Strategic Monitor 2014

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Strategic Monitor 2014 The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies Lange Voorhout 16 [email protected] STRATEGIC 2014 MONITOR 2514 EE The Hague HCSS.NL The Netherlands STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014 FOUR STRATEGIC CHALLENGES The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies SECURITY HCSS helps governments, non-governmental organizations and the private sector to understand the fast-changing environment and seeks to anticipate the challenges of the future with practical policy solutions and advice. This report is from the HCSS theme SECURITY. Our other themes are RESOURCES and GLOBAL TRENDS. SECURITY HCSS identifies and analyzes the developments that shape our security environment. We show the intricate and dynamic relations between political, military, economic, social, environmental, and technological drivers that shape policy space. Our strengths are a unique methodological base, deep domain knowledge and an extensive international network of partners. HCSS assists in formulating and evaluating policy options on the basis of an integrated approach to security challenges and security solutions. HCSS REPORT 1 STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014 The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) ISBN/EAN: 978-94-91040-95-5 Editors Joris van Esch, Frank Bekkers, Stephan De Spiegeleire, Tim Sweijs Authors Eline Chivot, Jan Hendrik Galdiga, Maarten Gehem, Emily Knowles, Matthijs Maas, Philipp Marten, Willem Theo Oosterveld, Menno Schellekens, João Silveira, Stephan De Spiegeleire, Tim Sweijs, Peter Wijninga, Michelle Yuemin Yang, Olga Zelinska Contributions Sijbren de Jong, Pavel Kogut, Esther van Luit, Philipp Marten © 2014 The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced and/ or published in any form by print, photo print, microfilm or any other means without prior written permission from HCSS. All images are subject to the licenses of their respective owners. Graphic Design Studio Maartje de Sonnaville, The Hague Print de Swart Graphics and Cover Image Joris Fiselier The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies Lange Voorhout 16 [email protected] 2514 EE The Hague HCSS.NL The Netherlands STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014 FOUR STRATEGIC CHALLENGES The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS SAMENVATTING 9 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 25 1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 39 2 ASSESSING ASSERTIONS OF ASSERTIVENESS: THE CHINESE AND RUSSIAN CASES 45 2.1 Preface 47 2.2 Why Great Powers Matter More 49 2.3 What is Assertiveness? 53 2.4 Research Design 56 2.5 Main Findings 59 2.6 Conclusions & Security Implications 89 3 WHY ARE PIVOT STATES SO PIVOTAL? THE ROLE OF PIVOT STATES IN REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY 97 3.1 Introduction 99 3.2 The Concept of a Pivot State 100 3.3 Identifying Pivot States 102 3.4 Caught in the Middle: Pivot States by Region 124 3.5 Security Implications 133 4 STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS: BEYOND THE DICHOTOMY 139 4.1 Introduction 141 4.2 What are State and Non-State Actors? 142 4.3 Non-State Actors in World Affairs 146 4.4 Examining Civil Society Actors in Depth 152 4.5 Conclusions & Security Implications 159 HCSS REPORT 5 5 BALANCING ON THE BRINK: VULNERABILITY OF STATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 163 5.1 Introduction 165 5.2 The Arab Spring 166 5.3 Birds-eye View of Regional Vulnerability 169 5.4 Paths to Conflict 170 5.5 Impact on Europe 191 5.6 Security Implications 201 6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS 205 ENDNOTES 211 HCSS REPORT 7 SAMENVATTING HCSS REPORT 9 SAMENVATTING De Strategische Monitor van het Den Haag Centrum voor Strategische Studies (HCSS) identificeert en analyseert bestaande en opkomende trends en ontwikkelingen op het gebied van internationale veiligheid en de gevolgen voor de veiligheid in Nederland en Europa. De HCSS Strategische Monitor vormt input voor de strategische vooruitblik en de beleidsvorming van de ministeries van Defensie, Buitenlandse Zaken en Veiligheid & Justitie. De Monitor is zowel een proces als een product: de resultaten en inzichten van de omgevingsanalyses worden jaarlijks gebundeld in een publiek beschikbaar rapport. Het rapport van vorig jaar, ‘De Toekomst in Alle Staten’, bevatte een brede ‘horizon scan’ van de veiligheidsomgeving. Dit jaar verkent de HCSS Strategic Monitor 2014: Four Strategic Challenges vier onderwerpen die in de horizon scan van de vorige jaarlijkse cyclus naar voren kwamen als van bijzonder belang voor de internationale veiligheidssituatie. Recente wetenschappelijke inzichten leren dat anticipatie van ontwikkelingen in complexe veiligheidsomgevingen het meest gebaat is bij het benaderen van deze ontwikkelingen vanuit diverse perspectieven. De vier afzonderlijke deelstudies in deze HCSS Strategische Monitor hanteren daarom met opzet een scala aan bronnen en kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve methoden. Hieronder worden de belangrijkste bevindingen en veiligheidsimplicaties van elk van deze vier deelstudies samengevat. Deelstudie I – Grootmachten en Assertiviteit De afgelopen jaren is veel geschreven over de toegenomen assertiviteit van grootmachten en met name die van China en Rusland. In deze bijdrage gaan we nader op deze observatie in. Daarbij baseren we ons niet slechts op anekdotische voorbeelden of laten we ons leiden door de waan van de dag, maar volgen een meer systematische en reproduceerbare methode. De basis van onze analyse is een definitie en operationalisering van de notie van ´assertiviteit´ in internationale betrekkingen. Belangrijk hierbij is het onderscheid tussen feitelijke en retorische HCSS REPORT 11 assertiviteit. Vervolgens kwantificeren we de verschillende dimensies van assertiviteit van de grootmachten China en Rusland. We doen dit aan de hand van data verkregen uit de Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT, een systeem dat bijna een kwart miljard wereldgebeurtenissen vanaf 1979 heeft geïndexeerd), uit de HCSS Off-Base (een database met daarin alle webpagina’s van de ministeries van buitenlandse zaken van zeven belangrijke grootmachten, waaronder China en Rusland), en een aantal statistische indicatoren. Het eerste belangrijke inzicht uit deze analyse is dat zowel China als Rusland in het afgelopen decennium inderdaad assertiever gedrag zijn gaan vertonen. Interessant is dat de assertiviteit van China in deze periode sterker is toegenomen, zowel feitelijk als retorisch, dan die van Rusland – hoewel hij in absolute aantallen nog steeds onder het Russische niveau blijft. (Noot: de verzamelde dataset loopt slechts tot medio 2013 en omvat dus niet de recente manifestaties van Russische assertiviteit in Oekraïne en op de Krim). Een tweede bevinding is dat in beide landen de feitelijke assertiviteit meer is toegenomen dan de retorische assertiviteit. De daden van beide landen lijken in dit geval luider te spreken dan hun woorden. Desondanks wegen voor beide landen positieve of neutrale manifestaties van assertiviteit nog steeds op tegen negatieve uitingen daarvan. Wel suggereren alle gebruikte bronnen en analyses dat feitelijke vormen van assertiviteit sterk zijn toegenomen. Op het gebied van militaire assertiviteit tonen alle datasets een flinke toename van Chinese macht, die zich meer en meer ook militair uit. Hoewel voor Rusland de baseline van militaire assertiviteit veel hoger blijft dan die van China, is hier de algemene trend minder eenduidig. De veiligheidsimplicaties van een toename in assertiviteit zijn aanzienlijk. In de afgelopen decennia is er grotendeels een einde gekomen aan open militaire confrontatie tussen de grootmachten. Zelfs waar hun belangen met elkaar in conflict kwamen, hebben deze geschillen zich zelden geuit in directe bilaterale confrontatie. Er zijn zeker internationale spanningen geweest en deze zullen blijven spelen: met Rusland over landen en gebieden zoals de Balkan, Irak, Afghanistan en Syrië, en met China over Taiwan, Japan, de Zuid-Chinese Zee en Noord-Korea; en over controversiële onderwerpen zoals valutawaardering, vrijhandel en protectionisme, olie en gas, mensenrechten, mineralen en grondstoffen. Al deze spanningen worden echter getemperd door krachtige corrigerende dynamieken, waaronder gedeelde belangen 12 STRATEGIC MONITOR 2014 (terrorisme, wederzijdse economische afhankelijkheid, ‘Chinamerica’), wederzijdse nucleaire afschrikking, uitruil van asymmetrische belangen (‘deze punten zijn belangrijker voor hen dan voor ons’), en diverse verdragen, afspraken en regelingen. Dit alles heeft potentiële ‘uitdagers’ in de wereldorde er tot nut toe van weerhouden teveel ‘op de rand te lopen’ van conflictescalatie – in het Engels aangeduid met de term ‘brinkmanship’. Onze analyse wijst echter wel op enkele bredere tendensen, feiten en gebeurtenissen die dit precaire evenwicht onder druk zetten. In het afgelopen jaar is gebleken dat zowel China als Rusland bereid zijn om, meer dan in het verleden, ‘brinkmanship’ aan de dag te leggen. Sinds het einde van de Koude Oorlog zijn deze landen nog nooit zó ver gegaan in het riskeren van internationale crises om hun doelen te bereiken. De sterke toename in assertiviteit in het laatste decennium, óók op militair gebied, versterkt het risico dat conflicten in de toekomst – opnieuw – kunnen escaleren tot het niveau van openlijk geweld. Oftewel, het gevaar van een ‘21ste-eeuwse Cuba Crisis’ neemt langzaam toe en het is de vraag of en hoe de escalatie van zulke conflicten beheerst kan worden. Een intrinsiek gevaar van assertiviteit ligt in de vicieuze cirkel van opruiende retoriek. Deze creëert een mist van onzekere informatie, vermoedens en speculatie, waarin het steeds moeilijker wordt feiten en fictie te onderscheiden en gebeurtenissen in perspectief te plaatsen. Vandaar dat we
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