The President f

GERARD A. LEE

Election and Similar to the policy adopted in the Weimar Constitution in Germany, and in the present Constitution of Portugal, the Presi- dent of Ireland is elected by direct vote of the people, the . elec- torate being the same- as at an for members of Dail Eire- ann and the voting being by secret ballot and on the principle of proportional representation by means of the single transfer- able vote.' He holds office for seven years from the date on which he enters upon his office, unless during that time he dies, or .re- signs or is removed from office or becomes permanently incapac- itated, the incapacity to be established to the satisfaction of . the Supreme Court consisting of not less than five . Every citi- zen who has reached his thirty-fifth year is eligible for. office and a, previous or outgoing President is eligible for re-election once only. The Presidential Act, 1937, provides the', machinery for the nomination of candidates. Former or retiring Presidents may become candidates on their own nomination, every stick nomination being made in writing on a nomination paper in. the specific form set out in the act.2 Every candidate for election, not a former or retiring President, must be nominated by not less than twenty members of the , the nomination, paper being signed by each of the twenty members making the nom- ination,' or, as an alternative method, the candidate may be nom- inated by the councils of not fewer than four administrative counties (including county boroughs) . The number of nomina- tions is deliberately kept in check by the provision in the C"ôn- stitution that no person and no council is entitled to sùbscribe to the nomination of more than one candidate in the same elec- tion. It has been enacted by a subsequent act that a commissioner ' Constitution, Art. 12 ; Presidential Elections Act, 1937, ss . 20-28. z Presidential Elections Act, 1937, s. 10. ' Presidential Elections Act, 1937, s. 8.

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appointed to supersede a county council shall not have the right to nominate a candidate for the office of President. No election takes place where only one candidate is nomin- ated for the office of President. The circumstances which led to the selection of the first were of a rather unexpected character. It was realized that the method of election set out in the Constitution would prove quite ineffectual as a means of raising the choice of President above party politics. A nation-wide contest of this sort was to be avoided at all costs. Consequently the unexpected happened. A conference took place between two members of the Government and two members of the Opposition Party. It was agreed that Dr. should be requested to accept nomination. He accepted and, since there was no other candidate, he was declared elected, unopposed, on May4th, 1938. His successor - President O'Kelly -was how- ever elected by direct vote of the people in 1945. During the Constitution debate in the Dail, arguments were advanced in favour of the method of direct election of the Presi- dent by the whole people. The head of the government put the case briefly: "Nobody would propose getting the whole people to elect a person unless it was proposed to give him substantial pow- ers and consequently if those powers are in any way to be exercis- ed in connection with legislation it is only right that a person who had got the authority definitely from the people for doing certain things should exercise it. . . . My own belief is that the powers in the legislative domain are the chief powers and the only powers the President has which would justify an election of him by the people. In exercising these powers he is acting on behalf of the people who have put him there for that special purpose. He is there to guard the people's rights and mainly to guard the Con- stitution." 4 Over against this argument in favour of direct election by the people may be placed another equally cogent one showing its fail- ings. The counter argument is similar to that advanced against popularly elected second chambers, namely, the danger of con- flict arising between rival authorities, each claiming to represent directly the wishes of the people : - "You have the seeds of con- flict sown by reason of the possibility of conflict between the President claiming a direct mandate from the people and the Government also claiming a direct mandate from the people."' The question of eligibility of the President for re-election was a Dail Debates, Vol. LXVII, Cols. 38 and 51. s Dail Debates, Vol. LXVII, Col. 1035.

10891950] ' The President of Ireland-

also fully discussed in the Constitution debate in the Fail. The neatest argument in favour of re-eligibility was that it "his a safe- guard against his yielding to the temptation of playing up to 'a particular Party. The fact that he may be standing again with a different Party in . power is surely a motive to him to abstain from partisan conduct." 6 Another argument in favour of re-eli- gibility centered on the confidence to be placed in the supreme wisdom of the people. "On the whole I think the right thing to do is to leave it open to the people to decide. If there are good reasons for the re-election of a man for the two terms, they will re-elect him." 7- One point developed by Alexander Hamilton in connection with the President of the United States is not out of place here . An ill effect of the exclusion of the President from the possibility of re-election would, he thought, lessen the induce- ments to good behaviour. "There are few -men- who would not feel much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious that- the advantages of the station, with which it was connected, must be relinquished at a determinate period than when they were permitted to entertain a hope of obtaining, y meriting, a continuance of them." 8 As against these arguments raised in favour of the policy of re-election- . must be placed another, strongly set out during the Constitution debate. "Having occupied the office for a period of seven years he will go before the people for re-election. During that period of seven years, all his public actions may be directed towards the one aim of being re-elected at the end of his term of office. . . . it is not in human nature that he should omit to direct his actions towards securing re-election." s When the choice has been made, the President formally enters upon his office by making and subscribing publicly in the pres- ence of members of both houses of the Oireachtas, of judges of the Supreme Court and of the , and other public per- sonages, the following declaration: In the presence of Almighty God I do solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will maintain the , and uphold - its laws, that I 'will fulfil my duties faithfully and conscientiously in ac- cordance with the Constitution and the law, and that I will dedicate my abilities to the service and welfare of the people of Ireland. May God direct and sustain me. On making this declaration the President takes precedence over all other persons within the state. 8 Dail Debates, Vol. LXVII, Col. 1090. - 7 Dail Debates, Vol. LXVII, Col. 1093. 8 Hamilton, The* Federalist, No. LXVII. Dail Debates, Vol. LXVII, Cols. 1072-1073 .

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~' During his term of office certain rights which are normally given to a citizen of the state are forbidden to the President. The President may not be a member of either house of the Oire- achtas and, if a member of either house should be elected, he must vacate his seat. In addition, the President may not hold any other office or position of emolument, and may only leave the: country with the consent of the government.

Legislative Functions of the President The President of Ireland has no power to initiate legislation, neither has he any direct on the legislative competence of . His functions in the legislative domain are, for the most part, of a quasi-judicial nature, exercisable by him after consultation with the Council of State. In this field his actions are, in actual fact, discretionary, there being no obligation on him to adopt the advice tendered by the members of the Council. Every passed by the Oireachtas, other than a bill con- taining an express proposal for an amendment of the Constitu- tion, is immediately presented by the to the President for his signature and for by him as a law. With the exception of bills, the time for the consideration of which by Seanad Eireann has been abridged under article 24 of the Con- stitution, every bill presented to the President for his signature must be signed by him not earlier than the fifth day after pre- sentation. At the request of the government, however, with the prior concurrence of Seanad Eireann, the President may sign any bill, the subject of the request, earlier than on the fifth day after presentation . Every bill presented for his signature to the Presi- dent must, with certain exceptions provided for in the Constitu- tion, be signed by him not later than the seventh day after the date on which the bill is presented to him. The provision postponing the signature of bills for five days is designed to give the President an opportunity to examine the measure before its promulgation by him as a law. If there appears to the President to be a danger that the bill contains provisions repugnant to the Constitution, then machinery exists whereby he can test its validity. The President may, after consultation with the Council of State, refer the bill to the Supreme Court for a decision as to whether it, or any specific provision or provisions, is or are repugnant to the Constitution. The reference must be made not later than the seventh day after the date on which the bill is presented by the Taoiseach to the President for his sig- nature. The Supreme Court, consisting of not less than five judges,

1950] The President of Ireland '1091

considers the, matter And, having heard arguments by or on behalf of the attorney-general and by counsel assigned by the court, pronounces its decision not later than sixty days after the date on which the bill was referred to it. If the court is of opinion that any provision of the bill is repugnant to the Constitution :the President must decline to sign the bill. In every other case, with the exception of bills which are referred to the people, he must sign as soon as may be after the date of the decision. Any bill passed or deemed to have been passed by both houses .-of the Oireachtas may be referred to the Supreme Court with .the ex- ception of a , a bill expressed to be a bill containing;,, proposal to amend the Constitution or a bill the time for. the con- sideration of which by Seanad Eireann is abridged under. article 24 o£ the Constitution . The second important discretionary power of the President_i4 connection with legislation is that of referring a bill to a refer- endum of the people. Amendments . of the Constitution,must re ceive the sanction of the people at a referendum before they pan become law. Ordinary bills, with the exception of money bills. and bills the time for the consideration of which by Seanad Eireann is abridged under article 24,. may also in certain circumstances be referred by the President, after consultation with the Council of State, to the decision of the, people at a referendum. The. in- itiating act in such a scheme consists of a petition in writing signed by a majority of the members of Seanad Eireann - and not less than one third of the members of Dail Eireann addressed to the President, requesting him not to sign and promulgate, as a law a bill on the ground that it contains a proposal of such .na- tional importance that the will of the people. ought to. be, as- certained. The third important discretionary power of the President over legislation concerns money bills. In the case of money bills, the Dail alone has` legislative competence, the bills being sent. to. the Seanad merely for its recommendations, which Dail Eireann may accept or reject. Accordingly it is of great importance to the Seanad that it be decided; without any doubt, whether a. bill is or is not a money bill. The decision is normally made by the chairman of the Dail Eireann, but Seanad Eireann is empowered. to request the President (by a resolution) to refer the question. to a committee of privileges. The President, after consultationn with the Council of State, decides whether or not he will accede to the request. Should he decide to do so, he appoints a committee of privileges consisting of an equal number of members of Fail

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and Seanad Eireann, and a chairman who is a of the Su- preme Court, the appointments being made after consultation with the Council of State. The decision of the committee is final. Should the President decide not to submit the question to the committee, the decision of the chairman of Dail Eireann stands confirmed .

The Council of State The President exercises his legislative functions, with the excep- tion of the signing of the bills, after consultation with the Council of State. The Council consists of important political and judicial figures in the state. Its ex-officio members are the Taoiseach, the Tainiste, the Chief Justice, the President of the High Court, the chairman of Dail Eireann, the chairman of Seanad Eireann and the Attorney-General . In addition every person able and willing to act as a member of the Council, who has held the office of President, Taoiseach, Chief Justice, or President of the Executive Council, is a member. The President may also in his absolute dis- cretion appoint seven members to the Council. Every member appointed by the President holds office until the succeeding Pre- sident enters upon his office, unless in the meanwhile he dies, resigns or becomes permanently incapacitated or is removed from office. Meetings of the Council of State may be convened by the President at such times and places as he may determine. The Council is merely an advisory body ; the members present must be heard by the President but their advice need not be taken. As a matter of strict law therefore the Council of State has no restrictive power whatever over the actions of the Presi- dent. It is in the prestige of its members that the real value of the Council rests. By its establishment, the President is formally al- lowed to obtain for his own benefit and enlightenment, in the manifold duties of his office, the opinion of leading political and judicial figures. He need not take their advice but he will have the benefit of it, and it is only natural to deduce that in practice their advice will be a weighty factor in arriving at an important presidential decision.

Executive Functions of the President "The modern framework of parliamentary government requires at the apex of its pyramid a formal embodiment of executive authority, removed from the sphere of political conflict and sym- bolic of the continuity of the legal order of the state amidst the

1950] The President of Ireland 1093

fluctuating changes of its political direction." to It is,as the formal head of the executive that we must now examine the functions of the President. The cabinet system of government contrasts sharp- ly with the system of presidential executive operating in the United States. Under this latter system the President is for all practical purposes the real executive and the system, established at a' time when the ,doctrine of the separation of powers enjoyed, wide popularity, illustrates the strict application of that doctrine- to the executive department of government. In those countries which have followed the British model of cabinet government (the executive being a mere committee of the legislature and ow- ing responsibility to the legislature) and where the office of Pre- sident has been introduced, the executive powers and functions surrendered to the President are, in the main, of a purely formal nature, being exercised by him only on the countersignature of a. responsible minister. In this . respect, the powers of the President of Ireland in connection with internal affairs are, in broad out- " line, not an exception to the general rule; the executive power of the state, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, being exercised by or on the authority of the government. It must be remembered, however, that although, in general, the President may act in all matters only on the advice of the government, or where it is provided by the Constitution that he shall act on the advice or 'nomination of some other person or body, in some cases he acts after consultation with the Council of State, and in two cases he is given absolute discretion. When he acts after consultation with the Council of State, he is really given a discretionary power because he is under no compulsion to take the advice given by the members of the Council. . The President appoints the Taoiseach or Prime Minister on the nomination of Dail Eireann. He appoints the other members of the government on the nomination of the Taoiseach with the previous approval of Dail Eireann. ®n the advice of the Taoiseach, the President accepts the resignation or terminates the- appoint- ment of any member of the government. It is again on the advice of the Taoiseach that Dail Eireann is summoned and dissolved by the President. But the President may in his absolute discre- tion refuse to dissolve Dail Eireann on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in Dail Eireann. The examination of this presidential function raises points of an important constitutional nature. As regards the summoning and dissolution of the representative house, the general constitutional

10 Kohn, Constitution of the (1932) 264 .

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principle is that such matters are under its own control. Under the Constitution of the Irish Free State the further position, rela- tive to the dissolution of Dail Eireann, was that the head of the Executive Council who had lost the support of the majority of the Dail could not demand a dissolution. The position in Eng- land operates in favour of strong government, the Prime Minister having the right to demand a dissolution whenever a vote of no confidence is passed or an important government measure is defeated. Afraid of the risk of a general election, the threat of dissolution will usually rally the majority behind the government. The rule under the Third French operated in a different direction. The President had power to dissolve the Chamber only with the assent of a two-thirds majority of the Senate and, this assent rarely being given, a defeated government went out of office without a dissolution. The position under the present Constitution of Ireland implies that as a basic principle the head of the government should be able to get a dissolution after having lost the support of the majority of the Dail but that, in such a case, it is for the Presi- dent to decide and, in his absolute discretion, he mayrefuseto grant it. If the President refuses to grant the dissolution, the Taoiseach has to resign and Dail Eireann proceeds to elect another Taoiseach and a new government is formed . If the President decides to grant a dissolution, then there is a general election and the people de- cide the relative numerical strength of the parties in the new Dail. The reason for this important constitutional innovation was ex- plained in conciliatory terms during the Constitution debates : "I grant you that there are certain circumstances in which the leader of a government, or a government, should not be given a dissolu- tion but there are circumstances in which they should. In order to try and distinguish between these two cases, we bring a third person, so to speak, as arbiter. He will give his decision and grant a dissolution, or refuse it, at his own discretion." ,' The provision of article 13, section 2(3), giving- the President power after consultation with the Council of State to convene a meeting of either or both houses of the Oireachtas, is also a new departure. Under the Constitution of the Irish Free State a speedy summoning of the Dail was possible through its standing orders without the intervention of any outside person. The inno- vation in the present document was explained as providing a con- stitutional safeguard that the executive, which is responsible to Parliament, should not be free to do certain acts without the

11 Dail Debates, Vol. LXVII, Col. 1208.

1950] The President of Ireland 1095

consultation of Parliament or of either house, if the President so decides. The supreme command of the is vested in the President and all commissioned officers of the defence forces hold their commissions from him. However, the exercise of the su preme command is regulated by law. It is a common feature in constitutions that the President or the King is commander-in- chief of the armed forces, with the proviso, however, that he can- not exercise this power in times of war. The principle that officers of the defence forces hold their commissions from the head of the state is 'not without precedent in other European countries, whether that principle is embodied in a statute or exercised as a general practice. In every case the possibility of dictatorial action by the President or King in his relations with the army is care- fully negatived by the provision that every act of the President or King must be countersigned by a minister. The position in Ireland is rather different since the principle is given constitu- tional effect and the act does not actually need the counter- signature of a responsible minister but must, by the implication,, of article 13, section 9, be done' on the advice of the gôvernment. The Defence Forces Act, 1937, clears up the question of the exercise of the military command. The act provides that under the direction of the President, acting on the advice of the govern ment, the military command of, and all executive and adminis- trative powers in relation to, the defence forces, including the power to delegate authority, are exercisable by the government through and by the Minister for Defence. In addition, the follow- ing functions are performed by the President, acting on the advice of the government: (1) appointing to the high offices (named in the act) in the defence forces: (2) commissioning, dismissing or retiring officers ; (3) accepting or refusing the tender by an officer of the resignation of his commission. By section 6 of the Defence Forces (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1941, it is provided that, during a period of emergency, an officer of the reserve of officers, or a temporary commissioned officer of the forces or the reserve, must relinquish his commission on being so directed by the Pre- sident acting on the advice of the Government. The President exercises the prerogative of mercy. The right of , and the power to commute or remit punishment im- posed by a court exercising criminal jurisdiction, is vested in him, "but such power of commutation or remission may, except in capital cases, also be conferred by law on other authorities" . The intention of this ` last provision is clearly to make possible the

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granting of powers of mitigation and commutation in non-capital cases to the Minister for Justice, such as existed under the Con- stitution of the Irish Free State. After consultation with the Council of State, the President may communicate with both houses of the Oireachtas by message or address on any matter of national or public importance. He may similarly address a message to the nation at any time on any such matter. Every message or address, however, must have received the approval of the government. It is the President who appoints the attorney-general on the nomination of the Taoiseach and receives his resignation from the hands of the Taoiseach. Supreme and high court judges and auditors-general are appointed and removed by the President in the manner provided by the Constitution. judges and district justices are also appointed by the President. The President is not answerable to either house of the Oire- achtas or to any court for the exercise and performance of the powers and functions of his office or for any act done or purport ing to be done by him in the exercise and performance of his powers and functions." The aim of this section is to give the Pre- sident protection against the encroachments of the legislature or the courts, but in subsection 2 of this article we get the other side. Here it is provided that the behaviour of the President may be brought under review in either of the houses of the Oireachtas or by the court, tribunal or body appointed or designated by either house of the Oireachtas under section 10 of article 12. This method of providing for the protection of the President in the exercise and performance of his powers and functions con- trasts sharply with the general machinery found in most other democratic countries. The usual procedure goes back again to the countersignature of a minister, who bears responsibility for the executive act of the President. An elaborate system of checks is set up which has the twofold effect of putting a check on the President or King, on the one hand, and upon the government and individual ministers who consequently bear responsibility, on the other. In addition it provides a simple means of ensuring that the government get their point of view carried, as against the President, in the case of a deadlock. Apart from the exercise of his official functions, the President must also be ensured adequate protection against possible vexa- tious charges, while, at the same time, the community must be protected against the unworthy actions of a President. The ma- 12 Constitution, Art. 13, s. 8(1) .

The19501 - President of Ireland 1097

chinery for securing this is set out in the Constitution, where it is provided that the-President may be impeached for stated mis- behaviour., The aim behind seems to be that, while the President must suffer punishment for his gross misconduct, at the same time the necessarily complicated procedure which preceeds a charge provides a measure of protection against vexa-. tious charges, such as would not be possible if the President found himself subject to the ordinary courts of justice. Impeachment did not die with"the trial of Warren Hastings. In Britain, true enough, it has become obsolete, and the expres- sion of Dicey that "the arm by, which attacks on freedom were once repelled has grown rusty by disuse; it is laid aside among the antiquities of the Constitution; nor will it ever, we may anti- cipate, be drawn again from its scabbard" seems appropriate to that case. Nevertheless a provision similar to that of our Con- stitution is -to be found in many of the democratic constitutions of the world. The Constitution of the Third French Republic provided that the Chamber of Deputies had the right to impeach the President, the charge to be investigated by the Senate. The Polish Constitution of 19,21 set out that the President may be impeached by the Diet, the charge being investigated by a Tri- bunal of State. Following the French model, Czechoslovakia al- lowed for the trial of the President by the Senate upon indict-- ment by the Chamber of Deputies. Because of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility the Pre- sident in most democratic counties does not incur any parlia- mentary or civil responsibility for acts done in the exercise of his official duties. . Accordingly, the machinery of impeachment is introduced for the trial of the President when charged with cer- tain named offences. Czechoslovakia and France made the Pre- sident responsible only in the case of high treason: Poland added responsibility also in the case of violation of the Constitution and in the case of penal offences. In this connection the Irish Constitution is gloriously vague, the President being liable to impeachment for "stated misbe- haviour". The charge may be preferred by either house of the Oireachtas. A proposal to either house to prefer a charge against. the President can only be entertained upon a notice of motion in writing signed by not less than thirty members of that house. Then, in order to have the proposal adopted by either of the houses, there must be a resolution of that house supported by not less than two-thirds of its total membership. ®n the charge being . preferred by either house, the other house investigates the- charge

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or causes it to be investigated -the house being allowed to appoint or designate any court, tribunal or body for the investi- gation.13 At the investigation of the charge, the President has the right to appear and be represented. If, as a result of the investiga- tion, a resolution be passed, supported by not less than two-thirds of the total membership of the house of the Oireachtas by which the charge was investigated or caused to be investigated, declar- ing that the charge preferred against the President has been sustained and that the misbehaviour, being the subject of the charge, was such as to render him unfit to continue in office, the resolution operates to remove the President from office. By way of generalisation, the powers and functions given to the President may be collected together under four headings. Most of the executive functions are performable by him only on the advice of the government or where it is provided by the Constitution that he shall act "on the advice or nomination of, or on receipt of any other communication from, any other person or body".14 His legislative functions are, in the main, to be performed after consultation with the Council of State. In two cases he is given an absolute discretion. He may refuse to dissolve Dail Eireann on the advice of a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in the Dail; and he may appoint seven nominees to the Council of State. During the Constitution debate in the Dail perhaps no sec- tion was more discussed than the one allowing additional powers and functions to be conferred on the President by law. The reason was obvious. In the original draft, these new powers conferrable on the President were to be exercised by him on the advice of the government or after consultation with the Council of State. But the advice given by members of the Council of State need not be heeded, so that, for all practical purposes, it was possible to confer on the President exceptional discretionary powers by a simple majority in Parliament. This might never have happened. but it must be remembered that a constitution is the funda- mental law of the State, which takes precedence over all other laws, and, if the Constitution purports to be a rigid one, it must ensure that the representatives of the people will never be able to trample on the liberties of the people. The section of the Con- stitution was, however, amended during the debate so that, as it now stands, no power or function conferred on the President by law may be exercised or performed by him save only on the advice of the government. 'a Constitution, Art 13, s. 8(2) . ~' Constitution, Art. 13, s. 9 .

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The Presidential Commission The President holds bffice for seven years from the date upon which he enters upon his office unless, before the expiration of that period, he dies, resigns or is removed from office, or becomes permanently incapacitated. In the event of any of these things befalling the President, as also in the event of his absence, tem- porary incapacity or failure to exercise and perform the powers , and functions of his office or-any of them, or at any times at which the office of President may be vacant, the powers and functions conferred on the President by or under the Constitu- tion are exercised and performed by a Commission consisting of the chief justice, the chairman of Dail Eireann and the chairman of Seanad Eireann. On any occasion on which the chief justice is unable to act, the president of the High Court acts as a member of the commission in his place. In similar circumstances, the deputy chairman of Fail Eireann and the deputy chairman of Seanad Eireann act as members of the commission in the place of the chairman of or Seanad Eireann, respectively. The provisions of the Constitution relating to the exercise and performance, by the President, of the powers and functions conferred on him by or under the Constitution also apply to their exercise and performance by the commission. In the event of the failure of the President to exercise or perform within a specified time any power or function conferred on him by or under the Constitution, it must be exercised or performed by the com- mission as soon as may be after the expiration of the time speci- fied. The action of any two of the members of the commission is sufficient and its duties may be performed notwithstanding a vacancy in the membership of the commission.

The Presidential Systems of.Ireland and the United States Both the President of Ireland and the President of the United States are popular figures chosen for a fixed term, in Ireland by direct vote (in certain circumstances) and in America by the in- direct election of the people. In each case the President is the head of the state in connection with the internal and external affairs of the country. Eligibility for the office of President in both countries demands that the candidate should be at least thirty-five years of age. The remuneration of the President is ensured in either case by a constitutional provision forbidding its diminution during his term of office. The Constitution of the United States, following the more democratic trend, in addition

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forbids that his remuneration or compensation should be increased while he is in office. The President of the United States may not hold any other office of emolument from the United States or any of them. The restriction on the President of Ireland in this respect is more rigid, since he is not allowed to hold any other office or position of emolument. A meeting of either or both houses of the legislature may be convened in both countries by the President. It is required in both Ireland and in the United States that the President-elect should make a declaration or affirmation in the prescribed form, on entering upon his office, promising to fulfil faithfully the duties of his office and to defend and maintain the constitution of his country. Removal of the President from office is in both countries by impeachment. Although in many respects the position of the President of Ireland bears a striking resemblance to that of the President of the United States, nevertheless an examination of the details of their respective powers and functions illustrates important dif- ferences. The President of the United States is not only the head of the executive but is himself almost the entire executive, the Am- erican cabinet having no trace of the collective responsibility so essential to the working of the true cabinet system. The American President is thus something more than the "keystone of the Cab- inet Arch". He is the master of the cabinet and the ministers live and move and have their being in the context of presidential thought. The President of Ireland is the formal head of the executive, his powers and functions in this respect, however, being exercised for the most part on the advice of the government. In this con nection he is the supreme commander of the defence forces and commissioned officers hold their commissions from him. He sum- mons and dissolves Dail Eireann having, however, in his absolute discretion power to refuse a dissolution to a Taoiseach who has ceased to retain the support of a majority in the Dail. The Pre- sident exercises the prerogative of mercy, having the right of pardon and the power to commute or remit punishment imposed by any court exercising criminal jurisdiction . After consultation with the Council of State, he may address messages to the nation or to the houses of the Oireachtas, provided every message has received the approval of the government. It is the President like- wise who appoints and accepts the resignation of and terminates the appointment of the executive ministers, judges of the Su- preme Court and the High Court, the attorney-general and the

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auditor-general. All these executive_ . functions of the President are however, unless otherwise stated, exercised on the advice of the government except where it is provided in the Constitution . that he shall act after consultation with the Council of State, or, on the advice or nomination of or on receipt of any other com- munication from, any other body or person. The President of the United States is commander-in-chief of the army and the navy of the United States and of the militia of the several states when called into active service of the United States. All officers of the United States hold their commissions .from him. The prerogative of mercy is vested in the President, he having power to grant reprieves and for offences against the United States, except in the case of impeachment. The President nominates and, by and with the advice and con- sent of the Senate, appoints judges of the Supreme Court and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are estab- lished by law and not otherwise. provided for in the Constitution, but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such in- ferior ,offices in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments . The President must from time to time give Congress information on the state of the Union and recommend to their consideration such measures as he may judge necessary and expedient. Although in some respects these powers and functions of the President of the United States are similar to those executive functions performed by the President of Ireland, nevertheless the American President exercises them almost en- tirely as of constitutional right in a discretionary manner, not being fettered in the performance of his task by the superior authority of any other person or body. Until recently an important contrast could be drawn between the two offices on the question of the exercise of the executive functions of the state in external relations . Up to 1948 the Pre sident of Ireland had no such powers, though provision. was made in the Constitution whereby additional powers and functions could be conferred on him by law." Since the passing of the Re- public of Ireland Act, 1948, however, the President, on the auth- ority and on the advice of the government, may exercise the executive power or any executive function of the state in con- nection with its external relations . These powers and functions relate to the - conclusion of international agreements and the appointment of diplomatic agents and were, before the passing of the act, exercised by the King. The President of the United 15 Constitution, Art. 13, ss. 10 and 11 .

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States has power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make treaties, provided that two-thirds of the Senators present concur. He nominates and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints ambassadors, consuls and other public ministers. It is the President likewise who receives all public ministers, including ambassadors and consuls. An impor- tant function in the realm of foreign affairs is, however, excluded from the competence of the President. This is the question of the declaration of war, Congress alone having the power to declare war for the United States. Although bills are signed and laws are promulgated by the President in each country, nevertheless the legislative powers surrendered to him are not the same. The President of the United States must sign every bill passed by Congress if the bill meets with his approval. If not, he must return it with his objections to the house in which it was originated, which then proceeds to re- consider it. After re-consideration, if two-thirds of the house agree to pass the bill it is sent, together with the objections, to the other house, which likewise reconsiders it, and, if approved by two- thirds of that house, it then becomes a law. The President of the United States has likewise legislative power in connection with orders, resolutions and votes (except on a question of adjourn- ment) to which the concurrence of the Senate and the House of Representatives is necessary. Before they take effect they must be approved by him, or, being disapproved by him, be repassed by two-thirds of the Senate and the House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. The President of Ireland has no direct veto on legislation. Every bill sent to him, other than a bill containing a proposal to amend the Constitution, must be signed by him within a specified period unless, on the request of aspecified number of the members of Dail and Seanad Eireann, the President should, after consulta- tion with the Council of State, decide to submit the bill to a referendum of the people or unless he should refer the bill to the Supreme Court for a decision on its validity having regard to the provisions of the Constitution. Should the President decide not to submit a bill to the people or to the Supreme Court or if, having so submitted the bill, it is ratified in either case, then he has no option but must sign the bill and promulgate it as a law. Should the bill be vetoed by the people at a referendum or should the Supreme Court decide that any provision of a bill, the subject of a reference to them, is repugnant to the Constitution or any

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provision of it, the President. must decline to sign. Pills contain- ing a proposal or proposals to amend the Constitution must in every case be submitted to a referendum of the people and, on his being satisfied that the required provisions have been com- plied with and that the proposal has been duly approved by the people, the President must sign. In the event of the failure of the President of Ireland to exer- cise or perform the powers and functions of his office, or in the case of his absence, death, resignation, removal from office, or temporary or permanent incapacity, the powers and functions conferred on him by the Constitution are exercised by a commis- sion consisting of the chief justice, the chairman of Dail Eireann and the chairman of Seanad Eireann . In the case of the removal of the President of the United' States from office, or of his death, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, they devolve on the Vice-President" who is elected at the same time and for the same period as the President and who, in addition, is President of the Senate of the United States.

Storing His Stomach with the Prating of Pedlars Among all other lessons this should first be learned, that we never affect any strange inkhorn terms, but so speak as is commonly received, neither seeking to be over fine, nor yet living over careless, using our speech as most men do, and ordering our wits as the fewest have done . Some seek so fat for outlandish English, that they forget altogether their mother's language. And I dare swear this, if some of their mothers were alive, they were not able to tell what they say; and yet these fine English clerks will say, they speak in their mother-tongue if a man should charge them for counterfeiting the King's English. Some far-journeyed gentlemen at their return home, like as they love to go in foreign apparel, so they will powder their talk with oversea language . He that cometh lately out of France will talk French English and never blush at the matter. Another chops in with English Italienated, -and applieth the Italian phrase to our English speaking, the which is, as if an orator that professeth to utter his mind in. plain Latin, would needs speak Poetry, and far-fetched colours of strange antiquity. The Lawyer will store his stomach with the prating of Pedlars . The Auditor in making his accompt and reckoning, cometh in with sise sould and cater denere for vis . iiiid. The fine courtier will talk nothing but Chaucer. The mystical wisemen and Poetical Clerks will speak nothing but quaint Proverbs, and blind Allegories, delighting much in their own darkness, especially, when none can tell what they do say. The unlearned or foolish fantastical, that smells but of learning (such fellows as have been learned men in their days) will so Latin their tongues, that the simple cannot but wonder at their talk, and think surely they speak by some Revelation . I know them that think Rhetoric to stand wholly upon dark words, and he that can catch an inkhorn term by the.tail, him they count to be a fine Englishman, and a good Rhetorician. (Thomas Wilson (1525?-1581) : The Arte of Rhetorique)