The Interstate Commerce Clause
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The Unitary Executive and Inherent Executive Power
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWER Louis Fisher* The unitary executive model, if reasonably applied, has much to commend it. The Framers experienced first-hand the administrative problems of the Continental Congress from 1774 to 1787 and brought with them to the Philadelphia Convention a determination to structure government in a manner that would better assure ac- countability and efficiency. A single executive in the form of the President was a key step toward improved management. When Con- gress created three executive departments in 1789, it expressed a sim- ilar commitment to accountability by placing authority in a secretary, not in a board. At the same time, the principle of a unitary executive has had to compete with other important values. The purpose of my Article is to examine some of the compromises with the unitary ex- ecutive model, beginning in 1789. I then will move to analyzing the concept of “inherent executive power” and its dangers to constitu- tional government. The model of a unitary executive, if properly un- derstood, is compatible with the Constitution. Inherent executive power is not. I. THE SEARCH FOR A UNITARY EXECUTIVE The Framers had plenty of strong executive models from which to choose. They could look to John Locke, who emphasized the need for independent executive action. He understood that the legislature could not always be in sitting, nor could it provide laws to cover every contingency: “It is not necessary—no, nor so much as convenient— that the legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary that the executive power should, because there is not always need of new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made.”1 Although Locke divided government into legislative and * Specialist in Constitutional Law, Law Library, Library of Congress. -
A History of the California Supreme Court in Its First Three Decades, 1850–1879
BOOK SECTION A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT IN ITS FIRST THREE DECADES, 1850–1879 293 A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT IN ITS FIRST THREE DECADES, 1850–1879 ARNOLD ROTH* PREFACE he history of the United States has been written not merely in the “T halls of Congress, in the Executive offices, and on the battlefields, but to a great extent in the chambers of the Supreme Court of the United States.”1 It is no exaggeration to say that the Supreme Court of California holds an analogous position in the history of the Golden State. The discovery of gold made California a turbulent and volatile state during the first decades of statehood. The presence of the precious ore transformed an essentially pastoral society into an active commercial and industrial society. Drawn to what was once a relatively tranquil Mexican province was a disparate population from all sections of the United States and from many foreign nations. Helping to create order from veritable chaos was the California Supreme Court. The Court served the dual function of bringing a settled * Ph.D., University of Southern California, 1973 (see Preface for additional information). 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. I (2 vols.; rev. ed., Boston; Little, Brown, and Company, 1922, 1926), 1. 294 CALIFORNIA LEGAL HISTORY ✯ VOLUME 14, 2019 order of affairs to the state, and also, in a less noticeable role, of providing a sense of continuity with the rest of the nation by bringing the state into the mainstream of American law. -
Enumerated and Implied Powers
6.3 Enumerated and Implied Powers Standard 6.3: Enumerated and Implied Powers Distinguish among the enumerated and implied powers in the United States and the Massachusetts Constitution. (Massachusetts Curriculum Framework for History and Social Studies) [8.T6.3] FOCUS QUESTION: What is the Difference Between Enumerated and Implied Powers? This standard looks at the differences between enumerated and implied powers in the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. Enumerated powers are those expressly granted to the federal government by the Constitution. Implied powers enable the federal government to carry out tasks outlined by the enumerated powers. Building Democracy for All 1 Modules for this Standard Include: 1. INVESTIGATE: The Enumerated and Implied Powers of the U.S. Constitution 2. UNCOVER: Federal Minimum Wage Laws, Young Workers and the Implied Powers of Congress MEDIA LITERACY CONNECTIONS: Exploring the Use of Media for Military Recruitment 3. ENGAGE: Should the Nation Adopt a Living Wage Rather Than a Minimum Wage? 1. INVESTIGATE: The Enumerated and Implied Powers of the U.S. Constitution The enumerated powers of the federal government are listed in Article 1 Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. Among the 18 direct powers given to Congress are the power to levy and collect taxes, borrow money, regulate commerce, coin money declare war, and support an army and navy (for a full list, see Key Constitutional Grants to Powers to Congress). The 18th power gives the federal government the ability to create and enact laws that are “necessary and proper” for its use of the other 17 powers. The Necessary and Proper clause (sometimes called the “Elastic Clause”) gives Congress implied powers; that is powers not named in the Constitution, but necessary for governing the country. -
The Constitutional Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause
FRIEDMAN&DEACON_BOOK_UPDATED 11/24/2011 8:10 AM A COURSE UNBROKEN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY OF THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE Barry Friedman and Daniel T. Deacon* INTRODUCTION................................................................................. 1877 I. THE FOUNDERS’ FEARS ............................................................. 1884 A. The Threat ............................................................................ 1884 B. Were the Framers Wrong? (Does It Matter?) ................... 1886 C. A Constitution for the Future ............................................. 1894 II. THE REJECTION OF THE “NEGATIVE” AND THE ADOPTION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ............................................. 1896 III. THE JUSTICIABLE COMMERCE CLAUSE .................................. 1903 A. The Argument for Commerce Clause Exclusivity............ 1905 B. Though Exclusive, States Retained the Police Power ...... 1914 1. The State’s Power of Police .......................................... 1917 2. Shifting Lines................................................................. 1920 C. The Longstanding Acceptance of the Dormant Commerce Power ................................................................ 1928 1. The Absence of Support for Full Concurrence........... 1929 2. Avoiding the Issue by Dissembling.............................. 1932 INTRODUCTION HO is the better originalist, Justice Thomas or Justice Ste- W vens? More attuned to constitutional history, Justice Scalia or Justice Brennan? In one area, at least, the answers -
Why Does Justice Thomas Hate the Commerce Clause?
WHY DOES JUSTICE THOMAS HATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE? James M. McGoldrick, Jr.* I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 329 II. CONGRESS’S POWER TO REGULATE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ...................................................................... 330 A. THE “DRAMATIC DEPARTURE IN THE 1930S” .................. 340 B. LOPEZ AND MORRISON: TWO OUTLIERS LIMITING FEDERAL COMMERCE POWER ....................................... 346 C. JUSTICE THOMAS’S VIEW OF COMMERCE POWER; SOMEONE TAKES A “WRONG TURN” ............................. 353 D. GONZALEZ V. RAICH: THE ADVENT OF THE RATIONAL BASIS TEST DRAWS NOT A WHIMPER ........................... 362 III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE’S LIMITATION ON STATE AND LOCAL POWER .................................... 365 A. THE MODERN TEST FOR THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE ........................................................................ 371 1. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST INTERSTATE COMMERCE: (VIRTUALLY) PER SE INVALID ............ 371 2. UNDUE BURDENS ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE: BURDEN IMPOSED VERSUS LOCAL BENEFIT .......... 375 B. JUSTICE THOMAS HATES THE DORMANT “NEGATIVE” COMMERCE CLAUSE ..................................................... 383 IV. CONCLUSION: WHY DOES JUSTICE THOMAS HATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE? ........................................... 393 I. INTRODUCTION “Until this Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the original understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers -
Assessing the Unitary Executive As the Strongest Determinant of Presidential Success
City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 5-2019 Presidential Power: Assessing the Unitary Executive as the Strongest Determinant of Presidential Success Maxwell J. Fuerderer The Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/3088 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: [email protected] Presidential Power: Assessing the Unitary Executive as the Strongest Determinant of Presidential Success By Maxwell James Fuerderer A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, The City University of New York, 2019. i © 2019 Maxwell James Fuerderer All Rights Reserved ii Presidential Power: Assessing the Unitary Executive as the Strongest Determinant of Presidential Success: A Case Study By Maxwell James Fuerderer This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science satisfying the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Arts. ___________________ _______ ___Charles Tien___________ Date Thesis Advisor (Print) ________________________________ Thesis Advisor (Signature) ____________Alyson Cole_____________ Executive Officer (Print) _____________________ Date _________________________________ Executive Officer (Signature) iii Abstract “Presidential Power: Assessing the Unitary Executive as the Strongest Determinant of Presidential Success” By Maxwell J. Fuerderer Faculty Advisor: Charles Tien The Unitary Executive Theory, which implies that the president should have plenary authority over executive branch functions, and is the sole arbiter of executive power, can be attributed to increasing the powers of the presidency and overall making a president more successful in his policy endeavors. -
Mcculloch V. Maryland / Implied Powers Activity
LandmarkCases.org McCulloch v. Maryland / Implied Powers Activity McCulloch v. Maryland / Implied Powers Activity— Answer Key Directions: 1. Read the Background section. 2. Complete the Implied Powers section. 3. Answer the Questions to Consider. Background In Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution the Framers listed the powers of Congress. These are called Congress’ enumerated powers. Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 states that Congress has the power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Sometimes called the Necessary and Proper Clause or the Elastic Clause, it has greatly expanded the powers of Congress. The Necessary and Proper Clause bestows powers on Congress that are only implied (not stated directly) in the Constitution earning them the name implied powers. Implied Powers Decide which enumerated power(s) in Article I, Section 8 (see page 3) make each implied power below “necessary and proper.” Write the name of the clause(s) on the blanks that follow. 1. Create regulations regarding workplace safety ____3____ 2. Create the Selective Service and issue a draft in wartime __11,12,13___ 3. Establish a national bank ___1,2____ 4. Pass a national minimum wage law ____3____ 5. Prohibit the mailing of certain items (e.g., illegal drugs) ___7,3____ 6. Pass a law restricting immigration from specific countries ____4____ 7. Purchase planes, drones, and tanks to send to Afghanistan ___12____ 8. Maintain camping grounds in National Parks ___17____ 9. -
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction, 1865-1873 David P
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Civil War and Reconstruction, 1865-1873 David P. Curriet The appointment of Salmon P. Chase as Chief Justice in De- cember 1864, like that of his predecessor in 1836, marked the be- ginning of a new epoch in the Court's history. Not only had the Civil War altered the legal landscape dramatically; Chase was to preside over an essentially new complement of Justices. Of those who had sat more than a few years with Chief Justice Roger Ta- ney, only Samuel Nelson and Robert Grier were to remain for a significant time. With them were six newcomers appointed be- tween 1858 and 1864, five of them by Abraham Lincoln and four of them Republicans: Nathan Clifford, Noah H. Swayne, Samuel F. Miller, David Davis, Stephen J. Field, and Chase himself. These eight Justices were to sit together through most of the period until Chase's death in 1873. Taney's longtime colleagues James M. Wayne and John Catron were gone by 1867; William Strong, Jo- seph P. Bradley, and Ward Hunt, appointed at the end of Chase's tenure, played relatively minor roles. The work of the Chase period was largely done by eight men.1 Chase was Chief Justice for less than nine years, but his ten- ure was a time of important constitutional decisions. Most of the significant cases fall into three categories. The best known cases, which serve as the subject of this article, involve a variety of ques- tions arising out of the Civil War itself. Less dramatic but of com- parable impact on future litigation and of comparable jurispruden- tial interest were a number of decisions determining the inhibitory effect of the commerce clause on state legislation. -
Legislative Department
ARTICLE I LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CONTENTS Page Section 1. Legislative Powers ................................................................................................... 63 Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances ............................................................. 63 The Theory Elaborated and Implemented ................................................................ 63 Judicial Enforcement .................................................................................................. 65 Bicameralism ...................................................................................................................... 70 Enumerated, Implied, Resulting, and Inherent Powers .................................................. 71 Delegation of Legislative Power ........................................................................................ 73 Origin of the Doctrine of Nondelegability ................................................................. 73 Delegation Which Is Permissible ............................................................................... 75 Filling Up the Details .......................................................................................... 76 Contingent Legislation ........................................................................................ 76 The Effective Demise of the Nondelegation Doctrine ............................................... 78 The Regulatory State ........................................................................................... 78 -
Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited
Scholarship Repository University of Minnesota Law School Articles Faculty Scholarship 2007 Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited Heidi Kitrosser University of Minnesota Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489 (2007), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles/53. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited Heidi Kitrosser* INTRO DUCTIO N ....................................................................................... 491 I. INTRODUCTION TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: FURTHER BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP TO CONGRESSIONAL INFORMATION DEMANDS ....... 496 II. EXISTING DOCTRINE AND SCHOLARSHIP ................................................ 500 A . EXISTING DOCTRINE.......................................................................... 500 B. MAJOR SCHOLARLY ARGUMENYS ....................................................... 505 III. SECRECY AND SEPARATED POWERS: THE ARGUMENT FOR A NEW APPROACH TO EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE ..................................................... 510 A. GETING TO THE -
Executive Privilege and the Congress: Perspectives and Recommendations
DePaul Law Review Volume 23 Issue 2 Winter 1974 Article 6 Executive Privilege and the Congress: Perspectives and Recommendations Thomas E. Evans III Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review Recommended Citation Thomas E. Evans III, Executive Privilege and the Congress: Perspectives and Recommendations, 23 DePaul L. Rev. 692 (1974) Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol23/iss2/6 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COMMENTS EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE AND THE CONGRESS: PERSPECTIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS The doctrine of executive privilege has surfaced at the height of several controversies recently and this exposure has raised numerous questions concerning its nature, none of which have been more debated than the validity of its existence.' Its advocates have pointed to history, statutes, court decisions, and the Constitution in an effort to justify its use, while its skeptics using the same materials have arrived at a different conclu- sion. The ultimate resolution of this issue is of more than academic con- cern, for executive privilege has created an executive-legislative schism the breadth of which threatens the constititional framework of this na- tion's government. 2 Is executive privilege well-established doctrine or ill- supported dogma? What are the effects of its assertion? And most im- portantly, is constitutional government in the United States institutionally equipped to resolve fundamental differences between its co-equal branches? These are the questions which are raised by the privilege and which will be considered during the course of this analysis. -
The Illusory Unitary Executive: a Presidential Penchant for Jackson’S Youngstown Concurrence
THE ILLUSORY UNITARY EXECUTIVE: A PRESIDENTIAL PENCHANT FOR JACKSON’S YOUNGSTOWN CONCURRENCE Captain Richard K. Sala INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 155 I. COMPETING THEORIES OF THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE ........................... 163 A. Unitary Executive Theory at the Macro Level ................................. 163 B. Unitary Executive Theory at the Micro Level .................................. 165 C. Inapplicability After September 11 .................................................. 166 II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE ................... 172 A. The Import of Traditional Checks and Balances .............................. 174 B. The Executive’s Proclivity Toward Cooperation ............................. 180 C. Congress’s Investiture of a Unitary Executive ................................. 186 III. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE AUMF ............................... 188 A. The O’Connor Question ................................................................... 189 B. The Predator/Reaper Drone Program and the AUMF .................... 191 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 196 INTRODUCTION The presidency of “George W. Bush . sparked a resurgence in popular interest in presidential power”1 and brought scholarly debate and research regarding the reach of that power to the leading edge of academic discourse. Among the most contentious of these theories is the Unitary Executive