Russia's Impact on Nuclear Policy in China: Cooperative Trends And

Russia’s Impact on Nuclear Policy in China: Cooperative Trends and Depth of Influence Roger N McDermott

Roger N McDermott is Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King’s College, London and Research Associate, the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies (MECACS), University of St. Andrews, Scotland. He is also Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC. McDermott is on the editorial boards of Russian Law & Politics, Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies and assistant editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. He specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues. His interests in Russia’s defense and security developments are mainly in the areas of defense reform, force structure, training, strategic exercises, military theory, perspectives on future warfare, planning and combat capability and readiness, as well as strategic and operational analysis.

1. The Extent and Limits of Russia’s Influence on China’s Nuclear Policy Arguments in Favor of Russia’s Influence on China Deliberate Ambiguity? Constraints Within the Sino-Russian Relationship Analytical Foundations of Moscow’s Interest in a Strategic Partnership

2. Russia-China Military Cooperation Since 1992 High Level Military-to-Military Contacts Moscow’s Approach to Military Exercises Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercises Vostok 2010: Moscow’s Threat Assessment and China Vostok 2018: Toward an Alliance?

3. Moscow’s Opaque Nuclear Policy and ‘Escalate-to-De-Escalate’ Escalate-to-De-Escalate The Role of C4ISR and Conventional Precision Strike Systems

Conclusion

1. The Extent and Limits of Russia’s Influence on China’s Nuclear Policy Arguments in Favor of Russia’s Influence on China The search for an accurate assessment of the possible influence that Moscow may have on Beijing’s nuclear policy may prove to be elusive since it relates to several complex political- military facets of the bilateral relationship which are difficult to gauge at a distance. Moreover, within the Russian expert and analytical sources, there is a definite paucity of material upon which to base such an assessment.1 Although many aspects of the defense relations are discussed publicly this is an area that is opaque and reflects the sensitivity of the issues involved. However, any methodologies used to define the extent to which Moscow might influence the development of China’s nuclear policy, or to coordinate their policies in certain circumstances, are more realistic if rooted in the historical development of their ties, with reference to structures and their similarities, as well as what they are doing to strengthen the defense partnership. Much of this is contextualized in the analysis that follows and in sections two and three of this report. It is argued that any trace of influence on China’s nuclear policy is very closely tied to understanding the nature of the defense relationship within the strategic partnership, which officials and experts on both sides note to be constantly growing. In turn, this is intricately linked to the question of whether the strategic partnership may herald an actual alliance, now or at some point in the future. The historical context of the Sino-Russian defense relationship is also an important factor, which helps in identifying periods of change and advances within these ties. In his presentation to the NPEC workshop in Washington DC in July 2018, Jacob W. Kipp offered a useful overview of these historical ties and concluded that since 2014 the relations have deepened to the point of a de facto alliance.2 At the outset, it is worth noting that the relationship between Beijing and Moscow has often been turbulent. Indeed, based on this and many points of contention between these powers, it can certainly be argued that they are not natural allies.3 Despite this, since World War II there have been examples of military cooperation ranging from Soviet support to PLA forces in Manchuria in 1945-49, the deployment of Soviet Air Defense to Shanghai in 1950 to protect against nationalist air attacks, and in the period 1950-61 Moscow supported rearming the PLA including aid with nuclear weapons development. There have also been numerous low points in bilateral ties.4 These included the end of military-to-military cooperation in 1962, Soviet planning for nuclear pre-emption to prevent the PLA acquisition of the Atomic Bomb and fighting on the Ussuri River in March 1969. Despite efforts to normalize ties in the 1990s, following the dissolution of the USSR and forming bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation, Beijing has refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2008) or Moscow’s annexation of Crimea (2014). Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, the bilateral defense relationship has consistently grown, united in opposition to a US-dominated unipolar world, witnessing for

1 Discussions during NPEC workshop, Washington DC, 12 July, 2018. 2 Jacob W. Kipp, ‘From Strategic Partnership to de facto Military Alliance: Sino-Soviet Mil-Mil Contacts in the Modern Era, 1945-2018,’ NPEC Conference, Washington. DC, 12 July 2018. 3 Rakhmanin, Vladimir, 'Russia and China: Strategic Cooperation', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, 1997, pp.1 1-15. (Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry). 4 Chen, Jian, and Yang, Kuisong, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', in Westad, Odd Arne (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998, pp.246-294.

2 example, the emergence of joint Sino-Russian military exercises and the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 (then composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). In 2010, both capitals expressed concerns over the Arab Spring and seemed to find common cause in opposing it. However, the annexation by Moscow of Crimea in 2014 and the Western-imposed sanctions that followed appear to be a real catalyst for deepening the bilateral defense ties, as Kipp explains:

[The] Euromaidan Revolution destabilizes Ukraine and brings a pro-Western government to power in Kyiv, which is immediately recognized by Western powers. Russia responds by seizing Crimea and annexing it to Russia with Russian intervention in the civil war in Eastern Ukraine, PRC-Russian ties deepen as the international system goes into new Cold War. In 2018 US identifies both Russia and China as peer competitors and military threats to international order. India joins the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [in 2017] and Russia assumes the Presidency of the SCO. Russian assessment of US pivot to Asia is that a long-term conflict, based upon different geopolitical imperatives, between Beijing and Washington should be expected to shape global security issues. The Russian elite recognizes their own weakness in the Far East but also see China as the best path into a world order dominated by Asia. In this context, Sino-Russian cooperation has deepened by exercises against ‘hypothetical opponents,’ which look like the United States and its allies. These exercises, including the joint Sino-Russian exercise in the Baltic in 2017 have involved nuclear capable surface ships and submarines. The joint air defense exercise of December 2017 was cast by both China and Russia as an ABM command post simulation to counter ballistic missile attacks and involved ground, air, and naval forces.5 It appears, therefore, referencing the historical development of the bilateral defense relationship, that Moscow made a concerted effort in the 1990s to normalize ties with China, based on a deep understanding and assessment in governmental and defense expert communities of Russia’s long-term interests in pursuing closer ties.6 This has since been aided by coordinating policy on several issues, including the Arab Spring and increasing displays of unity to oppose a US-led unipolar international order. Since 2014, and international efforts to pressure or influence Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis, Moscow and Beijing have further developed their defense ties. But the question remains to what extent? And does this closer defense cooperation imply Russia’s influence on China’s nuclear policy? Another participant in the NPEC workshop in July 2018 highlighted the case to be made for Russia’s influence on China’s nuclear policy —and its military more generally— by reference to a comparison of the various structures involved. The Communist Party and State structure in China, for example, was heavily influenced by the USSR. Many of the structures in China’s Armed Forces are similarly modeled on Soviet experience, including the role of commissars. In terms of weapons design, again there is a heavy reliance on Soviet or Russian design, and arguably the PLA Rocket Forces follow this pattern of mirroring Soviet/Russian structures. Equally, the growing number of military-to-military contacts at higher and senior officer levels or military exchanges seem to indicate both scope for influence and deepening of bilateral ties (this is discussed in more detail in section two). Moreover, there are many examples of senior-level PLA officers that have been educated in

5 Author’s emphasis. Jacob W. Kipp, ‘From Strategic Partnership to de facto Military Alliance: Sino-Soviet Mil-Mil Contacts in the Modern Era, 1945-2018,’ NPEC Conference, Washington. DC, 12 July 2018. 6 Karasin, Grigory, 'Long-Term Strategy for Russian-Chinese Partnership', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 2, 1997, pp.32-33. (Russian Deputy Foreign Minister); Moiseev, Leonid, 'Russian-Chinese Partnership: New Horizons', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 3, 1997, pp.3-8. (Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry).

Russian military institutions including the General Staff Academy in Moscow. Additionally, there are also exchanges between personnel in the respective defense industries.7 These historical and structural aspects of the bilateral defense relations were further advanced in a set of practical arguments advanced by Vasily Kashin, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. Kashin sought to explore the defense cooperation that has evolved between Beijing and Moscow by examining what they have been implementing rather than discussing the nuances of political rhetoric. Kashin noted that the countries officially deny they intend to form an alliance. But in examining their actions in recent years, he reached a different conclusion.8 Kashin notes that Russia and China closely cooperate in the international arena and coordinate their policies on major issues. This includes frequent consultations on regional and global security issues and frequent high-level meetings between military leaders and politicians. Over the past 14 years, they have held military exercises at significant and increasingly higher levels. These military exercises test and train for a broad range of applying military capabilities against a state actor. Both sides maintain high-scale military- technical cooperation, as demonstrated by Russian arms sales to China. Equally, China and Russian are attempting to achieve greater economic interdependence, though this is asymmetrically weighted in Beijing’s favor. Kashin then asserts:

Russia and China have already built a relationship which has all of the features of an alliance except one: a written, binding obligation to come to each other’s help in case of war. Most likely, that is missing because under the current circumstances they would have little to gain and much to lose in formalizing the relationship.9 Other Russian specialists on China with a military background tend to reflect the upward trend in defense ties with China. Although much of this work note common security interests pursued through the SCO, for instance, rather than assessing the extent of the bilateral defense relations.10 There is a seeming wall of silence on the nuclear dimension to such cooperation. Essentially Kashin’s analysis echoes Kipp in asserting that a de facto Sino- Russian alliance exists in all but the formality of a treaty. Kashin traces this through the practical elements of the deepening of bilateral defense ties in recent years, though he argues it would not be in the interests of either state to move a declaratory statement concerning such an alliance.11

7 Comments made during the NPEC Conference, Washington. DC, 12 July 2018. 8 Vasily Kashin, ‘The Current State of Russian-Chinese Defense Cooperation,’ CNA, August 2018. 9 Ibid, p. 23. 10 Tezisy vystuplenija Evseeva V.V. na kruglom stole «V preddverii sammita ShOS: ozhidanija i perspektivy», sostojavshegosja 16 maja 2017 goda v Institute stran SNG [Evseev V.V. Performances on a round table ‘On the Eve of the SCO Summit: Expectations and Prospects,’ held on 16 May 2017 in the Institute of the CIS Countries.]. Available at: https://mgimo.ru/about/news/departments/gusev-na-kruglom-stole-v-institute- stran-sng; Ivashov L.E. Reshenie ShOS o neobhodimosti vyvoda baz SShA i NATO ‘pravil'no’ ‘The SCO Decision on the Withdrawal of US Bases and NATO are Right.]. Available at: http://viperson.ru/articles/leonid- ivashov-reshenie-shos-o-neobhodimosti-vyvoda-baz-ssha-i-nato-pravilno; Kaukenov A. ShOS: vnutrennie protivorechija i real'nyj potencial sotrudnichestva. [Internal Differences and the Real Potential of Cooperation]. Available at: http://www.easttime.ru/reganalitic/1/180.html (accessed January 15, 2018); Luzjanin S.G., Vasil'ev L.E., Klimenko A.F., Matveev V.A., Morozov Yu.V., Safronova E.I. Strategija razvitija Shanhajskoj organizacii sotrudnichestva do 2025 g.: ishodnye realii i faktor rossijsko-kitajskogo partnerstva. Monografiya [Strategy of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Till 2025: the Original Reality and a Factor in Russian-Chinese Partnership. Monograph.] Moscow, Institute of Far Eastern Studies RAS, 2015, pp. 168. 11 Kashin, ‘The Current State of Russian-Chinese Defense Cooperation,’ Op. Cit, p. 25.

Deliberate Ambiguity? While this set of arguments reflect developments within Sino-Russian bilateral defense cooperation and may appear convincing, the question is what does this imply and how reliable are the arguments? In the absence of a declaratory position on the part of both powers, it leaves governments and experts essentially guessing about the precise nature of the relationship. If there is Russian influence on China’s nuclear policy, it would surely emerge if there is a de facto alliance and some level of coordination on nuclear policy. This rests in part on the deployment of nuclear-capable platforms in the bilateral military exercises, which is of some interest. It also relates to the yet more complex issue of nuclear first use or pre-emption, whether Beijing might be influenced by Russia’s unofficial policy of ‘escalate-to-deescalate,’ sometimes referred to as a ‘demonstration strike’ to signal intent to escalate to the adversary and therefore compel a de-escalation of the conflict. As noted, such influence might be more realistic if the powers are allied. While Russia and China may not be ‘natural allies,’ there are evidently historical examples of powers moving together in specific circumstances, such England/Great Britain with France in the early twentieth century after centuries of conflict and rivalry. Or, even more recently, the alliance formed by the US, Great Britain, and France with the USSR during World War II despite diametrically opposed ideologies and political systems. Even as Moscow pursued closer ties with the West during the 1990s, there was considerable academic and government level interest in developing closer relations with China.12 But at the present stage, both capitals remain curiously silent on the question as to whether a Sino-Russian alliance exists. If it does, and foreign powers conclude that China could be influenced by ‘escalate-to-deescalate,’ then it should be noted that Moscow is currently in transition away from this policy.13 It has set targets for the conventional forces to greatly enhance the number of precision strike systems in the military by 2027, which is consistent with the term used in the 2014 Military Doctrine: ‘pre-nuclear deterrence’ (pred’iadernoe sderzhivaniya).14 If there is Russian influence on China’s nuclear policy in this regard, it may be anticipated that Beijing will prioritize conventional precision strikes in the years ahead to add an additional layer of deterrence. The historical background to the current state of defense cooperation between Beijing and Moscow sheds light on the efforts in recent years to overcome obstacles to deepening such ties. It offers context to the relationship, which has often been uneasy and marked by high

12 Arbatov, Alexei G., Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives', International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2, Fall 1993, pp.5-43; Lukin, Alexander, 'The Initial Soviet Reaction to the Events in China in 1989 and the Prospects for Sino-Soviet Relations', The China Quarterly, No. 125, March 1991, pp. 19-136. 13 See section three of this report. 14 See: Andrei Kokoshin, O sisteme neyadernogo sderzhivaniya v oboronnoi politike Rossii [On the System of Non- Nuclear Deterrence in Russia’s Defence Policy]. Moscow: Moscow University Press, 2012. V.I. Poletayev and V.V. Alferov, ‘O neyadernom sderzhivanii, ego roli i meste v sisteme strategicheskogo sderzhivaniya,’ Voennaia Mysl’, No. 7, July 2015, pp. 3–10; A.N. Bel’skiy, D.A. Pavlov and O.B. Klimenko, ‘Aktual’nye voprosy obezpecheniya voyennoy bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii,’ Voyennaia Mysl’, No. 1, January 2015, pp. 3–10; Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii’ [Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], 2014, https://rg.ru/2014/12/30/doktrina-dok.html, Section 12, point G; and Section 21, point M; V.A. Sobolevskiy’, A.A. Protasov and V.V. Sukhorutchenko, ‘Planirovanie primeneniya strategicheskikh vooruzhenii,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 7, July 2014, pp. 9–27; V.V. Matvichuk and A.L. Khryapin, ‘Sistema strategichsekogo sderzhivaniya v novikh uslovyakh,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 11–16; A.V. Nedelin, V.I. Levshin and M.E. Sosnovsky, ‘O primenenii iadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalastii voennikh dyestvii,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 3, May–June 1999, pp. 34–7

5 and low points. Certainly, the drive to normalize bilateral ties in the 1990s paved the way for a strategic partnership and the expansion of military cooperation beyond arms sales.15 The most compelling arguments in relation to similarities of military structures and levels of exchanges and military-to-military contacts are by no means straightforward. Simply because there are growing levels of contact between the two sides, this does not necessarily equate to either influence or alliance. Even the fact that senior PLA officers were educated in Russia’s leading military institutions does not ipso facto demonstrate influence. Other militaries send their officers to Moscow to access such courses and yet retain confidence that these are not overly ‘influenced’ by the Russian military culture.16 Also, these exchanges and high-level contacts need context and comparison with for example, what the PLA is doing with other foreign militaries. And in terms of military exercises, greater awareness is needed about the number of such exercises Russia stages with its foreign partners. The picture that emerges is less than clear. It seems that if there is an alliance between Russia and China, the high-level military-to-military contacts as well as the number of bilateral military exercises remain comparatively modest for ‘allies.’17 It should be observed, given the differences that exist or the barriers to alliance status, that something is changing within the partnership, especially since 2014. There is a growth in high-level contacts accompanied by diversifying the nature of military exercises as well as the inclusion of the PLA in the Russian (operativno-strategicheskie ucheniya) operational- strategic exercise Vostok 2018. Indeed, the comparison between Vostok 2010 and Vostok 2018 is striking, since the former witnessed the PLA factored into the exercise scenario as a potential threat to Russia and the latter had transitioned to seeing them as a cooperative partner.18 Their bilateral exercises frequently involve recourse to rehearsing against a state actor; in the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) this may imply the United States is the ‘hypothetical opponent.’ But there are many complex or even unanswerable questions concerning the growth and direction of this defense partnership. If it represents a de facto alliance, what does each side offer the other in different theaters of operations? Despite the bilateral naval exercise in September 2017 in the Baltic Sea, there is little the PLA could bring to a European theater of conflict.19 Equally, in a conflict in the APR, it is unclear how Russia’s involvement would necessarily bring value added. More importantly, in what circumstances would either side commit to coming to the aid of the other in the event of war? One area that the PLA may benefit from regarding Russia’s military is its experience of recent conflicts from Ukraine to Syria, and especially Moscow’s approaches to and experience of escalation control. In the nuclear realm, as Nikolai Sokov suggests, Beijing is more than capable of forming independent and mature nuclear policy.20 But as already noted, nuclear coordination between these powers, if it exists, rests on the alliance issue and the use of nuclear-capable platforms during their maritime exercises.

15 Afanasev, Yevgeny V., 'Concerning the China Card. Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arranges the Accents', Literatumaia gazeta (Moscow), no. 7, 16 February 1994, p.9 and p.14, in Black, J. L., Russia and Eurasia Documents Annual 1994, Vol. 1, Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1994, pp.233-236. 16 See: R. N. McDermott, Kazakhstan-Russia: Enduring Eurasian Defence Partners, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, December 2012. 17 See section two below. 18 See: Roger McDermott, ‘Moscow Prepares Vostok 2018 as Sino-Russian Strategic Exercise,’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 15, Issue 122, https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-prepares-vostok-2018-as-sino-russian- strategic-exercise/, September 5, 2018. 19 Richard Weitz, ‘Assessing the Sino-Russian Baltic Sea Drill,’ China Brief, Vol. 17, No. 12, https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-the-sino-russian-baltic-sea-drill/, September 20, 2017. 20 Nikolai Sokov, ‘Russian Role in Development of China’s Military Strategy,’ NPEC Project, 2018.

The current level of defense ties between Moscow and Beijing are ambiguous. Perhaps this is deliberate. It is likely to remain ambiguous for the foreseeable future; arguably ambiguity seems to suit the interests of both powers. But contrary to Kashin’s analysis of the relationship, if the de facto alliance exists, then there is a lot missing from their interactions, not simply a formal treaty. It seems to be a relatively modest, low-key alliance, if at all. As argued below by reference to Russia’s experience with its allies, the numbers of exercises would need to be ramped up to promote alliance interaction and promote interoperability. They would also probably require formal joint structures to deepen training and develop broader interoperability. There should be imponderables addressed, such as how they would coordinate to act within the SCO during a crisis in Central Asia, for example, since this is left unclear. Another area left unaddressed at present is the issue of intelligence sharing, which is reportedly nowhere near what would be expected between allies. Russia’s closest intelligence partners are Belarus and its Central Asian allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).21 At the political level, Moscow tends to talk-up the bilateral defense ties with Beijing, while the latter downplays its significance. Moreover, while Moscow prefers to pursue bilateral military exercises, the comparative figures on PLA international cooperation show a trend to prefer the multilateral route; their multilateral cooperation in this sphere would be restricted due to the various national interests represented in the expanded SCO (as well as the Central Asian members, the SCO now includes India and Pakistan and could well see further expansion).22 Constraints Within the Sino-Russian Relationship Nevertheless, despite the undoubted progress made since 1992 in building more durable and broader defense ties between Moscow and Beijing, there are significant constraints, even barriers, in the path toward making this a full-fledged alliance.23 These also link with the historical themes already touched upon but extend into cultural and other areas. In short, defense cooperation, regardless of its depth, does not equate with alliance status. To date, Russia’s military cooperation with China —far from implying an alliance— is rooted in pursuing the state interests of each party, which is a questionable basis for forming an alliance. Both states seem to view the defense cooperation in different ways. China’s main interest since the 1990s was access to the Russian arms market and military-technical cooperation to facilitate defense modernization; this was also frequently implemented in ways to foster an expansion of Chinese commodities. By contrast, Moscow had something more strategic in mind: to consolidate its ties with China and to oppose the US-led unipolar international system.24 While this formed the context and basis to pursue closer defense ties, it did not

21 See: Stephane Lefebvre, Roger McDermott, ‘Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Vol. 21, No. 2, June 2008. 22 Paul Schwartz, ‘Russia-China Defense Cooperation: New Developments,’ Asian Forum, http://www.theasanforum.org/russia-china-defense-cooperation-new-developments/, February 8, 2017.; Lyle J. Goldstein, ‘Watch Out: China and Russia are Working Together at Sea,’ National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/watch-out-china-russia-are-working-together-sea-15767, April 13, 2016; Richard Weitz, ‘Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises,’ Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1266.pdf, April 15, 2015. 23 Alexey D. Muraviev, ‘Comrades in Arms: The Military-Strategic Aspects of China-Russia Relations,’ Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 1:2, 2014. 24 Elizabeth Wishnick, ‘The New China-Russia-U.S. Triangle,’ National Bureau of Asian Research, http://www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/brief/121615_Wishnick_ChinaRussiaUS.pdf, December 16, 2015.

7 eliminate mutual distrust, or necessarily resolve deeper issues or linger suspicions based on historical developments.25 Many of the foundations of an alliance are missing. The interests calculated in each capital may result in tactical cooperation for the benefit of both, but little more. For Beijing and Moscow, in addition to historical differences and perhaps sensitivities such as border areas and demographic factors at play in Russia’s Far East where the underpopulated region is imbalanced in favor of ethnic Han Chinese, there are other problems. There is, for instance, the lack of a shared military culture, comparatively modest military-to-military contacts that make more problematic issues surrounding military interoperability.26 Additionally, in terms of development alliance dynamics, a whole host of themes act as constraints even if either or both sides genuinely desire an alliance. For example, there is the question of the lack of shared values, agreed principles upon which to base the alliance; if an alliance is formed, how is to be funded? How do Beijing and Moscow practically seek their interests? What is the alliance intended to achieve other than agreeing to oppose American power in certain circumstances, and what exactly does this mean? On the question of how each side views the growing defense ties, there is quite a chasm in terms of perspective. As noted, with every joint military exercise the Russian government, media, and expert community talk up the significance and claim it as evidence of the growing partnership. Beijing, by contrast, consistently downplays the exercises largely viewing them in a much broader context of normal international military cooperation. Even the emphasis between both sides can differ widely to the point where it bewilders outsiders. For example, following a bilateral air defense exercise in December 2017, Russian officials claimed this as evidence ‘vigorously developing military cooperation.’ In the English language news website of the PLA, some of this was repeated before going on to list the key areas of increased cooperation as: ‘military medicine, martial music, and military orchestras.’27 Questioning the existence or prospects of Sino-Russian alliance, one American analyst objected: An alliance is a relationship of serious gravity. When two countries forge an alliance, it means their interests are aligned. In practical terms, that means they will put aside small-ticket items and points of contention because there is a larger shared interest that is of immense importance. The currency of an alliance is trust. The products of an alliance are duty and obligation. Alliances are not entered into lightly, nor are they broken easily. They are based on shared interests that are clear to both sides, interests important enough that they justify the sacrifice by the people of one country for the people of another should a threat arise. This is not the basis of the Russia-China relationship, and it cannot be the basis of a Russia-China alliance.28 Indeed, with these obstacles to full-fledged alliance relations, it is worth recalling historical sources of disagreement between these powers, and how diametrically opposed their views

25 Mikhail Barabonov, Vasily Kashin, and Konstantin Makienko, Shooting Star: China’s Military Machine in the 21st Century, East View Press, 2012, pp. 51–63; Alexander Gabuev, ‘Friends with Benefits? Russian-Chinese Relations after the Ukraine Crisis,’ Carnegie Moscow Center, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_CP278_Gabuev_revised_FINAL.pdf, June 2016; Vasily Kashin, ‘Why is China Buying Russian Fighter Jets?’ Carnegie Moscow Center, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/2016/02/09/why-is-china-buying-russian-fighter-jets-su-35/itoe, February 9, 2016. 26 Alexander Gabuev, ‘Russia and China: Little Brother or Big Sister?’ Carnegie Moscow Center, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/?fa=64006, July 5, 2016. 27 Jacob L. Shapiro, ‘Russia and China’s Alliance of Convenience,’ Geopolitical Futures, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/russia-chinas-alliance-convenience-1/, December 26, 2017. 28 Ibid.

8 and perceptions of this history can be. In the map below, the historical loss of land at various stages is reflected in the interpretation of Chinese historians as a period of weakness and vulnerability.

Source: Geopolitical Futures, https://geopoliticalfutures.com/russia-chinas-alliance-convenience-1/, December 26, 2017.

Analytical Foundations of Moscow’s Interest in a Strategic Partnership In an article in 2000, the British analyst Steven J. Main identified the most crucial ‘nerve center’ of Russia’s General Staff: the Center for Military-Strategic Research Under the General Staff (Tsentr Voyenno-Strategicheskikh Issledovaniy Generalnogo Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil’ Rossiyskoy Federatsii—TsSVI GSh); which was referred to in one Russian article he cited as ‘the brain of the Russian Army.’29 Main observed in passing the allusion to the military- theoretical work of Boris Shaposhnikov’s classic work, Mozg Armii, (The Brain of the Army).30 The TsVSI plays a crucial role in Russian defense planning. The author highlighted that the center functions at the very heart of defense and strategic decision making and that little was known about the center among foreign specialists focussing on the Russian Armed Forces. According to one of the heads of the TsVSI it ‘occupies one of the leading positions in the scientific formulation of decisions in military security, structure, and application of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.’31 By 2000, it was clear that the TsVSI plays a prominent and formative role in the drafting of Russian Military Doctrine. In the 1990s, although most of the work of the center remained classified, their staff was encouraged to publish in the military press. In September 1997 in an article detailing the

29 Steven J. Main, ‘The ‘Brain’ of the Russian Army: the Centre for Military-Strategic Research, General Staff, 1985-2000,’ Conflict Studies Research Center, Sandhurst, March 2000, pp. 14. 30 B. M. Shaposhnikov, Mozg Armii, (The Brain of the Army), Moscow: 1927. 31 Colonel V. Ostankov, ‘Na ostriye voyennoy strategii,’ Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 January, 2000.

9 work of TsVSI based upon its publications, Vadim Solov’yev, the editor of Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, listed its key tasks as follows:

• Assessing the military-political and military-strategic position in the world; elaborating recommendations for the leadership of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense; • Co-ordinating research work, the scientific basis for decisions in the Concept for the Construction of the Armed Forces; • Examining the issues in maintaining Russia’s military security and preventing the outbreak of war; • Elaborating nuclear strategy and the development of [the country’s] nuclear forces; • Analyzing problems in relation to the defense of the country’s air-space; • Assessing a series of unified operational-strategic demands (trebovaniy) and fundamental propositions on questions concerning the development and use of the Armed Forces; • Examining operational-strategic and military-economic foundation of the stages of reform of the Armed Forces, all services and branches; • Elaborating fundamental questions concerning the organization of scientific research and research & development for the Armed Forces; • Accumulating the results of the command-staff, operational and other measures, conducted under the leadership of the Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff and their deputies; • Preparing and conducting scientific conferences and meetings, held by the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff and their deputies.32

Its staff is drawn from the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces (Glavnoye upravleniye General’nogo shtaba Vooruzhonnykh Sil Rossiyskoy Federatsii), which functions as the main intelligence agency (Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye— GRU) of the General Staff. In other words, the staff in the TsVSI are mostly serving GRU officers, and normally with proficiency in foreign languages. Main’s analysis of the TsVSI in 2000 traced many of the published works of the center’s known staff. Among the themes of these articles in the latter part of the 1990s are several forward-looking issues, such as the idea of creating a new pan-European security system involving the US, Europe, and Russia; this was being advanced in 1997, eleven years before the policy was first advocated by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2008. The forward-looking and strategic themes pursued by these analysts is quite striking and confirms the strategic nature of the classified work carried out by the center. According to the website of the TsVSI, in addition to the spheres of its activity outlined above, there is confirmation that it plays a role in preparing and conducting research linked to Russia’s operational-strategic exercises, listed in order: Vostok 2010, Tsentr 2011, Kavkaz 12, Zapad 2013, Vostok 2014, Tsentr 2015 and Kavkaz 2016. The likelihood is the website has failed to be updated and the center would have played a similar role in preparing Zapad 2017 and Vostok 2018.33 The USSR MoD Order No. 020 established its forerunner on January 26, 1985, as the Center for Operational and Strategic Studies under the Soviet General Staff. Of note in this outline of its work and history was the fact that the center was liquidated under Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in 2010 and only re- established in March 2013 by Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. Despite this, in liquidated and ‘scattered’ form, it continued to play a role in forming the scenarios and experimental details for operational-strategic exercises in 2010-12.34 In 2010, in celebration of the 25th anniversary of the TsVSI, a collection of articles was published by its staff in a special issue of Voyennaya Mysl’, tracing the origins of the center

32 Vadim Solov'yev, ‘Mozg russkoy armii,’ Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25 September, 1997, p. 3. 33 See: http://vagsh.mil.ru/Struktura-akademii/Centr-voenno-strategicheskih-issledovani. 34 Ibid.

10 and considering its value and contribution to Russia’s military scientific community and its impact upon defense policy and the development of the Armed Forces.35 The think tank, according to these officers, was formed in 1985 in response to the need for deeper scientific study of Russia’s strategic environment and in recognition that the US strategic defense initiative (SDI) may impact its strategic deterrence. It went on to grow in terms of its input into strategic documents, assessments of the security environment and shaping ideas for the development of the Armed Forces to meet the demands of modern warfare.36 This center subsequently formed domestic ties with the leading analytical centers in Russia, especially those think tanks closely linked to the Kremlin or the Security Council; one of these is the Institute of Far Eastern Studies (RAS) where some members of staff share a background in the TsVSI. Two of the most prolific analysts in the Institute of Far Eastern Studies with such a background in TsVSI are Colonel (retired) Yury Morozov and Lieutenant-General (retired) Anatoly Klimenko.37 This author has met and co-written with Colonel Morozov and conducted research interviews with him in Moscow in October 2010 on the ongoing reform of Russia’s Armed Forces. Morozov also discussed the work of his center and confirmed the close links with TsVSI as well as the idea that these analytical centers push long term to boost Sino-Russian ties. In the 1990s, it also formed working exchanges with institutions in China and the US and expanded these foreign links to include centers in Japan, India, North Korea, Germany, Italy, and Ukraine, though the latter was suspended following the onset of the crisis in relations in 2014 in addition to suspending cooperation with centers in NATO countries. The whole process of assessing the strategic environment, discussing exercise scenarios and adopting these for the purposes of staging operational-strategic exercises, according to open sources, takes approximately one year. While there are a range of interested parties involved in this process, including government-linked think tanks, university departments, military and civilian specialists, power ministries, and senior figures across the political- military leadership, there is little doubt that the General Staff relies heavily on the work of the TsVSI; it is this center that gives strategic depth and long-term relevance to the myriad of themes and experiments that are built into such exercises.38 Therefore, the analytical work providing the foundation for deepening strategic defense ties between Moscow and Beijing were long established by the leading Russian Sinologists and the work of government-linked research centers such as the TsVSI and the Institute of Far Eastern Studies. It is unsurprising in this context to find this being acted upon more recently by Russia’s political-military leadership. In a very rare example of a collection of papers from the TsVSI being published as a book (in the author’s possession), in 2004 it issued Voyennaya bezopasnost' rossiyskoy federatsii v xxi veke: sbornik nauchnykh statey (The

35 Colonel S.G. Chekinov, ‘Tsentr voyenno-strategicheskikh issledovaniy general’nogo shtaba vooruzhennykh sil rossiyskoy federatsii istoriya i sovremennost’,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 3-5. 36 Colonel Y. G. Shushkanov, Colonel V.N. Gorbunov, ‘O nekotorykh aspektakh teorii i praktiki primeneniya vooruzhennykh sil,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1, January 2010, pp. 22-25. 37 See: Pavel Kamennov and Anatolii Klimenko, ‘O voyennoy politike i voyennoy doktrine Kitaya,’ Problems of the Far East, No. 5, 2014, pp. 126-148; Anatolii Klimenko and Pavel Kamennov, ‘Voyennaya politika KNR i yeye rol' v uvelichenii kompleksnoy moshchi gosudarstva,’ Problems of the Far East, No. 2, 2017, pp. 69-85. 38 V.V. Baskakov, ‘Metodicheskiy podkhod k otsenke urovnya ekonomicheskoy bezopasnosti gosudarstva,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. I, 2010, pp. 31-38; I.M. Irkaliyev, G.M. Pavlyukov, ‘Zonal'nyy sposob vedeniya inzhenernoy razvedki,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1, 210, pp. 39-46; B.N. Gorevich, ‘Analiz vozmozhnostey sistemy vosstanovleniya vooruzheniya i voyennoy tekhniki v novom oblike Vooruzhennykh Sil,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1, 2010, pp. 47-52; G.S. Tolstov, ‘Problemy i perspektivy vnedreniya sredstv avtomaticheskoy identifikatsii v interesakh tekhnicheskogo i tylovogo obespecheniya VS RF,’ Voyennaya Mysl’ No. 1, 2010, pp. 53-60.

Military Security of the Russian Federation in the Twenty-First Century), with an editorial chapter by the then Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Colonel-General Yury Baluyevskiy.39 Baluyevskiy, who developed a reputation as a hawkish and anti-American CGS, set the tone for the collection of papers by highlighting some of the strategic factors in Russia’s General Staff’s threat assessment. He began by referencing the renowned Russian geographer V. P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky and his work from 1928: Rayon i Strana (District and Country). Semenov-Tyan-Shansky had noted that ‘within Eurasia, the East Slavic colonization has the appearance of a constantly tapered serrated sword, nestling in its Eastern Pacific end, wedged between the harsh climatic territories of the North of Asia and the ancestral lands of the most extensive state of the yellow race —China. In every encounter with external opponents, it is very easy to cut off the end of this sword.’40 Baluyevskiy, however, presented the possible response to this historical vulnerability of Russia’s Far East by establishing friendly relations with China. But Baluyevskiy also implied that China could be a potential threat in Russia’s strategic threat assessment and argued that the China factor had an influence on the political reliance on nuclear deterrence. He represented the countries to Russia’s south (former Soviet Republics) as relatively stable but advanced the concern of instability stemming from Afghanistan, a theme taken up by Russia’s political-military leadership while the US military had basing rights in Central Asia. Baluyevskiy also expressed concern about nuclear and conventional weapons proliferation and argued that this might influence non- nuclear powers such as Japan and Germany to pursue nuclear status. He noted the potential danger to Russia’s security linked to Islamic extremism spreading north through Central Asia or destabilizing Central Asia itself. The strengthening of new centers of power could equally cause problems for Moscow in his view, potentially damaging Russia’s national interests. In this context, Baluyevskiy supported the idea that Asian countries are of special value to Russia, especially in securing long-term access global markets if there were a downturn in Moscow’s relations with the West, and implied that China could be at the forefront of this policy. 41 A number of these themes were further developed in the chapter authored by General Klimenko. Here the focus of the author was mainly on how to build long-term security in Central Asia in the post 9/11 security environment. Nonetheless, Klimenko framed this in terms of what he saw as the growing competition between China and the US. He noted the archaic condition of the PLA, which has certainly changed since 2004 as the military modernization advanced China’s military capabilities but highlighted the long-term rise of Russia’s neighbor. Klimenko referred to US estimates concerning the growth of China’s power, taking account of the country’s economic, demographic, military and political potential, and the likelihood that China would come to dominate Asian affairs. According to CIA estimates, Klimenko noted, by 2025 China would become the main military power in the APR. The author asserted that China-US relations would continue for the foreseeable

39 Voyennaya bezopasnost' rossiyskoy federatsii v xxi veke: sbornik nauchnykh statey, Ed. Colonel-General Yu. Baluyevskiy, TsVSI: Moscow, 2004. 40 V.P. Semenov-Tyan-Shansky, Rayon i Strana, Leningrad, 1928, p.191. 41 Colonel-General Yury Baluyevskiy, ‘Geopoliticheskiye problemy i vozmozhnosti ikh resheniya v kontekste obespecheniya bezopasnosti rossii,’ Voyennaya bezopasnost' rossiyskoy federatsii v xxi veke: sbornik nauchnykh statey, Ed. Colonel-General Yu. Baluyevskiy, TsVSI: Moscow, 2004, pp. 10-25.

12 future to be characterized as complex and evolve according to the formula: coexistence, cooperation, competition, rivalry and in extreme cases ‘regulated confrontation.’42 Turning to what this meant in terms of promoting security in Central Asia, Klimenko advocated for a multilateral build on a Sino-Russian strategic partnership. He also highlighted the importance of the regional countries and drew attention to the Summit on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Almaty in 2002 as an illustration of the regional security dynamics that might serve to promote closer cooperation and strengthen security. Klimenko then noted the creation of the SCO and the emergence of the CSTO as a full-fledged political-military organization that promotes security in Central Asia. Finally, as well as advocating closer defense cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, Klimenko also promoted the expansion of the SCO to include other powers such as India and Pakistan, stressing the need for multilateral approaches to Central Asian security.43 More recently, Klimenko’s colleague at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Colonel (retired) Yury Morozov, published an assessment of the implication of the SCO expansion to include India and Pakistan as members agreed at the SCO Astana Summit in June 2017. Morozov’s article, ‘Perspektivnyye napravleniya razvitiya ShOS v Yevrazii,’ published in Natsional’nyye interesy: prioritety i bezopasnost', reveals some common themes in Russian strategic thinking about the SCO and Moscow’s defense relationship with China.44 Morozov argued that by granting membership of the SCO to India and Pakistan, it was possible to talk of the SCO space in Eurasia. He then states by this reference it is equally possible to see this development as laying the foundations to build a ‘multipolar world,’ and thus oppose ‘the existing hegemony of the United States.’ Morozov’s thinking, as expressed in this article, resembles very closely the approaches and published work of other Russian defense intellectuals writing about the complex dynamics in the Sino-Russian partnership: it is driven by the need to oppose US interests and leadership internationally, to develop several multilateral mechanisms that act as alternatives to the US-led international order, and ultimately results in some kind of alliance between Russia and China. By reference, therefore, to work of Russian defense intellectuals, mainstream Sinologists, and analytical centers closely associated with the Kremlin and the General Staff, it is possible to assert that building an alliance between Russia and China has been a long-term project. Equally, much of this was being written about long before the Obama Administration talked about a US pivot to Asia. As will be shown below, these analytical and strategic foundations of the Russia-China partnership on defense were coupled with consistent action since the 1990s to put in place many layers of cooperation that might serve to promote a de facto alliance. Of course, while this analysis is rooted in the work of Russian defense intellectuals and the efforts of the Russian state to promote a strengthen and deepened partnership with China, much depended on Beijing’s’ approach to such an idea, as well as numerous external stimuli ranging from the breakdown in Russia’s relations with the US, NATO and the EU, as well as the policy towards China pursued by the Trump Administration.

2. Russia-China Military Cooperation Since 1992

42 Lieutenant-General (retired) A. F. Klimenko, ‘Voyennyy faktor i yego vliyaniye na mezhdunarodnopoliticheskuyu sistemu vostochnoy azii,’ Voyennaya bezopasnost' rossiyskoy federatsii v xxi veke: sbornik nauchnykh statey, Ed. Colonel- General Yu. Baluyevskiy, TsVSI: Moscow, 2004, pp. 104-125. 43 Ibid. 44 Yu. Morozov, ‘Perspektivnyye napravleniya razvitiya ShOS v Yevrazii,’ Natsional’nyye interesy: prioritety i bezopasnost', Vol. 14, No. 1, 2018, pp. 137-152.

Due to consistent state-level efforts by Moscow and Beijing, the defense cooperation dynamics have steadily grown since the early 1990s. From the perspective of the mainstream Russian Sinologists and defense intellectuals, this has represented a strategic project to deepen such ties in pursuit of Russia’s national interests, as well as presenting an opportunity to counterbalance the alleged unipolar international order that emerged at the end of the Cold War. In the process of building these ties, several bilateral and multilateral formats have offered mechanisms through which to institutionalize the defense partnership. In 1992, the first of these mechanisms was established: The China-Russia Intergovernmental Joint Commission on Military Technology Cooperation (normally co- chaired by Russia’s defense minister and China’s Vice-Chairman of the CCP’s CMC). The commission meets annually and discusses arms sales defense industry cooperation. There have been gaps in the annual gathering of the commission, such as in 2006 and 2007 due to a downturn in arms sales.45 Additional exchanges occur between the services, through a bilateral approach at the level of service heads and commanders of certain units. These meetings provide opportunities to discuss issues of technical maintenance of Russian-supplied systems to the PLA, improving communication and strengthening bilateral military ties. Since 1997, the China-Russia Staff Headquarters Strategic Consultation meets annually. Deputy Chiefs on both sides manage and improve defense cooperation as well as discussing regional and global security issues. In 2015 no meeting took place.46 Several multilateral avenues have also provided concurrent mechanisms through which to build ties and discuss relevant issues. In 2001 the SCO was formed, and within two years Russia and China held a joint exercise marking the first in the SCO Peace Mission series. Other opportunities for high-level and senior-level contacts have appeared through China’s Xiangshan Forum (expanded in 2015 to an annual track 1.5 defense dialogue), the South and Southeast Asian Nations Defense Chiefs’ Dialogue (first held in 2014), the Moscow Conference on International Security (initiated in 2012), and the Association for Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) (first held in 2010). Moreover, the annual Shangri-La Dialogue provides another such venue for senior military-to-military contact.47 High- Level Military-to-Military Contacts

45 Linda Jakobson, Paul Holtom, Dean Knox, and Jingchao Peng, ‘China’s Energy and Security Relations with Russia: Hopes, Frustrations, and Uncertainties,’ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 2011. 46 China Military Online, ‘Chinese, Russian Militaries Hold Strategic Consultation in Beijing,’ http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-05/25/content_7125790.htm, May 25, 2016; Richard Weitz, ‘Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises,’ Strategic Studies Institute, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1266.pdf, April 2015; Xinhua, ‘China-Russia Agree on Military Cooperation Projects,’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014- 11/06/c_127183099.htm, November 6, 2014. 47 China Military Online, ‘Overview of Xiangshan Forum 2015: Win-Win Cooperation the Way to Asia- Pacific Security and Stability,’ http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015- 10/21/content_6733368.htm, October 21, 2015; Yu Bin, ‘China-Russia Relations: Russia’s Pride and China’s Power,’ Comparative Connections, 16; Moscow Conference on International Security, ‘Review of Moscow Conferences on International Security Held in 2012–2015’ http://eng.mil.ru/en/mcis/2012-2015.htm; ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, About the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM-Plus), https://admm.asean.org/index.php/about-admm/about-admm-plus.html, January 14, 2015; Xinhua, ‘China, Russia Vow to Boost Ties,’ June 3, 2016; Xinhua, ‘Senior PLA Official Meets with Counterparts during Sidelines of Shangri-La Dialogue,’ http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-05/31/c_134284108.htm, May 31, 2015; China Military Online, ‘SCO Defense Ministers Stress Cooperation to Maintain Regional Stability,’ http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2016-06/08/content_7093228.htm, June 8, 2016.

In a ground-breaking, detailed and very revealing study of Chinese military diplomacy 2003-2016, Kenneth Allen, Phillip Saunders and John Chen assessed patterns and trends in PLA international military cooperation. The study, published by the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington, DC, offers invaluable insights into the level of military- to-military contact that the PLA has had during the period in question. This data is also very useful for the purposes of this study, not least in so far as it contextualizes the intensity in Russia-China military contacts during the period.48 The authors of the study note that such military diplomacy from Beijing reflects a ‘top- down’ approach; it stems from the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee outlining broad foreign policy goals and the Central Military Commission giving directives to various elements of the PLA. Much of this military diplomacy is conducted by senior level meetings (83 percent), while the fluctuations in numbers are often heavily influenced by the Chinese five-year political planning cycle and much of these meetings are conducted at a bilateral level, though there is a growing emphasis on multilateral contacts.49 The authors of the NDU report therefore conclude:

• Most PLA diplomatic activity consists of senior-level meetings carried out by the Defense Minister, the Chief of General Staff (now Chief of the Joint Staff), and the Deputy Chief of General Staff (now Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff), who handles foreign affairs and intelligence; • Senior-level meetings accounted for 83 percent of Chinese military diplomatic activity from 2003 to 2016. China views these meetings as useful for building bilateral relations and providing high-level buy-in for a broader program of military-to-military activities; • The number of meetings fluctuates in conjunction with the Chinese 5-year political cycle, with visits lowest in years when the CCP changes political and military leaders at a National Party Congress (2002, 2007, 2012); • Since mid-2010, there has been a significant decline in overseas visits by top PLA leaders. This has been partially offset by the willingness of other countries to ignore protocol and visit China without reciprocal visits from their PLA counterparts; • Most Chinese military diplomacy is bilateral, but the PLA now participates in a range of multilateral meetings, conferences, exercises, and competitions.50

Moreover, PLA military diplomacy does not aim to build or strengthen the capabilities of its partners, and in the case of Russia, this is interesting in terms of any alleged effort to move to build an alliance. As the authors assert:

Unlike the United States, building partner military capacity does not appear to be an especially important goal of PLA military diplomacy. Although some military diplomatic interactions help build partner capacity, the PLA’s foreign military relations do not emphasize this objective. Military diplomatic activities are typically framed as efforts to improve ties with foreign militaries.51

48 See: Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 11, NDU: Washington DC, July 2017. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 11, NDU: Washington DC, July 2017. p. 59.

Source: Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications, Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 11, NDU: Washington DC, July 2017.

In figure one, drawn from the NDU study, a comparison is shown of PLA military diplomacy, which enables the reader to understand the Sino-Russian military-to-military contacts in their context. The most obvious observation is that seen from these figures, and more importantly the PLA, Russia is actually ‘bottom of the league.’ By any means of interpreting these figures, based on PLA military diplomacy, Russia is far from being a high priority for Beijing. This is in stark contrast to the political rhetoric from Moscow about the defense ties with China, or the publications of Russian defense specialists; these sources stress the idea of growing and deepening partnership. According to the data of PLA military-to-military contacts in the period, the focus was on Asia, Europe and Southeast Asia. PLA diplomacy prioritized Africa ahead of Russia, and the PLA senior level contacts in Central Asia also eclipsed Russia.52

52 Ibid.

To counterbalance this, as shown in figure two, a different picture emerges from PLA visits abroad. Here the emphasis seems more weighted to Russia, followed by the United States, but the remainder of contacts appear quite random, and lack any sense of strategic planning in terms of priority. These visits, and the frequency, therefore, are open to question since they may reflect the willingness of PLA to learn from foreign militaries or be based on many other factors such as seeking access to foreign education, preparing PLA officers for foreign deployments, among numerous other factors. If there is evidence of a shift in the bilateral defense cooperation in terms of military-to- military contacts, it is most clearly represented in figure three, which demands close attention and some explanation. This is drawn from Ethan Meick’s study in 2017, which argued that an upward trend in military-to-military contacts between the PLA and Russia’s Armed Forces is discernible in the period in question. ‘High-level’ contacts are defined as follows: ‘officials and officers holding a leadership position and corresponding rank in the military services at or above deputy commander of a particular service and assistant to the chief of the general staff department (‘joint staff department’ in the PLA context as of its reorganization in late 2015).’53

53 Ethan Meick, China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation, US- China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2017, p. 17.

Source: Ethan Meick, China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2017, p. 19. There are periods of decline in the levels and frequency of contact, as well as upward trends. It seems that 2010 was a low point, coinciding with the Russian strategic exercise Vostok 2010 which appeared to include rehearsal of dealing with a security threat from China. These dips can also be explained in terms of difficulties in the military-technical relations specifically related to arms sales and technology transfers. Of note, however, is the growth in military-to-military contacts since 2014 and especially the expansion of high-level contacts in 2015. Some caveats are required to further examine this data. While a surge in such bilateral military contacts has occurred since 2014, it has not reached the high point of 2005. This may be due to the agenda of 2005 being focused on exploring joint military exercises and multilateral exercises under the SCO and expanding these to include other members of the organization and thus develop the multilateral dimension of the ‘Peace Mission’ series. Equally, a word of caution is needed in examining this data. Despite relatively frequent high-level and senior level contacts in 2008 and 2009, it did not prevent the development and use of an anti-China element to the Vostok 2010 strategic exercise. Also, these contacts offer no insight into the nature of the dialogue. But as Allen, Saunders, and Chen noted in their study, the PLA during such meetings are under very strict control by the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission. In this context, the contacts may not necessarily foster bilateral trust, as such, but it is open to question as to whether these officials could be mandated to discuss sensitive nuclear issues.54 Additionally, and most significantly, 2015 marks an upsurge in the frequency of high-level military-to-military contacts, more so than any previous year. It is surely in such meetings that planning discussions would occur concerning future joint and multilateral military exercises. It is conceivable that following the Western response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Beijing became more open to an expansion of the defense ties with Moscow. And, on the other hand, as Moscow sought to rebalance its ties within the international system,

54 Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016, Op. Cit, p. 59.

18 there were few options other than seeking closer relations with China. However, if the expansion of high-level contacts in 2005 was driven by the need to discuss and plan joint military exercises and the SCO Peace Mission exercises, it would surely require similar frequency in high-level contact to consider the creation of an alliance. Moscow’s Approach to Military Exercises To evaluate the importance of joint Sino-Russian military exercises, it is necessary to understand the significance of strategic level military exercises in the thinking of Russia’s General Staff. Of course, such exercises are frequently multifaceted and include elements of a show, promotion of arms sales, or strategic messaging. But they are also deeply connected to combat training preparing forces to fight on various strategic axes. Moscow’s interest in using military exercises as a feature of the annual military training program is not new. In the eighteenth century, for instance, the Russian General Aleksandr Suvorov coined the phrase ‘Tiazhelo v uchenii, legko v boiu,’ which literally translates as ‘difficult on exercise, easy in battle’ or its shorter more memorable form, ‘train hard, fight easy.’ It is a dictum that is pervasive within foreign militaries today.55 Russian and Soviet military traditions have always placed great emphasis on strategic military exercises as the key to military training and education. Russia’s General Staff plans and oversees the conduct of its operational-strategic exercises, and this approach reflects the thinking of its leading military theorists.56 Certain features of Russian military science underpin Moscow’s approaches to such military exercises. Army- General (retired) Makhmut Gareev is widely recognized as Russia’s greatest living military theorist, though he is not entirely correctly represented as simply a ‘theorist.’ Gareev’s thinking was shaped by his experience of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) and is equally considered to be strongly conservative in his views; though in more recent years he has helped to support theories of warfare that seem to indicate that he understands that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed. In Gareev’s work, a model of thinking about strategic exercises develops in his book on Combined-Arms Maneuvers (Obshevoinskiye Ucheniye) published in 1983. Gareev is essentially guided by military practice rather than theory. He is not really concerned about issues of military theory and adopts a practical approach to strategic exercises, seeing them as being designed for training. This is consistent with his view that although troops need to be trained in peacetime, it is only in actual combat that they emerge as professionally competent soldiers. However, an earlier Soviet work on military affairs differs from this practical approach: I. E. Shavrov and M. I. Galkin, Methodology of Military-Scientific Knowledge (Metodologiya Voyenno-Nauchnogo Poznaniya) published in 1977.57 Here the authors incorporate a philosophy of knowledge into their analysis. They considered tactical-level military exercises as one tool but differentiated between exercises involving the training of troops from those testing concepts and even placed in a different category command-and-staff

55 Bruce Menning, ‘Train Hard Fight Easy: The Legacy of A. V. Suvorov and his ‘Art of Victory’,’Air University Review, (November-December 1986), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1986/nov-dec/menning.html, Accessed on October 19, 2017. 56 Vladimir I. Slipchenko, ‘Voyna Budushchego,’ Scientific Reports No. 88 (Moscow: Social Science Foundation, 1999; See: Steven J. Main, ‘You Cannot Generate Ideas by Orders: The Continuing Importance of Studying Soviet Military History—G. S. Isserson and Russia’s Current Geo-Political Stance,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2016), pp. 48-72. 57 M. Gareev, Obshevoinskiye Ucheniye, Voenizdat: Moscow, 1983; I. E. Shavrov and M. I. Galkin, Metodologiya Voyenno-Nauchnogo Poznaniya, Voenizdat: Moscow, 1977.

19 exercises. The authors also paid some attention to wargaming and field tests of equipment as part of deepening the value of strategic-level military exercises. Zapad 1999 marked the resumption of strategic-level military exercises in Russia following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and new approaches to these exercises were coming into play. The late Major-General Viktor Riabchuk authored: ‘The Theory and Practice. The Theory of Military Science and the Methodology of Military Science,’ (Voyennaya teoriya i praktika. Voyennoye naukovedeniye i metodologiya nauki), in Voyennaya Mysl’, the professional journal of the General Staff.58 Riabchuk, Slipchenko, and Shevelev were among the most ardent proponents of military systemology in military science. This was a direct attack on Soviet military science from within, as it involved ascribing greater importance to information management in command and control. These were the military theorists pushing cybernetics and the revolution in military affairs (RMA).59 They argued that the intrusion of information systems into weapons systems had played havoc with the correlation of forces as a means of resolving combat outcomes in wargaming. The experience with their modeling of the 1991 Gulf War had a major influence in this area: The Soviet General Staff wargamed the conflict and arrived at the correct outcome of the conflict but expected much higher combat losses on the US and coalition side.60 Concepts and perspectives on future warfare, with its implications for greater levels of experimentation during strategic exercises, greatly increased in the aftermath of the US-led intervention in Iraq in 2003. Notably, in 2004, the pages of Voyennaya Mysl’, featured much discussion about future warfare tied to military forecasting.61 If infused into strategic exercises, in the view of many theorists, this would provide the General Staff with an edge over potential adversaries in terms of wars yet to be fought. In 2004, for instance, Voyennaya Mysl’, published an unusually high number of military forecasting-based articles. And, after a lull in 2005, the surge continued in 2006 with even more attention devoted to the themes of military forecasting, future warfare and tying this to strategic exercises.62 The interest in

58 Major-General Viktor Riabchuk, ‘Voyennaya teoriya i praktika. Voyennoye naukovedeniye i metodologiya nauki,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 6, 2001. 59 Mary C. Fitzgerald, ‘The Russian Image of Future War,’ Comparative Strategy, Vol. 13, 1994, pp. 167-180. 60 V. D. Riabchuk, ‘Nauka, obrazovanie, reforma,’ Voyennaya mysl’, No. 2, February 1994, pp. 39-41; V. D. Riabchuk et al., Elementy voyennoy sistemologii primenitel’no k reshenyu problem operativnogo iskusstva i takitiki obshchevoyskobykh ob'edineniy, soyedineniy i chastey: Voyenno-teoreticheskiy trud, Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii, 1995. 61 In the issues of Voyennaya Mysl’ in 2004 there featured the following in-depth articles consider future warfare and military forecasting: A.A. Nogovitsyn, V.V. Barvinenko, ‘Razvitiye sposobov i form voyennykh deystviy: informatsionnyy aspect,’ O.V. Orekhov, S.G. Chekinov, ‘Kharakternyye osobennosti vooruzhennoy bor'by v voynakh i konfliktakh poslednego desyatiletiya’, I.N. Vorob’yev, ‘Organizatsionnaya struktura obshchevoyskovykh formirovaniy: perspektivy sovershenstvovaniya,’ G.F. Molokanov, ‘Voyna v Irake i zhivuchaya oshibka Petra Velikogo,’ V.V. Vladimirov, ‘O nekotorykh ‘initsiativakh’ v issledovaniyakh voyenno-teoreticheskikh problem,’ S.A. Bogdanov, ‘O strukture i soderzhanii voyennoy nauki na sovremennom etape razvitiya voyennoy mysli,’ S.A. Bogdanov, ‘Zakony i metody issledovaniya voyennoy nauki,’ V.V. Serebryannikov, ‘O ponyatii ‘voyna’,’ A.V. Demidyuk, M.M. Khamzatov, ‘Molniyenosnaya voyna novogo pokoleniya: vozmozhnyye stsenarii,’ V.A. Kulikov, ‘Mirovyye voyny KHKH veka: formirovaniye i razvitiye strategicheskikh chert.’ 62 In 2006 Voyennaya Mysl’ carried the following articles on these themes: I.N. Vorob’yev, V.A. Kiselev, ‘Vooruzhennyy konflikt: bor’ba s diversionno-terroristicheskoy deyatel’nost’yu protivnika,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1; S.L. Pechurov, ‘Printsipy voyny v traktovke sovremennoy voyennoy nauki Zapada,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1; Yu.Ye. Gorbachev, ‘Setetsentricheskaya voyna: mify ili real'nost?’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 1; Ye.F. Podsoblyayev, ‘Spornyye voprosy teorii beskontaktnykh voyn,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 2; M.F.Gatsko, ‘O sushchnosti ponyatiy ‘voyennaya ugroza’ i ‘voyennaya opasnost’ ikh sootnoshenii v sisteme voyennoy bezopasnosti Rossii,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 4; V.A. Kulikov, Voyenno-tekhnicheskiye aspekty predotvrashcheniya voyn,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 5; S.P. Nepobedimyy, V.F. Prokof’yev, ‘Nekotoryye vzglyady na rol' rossiyskogo oruzhiya v epokhu sovremennykh vyzovov,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 6; M.M. Khamzatov, ‘Vliyaniye kontseptsii setetsentricheskoy voyny na kharakter sovremennykh operatsiy,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 7;

20 using strategic exercises to test new approaches to warfare has continued to grow.63 Russian military scientists believe the role of military forecasting has never been more vital for the Russian state and argue that this needs to be an intrinsic part of strategic exercises. According to military theorists, this is consequently the norm in planning and writing exercise scenarios. The role of military forecasting in Russia’s contemporary strategic military exercises is growing alongside more practical aspects such as building in the various lessons learned from combat experience in Ukraine and Syria.64 This theoretical and practical interest in future warfare also feeds into the ongoing effort in Russia’s Armed Forces to introduce and exploit Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) as part of a drive to adopt a Russian variant of network-centric warfare capability.65 Experiments in its operational-strategic exercises since 2009 have related to on introducing automated C2 to increase the speed of military decision-making, while this level of network-enabled experimentation has become a standard feature of these exercises. Advances in this area were prominent during Zapad 2017 and Vostok 2018, while there were clear experiments with C4ISR integrated operations during Russia’s operations in Syria.66 Moreover, another aspect of General Staff thinking about strategic-level military exercises is their interest in the initial period of war.67 In May 2004, for instance, Gareev authored an article in Voyennaya Mysl’, examining the problems of command and control and future warfare. However, in his article Gareev said something quite remarkable given his normally conservative stance.68 He could not have embodied better the need for more focus on future warfare and the initial period of war: And if we look critically at our past, for 150 years now the political leadership of the country has been putting the army at the beginning of the war in extremely unfavorable, unbearable conditions, from which it must extricate itself. Let us recall at least the Crimean, Russian-Japanese, First World War, 1941, Afghanistan and Chechnya in 1994-1995. And after all this, they still try to convince us today that politics is a matter for the elected, and ordinary sinful people, especially military men, who do not dare to judge politics even on a scientific level. By the way, such a one-sided, uncritical approach to

N.M. Il’ichev, ‘Yeshche raz o sushchnosti, soderzhanii i znachenii printsipov voyennogo iskusstva,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 7; I.N. Vorob’yev, V.A. Kiselev, ‘Strategiya nepryamykh deystviy v novom oblike,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 9; I.N. Vorob'yev, V.A. Kiselev, ‘Vysokotochnoye srazheniye,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 11; V.V. Kruglov, ‘Novyy podkhod k analizu sovremennogo protivoborstva,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 12. 63 Oleg Bozhov, ‘Kak stanut vesti voynu v budushchem,’ Moskovskiy Komsomolets, http://www.mk.ru/politics/2016/08/09/kak-stanut-vesti-voynu-vbudushhem.html, August 9, 2016. 64 ‘Osnovy sistemnogo analiza, analiticheskoy raboty i voyennogo prognozirovaniya, Ed. S.V. Chvarkov, the Military Academy of the RF AF General Staff Press, Moscow, 2016; V.V. Ivanov, G.G. Malinetsky, ‘Rossiya: XXI vek. Strategiya proryva: Tekhnologiyi. Obrazovaniye. Nauka, LENAND Publishers, Moscow, 2016; I.N. Vorobyev, V.V. Kruglov, A.I. Suptelya, ‘Voyennaya futurologiya,’ RF MOD Press, Moscow, 2000; V.V. Kruglov, ‘Voyennoye prognozirovaniye: sostoyaniye, vozmozhnosti i realizatsiya rezul’tatov,’ Voyennaya Mysl’, No. 4, 2016, pp. 80-86. 65 Kopylov A.V, ‘K voprosu o kritike kontseptsii setetsentricheskikh voyn (operatsiy) v amerikanskikh SMI,’ http://www.milresource.ru/Kop—NCW.html, July 8, 2013; Belenkov O.V, ‘Realizatsiya tekhnologii setetseitricheskogo upravleniya v ASU voyskami i oruzhiyem na baze GIS Karta-2011,’ http://www.gisinfo.ru/item/91.htm, July 8, 2013; Burenok V.M, Kravchenko A.Yu., Smirnov S.S, ‘Budushcheye za setetsentricheskoy sistemoy vooruzheniy,’ Poslezavtra: internet-gazeta, http://poslezavtra.com.ua/budushee-za-setecentricheskoj-sistemoj-vooruzhenij/, November 21, 2009; Burenok V.M., Ivlev A.A., Korchak V.Yu, ‘Razvitiye voyennykh tekhnologiy XXI veka: problemy, planirovaniye, realizatsiya,’ Tver’: Izdatel’stvo OOO KUPOL, 2009. 66 Tikhanychev, O. V., 2016, ‘O roli sistematicheskogo ognevogo vozdei'stviia v sovremennykh operatsiiakh,’ Voennaia Mysl', No. 11, November, pp. 16 – 20. 67 Author’s emphasis. See: М.А. Gareev, Yesli zavtra voyna? VlaDar, 1995, pp. 238. 68 M. Gareev, ‘Problemy sovremennoy sistemy voyennogo upravleniya i puti yeye sovershenstvovaniya s uchetom novykh oboronnykh zadach i izmeneniy kharaktera budushchikh voyn, Voyennaya mysl’, No. 5, May 2004.

politics does not contribute to the proper formation of a new generation of professional politicians. There were also a lot of failures in the field of military strategy, but this side of the matter was always mercilessly criticized.69 These aspects of Russia’s military exercises, which draw on combat experience and factor into their planning concepts and approaches developed by military theorists, reinforce the idea that the General Staff takes such exercises very seriously. It is therefore vital to see the growth in frequency and the more recent qualitative advance in joint Sino-Russian military exercises in this context. Even in terms of planning the exercise scenario for a joint Sino- Russian military exercise brings together high-ranking officers forced to share their experience in such scenario planning and agree to the various vignettes involved. From the perspective of Russia’s General Staff, the decision to involve the PLA in the strategic-level exercise Vostok 2018 was no small step. Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercises As Vasily Kashin has noted, since 2003 Russia and China have deepened their defense cooperation, particularly by holding regular joint or multilateral military exercises. These include multiple platforms encompassing air, land and sea capabilities, rehearsing several conflict scenarios and show a higher level of interaction between their militaries.70 In the series of SCO Peace Mission exercises, the scenario revolves around an anti-terrorist intervention in Central Asia to support the defense and security structures of the host government. More recently, the Russian Navy has conducted joint maritime military exercises with the PLA Navy, in numerous geographical locations, and in September 2017 this even included an exercise in the Baltic Sea; both sides deployed nuclear capable naval platforms in what seemed a move to send a message to NATO. In the following overview of these developments, reference is made to the number of Russian military exercises with forces from China measured against the figures for similar bilateral and multilateral activities which Moscow conducted with other partner countries. To determine if any qualitative change has occurred, a comparison will be made with the Russian strategic exercises that focus on its Far East region between Vostok 2010 and Vostok 2018. The former exercise involved elements of the scenario that implied Russia’s General Staff had seen China as a potential threat to Russia’s national security and rehearsed counter-measures. By Vostok 2018, for the first time, the PLA participated in a Russian strategic level exercise, and this needs to be better assessed.71 In terms of exercise numbers and frequency, to gauge whether the Sino-Russian defense cooperation is making progress, or if this may presage the formation of an alliance, they really need to be viewed alongside comparative figures for similar efforts with Russia’s allies and partners. Is Moscow more generally interested or open to staging bilateral and multilateral military exercises? Could this be to showcase its forces, learn from foreign militaries, share combat experience, develop contingency options to deal with future cries, sell arms, strengthen existing alliances and build new ones? Many of these factors are doubtless present in the General Staff’s planning. The exercise numbers and frequency also reflect a decade of Russian military transformation and ongoing modernization. In the graphic below, a Moscow-based think tank, the Center for Strategies and Technologies

69 Ibid. 70 Kashin, ‘The Current State of Russian-Chinese Defense Cooperation.’ 71 Mikhail Khodarenok, ‘Manevry Vostok-2018: chego tak ispugalis' na Zapade Pochemu Handelsblatt nazvalo ucheniya Vostok-2018 signalom vsemu miru,’ Gazeta.ru, https://www.gazeta.ru/army/2018/09/03/11942911.shtml, September 3, 2018.

(CAST), offered some insight into the level of joint or multilateral military exercises conducted in the period January 2012 to August 2018.72 Russia’s Bilateral and Multilateral Military Exercises, January 2012 to August 2018

Source: Moscow Defense Brief, No. 4, 2018, http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/4-2018/item5/article1/ Concerning the graphic, published in the reputable Moscow Defense Brief, there is no detail on the sources for the exercise numbers. In addition, this was published prior staging the SCO Peace Mission exercise in late August 2018, and of course, before Vostok 2018. However, there is much in the numbers and frequency of exercises that is of interest, especially to provide context for the growth in Sino-Russian military exercises. Moreover, some the Sino-Russian military exercises are institutionalized and pre-planned as regular events, such as the biannual SCO Peace Mission, and more recently their bilateral maritime exercises: Joint Sea.73 Some points about the information contained in this graphic are worth highlighting. At the very forefront of Russia’s international military exercises are those conducted with Belarus. Others that fall into this more intense category are Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Further down the scale of frequency are the US and Ukraine, and this is linked to the breakdown in Russia’s military cooperation with these countries following the eruption of the Ukraine crisis.74 In any case, Armenia, Serbia and India were ahead based on frequency. China appears a modest fifth in the graphic and the exercise numbers are not impressive.

72 Moscow Defense Brief, http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/4-2018/item5/article1/, No. 4, 2018. 73 ‘China, Russia Complete Extensive Naval Exercise’ RIA Novosti, en.rian.ru/world/20130710/182171807/China-Russia-Complete-Extensive-Naval-Exercise.html, July 10, 2013; ‘Start of Naval Interaction 2014 Exercises,’ President of Russia website, eng.kremlin.ru/news/7201, May 20, 2014. 74 Moscow Defense Brief, http://mdb.cast.ru/mdb/4-2018/item5/article1/, No. 4, 2018.

Some explanation is required to understand these dichotomies. First, since Belarus is Russia’s ally in the Union State of Russia-Belarus and in the CSTO it is normal to see such levels of exercise activity. To a slightly lesser extent this is followed among the CSTO allies (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Armenia).75 The imbalance related to Armenia can be explained since it is not a member of the SCO. Thus, the Sino-Russian military exercises, it should be noted, have not yet reached the frequency of Russia’s joint exercises with its existing allies. But in terms of a non-ally, Russia conducts regular military exercises with the PLA and PLAN, which implies that Beijing is seen differently in Moscow when it comes to such cooperation. Despite these figures and the issues that they present, a qualitative change seems to have occurred in the format of Sino-Russian military exercises marked by the presence of PLA forces in the Russian strategic exercise Vostok 2018. To examine this further, a contrast is offered with the details of Vostok 2010 to try to explain how the nature of the cooperation has shifted.

a. Vostok 2010: Moscow’s Threat Assessment and China

Vostok 2010 was billed by Russia’s defense ministry as the largest strategic exercise of its Armed Forces since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. It focused on testing the major elements of the ongoing reform of the Armed Forces, and used eleven combined-arms training grounds, four air force and air defense ranges, as well as Pacific Fleet training ranges.76

In typical style, the CGS Army-General Nikolai Makarov denied that the scenario was aimed against foreign countries or any political-military bloc.77 Nonetheless, the actions of the various force grouping seemed to suggest otherwise. According to the public statements concerning the exercise scenario it envisaged countering terrorist formations. But the use of air power and air defense assets contradicted the official line. The Russian Air Force rehearsed operations using electronic warfare (EW), reconnaissance and search and rescue and close air support for Ground Forces and Airborne Forces.78

Defense against an ‘enemy raid’ used live launches by S-300 anti-aircraft missile systems against Korshun and Strizh targets on the Telemba range. Mi-24 and Mi-8 helicopters provided air support for motorized-rifle and tank subunits in what appeared to be counter- offensive operations against a conventional adversary. A total of 70 Air Force aircraft participated: MiG-31, Su-24, Su-25, Su-27, A-50, An-12 and four S-300 anti-aircraft subunits.79 Su-24 and Su-25s were used to simulate an enemy strike, hardly consistent with the counter-terrorist claims about the exercise scenario, with a squadron of ‘blue’ bombers crossing the state border to bomb the capital of the Russian Far East, Khabarovsk. Russian media said this exercise dimension was characterized as a massive air raid, repelled by layered air defense including the S-300 SAM systems.80

The official claim about a counter-terrorist driven scenario was also contradicted by the reported activities of the Russian Navy in Vostok 2010; large and small anti-submarine warfare (ASW) ships from the Pacific Fleet staged in the Sea of Japan search and destroy

75 Ibid. 76 ‘Vostok 2010 Exercise,’ Zvezda Television, July 11, 2010. 77 ‘Medvedev to Visit 4 Far Eastern Cities, Watch Military Exercise,’ ITAR-TASS, June 30, 2010. 78 ‘Air Force Enters Active Phase in Vostok 2010 Drill,’ Interfax, July 2, 2010. 79 ‘Russian Air Force, Air Defense in Action in Chita Region as Part of Vostok 2010,’ Interfax, July 3, 2010. 80 ‘PVO Saved Khabarovsk From Air Strike,’ www.dni.ru, June 30, 2010.

24 operations against enemy submarines.81 Also, in relation to the use of operational-tactical missiles complexes such as the Tochka-U (SS-21) this system can carry the AA60 tactical nuclear warhead.82 Its conventional fragmentation munitions can readily be replaced by a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead. Although senior Russian military officials acknowledged that the Strategic Rocket Forces (Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya—RVSN) would participate in Vostok 2010, they stated that there would be no simulated intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches. But the presence and intention to use tactical launches from the Tochka-U was militarily significant, since in any real conflict with the PLA, early use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) would be a high probability on the part of the Russian armed forces in the face of the PLA’s conventional superiority.

Russian security documents pay no direct attention to the possible threat to Russia’s territorial integrity in the Russian Far East. The 2010 military doctrine obliquely referred to this dimension in its list of threats, noting an increased activity on the part of the armed forces of individual states or group of states involving partial or complete mobilization and the transitioning of the states’ organs of state, and command and control to wartime conditions (Section II.10.a-e).83 This approach was reflected in official statements about the exercise. Justifying the reform of the Armed Forces in a briefing for foreign defense attaches in Moscow in June 2009 CGS Makarov showed a series of slides concerning Russia’s strategic environment (below). The only reference to national security concerns in this strategic direction was the potential for a refugee crisis probably from the Korean Peninsula.

81 Artur Chirkov, ‘Pacific Fleet Ships Are Searching for Submarines of the Notional Enemy at the Vostok Exercises,’ RIA Novosti, July 2, 2010. 82 ‘Formations of Siberian and Far East Military Districts Were Placed in Full Combat Readiness in a Surprise Alert Within the Scope of OSU Vostok-2010,’ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, June 30, 2010; Tikhonov, Khudoleyev, ‘Vostok 2010 Exercise Missions,’ Op. Cit; ‘Russian Military to Conduct Five Tactical Missile Launches in 2010,’ Interfax, April 13, 2010. 83 Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010, http:// www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html.

CGS Makarov’s Briefing to Foreign Defense Attaches on the Reform of Russia’s Armed Forces

On the rare occasions that senior military officials commented on China or the PLA as a possible threat, the nuclear deterrent was never far from their thinking. In March 2010, for example, Lieutenant-General Vladimir Chirkin, then Commander of the Siberian MD, announced the deployment of two brigades closer to the Chinese border, near Chita, which he justified as based upon the presence of five combined-arms armies across the border. General Chirkin stated: ‘Despite friendly relations with China, our army command understands that friendship is possible only with strong countries, which can quiet a friend down with a conventional or nuclear club.’84 Although Vostok 2010 tested many aspects of the reform and modernization of Russia’s Armed Forces, it also revealed that in the Eastern strategic direction the General Staff still saw China as a potential adversary.

b. Vostok 2018: Toward Strategic Partnership in Defense Ties? To demonstrate that something changed qualitatively in the Sino-Russian military exercise dimension of their defense cooperation, in stark contrast to Vostok 2010 —which did appear to reference a potential security threat to Russia by the PLA— Vostok 2018 contained no such implied threat assessment. On the contrary, for the first time in the history of Russia’s strategic-level military exercises, China was invited and accepted to participate in Vostok 2018.85 Although this step was probably significant, there are some caveats involved. First, there were sparse details on the exact nature of the exercise scenario. Moscow also

84 Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Russia Looks East and Sees Storm Clouds: Part One,’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 7, Issue 53, March 18, 2010. 85 ‘Manovry Vostok-2018,’ https://imp-navigator.livejournal.com/756352.html, September 7, 2018.

26 exaggerated the size of the exercise, unrealistically claiming it was the largest since Zapad 1981, sending 297,000 military personnel to participate.86 Moreover, there were also very few details in Russian sources about the nature of the naval activity that could have included a new joint maritime element in the overall framework of the exercise. Finally, the PLA contribution was reportedly 3,200 almost certainly substantially smaller than the Russian force size. Mongolia also sent an unspecified number of troops. And, finally, assessing this PLA involvement in Vostok 2018 as a precursor to forming an alliance, or an indication of the deeper extent of cooperation that might imply a de facto alliance, needs to be balanced against the reported invitation extended to Ankara to participate.87 It may be that Moscow sought to use Vostok 2018 partly as a diplomatic tool to influence Ankara over the complex issues in Syria; the invitation was refused, but the point is no one speculated about a possible alliance in the making between Moscow and Ankara. Given the later agreement for Moscow and Ankara to form a joint patrol zone in Syria, this may be what the General Staff’s interest was in inviting the Turkish military to participate in Vostok 2018. Given the planning timescale for such exercises, it is extremely unlikely that the decision to include the PLA was taken at the last minute. In any case, bilaterally, the senior officer leadership of both sides would have to jointly consider the details of the scenario and to determine in which exercise elements China’s political leadership was satisfied to involve its military personnel. There appear to be several reasons that contributed to both sides extending the opportunity afforded by the Vostok 2018 exercise to involve some aspects of ‘joint’ training. On Moscow’s side, it seems connected with talking up the scale and significance of the exercise. And, perhaps serving as a message to the US and NATO that Moscow is neither alone nor isolated despite the continued sanctions regime against it. Equally, it provided an opportunity to send a joint force ‘signal’ to Japan.88 Also, it showcased Russian weapons systems and probably helps expand the potential for arms sales to China. Most intriguingly, it tested joint combined-arms operations against a hypothetical conventional adversary.89 Beijing’s interests, quite apart from seeing a Russian operational-strategic exercise up-close, were rooted in Moscow’s offer to share combat experience gained in Syria. It afforded an opportunity for joint training focused on Ground Forces, but extending to the use of air power, air defense and close air support in combat operations. It involved a relatively small force size of 3,200, and the focal point of the training at Tsugol Training Range in Russia’s Eastern MD rehearsed joint combat operations with a total Russian force size of 25,000. Despite this and given the absence of reported joint naval elements in the exercise, it is unclear how Moscow and Beijing envisage conventional warfare occurring against a hypothetical adversary in this part of Russian territory. Or, where, for that matter, they see the need for joint land-based operations against a conventional adversary.

86 Ivan Dragomirov, ‘Vostok – delo gromkoye Bol'shiye vostochnyye manevry proshli ot Zabaykal'skogo kraya do beregov Severnogo Ledovitogo okeana i tikhookeanskogo poberezh'ya Rossii,’ VPK, https://www.vpk- news.ru/articles/45052, September 18, 2018. 87 ‘Rossiya priglasila Turtsiyu na manevry Vostok-2018,’ TASS, https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya- panorama/5540731, September 9, 2018. 88 ‘Vostokotochnoye oruzhiye Na glazakh u Yaponii Rossiya provedet krupneyshiye voyennyye ucheniya vmeste s Kitayem,’ Kommersant, https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3733361, September 7, 2018. 89 ‘Svyazisty iz TSVO sovershat marsh iz Zabaykal'ya v Samarskuyu oblast',’ RIA Novosti, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20180917/1528722595.html, September 17, 2018; ‘V masshtabnom uchenii Vostok- 2018 budut zadeystvovany osnovnyye sily Tsentral'nogo voyennogo okruga,’ Rambler.ru, https://news.rambler.ru/middleeast/40685993-v-masshtabnom-uchenii-vostok-2018-budut-zadeystvovany- osnovnye-sily-tsentralnogo-voennogo-okruga/, August 30, 2018.

Instead of referring to the annual (operativno-strategicheskie ucheniya) operational-strategic exercise, Vostok 2018, by using this term, CGS Gerasimov used the phrase strategicheskiye manevry (strategic maneuvers), also adding that Russia needs more of these exercises. It is unclear how he understood the elevation of terms or whether the PLA presence in the exercise somehow added importance or strategic depth.90 Vostok 2018 centered on five combined-armed and four air defense training grounds in the Eastern and Central MDs. It also involved the Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno Kosmicheskikh Sil—VKS), the Airborne Forces (Vozdushno-Desantnye Voyska—VDV), and the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The Commander of the Central MD, Lieutenant-General Alexander Lapin, stated that many of many of his units would actively train during the exercise. He added that the ‘unprecedented’ scale of the exercise would entail ‘new forms and methods of combat’ based on lessons drawn from Russia’s operations in Syria.91 Ahead of the exercise, CGS Army-General Valeriy Gerasimov provided an outline of the scenario. The exercise would run from September 11-17, with the first two days devoted to planning. The second active phase would be held over five days, and its novelty lay in extending the exercise beyond one MD to include both Eastern and Central MDs, as well as the participation of the PLA. The main action would still focus on combined-arms training grounds in the Eastern MD, at four VKS and air-defense training facilities, and in the Okhotsk and Bering Seas. Again, noting the scale of the exercise, Gerasimov also noted the involvement of advanced weapons systems such as the Iskander operational-tactical system. He said in the second active phase of the exercise, repulsion of a ‘massive air strike’ would be rehearsed alongside repelling cruise missile attacks involving VKS air defense and naval platforms in the Sea of Okhotsk and the northwestern Pacific Ocean. The exercise also envisaged conducting offensive and defensive operations using land, air, and sea power. The joint operations conducted with the PLA at the Tsugol training ground rehearsed combined-arms action against a hypothetical opponent; this response was coordinated between Russian forces, PLA and a small number from Mongolia. A complex range of targets reportedly allowed commanders to form a ‘front’ 24 km in length and 8 km deep.92 On the basis of this detail, some analysts conclude that Vostok 2018 was a rehearsal for large-scale warfare. Yet, it could also be a series of conflict types built into the overall scenario to rehearse conflict escalation control. However, the search for a joint or coordinated Sino-Russian nuclear dimension to Vostok 2018 proves to be elusive. There were certainly Russian dual-capable systems in use such as the Iskander system. And the pre-exercise build-up, which included among other features increased training for the VKS, suggests nuclear capable platforms were involved on the Russian side. Long-range aviation drills ahead of Vostok 2018 included moving two-Tu-160 strategic bombers landing at the Anadyr airfield (closest airstrip to the maritime border

90 ‘V Rossii podoshla ochered' provodit' strategicheskiye manevry, zayavil Gerasimov,’ https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20180906/1527948289.html, RIA Novosti, September 9, 2018. 91 ‘V masshtabnom uchenii Vostok-2018 budut zadeystvovany osnovnyye sily Tsentral'nogo voyennogo okruga,’ Rambler.ru, https://news.rambler.ru/middleeast/40685993-v-masshtabnom-uchenii-vostok-2018-budut- zadeystvovany-osnovnye-sily-tsentralnogo-voennogo-okruga/, August 30, 2018; Dmitriy Sergeyev, ‘Vostok- 2018: kakova tsel' samykh masshtabnykh za postsovetskiye gody manevrov voysk,’ Tvzvezda.ru, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808210722-xsmd.htm, August 21, 2018. 92 Ivan Dragomirov, ‘Vostok – delo gromkoye Bol'shiye vostochnyye manevry proshli ot Zabaykal'skogo kraya do beregov Severnogo Ledovitogo okeana i tikhookeanskogo poberezh'ya Rossii Dragomirov,’ VPK, https://www.vpk- news.ru/articles/45052, September 18, 2018; Il'ya Kramnik, ‘Vostok s oglyadkoy na zapad: chem interesny ucheniya Vostok-2018 Dlya chego nuzhny samyye krupnyye s sovetskikh vremon manovry,’ Izvestia, https://iz.ru/789818/ilia- kramnik/vostok-s-ogliadkoi-na-zapad, September 17, 2018.

28 with the US).93 According to NORAD on September 13, during the Vostok 2018 exercise, the US Air Force intercepted two Tu-95 bombers escorted by two Su-35 fighters off the coast of Alaska in international airspace. It seems that if nuclear escalation was rehearsed in the exercise, it was exclusively among Russian forces. In terms of assessing the level of Sino-Russian defense cooperation or evaluating the possible transformation of the strategic partnership into an alliance, Vostok 2018 is important but also elusive.94 While clearly a significant step was taken by both sides by agreeing to the joint element of the exercise and Beijing accepting Moscow’s invitation to participate, there are other factors that might contradict the idea that this is a breakthrough or should be interpreted as an indicator of alliance status. It is quite unique to see these forces exercising in this way and at such a strategic level. Combined-arms operations rehearsal against a land-based conventional threat is noteworthy. The geopolitical show, with Russian and PLA forces and assets alongside each other supposedly on a grand scale, was evidently intended to impress a wider international audience. Yet, the PLA force size was comparatively small. It seemed to be restricted geographically to a smaller part of the exercise. Its fixed wing and helicopter contribution were equally moderate. There is scant information on whether the exercise extended to joint operations at sea. There is no information on the presence of any nuclear assets among participants in the exercise —apart from Russia. The PLA force size, 3,200, and the Russian size that exercised alongside up to 25,000 do not seem to indicate rehearsal for large-scale warfare but could imply, as already suggested, consideration of conflict escalation control; an area in which Russia’s Armed Forces have clear experience and which the PLA may seek to learn from. Nonetheless, given that China seemed factored into the threat scenario of earlier iterations of the Vostok series, including Vostok 2010, then it is worth noting that this seems to have been dropped from the 2018 version, as well as involving PLA forces. The question of the future frequency of exercises such as this, promised by Defense Minister Shoigu, remains unclear. 3. Moscow’s Opaque Nuclear Policy and ‘Escalate-to-De-Escalate’ Escalate-to-De-Escalate While the possibility of a de facto Sino-Russian alliance exists and may either be active but undeclared or developing towards such an alliance, the question remains whether Russia’s nuclear policy influences Beijing. Answering this, at least raising a series of issues related to this theoretical possibility, involves seeking some understanding on the role of tactical nuclear weapons in Russian military thinking and the thorny issue of nuclear first use, which in Russian terms is often referred to as its unofficial doctrine of ‘escalate-to-de- escalate,’ meaning the use of nuclear weapons to convince an adversary to pursue talks to de-escalate the conflict. The author argues that while this unofficially may persist, it is also worth noting Moscow’s efforts to increase conventional precision strike capability as part of an evolving effort to create credible ‘pre-nuclear’ or ‘non-nuclear’ deterrence. If China’s military leadership is influenced by Russia’s first use unofficial policy linked to escalate-to- de-escalate, then it is occurring at a time when Moscow is trying to lessen dependence on such systems by enhancing conventional precision strike capacities.

93 Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Manevry Vostok-2018 startovali u granits SShA Rossiyskiye strategicheskiye bombardirovshchiki vpervyye prizemlilis' na aerodrome Anadyr',’ Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2018- 08-16/2_7290_mukhin.html, August 16, 2018. 94 A solid and detailed overview of each day of the exercise is provided in English by the CNA analyst Michael Kofman on his blog: https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/09/18/vostok-2018-day-7- september-17/.

Russian policymakers continue to place great emphasis on nuclear deterrence in security policy, reflecting a number of important trends and developments in military theory, changes in the international security environment as well as Moscow’s assessment of its conventional military weaknesses vis-à-vis the US and NATO.95 Much of Russia’s security documents, force modernization, and political rhetoric is predicated upon withstanding a perceived growing threat from foreign nuclear powers and an expanding NATO.96 An essential element in Russian nuclear capability and deterrence is the presence of sizeable numbers of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (Takticheskoye Yadernoye Oruzhiye–TYaO), and in recent years Moscow has proved disinterested in attempts to discuss the complex issues related to a possible reduction or elimination of such weapons in the European theater. Their numbers and locations on Russian territory are kept secret.97 TYaO capability in Russia’s military is inexorably linked to the development in the late 1990s of the unofficial doctrine of ‘de-escalation,’ or use of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons to prevent further escalation. Although there is no clear support for the de-escalation strike principle mentioned in Russia’s recent military doctrines, either in 2010 or its updated version of 2014, equally there are no real grounds to conclude that the Putin regime has yet abandoned this policy.98 Indeed, the de-escalation strike doctrine emerged in response to Moscow’s interpretations and fears stemming from the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. That out-of-area operation, castigated by Moscow as illegal and a clear deviation from NATO’s espoused defensive alliance posture, raised very real concern in Russian security circles about how the US and its allies might regard the second Chechnya War; Russian policymakers still remain heavily influenced by these events, which were reinforced due to the recent history of NATO’s out- of-area operations.99 In this context, Zapad 1999, with its ‘demonstration strike’ rehearsing a nuclear attack on NATO territory, embodied the whole concept of nuclear first use to demonstrate intent to the adversary and compel a diplomatic solution. This has remained a feature of Russia’s strategic military exercises, rehearsing nuclear first use on its Western and Eastern flanks against potential aggression conducted by network-enabled and nuclear powers. But the difference is that the nuclear dimension appears much later in more recent strategic exercises, and its appearance in the Zapad 1999 exercise seemed to be an answer to

95 ‘NATO ugrozhayet Rossii takticheskim yadernym udarom,’ http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/05/27/nato- ugrozhaet-rossii-takticheskim-yadernym-udarom.html, May 27, 2015; ‘RFYATS-VNIIEF posetila delegatsiya Korporatsii Takticheskoye raketnoye vooruzheniye,’ TsAMTO, http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2015/0812/153530568/detail.shtml, August 12, 2015; ‘Takticheskoye yadernoye oruzhiye v Yevrope,’ https://topwar.ru/83603-takticheskoe-yadernoe- oruzhie-v-evrope.html, October 5, 2015. 96 Polina Sinovets, ‘The Kremlin’s Red Lines. Why Russia Is Brandishing Its Nuclear Weapons,’ Slon, January 19, 2016. 97 ‘Russia Will Not Disclose Tactical Nuclear Weapons’ Quantities or Location,’ Interfax, February 3, 2014. 98 Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010, http:// www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html; The Russian Federation National Security Strategy Until 2020 Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 537, May 12, 2009, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/436.html; On the recent development of Russian security and foreign policy see: Marcel de Haas, Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond, Routledge London, 2010. 99 ‘Major-General Vladimir Slipchenko Views Possible US ‘Non-Contact’ War on Iraq,’ Vremya Novostei, October 5, 2002; Vladimir I. Slipchenko, Voyna Budushchego (Future War), Scientific Reports edition 88 (Moscow: Social Science Foundation, 1999); Vladimir I. Slipchenko, ‘Information Conflict in Non-Contact Wars,’ Obozrevatel, December 15, 2001; Colonel (Ret.) V. V. Zhikhaskiy, ‘On the Issue of Wars of the Future,’ Voyennaya Mysl, No. 4, July-August 2000.

30 conventional weakness in comparison to the Alliance. Russian sensitivity to a sudden foreign attack is rooted in the historical events of June 1941 and rekindled by NATOs air campaign in 1999 in the Balkans, as a potential trigger in resorting to nuclear first use, was vividly demonstrated in its eastern strategic direction during Vostok 2010, which involved a rehearsed use of nuclear landmines to stop rapidly advancing ground formations.100 The de-escalation strike theory and its utility in Russia’s security policy are not in question. The parameters of how this would be implemented during any escalating international security crisis, how this might play out, what forms a demonstration strike involving tactical nuclear warheads and delivery systems might take, remain deliberately obscure. Russian security documents, military exercises, or even analyses in its leading military journals shed little light on how the leadership might approach these issues during a real crisis; either on the issue of how early or late the nuclear option may be sanctioned or where the pressures within the system could stem from to adopt such measures –these are consciously clothed in secrecy and obscurity. Despite this ‘escalate-to-de-escalate’ strategy in general terms, Moscow is very careful, cautious and mature in its nuclear deterrence policy, though some reservation is publicly expressed by critics concerning rhetoric that borders on alleged Russian use of nuclear blackmail.101 The Russian leadership appears to understand that nuclear first use –or recourse to the de-escalation strike– is a measure of extreme last resort. The threat would most likely be carried out in certain circumstances in conditions where an adversary refuses to back down, but it is uncertain as to the choice of target: non-lethal use (against space- based assets, for example) or low yield use against a sparsely populated area is lower-scale possibilities, compared with targeting a foreign battlegroup, strategic facility or a population center. Moreover, in Russia’s military operations in Ukraine and Syria, careful planning has been devoted to efforts to maintain conflict escalation dominance, though the movement of air defense assets into Latakia and off the Syrian coast was an afterthought following Ankara downing the Su-24M in November 2015.102 In the latter case, despite sending strong signals that military escalation could ensue with a NATO member, Moscow preferred to adopt a more patient policy of economic coercive counter-measures in order to pressure the Turkish government. Escalation control was evident in the seizure of Crimea, at least retrospectively; President Putin claimed nuclear strategic messaging was used to warn other actors to avoid interference.103 Moreover, the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in combat has long featured in courses in the former Frunze Academy, now the Combined-Arms Academy in Moscow, and this is important since the academy teaches operational art rather than strategy, providing further evidence that such weapons are assigned an operational role in the Russian

100 Oleg Falichev, ‘Vostok - 2010: Nachalo, Kulminachia, Epilog,’ (East - 2010: Beginning, Culmination, Epilogue), Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, No. 29, July, 28-August 3, 2010, http://www.vpk-news.ru/27- 343/cis/vostok-2010-nachalo-kulminatsija-epilog; ‘NATO's Belated Emotional Outburst Over Exercises Initiated By Ill-Wishers-View,’ ITAR-TASS, November 18, 2009; ‘Poland's ‘Nervous’ Reaction to Russian Army Exercises Intended To Alert NATO,’ Polityka, 18, 2009; Jacob W. Kipp, ‘Ten Years of Anti NATO Military Exercises by Russian and Belarusian Armed Forces,’ Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 29, 2009. 101 Krym: Pu’ Na Rodinu (Crimea: the Way Back Home), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QTRNiy39e5E, March 8, 2015. 102 ‘Ogon' na rastorzheniye,’ Kommersant, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2861705, November 25, 2015. 103 Aleksei Arbatov, ‘Krugi strakha: Zachem Rossiya ugrozhayet Zapadu yadernym oruzhiyem Podrobneye,’ Voyenno Promyshlennyy Kuryer, http://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/25868, July 1, 2015.

31 military.104 Senior officers in Russia’s Armed Forces are schooled in the use of tactical nuclear weapons is borne out by analytical articles from artillery specialists. For example, Colonel-General V. N. Zaritskiy, former Chief of Missile Troops and Artillery, writing in Voyennaya Mysl’ in 2007, referred to a closed document developed in the late 1990s, Kontseptsiya primeneniya takticheskogo yadernogo oruzhiya (The Concept for Using Tactical Nuclear Weapons), which in his view shaped a number of artillery and missile troops publications in the mid-2000s, used by the Mikhaylov Military Artillery Academy.105 In any case, if the other side is left guessing as to when and how the nuclear threshold is reached, then the deterrence value of the nuclear capability is functioning successfully. It seems that Russians either with a military background, or high-level access to the government system, have fewer doubts in this sensitive area. In certain circumstances, Russia’s political leadership would resort to nuclear first use if convinced that this would, in turn, defuse or ‘de-escalate’ an unfolding conflict. And that this is part of Russian security thinking on containing a local or regional conflict also fits with well-developed and widely studied Russian reflexive control theory.106 Moreover, Russian military theory helps to further contextualize and make sense of the de-escalation use of tactical nuclear weapons, especially analytical work on the development of military systemology by the late Major- General Viktor Riabchuk advocating attacking enemy subsystems; in the absence of advanced Russian C4ISR and conventional strike capability tactical nuclear weapons would likely target the components of an enemy’s C4ISR.107 Tactical nuclear weapons evidently play a pivotal yet sensitive role in Russia’s nuclear deterrence and security policy, and this was reinforced during Zapad 1999.108 Despite this high level of priority ascribed to the weapons and delivery systems by the political-military leadership, there remains ambiguity concerning their precise role in either the early stage of nuclear conflict or as a mechanism to exercise escalation control.109 Reluctance to discuss reductions or elimination of these weapons from some theaters also reflects the high value placed on such systems by the US and NATO, which results in concern by Russian policymakers about why the Alliance deems it necessary to place them relatively close to Russia.110 The question is at which points along the escalation of a given conflict the Russian nuclear threshold might be reached, with the commander-in-chief authorizing the use of TYaO against enemy targets. Although there is no specific answer to this question, it is clear from

104 Author interviews with retired Russian military officers, Moscow, July 2016, October 2010. 105 V.N. Zaritskiy, ‘New Methodology of Effective Engagement Planning in Combat Operations,’ Military Thought, Vol.1, 2007. 106 V.I. Kovalev, Larina E.S., Sergeev N.A, ‘The psychological factor of warfare, Information War, No.2, (30), 2014; V.V. Kruglov, ‘On the armed struggle of the future,’ Military Thought, No.5, 1998, pp.54-58; N.I. Turko, Modestov S.A., ‘Reflexive control the development of strategic forces, the mechanism of modern geopolitics,’ Conference Report «Systems Analysis on the Threshold of the 21’ Century: Theory and Practice, Moscow, February 1996, p. 366; V. Kruglov, D. Lovtsov, ‘The concept of information-strike operations in modern warfare,’ http://old.nasledie.ru/oboz/N12_99/12_14.html; Ionov M.D., ‘Psychological aspects of management adversary in antagonistic conflict (reflexive control),’ Applied Ergonomics, Special issue No.1, 1994. 107 Viktor Riabchuk, ‘Voyennaya Teoriya I Praktika,’ Voyennaya mysl’, No.6, http://militaryarticle.ru/voennaya-mysl/2001-vm/9117-voennaja-teorija-i-praktika-9, 2001, pp. 32-36. 108 Interview with Retired Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin, the former head of the RF MoD 4th Central Scientific Research Institute (1993-2001), Svobodnaya Pressa, June 5, 2014. 109 Andrei Kokoshin, Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, June 2011). 110 ‘Vladimir Yevseyev: Dlya bezopasnosti v Chernom more osnovnym igrokam nuzhno uchityvat' interesy Rossii,’ http://materik.ru/rubric/detail.php?ID=24376, June 27, 2016; ‘Rossiya bez takticheskogo yadernogo oruzhiya,’ https://topwar.ru/7715-rossiya-bez-takticheskogo-yadernogo-oruzhiya.html, October 17, 2011.

32 both Russian strategic military exercises as well as exercises involving the Strategic Rocket Forces (Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya—RVSN) and discussion among Russian military theorists that attention is given to this very issue in practical terms and in working out its precise implications during conflict containment. In Zapad 1999 nuclear first use was part of the strategic messaging to NATO, explicable by reference to the inherent weakness of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces at that time.111 The Role of C4ISR and Conventional Precision Strike Systems Russia’s leading military intellectuals have long discussed in the foremost professional military journals the problem of overdependence upon nuclear deterrence. During this discussion, some, including defense intellectuals such as Andrei Kokoshin, advocated the development of ‘pre-nuclear deterrence’ to provide an extra layer and set of options in a crisis before escalating to nuclear first use. The ideas around this concept crystalized and appeared in the 2014 Military Doctrine. Among a range of measures encapsulating pre- nuclear deterrence, including economic, informational, political and diplomatic, of course, was the issue of high-precision conventional strike systems. And, to make good on the development of high-precision conventional strike systems, tried and tested in Russia’s operations in Syria, the political-military leadership has opted to greatly enhance the quantity of these systems in the future available for the Armed Forces, to provide the backbone of the ‘pre-nuclear’ deterrence referred to in the 2014 Military Doctrine. This now centers on the Missile and Artillery Troops (Raketnyye Voyska i Artilleriya–RV&A). The RV&A is a Branch of Arms in the Ground Forces and acts as the primary means of destroying enemy forces by conventional and nuclear fires during the conduct of combined arms operations.112 They are tasked with the following:

Achieve and maintain fire superiority –defeat of the enemy’s means of nuclear attack, manpower, weapons, military, and special equipment – disrupt troops and command and control, reconnaissance, and EW systems –destroy permanent defense installations and other infrastructure –disrupt the enemy’s operational and tactical logistics –weaken and isolate the enemy’s second echelons and reserve –destroy enemy tanks and other armored vehicles that breach the defence –cover open flanks and junctions –participate in the destruction of enemy aircraft and the amphibious assault forces – conduct remote mining operations –provide illumination to troops manoeuvring at night –provide smoke screens and blind enemy targets –distribute propaganda materials.113 This official definition of the role of the RV&A offers insight into the role of high-precision systems in Russian military planning, but it is important to understand where this fits into the Russian command and control system.114 As shown (below), the missile troops are an integral part of the Ground Forces and serve to strengthen the land warfare component of the Russian Armed Forces.

111 ‘V Vooruzhennykh silakh RF nachalos strategicheskoe komandno-shtabnoe uchenie Vostok 2014,’ Russian Defense Ministry, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11986292@egNews, September 19, 2014; Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Rossiia tozhe gotovit rezervistov,’ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, http://www.ng.ru/armies/2014-07-28/1_rezerv.html?print=Y , July 28, 2014; ‘V RVSN provoditsia vnezapnaia proverka boegotovnosti Iurianskogo rakentnogo soedineniia,’ Russia Defense Ministry, http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=11896526@egNews, January 28, 2014. 112 See: Kombat-bvoku.com, http://kombat- bvoku.com/publ/voennye_prazdniki/raketnye_vojska_i_artillerija/6-1-0-52, Accessed 3 February, 2017; ‘Istoriya prazdnika dnya raketnykh voysk i artillerii,’ Mywebs.su, http://mywebs.su/blog/army/6872/, Accessed, 30 January, 2017. 113 ‘Missile Troops and Artillery,’ Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Website, http://structure.mil.ru/ structure/forces/ground/structure/rvia.htm, accessed 20 January, 2017. 114 ‘Raketnyye voyska i artilleriya (RViA),’ Militaryarms.ru, http://militaryarms.ru/armii-mira/raketnie- voyska/#h2_3, Accessed 30 January, 2017; ‘Den' raketnykh voysk i artillerii v Rossii,’ RIA Novosti, http://crimea.ria.ru/society/20161119/1108081563.html, 19 November, 2016.

RV&A (Missile Brigades) in the Structure of Russia’s Armed Forces115 RV&A constitutes missile, rocket, and artillery brigades, including high-power mixed units (tube and rocket), artillery battalions, rocket artillery regiments, and separate artillery reconnaissance battalions, additionally artillery units in combined-arms brigades and military bases. The RV&A are being increasingly strengthened with the Iskander-M and will reportedly enhance their capabilities by creating reconnaissance-fire units, including on an interim basis; ensuring the destruction of targets in real time; fielding more high- precision systems; and increasing weapons’ firing ranges, power of ammunition, and the automation of the processes for both preparing and firing.116 According to official sources, by 2020, the RV&A brigades (locations below) will be fully outfitted with brigade sets of Iskander-M. They were frequently referred to by the Kremlin to make threats in response to US missile defense as part of a strategy of ‘asymmetric responses.’117 One commentary in the Russian daily Kommersant noted the problems inherent to using Iskander-M to make such threats: ‘The problem is by virtue of its limited range (several hundred km) Iskander missiles can only threaten [Russia’s] neighboring states, but in no way the US BMD system as a whole, and on this level, they have little influence on the strategic balance as such. Moreover, the Russian military has promised to begin deploying Iskander systems widely since 2007, but since then the deadlines for their delivery to the army has been postponed more than once.’118

115 The author wishes to express thanks to Captain Charles K. Bartles, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas for kindly assisting with these graphics. 116 Vladimir Gundarov, ‘Innovatsii v raketnykh voyskakh i artillerii,’ http://nvo.ng.ru/nvoevents/2016-11- 25/2_art.html, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 25 November, 2016. 117 President Dmitry Medvedev, ‘Zayavleniye Prezidenta v svyazi s situatsiyey, kotoraya slozhilas' vokrug sistemy PRO stran NATO v Yevrope,’ Kremlin.ru, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/13637, 23 November, 2011. 118 Aleksandr Gabuyev, ‘Strategicheskiye yadernyye soobrazheniya,’ Kommersant, http://kommersant.ru/doc/1822901, 24 November, 2011.

Ground Forces’ Missile Brigades The General Staff and the leadership of RV&A indicate that by 2021 the modernization will be complete, achieving the aim of constructing a reconnaissance-strike system, functioning within a Russian C4ISR network: it is likely to require a longer timescale especially to diversify the variety of these systems. This was tested during recent operational-strategic exercises, and in Syria.119 The cruise missile system connected to the Iskander-M system, under development since 2008 and tested in 2014 has magnified concern about the deployment of the system close to NATOs borders. The cruise missile system in question, known only as ‘9M729,’ has a reported range of up to 5,500 km. Were it to be deployed in Kaliningrad using the Iskander-M platform, this would place most of continental Europe within its strike range.120 Russia’s defense ministry ascribes high priority to the completion of brigade sets of Iskander-M for the RV&A and more Kalibr cruise missiles for the Navy, but there are additional indicators of the extent to which the range and accuracy of such systems feature in Moscow’s defense planning. In recent years the 3K-22 and 3M-22 Tsirkon have passed state trials and represent a significant boost to acquire new generation cruise missiles. The Tsirkon will reportedly commence serial production in 2018 and be procured in large numbers by the Navy in 2018-20. Both Deputy Defense Minister Dmitry Rogozin and Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Viktor Chirkov, see the missile as a breakthrough for the defense industry. 121 It is now earmarked for deployment on the heavy nuclear-powered missile cruiser the Admiral Nakhimov in 2018 and by 2022 aboard the Pyotr Velikiy. Tsirkon is a strategic high-precision strike system designed to hit targets at distances of several thousand km. It follows in the traditions of other anti-ship missiles but can also be used against ground targets. Tsirkon is designed to fly at the boundary between the Earth’s

119 Ibid.. 120 ‘SShA obvinyayut Rossiyu v razvertyvanii krylatoy rakety 9M729,’ Livejournal, http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2433526.html, 15 February, 2017. 121 Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Rossiyskiye ‘Tsirkony’ legko preodoleyut amerikanskuyu PRO,’ Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2016-04-25/1_zircon.html, 25 April, 2016.

35 atmosphere and outer space. In terms of targeting it is designed to overcome enemy air defenses, including BMD, and cope with electronic counter-measures. Moreover, it is entirely consistent with Russian military theoretical thinking on the use of high-precision strike systems. It is important not only in offering an additional layer of strategic deterrence; it also advances Russia’s Armed Forces in adopting network-centric warfare capability. Here, the purpose of this overview of the future of Russia’s ‘pre-nuclear’ deterrence capability and, linked to this, its interest in boosting the range and numbers of high-precision strike systems, lies in the implications for any influence Moscow might have China’s nuclear policy. While it is unclear if there is an intention to abandon the unofficial policy of ‘escalate-to-de-escalate,’ it is evident that Moscow has embarked on a course that in the longer term will lessen dependence upon nuclear first use in an escalating crisis with a nuclear power.122 Conclusion The foregoing analysis is not intended to be conclusive, due to the complex nature of the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship, as well as the difficulties in assessing externally the extent to which Russia may influence China’s nuclear policy, or the thorny question of whether these powers are forming an alliance. What the paper sought to consider in detail were various angles and pertinent questions that may offer some additional insights both into the complexity of their evolving defense partnership and the problems associated with coming to a definitive answer. It has also presented a set of arguments for and against various levels of defense partnership that could in theory have implications for nuclear policy and endeavoured to highlight some inconsistencies. If Russia has influence or had an influence on Beijing’s nuclear policy, this has likely passed its zenith. If such influence exists or could resurface in the future, then this is tied closely to how foreign powers perceive the nature of the deepening defense partnership between Moscow and Beijing.123 There appears to be a strong argument in favor of the relationship being a de facto alliance that neither side can afford to publicly admit. It seems that the shift in emphasis in threat assessment vis-à-vis China on the part of Russia’s General Staff may be implied by a comparison of Vostok 2010 and Vostok 2018. Yet, there are also contradictory signals, such as the low numbers of PLA in Vostok 2018 and the relatively limited participation in the ‘strategic-level’ exercise. Nevertheless, it should neither be ignored nor exaggerated, since there is a qualitative change in witnessing the PLA participating in a Russian operational-strategic exercise.124 These exercises are certainly worth closer attention and assessment as and when they occur in the future. The author concentrated on joint and multilateral exercises involving Russia and China as an

122 TsAMTO, http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2016/0906/130536859/print.shtml, 6 September, 2016; TsAMTO, http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2016/0809/101036392/print.shtml, 9 August, 2016; TsAMPO, http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2016/0729/140036243/print.shtml, 29 July, 2016; TsAMTO, http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2016/0318/141534022/print.shtml, 18 March, 2016; TsAMTO, http://www.armstrade.org/includes/periodics/news/2016/0317/105533987/print.shtml, 17 March, 2016. 123 Sokov, ‘Russian Role in Development of China’s Military Strategy,’ Op. Cit. 124 Ivan Dragomirov, ‘Vostok – delo gromkoye Bol'shiye vostochnyye manevry proshli ot Zabaykal'skogo kraya do beregov Severnogo Ledovitogo okeana i tikhookeanskogo poberezh'ya Rossii Dragomirov,’ VPK, https://www.vpk- news.ru/articles/45052, September 18, 2018; Il'ya Kramnik, ‘Vostok s oglyadkoy na zapad: chem interesny ucheniya Vostok-2018 Dlya chego nuzhny samyye krupnyye s sovetskikh vremon manovry,’ Izvestia, https://iz.ru/789818/ilia- kramnik/vostok-s-ogliadkoi-na-zapad, September 17, 2018. 124 Vladimir Mukhin, ‘Manevry Vostok-2018 startovali u granits SShA Rossiyskiye strategicheskiye bombardirovshchiki vpervyye prizemlilis' na aerodrome Anadyr',’ Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, http://www.ng.ru/politics/2018- 08-16/2_7290_mukhin.html, August 16, 2018.

36 illustration of what they ‘doing,’ rather than simply referring to official statements and political rhetoric. Other indicators could be selected such as arms sales, for instance, that Moscow appears more willing to sell advanced system such as the S-400 SAM system to China. But, here again, there are problems in relying on this as an indicator of de facto alliance or an alliance in the making. Moscow is also selling the S-400 to a NATO member (Turkey), while its arms sales to India eclipse the level of its sales to China; the author concluded that the exercise patterns may reveal more about intent. There is a lack of drivers for the formation of a Sino-Russian alliance other than the desire, however long-term, in both capitals to oppose US power globally and in the APR. It is also worth noting the ambiguity in the defense relationship, perhaps reflecting sensitivities and different approaches on the part of both powers. While the relationship may face challenges in the future, the overall trend is toward closer military and security cooperation. But China has emerged as a mature nuclear power capable of forming its nuclear policy independent of other powers, regardless of the close nature of the relationship.125 It is worth noting the way Moscow talks-up the partnership as though it is a de facto alliance, and Beijing does the reverse. Moreover, with the US, EU and G7 sanctions against Russia, Moscow has just cause to seek partnerships that prevent its isolation and economic atrophying. An additional factor, probably serving to drive shows of togetherness and mutual support, are the Trump Administration’s trade tariffs on China, which has resulted thus far in a dangerous spiral of reciprocity. To widen the perspective and attempt the trace the origins on the part of the Russian Federation of the push to closer ties in defense relations with China, the author has delved into the writings of Russia’s foremost defense intellectuals and Sinologists, in so doing examining the importance of the work of the highly influential General Staff think tank TsVSI and the Institute of Far East Studies. This promotes the idea that the move to closer ties with China has been analytically underpinned since the 1990s and is, in fact, a long- term state-level project on the part of Russia to oppose American power in the international system and find ways and means to promote Russia’s own interests. A key part of this strategy is the use of the SCO, which is another layer of cooperation between Russia and China, and with the expansion of the SCO to include India and Pakistan, some Russian analysts see fresh opportunities to oppose US foreign policy and talk of the SCO as a critical element of the Eurasian space.126 Given these factors and the sense that the defense partnership is more driven by Moscow than Beijing, it is likely that the full extent of this de facto alliance would emerge in the mid-2020s or 2030s as the nuclear and conventional modernization of the militaries of Russia and China further develops. To try to define the nature of progress in Russia-China defense relations to establish the context for influence on nuclear policy or even theoretical nuclear policy coordination, these ties were assessed since 1992, covering high-level military-to-military contacts, joint exercises, and comparing Vostok 2010 and Vostok 2018. While high-level contacts between these militaries have grown since 2014 there have also been peaks and troughs in their bilateral exchanges.127 It is interesting to see the peak in 2005, and this raises the question

125 Pavel Kamennov and Anatolii Klimenko, ‘O voyennoy politike i voyennoy doktrine Kitaya,’ Problems of the Far East, No. 5, 2014, pp. 126-148; Anatolii Klimenko and Pavel Kamennov, ‘Voyennaya politika KNR i yeye rol' v uvelichenii kompleksnoy moshchi gosudarstva,’ Problems of the Far East, No. 2, 2017, pp. 69-85; Yu. Morozov, ‘Perspektivnyye napravleniya razvitiya ShOS v Yevrazii,’ Natsional’nyye interesy: prioritety i bezopasnost', Vol. 14, No. 1, 2018, pp. 137-152. 126 Yu. Morozov, ‘Perspektivnyye napravleniya razvitiya ShOS v Yevrazii,’ Natsional’nyye interesy: prioritety i bezopasnost', Vol. 14, No. 1, 2018, pp. 137-152. 127 Ethan Meick, China-Russia Military-to-Military Relations: Moving Toward a Higher Level of Cooperation, US- China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 2017, p. 19.

37 as to what level of contacts and frequency might be expected if an alliance exists. By comparing these figures with the frequency of military exercises again, a conflicted picture emerges. While Sino-Russian military exercises are frequent and to some institutionalized through the SCO or the bilateral maritime exercises, this has not attained the levels seen with Russia’s known allies within the CSTO such as Belarus or Kazakhstan. Vostok 2018 has received much international attention not least due to the involvement of the PLA, but if an alliance is forming then more attention will be needed on how Moscow and Beijing follow-up on such innovative activities. Finally, returning to the theoretical influence that Russia might have on China’s nuclear policy, this was considered in terms of Moscow’s unofficial doctrine of nuclear first use, its over-reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons encapsulated in the so-called ‘escalate-to- escalate’ use of a nuclear weapon to force an adversary to negotiate.128 While there are signs that this unofficial policy exists, referencing Russia’s operational-strategic exercises, reluctance to enter arms control talks on tactical nuclear systems and the presence of nuclear use on the curriculum of the Combined-Arms Academy, its most powerful underpinning is Putin’s interest in seeing the dual-capable Iskander-M used in Russia’s strategic exercises. However, while the policy of nuclear first use may remain viable as part of Russian nuclear strategy this is also now being accompanied by a growing emphasis on pre-nuclear deterrence; which means for conventional arms that Moscow is setting higher priority on outfitting the military with high-precision systems. Consequently, if Moscow’s ‘first use’ theory could impact on China’s nuclear policy planning, then it must be acknowledged that there is a shift underway in Moscow toward high-precision conventional strike systems as it adopts and integrates C4ISR. Thus, while proving some context and insights that might serve to widen discussion and future analyses, this report muddies the waters rather than providing concrete conclusions.

128 ‘Russia Will Not Disclose Tactical Nuclear Weapons’ Quantities or Location,’ Interfax, February 3, 2014; Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), February 5, 2010, http:// www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html; The Russian Federation National Security Strategy Until 2020 Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict No. 537, May 12, 2009, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/436.html; On the recent development of Russian security and foreign policy see: Marcel de Haas, Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond, Routledge London, 2010; ‘Major-General Vladimir Slipchenko Views Possible US ‘Non-Contact’ War on Iraq,’ Vremya Novostei, October 5, 2002; Vladimir I. Slipchenko, Voyna Budushchego (Future War), Scientific Reports edition 88 (Moscow: Social Science Foundation, 1999); Vladimir I. Slipchenko, ‘Information Conflict in Non-Contact Wars,’ Obozrevatel, December 15, 2001; Colonel (Ret.) V. V. Zhikhaskiy, ‘On the Issue of Wars of the Future,’ Voyennaya Mysl, No. 4, July-August 2000.