JULY 2015. Vol 8. Issue 7

Contents The Proceedings of the 2015

1 The Proceedings of the 2015 West Point Senior Conference West Point Senior Conference

REPORTS 2 Understanding Terrorism Today and Tomorrow By General Joseph L. Votel

6 In Search of New Approaches By Nelly Lahoud and Robert Person

9 The Truth Campaign And The War of Ideas By Pete Favat and Bryan C. Price General Joseph L. Votel addresses U.S. troops. USSOCOM

12 An Interview With: n behalf of Lieutenant Operations Command (USSOCOM), Usman Raja General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., who has kindly provided an augmented By Paul Cruickshank O Superintendent of the U.S. version of the keynote speech he Military Academy at West Point, and delivered at the conference. The CTC’s 15 An Interview With: his predecessors, the Department of Dr. Nelly Lahoud and SOSH’s Dr. Dennis Gleeson Social Sciences (SOSH) has convened Robert Person then provide an overview By John Watling the Senior Conference every year since of the themes addressed during the two- 1963, with the exceptions of 1969 and and-a-half-day event. Finally, several 17 Global Civilization and 2013, to discuss national security topics attendees have graciously agreed to Counterterrorism in a sequestered, informal setting. The expand on their presentations from By Yaneer Bar-Yam goal of the 2015 Senior Conference was to the conference and further share some bring together diverse ways of thinking of the insights that may help advance 23 Senior Conference Agenda about the challenges posed by terrorism. counterterrorism thinking, policy, This year’s theme, “Counterterrorism: and strategy. An article by Pete Favat 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts Unconventional Approaches to an and LTC Bryan Price looks at how Unconventional Threat,” was intended marketing skills can help weaken our to focus discussion on what one attendee opponents. Interviews with Usman About the CTC Sentinel described as “the hardest problem” the Raja and Dennis Gleeson explore their The Combating Terrorism Center is an United States is likely to face for a long thoughts on deradicalization and how independent educational and research time. In the spirit of previous years, to think about terrorism, respectively. institution based in the Department of Social West Point brought together eminent The issue concludes with an article by Sciences at the United States Military Academy, scholars in the field of terrorism, Dr. Yaneer Bar-Yam discussing his West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses representatives from international work on the science of complexity and the Center’s global network of scholars and organizations, non-governmental its implications for counterterrorism practitioners to understand and confront organizations, private industry, and the policy and strategy. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and U.S. government, in addition to senior other forms of political violence. military leaders.

The CTC Sentinel is devoting this issue to The views expressed in this report are those of the results of this endeavor with articles COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, that highlight the most interesting Professor and Head, the Department of the Army, or any other agency avenues of exploration and discussion. Department of Social Sciences of the U.S. Government. The issue begins with General Joseph U.S. Military Academy L. Votel, commander of U.S. Special JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

Achille Lauro off the coast of Egypt and ISIL share some common underlying Understanding Terrorism demanded that the vessel set course for ideology. Today and Tomorrow Tartus, Syria. By General Joseph L. Votel The simple, unfortunate threads of Before the hijacking was over, one continuity are twofold. First, although General Joseph L. Votel, commander elderly American passenger had they were motivated by different of U.S. Special Operations Command, been killed, pushed overboard in his beliefs and ideologies and pursued graciously delivered the keynote speech wheelchair. different objectives, they extended at the 2015 Senior Conference and took those beliefs into behavior that we find A decade later, on April 19, 1995, unacceptable—the targeting of innocent the opportunity to set out the gravity and American citizen Timothy McVeigh, persons. scope of the issue under consideration. The assisted by Terry Nichols, angered by article below is adapted from his speech. FBI actions at Ruby Ridge and Waco The second characteristic is less earlier in the decade, detonated a rental obvious, but perhaps more disturbing. i’d like to start by posing a basic truck full of explosives outside of the It’s that we were surprised by each question to this distinguished audience. Alfred R. Murrah Federal Building in of these events, and that we continue What makes an effective terrorist? Now, Oklahoma City, killing 168 people— to be surprised to this day. With 14 I don’t necessarily mean that question including a large number of children in continuous years of experience fighting in the way you might first consider. a daycare center. terrorist networks, how is it that we were unable to see the rapid rise and You might think that I’m asking And we are all far too familiar with the growing prominence of ISIL? you to reflect on ideology, socio- more recent attacks conducted in our economic factors or a general sense of homeland. The horrendous violence Inside this is also the answer to my disenfranchisement, but that’s not quite rhetorical question. What makes a where I’m heading. Personally, I do not terrorist effective is unpredictability, think there is a singular or consistent “What makes a terrorist surprise, and the exploitation of things cause for terrorism. effective is unpredictibility, that are common to us, but which we often take for granted. Nor do I believe that the impact of their actions defines an effective terrorist. A surprise, and the I don’t know if I can describe what suicide bomber who drives headlong terrorism will be or look like in the into a crowded market is really no exploitation of things that future. Historically, we don’t do different than a suicidal maniac who particularly well at this. Why is that? attacks a classroom full of kids. I really are common to us, but Why do we fail to anticipate actions mean: In the end, what allows a terrorist that so directly threaten our security? to achieve his or her objective? which we often take for granted.” Well, as Yogi Berra said, “It’s tough As I reflect on acts of terrorism over to make predictions…especially about the last 40 years—and there have the future.” In all seriousness, it is been too many of them—I note two on September 11, 2001 and two years really hard to predict what people will common characteristics: the targeting ago in Boston both trace their origin to do—particularly when we can’t always of innocents and the factor of surprise. religious fanaticism. define their motivation and inspiration. Several case studies illustrate these commonalities. Unfortunately, that fanaticism and There are, actually, many factors that violence continues today, as the Islamic contribute to this shortfall. One of In 1972, Palestinian terrorists from the State, a group we knew almost nothing the biggest factors is our tendency to Black September group broke into the about 18 months ago, and their adherents myopically focus on a singular root Munich Olympic Village and stormed use car bombs, explosives, beheadings, cause, to find that one answer to the the Israeli dormitory. They took 11 hostage taking, and lone wolf attacks to “why” question and then attempt to hostages, eventually killing them all, further their aspirations. apply a laser focus on that one cause along with a German policeman. This while effectively ignoring other event, carried out on the world stage But what do all of these terrorists have in potential reasons. through televised coverage of the common? It’s not the way in which they Olympics, literally brought terrorism planned or executed their attacks. It is Our focus on ideology is a great example into our homes in real time. not who they targeted. It is certainly not of this. Sunni-Wahhabism is in vogue that the PLF, Timothy McVeigh, Usama today, and is winning our attention Thirteen years later, on October 7, 1985, bin Laden, the Tsarnaev brothers, or right now, but I am not so sure I agree four men representing the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) hijacked the MS

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that it is the singular root cause for armor, and experiments with body a continuity of ideology, symbols, terrorism. bombs. and communication styles with the allegedly defunct Red Brigades. Some In fact, I’m not sure there is ever a This evidence simply drives home individuals from this new entity were singular root cause. What about the the point that terrorists have always even known to have been original Red results of rampant unemployment? adapted their methods, techniques, Brigade members. Dissatisfaction with corrupt or and approaches to match the tools and oppressive government regimes? Social opportunities of the day. We should We’re seeing a very similar phenomenon or cultural disenfranchisement? not expect anything else in the future. today in the way that al-Qa`ida in Iraq Complexity makes it easier for them. and others resurrected to form a core There are three broad reasons under the banner of ISIL. why I think we continue to have Terrorist groups have also evolved— problems in effectively predicting and more of today’s groups are disassociated Our political system, news media, and preventing terrorism. They have to from nation-states and are becoming national attention are consistently do with adaptability, persistence, and singular influences in their own right. drawn to the next crisis and have little imagination. ISIL not only coerces and subjugates patience for dealing with long-term its victims to an ideology, but it also issues. This tendency affects budgets, seeks to govern physical space. They “From Guy Fawkes and are adapting to a perceived need and “[We] are consistently attempting to fill space left vacant by his Gunpowder plot of sovereign governments. drawn to the next crisis...

1605 to the attacks on our In addition, the social media boom This tendency affects consulate in Erbil in April, has allowed terrorists to recruit and budgets, resources, and communicate better and faster. And terrorist groups adapt and they are learning—they learn from our talented people. The their mistakes and lack of operational exploit developments in security. They are self-aware. They terrorists know this, they remain anonymous and adapt to their technology, culture and environs. Their organizations exploit exploit it, and they keep our complex hyper-connected world social norms.” and metastasize like a cancer. pressing forward.”

For many reasons—legal, cultural, bureaucratic, or financial—we have not Complex threats continue to evolve and adapted well or quickly. Even though resources, and our talented people. The manifest in ways we don’t completely we recognize the tools and methods the terrorists know this, they exploit it, and understand. Terrorism has survived terrorists are exploiting, it’s frequently they keep pressing forward. and evolved throughout the ages. difficult to connect all the dots. Acts of terrorism, both large and small, From Guy Fawkes and his Gunpowder It’s even more difficult to maintain come at us from almost every direction, plot of 1605 to the attacks on our focus on the problem for the long term. and in creative ways that we often don’t consulate in Erbil in April, terrorist Our inability to persistently apply anticipate. groups adapt and exploit developments pressure often allows individuals and in technology, culture, and social groups to surprise us with their actions One of the findings from the 9/11 norms. and capabilities. commission concluded that we simply lacked the imagination, and belief, Terrorists also persistently improve on The evolution of the Red Brigades, a to envision that a group of terrorists tried and true methods, developing new paramilitary organization born in Italy would learn to operate large commercial and innovative ways to execute their in the 1970s, is one example of this passenger airliners and then fly them attacks. The evolution of improvised dynamic. The Red Brigades gradually into tall buildings where thousands explosive devices (IEDs) is a case in lapsed into inactivity through the 1980s worked. point. and 1990s. This led us to collectively dismiss In 14 years we have seen terrorists go However, a decade after their supposed intelligence reports pointing in that from crude exploitation of military demise, a new group emerged calling direction.1 The lesson that 9/11 taught us ordnance to factory-manufactured itself the “Anti-Capitalist Attack devices designed to penetrate top level Nuclei.” This group materialized, seemingly from nowhere, exhibiting 1 The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 339-348. 3 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

is that saying “that will never happen” who knows how to exploit rapid all while they collectively plan and is only ever true until it does. technological advances and the ubiquity execute their attacks. of the internet. Terrorists in the future Over the last 18 months we have seen will be even more sophisticated and will What Can We Do? more than 23,000 persons converge on continually improve their capabilities in Just because we have not always been the Levant in response to ISIL’s call for virtually all aspects of their operations successful at countering violence in action. What do we imagine they will do and support. the past does not mean we should not when they return to their homelands? strive to do better in the future. In the As societies become more connected near term, we must contain the use of We do not spend enough time and interdependent, many more violence and oppression—unilaterally, considering all of the contributing will become aware of their cultural multi-laterally, by, with, and through. factors—looking through social and disenfranchisement and economic cultural lenses, studying and mastering disadvantages. Across the country and We must disable and counter propaganda technologies, understanding the around the globe, connected youth are and information operations. We must multiplicity of ideologies, or connecting becoming more and more desensitized address known causal factors by local to regional to global events—at to unacceptable and violent behavior strengthening vulnerable populations least not quickly and efficiently enough through absorption of various and improving their ability to identify, to be predictive and preventive. electronic inputs, to include streaming characterize, attribute, and defend news, entertainment mediums, and against terror networks and threats. “The case studies... are a video games. “Our whole-of-government reflection of the kind of Computerized traffic and public safety systems and electronic banking will efforts...must work terrorism we’re familiar be among the new terrorist targets. It might be that the spectacular attack better. It is imperative with. But we can ill afford in the future will lie not in how many people you kill or injure, but in how that we share a common to think that we will effectively you can paralyze major urban areas by changing a few ones and zeros, operational view—across­ continue to face the same or potentially disrupt the functions of financial systems. Just imagine the U.S. agencies and with our foes in the same way using lasting impacts of those types of events happening without warning. international partners.” the same tactics.” The incredible proliferation of devices that connect us to the “internet of everything” will be both tools and Our counter-terrorism architectures Implications for the Future targets for terrorists. Experts say that and capabilities will need to be more I firmly believe that the ability of by 2020 there will be more than 40 agile and more integrated. We need terrorists to rapidly adapt in our billion wirelessly connected devices, a common strategy. Understanding complex world, combined with our and that all of them could be easily this complex environment will require lack of persistence and imagination, hacked.2 mature global networks and effective will continue to create blind spots links with our interagency teammates in our counterterrorism efforts. In the future, we should think of and partner nations—allowing rapid The implications of these gaps are disparate and isolated “lone wolves,” synchronization of information significant. still independent, anonymous, and across agency, regional, national, and elusive, but now connected to each other international boundaries. Terrorist attacks, like the case studies in cyberspace—forming “wolf packs.” mentioned earlier, are a reflection of the Often this will mean working with non- kind of terrorism we’re familiar with These packs can share tactics, traditional partners. But, by leveraging today. But, we can ill afford to think techniques, and procedures with a global network that is already present that we will continue to face the same one another, instantaneously move in every region of the world, we can foes in the same way using the same resources across the web anonymously— create the time and space necessary to tactics. address poor governance issues that have contributed to the emergence In the future, we will have to come to grips with new types of terrorists, 2 “Internet of Things By The Numbers: Market Esti- such as the computer-savvy individual mates And Forecasts,” Forbes, August 22, 2014.

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of threats such as Boko Haram, al- a global problem that will require global Joint IED Defeat Organization established Shabaab, and others. solutions. under the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Our whole-of-government efforts aimed “We are going to live He served as the Deputy Commanding at addressing violent extremism must General (Operations), 82d Airborne work better and in conjunction with each in a world that is more Division / CJTF-82, Operation other. It is imperative that we share a ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan and common operational view—across U.S. connected than ever before, was subsequently assigned as the Deputy agencies and with our international Commanding General of the Joint Special partners—of vulnerable populations and this connectivity will Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North and ensure our limited resources are Carolina. His most recent prior assignment applied to assist those governments make us more vulnerable. was as the Commanding General of the and areas in addressing circumstances Joint Special Operations Command. that lead to increased motivation and But it also offers us a opportunity for terrorists. means to overcome and, Given that many foreign terrorist fighters or “want to be” fighters ultimately, silence and and supporters virtually document everything on social media, we must defeat the...terrorists.” confront the issue of privacy versus public safety.

We are going to live in a world that is If we’re able to do these things more connected than ever before, and and maintain our persistence, this connectivity will make us more understanding that this is an enduring vulnerable. But it also offers us a means conflict (a “long war” as General John to overcome and, ultimately, silence Abizaid3 often reminds us), and if we can and defeat the dissatisfied few who we learn from our past mistakes, not only in identify as terrorists. We must contest countering ideology, but in identifying this space and own it. the multitude of motivations, tools, and techniques that enable them to do harm, Conclusion we have a chance to forestall the effects How we arrive at a less violent and more of violent extremism. harmonious existence in the future rests on the shoulders of the men and women Our nation is depending on us and I on the frontlines against terrorism. But look forward to being a partner in this the outcome will only be as good as our effort. aim.

Practitioners in large part rely on organizations such as the Combating General Votel is commander of U.S. Special Terrorism Center to establish the Operations Command (USSOCOM), intellectual underpinnings of this field, headquartered at MacDill AFB, Tampa, allowing us to better know the enemy, Florida. A native of St. Paul, Minnesota, and helping us best direct our precious General Votel attended the U.S. Military resources. Academy at West Point, and was commissioned in 1980 as an Infantry We can become more effective at Officer. preventing attacks if we can utilize the collective imagination of our network As a general officer he served in the to build the partnerships and processes Pentagon as the Director of the Army we need. and Joint IED Defeat Task Force and We must also maintain the proper subsequently as the Deputy Director of the perspective, understanding that this is 3 “Gen. John Abizaid Speaks on Leadership and Current Hot Spots,” Claremont McKenna University College, May 2, 2013. 5 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

In Search of New long-term threat posed by groups on the systems akin to a complex organism basis of their ideological persuasions. whose health is dependent on a number Approaches of interrelated factors. In this analogy, By Nelly Lahoud and Robert Person It is no surprise that a critical spirit terrorism is a disorder, or a malignancy defined the conversation in a conference like cancer, that requires treatment. the 2015 Senior Conference featured designed to explore unconventional open and honest discourse among a wide approaches to counterterrorism. The dangers of pursuing this analogy too range of participants, including senior This spirit is driven in large parts far are obvious. Like any shorthand—as representatives from the military, by the struggles of successive U.S. highlighted by Dennis Gleeson later in counterterrorism practitioners, administrations to devise effective and this issue—it can encourage absolutist policymakers, NGOs, international lasting ways to reduce and manage the and limited thinking. Equally though, institutions, and partner nations. The spread and appeal of terrorism through it can be useful in framing the problem result was a deeper understanding of the strategy and policy.2 One attendee and highlighting avenues of research. challenges facing the counterterrorism succinctly summed it up, stating, community and the identification of “Before 9/11 we got it wrong, and we The analogy was introduced by a some signs pointing the way ahead for got it wrong afterwards. Asleep at the presenter, Yaneer Bar-Yam, who the field. switch before, overestimated the threat discussed new approaches to complex strategic environments (a topic he These successes were made possible by “Being clear about the explores more deeply in his article later the balance of informal conversations, in this issue). He argued that global keynote presentations, and formal panel problem is the key to society is “a highly interdependent discussions organized under Chatham system” that consists of multiple House rules. The attendees were able getting strategy right.” distinct, complex sub-systems. Thus, to approach the topic of unconventional the “comprehensive global strategy” approaches to the unconventional threat to counter terrorism, as was called for of terrorism in a way that encouraged by several attendees, is more usefully honest reflection and genuine sharing of afterwards.” This individual underlined understood as one that addresses the viewpoints and ideas. As a result, only their belief that the consequences of political, economic, social, and cultural those participants who have contributed some early mistakes in this conflict realms. This is because “the violent formal articles to this publication will continue to generate serious challenges, extremists we are talking about are be quoted. including the ascendance of the group not separate from the systems they are that now calls itself the Islamic State. embedded in,” and their actions demand Understanding the Problem a multifaceted set of treatments within Addressing the threat emanating from The problem, though, is far more severe the multiple social systems in which terrorism and developing effective than simply either over- or under- they operate. The discussion turned and appropriate counterterrorism estimating specific terrorist groups. to how understanding the science of strategies and tactics is contingent Many of the participants noted how a complexity and the impact of scale on understanding the basic nature lack of an appreciation for, or focus on, can help shed light on the problem, of the problem. As one participant the complex factors that drive and help yielding some interesting avenues of stated, “being clear about the problem to sustain terrorism has contributed exploration regarding the different is the key to getting strategy right.” to a narrow view of tools or strategies types of organizational structures and It’s a warning that has a long history.1 available to combat this phenomenon; a the environments in which they perform And yet, from the vantage point of narrow view, which has led the United best. Bar-Yam pointed to the similarities some of the participants, the Western States and other states to place perhaps between the organizing principles of counterterrorism community has too much emphasis on kinetic solutions regular unit structures in the armed collectively come up short on this at the expense of other approaches. The forces and the neuro-muscular system count. “We have done a poor job of consequence, one individual declared, (e.g., centralized command, large knowing the enemy. We won’t name is that the United States has “grossly scale response), and between special them, and we won’t talk about them.” under-resourced the non-military operations forces units and the immune This comment from one conference aspects” of counterterrorism. system (e.g., distributed command, participant alludes to debates not about small scale response). specific organizations such as al-Qa`ida Reframing the Problem or the Islamic State, which clearly Discourse at the conference soon And at the risk of abusing the healthy governments will name, but rather moved to an old, but surprisingly body analogy, the malignancy of concerns the naming of the broader, useful analogy for thinking about the terrorism demands “we need to be problem. This paradigm sees terrorism as concerned about the health of the and global society in holistic terms tissue as we are about the pathogens with the political, economic, and social themselves.”

1 Jeffrey D. Simon, “Misunderstanding Terrorism,” 2 Rosa Brooks, “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy is the Failure to address the basic conditions Foreign Policy, Summer, 1987. Definition of Insanity,”Foreign Policy, June 24, 2015. necessary to promote a healthy society 6 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

can produce unintended negative wide net in determining the needs of absence of such attacks is commendable, consequences. As evidence, one those who are on the front lines of data one speaker noted, it does not mean that participant held up the example of the gathering and analysis for the purposes we can afford complacency given the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, an event that of counterterrorism. evolving nature of terrorist groups. spawned a vast array of unanticipated downstream effects. This individual A more grassroots approach to One participant argued that when it pointed out that “we were confused” gathering metrics is one that uses data comes to the issue of facilitating action as to why “we were not welcomed as from social media in communities where and strategy against the dynamic liberators who brought Jeffersonian terrorist organizations are embedded terrorism threat, there is a need for democracy to the people,” before going or likely to gain a foothold. The appeal the U.S. government to develop a on to explain that “when your basic of such an approach—though difficult “middle way.” In the view of this needs are not met,” then one’s needs to operationalize efficiently—is that participant, this approach would grant “become very primal and less idealistic.” it is “organic” and not necessarily the United States a set of standing By failing to meet the “basic needs” of constrained by the biases or blinders of counterterrorism authorities to deal Iraqi society, the speaker implied, the intelligence gatherers. The realities of with terrorism problems that sit door was opened to the chaos that has participation in social media as raised between those that it can affect from the ensued. in the discussion do, however, point to two main sets of authority that guide U.S. counterterrorism policy: 1) the Distinguishing unhealthy elements in “Terrorism...should be Authorization of Use of Military Force society from healthy ones in order to (AUMF), which has been used to guide develop well targeted strategies gives understood as a chronic the U.S.’s war against al-Qa`ida and rise to the challenging problem of data to counter large-scale terror problems; and metrics, which occupied a central problem, with moments of and 2) the more restrictive and smaller place in the conference’s discussions. set of authorities which allow the Unfortunately, this discussion yielded acute threat.” United States to conduct targeted more questions than answers and more counterterrorism actions to prevent, challenges than solutions, highlighting shape, or respond to a specific event. The the difficulties faced in gathering usable participant’s point in suggesting this or reliable data on terrorists. “Getting some concerns about the viability of this was really a call for the United States to metrics is hard because we are not sure approach to generating representative realize that the polarity of the low and what our goals are,” was one rejoinder data about the public mood in areas of high response authorities associated from the conference. And while there is concern. One participant warned that with each of these approaches are not a tendency for all oversight systems to “only one percent of social media users aligned with many of the middle ground be gamed, metrics are essential within are content creators, with an additional threats that the United States now faces. the counterterrorism community in nine percent of users as contributors.” order to evaluate the effectiveness The challenge continues to be developing Furthermore, as has been of programs and inform changes to robust, metrics and reliable data sources regularly documented in past U.S. policies and tactics. that can better help policymakers counterterrorism conferences, and practitioners detect, target, and effective counterterrorism requires A related challenge is that a concentration address the underlying causes of terror coordination. Each of the agencies, on goals and the data needed to achieve before violence occurs. The consensus actors, and governments involved them can lead policymakers and seen during the symposium was that in counterterrorism activities must practitioners to overlook vital concerns. the United States and other Western communicate and collaborate rather If the counterterrorism community only nations are frustratingly far from than stovepipe their operations. A attempts to answer questions for which solving that challenge. participant warned the room that we there is data available, then it risks must “mind the gaps,” lamenting that missing new threats. One participant Addressing Challenges despite significant progress having argued that using the number of “bad Terrorism—like many malignancies— been made over the last decade, “the guys” eliminated as a primary metric of should be understood as a chronic CIA, Department of Defense, NGOs, success only leads to a game of “Whack- problem with moments of acute the private sector, and international a-Mole,” neglecting the detection threat. Effective counterterrorism partners are not pulling together of future threats, the evolution of operations require vigilant monitoring today” to develop and implement a organizations, and/or their control over and ongoing action across the various comprehensive global strategy on territory. Nonetheless, the conversation complex systems that comprise terrorism. While this is certainly not turned to an innovative program that societies if we are to minimize the a novel finding, the fact that this issue regularly surveys intelligence analysts probability of terrorism’s reemergence. is still being raised after 14 years of regarding the key questions that need This, historically, has been a challenge counterterrorism conferences and to be answered, as well as the data for the United States and our short studies is of note in and of itself. necessary to answer them. While the national attention span, one that leads “right” data may not be available, this us to downplay threats in the absence Indeed, the question of leveraging bottom-up approach at least casts a of major terrorist attacks. While the partnerships with foreign governments, 7 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

the private sector, and the NGO undermines partner capacity and merely create additional problems in community occupied significant often causes mission failure. Put the future. The innovative intervention parts of the conversation during differently, the United States should techniques, integrating physical the conference. But the discussions not be in the habit of overpromising and training, peer discussion, charismatic surrounding partnerships were marred underachieving. leadership, and theological discussions with difficulties, not all of which could used in some programs hold some be easily addressed. For example, how Additionally, one participant suggested promise despite challenges in scaling should humanitarian organizations and that one of the main issues hindering up the most successful of them. Usman other NGOs fit into a counterterrorism the United States’ ability to forge deeper Raja, who directs such a program in the framework? Indeed, the activities of and more meaningful counterterrorism United Kingdom, shares his experiences NGOs are essential in a world where partnerships was often tied to the United later in this edition. civilians tend to be the primary targets States’ reluctance to share or declassify of terrorist groups and are often victims information (so it can be shared) Conclusion of collateral damage; yet what if in with its partners. The participant The diversity of representation at the some cases, as one participant asked, acknowledged that an understandable conference engendered novel approaches supporting NGOs “inadvertently funds hesitancy among policymakers to share to counterterrorism that move the the enemy?” information was certainly warranted, discussion forward in meaningful ways. but he cautioned the audience that the As the global community struggles Further, from the perspective of United States’ aversion to more risk in with the ascension of the Islamic State, humanitarian organizations, terrorism this area might actually damage such it seems clear that policymakers can is a political label, which could mean relationships because that caution draw on unconventional sources of that “today’s enemy can be tomorrow’s could be misconstrued (or correctly inspiration, such as the anti-smoking ally,” a nuanced understanding construed) as a lack of trust. campaign, as models to stem the Islamic that echoed comments from other State’s appeal. participants who warned about the Marketing and communications proved dangers of oversimplifying the language to be interesting and fertile ground. One More precisely, instead of devising used to describe terror groups and their speaker called to mind a 2007 speech by counter- and de-radicalization policies goals. then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, focused on peaceful theology, would a who noted that “public relations was campaign using an approach similar to More importantly, such organizations invented in the United States, yet we that of the Truth anti-smoking campaign are keen to distance themselves from are miserable at communicating to the be more effective in turning youth away the political dimension of the problem. rest of the world what we are about as from violence? Should democracies Among the many reasons for this is to a society and a culture, about freedom engaged in counterterrorism model their protect their primary mission of saving and democracy, about our policies and interactions with non-democratic states lives; if their stance is deemed partial our goals.”3 on the basis of collaboration rather to any of the parties to the conflict, than partnership, as humanitarian their mission is politicized, which Inspiration for a more effective organizations do, lest their support often leads to the flow of operating communications strategy came from of autocratic regimes breed more funds being constricted and/or the Pete Favat who was involved in the terrorism? There may yet be more movement of their personnel hampered. highly effective and innovative “Truth” questions than answers, but the 2015 In short, to paraphrase one participant, anti-smoking campaign. That campaign Senior Conference helped to point out humanitarian organizations do not is explored in depth later in this issue, useful avenues of inquiry. favor partnerships, but they are always but its lessons about the impact of willing to collaborate. Since saving lives guerilla marketing, understanding of Nelly Lahoud is an Associate Professor is what is at stake, collaboration may the target market, the importance of at the Combating Terrorism Center in the involve any and all parties, including prompting unconventional thought, and Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. terrorist groups. the role private-sector communications Military Academy. professionals could play in developing Yet, if partnerships may be considered more effective information campaigns Robert Person is an Assistant Professor of a liability for some NGOs, there were designed to prevent the spread of International Relations and Comparative compelling arguments that in other terrorist ideologies cannot be ignored. Politics in the Department of Social domains, partnerships are essential Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy. and that there aren’t enough of them. Rehabilitation of former terrorists also One participant strongly appealed to offered some insights that could be The views expressed here are reported by go beyond building local and national folded into a media campaign. Society the authors and do not reflect the official partnerships, calling for “synchronizing should have a way of reintegrating policy or position of the Department of the across regions.” Further, it was pointed former jihadis. Failing to do this could Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. out that partnerships should not be at Government. the mercy of timetables and termination 3 Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture (Kansas State Uni- dates extraneous to conditions on the versity),” U.S. Department of Defense Public Affairs, ground. Such an approach inevitably November 26, 2007. 8 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

The Truth Campaign suggest the CSCC is the latest casualty Today’s average 14-year-old has been in another bureaucratic turf war within exposed to more than $20 billion worth And The War of Ideas the Beltway.5 Still another line of of tobacco marketing since the age By Pete Favat and Bryan C. Price argument questions whether the State of six.10 Knowing that 80 percent of Department is the right organization smokers start before the age of 18,11 the the importance of the war of ideas for this job6 or whether the government tobacco industry focused on 10-year- between the United States and jihadist should be doing this type of activity at olds as their prime target.12 An official organizations has been well understood all.7 While the reasons for our collective document from Phillip Morris in 1981 by our adversaries since 9/11. In the ineptitude remain up for debate, the fact captured this mentality. “Today’s early days of the long war, Ayman al- that the United States and the West are teenager is tomorrow’s potential regular Zawahari, long-time deputy to Usama losing the battle of ideas to our enemies customer.”13 Targeting America’s youth bin Laden and al-Qa`ida’s current is not in dispute. with smoking advertisements was leader, declared that “more than half necessary to find, in industry parlance, of this battle is taking place in the In order to explore new thoughts and “replacement smokers.” battlefield of the media. We are in a frameworks for winning in this domain, media battle in a race for the hearts and the Combating Terrorism Center invited In addition to massive funding, Big minds of our umma.”1 subject matter experts from outside Tobacco owned some of the most the counterterrorism community to powerful brands in the world. Tobacco Senior U.S. government officials have a special Senior Conference panel on companies had cornered the market also acknowledged the importance the war of ideas. The most interesting when it came to empowerment and of winning the war of ideas from the solution that emerged from this panel rebellion. They made smoking cool, outset. A month after the 9/11 attacks, was to take the model employed by glamorous, and sexy. Celebrities in Richard Holbrooke wrote an op-ed the Truth campaign to stop teenage sports, music, and film became walking warning that our adversaries had the smoking and apply it to the countering billboards for the smoking lifestyle. upper hand in the propaganda domain. violent extremism (CVE) realm. He famously questioned “how can a man The ineffective anti-smoking campaign in a cave [bin Laden] outcommunicate The Truth Anti-Smoking Campaign of this time was invoked primarily by the world’s leading communications The Truth anti-smoking campaign was parents and came across as preachy society?”2 a product of the 1999 Master Settlement and controlling, with trite slogans such Agreement, which saw the major as “think, don’t smoke.” Public service To better compete with our tobacco companies settle out of court announcements (PSAs) encouraged adversaries in the war of ideas, the with 46 states and five U.S. territories parents to watch their children to U.S. government created institutions that had sued them to recover money prevent them from smoking. Rather like the Counterterrorism Strategic caring for sick smokers. Some of this than stemming the tide of teenage Communications Center in the State settlement money helped create the smoking, these early anti-smoking ads Department (CSCC). Despite these American Legacy Foundation, an actually had the inverse effect—in the efforts, most observers would argue independent non-profit, organization end, teenagers smoked more.14 the gap between our enemies and the in public health, which then funded the United States in the war of ideas has Truth campaign.8 Faced with these dire circumstances, the only widened in this domain, especially advertising firms of Arnold Worldwide with the emergence of the Islamic State, Playing David to Big Tobacco’s Goliath, and Crispin Porter & Bogusky came but why?3 the Truth campaign was operating at to the American Legacy Foundation a severe disadvantage from the start. with a bold idea. The Truth campaign Critics complain that the U.S. Big Tobacco was spending as much as was going to “un-market” tobacco. government has failed to provide the $13 billion each year in marketing.9 Advertisers who had spent their entire time, attention, and resources necessary to match the size and scope of the Islamic Rules,” Washington Post, May 8, 2015; Eric Schmitt, 10, 2013. State’s propaganda machine.4 Others “U.S. Intensifies Effort to Blunt ISIS’ Message,”New 10 Terry F. Pechacek, Best Practices for Comprehensive York Times, February 16, 2015; Mazetti and Gordon. Tobacco Control Programs (Diane Publishing, 1999), p. 22. 1 John Hughes, “In Battle for Hearts and Minds, Iraqi 5 Ibid., Miller, Higham, Schmitt. 11 Data calculated from Substance Abuse and Mental Insurgents are Doing Well,” Christian Science Monitor, 6 Philip Seib, “Counterterrorism Messaging Needs to Health Administration, Department of Human Health June 20, 2007. . Move From State to CIA,” DefenseOne, October 27, 2014. and Services, Results from the 2012 National Survey on 2 Richard Holbrooke, “Get the Message Out,” Washing- 7 Ibid., Miller and Higham. Drug Use and Health. ton Post, October 28, 2011. 8 See M. Farrelly, K.C. Davis, J. Yarsevich, M.L. Havi- 12 Pete Favat, Presentation at West Point Senior Confer- 3 Mark Mazzetti and Michael R. Gordon, “ISIS is land, J.C. Hersey, M.E. Girlando, and C.G. Healton, Get- ence 51, April 20, 2015, U.S. Military Academy, West Winning the Social Media War, U.S. Concludes,” New ting to the Truth: Assessing Youths’ Reactions to the Truth Point, NY. York Times, June 12, 2015; Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “A Problem and ‘Think. Don’t Smoke’ Tobacco Counter-Marketing 13 M. Johnston, H.G. Daniel, and C.J. Levy, “Young Heaven: Why the United States Should Back Islam’s Campaigns (Washington, D.C.: American Legacy Foun- Smokers Prevalence, Trends, Implications and Related Reformation,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2015, p. 36. dation, 2002). Demographic Trends,” Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 4 Greg Miller and Scott Higham, “In a Propaganda War 9 Michael Sebastian and John McDermott, “Is Big March 31, 1981, Bates No 1000390803/0855, pg. 1. Against ISIS, the U.S. Tried to Play by the Enemy’s Tobacco Back as a Big Advertiser?” AdAge.com, June 14 Ibid., Farrelly, et al. 9 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

careers selling things would now try adults as possible. It needed to be made the fact that both the feces and cigarettes to “un-sell” them. It was the first time by kids for kids. contain poisonous ammonia. this approach had ever been tried, but if advertising caused the problem of Instead of telling teenagers that smoking Another guerilla marketing technique adolescent smoking, their thinking would kill them, turn their teeth had skate punk readers leave magazines went, then advertising could be the yellow, and cause their breath to stink, open on bookstore racks to the same solution. the campaign provided unmistakable spread, effectively serving as free visuals of what that looks like. For billboards. Yet another tactic instructed “Out-Branding” Big Tobacco example, instead of simply reporting the participants to navigate to internet sites The plan was to create a brand that was statistic that 400,000 people die every with anti-smoking advertisements on more rebellious than tobacco brands, year from tobacco-related illnesses, the the screens of every device in an Apple and to ultimately “out-brand” Big first TV ad featured teenagers dumping store. Tobacco. They needed to find a way for 1,200 paper-filled body bags outside the Truth campaign to be empowering Not surprisingly, the Truth campaign and rebellious, not preachy, boring, and “The Truth campaign received industry accolades,21 but more controlling like previous PSAs. importantly, it helped cut teen smoking was going to ‘un-market’ by 52% in the United States in the years To do so, the Truth campaign ironically after the effort. Although nobody at ended up exploiting the same research tobacco. Advertisers who Arnold Worldwide and Crispin Porter used by the British-American & Bogusky would claim sole credit Tobacco Company in the 1950s on the had spent their entire for this achievement, there have been psychological needs of adolescents several academic studies that attempt that helped inform their advertising.15 careers selling things, to show the campaign had a significant According to this research, all children and independent effect on reducing go through what is called the “age of would now try to ‘un-sell’ adolescent smoking.22 assertion” around ten years of age.16 At this point, the brain is developed them.” Lessons for CVE Programs enough where the child wants to assert While teenage smoking and control and make his own decisions. radicalization and recruitment by Parents and children often have groups like the Islamic State might conflicts at this age because kids want the headquarters of a major tobacco seem to have little in common, the to start making their own decisions and company in New York City representing psychological dynamics at play when parents are unwilling to relinquish this one day of the annual death toll.19 trying to combat these phenomena decision-making authority. The tobacco are quite similar. A closer inspection industry therefore concluded that 10-to In a follow-on TV ad, 1,200 students suggests the lessons from the Truth 12-year-olds were the perfect targets for wearing white shirts numbered 1 to campaign can help improve the West’s their advertising.17 1,200 marched outside another major ability to compete in the CVE war of tobacco company headquarters in ideas, particularly in the eyes of young Big Tobacco also identified the Kentucky. At a predetermined time, all adults. psychological need of teenagers to take 1,200 fell down “dead” simultaneously. risks, rebel, fit in, remain independent, The campaign filmed the stunt from First, the psychological needs of self-express, and be respected. The multiple angles including from a teenagers are universal and know cigarette met all of these needs.18 helicopter.20 no boundaries. They hold true from Bayonne to Beijing. The youth flocking If the anti-smoking campaign aimed to Because this occurred before the dawn to wage jihad with groups such as the take tobacco away, it needed to replace it of social media, the campaign exploited Islamic State often display a need to with something, not just to fill the void, unconventional methods to spread rebel from their parents’ generation and but something that would also satisfy their message, draw attention to the a need to fit in with a peer group. Some psychological needs. To do so, Truth lies of Big Tobacco, and make teenagers become foreign fighters to rebel against aimed to replace cigarettes with the feel empowered and rebellious. ultimate youth icons—rebellion and the Truth material prominently placed 21 Jeff Naff, “Top 15 Ads of the 21st Century,” ability to control your own decisions. in skateboarding magazines invited AdAge.com, 2015. The Truth campaign needed to be a readers to cut out signs that were to be 22 James C. Hersey, Jeff Niederdeppe, W. Douglas Ev- cooler brand than tobacco, expose the stuck in dog feces in order to highlight ans, James Nonnemaker, Steven Blahut, Debra Holden, lies and manipulation of the tobacco Peter Messeri, and M. Lyndon Haviland, “The Theory of industry, and remain as far away from ‘Truth’: How Counterindustry Media Campaigns Affect Smoking Behavior Among Teens,” Health Psychology. 15 Favat presentation, Senior Conference 51. 19 See https://www.youtube.com/ 24: 1, 2005, pp. 22-31; David F. Sly, Richard S. Hopkins, 16 Ibid. Favat. watch?v=c4xmFcrJexk. Edward Trapido, and Sara Ray, “Influence of a Counter- 17 Ibid. Favat. 20 See https://www.youtube.com/ advertising Media Campaign on Initiation of Smoking: 18 Ibid. Favat. watch?v=gJTCWtcAews. The Florida ‘Truth’ Campaign,” 10 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

their families, their state regimes, or the commercials, the footage often appeared genuine credibility that is required to West in general. It is no surprise that to come from hand-held cameras of influence fence-sitters in the current many of the foreign fighters who flock to questionable quality. The clips were war of ideas. Prospective jihadis do Syria and Iraq do so to feel empowered, choppy, blunt, and sometimes frantic. not look to the U.S. government for enfranchised, and respected. They contained a hip, acerbic, and career advice. Commenting on this occasional dark sense of humor that core problem facing CSCC, one former Second, the U.S. government has called appealed to younger audiences, and far CIA agent quipped, “It’s like the upon Madison Avenue to improve less so to older viewers and readers. grandparents yelling to the children, its global brand in the CVE space After all, that was the point. The Islamic ‘get off my lawn!’”26 before,23 but the Truth campaign is a State’s propaganda is appealing for the different animal. Previous attempts same reasons—it is credible and young Regardless of how witty, hip, and edgy to incorporate Madison Avenue-style people can relate to it, even more so its message may or may not be, the CSCC branding into the U.S. government’s than the propaganda produced by their and its products will be perceived as the public diplomacy took a conventional al-Qa`ida predecessors. counterterrorism equivalent of the old advertising approach that tried to school anti-smoking PSAs. As a case in sell America and our value system to In fact, it is this aspect of the Truth point, the CSCC’s recent “think again, the masses in the Middle East, with campaign—the requirement to keep turn away” campaign is eerily similar to lackluster if not counterproductive the ineffective anti-smoking slogan of results.24 “Prospective jihadis “think, don’t smoke.”

A counter-industry campaign like Truth, do not look to the U.S. The Way Forward on the other hand, aimed at dissuading As evidenced by the unprecedented future foreign fighters would not aim to government for career number of foreign fighters flowing into sell a Western alternative to the Islamic Iraq and Syria, our adversaries are State. It would instead attempt to “un- advice.” beating the West in the propaganda sell” what the Islamic State and other domain. Fifteen years ago, Big Tobacco groups are advertising. This is not to held a similar position of advantage say that this will be easy, but that the when it came to teenagers and smoking. U.S. government has never approached adults as far away as possible from Federal and state public service (to our knowledge) the advertising the message—that may be the most campaigns were as unsuccessful in professionals in the private sector that important takeaway for those in the the anti-smoking domain as the U.S. specialize in this kind of advertising. It field of CVE strategic communications.25 government’s efforts are in the CVE should. When the corporate office managing domain. the Truth campaign starting receiving Third, a critical component of the numerous complaints from parents and It took the private sector to adopt a Truth campaign was that it was teachers about the various in-your- perceived to be a campaign made by face and off-putting advertisements, risky counter-industry approach to kids, not middle-aged and established the “suits” could not understand why “un-sell” and “out-brand” Big Tobacco advertising executives. It was intended the campaign’s creative team was so with a campaign that appeared to have to be seen as being made by kids for delighted. To the Truth team, the fact been made by young adults for their kids, even if seasoned and advertising that their advertisements did not appeal peers. The U.S. government would be professionals were actually tapping to adults and authority figures was an wise to elicit the support of private into the vibe of the younger generation unmistakable measure of effectiveness. sector advertising firms to execute a to execute the campaign. Everything Receiving complaints from adults similar counter-industry approach from the language, look, style, and feel wasn’t a problem to be fixed; it was a aimed at jihadis. of the advertisements in both print and sign of success. video gave the impression that Truth Two caveats are required, however, ads were made by teenagers. For the The work that the State Department’s to establish proper expectations. It CSCC has done to engage with the is unrealistic to assume that a trendy 91:2 (February 2001): pp. 233-238; W. Douglas Evans, enemy in social media is noble, but hashtag campaign or slick advertising Simani Price, and Steven Blahut, “Evaluating the Truth being a government entity, its message are going to convince current jihadis to Brand,” Journal of Health Communication 10:2 (2005), pp. by definition lacks the authenticity and lay down their arms and stop waging 181-192. violence. In fact, even the Truth 23 Todd C. Helmus, Christopher Paul, and Russell 25 Recent news that the State Department is funding an campaign’s creators realized that it was W. Glenn, Enlisting Madison Avenue: The Marketing initiative to get younger audiences not affiliated with going to be more effective to stop future Approach to Earning Popular Support in Theaters of the U.S. government involved in producing social media smokers rather than persuade current Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp), 2007; Bri- campaigns to counter violent extremism is a positive smokers to quit.27 Nor is it realistic gitte L. Nacos, “Al Qaeda’s Propaganda Advantage and sign, but the effectiveness of these programs remains How to Counter It,” Perspectives on Terrorism 1:4 (2007). to be seen. See Justine Drennan, “Making ‘Countering 24 Nacos, “Al Qaeda’s Propaganda Advantage and How Violent Extremism’ Sound Sexy,” ForeignPolicy.com, 26 Miller and Higham. to Counter It.” June 4, 2015. 27 “Top Ad Campaigns of the 21st Century,” 11 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

to suggest that a counter-industry An Interview With: I grew up in a tough neighborhood—in campaign alone would be sufficient my case in east London—and once had to persuade jihadi “fence-sitters” to Usman Raja fundamentalist Salafi views myself. I choose a non-extremist path. Also, By Paul Cruickshank came close to fighting jihad in Bosnia in although this kind of approach showed the 1990s. This personal experience— promise in affecting teenage behavior, Usman Raja, a leading British-Pakistani and the delivery of our approach to it may be less effective against an older cage-fighting coach with a storied career hard-to-reach elements of society—has demographic of foreign fighters are in the sport, is the managing director of given us a legitimacy and access that drawn. This kind of counter-industry The Unity Initiative, a British-Muslim makes these types of individuals willing approach must be a part of a more interventions consultancy founded in 2009 to listen. comprehensive CVE plan that improves that has deradicalized dozens of convicted how we identify, interdict, and terrorists and hundreds of Islamist In about a third of the cases, coaching ultimately prevent future extremists extremists, and promotes pluralism in these individuals in MMA (mixed from choosing violence. But in the battle the UK. British officials view it as the martial arts) has helped me connect. of ideas with jihadist groups such as the most successful program of its kind. His A lot of these guys got into physical team has worked to dismantle the radical Islamic State, the United States needs training both as an outlet and for their views of 25 convicted terrorists after their all the help it can get, and a counter- own protection inside jail, and they release from prison through intensive one- industry approach will likely improve think MMA is pretty cool. Getting inside on-one mentoring based on the teaching our efforts in this domain. the fighting cage challenges your idea of of a spiritual, open-minded, and tolerant yourself—believe me—and this gives me interpretation of Islam. Unity also Pete Favat is the North American Chief an opportunity to bond with them and provides training to British police, prison, Creative Officer for Deutsch, Inc, leading and probation staff, as well as imams. open up their minds. Training with me transformative creative work on behalf gives these guys a sense of discipline of Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, and Dr Pepper. CTC: a growing number of individuals and purpose. Prior to joining Deutsch, Mr. Favat spent convicted of Terrorism Act (TACT) 13 years at Arnold Worldwide where he offences in the United Kingdom are The process of dismantling their radical co-created the Truth campaign, one of Ad worldview is really intense. It can Age’s “Campaigns of the 21st Century.” back on the streets after serving their sentences, creating a headache for be a very traumatic experience. They Mr. Favat has earned numerous awards, come to realize almost everything that including three Emmy Awards and three British security agencies. How do previously gave them a sense of self- United Nations Awards for Public Health. you connect and engage with these radicalized individuals? worth and identity was wrong. We spend hundreds of hours sitting down LTC Bryan C. Price, Ph.D. is the Director one-on-one with each released TACT of the Combating Terrorism Center and an Raja: In some cases they are channeled offender we work with, meeting at least Academy Professor in the Department of toward The Unity Initiative by prison Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy, or probation officials soon before or four hours each week for coffee or food West Point, NY. soon after release. But in an increasing in halal restaurants or shopping malls. number of cases the individuals And they call me up night and day on my The views expressed here are those of the themselves contact me because they cell phone. They basically come to rely authors and do not reflect the official have heard about our successful track on me, and that gives me the opportunity policy or position of the Department of the record from sources they trust including to reshape their perspective. The aim is Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. lawyers, prison imams, fellow Muslim not just to defuse the potential threat Government. prisoners, and community contacts. they pose but to transform their entire One recent self-referral was a British worldview. This involves convincing recruit to an Islamic State-linked group them that their previous interpretation who was arrested on his return from of Islam was misguided and instilling Syria. He wrote to me post-sentence in them a spiritual, open-minded, and from Belmarsh prison telling me he had tolerant understanding of Islam. We’ve made a terrible mistake and asking me been successful in about 95 percent of to help him through his crisis of faith.1 cases so far. And nobody I’ve worked with has been convicted again on From my experience, the key aspect of terrorism charges. striking up a trusting relationship—in which they want to listen—is for them CTC: But how do you get some of to be impressed by your sincerity. the most hard-core extremists in the What helps is that like many of them, UK to so fundamentally change their worldview? 1 Belmarsh prison in south-east London contains a high security unit that often houses prisoners charged in Raja: It’s the legitimacy of the Islam AdAge.com. terrorism cases. we preach. It’s based on the teachings 12 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

of my mentor Sheikh Aleey Qadir, extremist who murdered the British in dismantling their radical ideology. a Malaysian cleric who is a leading soldier Lee Rigby in east London in Her life story is a direct contradiction figure in a worldwide spiritual Islam 2013, regularly attended Ali’s talks. In to their perception of Muslim women movement that includes the American 2009, Ali was convicted of an arson being discriminated against in British Islamic scholar Hamza Yusuf and attack on the house of a publisher society, and this starts the process. Her the Jeddah-based cleric Abdallah bin of a controversial novel about the reputation within the community in Bayyah, who President Barack Obama Prophet Mohammed.4 After his release effectively helping women with social recently praised for issuing a fatwa from prison he was referred to me by issues and her certification to provide condemning the Islamic State.2 Millions probation officials. It wasn’t easy or religious guidance by Sheikh Aleey of Muslims around the world follow this quick—it took nearly a year—but Ali’s means that she is then able to tackle the traditional spiritual understanding of views have been totally transformed. literalist mindset, whilst empowering Islam. He’s out on the streets now, helping and supporting women to follow us counter the extremists’ message. through on their liberated outlook and Unity’s theological expert—my He’s been particularly effective given implement change within their families. colleague Wael Zubi—is a student his history. Just imagine if he was still and official interpreter of Sheikh bin working for the other side. What needs to be understood is that Bayyah. My mentor Shekih Aleey women turn to radical Islam for different often comes to London and sits down reasons: some turn to this ideology with the young men I’m working with. “Many of these groups in a search for independence from These teachers belong to a lineage of immigrant families with traditional learning stretching back to the Prophet run ...clubs for young belief structures. Others turn to it in a Mohammed that predates the writing search for status as a wife or mother. down of the Quran. Salafis have a Muslims...but that does narrow and literalist interpretation of CTC: How do you assess the overall the Quran, but it’s the oral tradition nothing to break down effort to counter violent extremism in that shapes the way we interpret it. the United Kingdom? The oral tradition has primacy. For us, their separation from the true Islam is open-minded, tolerant, Raja: The results are not encouraging. and humanistic. We believe Islam is wider community.” Too few government officials and civil but one of many spiritual pathways servants understand the terrain. An to God. Christians, Jews, Buddhists, interventions industry has emerged and others all have their own spiritual in which Muslim community groups pathways. The Islam we follow doesn’t CTC: How important is the work Unity tick boxes on forms to get government just counter violent extremism; it also does to deradicalize female radicals? funding. Many of these groups run counters associated bigoted attitudes sports and social clubs for young like anti-Semitism and homophobia. Raja: It’s absolutely vital, but until Muslims in neighborhoods where recently it was totally overlooked. This there is a high degree of radicalization CTC: Some Salafis have labeled people is a social movement we are dealing [in order] to keep youth active and like you “hippy” Sufis. What do you say with. Families are being radicalized distract them, but that does nothing to to those who might think it’s farfetched and leaving for Syria to join the Islamic break down their separation from the to believe that the most hardcore of State. We are aware of one woman who wider British community. Very few extremists could be swayed by this took her five children to Syria to join are effective. Over the years, some of spiritual interpretation? up with the group, with the support these groups have themselves espoused of her mother-in-law, among others. fundamentalist interpretations. Salafi Raja: Our efforts are backed by some of Mothers, wives, and sisters reinforce Muslim community groups working the world’s foremost Islamic scholars and sometimes influence the radical to counter violent extremism can do and the results are there for all to see. worldviews of fathers, husbands, and little more than defuse radicalized Take just one example: Ali Beheshti, a brothers. Women are often the sole individuals because Salafis are radicalized British-Pakistani who was gateway to knowledge for the next fundamentally reactionary in their previously the number-two leader in generation and therefore need to be worldview. I suppose there is a the British pro-al-Qa`ida (and in recent immunized against this ideology to public safety argument for such Salafi times pro-Islamic State) grouping al prevent it being passed down. community groups working with young Muhajiroun founded by Omar Bakri Muslims. But unless you can radically Mohammed.3 Michael Adebolajo, the My wife, Angela Misra, has successfully transform their worldview, radicals can transformed the worldview of five all too easily tilt back into violence. 2 Dina Temple-Raston, “Prominent Muslim Sheik convicted female terrorists recently Issues Fatwa Against ISIS Violence,” NPR, September released from prison. As a Muslim CTC: How big a challenge has the rise of 25, 2014.. convert, doctor, wife, and mother of the Islamic State posed? 3 Al-Muhajiroun has periodically changed its name three, Angela is particularly effective to avoid bans. Names it has allegedly operated under Raja: The declaration of a so-called include “Muslims against Crusades” and “Shariah4UK.” 4 “Three Jailed for Publisher Arson,” BBC, July 7, 2009. Islamic Caliphate has created an 13 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

unprecedented challenge. I have never offenders, we’re also working with not the messengers. We’re training up seen anything like it. It has electrified hundreds of individuals across London around a dozen people right now so a significant minority of young British to break the absolutist mindset through that we can expand our efforts in the Muslims. Previously, extremism was group sessions, dynamic workshops, UK. But money is tight. We get a small something that was endemic but it and specialist interventions. amount from government agencies for could be contained. It’s now become an some of our intervention work, but we epidemic spreading like wild-fire. The CTC: To what degree has social media are mostly self-financed and our goal is analogy I like to use is Communism and played a role in radicalization? to eventually raise all the money for our the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet Union operating costs ourselves. I’ve worked that gave Communism staying power Raja: A lot of research into with several convicted terrorists and legitimacy, and it’s the same with radicalization has focused on the completely pro bono. the “Caliphate” and violent Islamist social media aspect because that’s the extremism. They’ve legitimized what easiest part to research. But this is just Our long-term goal is to create was previously a fringe deviant jihadist scratching the surface. In the UK, most international branches that will act as subculture. Its utopian worldview has of the radicalization is going on inside hubs propagating and disseminating attracted a lot of support. the Muslim community through person- change while maintaining quality to-person contact. You have to tackle control. We are discussing setting up a When it comes to the threat, the “Unity4Belgium” branch and are looking fatwa announced by Islamic State “Previously, extremism to also export this to other European spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani countries and North America, where we in September 2014 calling for attacks was something that was hope to create a “Unity4USA.” The goal in the West was a game-changer. Those is not just to work on deradicalization, who support the Islamic State here in endemic but it could be but to help provide the military, police, Britain view it as creating a religious probation, and prison officers with a duty to carry out attacks. contained. It’s now become better understanding of the challenge they are facing. CTC: What are the root causes of violent an epidemic spreading like extremism in the United Kingdom? In aiming for these branches, we are wild-fire.” consciously countering the efforts of Raja: The core of the problem is the Anjem Choudary and his pro-Islamic existence of what I call a deviant and State al Muhajiroun grouping in the jihadist subculture that often has a UK, which in recent years has set criminal undertone. In this subculture, the problem inside the community. up “Shariah4” franchises in Europe. the belief is that they are living in Dar When I sit down with young Muslims The Sharia4 franchises have supplied el Harb (the land of war) and that this they tell me what’s really going on. One hundreds, if not thousands, of recruits justifies all manner of criminality, significant development is the growth to the Islamic State and other terrorist including terrorist attacks. You have of Sunni-Shia violence that mirrors groups. I’m arguably Anjem Choudary’s groups like Anjem Choudary’s al what’s going on in Iraq and Syria. biggest threat. Unity has dismantled Muhajiroun, whose greatest strength the worldview of several al Muhajiroun is providing their followers a sense of CTC: Given the scale of the radicalization followers, including Ali Beheshti who community by creating a wall between problem in the United Kingdom, some outranked Anjem Choudary while “us” and “them.” And this network is experts who have praised your work the group was led by Omar Bakri spread across Europe and the West, say that it would need to take place on Mohammed. If I can rip away people creating an alternative worldview and an industrial scale to make a significant like Ali, just think of what we can do if lifestyle. difference. Some might say your success we can get hundreds of people working is to a great degree down to your for Unity across Europe. The problem is wider than that though. personality—charismatic, driven, and This deviant jihadist subculture unrelenting in the face of death threats— subsists in a wider Salafi-absolutist and that’s difficult to replicate. To what insular community. A lot is written degree can Unity’s efforts be scaled up? about Muslims feeling alienated from mainstream society, but the problem is Raja: We’re essentially a three-person that if you are growing up in some parts team so right now obviously Unity can of east London or “Muslim ghettos” only make a small dent in the problem, of Europe, then this environment is but our results demonstrate our effectively the mainstream. We need to approach works. To scale up, clearly find ways to break down these barriers. you need people who have the right In my MMA training sessions, some of kind of experience and who are willing the TACT offenders are now training to deal with these individuals from a with white working class youngsters. human perspective, but ultimately what As well as our work with TACT will make a difference is the message 14 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

An Interview With: thinking about formulating a policy or some variant of Ignatieff’s scale of ally, Dennis Gleeson executing a plan. That’s a problem. partner, adversary, or enemy.

By John Watling I am concerned by this for a handful of CTC: How do we prioritize our efforts? reasons: Dennis J. Gleeson, Jr., was formerly Gleeson: The challenge for our country a Director of Strategy in the Central First, how we speak and how we think is to consider, really consider, the Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of are related. Lera Boroditsky, a professor threat—in terms of motive, means, Analysis. For the past five years, he has at Stanford University, found that “the and opportunity—they and other been one of the driving forces behind how way we think influences the way we groups pose to US national interests. analysts might discover, explore, search speak, but the influence also goes the In that, I tend to agree with folks like for, and interact with information in the other way.”1 To me, this means that even Micah Zenko, who has highlighted the face of “big data.” Prior to joining the if we, as individuals and professionals, tendency to use hyperbole as a political government, he worked at the Institute routinely rely on and use this shorthand, tool. Arm-waving might be great for for Defense Analyses and wrote on we create the conditions for a range of securing funding for a program, but it topics like military innovation, military cognitive biases like the bandwagon is a disservice to the American people experimentation, and effects-based effect or confirmation biases that limit insofar that not everything can be an operations. During the most recent Senior how we might think about a challenge existential threat demanding immediate Conference, we asked him to sit on our Data or pursue an opportunity. action.2 and Metrics panel, where his reputation as a critical and creative thinker who My second concern builds on the first: There will always be people and pointedly questions assumptions and teases binary thinking limits the courses of organizations doing, or planning to do, out more concise narratives proved well- action that are open to an individual things that are inimical to their fellow founded. This interview expands on some or a group. I think the best explanation man, as well as to the interests, security, of the ideas he presented on the panel. of this came from Michael Ignatieff, a and safety of the American people; that Canadian politician. He wrote, said, the United States will never be The views expressed here are those of the able to respond to each and every one author and do not reflect the official policy “An adversary is someone you want to of these people and groups. As a result, or position of the Central Intelligence defeat. An enemy is someone you have to the decision to respond—and the costs Agency, the Department of the Army, destroy. With adversaries, compromise that we are willing to incur and ask Department of Defense, or the U.S. is honorable: Today’s adversary could the American people to pay—should be Government. be tomorrow’s ally. With enemies, the product of serious discussion and on the other hand, compromise is debate, not sound-bite driven posturing CTC: how would you characterize the appeasement.” that plays well on the news. way we think about terrorism? A common theme at the Senior CTC: You talked about the challenges Gleeson: It’s often too simplistic. In the Conference was the recognition that that binary thinking poses to analysis. immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, we cannot “capture or kill” our way Given that metrics are very much in It could be argued that we needed the out of the long war that we seem to vogue, could you expand on that? simple message of then President have resigned ourselves to. In light of [George W.] Bush: “Either you are with Ignatieff’s argument, binary thinking Gleeson: Everyone is in the midst of us, or you are with the terrorists.” The all but condemns us to those being the shifting to working with larger volumes problem is that now, almost 15 years main strategies open to us. of more diverse data. The consequence later, the discourse around terrorism is that, as Viktor Mayer-Schonberger in many cases has devolved into a Lastly, as a recovering political analyst, and Kenneth Cukier captured in their simplified shorthand of “good guys” binary thinking has the potential to limit book Big Data, correlations are likely to and “bad guys.” analysis and what a leader should expect be more interesting and useful than, of analysis. Analysis is about change let’s say, conceptual models that are CTC: Why is this shorthand detection: as a result, segmentation— based on assumptions and experiences. problematic? Might it not reflect the geographic, organizational (i.e., The correlations, even if they are poorly criticality of mission or esprit de corps? factions, individuals), domain-specific understood, encourage asking more and (e.g., political, economic, societal, different questions, spawn new lines of Gleeson: It might. The casual nature etc.)—against the backdrop of time research, etc. with which we use terms like terrorist allows the analyst to paint a far more and terrorism suggests that is not nuanced picture of where a group (or an The challenge is that absent a well always the case though. I think some individual or a faction) is or is going on understood, easily quantifiable thing people do understand the history and they tend to be arbitrary. It might be nuance behind the shorthand. In other easy to measure activity or output, but cases, though, I think that absolutist language masks nuances—or context— 1 Lera Boroditsky, “How Language Shapes Thought.” 2 Micah Zenko, “Exaggeration Nation,” Foreign Policy, that might allow for new approaches to Scientific American. 304, 2011, pp. 62-65. November 21, 2014. 15 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

it is often difficult to measure effect. to and operations in Afghanistan and the challenge of engaging and thwarting Binary thinking makes metrics easy Iraq. With the benefit of hindsight (i.e., ideologically driven adversaries and though perhaps not terribly useful: did other historical data and reporting), enemies? How might other partners X number of missions or sorties kill or what correlations might be found that and players in the theater of operations neutralize Y number of bad guys? spark discussion and debate? help?

A while back, Jessi Hempel, who’s The important thing here is Army data The final step would be to distill the now a senior writer at Wired, made this should not—cannot—be the only data insights into discrete lessons and great point in an article for Bloomberg considered: what did other government philosophies that can be passed on to Business that still resonates with me. departments and agencies report? What soldiers throughout the Army. Having “Metrics madness can lead to confusion, did non-governmental organizations worked with the Department of Defense dysfunction, and less innovation, not report? The volume of data we routinely and having come out of another large more. generate far exceeds the capacity of an governmental bureaucracy, I think the individual to process it; fortunately key is to find a way to explain what The common mistakes are putting in storage and computational power are might be a set of complex dynamics or too many metrics, measuring the wrong both cheap enough to allow for us to ideas in plain language. Jargon can be things, misaligning metrics within consider far more data that we could every bit as harmful as binary thinking. organizations, and counting what can have even five years ago. What would Sun Tzu or Miyamoto be counted, not what counts.”3 Musashi say if they were asked to review the next generation of doctrinal Unfortunately, metrics tend to be recast “Metrics tend to be publications? in ways that help protect participants and programs. They make for great recast in ways that help As a lifelong civilian, these are PowerPoint slides; they allow for all methodologies I would consider. I am sorts of bar graphs and pie charts. protect participants and sure the men and women at the Center for Army Lessons Learned and the US Unfortunately, the charts tend to speak programs. They make for Army Training and Doctrine Command more to activity or output than effect. are grappling with issues like this. great PowerPoint slides... CTC: How might we incorporate this In the run-up to this interview, I read thinking in a practical way? Unfortunately, the charts Major Robert A. Doughty’s The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-1976. In it, Gleeson: In the context of the Army, tend to speak more to he speaks to what I suspect is a core I think it ends with doctrine and field function and responsibility of the U.S. manuals. Doctrinal publications such as activity or output than Military Academy: ADP 3-0 (“Unified Land Operations”), ADP 3-07 (“Stability”), and ADP 3-37 effect.” Doctrine, nevertheless, cannot perform (“Protection”) all speak to facets of the impossible. It can only provide the challenges and opportunities of guidelines for action, not final answers. dealing with enemies and adversaries Given the infinitely varied situations that routinely apply “unconventional” CTC: What is the next step after the on the battlefield, the application of strategies and tactics in pursuit of their analysis? doctrine requires judgment. While goals. doctrine is important for providing Gleeson: The next step should be models for adaptation, the prime factors The question is how we get from where submitting some of the hypotheses remain the imagination, the inventive we are to a conceptual framework that and theories that emerge around the genius, and the will to fight of the better reflects what we have learned correlations to testing. What might American soldier. over the past 15 years of contending a wargame that seeks to undercut an with and fighting ideologically driven insurgency look like? How might the groups that transition between being Army better achieve “stability” and terrorist groups (as defined by their “protection” in the context of commonly actions) and insurgent movements.4 correlated conditions? What might small-scale experiments like the ones The Army generated massive amounts of Hans von Seeckt conducted prior to the data over the course of its deployments Second World War5 look like relative to

3 Jessi Hempel, “Metrics Madness,” Bloomberg Business, lenge political control of a region.” September 24, 2006. 6 James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt 4 Joint Publication 1-02 -The Dictionary of Military and and German Military Reform, Lawrence: University Associated Terms defines insurgency as “The organized Press of Kansas, 1992, Williamson Murray and Allan use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or chal- R. Millett (eds), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 16 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

Global Civilization and relationships, current conditions values, economic conditions, and social Counterterrorism have shifted to a fundamentally global imperatives. framework of economic markets and By Yaneer Bar-Yam cooperation that includes necessities Principles of Global Security such as food, energy, and other Since specific national constitutions global changes are causing both commodities, as well as manufactured and value systems cannot serve as global integration and local divergence goods and services. This economic a framework for counterterrorism of social / cultural domains. As a result, integration is part of the social activities globally, it is necessary to the problem of global security becomes integration that prominently includes develop a more universal perspective not just one of fighting disruptors of widespread travel as well as internet- that can serve in a context of cross order, but also of understanding what based information sharing and social socio-cultural actions. This section constitutes order. Reinforcing order media interactions. articulates basic assumptions that can and its active protection requires be justified scientifically and which understanding the local socio- may serve as part of a framework for cultural domains, their vulnerability “Action in response to action: to disruption, and what must be done to strengthen them and respond when terrorism and other Human civilization is an interdependent they are unable to defend themselves. collection of diverse individuals and Achieving global peace requires security threats should groups up to the scale of the world as addressing the fundamental drivers of a whole. We recognize that differences unrest and violence—including high food be understood in the and autonomy are essential to the well- prices and ethnic geography, as well as being of the whole and that the well- the way values translate into behavioral context of changes in the being of the system, and in appropriate and social imperatives. This is at least ways to all of its parts, is an objective of as essential as combating disorder and global structure of human the system itself. violent extremists in pursuit of the universal values of respect for life and civilization.” There are universal values that should liberty. be present globally. These include a respect for individual life, security, The U.S. military is the main responder social order, and justice. One of the to disruptions of social order globally. At the same time, cultural values and values that the system must have is to Due to the complexity of this task, other local conditions are leading to the protect itself. effectiveness depends critically on divergence of groups from each other. rapid decision-making and adaptability This should not be viewed as a negative The United States is a powerful part of to changing global and local conditions. development, nor is it practical to divert the global civilization, and has taken a At the recent Senior Conference hosted massive social changes substantially role that enhances the world as a whole by the Department of Social Sciences at from their course. Diversity is known and not just itself. This enhancement the United States Military Academy at to strengthen many types of natural may include promoting the well-being West Point, I was invited to discuss my systems, and social heterogeneity is of others, but does not involve imposing work on the science of complexity and consistent with the integrated global its own values, with limited exceptions its implications for counterterrorism civilization becoming a complex for universal values. The United policy and strategy, and show how organism with diverse roles played by States carries responsibility today for different organizational models can parts of the system. protecting universal values across help in this task. the world. The U.S. military helps to While it may ultimately be a positive protect these values against those who Action in response to terrorism and other development, social diversity leads would destroy, disrupt and harm parts security threats should be understood to challenges when responding to of the system, from the global down to in the context of changes in the global disruptions of social order, as the (almost) the individual level. structure of human civilization. While it interventions that are needed, in is widely recognized that globalization governance, economic assistance, and Social Imperatives is taking place, the implications of the other efforts to establish effective There are many aspects of local social essential integration of global social security, are unclear. This also adds values and their implications for social and economic systems for security is yet to the difficulty of strengthening order. Developing an understanding of to be fully recognized. societies through promoting economic specific cultural imperatives and their development and nation building, implications for governance, economic, Interdependence results in a common which are well established as complex and social activities is essential. security priority in which disruptions tasks. Viewed in this way, the military Here we limit the discussion to two of local social order anywhere lead and other responders to security topics for which theoretical insights to greater risk everywhere. While problems must be concerned with the have been validated empirically: the traditional perspectives often focus on health of social systems, where health importance of food prices and the role national priorities and international has a local definition dependent on the of ethnic geography in social unrest 17 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

Figure 1: Food Prices and Social Volatility

280 Algeria (8), Saudi Arabia (15) Oman (2), Morocco (10) Mauritania (3), Sudan (2), Jordan (4) Iraq (35), Bahrain (98) Haiti (5), Egypt (3) Somalia (5) 260 Cote d'Ivoire (1) Yemen (2000+) Syria (20000+) Tunisia (1) Egypt (800+) Uganda (5), Iran (12) Sudan (3) Libya (30000+) Georgia (2) 240 Cameroon (40) Tunisia (300+) Kenya (2), Malawi (18) Yemen (12) Somalia (10) Mozambique (6) India (1) 220 Sudan (1) Mozambique (13) 200 Mauritania (2) India (4) Somalia (5) 180

Food Price Index 160

140 Burundi (1) 120

2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 Time dependence of FAO Food Price Index from January 2004 to May 2011 (black line). Red dashed vertical lines correspond to beginning dates of “food riots” and protests associated with the major recent unrest in North Africa and the Middle East. The overall death toll is reported in parentheses. Blue vertical line indicates the date, December 13, 2010, on which NECSI submitted a report to the U.S. government, warning of the link between food prices, social unrest, and political instability. and violence. By recognizing the role of Addressing the economic problem exists.5 This is the conclusion of these factors in global unrest, we can of food availability for vulnerable fundamental theoretical analysis based better adopt policies and actions that populations can alleviate suffering and upon renormalization group methods,6 can prevent disruptive violence and promote global security. empirically validated quantitatively for promote security. predictions of geographical locations Ethnic Violence of violence and peaceful coexistence Food and Social Unrest The second case study relates to ethnic in Yugoslavia, India, Yemen, and In 2011 protest movements became violence. Efforts to resolve conflicts Switzerland. Significantly, our theory pervasive in the countries of North and achieve sustained peace are guided points to two distinct conditions that Africa and the Middle East. These by perspectives about how conflict is are conducive to peace—well-mixed protests were associated with dictatorial rooted in interpersonal and intergroup and well-separated populations. regimes and were often considered to be relationships, as well as historical, The first option corresponds to the motivated by the failings of the region’s social, economic, and political contexts. most commonly striven for peaceful political systems in the human rights Our research indicates that details framework: a well integrated society. arena. Our research demonstrated of history and social and economic The second option corresponds to that food prices were the precipitating conditions are not the primary spatial separation, partition, and self condition for social unrest (See Figure determinants of peace or conflict. determination—a historically used 1) and we were able to identify a specific Instead, the geographic arrangement but often reviled approach. We also global food price threshold for unrest.1 of populations and the degree of showed that within-state boundaries Our research indicated that, even autonomy is the key factor (See Figure that provide for an intermediate without sharp peaks in food prices, 2). We have shown that where there degree of autonomy can also enable within just a few years the trend line on are patches of one ethnic group of peaceful outcomes.7 The success of local food prices would reach the threshold characteristic size of between 20 and we identified. This pointed to a danger 60 kilometers3 that are completely or Coexistence,” PLoS ONE, May 21, 2014. of spreading global social disruption. largely surrounded by another ethnic 5 A. Gros, A.S. Gard-Murray, Y. Bar-Yam, “Conflict Our predictions have been realized.2 group 4 a high propensity to violence in Yemen: From Ethnic Fighting to Food Riots.” arXiv:1207.5778, July 24, 2012. 1 M. Lagi, K. Bertrand, Y. Bar-Yam, The Food Crises and 3 M. Lim, R. Metzler, Y. Bar-Yam, Global pattern 6 Y. Bar-Yam, “Beyond big data: Important informa- Political Instability in North Africa and the Middle East, formation and ethnic/cultural violence, Science 317, 5844 tion,” arXiv, December 17, 2013. arXiv:1108.2455, August 10, 2011. (2007). 7 A. Rutherford, D. Harmon, J. Werfel, S. Bar-Yam, 2 B. Merchant, “The Math That Predicted the Revolu- 4 A. Rutherford, D. Harmon, J. Werfel, S. Bar-Yam, A.S. Gard-Murray, A. Gros, Y. Bar-Yam, “Good Fences: tions Sweeping the Globe Right Now,” Motherboard, A.S. Gard-Murray, A. Gros, Y. Bar-Yam, “Good Fences: The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful February 19, 2014). The Importance of Setting Boundaries for Peaceful Coexistence.” 18 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

Figure 2: Ethnic Variation in the Former Yugoslavia

(A) Census data from 1991 shown in map form was converted into a spatial representation and used in an agent-based simulation shown in (B). Our prediction of populations likely to be in conflict with neighboring groups (red overlay, (C) and (D)) agrees well (90% correlation) with the location of cities reported as sites of major fights and massacres (yellow dots, (D)). autonomy is of particular importance and the Arab Spring. The loss of social desert terrain with a clear cut objective as the world becomes more integrated. order and the opportunities for terror of inflicting massive damage on the Adopting various types of federal organizations in Yemen might be best enemy can be contrasted with loosely systems that enable local autonomy for addressed by eliminating the causes of coordinated forces fighting in jungle, groups of divergent values may result violence. Inter-group violence might mountain, or urban environments. in more peaceful coexistence. be addressed by delineating within- These examples begin to illustrate the country provinces for local autonomy of distinction between conventional large- Yemen ethnic and religious groups. Addressing scale but relatively simple conflicts, We combined the results on ethnic the severe problems triggered by and complex conflict.8 violence and the role of food prices fluctuating food prices can alleviate in looking at the case of Yemen. Our other sources of unrest. Identifying the Hierarchical command of traditional research indicates that the origins of means for addressing ethnic friction military forces is designed for the largest violence changed in 2008. Prior to and despair as drivers of social unrest scale impacts and thus relatively simple 2008, the locations of violence are can dramatically reduce the need for warfare. In comparison, distributed consistent with inter-group conflict direct military action in Yemen and control systems, when properly between ethnically and religiously elsewhere. designed, can enhance the ability to distinct groups. Starting in 2008, a meet complex challenges. The existing peak of global food prices coincided Military Organization military literature, however, is limited with a new wave of violence that spread A better understanding of complexity in providing guidance for design, to the endemically poor southern can also help inform how to respond region with demands for government more effectively to the challenges posed 8 Y. Bar-Yam, “Complexity of Military Conflict: Multi- change and economic concessions. by terrorist groups. Large and uniform scale Complex Systems Analysis of Littoral Warfare,” This violence appears to share its military forces operating in deadly Report to Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies origins with many other food riots confrontation across a marked border in Group (2003). 19 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

planning, execution, and assessment partially independent and coordinated system, a decision system, and an of military systems and operations actions of its units. This concept effector system. The decision system utilizing distributed control. is related to command and control is a distributed control network that structures, its information sensing, enables high complexity decisions A conventional analysis of aggregate processing, decision and communication based upon disparate information force size, firepower, and incapacitation capabilities, as well as its sociocultural sources. The effector system is designed of the enemy via attrition provides background. Substantial improvement for large-scale impacts and consists little, if any, guidance for the conduct in the complexity of a military force of highly synchronously (coherently) of complex warfare. Instead of scale requires a profound redesign of force behaving muscle cells. Because of the alone (i.e., manpower or firepower), organization and related training and networked decision system, the choice complexity (i.e., the variety of possible culture. of when and which large-scale act to actions that can be taken) should be used perform can be made highly selectively. as a measure of force capability in the It is impossible to have a single The complexity appears because each organizational structure that is “A better understanding effective for all types of military “It is impossible to have conflicts. An organization cannot of complexity can also be well-designed for success in both a single organizational large scale and complex encounters. help inform how to Tradeoffs must be chosen. This analysis structure that is effective indicates that to be successful in as respond more effectively broad a range of conflicts as possible, for all types of military the military should be partitioned into to the challenges posed by a variety of functional groups designed conflicts.” to address conflicts of varying scales terrorist groups.” and complexities, as is currently the case. More generally, if we consider a conflict as having a complexity profile act at a particular time can be precise that specifies the number of actions and carefully chosen. context of complex military scenarios. needed at each scale, the forces can be In a high complexity environment, high well adapted to the conflict by having a The second paradigmatic organizing complexity forces are more capable than matching complexity profile. framework is illustrated by the immune low complexity ones. Thus, war fighting system, which consists of largely capability must include both the scale In order to advance the capability of independently acting agents that are and complexity of the forces and the military organizations, it is helpful to coordinated and adopt functional environment in which the conflict understand the relationship between specialization through communication. occurs. organization and task in other kinds of A variety of types of agents (immune systems, in particular in functionally cells), many of which are capable of Scale and complexity are not, however, corresponding biological systems. There autonomous movement, have sensory independently controllable—they are are two paradigmatic types of biological receptors, communicate with each interrelated. The essential role of organization that are helpful to consider other, and are individually capable of complexity and scale in military conflict when we think about highly complex attacking harmful agents. The immune is already present in the structure of encounters and the role of distributed system can be understood to act with military organizations and is percieved control. These are the neuro-muscular high complexity at a very fine scale with using the “complexity profile,”9 10 a system13 and the immune system. 14 15 16 17 many independent agents and does not mathematical and conceptual tool for aggregate to large-scale behaviors. By characterizing complexity and scale in The neuro-muscular system can be contrast, the neuro-muscular system systems. 11 12 (See Figure 3) understood to be composed of a sensory performs high complexity behaviors over time due to the distributed control The complexity of a military force is Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems, (EOLSS UNESCO of the nervous system, but at any one linked to its ability to conduct multiple, Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2002). time it performs individual large-scale 13 Ibid Y. Bar-Yam, Dynamics of Complex Systems. actions of the muscles. This analysis 9 Y. Bar-Yam, “Complexity Rising: From Human 14 A. S. Perelson and F. W. Wiegel, “Some Design highlights the difference between high Beings to Human Civilization, A Complexity Profile,” Principles for Immune System Recognition,” Complexity, complexity at a particular time and high Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS UNESCO 4, 1999, pp. 29-37. complexity over time as captured by the Publishers, Oxford, UK, 2002); also NECSI Report 15 A. J. Noest, “Designing Lymphocyte Functional immune and neuro-muscular systems. 1997-12-01 (1997). Structure for Optimal Signal Detection: Voilà, T cells,” 10 Y. Bar-Yam, Dynamics of Complex Systems (Perseus, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 207:2, pp. 195-216, (2000). 1997), Chapters 2, 3. 16 I. Cohen and L. A. Segel (eds.), Design Principles of the Perelson, “Somatic Evolution in the Immune System: 11 Y. Bar-Yam, Making Things Work (Knowledge Press, Immune System and Other Distributed Autonomous systems, The Need for Germinal Centers for Efficient Affinity Cambridge, MA, 2004). (Oxford University Press, 2001). Maturation,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 186, pp. 159- 12 Y. Bar-Yam, “General Features of Complex Systems,” 17 D. M. Pierre, D. Goldman, Y. Bar-Yam and A. S. 171 (1997). 20 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

Figure 3: Scale Versus Complexity in Military Organization Complexity

Scale

Schematic complexity profiles (complexity as a function of scale) are shown for military forces. From lower right to upper left: Navy, tank divisions, infantry, marines, and special operations forces. Different organizational structures make forces effective in different environments. Special operations forces are adapted to complex environments.

These differences arise as a result of tradeoff between scale and complexity. increased decision capacity so that differences in control structures. A system designed for large-scale the capability can be effectively used. behavior is not the same as a system Increasing jointness and coordination The context in which the immune designed for high-complexity behavior opportunities enables combinatorially system operates—internal to the human at a fine scale. greater numbers of military options, but body it is striving to protect—can be without improving the decision-making contrasted with the context in which In correspondence with the two capacity they cannot be effectively the neuro-muscular system operates, biological systems, it is natural to used. Components of the military such which is in response to external forces distinguish military organizations as naval fleets, tank divisions, infantry, or conditions that are separated from by the scale and complexity of and marines, provide capabilities at the human body by a margin of space their organizational structures and large and progressively finer scales. that is typically comparable to that of capabilities. This is in correspondence with neuro- the human body itself. This illustrates muscular components: arms, hands, the different tasks for which distinct The neuro-muscular system most and fingers. organizational structures are effective. naturally corresponds to conventional It also illustrates the importance of military forces augmented by elaborate In an advanced organizational concept, functional segregation since both the decision-making processes that may the forces involved may be similar immune system and the neuro-muscular not yet be well formed, so that actions to conventional forces, but they are system are parts of the same organism. cannot be made even though the coupled to a distributed decision- By specialization of subsystems, capabilities are present (See Figure making process that enables many different types of functional tasks for 4). In this situation, increasing factors to be considered in order to protecting internal components and capabilities necessitate increasing the achieve desired objectives. Actions responding to the external environment capacity of decision making processes. in general will probably not be at full are possible. The examples also show Thus, for example, the development force, just as the availability of muscles how organizational structure reflects a of high precision weapons requires that can kick or punch does not imply 21 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

Figure 4: Military Organization (‘Neuromuscular Paradigm’) and team strategies should arise from evolutionary processes.

Conclusion Combining the two perspectives we have developed, essential aspects of counterterrorism activities are (1) engaging in improving the health of local socio-economic systems including providing food security and preventing ethnic violence by selectively fostering local autonomy where it is needed, and (2) enhancing the ability of military organizations to match the scale and complexity of tasks associated with counterterrorism activities through improved decision-making structures at the scale of engagement, including adaptive local decision-making by special forces, and networks of decision- makers at the global scale. Scientific Schematic of neuro-muscular type military system with information gathering, analyses suggest that dramatic decision making, and force projection. changes for the better will result from incorporating these imperatives into that they will be used at full capacity at achieve the right level and kind of local policy decisions. all times. The objective is to deliver the capability. right force to the right target at the right Professor Yaneer Bar-Yam received his time through an understanding of the In this organizational structure, local S.B. and Ph.D. in physics from MIT in specifics of the situation as it changes in coordination replaces the role of 1978 and 1984, respectively. Since the time. Developing such decision-making command and control of a hierarchical late 1980s he has contributed to the field capacity requires adopting network force. The emergent collective of complex systems science, introducing structures for the decision-making behaviors are not directly specified. fundamental mathematical rigor, real system. Indeed, the specific pattern that arises world application, and educational should not be controlled because the programs. In developing new mathematical The immune system most naturally pattern is determined by the response methods and their application, he has corresponds to special operations of the agents to the local challenges published on a wide range of scientific forces that have the expectation of being they face in the environment, as well as and real world problems ranging from cell embedded in local contexts and serving interactions with each other. biology to the global financial crisis. highly complex, (i.e., diverse) roles. The existence of high fine-scale complexity The ability to field a rapidly evolving He is the author of over 200 research forces, including special operations fine-scale force is the key to complex papers in professional journals, including forces and integrating diplomatic, warfare. Ongoing development of Science, Nature, PNAS, American intelligence, and law enforcement military forces, extending the notion Naturalist, and Physical Review agencies, and the extensive engagement of special operations forces and Letters, has three patents, and has given with non-combatants, training of local their technological capabilities (as 160 invited presentations. His work on the forces, non-lethal force, psychological individuals and as groups), is needed to causes of the global food crisis was cited warfare, economic incentives, and increase effectiveness when addressing among the top ten scientific discoveries of economic support, reflects the natural high complexity challenges. Because 2011 by Wired magazine. extension of the complex fine-scale each circumstance requires rapid actions that are needed for achieving adaptation, extensive planning of such local and global objectives of complex innovations is not effective. warfare. A system which is intrinsically built Agents interact with each other around rapid innovation is much primarily through local communication more effective18 Effective individual to achieve coordination of their individual actions for effective attack, defense, search, or other tasks. The 18 Y. Bar-Yam, “Enlightened Evolutionary Engineering primary role of such coordination is to / Implementation of Innovation in FORCEnet,” Report to Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (May 1, 2002). 22 JULY 2015. VOL 8. ISSUE 7

Conference Agenda

Sunday, 19 April 2015 session 2 session 3 metrics and data media and the war of ideas introductory remarks This session will build upon session This session will explore LTG ROBERT L. CASLEN, JR. one and focus on exploring how we media, marketing, and strategic Superintendent, U.S. Military Academy can better metric our performance in communications as it relates to at West Point the counterterrorism space, and how— terrorism and counterterrorism—a non- in specific and concrete terms—we kinetic area that could be characterized should be evaluating our success or as the “War of Ideas.” This is an arena opening keynote lack thereof. As any student of data that the United States and its allies have GEN(R) JOHN ABIZAID science knows, the perception one consistently struggled with since 9/11. Emeritus Distinguished Chair, has of their performance is intimately Not only is the U.S. being outcompeted Combating Terrorism Center: tied to the metrics they have selected in this space, but one could also “The State of Global to evaluate their actions and impact. (perhaps provocatively) make the Counterterrorism Today” The United States has certainly made case that it has also ceded this battle- some progress since 9/11 in degrading space, an issue which is reflected in the the capabilities of al-Qa`ida and other paucity of resources and analytical and Monday, 20 April 2015 militant actors who intend to do harm operational attention given to this area. to the United States and our allies. The trends we are witnessing in terms However, the geographic dispersion of how violent extremist organizations session 1 and decentralization of the terrorist and the individuals associated with or determining strategic ends threat and the emergence of entities inspired by them are communicating in complex and uncertain environments like the Islamic State illustrate that our particularly the speed, dynamism, approach has not been sufficient, and diversity (of platforms), and volume of This session will be foundational and that there remains a lot to be done. To their communications—pose additional focus on determining strategic ends in that end, this panel will examine what challenges and will likely only complex and uncertain environments. certain non-counterterrorism fields can continue to compound our lackluster Before embarking on a critical teach strategists about crafting metrics performance in this area. To that end, conversation about U.S. strategic that are useful for gauging effectiveness. attention in this panel will be placed counterterrorism ends, leaders from The panel will then take a critical look on hearing from voices from other other fields who face problems of equal at both the data that can be leveraged fields—particularly what we can learn (if not greater) size and scope will—from and the metrics we can establish— from news and marketing / advertising their outside vantage point—offer their or refine—that might help us to gain specialists about how they diagnose the appraisal of our problem, as well as share efficiencies and be more effective in our environment we are operating in and their thoughts about how approaches or counterterrorism pursuits over the long what advice they might have about how strategies pursued in their field might term. one could more effectively respond. benefit our own. Specific emphasis will Emphasis will be placed on identifying be placed on exploring the terms we use Featured Speaker why groups like the Islamic State have to characterize our strategy (i.e., will we Brian Macdonald been so successful in the social media ever really defeat al-Qa`ida, its affiliates Director of Analytics, Florida Panthers sphere and what we can learn from and adherents?) and on identifying not Moderator them, as well as discussing what has only what has worked and not worked LTC Michael Yankovich or has not worked with respect to our in terms of our approach, but also what Professor, USMA Math Department approach in the “War of Ideas” area. strategy is achievable and sustainable Expert Roundtable moving forward. Featured Speakers Vinnie Viola Featured Speakers Pete Favat Founder, Virtu Financial Chief Creative Officer, Deutsch Michèle Flournoy Javed Ali CEO, Center for New American Security Usman Raja Director, Office of National Intelligence Director, Unity Initiative Dr. Yaneer Bar-Yam Management, NCTC Founding President, NECSI Moderator Dennis Gleeson Moderator Paul Cruickshank Former Director of Strategy (DI), CIA Terrorism Analyst, CNN Dr. Stephen Biddle Professor, George Washington University Expert Roundtable Expert Roundtable LTG William Mayville lunch keynote Director of Operations, Joint Staff LTG Tony Thomas AMB. MICHAEL SHEEHAN Commander, JSOC David Ensor Distinguished Chair, Combating Director, Voice of America LTC Bryan C. Price Terrorism Center LTC John Gallagher Director, Combating Terrorism Center “Unconventional Approaches and our Joint Staff Layered CT Strategy”

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dinner keynote address Moderator CTC Sentinel Staff GENERAL JOSEPH L. VOTEL Dr. Alexander Evans Commander, USSOCOM Coordinator, UN Al-Qa`ida Sanctions Editor-in-Chief “The Future of Counterterrorism” Committee Paul Cruickshank Expert Roundtable LTG Robert L. Caslen, Jr. Managing Editor Tuesday, 21 April 2015 Superintendent, West Point John Watling MG Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr. session 4 Commander, CJTF-Horn of Africa partnerships building Editorial Board & partner capacity COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. session 5 Given the geographic scope of the Department Head islamic state policy session terrorism problem and the United Department of Social Sciences (West Point) This session will function as a practical States’ inability to fully defeat the capstone exercise for the conference, threat of transnational terrorism and COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. whereby the panelists and audience deny malign actors safe-haven by itself, Deputy Department Head members will be provided with a partnerships are an essential part of our Department of Social Sciences (West Point) venue to share their ideas and apply long-term counterterrorism approach. what they have learned to a significant To that end, this session will focus on LTC Bryan C. Price, Ph.D. counterterrorism problem: the self- relationships and alliances—specifically Director, CTC declared Islamic State. Through a how we should think about building discussion facilitated by a moderator, partner capacity in counterterrorism Brian Dodwell, panelists and other attendees will be (i.e. what type of relations are needed Deputy Director, CTC encouraged to provide both ‘outside to facilitate effective counterterrorism); of the box’ and practical ideas how those partnerships (and the trade- about strategy, metrics and data, offs often associated with them) are partnerships, and the war of ideas— best managed and what pitfalls we the four substantive panels of Senior can avoid in building them; and what CONTACT Conference—as it relates to the so- success looks like in this domain. Are Combating Terrorism Center called Islamic State. The goal of this there specific cases we should look at U.S. Military Academy session will be to refine our thinking and metrics that can help us to better 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall about this group and how its growth, evaluate our progress / lack of progress? West Point, NY 10996 actions, and influence can be better To broaden our view, the diverse mix of Phone: (845) 938-8495 managed, limited, or countered. Email: [email protected] panelists will be asked to share their Moderator Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ thoughts about how public-private sector partnerships have been used in Juan Zarate * For Press Inquiries: (845) 938-8495 their field(s) to help solve or at least Senior Advisor, Transnational Threats better manage intractable, complex Project at CSIS problems. This panel will also be asked Expert Roundtable to evaluate the best way to balance the RDML Robert Sharp operational with the political aspects of J2—U.S. Special Operations Command counterterrorism. SUPPORT Nada Bakos The Combating Terrorism Center would Featured Speakers Former CIA Analyst like to express its gratitude to its financial CSM Faiz Wafa Brian Fishman supporters, for without their support and Afghan National Army Special Counterterrorism Fellow, New America shared vision of the Center products like the Operations Command Foundation CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you Sophie Delaunay are interested in learning more about how Executive Director, Doctors Without to support the Combating Terrorism Center, Borders (US) please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561. Many thanks to all the Senior Conference participants for making this event so productive and engaging, and special thanks to our conference executive secretaries, Mr. Don Rassler and Dr. Rachel Yon, our donors, and the Association of Graduates. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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