Russia's Impact on Nuclear Policy in China: Cooperative Trends And

Russia’s Impact on Nuclear Policy in China: Cooperative Trends and Depth of Influence Roger N McDermott Roger N McDermott is Visiting Senior Research Fellow, Department of War Studies, King’s College, London and Research Associate, the Institute of Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Studies (MECACS), University of St. Andrews, Scotland. He is also Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC. McDermott is on the editorial boards of Russian Law & Politics, Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies and assistant editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies. He specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues. His interests in Russia’s defense and security developments are mainly in the areas of defense reform, force structure, training, strategic exercises, military theory, perspectives on future warfare, planning and combat capability and readiness, as well as strategic and operational analysis. 1. The Extent and Limits of Russia’s Influence on China’s Nuclear Policy Arguments in Favor of Russia’s Influence on China Deliberate Ambiguity? Constraints Within the Sino-Russian Relationship Analytical Foundations of Moscow’s Interest in a Strategic Partnership 2. Russia-China Military Cooperation Since 1992 High Level Military-to-Military Contacts Moscow’s Approach to Military Exercises Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercises Vostok 2010: Moscow’s Threat Assessment and China Vostok 2018: Toward an Alliance? 3. Moscow’s Opaque Nuclear Policy and ‘Escalate-to-De-Escalate’ Escalate-to-De-Escalate The Role of C4ISR and Conventional Precision Strike Systems Conclusion 1 1. The Extent and Limits of Russia’s Influence on China’s Nuclear Policy Arguments in Favor of Russia’s Influence on China The search for an accurate assessment of the possible influence that Moscow may have on Beijing’s nuclear policy may prove to be elusive since it relates to several complex political- military facets of the bilateral relationship which are difficult to gauge at a distance. Moreover, within the Russian expert and analytical sources, there is a definite paucity of material upon which to base such an assessment.1 Although many aspects of the defense relations are discussed publicly this is an area that is opaque and reflects the sensitivity of the issues involved. However, any methodologies used to define the extent to which Moscow might influence the development of China’s nuclear policy, or to coordinate their policies in certain circumstances, are more realistic if rooted in the historical development of their ties, with reference to structures and their similarities, as well as what they are doing to strengthen the defense partnership. Much of this is contextualized in the analysis that follows and in sections two and three of this report. It is argued that any trace of influence on China’s nuclear policy is very closely tied to understanding the nature of the defense relationship within the strategic partnership, which officials and experts on both sides note to be constantly growing. In turn, this is intricately linked to the question of whether the strategic partnership may herald an actual alliance, now or at some point in the future. The historical context of the Sino-Russian defense relationship is also an important factor, which helps in identifying periods of change and advances within these ties. In his presentation to the NPEC workshop in Washington DC in July 2018, Jacob W. Kipp offered a useful overview of these historical ties and concluded that since 2014 the relations have deepened to the point of a de facto alliance.2 At the outset, it is worth noting that the relationship between Beijing and Moscow has often been turbulent. Indeed, based on this and many points of contention between these powers, it can certainly be argued that they are not natural allies.3 Despite this, since World War II there have been examples of military cooperation ranging from Soviet support to PLA forces in Manchuria in 1945-49, the deployment of Soviet Air Defense to Shanghai in 1950 to protect against nationalist air attacks, and in the period 1950-61 Moscow supported rearming the PLA including aid with nuclear weapons development. There have also been numerous low points in bilateral ties.4 These included the end of military-to-military cooperation in 1962, Soviet planning for nuclear pre-emption to prevent the PLA acquisition of the Atomic Bomb and fighting on the Ussuri River in March 1969. Despite efforts to normalize ties in the 1990s, following the dissolution of the USSR and forming bilateral and multilateral defense cooperation, Beijing has refused to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (2008) or Moscow’s annexation of Crimea (2014). Since Vladimir Putin came to power in 1999, the bilateral defense relationship has consistently grown, united in opposition to a US-dominated unipolar world, witnessing for 1 Discussions during NPEC workshop, Washington DC, 12 July, 2018. 2 Jacob W. Kipp, ‘From Strategic Partnership to de facto Military Alliance: Sino-Soviet Mil-Mil Contacts in the Modern Era, 1945-2018,’ NPEC Conference, Washington. DC, 12 July 2018. 3 Rakhmanin, Vladimir, 'Russia and China: Strategic Cooperation', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, 1997, pp.1 1-15. (Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry). 4 Chen, Jian, and Yang, Kuisong, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', in Westad, Odd Arne (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998, pp.246-294. 2 example, the emergence of joint Sino-Russian military exercises and the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001 (then composed of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). In 2010, both capitals expressed concerns over the Arab Spring and seemed to find common cause in opposing it. However, the annexation by Moscow of Crimea in 2014 and the Western-imposed sanctions that followed appear to be a real catalyst for deepening the bilateral defense ties, as Kipp explains: [The] Euromaidan Revolution destabilizes Ukraine and brings a pro-Western government to power in Kyiv, which is immediately recognized by Western powers. Russia responds by seizing Crimea and annexing it to Russia with Russian intervention in the civil war in Eastern Ukraine, PRC-Russian ties deepen as the international system goes into new Cold War. In 2018 US identifies both Russia and China as peer competitors and military threats to international order. India joins the Shanghai Cooperation Organization [in 2017] and Russia assumes the Presidency of the SCO. Russian assessment of US pivot to Asia is that a long-term conflict, based upon different geopolitical imperatives, between Beijing and Washington should be expected to shape global security issues. The Russian elite recognizes their own weakness in the Far East but also see China as the best path into a world order dominated by Asia. In this context, Sino-Russian cooperation has deepened by exercises against ‘hypothetical opponents,’ which look like the United States and its allies. These exercises, including the joint Sino-Russian exercise in the Baltic in 2017 have involved nuclear capable surface ships and submarines. The joint air defense exercise of December 2017 was cast by both China and Russia as an ABM command post simulation to counter ballistic missile attacks and involved ground, air, and naval forces.5 It appears, therefore, referencing the historical development of the bilateral defense relationship, that Moscow made a concerted effort in the 1990s to normalize ties with China, based on a deep understanding and assessment in governmental and defense expert communities of Russia’s long-term interests in pursuing closer ties.6 This has since been aided by coordinating policy on several issues, including the Arab Spring and increasing displays of unity to oppose a US-led unipolar international order. Since 2014, and international efforts to pressure or influence Russia in response to the Ukraine crisis, Moscow and Beijing have further developed their defense ties. But the question remains to what extent? And does this closer defense cooperation imply Russia’s influence on China’s nuclear policy? Another participant in the NPEC workshop in July 2018 highlighted the case to be made for Russia’s influence on China’s nuclear policy —and its military more generally— by reference to a comparison of the various structures involved. The Communist Party and State structure in China, for example, was heavily influenced by the USSR. Many of the structures in China’s Armed Forces are similarly modeled on Soviet experience, including the role of commissars. In terms of weapons design, again there is a heavy reliance on Soviet or Russian design, and arguably the PLA Rocket Forces follow this pattern of mirroring Soviet/Russian structures. Equally, the growing number of military-to-military contacts at higher and senior officer levels or military exchanges seem to indicate both scope for influence and deepening of bilateral ties (this is discussed in more detail in section two). Moreover, there are many examples of senior-level PLA officers that have been educated in 5 Author’s emphasis. Jacob W. Kipp, ‘From Strategic Partnership to de facto Military Alliance: Sino-Soviet Mil-Mil Contacts in the Modern Era, 1945-2018,’ NPEC Conference, Washington. DC, 12 July 2018. 6 Karasin, Grigory, 'Long-Term Strategy for Russian-Chinese Partnership', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 2, 1997, pp.32-33. (Russian Deputy Foreign Minister); Moiseev, Leonid, 'Russian-Chinese Partnership: New Horizons', Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), No. 3, 1997, pp.3-8. (Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry). 3 Russian military institutions including the General Staff Academy in Moscow.

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