RUF TRIAL REPORT: AUGUSTINE GBAO DEFENSE CASE-IN-CHIEF JUNE 2 - JUNE 24, 2008

Jack Bouboushian Researcher & Trial Monitor, UC Berkeley War Crimes Studies Center Special Court for Sierra Leone Trial Monitoring Program

12 August 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Executive Summary 1 (a) Introduction (b) Overview and Roadmap (c) Key Findings II. The Gbao Defense’s Opening Statement III. Witness Profiles (a) Insider Witnesses, Civilian and Non-Civilian (b) Crime Base and Anecdotal Witnesses (c) Expert Witnesses IV. Major Themes in Witness Testimony (a) The RUF’s Command Structure and Gbao’s Role in It (i) Overview of the RUF’s Command Structure (ii) Gbao’s Responsibility as Overall IDU Commander and the RUF’s Internal Policing of War Crimes (iii) Gbao’s Responsibility as Overall Security Commander (b) The Puzzling Case of the Makeni Crime Base (c) Two Large-Scale War Crimes: The Massacre of the Sixty-Five Kamajors and the UNAMSIL Incident (i) The Massacre of the Sixty-Five Kamajors (ii) The UNAMSIL Incident (d) The Prevalence and Patterns of RUF War Crimes (i) Examples of Incongruent Witness Testimony on War Crimes (ii) Patterns of Violence or Random Occurrences? (e) War Crimes Perpetrated by Non-RUF Actors (i) Liberian Gios as the Primary RUF-Connected Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuses (ii) CDF/Kamajor, ECOMOG, and GOSL Attacks on Civilians (f) Gbao’s Personal Character and Relations with Other RUF Members (g) Gbao’s Individual Responsibility for War Crimes (h) The Role of RUF Ideology in the War (i) Non-Evidentiary Notes on Witness Testimony and Credibility V. Testimony Elicited on Cross-Examination (a) Sesay Defense’s Cross-Examination (b) Prosecution’s Cross-Examination VI. Witness Protection Issues VII. Legal and Procedural Issues (a) Potential Conflict of Interests between Gbao and Second Accused Morris Kallon Related to the UNAMSIL Incident (b) Court Rejects Gbao Defense’s Motion to Stay Proceedings (c) Prosecution Objections to the Expert Testimony of General Hederstedt (d) Cammegh’s Insistence that Prosecution Must Have Evidentiary Grounds for Cross-Examination Questions (e) Prosecution and Bench Objections to Cammegh’s Questions on Re- Examination VIII. Court Management Issues: Punctuality, Stenographic Accuracy, and Administrative Tensions IX. General Conclusions

i LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council AFRC case, The case against the three accused alleged to be members of the AFRC at the AFRC trial Special Court for Sierra Leone (Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu). CDF Civil Defence Forces CDF case, The case against the three senior members of the CDF at the Special Court for CDF trial Sierra Leone (Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa). Defense The defense teams for all three accused in the RUF trial. DDR camps Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration camps set up by UNAMSIL in the latter years of the war. ECOMOG The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group. GOSL Government of Sierra Leone G5 One of the RUF’s joint security units IDU Internal Defense Unit, one of the RUF’s joint security units IO Intelligence Office, one of the RUF’s joint security units Indictment Prosecutor v. Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (SCSL-04-15-T), Amended Indictment, 2 August 2006. JCE Joint Criminal Enterprise JSBI Joint Security Board of Investigations MP Military Police, one of the RUF’s joint security units OSC Overall Security Commander OTP Office of the Prosecutor, Special Court for Sierra Leone RPE Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Special Court for Sierra Leone RUF Revolutionary United Front RUF case, The case against the three accused RUF members soon to be completed at the RUF trial Special Court for Sierra Leone (Prosecutor v. Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao). SBU Small Boys Unit SCSL, the Special Court for Sierra Leone Court SLA Sierra Leonean Army UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone WACs Women in Armed Conflict

ii I. Executive Summary

(a) Introduction

This report offers a thematic overview and analysis of the evidentiary, legal, procedural, and court management issues that arose during the final session of the Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) trial,1 during which the Defense for third accused Augustine Gbao presented its case- in-chief. Taken together with similar reports provided by the War Crimes Studies Center during the past four years,2 it hopes to constitute a helpful record to those who would like to compare each side’s recently-completed final briefs and arguments, as well as the Court’s forthcoming judgment, to the evidence presented. Researchers interested in issues ranging from the evidentiary to the procedural to the administrative will also find it useful. Although the Gbao Defense case was not lengthy, the evidence provided therein has important implications for the RUF trial as a whole (and indeed, the historical record of the war that the Court is creating).

As a preliminary note, this report employs a somewhat unorthodox citation format via which well over 400 footnotes have been condensed to almost half that number, such that oftentimes, a single footnote provides references for the content of the entire foregoing paragraph. This decision is not only stylistic, but also practical, as researchers seeking direction towards passages of the transcripts relevant to particular subjects (e.g. a given witness’s background or the RUF’s basic command structure) will be better served by being given a list of references to several such passages, as opposed to individual references to minor components of broad subjects (e.g. the history of an individual security unit).

Additionally, no substantial witness testimony was given in closed session, such that this report covers all of the Gbao Defense’s evidence.

(b) Overview and Roadmap

This report begins with a summary of the Gbao Defense team’s opening statement, which touched on many of the broader issues raised by the Defense throughout the trial, including rebukes of former Chief Prosecutor David Crane’s florid opening statement and the broad scope of the Indictment.3 It then provides brief profiles of all eight defense witnesses and the subjects covered extensively in the testimony of each. For brevity’s sake, it uses only acronyms and shorthand titles; further information is contained in the Witness Testimony section and the above List of Abbreviations.

Section IV, the heart of the report, discusses the Gbao Defense case’s major themes approximately in order of significance, with an additional eye to logical progression (e.g. from overall command structure to Gbao’s own rank). Sub-section (a) covers the privileges and responsibilities Gbao held in his two posts, (b) considers the somewhat different picture of these

1 Prosecutor v. Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao (SCSL-04-15-T). All transcripts available online at http://www.sc-sl.org/RUF-transcripts.html. 2 All other trial reports available online at http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~warcrime/SL.htm. Also, for more narrative- style summaries of individual witness testimony in the Gbao Defense case, see the Sierra Leone Court Monitoring Program’s weekly trial reports, available online at http://www.slcmp.org/drwebsite/reports/index.shtml. 3 See Prosecutor v Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Gbao, (SCSL-04-15-T), Amended Indictment, 2 August 2006, paragraphs 36 and 37 (hereafter, “Indictment”). Available online at http://www.sc- sl.org/Documents/RUF/SCSL-04-15-T-619.pdf. 1 responsibilities that emerged from testimony on Gbao’s time in Makeni, (c) summarizes testimony on two of the most significant war crimes that the Prosecution charges Gbao with in the Indictment, (d) and (e) broadly consider testimony on crimes committed during the war, (f) touches on Gbao’s character and relations with other RUF members, (g) on his individual responsibility for war crimes, (h) on the role of RUF ideology in the war, and (i) on some remaining credibility and consistency aspects.

Each sub-section of Section IV includes some degree of analysis of the evidence’s coherence and consistency, much of which is summarized the key findings in Section I(c) below. Of course, there is a good deal of thematic overlap among these sections, and many of the divisions between them are somewhat arbitrary. For example, to understand how much command responsibility Gbao actually had during the war (covered in sub-section (a)), one must understand his possible roles in the UNAMSIL incident (covered in sub-section (d)). Moreover, it is crucial to emphasize that many statements made somewhat nonchalantly in this report (e.g. regarding the command hierarchy of the RUF) have actually been hotly contested over the course of the RUF trial. However, the report’s primary purpose is to relate the evidence presented by the Gbao Defense, not to analyze its full implications for the rest of the case or weigh it against the Prosecution’s case. In other words, to each sub-section under “Witness Testimony,” I would append the qualifier “according to Gbao’s defense.”

Section V briefly runs down the issues that arose during cross-examination by the Prosecution and Sesay Defense. Particularly important issues regarding the witness’s evidence and credibility are often additionally discussed in Section IV or referred to in its notes. As the primary purpose of this report is relating the evidence presented during the Gbao Defense case, testimony elicited during Defense cross-examination is summarized primarily to enable readers interested in the Sesay and Kallon cases to locate relevant testimony. Counsel for Morris Kallon declined to cross-examine any witnesses and formally closed the Kallon Defense on June 6th.4

The report goes on to discuss important witness protection issues, legal and procedural issues, and court management issues that came up during the case. It ends with some reflections on the broader implications of the Gbao Defense for the RUF trial, the Special Court, and international criminal law broadly construed.

(c) Key Findings

The key findings of this report are as follows:

• Gbao Defense presents the RUF as a somewhat organized, coherent insurgency. Outlining the command structure and operational practices of the RUF, a crucial aspect of all the Defense cases, is a tortuous enterprise. It is certain that the RUF in theory and the RUF in practice were two very different organizations, with some titles being purely ceremonial, certain actors exercising dictatorial power in certain periods or locations, and a great deal of fluidity on both counts. Outside observers have tended to characterize the RUF as an internally chaotic insurgency,5 but few witnesses presented this sort of picture. Thus, one could not help but experience a bit of disbelief (or at least shock) when hearing insider witnesses nonchalantly lay out intricate schemes of command hierarchy and procedures for

4 Trial Transcript, 6 June 2008, 3. 5 See Lansana Gberie, A Dirty War in West Africa: The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone (Indiana University Press, 2005). 2 internal monitoring, reporting, investigation, etc.6 If the RUF actually functioned as predictably as some insiders indicated, then it was more organized than many conventional armies. The Gbao Defense attempted to prove that its client occupied an insignificant position in this formal hierarchy, and also that the despotic authority exercised by Sam Bockarie rendered the hierarchy meaningless. The latter proposition seems to be more in accord with a view of the latter days of the war as chaotic and confused.

• Possible inconsistencies arise in Gbao Defense’s portrayal of its client’s command responsibilities while stationed in Makeni. As noted especially in Sections IV(a) and (e), the Gbao Defense portrayed Gbao as a man who had very little practical power during the war, who tried and failed time and again to use this limited power to prevent abuses of civilians. However, a good deal of witness testimony indicates that Gbao did hold some significant sway while he was stationed in Makeni. This may be the central tension in the Defense case, and is covered at length in Section IV(b).7

• Gbao Defense’s distancing of its client from the UNAMSIL incident may implicate second accused Morris Kallon, raising important procedural issues. The depiction of the UNAMSIL incident summarized in Section IV(c)(ii) was interrupted by a lengthy legal debate on the propriety of the witness’s testimony relative to the case of the second accused. This debate, covered in Section VII(a) was one of the most interesting components of the Gbao case in that the questions it raises are important not only for the RUF trial, but for the broader practice of trying multiple defendants at once.

• No coherent picture of the prevalence and patterns of RUF war crimes emerges from the Gbao Defense case. Like Gbao’s command responsibility, this issue came up in a variety of contexts that complicate any attempt to construct a single clear depiction of what went on during the final five years of Sierra Leone’s civil war. Section IV(d) runs down the whirlwind of claims made by various witnesses. In truth, this confusing picture may more accurately reflect the reality of the war than any straightforward description of the extent of war crimes (or of the culpability for them). This issue also indicates the difficulty of trying individuals for their roles in creating a context in which impunity was the norm, as opposed to trying them only for committing or ordering the commission of crimes. Inculpating non-RUF actors for war crimes was also a key aspect of the Gbao Defense case and is covered in Section IV(h).

• Tensions between the Court and the Defense teams rise to a boiling point. During the final four weeks of testimony, the atmosphere in Trial Chamber I, was far less than cordial. The procedural debates covered in Section VII give some sense of this, but those interested are advised to watch the trial itself.8 The level of hostility between the bench and the defense side of the bar at times overwhelmed the proceedings, with witnesses’ presence an awkward reminder of the fact that the purpose of the proceedings had fallen by the wayside. Although only an analysis of the Court’s final judgment on the RUF case can be authoritative, it is clear that the Defense teams are uncertain as to the Court’s impartiality in this case.

6 See infra Section IV(a). 7 It is also worth keeping this possible inconsistency in mind when reading the insider witnesses’ testimony on the latter stages of the war, during which time Gbao was largely in Makeni. For example, DAG-048 was actually stationed in Makeni during the same period Gbao was. See Testimony of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 21); Cross-examination (Prosecution) of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 141). 8 Videos of the RUF trial session are available online at http://www.sc-sl.org/video.html. 3

II. Opening Statement of Gbao Defense

John Cammegh, lead counsel for Augustine Gbao, delivered an incisive opening statement that made the most of his allocated thirty-minute limit in spite of covering some non-traditional grounds. Cammegh began by reminding the Court of its central place in the shaping of international criminal jurisprudence, focusing on the need for fairness and humanity in the face of competing political views and financial demands. He argued that, in spite of former Chief Prosecutor David Crane’s dramatics, the Prosecution’s lengthy case completely failed to prove that Gbao was a key player in the commission of atrocities by RUF members, such that Gbao’s own well-documented refusal to testify is justified. Specifically, none of the three bases on which Gbao is being tried – individual responsibility, command responsibility, and joint criminal enterprise – are supported by the evidence thus far offered. Moreover, at the time its indictment was made, the Prosecution lacked evidence supporting many of its allegations against Gbao; for example, its failure to call witnesses testifying as to Gbao’s command responsibility in Kono until the trial had been proceeding for eighteen months indicates such a lack.9 Cammegh implored the Court to rule against such approaches, to rule that “[i]t’s not acceptable to mold the case as it goes along… [or] to try a case on prejudice alone.”10

Cammegh then moved on to the more traditional subject matter of an opening statement: his own case, which alleges that there’s little credible evidence that Gbao ever fought at the front lines, killed anyone, or had the power to issue orders “to anyone to do anything” – or even the power to intervene in the commission of crimes against humanity by RUF members. Testifying primarily in English, Cammegh’s witnesses would show that Gbao was a bookish “local policeman” of modest means, who protected civilians from RUF excesses and passionately believed in the RUF’s quest to “free Sierra Leone from the corruption that had been strangling her for years.” In the posts he held (discussed at length below), Gbao was more or less a glorified reporter with a ceremonial title and lacked power to command other units. In fact, he tried his best to use his limited powers to ensure that RUF members did not abuse civilians and that those who did were punished. Nonetheless, he was abused by the RUF’s high command, who considered him a cowardly ideologue. Gbao was also in no position to influence the course of the May 2001 UNAMSIL incident.11

Cammegh made a point of emphasizing that the Gbao team would not be relying on alternative legal theories, “creative” defenses, claims of mistaken identity, or alibi, but rather would provide evidence demonstrating that Gbao simply did not commit the crimes alleged. Finally, characterizing his client as a stoic, intelligent, and sensitive man with the right to resent his presence in the Court, and contrasting Gbao’s behavior with the Prosecution’s abusive allegations and unjustifiable use of insider witnesses lacking clean hands or credibility,

9 At one point he Court cautioned Cammegh to stay within the realm of subject matter prescribed under RPE 84, to which Cammegh responded that it was imperative that he (a) address Crane’s dramatic allegations and (b) explain the “extraordinary decision” not to call Gbao. Ultimately, the Court allowed Cammegh to continue his opening statement as prepared. Gbao Defense Opening Statement (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 7-11). See also RPE 84: “At the opening of his case, each party may make an opening statement confined to the evidence he intends to present in support of his case.” 10 On Crane’s opening and the weakness of the Prosecution’s case, see Gbao Defense Opening Statement (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 2-5, 9-10). 11 On the basics of the Gbao case, see Gbao Defense Opening Statement (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 11-14). 4 Cammegh expressed hope that the Court would meet its duties to fairness, reconciliation, and international criminal jurisprudence.12

Whether the below-discussed evidence lives up to the promises made in this opening is, of course, up for debate, but it does seem that Cammegh’s opening statement, like Crane’s, diverged from his actual evidence, though far less dramatically. Namely, saying that Gbao never had any power to issue orders at all overlooks some of the responsibilities Gbao enjoyed as an overall unit commander. Also, many witnesses gave examples of instances in which Gbao did intervene to prevent abuses of civilians.

III. Witness Profiles and Subjects Discussed

(a) Insider Witnesses, Civilian and Non-Civilian

• DAG-110 was a teacher-in-training at Bunumbu College at the time he was captured by Liberian RUF fighters, in 1991. He worked as a civilian contractor in the RUF-controlled Kailahun district from 1994 until 1999, never becoming a combatant. He met Gbao in Giema in 1993, and spent some time with him later in the war, though the two did not become close friends.13 The witness testified in English on June 2nd regarding the RUF’s trading practices, Gbao’s personal trading activities, abuses of civilians perpetrated by the Gios, the RUF’s command structure and Gbao’s role in it, Gbao’s being abused by other RUF members, Gbao’s cordial relations with civilians, mining activities in Kailahun district, the killing of the sixty-five Kamajors, the RUF’s use of child soldiers, and government air raids in Kailahun.

• DAG-048 was a farmer at the time he was captured by Liberians in the RUF, in 1991. The RUF later appointed him town clerk, but he was eventually trained as a fighter and rose to third-in-command in the Military Police. He held this position until the end of the war, operating in various places, including Giema, Buedu, Pendembu, Segbwema, and Makeni. He knew Gbao well, but the two were never personal friends. The witness testified in English on June 3rd and 5th regarding the RUF’s command structure and Gbao’s place within it, Gbao’s command responsibilities in general, Gbao’s being abused by other RUF members, the RUF’s loss of control over its fighters following the AFRC coup, Sam Bockarie’s megalomania, war crimes perpetrated by non-RUF actors, and the killing of the sixty-five Kamajors.

• DAG-080 is a former teacher who was initially captured by Liberian RUF fighters and appointed town commander of Mende-Kema in 1991. He became an intelligence officer (“IO”) in 1994, and was later appointed overall IO commander at the same time Gbao received his promotions, in 1996. He was close friends with Gbao during the early years of the war.14 The witness testified in English on June 6th and 9th regarding the RUF’s command structure and Gbao’s place within it, Gbao’s command responsibilities in general, Gbao’s being abused by other RUF members, Gbao’s cordial relations with civilians, abuses perpetrated by the Gios, and the RUF’s procedures for investigating and punishing suspected war criminals.

12 On the Prosecution’s shortcomings and Gbao’s rejection of the Court’s legitimacy, see Gbao Defense Opening Statement (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 15-18). 13 Testimony of DAG-110 (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 33-34, 37, 58-59, 64-66). 14 Testimony of DAG-080 (Trial Transcript, 6 June 2008, 6-7, 18-19, 13). 5 • DAG-101 was training as a teacher at Bunumbu in 1991 when she initially encountered Liberian fighters and Sierra Leonean Vanguards, including Augustine Gbao. She eventually rose to a high rank within the women’s sub-unit of the IDU. She was the Gbao defense team’s only female witness and was at some point married to a former RUF member currently employed by the Gbao defense team.15 The witness testified in English on June 9th and 10th regarding the IDU WACs, the RUF’s command structure and Gbao’s place within it, Gbao’s command responsibilities in general, Gbao’s cordial relations with civilians, the RUF’s loss of control over its fighters following the AFRC coup, and Gbao’s failed efforts to prevent war crimes.

(b) Crime Base and Anecdotal Witnesses

• DAG-111 was Gbao’s live-in auto mechanic and driver during Gbao’s time in and around Makeni. He was a civilian and never knew of the different units or operations of the RUF, though he also drove other commanders, including first accused Issa Sesay.16 The witness testified in Krio on June 17th and 19th regarding Gbao’s command responsibilities, the UNAMSIL incident, Gbao’s cordial relations with civilians, and civilian life in Makeni during Gbao’s time there.

• DAG-018 first met the war in 1992, while working as a rice trader in Kono. Thereafter, he was based in Makeni and moved in and out of town in order to ensure his and his family’s safety (for example, he left upon the ECOMOG intervention and did not return until the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord).17 The witness testified in Krio on June 16th regarding life in Makeni during Gbao’s time there, including several anecdotes and commentary on non- RUF abuses of civilians.

• DAG-047 worked as a medical records statistician in the Government Hospital in Makeni prior to the war. In 1998, at Teko Barracks, he became one of the first set of CDF trained by ECOMOG personnel. Following the CDF surrender at Teko, he briefly met Gbao for the only time and later joined the RUF in an unspecified role “far junior” to Gbao’s.18 The witness testified in English on June 16th and 17th regarding Gbao’s activities and responsibilities in Makeni, life in Makeni during Gbao’s time there, and the UNAMSIL incident.

(c) Expert Witnesses

• General Johann Hederstedt (a.k.a. DAG-112) was a joint witness examined in chief by counsel for Issa Sesay. He has held several relevant posts in the Swedish armed forces, UN international peacekeeping and negotiation efforts, and various military consultancies, and has also worked with and studied guerilla organizations in areas ranging from Kosovo to Lebanon to south-central Africa.19 The witness testified in English on June 23rd and 24th regarding “the precise categorization of the RUF in terms of… the distinction between conventional and guerilla forces and secondly, the issues concerning command and control which arise

15 Testimony of DAG-101 (Trial Transcript, 9 June 2008, 66, 74-80, 85); Cross-examination (Prosecution) of DAG- 101 (Trial Transcript, 10 June 2008, 23-36); Re-examination of DAG 101 (Trial Transcript, 38). 16 Testimony of DAG-111 (Trial Transcript, 17 June 2008, 46-52; 19 June 2008, 8-9). 17 Testimony of DAG-018 (Trial Transcript, 16 June 2008, 3-9, 26-27). 18 Id. at 71-75, 79, 95-96; Testimony of DAG-047 (Trial Transcript, 17 June 2008, 2-3). 19 Testimony of Johann Hederstedt (Trial Transcript, 23 June 2008, 19-38). 6 thereof.”20 His evidence was much more relevant to the Sesay Defense, which constructs a broad, systematic picture of the RUF, than to the much narrower and more specific Gbao Defense. Accordingly, the Gbao Defense chose not to examine this witness.21 The portions of his testimony relevant to evidence presented by other Gbao Defense witnesses are noted in Section IV below; the procedural debates that arose during Hederstedt’s testimony are covered in Section VII.

IV. Major Themes in Witness Testimony

(a) The RUF’s Command Structure and Gbao’s Command Responsibility

As the command responsibility of each defendant is one of the central pillars of the Indictment,22 the Gbao Defense took great care to elucidate the command structure of the RUF and then to demonstrate that, contrary to the allegations made in the Indictment, Gbao’s place in this hierarchy bequeathed him almost no control over combatants’ actions – that, as DAG-101 bluntly stated, he occupied an “insignificant” position in the RUF leadership.23 Rather, according to his attorneys, the one unit Gbao did have some control over (the Internal Defense Unit, or “IDU”) was tasked with investigating abuses of civilians and did so thoroughly under his command. The following section attempts to paint a comprehensible picture of the tangled web of units, responsibilities, and power relationships that emerged during testimony.24 A solid grasp of the RUF’s command structure is of course crucial to understanding if or how Gbao was involved in the more specific incidents (e.g. the UNAMSIL incident) discussed below.

(i) Overview of the RUF’s Command Structure This section’s findings are summarized in the following diagram:

At the apex of the RUF was the “leader” (a.k.a. “the leadership” or “the commander-in-chief”): Foday Sankoh prior to 1996, Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”) during the period covered by Gbao’s case. “High command” included the leader, the battlefield (or “battle front”) commander, the battle group commander, and the military advisor. Aside from Bockarie, individuals such as Mohammed Tarawallie, one Kallon (but not RUF accused Morris Kallon), and one Mansaray were once a part of this group. Beneath high command were the area (a.k.a. “district” or “brigade”) commanders, who controlled all operations taking place within a given geographic area. The RUF also appointed “town commanders,” surrogate-chief liaisons who settled minor disputes between civilians (or between civilians and fighters).25 As a general

20 Id. at 5-6, 41-44. 21 Testimony of Johann Hederstedt (Trial Transcript, 24 June 2008, 29-30); Cross-examination (Prosecution) of Johann Hederstedt (Trial Transcript, 118). 22 See, e.g., Indictment, paragraphs 30-33. 23 Testimony of DAG-101 (Trial Transcript, 9 June 2008, 114-115). 24 Nonetheless, at times, the Court became confused due more to its misinterpretations of what a given witness had said than to any fault of the Gbao team. For example, see Testimony of DAG-080 (Trial Transcript, 6 June 2008, 64-67). At this point, as this report indicates, the basic command structure of the RUF had already been elucidated. Nonetheless, Judge Boutet conflated the terms “area/district commander” and “area/district IDU commander,” which necessitated a reiteration of the relationship between general and unit command. 25 Testimony of DAG-080 (Trial Transcript, 6 June 2008, 20-21); Testimony of DAG-101 (Trial Transcript, 9 June 2008, 114-117). It is important to note that some witnesses used the term “high command” to refer to the leader as well; which parties the witness meant to refer to was usually clear given the context. However, this report certainly glosses over the fact that at trial, it was often very difficult to determine which positions ranked where in the RUF 7 matter, many witnesses testified to the effect that Bockarie ruled the RUF with an iron fist, such that the powers of many other so-called “commanders,” such as Gbao, were severely diminished in practice.26

The RUF also had various “units” that operated across area boundaries. Many such units were supportive or logistical in function, such as the S4 (quartermaster), G1 (combat training), G3 (secretary), and G4 (armory). Four “joint” or “security” units were tasked with monitoring relations among fighters and, most importantly, between fighters and civilians. The G5, once commanded by Prince Taylor, was responsible for managing civilian affairs, which entailed, e.g., issuing travel passes and organizing citizens for collective labor. The Intelligence Office (“IO”), once commanded by DAG-080, reported on fighters via placing undercover agents within the rank-and-file. The Military Police (“MP”), once commanded by Mohamed Kaisamba (alias “Kaisuku”), arrested fighters suspected of violating the RUF’s code of conduct and also helped investigate minor crimes. Most importantly, the Internal Defense Unit (“IDU”, formerly known as the G2), once commanded by Augustine Gbao, was tasked with investigating alleged abuses of civilians by fighters.

Each unit had its own hierarchy, with an “overall unit commander” at the apex. Agents in a given unit did not report to or take orders from commanders of other units (especially not IO agents, whose identities were secret to most).27 Many units had female members known as “WACs” (i.e. women in armed conflict). For example, DAG-101 was a member of the IDU WACs. Though the exact interrelationship between the general IDU and the IDU WACs was never made crystal clear, it seems that IDU WACs agents did the same work as their male counterparts, but reported to a different unit commander.28

However, although a unit commander could issue orders to agents in his unit, a given agent only had to report his findings to the area commander of the area in which he was operating. Crucially, though unit commanders would sometimes be “copied” on these reports, even they were obligated to follow orders given by the area commander in whose area they operated, such that the unit commanders actually ranked below area commanders in terms of command responsibility. For example, if an area commander ordered a unit commander to stop an investigation into one fighter’s alleged rape of a civilian, the unit commander had to do so. The rationale behind this was that fighters’ activities were considered frontline matters.29

hierarchy. See also Cross-examination (Prosecution) of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 132; 9 June 2008, 30) on interchangeability of certain terms. 26 On Bockarie’s megalomania, micromanagement, and brutality, see Testimony of DAG-110 (Trial Transcript, 2 June 38-39, 44-45); Testimony of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 45, 64-66). Expert witness General Hederstedt also stated that Bockarie exercised de facto control over all battle operations. Testimony of Johann Hederstedt (Trial Transcript, 23 June 2008, 115-16). 27 On support units, see Testimony of DAG-110 (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 67-68, 103-105). On the G5, see Testimony of DAG-110 (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 89); Testimony of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 92); Cross-examination (Sesay Defense) of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 103). On the IO, see Testimony of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 30-31); Testimony of DAG-080 (Trial Transcript, 6 June 2008, 39-43). On the MP, see Testimony of DAG-110 (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 74); Testimony of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 22-23, 36); Cross-examination (Sesay Defense) of DAG-048 (Trial Transcript, 3 June 2008, 106). On the IDU and its command structure, see Testimony of DAG-080 (Trial Transcript, 6 June 2008, 22- 25, 45-48); Testimony of DAG-101 (Trial Transcript, 9 June 2008, 87-97). 28 Testimony of DAG-101 (Trial Transcript, 9 June 2008, 83-85, 87-97, 99-102); Cross-examination (Sesay Defense) of DAG-101 (Trial Transcript, 9 June 2008, 132). 29 On unit commanders being subordinate to area commanders, see Testimony of DAG-080 (Trial Transcript, 6 June 2008, 51-53); on DAG-110’s contrary statement, see Testimony of DAG-110 (Trial Transcript, 2 June 2008, 79). 8

(ii) Gbao’s Responsibility as Overall IDU Commander and the RUF’s Internal Policing of War Crimes After stints as an ideology instructor, secretary to the leader, and border patrol commander, Gbao was appointed overall IDU commander in 1996 in Zagoda and retained this position until 2001. His defense team took great care to demonstrate that the the relationship hierarchy between unit commanders and area commanders greatly diminished any power Gbao had in practice as overall IDU commander. Effectively, Gbao is alleged by the Defense only to have had command and control over IDUs. It also attempted to prove that Gbao was never a member of the MP or the G5 and could only give orders to IDU agents. However, it should be noted that DAG-110 stated that, in his capacity as overall IDU commander, Gbao was only answerable to Bockarie.30

Strongly committed to the RUF’s spoken pro-civilian ideology, as overall IDU commander, Gbao was known for thoroughly and fairly investigating any war crimes allegedly committed by RUF members. Investigations of war crimes committed by RUF members proceeded as follows. For the purposes of investigation and punishment, there was a division between “major” or “serious” crimes (such as rape, murder, forced labor, arson etc.) and “minor” ones (such as insulting, minor harassment, etc.). Minor crimes would usually be punished without any formal investigation and via means such as press-ups or a few lashes. Major crimes would be punished with either hard labor, being sent to the front lines, or death, depending on the severity of the offense. For particularly serious offenses, investigations were carried out by a “people’s court” composed of a Bockarie-appointed chairman and seven members whom the chairperson would appoint. The Joint Security Board of Investigations (“JSBI,” discussed below) also played a role in these investigations, but how its role was different from that of the people’s court was not clear. In other cases, following i