Not for quotation or citation

A Chronology of Events Relating to Chemical & Biological Warfare

1968 Sample file

(Not For Quotation or Citation in Current Form)

IMPORTANT NOTICE

This document is provided as a preview of work from the CBW Events website — <>.

As with any compilation of this size, there is always a difficulty in deciding at what point to stop collating material and organize and refine the document for publication.

This working draft is, of neccessity therefore, a snapshot of the progress towards the final publication. The intention for producing working drafts is to enable reviews of the work in progress. As the final publication format has yet to be decided, sample files are being posted in the form of annual sub-sets of the draft chronologies. Those interested in reviewing or contributing to fuller drafts are encouraged to contact Richard Guthrie at .

Richard Guthrie [email protected]

(WORKING COPY @ JUNE 2007) Not for quotation or citation

Introduction

Sources and methodology The information gathered for this chronology comes from open-source documentation (such as news reports, academic papers, published governmental and inter-governmental reports, and national archives). Some of the material has been gathered directly by Richard Guthrie. Much of the rest of the material has been collected by the Harvard Sussex Program (HSP) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). As in any exercise such as this, the compilation of material has been a collective effort. To attempt to list all of those very many individuals who have helped put together the CBW archives at HSP and SIPRI over a number of decades would be an exercise doomed to failure. With apologies for any mis-spellings, known contributors include: Joachim Badelt, Brian Balmer, Gordon Burck, Priya Deshingkar, Nicholas Dragffy, Treasa Dunworth, Rob Evans, Simon Evans, Daniel Feakes, John Hart, Peter Herby, Melissa Hersh, Mitslal Kifleyesus, Frida Kuhlau, Milton Leitenberg, Lora Lumpe, Rod McElroy, Kathryn McLaughlin, Caitríona McLeish, Rayissa Manning, Nicholas Martin, Matthew Meselson, Pamela Mills, John Parachini, Tony Randle, Sandy Ropper, Carolyn Sansbury, Jacqueline Simon, Jenny Smith, Justin Smith, Guy Stevens, Thomas Stock, Ralf Trapp, Fiona Tregonning, Emmanuelle Tuerlings, Jonathan Tucker, Simon Whitby, Henrietta Wilson, Jean Pascal Zanders, and Elisabetta Zontini. In addition to those listed above, there have been numerous people who have presented one or the other of the organizations with an interesting reference or obscure, yet valuable, article.

Chronology entries All chronology entries are written in the present tense. Entries for the same date are put in the sequence of events that happened (if specific times are known) or are placed in the order that dawn rises around the world. This means that entries for Japan, for example, will appear before Iran, which will appear before Iraq, which will appear before Germany. Specific times for events are given in GMT/UTC, where known, and local time if that has been specified. Holding entries are preceded by the letter ‘H’ to indicate this status. Entries containing questions to be resolved are preceded with the letter ‘Q’. The margins of this document have been set for double-sided printing.

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VOLUME V 1 JANUARY 1966 THROUGH 31 DECEMBER 1970 (extract)

(lacrimators). (5) Agents which disrupt basic life-sustaining 1968 systems of the body and thus prevent the carrying out of physical activity. Examples might include agents which lower blood pressure, paralyzing agents such as curare, fever-producing 68xxxx agents, respiratory depressants, and blood poisons. Although Q XX Xxxx 1968 Romania starts programmes ‘in the domain theoretically effective, such agents almost invariably have a low of chemical weapons’, according to a Romanian Defence margin of safety between the effective and possible lethal doses Minister speaking 26 years later. The programmes were and, thus, defeat the basic purpose of an incapacitating agent halted in 1990.[1] [*find more*] which is to reduce military effectiveness without endangering [1] Rompres (Bucharest) (in English), 1423 GMT 23 June 1994, as reported life.[1] in BBC-SWB 27 June 1994; Radio Romania (Bucharest), 1000 GMT 30 June [Note: paragraph (4) of the section above relating to what 1994, as reported in BBC-SWB, EE/2032 B/4 (12), 2 July 1994; Radio is not regarding as an incapacitant excludes tear gases from Romania (Bucharest), 1900 GMT 30 June 1994, as reported in FBIS-EEU-94-128, 5 July 1994, pp 33-34; [no author listed] (from Bucharest), this category, whereas the definition of incapacitants in the ‘Romania does not make chemical weapons’, AFP, 30 June 1994; [no author Defense Science Board Task Group on Biological and listed] (from Bucharest), ‘Romania says Ceausescu had chemical weapons Chemical Weapons Development [see 18 February 1959] plan’, Reuters, 30 June 1994. would seem to include them within this category.] [1] US Department of the Army, Treatment of chemical agent casualties, 68xxxx Department of the Army technical manual TM 8-285. January 1968. Q XX Xxxx 1968 ‘The nerve agent VX was last produced at Nancekuke in 1968. The total amount produced was less than 6801xx 110 kilograms.’[1] [*add more*] Q XX January 1968 The carries out an exercise, The first Nancekuke production of VX had been in 1957, ‘Small Change’, in which the effects of the psychochemical some samples of VX were held at Nancekuke up to 1976 for LSD [also known as T3456] on tactical unit performance is studies into storage stability.[2] assessed. Half the personnel of an infantry platoon receive an [1] , Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Written Answer oral dose of 0.16 mg/man prior to conducting an anti-terrorist [with letters from CBDE Chief Executive Graham Pearson], 20 July 1993, Hansard, vol 229, c168–74. sweep as formed sections, each sweep involving an advance [2] Jonathan Aitken, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, Written over four kilometres. A later report states: ‘Small Change Answer [with letters from CBDE Chief Executive Graham Pearson], 16 July showed that the platoon did not discharge its functions as well 1993, Hansard, vol 228, c710-19. as would normally be expected. Overall its performance was 680100 adequate but it would have sustained a higher number of January 1968 In the United States, a military training casualties than might have reasonably been expected. Unit manual entitled Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties is efficiency fell by about 10% and the role of good discipline published by the US Departments of the Army, the Navy and and mutual support between drugged and undrugged soldiers the Air Force. The manual includes the text: in mitigating the drug effects were demonstrated.’[1] Generally speaking, an incapacitating agent is any compound The exercise takes place on the trials range at Porton which can interfere with the performance of military duties. In Down[2] and follows on from the earlier ‘Moneybags’ [see actual usage, however, the term has come to refer primarily to XX December 1964] and ‘Recount’ [see XX September 1966] those agents which-(l) Are highly potent and logistically feasible. experiments. (2) Produce their effects mainly by altering or disrupting the ‘In January 1968 13 of the service volunteers who higher regulatory activity of the central nervous system. (3) Have a duration of action of hours or days, rather than momentary or participated in field trial Small Change were given LSD ... We fleeting action. (4) Do not seriously endanger life except at doses also now believe that work on LSD ceased in 1968 when the exceeding many fold the effective dose, and produce no results of trial Small Change confirmed it was not a serious permanent injury. threat’.[3] The manual continues: Some materials on the LSD trials are later placed in the Incapacitating agents would not be considered to include the public domain: ‘A search of the CBDE Information Service’s following: (1) Lethal agents which are incapacitating at sublethal list of technical papers produced by CBDE and its predecessor doses such as the nerve agents. (2) Substances which cause permanent or long-lasting injury such as blister agents, choking organisations at Porton Down has identified four published gases, and those causing eye injury. (3) Common papers concerning the work conducted with LSD in the 1960s. pharmacological substances with strong central nervous system Three of these reports are concerned with the field studies. actions such as the barbiturates, belladonna alkaloids, These are Porton Technical Paper 936 ‘A field experiment tranquilizers, and many of the hallucinogens. These drugs, using LSD25 on trained troops’, Porton Technical Paper 979 although effective and relatively safe, are logistically infeasible ‘Recount — A second field experiment to assess the effects of for large-scale use because of the high doses required. (4) Agents of transient effectiveness which produce reflex responses T3456 on trained troops’ and Technical Note 53 ‘Small interfering with performance of duty. These include skin and eye Change — A brief preliminary report’. As you know we have irritants causing pain or itching (vesicants [sic]), vomiting or recently arranged for these papers to be made available in the cough-producing agents (sternutators), and tear agents Public Record Office at Kew at the end of January [1996] in

CBW Events 1968 Sample file [Draft @ June 07] — 1 Not for quotation or citation

response to your earlier request to see information relating to glassy-eyed. His blood pressure dropped. In two minutes 45 trials with LSD involving service volunteers. We have seconds he felt nauseated. Five minutes later he was acutely recently located a fourth report, Technical Note 5 ‘The ill. For an hour, he was helplessly stretched out on a determination of T3456 in human plasma following oral mattress.’[1] Other reporting notes: ‘Vigorous vomiting, it is administration’ which concerns the laboratory based thought, will immobilize any suspect’.[2] This second development of an analytical method to detect low levels of reportage, by the author of the Institute for Defense Analyses LSD in human plasma. This report is not yet in the Public study on non-lethal weaponry [see November 1967], suggests Records Office but arrangements can be made for its early the first known use on people of incapacitant dart weapons release should this be required. The library search also was ‘several years ago’ in a Georgia jail, when a veterinary identified eight papers which include references to laboratory dart gun loaded with sodium amytal was borrowed from a work involving LSD and other substances being tested on veterinary school to subdue a psychotic prisoner. animals. The work was primarily concerned with analytical [1] [no author listed] (from Atlanta), United Press International, as in: ‘Tranquilizer Gun Fells Man in Test’, New York Times, 27 February 1968 methods and the papers remain classified.’[4] [2] Joseph F Coates, ‘Safe police weapons’, Science & Technology, May [1] Roger Freeman, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, Written 1968, pp 52-59. Answer [with letter from CBDE Chief Executive Graham Pearson [*check*]], 8 March 1995, Hansard (Commons), vol 256, c257–58, in response to a 680311 question from Dr David Clark MP; see also Rob Evans, Gassed, (London: 11 March 1968 House of Stratus, 2000), Chapter 8. In the UK House of Commons, the [2] , Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Written government replies to a number of Parliamentary Questions Answer [with letter from DERA Chief Executive John Chisholm], 18 July on CBW issues. On Gruinard Island one answer relates: 1995, Hansard (Commons), vol 263, c1169, in response to a question from Dr ‘Since 1939, 11 cases of anthrax, all in cattle, have occurred David Clark MP. [3] James Arbuthnot, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, Written within 50 miles of Gruinard Island, and of these only three Answer [with letter from DERA Chief Executive John Chisholm], 18 April cases, which occurred in 1943, could reasonably be attributed 1996, Hansard (Commons), vol 275, c578, in response to a question from Dr to the Gruinard infection’.[1] Another states: ‘In view of the David Clark MP. very persistent nature of the anthrax organism it is not possible [4] James Arbuthnot, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, Written Answer [with letter from DERA Chief Executive John Chisholm], 25 January to estimate how long the contamination will last’.[2] 1996, Hansard (Commons), vol 270, c326, in response to a question from Dr A reply to a question on regarding what is known about David Clark MP. toxicity of CS is given: ‘The toxicity of CS vapour, expressed in milligram minutes per cubic metre to give a 50 per cent. 680222 probability of death, has been estimated from experimental H 22 February 1968 [In London, the inauguration of the JD evidence to be 45,000 for rats and 150,000 for larger animals Bernal Peace Library is marked by the convening of a two-day comparable with man. The latter is 50,000 times the dose conference on the subject of chemical and biological warfare. which can be tolerated by a human being and about 200,000 Papers presented include: JP Perry Robinson, ‘Chemical times the amount needed to disperse rioters. CS has been used weapons’; CRB Joyce (London Hospital Medical School), on a world-wide basis for about seven years, but no ‘The use of psychedelic agents in chemical warfare’; Dr V. authenticated report has been received of death or injury Sidel (Physicians for Social Responsibility), ‘A brief note on resulting from its inhalation’.[3] napalm’; I Malek (Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences), [1] James Hoy, Joint Parliamentary Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture ‘Biological weapons and defence’; A Galston (Yale), Fisheries and Food, Written Answer, 11 March 1968, Hansard (Commons), ‘Defoliation — the herbicides and their effects’; J Mayer vol 760, c222, in response to a question from Tam Dalyell MP. (Harvard), ‘Starvation as a weapon — the effects of [2] , Minister of Defence for Equipment, Written Answer, 11 March 1968, Hansard (Commons), vol 760, c231, in response to a question defoliants’; I Brownlie (Wadham), ‘The legal issues in CBW’; from Tam Dalyell MP. E Langer, ‘The United States’ research programme’; R Clarke [2] Roy Mason, Minister of Defence for Equipment, Written Answer, 11 and JP Perry Robinson, ‘Research and policy on CBW in the March 1968, Hansard (Commons), vol 760, c227, in response to a question ’; D Viney, ‘CBW potential and policy — the from Tam Dalyell MP. Soviet Union’; F Kahn (Paris), ‘Chemical weapons in use in 680313 Vietnam’; M Meselson (Harvard), ‘The use of chemical Q 13 March 1968 In the United States, an F-4 Phantom strike weapons in the Yemen’; CF Powell (Bristol), ‘Scientific aircraft flies a test mission over the Dugway Proving Ground ethics’; VW Sidel, ‘Biological warfare and medical ethics’; S with chemical dispensers containing VX. One of the Rose (Imperial College), ‘Implications for society’; JH dispensers isn’t completely emptied during the test, and an Humphrey (National Institute for Medical Research), outlet valve remains jammed open. A VX cloud forms in a ‘Practical proposals: introduction’; M Meselson (Harvard), trail behind the aircraft, drifting into Skull Valley, north of the ‘Preventing the use of CBW’; and R Bjomerstedt (SIPRI), proving ground, and settling over a huge flock of sheep. ‘The work of the Swedish Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’. Thousands of sheep die as a consequence in the following See [no author listed], ‘JD Bernal Peace Library London CBW days. The cloud is said to travel over halfway to Salt Lake Conference’, Scientific World, March 1968 ] City, some 80 miles (130 km) away and is only dispersed by a rain shower. The DoD denies responsibility for over a 680222 year.[1] H 22 February 1968 [In London, the British Ministry of [1] Roy Reed (from Washington), ‘Gas or germ tests in air are scored’, Defence publishes the latest annual Defence White Paper, New York Times, 21 May 1969; Stephen Barber (from Washington), ‘Official Statement on the Defence Estimates 1968 — any specific U.S. Map “Proof” of Gas and Germ War Tests’, Daily Telegraph (London), 22 May 1969; Seymour Hersh, ‘On Uncovering the Great Nerve Gas mention of CBW?] Coverup’, Ramparts, June 1969, pp 13–18; Sterling Seagrave, Yellow Rain: a journey through the terror of chemical warfare, New York: M. Evans and 680226 Company, Inc., 1981, p 109; Final Environmental Impact Statement for 26 February 1968 In the United States, an experimental Activities Associated with Future Programs at U.S. Army Dugway Proving police dart gun loaded with apomorphine is demonstrated by Ground, Volume II, August 31, 2004, pp I-16-17; [*add more detail??*] firing into the thigh of a volunteer medical student. One 680506 journalist present describes the effects on the volunteer as: Q 6 May 1968 In the United Kingdom, the House of ‘Within 75 seconds the victim felt a chill and began to get Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology

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takes evidence at CDEE Porton Down for its inquiry into 7. As regards the exchange of classified information, the Defence Research. The testimony is later published by the Minister of Defence for Equipment has said in the House of committee.[1] [*add more/leak inquiry*] Commons in March 1968 [see 11 March] that arrangements are [1] Reproduced in: House of Commons, Select Committee on Science and confidential; I am afraid I can add nothing to his statement. Technology, ‘Defence Research’, Second Report of session 1968-69, HC 213, 8. I hope that this will satisfy you that we comply with our 7 May 1969, pp. 235–47. international obligations. But I agree with you that the present international regime is far from satisfactory, Her Majesty’s 680526 Government would like to see further action taken to deal with H 26 May 1968 [Observer on Porton.] biological and chemical weapons in the arms control and disarmament context. Proposals to deal with those weapons were 680530 included in the Western plan for general and complete Q 30 May 1968 In London, Defence Minister John Morris disarmament tabled at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament tells Parliament that four rail wagon loads of CS have been Committee in 1962. We are now carefully considering the whole transported from Nancekuke, Cornwall, to ; that no question of what particular arms control objectives we should other substances have made this particular journey; and that pursue at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee after the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the possibility of there have been no discussions between the Ministry of further action on chemical and biological weapons is one to Defence and the police about additional safety precautions for which we are giving particularly careful thought.’ such transport as this is ‘fully covered’ by ‘Instructions for the [Note: Sydney Dawson Bailey (1916–1995) was one of the Handling and Conveyance of Dangerous Goods by Rail and original members of the Disarmament Advisory Panel Road’ issued by British Railways. [*worth getting??*] [1] established by Lord Chalfont soon after taking office as [1] John Morris, Minister of Defence for Equipment, 30 May 1968, Written Answer, Hansard, vol 765, c263-64, in response to questions from Mr Pardoe. Minister for Disarmament at the Foreign Office in 1964. After receiving this letter he writes back to Chalfont asking if he can 680611 show the letter to others — this may indicate that he is not sure Q 11 June 1968 In London, Foreign Office Minister Lord whether he received the reply as a member of a government Chalfont responds to a letter from Sydney Bailey, possibly committee or as a member of the general public. The request prompted by the recent revelations in the Observer newspaper to give wider prominence to the letter causes a stir within [see 26 May]. This letter,[1] which becomes known as the government.] ‘Bailey letter’, includes in the third paragraph an [1] In PRO file 10/182 [*full ref, is Bailey’s original letter on file??*] acknowledgement that the UK has no stockpiles of lethal chemical weapons. This acknowledgement is the cause of 680612 12 June 1968 In London, on the floor of the House of some controversy within the British Government. The letter Commons, the Ministry of Defence is asked what stocks of reads: Thank you for your letter of 29 May on the subject of biological nerve gases are held. A junior Minister replies: ‘The only and chemical weapons. stocks of nerve gases currently held are small quantities 2. As you know, signatories to the 1925 Geneva Protocol necessary for the development and testing of defensive accepted the prohibition of the use in war of lethal chemical and measures. It is not the practice to reveal which gases they are’. biological warfare weapons. The United Kingdom, along with Challenged as to whether other countries are manufacturing other signatories, including the Soviet Union, reserves the right to nerve agents using British patents, the Minister responds: ‘I use those weapons in retaliation against their use by am not aware of any gases manufactured under British patent non-signatories and violators of the Protocol. In this connexion it is important to note that although the United States did not ratify elsewhere. If [the questioner] sends me details I shall the Protocol its basic position on lethal chemical and biological willingly look at any case he has in mind’. weapons is close to our own. The United States has repeatedly [1] John Morris, Minister of Defence for Equipment, 12 June 1968, Oral Answers, Hansard, vol 766, c221, in response to questions from David Kerr made it clear that it would never be the first to use such weapons. MP. 3. Given our reservation, we are not debarred by the Geneva Protocol from the manufacture of these weapons. Nor are we 680617 debarred from exchanging information about our research into H 17 June 1968 [John Morris WA on Porton publication these weapons or from exporting them to countries which follow policy — ‘There are arrangements for the exchange of a similar policy. But in fact we have no stockpiles of these lethal weapons and therefore there is no question of export. information on Defence R. and D. with the United States, 4. As far as non-lethal agents such as tear-gas are concerned it Canada and Australia and with other members of N.A.T.O. has never been authoritatively concluded that the Geneva These include information on defence against biological Protocol prohibits their use in war. Incendiary weapons, which warfare. In addition much of the work of the Microbiological are not normally grouped with biological and chemical, fall into Research Establishment is published in scientific literature two categories. First, there are those such as napalm, which use and is therefore generally available.’] phosphorus as an igniting agent, and second, those called fire bombs, which are ignited by a pyrotechnic fuse. Phosphorus is of 680619 course a chemical agent, and the first use of weapons containing 19 June 1968 In an exchange on the floor of the House of it might be prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. Fire bombs, on Commons following a statement on the recently agreed the other hand, definitely fall outside the terms of the Protocol. nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a junior Foreign Office Unfortunately the term ‘napalm’ is often loosely applied by the press and public to describe what are in fact, fire bombs. Minister is asked whether the Government will be putting 5. Although we are not debarred from the export of chemical forward ‘any proposals to the United Nations for a treaty on agents, as I have explained, the only one which we export is the chemical and biological warfare, in view of the great public unpatented anti-riot CS gas which is used by police forces in anxiety which has arisen in the last few months on this Commonwealth and other countries to control civil disturbances. question?’ Frederick Mulley responds: ‘priority should be Each application for export is carefully scrutinised. given to seeing what can be done in the chemical and 6. We do not deploy or export napalm weapons, nor have we bacteriological fields. But I would say that we have a exported fire bombs. If we were asked to provide fire bombs to another country, such a request would receive the usual careful protocol. Although it may not be entirely as we would have scrutiny which we apply to all requests for arms. We would, of wished 40 years after it was propounded, the 1925 Geneva course, take into account all political, economic and humanitarian Protocol prohibits the use of poisonous gases and biological considerations before arriving at any decision. and bacteriological means of warfare’.[1]

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A written answer provided today lists the number of (much better than their critics) and feel it is their duty to try to experiments on animals that took place in 1967: Rabbits 816; ensure that proper protection can be provided for their follow Guinea Pigs 4721; Rats 16 121; Mice 42 098; Hamsters 1025; citizens and for British forces if biological warfare is used Voles 60; Frogs 477; Sheep 221; Pigs 82; Monkeys 63; Chicks against them’ — CE Gordon Smith, ‘Microbiological 300; Dogs 9; Cats 151; leading to a total of 66 144.[2] Research at Porton’, Nature, vol 218, 22 June 1968, p [1] Frederick Mulley, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, 19 June 1968, 1114-16.] Statement, Hansard (Commons), vol 767, c1112–13, in response to questions from Eric Lubbock MP. 68064 [2] John Morris, Minister of Defence for Equipment, 19 June 1968, Written H 24 June 1968 [Letter from JM Barnes and 11 others sent to Answers, Hansard (Commons), vol 767, c144–45, in response to questions from Tam Dalyell MP. Times, published two days later — ‘The doubts which have been cast on the nature of the work of the Chemical Defence 680619 Experimental establishment at Porton imply that the scientists H 19 June 1968 [In New York, the UN Security Council working in the establishment are socially irresponsible. We adopts resolution 255 on security assurances. Includes: ‘1. are scientists who know the work and the staff of the Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons or the threat establishment well, and we know that both are devoted to the of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State would protection of the country from a real threat.//No one has yet create a situation in which the Security Council, and above all produced a global disarmament plan that will work, and the its nuclear-weapon State permanent members, would have to rate of progress is so slow that it may be a very long time act immediately in accordance with their obligations under the before disarmament becomes a reality. Until there is United Nations Charter;//2. Welcomes the intention expressed disarmament there must he effective protection against by certain States that they will provide or support immediate chemical attack.//The work of CDEE is directed to finding out assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any what we must protect against and how to create the protection. non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Without this work we might have no breathing space in which Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an to strive for a less menacing world.’] act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used;’ Adopted 10–0 with five abstentions — 680626 Algeria, Brazil, France, India and Pakistan.] H 26 June 1968 [WA on CS] 680627 680621 Q 21 June 1968 In London, Defence Minister John Morris H 27 June 1968 [21 FRS (inc 8 Nobels) write to PM asking for replies to a number of Parliamentary Questions on CS and on all MRE research to be published, letter from BRAB members Porton Down.[1] appears in Times (the day after a letter from chem equiv) [see He states that the CS grenade being manufactured in 24 June].] Surrey by Schermuly Ltd is covered by British Patent No 680627 967660, [*worth getting??*] ‘rights in which are held by Her Q 27 June 1968 In London, the Foreign Office and the Majesty’s Government’. On transport of CS from Nancekuke Commonwealth Office distribute to certain missions new in Cornwall to Surrey he says: ‘CS is packed in specially guidance on the subject of biological and chemical labelled sealed steel drums and transported in accordance with weapons.[1] [*what did this replace??*] The note reads: the instructions’ given in an earlier answer [see 30 May]. There has been considerable public and Parliamentary concern Questioned about the Porton establishments, he says: in recent months over the work done at the Microbiological ‘Each of the main establishments at Porton has its own Research Establishment and the Chemical Defence Experimental advisory board. That for the Microbiological Research Establishment at Porton Down. The following is primarily for your own information but you may draw on it in reply to Establishment has 11 members excluding Crown servants. questions, except for paragraphs 3, 7, 9 and 10. That for the Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment 2. The research at both Establishments is defensive, for the has 9 members excluding Crown servants. No member from purpose of assessing the threat of chemical and biological attack either board receives a grant for research. A member of a and of seeking to prepare defences against these weapons. sub-committee which reports to the board for the Chemical Naturally, this involves assessment of the offensive potential of Defence Experimental Establishment has been in receipt of a chemical and biological agents. The only production at Porton grant under a contract which is about to expire, but he is not a Down is of small quantities as necessary for the development and testing of defensive measures. The activities at Porton Down are member of the board itself.’ fully in conformity with our obligations under the 1925 Geneva [1] John Morris, Minister of Defence for Equipment, 21 June 1968, Written Answers, Hansard (Commons), vol 766, c181-82, in response to questions Protocol. from Tam Dalyell MP. 3. (For your information) A statement that we have no stockpiles of chemical weapons made during the course of an 680622 enquiry by the Parliamentary Select Committee on science and H 22 June 1968 [The Director of the Microbiological technology was revealed last month as the result of a leak to The Research Establishment, CE Gordon Smith, writes in Nature Observer. This episode is under investigation. Meanwhile we are — the MRE ‘has two principal functions: to assess the risk to not denying the truth of the statement but we are not inviting attention to it. It has however been publicly known for some time the British people and armed forces of attack by biological that we have no stockpiles of biological weapons. [*since when warfare, and to devise means of protection against such was this ‘known’??*] attacks ... none of its work on biological warfare has an 4. A very high proportion of the research done at Porton Down offensive objective ... at least W per cent of the work is is published and some of the results applied to civilian uses. But unclassified and is published whenever results of sufficient the primary task of the Establishments is for defence and for interest and importance are achieved. Only information of normal reasons of military security about defensive preparations advantage to a potential attacker is withheld. Recent it would not be in the public interest to declassify the remainder. 5. As a result of the present concern over chemical and criticisms of the ethics of medical and other scientists at MRE biological weapons, it was announced on 12 June [see 12 June] are quite unjustified. MRE staff are not involved, and would that Open Days at the Microbiological Research Establishment resist becoming involved, in any work with an offensive would be arranged. The Open Days, which will take place objective. They realize the dangers of biological warfare sometime after the beginning of October, will show the greater

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part of the work going on there. There is however certain him’. The agents identified in the Memorandum — information which must remain classified for reasons of national respiratory irritants, anaesthetics, analgesics, tranquilizers, security. A balance has to be maintained between public security glycolates, and vomiting agents — are listed in Annex 2. and the natural desire of the public for information. [1] B Witten, Nonlethal agents in crime and riot control, Edgewood Arsenal 6. Exchange of information with the United States, Canada and Technical Memorandum EATM 133-1, July 1968, AD392476. Australia takes place under the general terms of the Technical Cooperation Programme (instituted in 1958) and of the Basic 680701 Standardisation Agreement of 1964. In neither case is there a 1 July 1968 In Moscow, London and Washington, parallel special agreement covering chemical and biological warfare. ceremonies are held to open the nuclear Non-Proliferation Details of the information concerned are confidential, but it is Treaty for signature. The Soviet Government publishes a generally assumed that CBW information is included under these memorandum on ‘some urgent measures for stopping the arms agreements and this has not been denied. 7. (For your own information). In the Technical Cooperation race and for disarmament’, copies of which are circulated at Programme, Sub-group E deals with chemical and biological the ceremonies.[1] Section 6 of the memorandum, entitled defence. Under Sub-group E are Working Panel E1 (Chemical) ‘Prohibition of the Use of Chemical and Bacteriological and B2 (Biological). Collaboration within these working panels Weapons’, reads: ‘The Soviet Government has on several is confined to defensive aspects, but again this necessarily occasions drawn the attention of other states to the threat involves assessment of the offensive potential of chemical and posed for mankind by the use of chemical and bacteriological biological agents. Research information on the nerve gas group weapons. Voicing the general concern of the nations over V has passed to the United States but the basic scientific information is well known and could be developed by any such a threat the UN General Assembly at its 21st Session country with the necessary facilities. adopted a resolution [see 5 December 1966] calling for strict 8. If you are asked whether the information on CS was observance by all states of the principles of the Geneva provided to the United States under these arrangements, you Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and should point out, that CS is a riot control agent and not a lethal bacteriological weapons, condemning all actions contrary to chemical warfare agent. It was invented in the United States in this objective, and inviting all states to accede to the Geneva 1928 and was developed at Porton a few years ago as an agent Protocol. very much safer than anything else previously used. Information about it has been released to the United States and to 60 other ‘However, this important decision of the General countries. It has been used on a world-wide basis for about seven Assembly is not carried out by some countries, and first of all years, and no authenticated report has been received of death or by the United States of America. Furthermore, the USA uses injury resulting from its inhalation. No exclusive rights in respect chemical weapons in its aggressive war in Vietnam. In view of CS gas itself are vested in Her Majesty’s Government, and it of that the Soviet Government proposes that the Eighteen can be made in the United States, France or anywhere else. There Nation Committee consider ways and means of securing are other agents on the market and in current use and it should not observance by all states of the Geneva Protocol for the be assumed that casualties reported from irritant gases have anything to do with CS. prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological 9. (For your own information). For some years all requests to weapons.’ export CS and riot control devices containing it to the United [1] ‘Memorandum by the Government of the USSR on Some Urgent States have had to come to the Ministerial Committee on Measures for Stopping the Arms Race and for Disarmament’, as reproduced in: Pravda [English language edition], 2 July 1968. Strategic Exports. Exports to any other countries are considered at official level. Manufacturing know-how of a CS composition 680701 combined with a container does however have a UK patent and 1 July 1968 In London, Foreign Office Minister of State has been released to the United States. We do not know whether tells the House of Commons: ‘We think that the Americans are in fact using this particular combination in Viet Nam. It is believed that they are using other agents. [*INSERT when the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee note??*] reconvenes, it should work for further measures in the nuclear 10. (For your own information). In 1964, we exported small field to follow up the Non-Proliferation Treaty [see 1 July quantities of CS to Switzerland and the Netherlands and there are Moscow, London and Washington], but that it should also two current orders for Sweden and Switzerland. Devices give serious consideration to non-nuclear disarmament containing CS are however made in the UK and exported problems. commercially. ‘A priority here will be for the Committee to consider what 11. If you are asked about incendiary weapons, you should take the line that they are not traditionally grouped with can be done in regard to chemical and biological weapons, biological and chemical weapons. with a view to strengthening and bringing up to date the [1] Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office, ‘Biological and Chemical existing agreement in this field, the 1925 Geneva Protocol.’[1] Weapons’, Telno Guidance No. 169, Guidance Nos 155 and 156, 27 June 1968, [See also 19 June.] in PRO file FCO 10/183. [1] Fred Mulley, Minister of State, Foreign Office, 1 July 1968, Written Answers, Hansard (Commons), vol 767, c167, in response to a question from 680700 Tam Dalyell MP. July 1968 In the United States, Edgewood issues a 680701 confidential Technical Memorandum entitled Nonlethal Q 1 July 1968 In London, the Ministry of Defence sends a Agents in Crime and Riot Control.[1] It says: ‘The intensive memorandum on Allington Farm to the House of Commons search at Edgewood to find incapacitating agents for military Select Committee on Science and Technology for its inquiry application has led to the discovery of several types of into Defence Research which reads: nonlethal agents with properties suitable for use in crime and The primary function of Allington Farm is to provide the riot control’. It then goes on to identify the more promising ‘biological aids’ which include laboratory animals, fertile eggs, chemicals, having observed: ‘The ideal agent is one that sera, etc., required for the research programmes of the Chemical essentially immobilizes the person, but leaves him Defence Experimental Establishment and the Microbiological manageable and on his feet. It would be undesirable to use an Research Establishment at Porton Down, and also by the David Bruce Laboratories (The Army Vaccine Laboratory) at Everleigh, agent that psychologically disturbs an individual or in any way Wilts. A continuing programme of research aimed: (a) at makes him mentally difficult to manage. Furthermore, when improving the quality of laboratory animals for research a person is physically incapacitated, visual observation is generally, and (b) achieving higher standards of laboratory generally sufficient to indicate whether it is safe to approach animal health and husbandry, has been in operation for some

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fifteen years. The results of pioneer work in these fields has been immovable at official level, I would like a letter drafted from and is being published in the scientific literature. me to the appropriate MoD minister.’ According to the memorandum, professional veterinary [1] In PRO file FCO 10/182 [*full ref*] and technical staff collaborate closely with the scientific staffs of the Porton establishments and supervise animal care and 680703 3 July 1968 In London, a Scottish Office Minister, having usage, as recommended by Littlewood Committee [see XX been asked how much CS has been purchased by or on behalf April 1965]. Surplus laboratory animals from the farm are of Scottish police forces since 1965, tells the House of sold at commercial rates to other government departments, to Commons: ‘I am informed that initial supplies of 32 grenades universities and to other Home Office registered laboratories were purchased in 1965 and that five grenades have since been requiring them. Allington Farm also farms some 1300 acres purchased to replace four used in practice and one in a incident of the safety zone of the Porton Range on commercial lines. involving an insane person. ... [The Secretary of State for Costing of this farming activity shows it to be a profitable Scotland] has advised chief constables that those weapons enterprise. should be used only to deal with armed criminals or violently The memorandum is later published by the committee.[1] [1] Reproduced in: House of Commons, Select Committee on Science and insane persons in buildings from which they cannot be Technology, ‘Defence Research’, Second Report of session 1968-69, HC 213, dislodged without danger of loss of life, or as a means of 7 May 1969, pp. 482. self-defence in a desperate situation, and that in no circumstances should they be used to assist in the control of 680702 disturbances.’[1] [See also 20 May 1965.] H 2 July 1968 [further PQ on porton publication policy — see [1] Norman Buchan, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, 3 July 1968, 17 June] Written Answers, Hansard (Commons), vol 767, c227, in response to a question from Tam Dalyell MP. 680702 Q 2 July 1968 In London, the office of Foreign Office 680704 Minister Lord Chalfont is minuted by the AEDD [*CHECK*] H 4 July 1968 [Home Sec on CS in HoC, OA, 1681-83 and on the question of chemical weapons stockpiles and the PM on CBW and MRE c1685.] ‘Bailey letter’ [see 11 June].[1] The minute reads: 680709 We have consulted the Ministry of Defence about Mr. Bailey’s Q 9 July 1968 In London, Ronald Hope-Jones, Head of the enquiry whether he could show Lord Chalfont’s letter on this subject to others. The Ministry of Defence have asked that the Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department, Foreign letter should not be so treated, since paragraph 3 of the letter Office, writes to KT Nash, Assistant Under-Secretary confirms that we have no stockpiles of lethal chemical weapons. (Policy), Ministry of Defence, on the subject of ‘Stockpiles of The reasons for the Ministry of Defence request are as follows. Chemical Weapons’ [see 2 July].[1] The letter reads: 2. An official statement that we have no stock-piles of As you know, a confidential official statement that the UK has chemical weapons was revealed in May, as the result of a leak to no stockpiles of chemical weapons, made during the course of an The Observer [see 26 May], during the course of an enquiry by enquiry by the Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and the Parliamentary Committee on Science and Technology. It was Technology, was leaked by Tam Dalyell to the Observer in May at first assumed that this fact would in future be treated as public [see 26 May]. I understand that the question whether the fact that knowledge and on this assumption the Ministry of Defence we have no stockpiles of these weapons should be de-classified agreed to the letter to Mr. Bailey. Subsequently however, the was subsequently submitted to the Chiefs of Staff, who decided question whether the statement that we have no stockpiles of that this should not be done. The position now, as I understand it, chemical weapons should be de-classified was submitted to the is that the Ministry of Defence are not denying the truth of the Chiefs of Staff who decided that this should not be done. The statement in question, but that you are not inviting attention to it position now is that the Ministry of Defence are not denying the and do not want the fact of our having no stockpiles of these truth of the statement, but they are not inviting attention to it and weapons repeated more than absolutely necessary. do not want it repeated more than absolutely necessary. 2. I am writing to urge that the Ministry of Defence policy of 3. The attitude of the Ministry of Defence is not altogether not publicly stating and confirming that we have no stockpile of logical. The statement in question received considerable notice. It lethal chemical weapons should be reconsidered. The reasons for can in any case be officially confirmed that we have no stocks of urging this course are as follows. biological weapons, so that questions are naturally asked about 3. The statement leaked by Mr. Dalyell to the effect that we stock-piles of chemical weapons. Unnecessary suspicions are have no stockpiles of chemical weapons received considerable only aroused if we fail to give a clear answer. We have made notice at the time. It is now, whether we like it or not, public these points to the Ministry of Defence. But since this is knowledge, and will no doubt have been duly noted by foreign primarily a matter for them, we see no alternative but to accept governments interested in the question. If evasive answers to the ruling of the (Chiefs of Staff). questions on the point are now given, or we seek to blur the truth 4. I recommend, therefore, and the Ministry of Defence agree, of the statement leaked to the Observer, quite unnecessary that the background should be explained to Mr. Bailey on the suspicions about activities at Porton and the Government’s policy telephone and that he should be asked not to give further in regard to chemical weapons are bound to be aroused. In view circulation to the letter. The point to stress is that we do not want of the current public agitation in regard to chemical and to invite attention to the statement which was improperly leaked biological weapons, there would seem to be every advantage in to the Observer. our stating clearly that we have no stockpiles of these weapons. 5. Mr. Bailey may of course tell any one that we have no stocks Indeed, this is implicit in the public statement that we are of biological weapons, that we do not export biological and permitted to make, namely that the only production at Porton is of chemical weapons, and that the only production at Porton Down small quantities of chemical and biological weapons prepared as is of small quantities prepared as necessary for the development necessary for the development and testing of defensive measures. and testing of defensive measures. 4. Account must also be taken of the fact that it can be At the end of the minute there is a handwritten annotation, officially confirmed that we have no stocks of biological dated 3 July, by the minister: ‘This sounds like the worst sort weapons. This naturally leads to questions about the position in of obscurantism to me — and of the kind that makes everyone regard to stockpiles of chemical weapons. 5. The difficulties into which the current policy on this issue concerned look very foolish. I am most reluctant to accept this can lead have been illustrated by a recent problem about which Chiefs of Staff ruling, which is quite illogical. You cannot we have consulted your Department. In a letter written to a make a public statement secret again by saying it should not member of the public in early June [see 11 June], Lord Chalfont have been ‘de-classified’. If the Ministry of Defence prove confirmed (with your agreement at the time) that we have no

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stockpiles of lethal chemical weapons. The correspondent has suggestion that it adopt them as a basis for consideration with a now asked if he could show this letter to others; and you have view to taking action in this field at an early date. said, in the light of the latest ruling by the Chiefs of Staff, that this He notes that in going beyond the Geneva Protocol, there should not be done because of the statement on chemical weapon are fewer problems in the biological area than the chemical stockpiles. This seems to us to be an anomalous position, and one and ‘therefore, that one answer may be to make a distinction which is not easy to defend. Unfortunately, once a fact has become public knowledge, even if this was due to an improper between chemical and biological weapons in our approach to leak, it is impossible to act as though it had never been revealed. the problems involved’. While new instruments would be 6. We should be most grateful to know whether the Ministry of needed for both chemical and biological warfare, ‘I think it Defence, on reconsideration, would be prepared to agree that it may be easier first to tackle agents of biological warfare and should in future be made known, in line with the official seek to conclude an instrument on biological warfare which statement leaked during the enquiry by the Parliamentary Select would go beyond the Geneva Protocol and actually ban the Committee, that the position is that we have no stockpiles of production and possession of agents of biological warfare’. lethal chemical weapons. 7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Major-General Gibbon He proposes to submit a working paper on the subject. and to Walker (MGO (Sec)). The Minister puts forward a further idea: [1] In PRO file FCO 10/182 [*full ref*] I would take up a proposal contained in the draft resolution submitted by the Maltese delegation at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly and suggest that our 680711 co-Chairmen on behalf of this Committee should request the H 11 July 1968 [US Deputy Secretary of Defense states that, Secretary-General to prepare a report on the nature and possible although the United States is not a party to the Geneva effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use, Protocol of 1925, it had consistently supported the worthy with a view to giving this Committee an international scientific objectives which the Protocol sought to achieve, and it basis for future consideration of further measures for their believes that all states should do likewise. Also this day, US limitation and control, as well as focusing public opinion on the General Wheeler says that the Soviet proposal [see 1 July] was issues involved. This would follow the precedent of the recent very valuable report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear ‘obviously designed for other than serious negotiations’, weapons which has been so often quoted in our discussion. The basing this observation on the fact that the proposal was British Government would be willing, of course, to play a full accompanied by an accusation that the United States was part in the preparation of such a report.[1] involved in a war of aggression in Viet-Nam.] [1] As reproduced in ENDC document ENDC/PV.381, 16 July 1968.

680716 680716 Q 16 July 1968 In London, the Secretary of State for Defence, 16 July 1968 In Geneva, British Foreign Minister Frederick , speaks to reporters on his return from visiting Mulley addresses a plenary session of the Eighteen Nation the defence facilities at Porton Down. His visit follows recent Committee on Disarmament (ENDC). The Committee has controversies [see [*ref*]]. He declares that work at the been considering its priorities for future action following the establishments will remain secret and states that he now completion of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) knows all the secret work that is going on, some of which he [see 1 July]. He says: had not known before. He says: ‘I am not only satisfied it is my own priority for action in the non-nuclear field concerns chemical and biological warfare. ... Some countries claim that genuinely defensive; I am also satisfied of the reasons why it nothing more is needed in this field than that all States should should remain secret’ and adds that only about 20 per cent of adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol ... and strictly observe its the work is secret. He promises that the open days will go principle. I recall the resolution of the General Assembly on this ahead as planned [see 12 June] and expresses the belief that a subject in the twenty-first session [see 5 December 1966] and, of great deal of public anxiety could be allayed if more course, would like to see all countries which have not done so information was given about the nature of the work which had already ratify the Protocol. But I cannot agree that this is all that to be kept secret and why it should be so. He also indicated is needed, and there are three points to which I would draw attention. The first is that the States which are parties to the that the government was searching for means for effective Protocol — I think there are fifty-four of them — have not all international control of biological weapons — ‘a total ban undertaken exactly the same obligations. Many of them, with effective verification’.[1] including the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to use [Note: although some media place emphasis on the 20 per chemical and biological weapons against non-parties and cent secrecy figure as being new, it is the same figure that has violators of the Protocol. Secondly, even if all States were to been bandied about for some time, e.g., see 22 June.] accede to the Protocol there would still be a risk of large-scale use [1] [No author listed], ‘Some Porton work must remain secret — Healey’, of the proscribed weapons as long as States have the right to Financial Times, 17 July 1968. [*Guardian or Times coverage??*] manufacture such weapons and to use them against violators. Thirdly, there is no consensus on the meaning of the term “gases” 680718 in the phrase “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all 18 July 1968 In London, the Secretary of State for Defence, analogous liquids, materials or devices”. The French and English Denis Healey, gives evidence to the House of Commons versions of the Protocol do not correspond exactly and this has Select Committee on Science and Technology for its inquiry led to disagreement on whether non-lethal gases are covered by into Defence Research. His testimony begins in public then the Protocol. It is also argued that the term “bacteriological” as used in the Protocol is not sufficiently comprehensive to include moves into a private session. During the evidence heard in the whole range of possible biological agents of warfare. private he says: ‘One has to accept there is a potential threat to Unhappily, there have been considerable developments in both this country from both chemical and biological weapons. The the chemical and biological means of warfare in the forty-three view we have taken is that we must maintain, as you were told years since the Protocol was concluded. This suggests that there at Porton, an adequate defence capability in both fields. In the is a strong case for either revising the Geneva Protocol or trying field of chemical weapons we have a very good capability to negotiate some additional instrument to clarify and strengthen indeed so far as our services are concerned. It is not so easy its provisions while keeping the Protocol itself in being. My preference is for the latter course and my Government has for to conceive of the use of chemical weapons against a civil some considerable time been studying the problems involved. population in these islands. Their use against soldiers in These studies will be finalized shortly and I hope then to put some Europe is something we must almost expect if there were a positive and specific proposals before the Committee with a war in Europe. We have not felt it necessary, nor indeed did

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the previous Government, to develop retaliatory capability number of organisations likely to be interested in the work of here, because we have nuclear weapons, and obviously we the Establishment.’[1] might choose to retaliate in that way if that was the A separate answer today gives details of sources of requirement. But this is a thing one has to keep under animals used for experimental purposes: ‘65,222 of the continuous review. As I have said publicly when I came back animals used for research at the Porton Research from Porton two days ago [see 16 July], in the biological field Establishments in 1967, and subsequently destroyed, were it is very difficult to form a fully satisfactory estimate of the bred at Allington Farm [see 1 July], a Government nature of the threat in this theatre, but the possibility is there, establishment also situated at Porton. The remaining 922 and we are therefore doing research on defence against these animals, comprising chicks, pigs, frogs and monkeys, were weapons, for a very small cost indeed, which I think is well purchased from farmers and other suppliers.’[2] worth continuing. The real question is whether we can find Also today, Tam Dalyell MP apologises to the House of some way of relieving public anxiety lest we are developing Commons for the leaking of the transcript of evidence taken offensive capability by some means or other. This is what I by the Science and Technology Committee at Porton Down am looking at the whole time.’ The testimony is later [see 6 May] to The Observer newspaper [see 26 May]. He is published by the committee.[1] reprimanded by the House by a vote of 244–52 after a long [Note: this statement, once public, becomes the first debate.[3] [*more, inc privileges report*] official public acknowledgement of the UK’s lack of [1] John Morris, Minister of Defence for Equipment, 24 July 1968, Written Answers, Hansard, vol 769, c136-37, in response to a question from Mr Ellis. retaliatory CW capability.] [2] John Morris, Minister of Defence for Equipment, 24 July 1968, Written [1] Reproduced in: House of Commons, Select Committee on Science and Answers, Hansard, vol 769, c136, in response to a question from Mrs Lena Technology, ‘Defence Research’, Second Report of session 1968-69, HC 213, Jeger. 7 May 1969, pp. 425-50. [3] Hansard, vol 769, c587–666.

680718 680726 18 July 1968 In London, the subject of whether the 26 July 1968 In London, the House of Commons is told, in Microbiological Research Establishment, Porton Down, response to a question about Gruinard Island [see 11 March]: should be transferred from the Ministry of Defence to the ‘The most recent examination took place on 4 September Department of Health is raised once again [see 4 July] during 1967. The next examination will take place later this year.’[1] Prime Minister’s questions in the House of Commons. The [1] John Morris, Minister of Defence for Equipment, 26 July 1968, Written Prime Minister responds: ‘These matters are of course kept Answers, Hansard (Commons), vol 769, c229, in response to a question from under review, Sir. But in the Government’s view the present Mrs Ewing. balance of argument favours the existing arrangements.’ 680730 Further exchanges follow: ‘Is the Prime Minister aware 30 July 1968 In Geneva, the Polish representative addresses that some of us are shaken by the statement attributed to the a plenary session of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Secretary of State for Defence after his visit to Porton on Disarmament (ENDC). He suggests the proposal for a study Tuesday [see 16 July] by helicopter, that he now knows a lot by the UN Secretary-General on the nature and possible of things about CBW and Porton that he had not known before effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their and that no one had told him before? ... Is it not painfully clear use [see 16 July] should instead include issues related to both that the decision to keep [MRE] Porton under the Ministry of chemical and biological weapons.[1] Defence was in fact taken at a time when senior members of [1] As reproduced in ENDC document ENDC/PV.385, 30 July 1968, pp the Cabinet were not aware of all the facts?’ The Prime 18–24. Minister responds: ‘I would have thought that, whenever a visit of this kind takes place, something is learned from it. All 680801 that was needed to take this decision was known. All that had Q 1 August 1968 In the UK, the Firearms Act enters into to be known was known when this decision was taken. As I force, having received Royal Assent on 30 May. The section have said, we are keeping it under review. There might be a of the Act defining weapons subject to general prohibition case for transfer in the future, I am not closing the door to that includes: ‘(b) any weapon of whatever description designed or at all.’[1] adapted for the discharge of any noxious liquid, gas or other [1] , Prime Minister, 18 July 1968, Oral Answers, Hansard thing’ and ‘(c) any ammunition containing, or designed or (Commons), vol 768, c1660, in response to questions from Tam Dalyell. adapted to contain, any such noxious thing’.[1] These provisions replace similar provisions that had been contained 680720 in the Firearms Act 1937. H 20 July 1968 [Nature{‘Porton Revealed’, Nature, vol 219, [Note: (1) Sub paragraph (c) is later amended by the 20 July 1968, p. 213.} and Economist{‘The Shuddermakers: Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 to read: ‘(c) any cartridge What goes on at Britain’s secret research establishments at with a bullet designed to explode on or immediately before Porton, Wilts, is anathema to left-wing agitators. But it is a impact, any ammunition containing or designed or adapted to necessary precaution’, The Economist, vol 228, no 6517, 20 contain any such noxious thing as is mentioned in paragraph July 1968, p. 20.} articles on Porton.] (b) above and, if capable of being used with a firearm of any description, any grenade, bomb (or other like missile), or 680724 rocket or shell designed to explode as aforesaid’; (2) By the Q 24 July 1968 In London, a Defence Minister confirms Transfer of Functions (Prohibited Weapons)Order 1968, SI details for open days at MRE Porton Down to the House of 1968/1200, the functions of the Defence Council are Commons: ‘Open days are to be held at the Microbiological transferred to the Secretary of State.] [*Add case law, e.g., Research Establishment on Wednesday, 23rd October, and the hydrochloric acid bottle and electro-shock??*] two succeeding days. I hope that Members [of Parliament] [1] Firearms Act 1968 c27, Section 5, paragraph 1. will take advantage of this opportunity to visit the Establishment. ... Invitations will also be issued to 680806 representatives of universities, learned societies, research Q 6 August 1968 In Geneva, the United Kingdom submits to associations, local authorities, industry, the Press and a the ENDC a ‘Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare’.[1]

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The paper is presented in person by British Foreign Office respect for the Geneva Protocol. Respect for international law Minister of State Fred Mulley. The paper includes: was not one of his strongest points, as far as I recall — and I The United Kingdom Delegation consider that the 1925 had some first-hand experience of his concern for another Geneva Protocol is not an entirely satisfactory instrument for Geneva Convention, concerning prisoners of war. In my dealing with the question of chemical and microbial warfare. The opinion a more likely explanation of his restraint was fear of following points may be noted: (i) Many states are not parties to the Protocol and of those that retaliation. And although chemical warfare was not used in are parties many, including the United Kingdom, have reserved the Second World War, it was used in the 1930s and has been the right to use chemical and bacteriological weapons against used again since then. non-parties, violators of the Protocol and their allies. ‘But the most eloquent evidence of the fear of the use of (ii) Jurists are not agreed whether the Protocol represents these weapons, and the lack of faith in the Protocol’s power to customary international law or whether it is of a purely prevent their use, lies in the fact that the armed forces of all the contractual nature. major Powers are trained and equipped to defend themselves (iii) Even if all states were to accede to the Protocol there would still be a risk of large-scale use of the proscribed weapons as long at any rate against chemical methods of warfare, and that those as states have the right to manufacture such weapons and to use countries are engaged in expensive research programmes to them against violators and their allies. produce countermeasures against attack by microbiological (v) The term "bacteriological" as used in the Protocol is not agents. I am sure neither of those precautions will be sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of abandoned even if the Protocol is ratified by all states.’ microbial agents that might be used in hostilities. [*more?*] (vi) The prohibition in the Protocol applies to use "in war". [1] United Kingdom, ‘Working Paper on Microbiological Warfare’, There may therefore be doubt about its applicability in the case of ENDC/231, 6 August 1968. hostilities which do not amount to war in its technical sense. [2] ENDC/PV.387 ... [*add para 2??*] 3. ... As far as chemical agents are concerned it seems unlikely 680813 that states will be prepared to forego the right to produce and H 13 August 1968 [In Geneva, the Soviet Representative stockpile such agents for possible use in war unless adequate Alexei Roshchin tells the Eighteen Nation Disarmament verification procedures can be devised and applied and problems of definition, etc. resolved. However, the use of microbiological Committee: ‘The proposal to revise the Geneva Protocol is a methods of warfare has never been established, and these are dangerous one. If we were to follow that course we might generally regarded with even greater abhorrence than chemical destroy an already existing, useful and important international methods. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore consider that document on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological in this field the choice lies between going ahead with the weapons without having replaced it by a better or indeed by formulation of new obligations and doing nothing at all — in any other international instrument — a treaty or convention which case the risks and the fears of eventual use of that would provide for the prohibition of the use of such types microbiological methods of warfare will continue and intensify of weapons.’] indefinitely. 4. The United Kingdom Delegation therefore propose the early conclusion of a new Convention for the Prohibition of 680814 Microbiological Methods of Warfare, which would supplement Q 14 August 1968 In London, further letters are written as part but not supersede the 1925 Geneva Protocol. This Convention of the on-going correspondence relating to responses to would proscribe the use for hostile purposes of microbiological questions about whether the UK holds stockpiles of chemical agents causing death or disease by infection in man, other weapons [see 9 July]. animals, or crops. Under it states would:— One letter,[1] from Fred Mulley, Foreign Office Minister (i) declare their belief that the use of microbiological methods of warfare of any kind and in any circumstances should be treated of State, to the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey as contrary to international law and a crime against humanity; reads: (ii) undertake never to engage in such methods of warfare I am writing to you about a decision taken by the Chiefs of Staff themselves in any circumstances. on 8 August [*get*] to uphold the policy that we can confirm, 5. The Convention should also include a ban on the production when asked directly, that we do not have a stockpile of chemical of microbiological agents ... weapons but that otherwise this information should not be ... publicised. This matter has just been brought to my attention. 10. Consideration should be given to the possibility of The present policy seems to me to be anomalous. In including in the Convention an article under which the parties unclassified letters to individuals I may confirm, so long as I am would undertake to support appropriate action in accordance with directly asked, that we do not have a stockpile of chemical the United Nations Charter to counter the use, or threatened use, weapons, a fact that was leaked during the recent enquiry by the of microbiological methods of warfare. If such an article were Parliamentary Select Committee on Science and Technology [see included it might be endorsed by the Security Council in rather 26 May]. But the recipient is apparently expected to keep this the same way as the Council welcomed and endorsed the information to himself, though there is no need for me to tell him declarations made by the United States, the Soviet Union and the this unless he asks. Whilst I can understand that in other United Kingdom in connection with the Non-Proliferation circumstances it might have been logical to conceal the truth, this Treaty. [*more?*] is no longer practicable, since the fact that we have no stockpile Speaking to the ENDC, Mulley says:[2] ‘ I should stress of chemical weapons has become public knowledge, has received considerable notice in the press, and will not have escaped the again, as I did in my speech on 16 July [see 16 July], that our attention of foreign governments interested in the question. purpose is to supplement and not to supersede the Geneva If the Government fail to make the position about stockpiles of Protocol of 1925. ... chemical weapons clear, or are evasive, quite unnecessary ‘I contest the view, therefore, that the 1925 Protocol or suspicions are likely to be aroused about our activities at Porton similar declarations against first use is all we need or that ... Down and about the Government’s policy over chemical the Geneva Protocol has prevented the use of chemical and weapons. These suspicions are bound to be aggravated by the biological warfare in the past, notably in the Second World fact that it can be officially confirmed that we do not have a stockpile of biological weapons. War, and that by implication the Protocol can be relied upon I would therefore urge that the current policy be reversed. to prevent the use of these horrible weapons in the future. I Apart from the considerations I have already given, there seems cannot accept that argument. I know of no evidence to support to be definite advantage, from the political point of view, in the view that Hitler did not resort to the use of gas because of stating clearly that we do not have a stockpile of chemical

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weapons and I do not believe that this would prejudice our [1] From a list, published in the Russian-language journal Posev (1999, no present military position or any future military decisions. 1), of resolutions passed during the period 1926-89 by the Central Committee Another letter,[2] from KT Nash, Assistant of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers. The list is adapted from information made available from Russia Under-Secretary (Policy), Ministry of Defence, to Ronald by Lev Fedorov, president of the Union of Chemical Safety, but otherwise Hope-Jones, Head of the Atomic Energy and Disarmament cites no sources. Department, Foreign Office, reads: I am now in a position to reply to your letter of 9th July [see 9 680902 July] which has been considered by the Chiefs of Staff and H 2 September 1968 [‘Pumping out the nerve gas well in Ministers here. Denver has been delayed by mechanical problems with the 2. I should explain first that if we were starting from scratch, pump. The poisonous fluids are being pumped into a our view would be that to any enquiries about stockpiles the reply ninety-acre asphalt-bottomed “evaporation lake” at the should be that we ‘neither confirm nor deny’. This line has served [Rocky Mountain] arsenal.’ — ‘the Pogo Equation’ in Sterling HMG well on a number of occasions in the past in relation to other matters, and in our view the subject of CW stockpiles would Seagrave, Yellow Rain: a journey through the terror of have been very suitable for such treatment. chemical warfare, New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 3. Unfortunately we are not starting from scratch; but I know 1981, p 261 [*find more??*].] you appreciate that in our approach to the question we must still consider the security aspects and the military benefits of different 6810xx ways of public treatment. On this basis I am afraid that we cannot Q XX October 1968 The agent CR is first authorized for use go along with your view that there is ‘every advantage in our by British forces, in the form of an aerosol or with water stating clearly that we have no stockpiles of these weapons’; there cannon. A wheeled dispenser is introduced in December is no military advantage in so doing. As we see it, the aim must be 1974, a vehicle-based version is deployed in 1976 and a to make the best of the situation militarily as well as politically in projectile delivery device authorized for use in 1977.[1] The the light of the disclosures that have been made already. 4. Following your letter, therefore, we have considered the aerosol form of CR is a hand-held squirt device known as a situation again; and our review has confirmed us in our belief self-protection aid device (SPAD). Authorization for CR to that, while to be evasive in reply to direct questions would not do be held in readiness for use has always been subject to anyone any good, we should volunteer nothing further, but be ministerial approval.[2] prepared to confirm that we have no stockpile of chemical Thirty years later, a defence minister tells Parliament: ‘We weapons when we are asked directly. Any discussion tending to have no records of CR having been used operationally by the go beyond this specific question would be clinched by reference Armed Forces. ... Its possible use has also been authorised on to the whole of the statement (shortly to be published) which the a small number of occasions where the armed forces have Secretary of State for Defence recently made to the Select Committee [see 18 July]: - ‘We have not felt it necessary, nor responded to a request for assistance for law enforcement indeed did the previous Government, to develop retaliatory purposes from the civil power. CR is only authorised as a capability here, because we have nuclear weapons, and obviously non-lethal self-defence option where the risk to the safety of we might choose to retaliate in that way if that were the military personnel is considered particularly high.’[3] requirement. But this is a thing one has to keep under continuing [1] John Spellar, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Written Answer, review’. Given that any questions which actually arise can thus 27 April 2001, Hansard (Commons), vol 367, c415W, responding to a question be answered in a straightforward manner, we envisage no great from Kevin McNamara MP. awkwardness will result for either of our Departments; and we [2] John Spellar, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Written Answer, hope that you will feel able to agree with this. 8 May 2001, Hansard (Commons), vol 368, c17W, responding to a question from Kevin McNamara MP. 5. There remains the question whether the recipient of the letter [3] John Spellar, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence, Lord Chalfont wrote [see 11 June] may show it to other people. Written Answer, 17 December 1998, Hansard (Commons), vol 322, c657, Our view remains that we should like you to ask the responding to a question from Ken Livingstone MP. correspondent to regard it as information given to him personally; we hope that your relations with him will make this possible. 681014 (Presumably there is nothing else in the letter on which it would 14 October 1968 In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of be possible to base a refusal of the request?) Defence is criticized for its policy on experiments with [1] Letter from Fred Mulley, Foreign Office Minister of State, to Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence, entitled ‘Stockpiles of Chemical humans taking LSD [see XX January]. The Reverend John Weapons’, dated 14 August 1968 (marked Confidential), in PRO file FCO McNichol, founder of the National Association of Drug 10/182. Addiction, condemns the practice as irresponsible.[1] [2] In PRO file 10/182 [*full ref*] [1] [no author listed], ‘Troops given LSD in Porton tests’, Times (London), 15 October 1968. 680828 Q 28 August 1968 In Geneva, the report of the current session 681015 of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), 15 October 1968 Nigeria deposits its instrument of which had started on 16 July, is agreed. Acknowledging the accession to the 1925 Geneva Protocol with the French proposals from the UK [see 16 July] and Poland [see 30 July] government, together with the following reservation: ‘The for studies by the UN Secretary-General, the Committee Protocol is only binding on Nigeria in relation to States agrees ‘to recommend to the General Assembly that the effectively bound by it and it ceases to bind Nigeria towards Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to study the any States whose forces or the armed forces of whose allies effects of the possible use of chemical and bacteriological fail to respect the prohibitions laid down therein.’ means of warfare. Because of the importance of this matter, the hope was expressed that the report on this study would be 681017 H 17 October 1968 [In the United Kingdom, a reorganisation referred at an early date to the General Assembly, the Security of Ministerial responsibilities leads to the creation of the Council and the Committee’.[1] [1] ENDC/236, 28 August 1968 [*get original*]. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) from the merger of the Foreign Office (FO) and the Commonwealth Relations 680902 Office. The Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department of 2 September 1968 Soviet political authorities pass a the FO becomes the Disarmament Department of the FCO. resolution on a major expansion of chemical-weapons AEDD head, Ronald Hope-Jones, becomes head of the new programmes, according to a list published some years later.[1] DD.]

10 — [Draft @ June 07] CBW Events 1968 Sample file Not for quotation or citation

681024 681220 24 October 1968 James Watson, joint winner of a Nobel Q 20 December 1968 The United Nations General Assembly Prize with Francis Crick for the discovery of DNA, urges the adopts resolution 2454 A (XXIII) on the Geneva Protocol. abandoning of all research on biological warfare. In a press The resolution also calls for the Secretary-General of the interview published the next day, Watson calls biological United Nations to establish a ‘Group of Experts’ to report ‘on weapons ‘impractical’ and recommends the military facilities chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the working in this subject area be transformed into institutions effects of their possible use’. The resolution recommends studying dangerous diseases.[1] ‘that the report should be based on accessible material and [1] Victor Cohn, ‘Nobel Winner Calls Germ War Studies Useless’, prepared with the assistance of qualified consultant experts Washington Post, 25 October 1968.] appointed by the Secretary-General, taking into account the 681023-25 views expressed and the suggestions made during the H 23–25 October 1968 [MRE open days. Lidar discussion of this item at the twenty-third session of the demonstrated] General Assembly’ [*INSERT full text*] 681228 681030 Q 28 December 1968 The United States mission to the United Q 30 October 1968 While observing a British Army exercise Nations transmits an airgram to the State Department on in West Germany, a newspaper correspondent writes ‘More ‘XXIII General Assembly: Evaluation of Results in the than a third of the gun ammunition stockpiled by the Disarmament Field’.[1] The airgram includes: ‘The Soviet Communist forces in Eastern Europe is believed to be filled agreement to use the formula ‘chemical and bacteriological with gas, most of it probably nerve agents of one kind or (biological)’ throughout the terms of reference (TR) for the another’. [*more*] [1] [1] David Fairhall (from Willebadessen), ‘Russia’s nerve-gas shells’, SYG’s [UN Secretary-General’s] CBW effects study Guardian (London), 30 October 1968. represents an advance in obtaining acceptance of the US position on this issue. This is particularly true in light of the 681113 precedent, to which we earlier expected the Soviets to cling, Q 13 November 1968 In London, GN Gadsby, Head of the of the term ‘chemical and bacteriological’ in the ENDC report UK’s Chemical Defence Establishment, tells a seminar that that recommended the SYG study. [see 28 August] defence scientists believe that between 15 and 20 per cent of ‘The US Delegation encountered some difficulty in Soviet Munitions stockpile is chemical [see also 30 October]. arriving at an acceptable resolution (2454A) [see 20 The seminar, held at the Royal United Services Institute, is December] on the CBW study due to the assertiveness of the also addressed by Gordon Smith, head of the Microbiological Polish Delegation and a tendency on the part of the Canadians Research Establishment — the other defence establishment at and British not to fight with the Poles about points that were Porton — who describes a simulated attack on Britain in of more interest to the US than to Canada and the UK. which a harmless agent was sprayed off the east coast; Moreover, a strong UK objection to the TR worked out by the measurements from which showed that the agent effectively US and Soviet Delegations, and accepted by the Canadian blanketed the south of below the line from Delegation, almost wrecked US effort to provide the TR to the Birmingham to the Wash [see REF BACK].[1] SYG. The UK Delegation continued to press its objection to [1] [no author listed], ‘Gas war build-up by Russia’, Times (London), 14 November 1968, p 12. the ‘bacteriological (biological)’ formula with the Secretariat and the US Delegation even after the TR had been read to the 681123 First Committee and handed over to the Secretariat. The UK H 23 November 1968 [‘West German scientist Dr. Ehrenfried Delegation hopes this difference will not affect the CBW Petras defects to East Germany, claiming he had been working study, but the UK and Soviet experts may not be able to avoid on chemical and biological warfare projects for the Bonn a resumption of the dispute when drafting the CBW study government. He asks for asylum to work “in the service of report.’ peace.” Bonn denies the Petras charges, insisting that it [1] Airgram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State (Drafted by Alan F. Neidle, David L. Aaron, and Richard L. McCormack studies only defensive problems.’ — ‘the Pogo Equation’ in on 21 December, and cleared by Peter S. Thacher, Committee I Executive Sterling Seagrave, Yellow Rain: a journey through the terror Officer), 28 December 1968, Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-6, of chemical warfare, New York: M. Evans and Company, marked ‘Confidential’, [electronic copy available via Department of State Inc., 1981, p 261.] website] [*URL?*] 681228 681206 H 28 December 1968 [‘Geologist Dr. David M. Evans tells an 6 December 1968 Mongolia deposits its instrument of ecological conference that America has 110 deep wells for accession to the 1925 Geneva Protocol with the French disposal of chemical warfare agents (up from only 2 in 1950) government, together with the following reservation: ‘In the and warns that they are causing permanent damage to event of the violation of this prohibition by any State vis-a-vis farmlands and urban areas in the Southwest. He said there is the Mongolian People’s Republic or its allies, the Government “an absolutely beautiful correlation” between the number of of the Mongolian People’s Republic shall not hold itself gallons poured in and the number of earthquakes produced’ — bound by the obligations of the Protocol with regard to that Sterling Seagrave, Yellow Rain: a journey through the terror State.’ of chemical warfare, New York: M. Evans and Company, 681217 Inc., 1981, p 262 [*more??*].] 17 December 1968 The Syrian Arab Republic deposits its instrument of accession to the 1925 Geneva Protocol with the French government, together with the following reservation: ‘The accession of the Syrian Arab Republic to this Protocol and its ratification thereof shall in no way signify recognition of Israel or lead to entry into a relationship with it regarding any matter regulated by the said Protocol.’

CBW Events 1968 Sample file [Draft @ June 07] — 11