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L'absente De Tous Bouquets L’absente de tous bouquets Linguistic Negativity in Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty ———————————————————— Berndt Sellheim B.A. Comm. (Hons 1 st Class, UTS), Dip. App. Sci. (Nuc. Med., Sydney). ———————————————————— Macquarie University, Department of Philosophy, Division of Society, Culture, Media and Philosophy, April 2008. This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 1 2 Contents Foreword 13 Prelude 19 Introduction 23 Chapter1 RomanticOrigins 31 Chapter2 PoeticRevelationinGermanRomanticism 45 Chapter3 NegativeFoundationsinMartinHeidegger 71 Chapter4 HeideggerandPoeticRevelation—Artwork, 119 ThoughtandWord Chapter5 Merleau-Ponty:SilenceandÊtreSauvage 163 Chapter6 Merleau-PontyandtheSilenceofNature 203 Chapter7 ThePoetic:ConfluenceofWordandFlesh 247 Bibliography 289 3 4 L’absentedetousbouquets ——————— LinguisticNegativityinMartinHeidegger andMauriceMerleau-Ponty Synopsis What is our opening upon the world? What is the relationship between this opening—its tactility, depth and reach—and the language with which we seek to expressit?Poetryandphilosophyarefrequentlyconsideredinopposition,buthere, pushing up against the limits and possibilities of expression, in the face of ‘raw’ perception, they speak of a common opening upon experience. Both disciplines begininasenseofwonderthatwefindourselvesinameaningfulworld,andeach takestheexplorationofthat‘meaning’tobethefirstquestionofexistence.Their divergence,andthemanifoldpathsthatproliferatewithineachindividualdiscipline, arrivesinhowthisquestionisunfoldedandengaged. Although the opposition between the disciplines is an ancient one, one that continuestothisday,sometheoristsdoattempttomergethesegenres,andinfact see the possibilities of exploring this phenomenological opening as existing only within the coupling of the two. This thesis will look at how such a coupling is theorisedinJenaRomanticism,andexaminethewayinwhichitisformulatedand executedintwoofthe20 th Century’smostoriginalandimportantthinkers,Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The central question is why, in the responses offered by both these philosophers, modes of ‘indirect’ expression are frequently privileged over more ‘direct’ logico-discursive language. The inquiry willbeengagedthematicallyandinthelinguisticformoftheworkitself. 5 StatementofCandidate Ideclarethatthissubmissionismyownworkandtothebestofmy knowledge contains no material previously published or written by anotherperson,normaterialwhichhasbeenacceptedfortheawardof any other degree or diploma at Macquarie University or any other educationalinstitution,exceptwheredueacknowledgementismadein thethesis. Theintellectualcontentofthisthesisistheproductofmyownwork, excepttotheextentthatcriticismandadvicefromothersconcerningthe overall structure and design, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. BerndtSellheim 6 AbbreviationsforFrequentlyCitedTexts MartinHeidegger BDT.‘Building,Dwelling,Thinking.’MartinHeidegger Poetry,Language,Thought. Trans.AlbertHofstadter.NewYork,PerennialClassics,2001. BT. BeingandTime trans.JohnMacquarieandEdwardRobinson.Oxford,Blackwell Publishing,1962. CCP.‘ConversationonaCountryPathaboutThinking’in DiscourseonThinking trans.JohnM.AndersonandE.HansFreud.NewYork,HarperPerennial,1966. CTP. ContributionstoPhilosophy:(FromEnowning) trans.ParvisEmadandKenneth Maly.Bloomington,IndianaUniversityPress,1999. DL.‘ADialogueonLanguage’in OnTheWaytoLanguage. SanFrancisco,Harper Collins,1971. EoP.‘TheEndofPhilosophyandtheTaskofThinking’in BasicWritings, ed.David FarrellKrell.London,Routledge,1993. I. Hölderlin’sHymn“TheIster,”trans.WilliamMcNeillandJuliaDavis. Bloomington,IndianaUniversityPress,1996. LH.‘TheLetteronHumanism’in BasicWritings ed.DavidFarrellKrell. London, Routledge,2002. LP.‘LanguageinthePoem’in OnTheWaytoLanguage ,trans.PeterD.Hertz.San Francisco,HarperCollins,1971. OWA.‘TheOriginoftheWorkofArt’in BasicWritings, ed.DavidFarrellKrell. London,Routledge,1993. NL.‘TheNatureofLanguage’in OnTheWaytoLanguage ,trans.PeterD.Hertz.San Francisco,HarperCollins,1971. RP.‘RemembranceofthePoet’trans.DouglasScottin ExistenceandBeing .Chicago, Gateway,1968. PR. ThePrincipleofReason.Bloomington,IndianaUniversityPress,1996. QCT.‘TheQuestionConcerningTechnology’in BasicWritings, ed.DavidFarrell Krell.London,Routledge,1993. 7 WCT.MartinHeidegger, WhatisCalledThinking, trans.J.GlennGray.NewYork, HarperCollins/Perennial,2004. WM.WhatisMetaphysics’in BasicWritings, ed.DavidFarrellKrell.London, Routledge,1993. WPF.‘WhatarePoetsFor’in Poetry,Language,Thought ,trans.AlbertHofstandter. NewYork,PerennialClassics,2001. WTL.‘TheWaytoLanguage’in OnTheWaytoLanguage ,trans.PeterD.Hertz.San Francisco,HarperCollins,1971. MauriceMerleau-Ponty EM.‘EyeandMind’inGalenA.Johnsoned. TheMerleau-PontyAestheticsReader: PhilosophyandPainting ,trans.ed.MichaelB.Smith.Evanston,Northwestern UniversityPress,1993. N. Nature.CourseNotesfromtheCollègedeFrance, trans.RobertVallier.Evanston, NorthwesternUniversityPress,2003. PhP. PhenomenologyofPerception ,trans.ColinSmith.London,Routledge,2002. viii. PS.‘ThePhilosopherandHisShadow’in Signs ,trans.RichardC.Mcleary.Evanston, NorthwesternUniversityPress,1964. SB. TheStructureofBehaviour ,trans.AldenL.Fisher.London,Methuen,1965. UP.‘AnUnpublishedTextbyMauriceMerleau-Ponty:AProspectusofHisWork’ trans.ArleenB.Dalleryin ThePrimacyofPerception .Evanston,Northwestern UniversityPress,1964. 8 MiscellaneousandSecondaryLiterature NH.MigueldeBeistegui,TheNewHeidegger. London,Continuum,NewYork,2005. CJ.ImmanuelKant, TheCritiqueofJudgment ,trans.J.H.Bernard.Mineola.Dover Publications,2005. LA.PhilippeLacoue-LabartheandJean-LucNancy, TheLiteraryAbsolute:The TheoryofLiteratureinGermanRomanticism, trans.PhilipBarnardandCherylLester. Albany,StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1988. HLP.JulianYoung,Heidegger’sLaterPhilosophy .Cambridge,CambridgeUniversity Press,2002. HPA.——Heidegger’sPhilosophyofArt .Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001. 9 10 Thereareallkindsofemptinessandfullness thatsinganddonotsing. RobertHass 11 12 Foreword Thethesisbeganinaparticular‘senseofworld’thatariseswhenweengagewiththe naturalenvironment,andacuriositywithhowitmightbearticulated.Whatithasbecome isasustainedandinsomerespectsopeninquiryintothenatureoflanguageandits‘fit’ withthatworld.Thewaythisquestionisframedisviatherelationshipbetweenpoetic languageandphilosophy,andthedirectionalityofthequestionwillmostfrequentlybe fromthephilosophicalintothepoetic. Somepracticalmattersneedtobeclarifiedattheoutset.ThefirstiswhatImeanbythe poem, or poetry, or the poetic, a notion that will be used frequently. Besides a few provisos,Idon’tfindanycontradictioninsayingthatmydefinitionhereisessentiallya circular one: most of us have experiences of poetry, of reading poems or having them readtous,andhavesubsequentlydevelopeda‘senseofthepoetic.’Thisdefinitionisnot much help in any absolute sense, but for the majority of readers it will function well enough. 1 Significant differences appear within changing poetic history, ‘school’ and genre,butitisarguablethatevenbetweenthesonnetandfreeverse,betweenHomerand Robert Perelman, a certain relationship arises between the poetic object and language whichaskssimilarquestionsofsound,meaning,andform,whichenquiresaboutthelink betweensense,musicandword.Thepoemisanaestheticenaction ofthesequestions. FromPage11.RobertHass, SunUnderWood. Hopewell,TheEccoPress,1996.21. Wherevertranslationsaremyown,Ihaveincludedtheoriginaltextinthenotes. 1 Derridainfactsuggestsisthatthereisnotheoryofaestheticsthefoundationofwhichisnotinsomeway embeddedwithinitsownaestheticobjects,adding“Circlesofcircles,circleintheencircledcircle.” JacquesDerrida,‘Parergon’in TheTruthinPainting, trans.GeoffBenningtonandIanMcLeod.Chicago, UniversityofChicagoPress,1987.24. 13 Thissaid,whenItalkof‘poetry,’itisespeciallyinthedirectionofmodernpoetrythat Iamgesturing.Modernpoetry(forthesakeofconvenience)isanythingbeginningwith Mallarmé. At the same time as recognising the arbitrary nature of this definition, the significanceofMallarmé’sbreakfrompoetichistory,andhisemphasisonaveryprecise andprofoundnegativity,makehimhardtoignoreasapointofepochalcommencement. Still,adiscussionwhichfocusesontheAmericantraditionmightwelldrawthelineat Walt Whitman, which is to say, really, that such distinctions are arbitrary, but remain somewhatusefulandnotaltogethermeaningless.InparticularIchooseMallarmébecause thecentralthemeofthisthesisislinguisticnegativity,andMallarméwasboththemother and midwife of a certain form of negativity that is now commonplace within poetic expression. The idea that certain linguistic structures are not reducible to a logico-discursive language, yet remain meaningful, is central to the following discussion, and it is this particularly that is understood by the term ‘linguistic negativity.’ Such negativity may taketheformofunresolvedorpolysemouslanguagewithinapoem,oraphilosophical textwhichtradesonan apparent ‘imprecision.’ Negative meaningindicatesthatwhich cannot be understood in a positive sense: a word (or a phrase or an entire text) that exhibits a problematic reference to its usual object or action, where ‘direct’ lines of significationaresevered,whereliteralmeaningsperhapsdonotfunctionatall,donot,as such,‘makesense.’ Frequently, such ‘negative’ relationships counter-determine the usual modes of understanding.Inthisbreakdownofsense,alternativepossibilitiesofmeaningarise,yet
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