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Doctrine of Implied Powers As a Judicial Tool to Build Federal Polities

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Doctrine of Implied Powers As a Judicial Tool to Build Federal Polities Doctrine of Implied Powers as a Judicial Tool to Build Federal Polities Comparative Study on the Doctrine of Implied Powers in the European Union and the United States of America PhD dissertation by Milosz Hodun School of Law, Reykjavik University Table of content Table of content ............................................................................................................... 2 I INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………10 1. Methodology ............................................................................................................. 12 2. Judicial integration ..................................................................................................... 17 3.1. What is federalism? ............................................................................................. 22 3.2. State and sovereignty .......................................................................................... 25 3.3. Historical overview .............................................................................................. 27 3.4. Political and philosophical underpinnings of American and European federalism .. 37 3.5. Integration, federation and other forms of coexistence ........................................ 43 4. Implied powers and International Organizations ......................................................... 47 4.1. Scholars on implied powers.................................................................................. 58 II IMPLIED POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES………………………………………………………………………..61 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 61 1.1. Implied powers and judicial interpretation ........................................................... 62 1.2. Necessary and Proper Clause ............................................................................... 64 1.3. The Bank case ...................................................................................................... 66 1.4. McCulloch v. Maryland ........................................................................................ 71 1.4.1. Proper........................................................................................................... 75 1.4.2. Who decides what necessary and proper is? .................................................. 76 1.5. The Position of McCulloch in American jurisprudence ........................................... 81 2. Interplay with the Commerce Clause .......................................................................... 84 3. Dual federalism .......................................................................................................... 88 3.1. Implied powers in the pre-1937 era ...................................................................... 91 4. The New Deal and cooperative federalism .................................................................. 99 4.1. Implied powers in the post-1937 era .................................................................. 100 5. New Federalism ....................................................................................................... 111 2 5.1. Lopez ................................................................................................................. 112 5.2. Morrison ........................................................................................................... 118 5.3. Raich ................................................................................................................. 121 5.4. Comstock .......................................................................................................... 125 5.5. Obamacare ........................................................................................................ 128 6. Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 133 III IMPLIED POWERS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION………………………………………………………………..145 1. External Implied Powers ........................................................................................... 145 1.1. The ERTA case ................................................................................................... 145 1.1.1. External Powers of the Communities ........................................................... 147 1.1.2. ERTA judgement .......................................................................................... 150 1.1.3. Exclusivity ................................................................................................... 153 1.1.4. Argumentation ............................................................................................ 156 1.2. The Kramer case ................................................................................................ 160 1.3. Opinion 1/76 ..................................................................................................... 162 1.4. Opinion 2/91 ..................................................................................................... 166 1.5. Opinion 1/94 ..................................................................................................... 170 1.6. The OECD opinion .............................................................................................. 178 1.7. Opinion 2/94 ..................................................................................................... 180 1.8. Open Skies cases ................................................................................................ 184 1.9. Constitutional Treaty ......................................................................................... 190 1.10. Opinion 1/03 ................................................................................................... 194 1.11. The Lisbon Treaty ............................................................................................. 198 2. The Flexibility Clause ................................................................................................ 202 2.1. Comparison with judicial implied powers ........................................................... 206 2.2. The Lisbon Treaty .............................................................................................. 208 3. Internal implied powers ........................................................................................... 212 3.1. First attempts .................................................................................................... 212 3.2. Migration policies .............................................................................................. 215 3.3. New Agencies .................................................................................................... 216 3.4. The Criminal law ................................................................................................ 220 4. Conclusions .............................................................................................................. 227 3 4.1. Division of implied powers ................................................................................. 227 4.1. The Court and the other actors ........................................................................... 232 4.2. The Court‘s agenda ............................................................................................ 233 4.3. Implied powers and federalism .......................................................................... 242 4.3.1. Implied powers and subsidiarity .................................................................. 243 4.3.2. Democratic deficit ....................................................................................... 247 IV CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………253 1. Division of powers and development over time ........................................................ 253 1.1. Development over time ..................................................................................... 253 1.2. Different implied powers ................................................................................... 259 2. Implied powers and federalism ................................................................................. 263 2.1. Implied powers typical for federations ............................................................... 265 2.2. The key actors in the debate over implied powers .............................................. 268 2.3. Courts as federators ........................................................................................... 272 2.3.1. Court strategies ........................................................................................... 274 3. Federalism in the European Union ............................................................................ 285 3.1. Implied powers as a tool to measure federalism in the EU .................................. 290 4. Transforming polities ............................................................................................... 294 4 I. INTRODUCTION ´Federation‘ has been one of the most controversial words in the history of the European integration. It has always been in the air but most of the time it has remained silent and hidden so as not to disturb and wake up the demons that could stop or slow down the process of bringing the nations of Europe closer together. Federal thinking has been present in the European project since its beginning, and it has been more or less visible in different periods of the integration
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