important most The learned. Lessons 8. 7. Execution. The most important problems encountered in encountered problems important most The planning in Execution. encountered were 7. problems major No Planning. 6. ir.) ------e paragraph 7. Current operational plans must take into into take must plans operational Current 7. paragraph i n Trihfre participatin forces Turkish and nic » y § « © F M . b b. There is an urgent need for an overall Air Defence Defence Air overall an for need urgent an is There b. a . . Better communications are required, especially as as especially required, are communications Better a.. c. a. Inadequacy of communications continues to be a major major a be to continues communications of Inadequacy a. g b. "CRESCENT HINGE1' was to be conducted in two phases phases two in conducted be to HINGE1' was "CRESCENT b. a. ''FLAME TIDE” was scheduled for the the for scheduled ''FLAME TIDE” was a. « A A An analysis of communications security by Standing Standing by security communications of analysis An U ncoordinated action and vacillation which result from from result which vacillation and action ncoordinated Because of the politically difficult situation in the the in situation difficult politically the of Because Due to difficulty in mounting a la.rge-scale exercise exercise la.rge-scale a mounting in difficulty to Due prerequisite to the"successful implementation of of implementation the"successful to prerequisite Plans Plans APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D 58 a APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D s i nce, conventional and atomic strikes in support support in strikes atomic and conventional nce, , LANDSOUTHEAST MARITSA Plan and Retardation Retardation and Plan MARITSA LANDSOUTHEAST , is a, high state of readiness; we must must we readiness; of state a, is high " revealed practices practices revealed a I SCLOSURE I limited was staffs and nders SCLOSURE g n h exercise. the in e a a nd procedures procedures nd ss within our our within ss fact the rticularly p 0 ro 1 to 12 eriod [i® g h manoeuvre manoeuvre h s tem, 19 DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE S greatly, there are few forces which can be considered properly pre­ properly considered be can which forces few are there greatly, placed aricT placed r mented during Exercise FULL PLAY facilitated cross-telling between between cross-telling facilitated PLAY FULL Exercise during mented Improving for need a is There standpoint. logistic the from pared Improved. ln ar en iaie frery implementation. early for finalized a.re being plans F command that ensure to effort large system intelligence t HP. ■ SHAPE. at porting procedures to be employed In Exercise TOP WEIGHT In 1959 are are 1959 In WEIGHT TOP Exercise In employed be to procedures porting Improvement. further needs results reconnaissance strike mrv cmuiain I toe ra. e vie icis imple­ circuits voice New areas. those In communications Eur Improve Southern the In which will meet member nations* requirements are being developed developed being are requirements nations* Janu member to In meet SHAPE Council at will NATO which developing the to are established and been problem a.gencyhas plans staff a intermediate plans; range submitted long have Commanders ie f post- of time rs-evcn cpblte o l services. all of capabilities cross-servicing substantially changed from those previously used. previously those from changed substantially shore communications project has been established and at present present at and established been has project communications shore concentrate effort on Integration; SACEUR personally emphasized the the emphasized personally SACEUR Integration; on effort concentrate s d n E 7 C 4-3/6 MC SECRET - NATO -3- ENCLOSURE 1 ENCLOSURE -3- NATO - SECRET E ac adIay IayadGec, n tl n at. si to ship A Malta. and Italy and Greece, and Italy Italy, and rance CRET - NATO - CRET 3 MEDFLEX FORT Report Report FORT MEDFLEX 3 Report VIII CPX 1 4 HOSTAGE NOIR Report Report NOIR HOSTAGE 4 Report PLAY FULL 2 5 HOSTAGE BLEU Report Report BLEU HOSTAGE 5 7 CLEAR LIME Report Report LIME CLEAR 7 Report HINGE CRESCENT 6 9. Remedial Actions. Remedial 9. Appendix E Appendix pedxC . C Appendix B Appendix A Appendix Appendix D Appendix Appendix F Appendix Appendix G Appendix ----- m m _f , The time delay between atomic strikes and receipt of of receipt and strikes atomic between delay time The _f, g. There Is a requirement to review and Improve the NATO NATO the Improve and review to requirement a Is There g. h. Although the logistic capabilities of ACE forces vary vary forces ACE of capabilities logistic the Although h. _ Rato tm t Gnrl lr/-ormsae ut be must message Alert/R-Hour General to time Reaction e_. need clear a is There d. . n h itrs o cmuiain scrt, agt re­ target security, communications of interest the In b. a . . Projects HOTLINE and DOUBLE JUMP in North Norway and and Norway North in JUMP DOUBLE and HOTLINE Projects a.. c. Emphasis will be placed on lessening the processing processing the lessening on placed be will Emphasis c. FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE: COMMANDER ALLIED SUPREME THE FOR d. In respect of integrating air defense, Major Subordinate Subordinate Major defense, air integrating of respect In d. - e s expe ady as to act as a real deterrent to any aggres any to deterrent real a as act to as ady s trike reconnaissance in Exercise TOP WEIGHT WEIGHT TOP Exercise in reconnaissance trike n e b ainl nelgne agencies, intelligence national by ded o APPROVED FOR APPROVED P pe pe APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D , n o i g e R epcieyhv be udrae to undertaken been have respectively U BLIC D Deputy Chief of Staff of Chief Deputy . . DUNLAP R. C. i asa, RCAF Marshal, Air f a (signed) rNT sil fre t e so be to forces shield NATO or ry; and rules of engag of rules and ry; I SCLOSURE I SCLOSURE e rs rs [FOI® c an b an e nef i t from the the from t i e 1959. n ment ment s ion. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE DISTRIBUTION : DISTRIBUTION O T A N - T E R C E S Fec rnlto follows. translation *French SECRET - NATO NATO - SECRET C 43/5 MC NATO DEF COL DEF NATO MAS SGN SHAPE SHAPE CINCHAN SACLANT SGREP SACLANTREPEUR CINCENT CINCAFMED CINC CINCNORTH CINCSOUTH 3IÏÏEUR DCPANDP DCPANDP NAVDEP DSACE DCO DCO DC LA AI OSCAD OSCAD COFS EXNMR INTAF SHAPE Central Central SHAPE (TH TRANS AG NM AG SECY AD 6 OANDT m m w m M R R DEP DEP AIRCHAN Records Records - 10 STATES UNITED OANDT) U R R R U U FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D APPRHUPn POR APPRHUPn :*æ§@ikh> h k i @ § æ * : “ST Eng 112 15 10 3 7 9 5 4 1 1 2 2 T I Fr* 2 4 2 -4- P uri i r . n i < ; r i n . c i I SCLOSURE idp NLSR 1 ENCLOSURE DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE uoe wa.s stressed. Europe Standing the of Members by Staff, International the of members a hl ne te directio the under held was nations of Allied Command Europe was emphasized, and the urgent urgent the and syste Defence emphasized, Air was Europe integrated a. for fully Command need Allied of nations possibilities, financial and realities practical with Europe. Supreme Commander, Allied Command Europe, at SHAPE from 28 April April 28 from SHAPE at Europe, Command Allied Commander, Supreme SEC Allied Command Europe were were Europe Command Allied Exercise. the in part a.n active took NATO of Commanders-in- Allied the by Atlantic, of Command nations the Allied of all Sta.ff of of officers Chiefs of majority the by Group, MC MC SECRET - NATO NATO - SECRET in Defence Air of problems the and discussed, and considered was accorda in forces necessary the produce could Europe Command Command Allied of regional officers by and senior other Command, and Channel senior of other and officers Commanders-in-Chief senior Commander and Supreme Chief the by Alliance, Atlantic the to 1 Ma.y, 1 to R 43 T- NATO - ET . h ne fr olcie aacdfre throu forces balanced collective for need The SACEUR for 6. CINCHAN and SACLANT from available support The 5. Secretary-General the CPX, SHAPE a in time first the For 3. 4. The purpose of the exercise was to study how best Allied Allied best how study to was exercise the of purpose The 4. /b 1. CPX EIGHT, the la.st of the current series of SHAPE CPXfs CPXfs SHAPE of series current the la.st of the EIGHT, CPX 1. . h exerci The 2. 1958 O iKKMssHiG! G i H s s M K K i SO® bt ae inclusive, dates both # R EP R s APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUB wa e ODUCED BY THE STANDING GROUP STANDING THE BY ODUCED APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE REPORT REPORT s attended by the NATO Council and senior senior and Council NATO the by attended g n APPENDIX A APPENDIX fFedMrhlMngmr, Deputy- Montgomery, Field-Marshal of Pa vn consideration, iven O g -1- N CPX EIGHT CPX N s 1 es L I C D I SCLOSURE NLSR 1 ENCLOSURE Appendix A to to A Appendix m in Allied Command Command Allied in r u p § g hout the the hout n ce DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ao uodnt Cmad. ahRgo, n h vr ra frame­ broad very the in Region, Each Commands. Subordinate Major C E S pared the detailed plans. On the other hand, SACEUR bein SACEUR hand, pre­ who other the SHAPE by On PLAY. FULL controlled exercise and plans. combined directed detailed the the a There, of was pared sponsored, part was PLAY defence air FAST separately. the on PLAY, GOOD reported are portions these Appendix which suited best its own situation and and situation own its best suited which work fundamental difference between FAST PLAY, the atomic part, and and part, atomic the PLAY, FAST between difference fundamental when Atomic Strike Plan procedures should be practiced under more more , under practiced be should procedures Plan Strike Atomic when . “ message. in: provement I three the by PLAY controlled GOOD and Europe, directed was Command and Allied SHAPE in by sponsored Co-ordinator was Defence Air the MC MC osbe maue sol e nrdcdt esr ta tee exer­ these that ensure to air­ to played introduced be be should should losses measures future, In possible, conditions. realistic FS PA) n n i eec prin GO PA) I t In PLAY). (GOOD portion Defence Air an and PLAY) (FAST SECRET - NATO NATO - SECRET reduced. be should traffic this of quantity surprise. improving, require tactical is as far complete so of In conditions under facilities. start cises communications and aircrews craft, iey xcto o srksaant ls spot targets. support close against strikes of the execution timely practicable, If traffic. signals of volume large a tates . Summary of Main Conclusions and Recommendations. and Conclusions Main of Summary . R 43/à NATO T A N - T E Exercise FULL PLAY had consisted of a Joint Atomic portion portion Atomic Joint a of consisted had PLAY FULL Exercise g . h mjrrcmedtos n cmet ae s follows: as are comments and recommendations major The 3. 1. The wiajor The 1. . hr rmis nugn rqieet o eoe eas in: delays remove to requirement urgent an remains There 2. iven by SHAPE, had therefore to prepare the detailed plans plans detailed the prepare to therefore had SHAPE, by iven _ c . The timely dissemina.tion of the General Alert/R-Hour Alert/R-Hour General the facilities. of dissemina.tion communication timely of The _c.capacity handling The . b a. It is considered that the stagé has now been reached reached been now has stagé the that considered is It a. . h atc f ls spot agt. . targets. support close of attack The b. a. procedures. SS of use The a. b. The reporting of post-strike reconnaissance results results reconnaissance post-strike of reporting The b. d. Further improvements are required towards ensuring the the ensuring towards required are improvements Further d. c. h poesn f otsrk rcnasac results. reconnaissance post-strike of processing The m w The implementation of the Atomic Strike Plan nécessi-, .nécessi-, Plan Strike Atomic the of implementation The R REPORT ON EXERCI ON REPORT EP c R onclusions are that there has been a a been has there that are onclusions ODUCED BY THE STANDIN THE BY ODUCED APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Pages Pages APPENDIX B APPENDIX AT PLAY FAST 1-6, -1- S E FULL PLAY FULL E Incl. g NLSR 1 ENCLOSURE pedxB to B Appendix eography, G GROUP g h g only only is et im­ reat DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE II Pltcl Implications. Political * III. SECRET - NATO - SECRET using nuclear weapons, against Allied Command Europe. Appropriate Appropriate Europe. Command Allied against weapons, nuclear using practice "ïhe procedures involved In the execution of SACEUR's Atomic Atomic SACEUR's of execution the In involved procedures "ïhe practice set O te mlmnain f h Aoi,Srk Pa wer Plan Strike Atomic, the of implementation the Of aspects Plan. Strike Description. Brief II. SHAPE. by taken a gradually deteriorating international situation with strong enemy enemy strong with situation international deteriorating gradually a Joint Atomic Exercises; it envisag it Exercises; Atomic Joint obs practiced,carefully however, ely hi fre i a oiin o h sat fte exercise. the of start the for a. in position forces their deploy intellige exercises previous wEich cedures naval andHalr forces assig forces andHalr to naval Commanders the enable to before used border was ACE play the opposite intelligence The immediately deployed exercise. being forces n aa^ocs atcptdo "ie o C or "live” a on participated naval^forces and of actual hostilities plus elements of the United States Strategic Strategic Command. States Bomber United the Kingdom of United the elements and plus Command Air hostilities actual of rto o Cmadr concerned. Commanders of cretion IV. nonee npann. a planning. in encountered rfi ad . . signals of units intensity high extremely the of and account traffic on mëssages ormsae : . . a : message. Hour V. rvos exercises. previous prtn“rcdrs I ti rgr ATPA a superi was PLAY FAST regard this In operating“procedures. MÙ SECRET SECRET 43/6 Major Problems Encountered In Planning and Execution. and Planning In Encountered Problems Major 10. Execution. Execution was hampered to some degree by: degree some to hampered was Execution Execution. 10. 11. a. Improvement was noted in the use of Atomic Strike Plan Plan Strike Atomic of use the in noted was Improvement a. 11. 4. Action to implement the above recommendations is being being is recommendations above the implement to Action 4. . Alms. 5. o eiu pltclpolm ee Involved, were problems political serious No 7. Operations. of Outline 6. 9. 9. Conclusions. n o ------NATO -2- Appendix B to B Appendix -2- NATO a. The aim of the Joint Atomic portion of FULL PLAY was,to was,to PLAY FULL of portion Atomic Joint the of aim The a. n The setting for FAST PLAY was similar to that for pr for that to similar was PLAY FAST for setting The b. Particular emphasis was laid on the practice of pro­ of practice the on laid was emphasis Particular b. a. Forces participating In FAST PLAY were those land, land, those were PLAY FAST In participating Forces a. p b. All air forces participated on a "live” basis. Land Land basis. "live” a on participated forces air All b. b. Delay In starting the exercise at some of the lower lower the of some at exercise the starting In a Delay operational of b. handling and transmission in Delays a. articipating Commands, Headquarters and Forces. and Headquarters Commands, articipating included it exercise; the of start the to up led play ce t n u o c c æ m ENCLOSU P lanning. No major problems, nor difficulities were were difficulities nor problems, major No lanning. of delay in the receipt of the the of receipt the in delay of APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE n dt o earmarke or to ed e h rved and evaluated. and rved e All deficient. be to shown ad d an all-out surprise attack, attack, surprise all-out an d I SCLO S d URE for SACEUR in event event in SACEUR for P X basis at the dis­ the at basis X RE G eneral Alert/tl- Alert/tl- eneral 1 o e r to to r , e viou s

DECLASSIFIED-P UBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE SECRET - NATO - SECRET uoe icuigtss fntoa n oa ln) gis the against plans) local and national of tests (including Europe plans best suited to its own individual requirements. In this this In follows: as requirements. given are individual own its to suited best plans Command Allied within organization defence air over-all the cise ment . eep o h srk rcnasac rslsnes ute improve­ further needs results reconnaissance strike the oT receipt R-H considerable without a handled be not imposed delay. tra.fficcould of conditions, volume optimum this under even Plan, Strike Atomic respect, the Regions have stated their objectives. The main ones ones main The objectives. their stated have Regions the respect, exercise. atomic joint the by generated sorties raid war, in losses communication some Assuming facilities. these on load SACE Description. Brief I. eurmn t ipoe n hs iig . timing. this on improve to requirement LY wihto lc fo truh5 ue 1958. June 5 through 3 from place took which PLAY, C 3b NLSR 1 ENCLOSURE to B Appendix -3- 43/b MC NATO - SECRET o U ur message from SHAPE to the operational units there remains a a remains there units operational the to SHAPE from message ur R-sponsored Combined Joint Atomic/Air Defence Exercise FULL FULL Exercise Defence Atomic/Air Joint Combined R-sponsored 1. Exercise GOOD PLAY was the Air Defence portion of the 1958 1958 the of portion Defence Air the was PLAY GOOD Exercise 1. . i.. Aim. 2. £. Although it took less time to pass the General Alert/ Alert/ General the pass to time less took it Although £. . h vlm o sgas rfi rqie t ipeet the implement to required traffic signals of volume The b. Within the above over-all aim, each Region had to prepare prepare to had Region each aim, over-all above the Within a. Northern Region: Northern a. the and strike atomic the between delay time The d. Ä L M I P W Ä I The aim of the air defence exercise GOOD PLAY wa.s exer­ to PLAY GOOD exercise defence air the of aim The b. Central Region: Central b. i b - To prepa.re the passing of air movements and to study study to and movements air of passing the prepa.re To - - To pa.ss early warning information to SHAPE and and SHAPE to information warning pa.ss early To - adjacent with Information of exchange the study To - - To exercise ADOC Sector Controllers and Artillery Artillery and Controllers Sector ADOC exercise To - - To exercise the coordinated a.ir defence system under under system a.ir defence coordinated the exercise To - IDF conditions, load under generally exercise, T6 - - To exercise the coordination of the various air air various the of coordination the exercise To - rbes farrf rglto priual i over­ in particularly regulation aircraft of problems isl defences. missile Controllers in the coordination of fighter, gun and and gun fighter, of coordination the in Controllers area. European Central the in agencies interested and Systems Reporting and Control aircraft, AWX and flight, out of action. of out conditions where selected vital functions are taken taken are functions vital selected where conditions organizations. associated areas. and Coplands defence plans within Central Europe. Central within plans defence / APPROVED F APPROVED APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

s e m m o m GOOD PLAY GOOD O R R PUBLIC D I SCLO * S URE . capacity capacity DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE hostilities, including the forces assigned to COMSTRIKFORSOUTH and and PLAY: GOOD COMSTRIKFORSOUTH Exercise to assigned forces the including hostilities, The following NATO and national headquarters also participated In In participated also headquarters national and NATO following The D+2. period from 1 January 1958. During the period immediately pre­ immediately period the During 1958. January 1 from period omn uoe n h 2 TFad4hAA .es Ti concentra­ This a.reas. ATAF 4th and ATAF 2d the in Europe Command Comments. and Evaluation II, earmarked to SACEUR which would be available In the event of actual actual of event the In available be would which SACEUR to earmarked ee ietdit te oiin rmwihte ea te exercise. the began they which from position the exerci The into directed were concentrated an important part of the air defence forces of Allied Allied of forces defence air the of part important an concentrated follows: as are Commands, Subordinate Major the from received the air defence forces of Belgium, The Netherlands, and France. and Netherlands, The Belgium, of forces defence air the enemy atomic surprise attack against Allied Command Europe, The The Europe, Command Allied against attack surprise atomic enemy NATO - SECRET "MS' 43/5 ENCLOSURE 1 ENCLOSURE "MS' 43/5 setting was established through intelligence play covering the the covering play intelligence through established was setting tion will explain some of the comments for Central Europe. Central for comments the of some explain will tion ceding the exercise, the situation reached the point where forces forces where point the reached situation the exercise, the ceding SECRET - NATO -4- Appendix B to B Appendix -4- NATO - SECRET The major comments, based on the evaluation of the reports Deployment, reports the 5. of evaluation the on based comments, major The 3. Outline of Operations. of Outline 3. 6. Evaluation and Comments on Southern Region : Region Southern on Comments and Evaluation 6. 4. Participating Forces. Participating 4. _e. b. * oten Region: Southern £* h. The air defence weapons deployment for Exercise GOOD PLAY PLAY GOOD Exercise for deployment weapons defence air The d. Italian DAT Italian d. a. f. c_. The setting of Exercise FULL PLAY envisaged an all-out all-out an envisaged PLAY FULL Exercise of setting The a. Communications. The requisite and and requisite The Communications. a. redyardfne ocswr thos were forces defence air Friendly m m s e represented a simulated wartime period of D-day through through D-day of period wartime simulated a represented e STRIKFORSOUTH AFMED Malta Headquarters Air Middle East Air Forces Air East Middle edures Gibraltar Headquarters French DAT (ZDA 901 and ZDA 902) ZDA and 901 (ZDA DAT French 17 - To evaluate air defence force capability for instan­ for capability force defence air evaluate To - conducted when defence air of procedures evaluate To - - To foster cooperation among all elements of the air air the of elements all among cooperation foster To - th Air Force (no aircraft) (no Force Air th defence of NATO and national resources and territories. and resources national and devel NATO to of order In defence system defence operations. offensive with conjunction in ete conditions. weather taneous reaction to attack and operational ability ability operational and attack to reaction taneous to sustain operations under day, night, and adverse adverse and night, day, under operations sustain to APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ® ! » y « e forces assigned or or assigned forces o p a,n integrated a,n p integrated e s degx-ee l a i t n e s DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE obrCmad ■ Command. Bomber Europe... Problems were created.by the late receipt of certain Instructions Instructions Regulations. certain Safety of aircraft. and receipt defence Rules air late of Combat the role Air the true like created.by and were testing Problems through the capped and AIRCENT, SHAPE, to circuits telephone the out ..which D-Day, put Exercise ü Exercise Bomber.Command aircraft at night and during Instrument Meteorological Meteorological Instrument during and night at aircraft Bomber.Command the Also, Region. this in operations jeopardize severely would C 36 : ^3/6 MC NATO - SECRET phasing the in inventory. acute weapons particularly defence air becomes the This in units SAM of problem. Central major a in be simultaneously conducted areas) DAT French and ATAF, 4 before nights two on Bergen at system microwave the In breakdown gra.ve ' s forces. A compromise solution might be found by banning only load load only banning by found fighter be might all-weather of solution training compromise the A restricted forces. severely Conditions ATAF, (2d exercises separate three was PLAY GOOD fact, In Plan, a. circuit during Illustrated was routing common In involved risk condi­ adverse.weather and night over operations sustain to bility olso cus atcs n emtig tr caet gvn range. given chase.to stern permitting and attacks course collision capa­ the as far as and performances, acceptable minimum the even E S in i cnend to at wr aga.in demonstrated: were facts two below far concerned, is remain improvement tions they an indicate was exercises, tracks similar percentages these previous unidentified in total Although these of over versus ratio the 8.3$. only interceptions tactics, their in successful of restricted were aircraft truder partially""effêctlve düë ï düë partially""effêctlve ucsfl ess att versus successful system. the of system system and Italy and Greece, and satisfactorily, Italy very Italy, and operated France Malta, between telling exer icis mlmne uig h eecs t fcltt te cross­ the facilitate to exercise the during implemented circuits a of cl of a Te rm.ydfiut hc aprd h eeuin of execution the hampered which difficulty prima.ry The a. . R C E d c 8. Evaluation and Comments on Central Region Central on Comments and Evaluation 8. T - - T equate communications. However, in comparison with previous previous with comparison in However, communications. equate 7. Evaluation and Comments on Northern Region: Northern on Comments and Evaluation 7. ises, some progress has been made in this field. field. this in made been has progress some ises, o e co se . a. Communications. Exercise GOOD PLAY again revealed the the revealed again PLAY GOOD Exercise Communications. a. . h f ortage of "communications personnel which In time of war war of time In which personnel of "communications ortage clte n t and acilities £. Safety Regulations. The ban on Interception of of Interception on ban The Regulations. Safety £. ) Pann n xcto. takrsrcin handi­ restrictions Attack Execution. and Planning t). c Itreto eut. lhuhal grso n In­ and aggressor all Although Results. Interception _c. . dniiain Aeut ietfcto cnius to continues identification Adequate Identification. b. N b. Early Warning. The early warning system was only only was system warning early The Warning. Early b. r OOD PLAY was the la.ck of an approved Regional Air Defence Defence Air Regional approved an la.ck of the was PLAY OOD O T A o eain a nt a not was peration (1) The limited capability of 5 ATAF and DAT Italy In In Italy DAT and ATAF 5 of capability limited The (1) (2) The lack of first line Interception aircraft In In aircraft Interception line first of lack The (2) are medium performan medium are hs field. this fetvl cmaiga oen nm i force). air enemy a. modern combating effectively the Southeastern zone (6 ATAF has only F~86Es which which F~86Es only has ATAF (6 zone Southeastern the e APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE mpted interceptions was 48$. The percentage percentage The 48$. was interceptions mpted APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUB h e lack of trained per trained of lack e o the Inadequate ra.dar equipment and and ra.dar equipment Inadequate the -5- c hieve d LI c . This was mainly due to lack lack to due mainly was This . C C DISCLO e day fighters incapable of of incapable fighters day e S NLSR 1 ENCLOSURE pedxB to B Appendlx s URE onnel at al at onnel : N ew voice voice ew l levels levels DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE NATO T A N - T E R C E S defence exercises along with interceptor defences in order to to order in defences interceptor with along exercises defence M WEIGHT. TOP Exercise Dëfence large for capability defensive improve and"thus exercises. Scale procedures improve above conclusions have been taken into account and/of have served served have Combined and/of 1959 the of account into planning taken the for been have basis a as conclusions above ete fighters. weather also were There r e t f a e s i c r e x e e s n e f e d r i a scale" e g r a l a r o f y t i n u t r o p p o SECRET.-..NATO some differences of opinion between Army and Air Force personnel personnel Force high-lighted Air NIKE. of and and Army use system between defence operational air the opinion the of into regarding NIKE of differences some integration the III. III. Defence Plan which incorporates integrated air defence of the the of defence air integrated incorporates which Plan Defence • follows; as are PLAY GOOD Exercise from intercepted. being raids 8OO than more only with flown were processed consequently, were sorties and raids time, completely be hostile not cotild sufficient 1,200 intercepted. in were period, information raids agencies mass 275 24-hour This proper one the to During identified. exercise. the handl o? capable This is.particularly required in the employment of surface-to-air surface-to-air of employment the in required is.particularly This incapable of handling the magnitude of air activity experienced experienced activity air of PLAY. GOOD magnitude the Exercise handling during of incapable Région. Central continued. be should missiles. C some hostile forces at night or under Instrument Meteorological Meteorological Instrument under or night at forces hostile some o /6 3 4 ndition 15 14. Missile defences should be included in the minor air air minor the in included be should defences Missile 14. 12. In the 4th ATAF area, the present ground environment is is environment ground present the area, ATAF 4th the In 12. problem. major a be to continues identification Adequate 10. 11. There is an urgent urgent an is There 11. 13. 13. 9. The combination of Air Defence and Joint Atomic Exercises Exercises Atomic Joint and Defence Air of combination The drawn be can which 9. recommendations and conclusions main The C onclusions and Recommendations. and onclusions . Most of the comments contained in Section II and in the the in and II Section in contained comments the of Most ------. f This exercise provided te t s r i f the d e d i v o r p e s i c r e x e s i h T . E K I N of n o i t a r g e t n I d. e . In the 4th 4th the In .e S s eeeyrsrce te au o te xrie o all­ to exercise the of value the restricted severely afety regulations which did not allow interception: of of interception: allow not did which regulations afety m m Q| » ï During the entire exercise, more than 9OO air defense defense air 9OO than more exercise, entire the During 830 in g the magnitude of activity experienced during during experienced activity of magnitude the g ucsflNK engagements. NIKE successful APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D s p œ « , a e r a F A T A m m n eed for an approved Regional Air Air Regional approved an for eed -6- h gon niomn ws in­ was environment ground the NLSR 1 to ENCLOSURE B Appendix I SCLOSURE p j n ^ ■ J oint Atomic/Air Atomic/Air oint n DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE adnle t te tat o Gibraltar. of Straits the to Dardanelles NATO - SECRET O C 43/Ö MC M xrie iha stigo +8 o +2 unn rm1O 1 a to May 19 12OO from running D+32 to D+28 of a. with setting exercise SECRET SECRET in used ent they system if on a and command mander protected exercise divided the the of effectively over limits the Improvement within effective considerable proved Straits . Introduction. I. II. Major Lesson Major II. DLXEI. ovy psig t passing Convoys EPIC. EDFLEX 9 • Command of Allied Forces Mediterranean (BLUE Forces). (BLUE Mediterranean Forces Allied of Command • OO 24 May. 24 OO , Comm 4, . is Te is f h eecs were:- exercise the of aims The Aims. 3. 5 . ra f h Exercise. the of Area 2. . Setting. 1. . - NATO NATO £. Area Comma,nders through their subordinate commanders commanders subordinate their through Comma,nders Area £. ~ COMREDFOR (Rear Admiral R.H. PHILLIPS, U.S.N., Deputy Deputy U.S.N., PHILLIPS, R.H. Admiral (Rear COMREDFOR ~ a. CINCAFMED wa CINCAFMED a. a b The exercise covered the whole Mediterranean from the the from Mediterranean whole the covered exercise The strategic wa.s Mediterranean-wide a FORT MEDFLEX Exercise b. COMSIXTHFLT and COM COM and COMSIXTHFLT b. Anti-Submarine . h eey RDfre) ee ne te omn of Command the under were forces) (RED enemy The d. a. Unified control of the A/S battle in the Sicilian Sicilian the in battle A/S the of control Unified a. . . To test the redeployment of forces required for the the for required forces of redeployment the test To §y\ [F[llll D ® \g y (§ O T O T Ä defence of the Aegean in the event of the fall of the the of fall the of event the in Stra.its. Aegean Turkish the of defence T a war. of week fifth the during tasks appointed their by the exercise director. exercise the by from COMSUBMED’s Headquarters in Malta.. He exercised exercised He Malta.. in Headquarters COMSUBMED’s from e BLUE the on na.tiona.l operations a out in a.cting role, were carried and which forces their of command in accordance with a special directive from from directive special a with operated CINCAFMED. who accordance in HAFMED) in command (intelligence) Staff of Chief area. their e nd Organization nd ecsd prtoa oto oe l fre in forces all over control operational xercised Mediterranea Forces Allied exercise o ring the area.. the ring REPORT ON EXERCISE MEDFLEX FORT MEDFLEX EXERCISE ON REPORT REPRODUCED BY THE STANDING GROUP STANDING THE BY REPRODUCED s Le APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D a rned. Pages Pages s exercise director and In Operational In and director exercise APPENDIX C APPENDIX 1-4, a -1- Appendix C to to C Appendix -1- r copd o h curlln com­ ling coutrol the to .re chopped h rough the straits will be more more be will straits the rough 28 TAP were in operational command command operational in were TAP Incl. I SCLOSURE NLSR 1 ENCLOSURE m n s in carrying out out carrying in ide as planned planned as ide DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE would nee would SECRET - NATO APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE NATO - SECRET able. A full test of the NCS organization should be carried out out carried be should organization NCS the Integral of an test become full A should element NCS able. the exercises major future In tinuous a.Tr operations for more than two days. Sustained operations operations Sustained days. two than more for a.Tr operations tinuous u cnurnl iha taeia exer strategical a with concurrently run at f h mi eecs adb lmtdt te ie ocs avail­ forces live exercises. the to post limited command be and separate in exercise main the of part over previous editions, but some further study is required on: required is study further some but editions, previous over uue exercises. future Gibraltar on D-Day. on Gibraltar In tested be should procedures area Linked exercise. the in Intelligence Reporting Procedures (CELINTREPS) to keep CINCAFMED CINCAFMED keep to occurrences. important (CELINTREPS) more the of Procedures Informed Reporting Intelligence ports were open. Consequently there is a need for more mobile mobile more for need a is there Consequently open. were ports aa fre i teMDC raws confirmed. was area MEDOC the in forces naval schemes. planning emergency port and facilities logisti the Sixth Fleet. The coordination necessary in wartime between between wartime in necessary coordination The Fleet. Sixth the OAROT ( TF CO ATAF) (6 COMAIRSOUTH exercise % the facts that COMEDEAST alone controlled 28 TAF and and TAF 28 controlled alone COMEDEAST that facts the % exercise Larissa, su Larissa, M O C tha ERT AO 2 Apni to C Appendix -2- 45/6 MC NATO - SECRET communicat are Nor tliese authorities. of some of cipation S t 11. Logistics : Logistics 11. 0 Intelligence: 10. he was able to make requests requests make to able was he 2 General: 12. R O F K I R T 6. Naval Control of Shipping. of Control Naval 6. . a Pann eoadmN. 8 No. Memorandum Planning War 7. . ie Countermeasures: Mine 9. Messages: 8. c ------support and for developing proper over-the-beach un over-the-beach proper developing for and support d . n At-umrn criraoe ant odc con­ conduct cannot alone carrier Anti-Submarine One b. A separate full scale Naval Control of Shipping exercise exercise Shipping of Control Naval scale full separate A The new War Planning Memorandum showed a marked Improvement Improvement marked a showed Memorandum Planning War new The There is an urgent requirement for Minesweepers at at Minesweepers for requirement urgent an is There AHP 1 and the new Mediterranean Annex worked satisfactorily satisfactorily worked Annex Mediterranean new the and 1 AHP rae s sol emd o ceeae opera accelerated of made be should use Greater a . . At one time during the exercise, only three major major three only exercise, the during time one At a.. b. The importance of Bizerte for the logistic support of of support logistic the for Bizerte of importance The b. w m a, . The defences of the Aegean were simplified in this this in simplified were Aegean the of defences The a,. l l P g g M M i ( ® M K a scn crir r upr fo aiie aircraft. maritime from support or carrier a. second f SO iinl eeoe fr uh coordination. such for developed ficiently (3) Handling of SITREPS of Handling (3) (1) Rainbow Rainbow (1) (4) The POD numbering system. numbering POD The (4) Signals NATOMOVE (2) H T U ENC could not be fully ex fully be not could APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE M LA R eporting System eporting N SUHAT CMDAT C COMEDEAST, DSOUTHEAST, f rAoi Srks iet to direct Strikes Atomic or e csdde o h non-parti­ the to due rcised c s i nt practicable. not is ise L OSURE 1 OSURE N D E M O l i l D) t O ional ional T S A E R i ons ons l oading oading and and a t DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE equipment is provided traffic handling capacity will be greatly greatly be will capacity handling traffic provided is equipment periods. used in MEDFLEX FORT, Is recommended on a NATO wide or a,t least ACE ACE a,t or least wide NATO a on recommended Is FORT, MEDFLEX in used necessity for subordinate commands to be ready to operate to a to operate to ready be to commands subordinate for necessity introduction of communications states on the lines of CINCAFMED CINCAFMED of lines the on states SIG communications letter of volum the introduction controlling of C`3b ENCLOSUR to C Appendix -3- `43/b MC NATO - SECRET basis. wide common plan independently of their senior commanders for considerable considerable for commanders the senior to their points of This independently plan capacity. common this restrict will emergency an increased but shortage of personnel a and personnel Hq of War When shortage but increased available. facilities communication the for high long-line infrastructure projects are completed and more on-line on-line more and completed are unacceptably projects be will war in infrastructure handled be long-line to traffic of volume the that i for achieved be planned is however not which will test exercise, wide NATO a communication until realistic fully A greater circuit availability, replacement of RATT and CW circuits circuits CW equipment. and on-line RATT of in increase replacement and lines long availability, by circuit greater for the ASP, at present exists to SHAPE and CINCSOUTH, it is certain certain is it CINCSOUTH, and SHAPE to exists present at ASP, the for its Infancy and where only one on-line circuit, which is reserved reserved is which circuit, on-line one only where and Infancy its ag sae AOeecs smlaeul s s lne fr 1959. for a planned out is as carry commanders simultaneously subordinate exercise NATO major and scale large SACEUR until quately to mainly due handling year, last message from and reduced overloaded considerably unduly were become not times did Com-Centre I I that to be expected in war, it was greater than in MEDFLEX EPIC. EPIC. MEDFLEX in than greater was it war, in expected be to that be to the had command. of gave problems staff levels and all at operational command faced fla.vourand red a,a. of separate realistic exercise control operational satisfactory. Headquarters. abundantly clear that many lessons were learned in the various various the in learned were lessons many that clear abundantly ~ are of: that used. are positions that concerned essential is authorities it all to 923, known Article T, ATP with SECRET - NATO APPROVED F APPROVED NATO - SECRET potnt o xrie ntaie a flyahee n t is it and achieved fully was initiative exercise to opportunity role. Surfa Red the . 17 15 16 14. Although the volume of traffic was considerably less than than less considerably was traffic of volume the Although 14. 3 Eecs Control: Exercise 13. dqay f Communications. of Adequacy . If vital operational messages are to get through some means means some through get to are messages operational vital If . . The ACE Communications organization will not be tested ade­ tested be not will organization Communications ACE The . . In APMED Command where communications infrastructure is in in is infrastructure communications where Command APMED In . b. The principle of having the aggressor forces under the the under forces aggressor the having of principle The b. b . The 28 TAF shore radar proved most useful in tracking tracking in useful most proved radar shore TAF 28 The . b a. The method of control outlined in EXPERIN 4 proved proved 4 EXPERIN in outlined control of method The a. d. Subordinate commanders must keep each other informed informed other each keep must commanders Subordinate d. e. c. When reporting the position of the enemy in accordance accordance in enemy the of position the reporting When c. y « p « m m 651 T c 2 Te oiin f ovy ta ae o a scheduled, as not are that convoys of position The (2) 1 A eey oc apocigaohr commander another approaching force enemy An (1) O of 3 April April 3 of O e i f th of aim he e Force in the Aegean, in addition to its primary primary its to addition in Aegean, the in Force e APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE E œ o œ « e of traffic is considered essential. The The essential. considered is traffic of e 1958 xrie ogv ae command area give to exercise O , although these did not have to be be to have not did these although , R R PUBLIC DISCLOSURE n d enemy action beginning of beginning action enemy d 3 » E 1 960 tks place. takes , e rs an an rs . 's

area. DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE T E R C E S his his iny fhs nisbaie forces. anti-submarine his of ciency uodnt cmadr. hs edures ucind satisfactorily. functioned Headquarters This commanders. subordinate Headquarters. Participating on co revision. Comments finalized, require are ll. I may commands areas these for COMEDNOREAST plans and COMEDEAST IV. Comments on Participating Units. hi for Participating network on Comments communication IV. special a with Malta, Headquarters to moved in COMEDCENT EDP locations, the in present down their laid and principles exercise with the of limits accordance the within confirmed, e otmi te iiin tat cnieal eue te effi­ the reduced considerably Straits Sicilian the in bottom sea hw ht hs wr ms satisfactory. most were these that show T E R C E S the of nature the and conditions sonar that reported commander 43/6' C M c local their by exercise the to prior briefing thorough a 18. The urgent need for an on-line PO line to COMEDNOREAST wa COMEDNOREAST to line PO on-line an for need urgent The 18. wa.r 21. Red Headquarters. Red 21. General. 20. 9 1 2 General. 22. 23. Italian A/S patrol in the Sicilian Channel, This unit unit This Channel, Sicilian the in patrol A/S Italian 23. . When arrangements for the release of atomic weapons in in weapons atomic of release the for arrangements When . headquarters at Santa Santa at headquarters - - O T A N O T A N m W a. Reports received of cooperation and mutual understanding understanding mutual and cooperation of received Reports a. satisfactorily, functioned Headquarters area CINCAFMEDs All COMREDFORS Headquarters was established in COMSUBMEDs COMSUBMEDs in established was Headquarters COMREDFORS b. Whenever possible, participating units should be given given be should units participating possible, Whenever b. APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE -4- R s (oe frte exercise. the for (Rome) osa NLSR 1 to ENCLOSURE C Appendix m munication munication o m ma nder. s

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DECLASSIFIED-P UBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE MC 43/b ENCLOSURE 1 ENCLOSURE 43/b MC SECRET - NATO -1- Appendix D to D Appendix -1- NATO - SECRET significant a has defence air state, alert high a Given system. The Inability to predict what facilities are most likely to be be to likely most are for: facilities need the The what predict emphasized to dama.ged war. to Inability peace The from change rapid a supporting of capable be the upon wa.s laid Stress exercise. the by emphasized were Region NATO - SECRET exercise also pointed out the high degree of vulnerability of our our equipment. of terminal vulnerability mobile of and degree will fixed a.s high system both well the as the out lines that land pointed headqua.rters order by In also system wartime exercise operation place to into communications required centers the of presently time communications the decreasing peacetimereadiness the a.proving than part rather burden" a,ir expensive an defence our but deterrent. state the of "nothing alert be high a may reporting forces stages the j without and Is early control which the in the of problem manning readiness the the is it especially - again, But critical most deficiencies. are which resources additional those obtain to endeavor must we and attack. the to prior readine of state higher a In resulted com­ which mea,sures that in alert differed menting but bloc communist the by attack all-out an highest possible state of readiness within our present resources, resources, present our within readiness of state possible highest and posture survival improved in from difference resulted alert when great which rea.diness the was retaliate increased to surprise ability tactical and to opposed as weapons. objectives conventional considered of limited at use exercise the only the to of aimed attack part his aggressor third the The confined and which in imple­ of attack. situation case the a of first opportunity ha.d time the the the in forces at NATO case aggressor the second by the in realized was while surprise situa plete two first The NATO. Introduction. I. contribution to make to the battle in Central Europe, particularly particularly Europe, Central in battle the to make to contribution tion problem. Future equipment and aircraft will help to alleviate alleviate to help will aircraft identifica­ and the and equipment aircraft, our capability Future of some of all-weather problem. increased performance tion an for Inadequate need the the Engagement, of some, and planning and national agreement can correct other other correct can agreement national and planning Rules and of some, standardization for need the structure, control and command retaliate. and survive to the for ability our strive to EDP must the we critical of therefore, implementation preparedness; of successful the state to high a is prerequisite a that is NOIR. HOSTAGE of II and I Parts II. against aggression of types three upon based Region Central the 5. Communications. This exercise demonstrated a need for im­ for need a demonstrated exercise This Communications. 5. Defence Air 4. exercise the of parts two these from conclusion primary The 3. . h ao lso fo h cmaio f opee surprise complete of comparison the from lesson major The 2. 1. Exercise HOSTAGE NOIR examined the problems of war within within war of problems the examined NOIR HOSTAGE Exercise 1. smsmFZ® Z F m s m 's w m m m EOT N XRIE OTG NOIR HOSTAGE EXERCISE ON REPORT REPRODUCED BY THE STANDING GROUP STANDING THE BY REPRODUCED . The problems of air defence within Central Central within defence air of problems The APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D E n o » y « Pages Pages t APPENDIX D APPENDIX ions utilized the same enemy plan for for plan enemy same the utilized ions 1-2, m easures are are easures Incl. I SCLOSURE p artially Implemented Implemented artially s s DECLASSIFIED-P UBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE C 43/6 MC NATO - SECRET SECRET - NATO - SECRET a ln ad nie h fiue f hs pas n liae defea.t. ultimate and plans those of failure the invite and plans war unlikely. in a. rapidly deteriorating situation involving infiltration and and infiltration involving situation deteriorating a. in rapidly vacillation could seriously impair our ability to implement major major implement to ability our impair seriously could vacillation national the that n insure to urgent an control of guerilla exists and means There effective infiltration and the if single a.magnitude. a complex reach major very activity become would weapons. police conventional only utilizing considered Curtain phase Iron the second of The West the forces - forces. considered non-Soviet phase by first action The guerilla, objectives. limited with aggression HOS of III Part III. repea.ter"stations. is bomb a, by single both of destruction tha.tpreplanning. the manner a operational such of use maximum the by war a of stages early elements do not act at variance, or in a. manner which might might which a. in or manner variance, at act not do elements f NATO armed, of Soviet by intervention limited from Republic resulting Federal problems the the of border the controlling of problems complex h stain required. situation the jeopardize the ability of CINCENT to implement the EDP a.t any time time a.t EDP any the implement to CINCENT of ability the jeopardize : 8. The exercise emphasized that uncoordinated action and and action uncoordinated that emphasized exercise The :8. 7. In the first phase it was found tha.t the command and control control and command tha.t the found was it phase first the In 7. 6. e Isrn raet ucinn f h NAL the of functioning prealert Insuring _e. a T b. Reduction in our transmissions requirements during the the during requirements transmissions our in Reduction b. o important most the to protection increased Providing in d. facilities up back and primary of location Peacetime c. » t he third part of the exercise dealt with two phases of an an of phases two with dealt exercise the of part third he rces, national military forces and the B'ederal Republic B'ederalRepublic the and forces military national rces, . Increas m m T e AGE NOIR. AGE feiiiyi te omnctos system. communications the in flexibility d APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC DISCLOSURE mfiÆi fêi!Æ nm -2- I SCLOSURE ENCLOS Appendix D to to D Appendix UR 1 E L AS. iD. e ed for ed DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE seeking to attain this aim it was hoped that new ideas on the the on ideas new that hoped was it aim this attain to seeking S presentations were given, but which resulted in little useful useful little in prepared AIM. well resulted and which lectures but given, wherein discussion. were exercises Hostage presentations of series vious mns te eirLn oc Com Force Land senior the amongst INTRODUCTION. an opportunity given to consider their practical consequences. It It consequences. practical their consider to given opportunity an most of the tactics portrayed were based on well tried conventional conventional tried well on based were portrayed tactics the of most the within problems D/SACEUR. and SACEUR including SHAPE, from officers in Europe Central Forces Land Allied Commander, the by conducted matters. It was clear, however, that there remain areas of of areas remain there that however, undoubtedly clear, and was It interest great of matters. were battle Land a the on warfare Model. the on solutions presentations. their the the followed at presented then second the who discussion A and D+2 of Groups/ATAFs Army evening the at first the depicted, EXERCISE. THE OF CONDUCT plans. operational all Commanders showed a. readiness to change their ideas and adopt adopt and ideas their change wher to a. doctrines readiness showed new Commanders all ATAF the t Commanders, of Corps 1958. Commanders including Force and to November 5 Land down and Comm 4 senior on the Region, Paris all in by Central Guerre attended de was It Supérieure Ecole the military thought can only be obtained aft obtained be only can varyin thought the to military part in least at due difference D+7. of evening future or current test to and not was aim forward, the put be that would noted be warfare should atomic in operations of conduct tried doctrines which still offer a chance of success; however, however, well and success; of known use chance to a try offer still obviously that and will which no forward Commanders doctrines that put said tried were war been of have doctrines. conduct might It the on ideas ideas. their revolutionary freely exchange senior and HQs of group Fontainebleau the of Commanders senior hne necessary. changes C Force Land senior the were situations Two COMLANDCENT. of responsibility of area the ô 36--- ECOUE 1 ENCLOSURE fôC 43/6------ence and knowledge of these new weapons. The harmonization of of harmonization The weapons. new these of knowledge and ence SECRET - NATO -1- Appendix Appendix -1- NATO - SECRET held. been have cises . E CRET - NATO - CRET is se a tkn oad te harmoniz the towards taken was step first a . Ex 1. . h amo h Eecs ws ohroie iiay thinkin military harmonize to was Exercise the of aim The 3. major the nders, 5. It is believed that this was the first occasion on which which on occasion first the was this that believed is It 5. covered which model map a round conducted was Exercise The 4. . h eecs a afrt tep t e aa fo h pre­ the from away get to attempt first a was exercise The 2. . Th 6. MÛ M(M§ |[FDd® §© (sM (M Û® IM ) E Z F M  J ' « S e e discu cs Hostag rcise REPORT ON EXE ON REPORT R P EPRODUCED BY THE STANDING. GROUP STANDING. THE BY EPRODUCED roblems concerning each Situation were given to to given were Situation each concerning roblems e s the situation and the conditions make such such make conditions the and situation the sion APPROVED FOR APPROVED PUBLIC D a APPR rea of responsibility of COMLANDCENT. In In COMLANDCENT. of responsibility of rea i ty of the national Chiefs of Staff, the the Staff, of Chiefs national the of ty Pages Pages o s on the revolutionary effects of atomic atomic of effects revolutionary the on e mmanders in Central Europe had been able to to able been had Europe Central in mmanders Bleu was a map mod map a was Bleu O VE APPENDIX E APPENDIX D FOR PUBLIC DISCLO R 1-8, CISE HOSTAGE BLEU HOSTAGE CISE m anders on strategical and tactical tactical and strategical on anders Incl. I SCLO S e URE r a. series of such exer­ such of a. r series S a URE e tion of views on these these on views of tion l type of exercise exercise of type l g standards of experi­ of standards E to h e g

DECLASSIFIED-PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IMSM-0431-99 DECLASSIFIE-MISE EN LECTURE PUBLIQUE ERT NATO - SECRET hc C 0 ned te ocs n en t b provi be to means and forces the intends 70 MC which SITUATION. INITIAL -or . R-Hour. which is not In line with current or future plans since any plausible plausible any since plans future or current with line In not air is our which gave however, Plan, Strike Atomic the of effects ultimate a start to attempted had aggressor the which in written been had for war of form the war. on based nuclear was out it all an plans, operational current nuclear war had been raging for some some for raging been had war nuclear aggress­ the allowed reinforcement. this and and weather bad by hampered was Plan Strike heavy received not had Due Centre, the In boundary. forces broken Group casualties. those of Army having and inter ception the front whole astride the Centre along the havin back in enemy troops through the with covering our D+2, of evening and the declaration of R-Hour, to enable an exercise situation to to situation exercise an enable to R-Hour, of declaration the and The ha.ve done. might they than thereby force further forces, NATO advance to the by forces or dropped were weapons nuclear authorizing first from propa the a Council by and NATO the force, large prevent a to massed hoped had having war, campaign, conventional ex­ the with the in and, and war of strength to outbreak up the were at forces locations own our battle warning correct of plenty to develop which would allow the study of the desired problems. This This problems. desired the of study the allow would which develop SITUATION. the In INITIAL THE ON bombers, Zone. range Combat COMMENTS long the his In of weapons he majority had the nuclear case of the the use In been and have extensive an would homelands as Allied heavy as the on not was zone aggressor the the combat by to predicted. Inflicted subsequent events accurately be The hardly can a. of war considered. hours be few to first ought situation Atomic SACEUR The exchange. nuclear continental inter the starting given Is, of course, open to question, particularly In respect of of respect In particularly question, to open course, concerning of was Is, It doubts as given any be R-Hour, SHAPE of to there should acceptable declaration time no at H-Hour Immediate politically that the not between was delay considered however, delay, considerable a be should there that intended us waos n ifed n lre oitc Isaltos How­ Installations, ground logistics from large fall-out and to due airfields on areas active ra.dio weapons large burst of absence out knocked successfully made had not had bombing he to and been strategic had Germany and aim ASP West our of Aggressor’s setting resources the outset. a,t the seize and warfare spare nuclear started ever, it appeared to the exercise director that it would ha.ve been ha.ve been would it that director the and exercise the areas to rear our appeared to it damage ever, of amount small comparatively the C 43/b MC NATO - SECRET impossible to base an exercise, and particularly the first exercise exercise such first though the even particularly situation, and a. on chaotic exercise, an natu