~bmbat~dti~1ieror Myth

A Monograph by Lieutenant Colonel George P. Ritter Armor

School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas SCHOOL OF ADVANCED HILITMY STUDIES PIOWGRAPH APPROVAL

.4iGub?LDirector,f3mhb,Pm PhllipJ. Brooks, Ph. D.

Accepted this 27th dsy of Msy, 1993 Abstract

L£AOERSHIP OF THE OPERATIOtW. COMMANDER: COMBAT MUlTIPLIER OR MYTH? By LTC George P, Ritter ,l1S', 54 pages

The exercise ofoperatlonalleedlll shipbecomes IllCl"8llSlngly difficult es technology makes the battlefield more lethel, es thepace ofClllllbat eccelerates, and esClllllbat forces become more jointandClllllbined. U.s. N'1frf senior levelleedei shiplb:\rlO8stetes that h~ levellellllers exercise leedIll shiptIlroul1l Indirect metIDls. This mOl'lO!1llPh answer s thequestion: IsIt possible for themodern, operational Clllllmendllr toexercise leedIll shipesa Clllllbat multiplier, or have battlefield condltlons maOIl8I'atlonalleedlll shipa myth?

The lIlOI'IOQI aph examines two case studies ofoperational Clllllm8llders in the modern era: General IntheNorth African C8mP891 of 1941-1942 and General Matthew Rldgwa'( intheKoreen campal", of 1951. The case studlesanalyZ8 theIeedIll ship,or 18Clc ofit, intermsofthefour functions of leedIll shipasdescribed by U. S.N'1frf lb:\rlne and expanded upon by U.S. N'1frf Brlgadlar General Huba Wass de CZ8ge: pNlYlding purpose, establishing direction. generating motivation. and sustaining force effectiveness. To determ108 the effectiveness ofthese functions asexercised by Rommel and RidgWay, theanalysis uses battle outClllllas, ClISUlIlty/loss ratas, and condltlon offorces at theCllIlCluslon ofoperations. The evidence cited sOOws that mucll ofRommel's defeet can beattributed tohisfailuretoexercise leedIll shipat theoperational level. In contrast, RIdgway's Ylctory. Inlreat part, was theresult ofhisS1000essful, OIl8I'ationalleedlll ship.

The lIlOllOITaph CllIlCludlls thatoperatlonalleedlll shipIsa Clllllbat'multiplier, butthat the functions of leedIll shlp--as demonstrated by these two Clllllm8llders--are not equal In importance tooperational outCllllles. Establishing direction Isthemost Imprtant function ofthe four and can have s""lflcant Impact on sustaining force effectiveness. PNlYlslon ofpurpose must beconslstant with that oftheoperational Clllllmendllr's hll1l8l' h8lIl*lIllrters, and the gener atlon of motivation must beeccompllshed at theoperational level ; tactical motivation alone Is not sufficient for operational success, The artharsof theUnitedStabArmy's kqetme field mml,Ftl100-5 m, dssaibe leadership as "Um most essential ehmtof mbat pawer" and state that 'in the fins1 ~~isandoncathef~fsengqled,superlcrmnWpcmerderivesfmthecarragead ampetenceof soldiers ...and lbavr dlthr qwllty of thrlr laaflwshlp[empkis 1."The~revlsiondthemcnus1,repeatsthkstadmtheimpor~oflesdersnipin military operatimsand notes that IYhs persons1 influence of lagejoint ad ambined force, field, arps, and dlvlsimmMndershaves major bearingan themof battles and mnpstm'' ad that leadership is me of two wrnpomtsofmnmad2 Clearly, from the positionof current UnitedStatssArmy doctrine, leakship isthe most impoitart element an thebsttleffeld, but the wcy inwhich ammaders hw-8ledm the battlefieldhas ;#sover tima Prior to the 18thcentury,wmy mnmmders performedthis leadership insface-to-face environment Canmaderssuch asAlexmdr, Hmnlbsl, Caesa, Henry IV, well,and Marlborough found ttmt they couldobserve ad personally lead most, ifnot all, of their forason the bettlefield These great ammambrs mssssd their wmles to Q& the most shack and firepower effect of their waapons However, as thesizeaof armies inrassed. as bettiefietds became larger. and as wmfes dispersed, mmanders learibd thet this face-to-face leadership was nearly impossiblefor Umm tomaah In the late 19th and 20thcsn(uries, armiewar bsndon the popularlcitizen m&l d~~8loped during the French Revolution. Armies of from me milliontoover five milllm men ware not uncommon. Improved mnolagv (ag the rifled misket andcmmn. the railroad, mechanlzetlon, airpower, and weapans of msss-len) mads the bettlefielda mar, mobileand lettml placs. As a result, wmiesdispensda fwtfrom fertiftwtims making the battlefield ~lre"empty.' To malntaln freedom of actim, amy ammandmhad to manewer Imp masses of men over distawas and time: they had to beameoperathi artists Naw army amm- found tlist the face-to-face laalenhlp of their predeassorswss extremely dKficul& The distawas between units within their amies were grwl;thmmawbrswereat great risk when they mm, onto the b8ttlefteIdbecarreof its incfasdletbPIty; md Wtes pmgresdso quickly that commaders haddifficulty keeping up with the tempomdYith being ahle to leadat the critical place and time. ks81t1mlW. the armis were chmgiw inmtm kmi~~~laow~compossdlalmaethanj~~~f~fmmM1fcn.Formtodc on @jointad mbiwmtaArmies com~~sdfBPS,seibrs, ad $Pmen of divers mtlonsand the emplayment of nwel adair forces nw lmcunearmy commanders' respmsibilities Thess commardersalsofandW their prol~ssfaw1experience, educstion, and training metime3 dld not prsparsthemfor the ~bilittssdma1and air force emplumat or for caelition mrfmAll dthese facters msds leadingsuch farrr, more complex for the nwrnarmy commader than for htspre- tndustrts$-~~)1utton . ln fact, not only does UnitedStatesArmy doctrine see mt.8 problem of ldmhipas the most important elmsnt on the battlsfield, but dactrine also SES itsthe gmt& challmge on the battlefieldof the futura3 TheUPlitee SWEumy detrPtesasl~~Ifimteffort inteeEhi~glaaimhip in its m-amm(ssioningtralnlng, in its militsy schoels, and& its colleges The U.S. Army's basic leadership mmtal dascribss ladsship as *a pmssby which s soldier lnflunees others to axrmplish the missim4 Initsmwlon senior level leulemhlp, theU.S. Asmy stabs lRat le%mMp of the sort that an opedfortal I'wlamman& might exercise 'is the art of cikect md indirect influneeand theskill ofcreoting the cardltbsfor sust8imdorganizatfawlsums to achisvathedesiredresult But~all,iththeartaltakingavhimofwhatmustbe63na. communicating it inswsy that the intent tscksly undastaod. and ~wnkingtau@ mto ensun,its execution.4 ?his, thsn, is the i~stitutidWinitM ct WM the oparatiml-leve~ cummandermustch Brlgedi8P Gansral WWsssds ~~of the I986 wrshm of FH 100-5 and founding director of the UnitedStatsskrrr/sSchoo\ ol~ H t sStvdlss,y inhisartkle titled "A Comprensive View of Labship: agrees with U.S. Army doctrine mdwrites that -senior leaders rely mae on indirect procmesinproportion to Wr seniority' and explains that leadership has four f~IICtim*providing purpose. &lhhing direction, gmmtting motivstim for unit actions, ad sustaining theelfedivenessalthe unit for futureWks6 HersWassdem sttempts to bred: into components whet the effective leader mustdo and how he does it Amrdlng to Wass de Cage, for the gQ@Afve W to provide purpose, ha must impart "a m t pictureof how the unit mfsslanfitsinto the'bigptdm'. ..[togive hisunlt] . . .asem of importana,ofthe tasks to beaxrmpiishedmdhow sumsafailureof thewit mission will sect the world IIWW the unit07 hisv view cmforms to U.S. &my doctrine mst s~esthat tor the senior commander to establish purpose ha must hum *an &ilfty to mdmtandwhat isreq~irod of an organization. ..[ad]. . .a well-informal ability to canmunlcsts the intent clearly athat it links the larger aims to the orgmWiml mission. .. The authars of thisWine write that the senior wmmanws abf~ityto db this "is tnm~on an appreciationof the strategic, operatlml, and Mical levelsof w.'~Clesly, then, an operatfonal-level mmander providingpurpose to his fcrce gives ita stingtfngint inrelationtothemll scheme of the mr. Hawever, it isthe functionof Bstablishingdirsctionthat provMes the 'how-to" in moving that fmfrom thestwttng pojnt. Establishingdimctknis the functtohaf laakmhip that gives the fawa way to ampiish its mission. %ttinggmls and stadards, riavelopfng tmnns, ensuringdlsclpline, and training the orgmlzatlon we the meam senlor 1- and mfm3m use to chart mlzatlml direction."lO wsssd~zegeg~esfurther tode~aitmthis function:

Effectlve leadm prorids unambiguous direction and guMmce for action. The/ ha9aclesvlsfonofwhiitmusttmdme, wMisnecessarytoOS1 thejobdme and how to pmceed They.clearly articulate and ssstgn ob]ectlves, missims and gals tosubadf- In addltion to such direct guMmce, they also provlde indlrect guldnnca. They promotevalues; set stadards for axxmvllshment of tmks:enfaw disci~line:sstablish stmdard aogatlnp procahrreo;ensun,the thingof soldersbd unlts inappropriate doctrine, methodsand tedvlipues; and establish policies and regulations.

It isthw this function of establishing dlreclim that the opemtiml amrnader develops his fm8s a machine to acunnpilsh itspwposs. The "fuel' that keeps this mineworking towards itspurpass, though, ismotbatfan. Oeneratlngrnotlvatlmgtves the omatlml wmmader's law the impetus to act and mafntains that fm's manenturn. OfficialArmy doctrinestaes thsl -senior leaksmd commanderr we mpmiblefor enewingthat therequired motivation exlsts. They do this by &eloping the propa ethical perspective.sustaining a positivepld proqesslva mmand climate, ~fosteringa~ofunitthat~dn~~1eargm~lon~1~on.~l2 WsssdCzegelsmspeciflcastowhsttheoperstlonsl levelmmadermustdoto~ motivation. He cltes 'pasons1 dispbys ofcmagmusexanple, self-discipline, falress, mpetenceandforce of pemnality' as being "cmsimslly narasay mdeffectlve," but ststss further that "amamplex wstertkofauthorlty, mutual trust andcmlldenr,must be estab~ishc~betweenthe led and the hader. 13 T~IS =mmmpb system* is necessary at me operattaml lwei becarsethe majorityof theforce's su\dlsrs must be motivated by a trust and mfldsncs dsvebped by tha anmadawhik unabb physically to be nes that majorityof soldiers. The mmadardoes this, according to Wsss ds CZsgs, by influencing Wdlers through lsyersof their subad(nat8 leaders. They wltlvate positive leakship among their immediate subordinatesand mart to face-to-face persussion to bolster will ss theaxashwwrants (but usus\ly with subcrdtnate commanders and stdlfs). 14 ~xplicit~thers isrecopnitim thst higher levelam- exercise the IeaWshIp functim of motlvatim not dlrectly to sohlfers, but through su8opdnW to thmsow tkmw,it isthe flm! function eP IeaWshlp (sustaining 6f effective

U.S. &my tbctrimdm not Include in its dlscussicm of leadership imperatives at senior levels this final functfa of sustaining the effectfwnrssof the unit for future ws l5 Wass da Cage, howaver, iswit8 specific &cut this important functionof hlgher level aimmamks He writes that this function beams mmsysmatic and institutlawlized at hi@er levek He isalso very specific about what this functlon requiresof opgatiml level mmmlers They must plan fw the lossof key lealers, the Impact of new weapms, ad the effects of -a myriadof erwimnmental clmpaffectingthehlthand ~ i ~ their wmmd't6 o f Ham, thts fourth function of and miap~epaed for the futunr it seeks to enswe that fhe Re,i&m of pllrm, tRe&ablisRmfmt oPdlrectlm, and the gemation of motivaticmmRfnwto make the fm effecthrefor theopsstfmal Wl mmandw. Yet inall this doctrim1dlsEuJsim, Wecre few examples of maMnaperatfonsl level sctua~~~performingthesennctionn'i Isopersttons1 leadership still possfbkssamnbat multiplier or Is Itamyth, something m& impmibleby the mdwn cmditlons fadby theoperstionsl level leader? The monog.aph will exmine hcw twoopsdlamlammardss (Gsnasl Erwin ~anmel~~inhisNorth African mpaf0nsof1941 and 1~2~~~~istthav~~gwsyl9ini(cnar~uringes1~1st) exdsed leadership Ina combinedmirmment and what. Ifany. impac?this leadership had on thesuccessw Wl~ofikirf~~f~~. The csasMIss of Ranmel and R mire sigMfcant and mlsMlt bsoasethey both mmanded armies Inmimnrnents simllar to UILW which U.S. Army/U.S. UnifidCanmad Canmandm-in-Ghief mw emmter inthe future. Eacb of tfim~kannmandsda multi-national (combined) fameand hadto plan for the empluymmt of naval andelr forces (joint operatims). Each commardar was at the end of a long llmof communicdimfrom his sustalnment bsse (repuiringpcmer projactlon interms of forces and logistics). Eachammmder was faced wlth the dlfflcult situstlon of tklng ever anmmddforce that Bst bm werely beaten by thelr opponents. Ffnally, each was mmaR4inginagsogaphlcel settlng different thm any other in which he had fought befare. This monograph ewl- methods adproadures these twocommanders wed ta provide purpose, establishdirection,OBnrsts motivaticm, and sustain their agaitatlons' effectlvlness. These leadership functims are the basls of anslyslsbecase Vley are, accardlngtofbctrimand Wass dacage's view, the fuctlons of leadsshlp. Thsn the mcrograph will illustrate the results of each mmsnder's meUlods and proEedures through a lmk at thecommsnder's force effectiveness. Beaustheobjectiveof military leedership isa fores ttmt iseffective on the battlefield, the criteria for this examinatim mthe outcanesof battlesad ampai~lsin which etrch fmparticipated (i.a the ability of a comma* to impose his will mthe opposing commander and fmat the operatbl level), the number of battlead m-Wle~lttes,and the rmdftim of the foresat the amclusimof battles/mpafgnsfor shsqwnt aperatfms. The objectiveofthis analysis, as statedabove, kto determine ifthe leakship of a modern operational commander isa aimbat multiplier for his fom, ad, ifso, how dm he make ita

Mitchell M. Zsls, a colonel in the UnitedSMesArmy, aamind theater commanders for their key attrtbutesandfound two imperativesfor suws at this operational 1~1:stratepc visim and strength of wi11.20 his strategic vision, aa view ofthe larger gm~to which a theater commander's mnpalg, must lead, is the anterplscefa providing purpose tom wgmimtion. Yet, hsvingash@kvislan andmof will onrotshdalona The~cvisimmust be methat isampatibk, with the theof d thetonal ammader's superior command, wh&w that be the natblcommmdwityor a theaer-of-wa commander. If it isnot compstibk, theaperatimsl ammader wsethis foramacwrsethst is inamistentwith the murse of his nationor hfscoalition. In the caras of Rommel ad Rfdgway, both of these operational annmmdmhadstreng~~of will. ~idpmy'sshtagk visim, huqhhedid little to provide purpas effectively to his forea, didfit into the st- d his superior. bnwal Madrthur. RamM'Sstrsteglcvi~W,his p~W%bd-purpose, was pur8iy hkm,ad tt ledto the mtwlMeat of Axis faar,inNathAfrica During 1940, the kitish 8th Army hadsandly Meeted ths Itslim 10th &my in Nath Africa affer the ltaliaw had sttanpled an immsian of Ewtfrom Libya At theamclusimef this Meat, Britishfcrcm pursumdthe Itslimsback through Libysandthen establishedathindefense line inorder to PaCMStitute forcesand mmUmm to other Vleaters of ogerstim (i.a the Balkans adSudan). Thfs Italian Mest was so thorough in&If Hitler's mind that he feaed the ultimate milapse of his aliy in North Africaand Um ultimate endmgnring of Vichy FmchTunesia In an effort to share up the Italfans, he sent twoOerman dlvisfons under command of meof Oermany's fastest risinggmeml offfarsand a hero inthe blflzrbydefed of France Lieutenant bnwal Emtn Runml. in hts role, Ranmel wss to be subordlrmte to the ltalta Commander in Chief, Marshall [~afmi.*~ Prior to travelling to Narth Africa. Rommel mivedhis instructionsfrom the commands-in-chief of the &man army, Field PIarshsl Walther wn Brarchitsch. Vm Brwhitsch reitem&! thet Rmmelwas to meatAder the mmmdof Oraimi, but was to have di~mmmdloftReBermanAfrlkaKw~composedof5~!d@t Divisim ad 15thPmzer Dkisim,~dwhanweplMmbe~bthehe~dfmHewaaMalsa mmad the remainsofthe ItaliantlatoriarlCorps that that been so bW&fasted by the British. In a*lenre, he was to bemnem army commader though officially he was still a carpsmmarder in terms of theOermm units that he mmaded #omme1 was further instructed not to assume the offeasiw untilam the rrrlvslof all &man units Rommel listened but appmntly did not We these tnstructknsvery seriously, partlcukly the partabout belwuntk.r theammadof the ltalians"22 Upon arrival at Tripoli m 12 Februay 1941, he farnd thd Grazimi had turnedover mmand to hls chief of staff, BeRers1WarlboMn. Ranmel s~gsleasned that Wlboldl was not in favor of his plm to&& in vicinity of the ~u~of~irta~~Thhmel m& his first d