German Forces, Battle of Verdun, March-September 1916
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10/10/2007 Veterans History Project Content Page 1 Last Name First
Veterans History Project content 10/10/2007 Last name First name Branch Yrs service Battalion-Regiment Highest rank Conflict Injured POW Honors Notes Ainsworth Thomas Army (Air 1941-1945 332nd Service 1st World War N N African OCS; Africa, Italy; Corps) Group, 12th Air Lieutenant II Campaign w/4 photocopies of Anderson Mary K. Navy 1943-1946 WAVES Lieutenant World War N N American photographs and Junior Grade II Theater and manuscripts Anderson John D. Army (Air 1944-1945 443 AAF BU 1st World War N N Theater Interview by Corps) Lieutenant II Ribbons-5 Kathleen Anteau Robert L. Navy 1943-1946 USS Drexler DD Fire World War N N American 741 Controlman II Area, Antoszews Rita S. Army 1945-1946 361st Station Ist Lieutenant World War Y N Victory Medal, suffered from ki Nurse Hospital II A-P Theater perforated Apel Edward G. Army 1941-1946 Special Engineers Corporal 5th World War N N Interview on mini Grade II cassette Balough Elmer J. Air Force 1947-1950 5th Air Force Sergeant Korea N N Japanese Occupation Bartell Frank J. Navy 1942-1953 Lieutenant World War N N Theater photographs, Junior Grade II (Korea? Ribbons, manuscripts Baron Eugene A. Army (Air 1942-1945 8th AF 351 Bomb Tech. World War N N Air Medal w/3 manuscripts, Force) Group Sergeant II clusters, photographs Basilius Vernon J. Navy 1952-1954 USS Hunt DD674 Petty Officer Korea N N 2nd Class Basler Francis Army 1942-1946 11th Armored Div. T4 Tech World War NNService 3rd Army Sergeant II Ribbons, Battle Batchelor Edward W. -
German 5Th Army Before Verdun March-September 1916
German 5th Army Before Verdun March-September 1916 5th Army: Crown Prince Wilhelm On Left Bank of the Maas Western Attack Group: General der Artillery von Gallwitz VI Reserve Corps: General der Infanterie z.D.von Goszler 11th Bavarian Division: Generalleutnant von Kneussel 21st Bavarian Brigade: Generalmajlr Ritter von Schoch (replaced on 4/18 by GM z.D.Raab) 3rd Bavarian Regiment 22nd Bavarian Regiment 13th Reserve Bavarian Reserve Regiment 21st Bavarian Field Artillery Regiment 19th Bavarian Pioneer Company 21st Bavarian Pioneer Company 4th Co/6th Pioneer Battalion 11th Bavarian Trench Mortar Company 11th Bavarian Pontoon Engineers 11th Bavarian Telephone Detachment 192nd Division: Generalmajor Kotsch 192nd Infantry Regiment 193rd Infantry Regiment 25th Bavarian Infantry Regiment (2 bns) 1st Landwehr Squadron, 12th Corps District 192nd Field Artillery Battalion 192nd Pioneer Company 404th Trench Mortar Company (may be detached) 11th Reserve Division: Generalleutnant von Hertzberg 23rd Brigade: Oberst Daubert (until 4/3, then Oberst Jetter 10th Reserve Regiment 2 Machine Gun Companies 22nd Regiment 2 Machine Gun Companies 156th Regiment 2 Machine Gun Companies 11th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment 95th Anti-Aircraft Platoon 4th Field Company, 29th Pioneer Battalion 283rd Pioneer Company 211th Trench Mortar Company 6th Reserve Medical Company 12th Reserve Division: Generalleutnant von Kehler (until 4/20, then Generalleutnant von Kahlden 22nd Reserve Brigade: Generalleutnant z. D. von Leyser 23rd Reserve Regiment 1 Machine Gun Company -
Failure in 1813: the Decline of French Light Infantry and Its Effect on Napoleon’S German Campaign
United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons Cadet Senior Theses in History Department of History Spring 4-14-2018 Failure in 1813: The eclineD of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign Gustave Doll United States Military Academy, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd Part of the European History Commons, and the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Doll, Gustave, "Failure in 1813: The eD cline of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign" (2018). Cadet Senior Theses in History. 1. https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd/1 This Bachelor's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at USMA Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cadet Senior Theses in History by an authorized administrator of USMA Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. United States Military Academy USMA Digital Commons Cadet Senior Theses in History Department of History Spring 4-14-2018 Failure in 1813: The eclineD of French Light Infantry and its effect on Napoleon's German Campaign Gustave Doll Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/history_cadet_etd UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY FAILURE IN 1813: THE DECLINE OF FRENCH LIGHT INFANTRY AND ITS EFFECT ON NAPOLEON’S GERMAN CAMPAIGN HI499: SENIOR THESIS SECTION S26 CPT VILLANUEVA BY CADET GUSTAVE A DOLL, ’18 CO F3 WEST POINT, NEW YORK 19 APRIL 2018 ___ MY DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFIES ALL SOURCES USED AND ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT. ___ NO SOURCES WERE USED OR ASSISTANCE RECEIVED IN COMPLETING THIS ASSIGNMENT. -
Holy Roman Empire
WAR & CONQUEST THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 1618-1648 1 V1V2 WAR & CONQUEST THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 1618-1648 CONTENT Historical Background Bohemian-Palatine War (1618–1623) Danish intervention (1625–1629) Swedish intervention (1630–1635) French intervention (1635 –1648) Peace of Westphalia SPECIAL RULES DEPLOYMENT Belligerents Commanders ARMY LISTS Baden Bohemia Brandenburg-Prussia Brunswick-Lüneburg Catholic League Croatia Denmark-Norway (1625-9) Denmark-Norway (1643-45) Electorate of the Palatinate (Kurpfalz) England France Hessen-Kassel Holy Roman Empire Hungarian Anti-Habsburg Rebels Hungary & Transylvania Ottoman Empire Polish-Lithuanian (1618-31) Later Polish (1632 -48) Protestant Mercenary (1618-26) Saxony Scotland Spain Sweden (1618 -29) Sweden (1630 -48) United Provinces Zaporozhian Cossacks BATTLES ORDERS OF BATTLE MISCELLANEOUS Community Manufacturers Thanks Books Many thanks to Siegfried Bajohr and the Kurpfalz Feldherren for the pictures of painted figures. You can see them and much more here: http://www.kurpfalz-feldherren.de/ Also thanks to the members of the Grimsby Wargames club for the pictures of painted figures. Homepage with a nice gallery this : http://grimsbywargamessociety.webs.com/ 2 V1V2 WAR & CONQUEST THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 1618-1648 3 V1V2 WAR & CONQUEST THE THIRTY YEARS WAR 1618-1648 The rulers of the nations neighboring the Holy Roman Empire HISTORICAL BACKGROUND also contributed to the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War: Spain was interested in the German states because it held the territories of the Spanish Netherlands on the western border of the Empire and states within Italy which were connected by land through the Spanish Road. The Dutch revolted against the Spanish domination during the 1560s, leading to a protracted war of independence that led to a truce only in 1609. -
The French Military During 1870
University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 1964 The rF ench military during 1870,: in light of the tradition and strategy of Napoleon Bonaparte. Robert Fernand Forest University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses Forest, Robert Fernand, "The rF ench military during 1870,: in light of the tradition and strategy of Napoleon Bonaparte." (1964). Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014. 1519. Retrieved from https://scholarworks.umass.edu/theses/1519 This thesis is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses 1911 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. FIVE COLLEGE DEPOSITORY THE FRENCH MILITARY DURING 1870 IN LIGHT OF THE TRADITION AND STRiVTEGY OF NAPOLEON 30NAPi\RTE by Robert F. Forest B.S.E. Westfield State College M.Ed. University of Massachusetts Thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. University of Massachusetts, Amherst May, 1964 In the preparation of this paper, I am indebted to my wife, Barbara, for her patience and assistance and to Paul A, Gagnon, whose guidance and suggestions were indispensable for the completion of this thesis. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 1 II. NAPOLEONIC ARMIES ... ' • »••• 3 III. CHANGES FROM NaPOLEON I TO 1870 13 Changes in Prussia 13 Material and Technological Developments ....oo,. •••• 20 Changes in French Military Doctrine Before 1851 26 Changes During the Second Empire , 32 IV. -
Processes of Tactical Learning in a WWI German Infantry Division1
Journal of Military and Strategic VOLUME 13, ISSUE 4, Summer 2011 Studies Strategy "in a microcosm": Processes of tactical learning in a WWI German Infantry Division1 Christian Stachelbeck Despite the defeat of 1918, the tactical warfare of German forces on the battlefields against a superior enemy coalition was often very effective. The heavy losses suffered by the allies until well into the last months of the war are evidence of this.2 The tactical level of military action comprises the field of direct battle with forces up to division size. Tactics – according to Clausewitz, the “theory of the use of military forces in combat” – is the art of commanding troops and their organized interaction in combined arms combat in the types of combat which characterized the world war era – attack, defense and delaying engagement.3 1 This paper is based on my book Militärische Effektivität im Ersten Weltkrieg. Die 11. Bayerische Infanteriedivision 1915-1918, Paderborn et al. 2010 (=Zeitalter der Weltkriege, 6). It is also a revised version of my paper: “Autrefois à la guerre, tout était simple“. La modernisation du combat interarmes à partir de l’exemple d’une division d’infanterie allemande sur le front de l’Ouest entre 1916 et 1918. In: Revue Historique des Armées, 256 (2009), pp. 14-31. 2 See Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 3 See Gerhard P. Groß, Das Dogma der Beweglichkeit. Überlegungen zur Genese der deutschen Heerestaktik im Zeitalter der Weltkriege. In: Erster Weltkrieg - Zweiter Weltkrieg. Ein Vergleich. Krieg, Kriegserlebnis, Kriegserfahrung in Deutschland, on behalf of Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (Military History Research Institute) edited by Bruno Thoß and Hans-Erich Volkmann, Paderborn et al. -
German Air Units, 1916-1918
German Air Units 1916-1918 "Fokker scourge" There were 55 Fokker E-1 Eindeckers on the western front at the end of October 1915 and 86 by the end of December 1915. They were progressively organized into four aircraft Kampf Einsitzer Kommandos (KEKs) and came under army control In August 1916 the KEKs came under corps control. August 1916 September 1916 1st Army: 1st Army: 1st Jagdstaffel 1st Jagdstaffel 2nd Jagdstaffel 2nd Jagdstaffel 2nd Army: 2nd Army: 3rd Jagdstaffel 3rd Jagdstaffel 4th Jagdstaffel 4th Jagdstaffel 3rd Army: 3rd Army: none none 4th Army: 4th Army: none 8th Jagdstaffel 5th Army: 5th Army: 5th Jagdstaffel 5th Jagdstaffel 6th Army: 6th Jagdstaffel none 7th Jagdstaffel 7th Army: 6th Army: none none Armee Abteilung A 7th Army: none none Armee Abteilung B Armee Abteilung A none none Armee Abteilung C Armee Abteilung B none none Ost Armee Abteilung C none none Madeconia Ost none none Madeconia none 1 October 1916 November 1916 1st Army: 1st Army: 1st Jagdstaffel 1st Jagdstaffel 2nd Jagdstaffel 2nd Jagdstaffel 5th Jagdstaffel 5th Jagdstaffel 2nd Army: 21st Jagdstaffel 3rd Jagdstaffel 2nd Army: 4th Jagdstaffel 3rd Jagdstaffel 6th Jagdstaffel 4th Jagdstaffel 3rd Army: 6th Jagdstaffel 9th Jagdstaffel 20th Jagdstaffel 4th Army: 3rd Army: 8th Jagdstaffel none 5th Army: 4th Army: none 8th Jagdstaffel 6th Army: 18th Jagdstaffel 10th Jagdstaffel 5th Army: 7th Army: 7th Jagdstaffel 12th Jagdstaffel 10th Jagdstaffel Armee Abteilung C 14th Jagdstaffel none 6th Army: Armee Abteilung A 11th Jagdstaffel 13th Jagdstaffel 7th Army: Armee Abteilung -
A New Form of Warfare? Erich Von Falkenhayn's Plan for Victory in 1916
A New Form of Warfare? Erich von Falkenhayn’s Plan for Victory in 1916 Dr. Robert T. Foley ([email protected]) In both terms of time and numbers involved the battle of Verdun ranks as one of the greatest battles in history. Stretching from February to December 1916, the “Meuse Mill,” as it was called by the Germans who had the misfortune of serving there, chewed up most units of the French and the German armies. During the battle’s course, 74 French divisions (74 percent of the number in France) and 40 German divisions were rotated through the battlefield.1 Although the casualty numbers are still disputed, in large part because it was impossible to keep accurate records in such conditions, the French army admitted to some 327,000 and the German army some 313,000 casualties.2 It has also been estimated that between them the Germans and French fired close to 30 million artillery rounds in the 10 mile by 10 mile borders of the battlefield during the battle, making it one of the most intensive battles of material the world has ever seen.3 Perhaps because of its vast scale and impact on the psyche of both the French and the German people, observers have struggled to understand the purpose of what one distinguished historian has called “the most senseless episode in a war not distinguished for sense anywhere.”4 The battle was set in motion by the Chief of the German General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn. In the memoirs, published shortly after the war and designed to clear himself of blame for Germany’s defeat, Falkenhayn declared that his intention from the beginning of the battle had simply been the wearing down of the French army. -
The German Army and Politics, 1918-1923
University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2015-09-11 Republic of Violence: The German Army and Politics, 1918-1923 Bucholtz, Matthew N Bucholtz, M. N. (2015). Republic of Violence: The German Army and Politics, 1918-1923 (Unpublished doctoral thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/27638 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/2451 doctoral thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY Republic of Violence: The German Army and Politics, 1918-1923 By Matthew N. Bucholtz A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN HISTORY CALGARY, ALBERTA SEPTEMBER, 2015 © Matthew Bucholtz 2015 Abstract November 1918 did not bring peace to Germany. Although the First World War was over, Germany began a new and violent chapter as an outbreak of civil war threatened to tear the country apart. The birth of the Weimar Republic, Germany’s first democratic government, did not begin smoothly as republican institutions failed to re-establish centralized political and military authority in the wake of the collapse of the imperial regime. Coupled with painful aftershocks from defeat in the Great War, the immediate postwar era had only one consistent force shaping and guiding political and cultural life: violence. -
The Russian Army and the Conduct of Operations in 1914
British Journal for Military History, Volume 2, Issue 2, February 2016 The Russian Army and the Conduct of Operations in 1914 STEPHEN WALSH Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Email: [email protected] ABSTRACT The scale of the fighting on the Eastern Front in 1914 is reasonably familiar but the Russian campaign of 1914, apart from Tannenberg, is poorly understood. The Russian Army’s military strategy, the choices it made, what it was trying to achieve, why and how, are not well known. This article will analyse Russian strategy and operations in a thematic rather than narrative manner, placing the Russian conduct of operations in the context of Russian military thinking at the time. It will argue that the relative importance of the East Prussian and Galician Operations has been misunderstood, especially the Russian operations in northern Galicia. In late August 1914, the Russian Army faced strategic catastrophe on the entire Eastern Front, not because of events in East Prussia, but in northern Galicia where the chronic lack of correlation between ends and means in Russian military strategy became acute. The Russian high command’s desire to launch a third operation into eastern Germany, in August 1914, distorted Russian strategy to the point where the Russian Army flirted with catastrophe in northern Galicia, a brush with disaster that rescued Russian strategy from its own illusions, enabling them to defeat the Austrians and force the German Army into a sustained two- front war. ‘The history of the campaign of 1914 is nothing else but the story of the consequences of the strategical errors of the War Plan’1 On 31 July 1914, Tsar Nicholas II authorised the mobilisation of the Russian Army, a defining moment2 in the sequence of events that began the First World War, a war 1 N.N. -
882 M Bzcrrjou OBITUARY
882 M BzCRrJOu OBITUARY. [APRIL 8, 1899. best known writings are perhaps his articles on Croup and sions and hemiplegia, followed by a semicomatose condition, Diphtheria, Reynolds's System of Medicine, and on the Exanthe- from which he never rallied. Death came as a deliverer from mata, on Incubation, and on Measles, Rubella, Scarlet Fever, sufferings, which would have been more than probable if he and Whooping-cough in Quain's Dictionary of Medicine. He liad lived longer. gave much attention to the diseases of children, and published essays on Infantile Temperature in Health and Disease, on Temperature variations in the Diseases of Children, and on the MR. J. T. O'CONNELL HYNES of Nottingham died on Satu Paralyses of Childhood. day, March 25th, after a few days' illness, at the age of 57. He In past years he was a very regular attendant at most of the had not been in robust health for some time, and only returned medical societies and at the meetings of this Association. His from a visit to Ireland on March 2ISt. The same night he was remarks in debate were always characterised by sound common attacked with influenza followed by pneumonia. Mr. Hynes sense, and slhowed a complete mastery of the subject lie was was born at Beeston, now almost a suburb of Nottingham, discussing. For many years ho was Physician to the St. where his father, a medical man, was then in practice. He George's Dispensary and to the North London Hospital for was educated at the Nottingham High School, and at Queen's Disease of the Chest. -
The Munich Putsch November 8Th / 9Th 1923
Reparations were set at 6.6 billion pounds. 1 Treaty of Article 123 of the Treaty stated that Germany had caused the war, Versailles 2 known as the War Guilt Clause. TRUE OR FALSE? In terms of land, Germany lost 10% of its population and 13% of its 3 European land. Germany’s army was limited to 1 million men. 4 Germany lost all of its overseas colonies, property and investments. 5 Germany’s navy was limited to 6 battleships, 6 cruisers, 12 destroyers 6 and 12 torpedo boats. No submarines were allowed. Reparations were set at 6.6 billion pounds. 1 Treaty of Article 123 of the Treaty stated that Germany had caused the war, Versailles 2 known as the War Guilt Clause. Article 231 TRUE OR FALSE? In terms of land, Germany lost 10% of its population and 13% of its 3 European land. Germany’s army was limited to 1 million men. 100,000 men 4 Germany lost all of its overseas colonies, property and investments. 5 Germany’s navy was limited to 6 battleships, 6 cruisers, 12 destroyers 6 and 12 torpedo boats. No submarines were allowed. Title: How did the Munich Putsch start and what happened? Lesson objectives: Could an uprising like Describe what caused the Munich this be Putsch. successful today? Explain the events of the Munich Putsch. Assess which was the most important cause of the Munich Putsch. (A lack of!) Rule of law & democracy The Munich Putsch (1923) 1) Describe 3 problems in Germany before 1923 2) Due to hyperinflation, how much did bread cost? 3) What was Hitler’s response to these problems? 4) Who did Hitler take inspiration from? 5)