EPC WORKING PAPER N° 9

Integrating Europe Multiple speeds - One direction ?

April 2004

Franklin Dehousse Wouter Coussens In strategic partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation Giovanni Grevi

POLITICAL EUROPE EPC WORKING PAPER

Integrating Europe Multiple speeds - One direction ?

April 2004

EPC Working Papers cover the extended discussion of contemporary themes. They are normally written by in-house analysts, although outside experts may also be invited to produce papers. Working Papers are poli- cy oriented and contain an executive summary and key recommendations. The papers represent the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the EPC.

Franklin Dehousse Wouter Coussens Giovanni Grevi

POLITICAL EUROPE 2 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 . h e omnmnso lxbeitgain 31 W Relations, andProfessor attheUniversity 14 ofLiège. Communities, Assessor ofEuropean StudiesattheRoyal InstituteforInternational 18 Fr 5. The tencommandmentsofflexible integration 9 4. Potential applicationsofflexibleintegration 3. Typology offlexibleintegration 2. Enhancedcooperation inthe Treaty 1. Flexibility:experiencessofar to which theybelong. *The viewsexpressedhere belongexclusively totheauthorsand theycannotbeascribedtotheinstitutions anklin Dehousse*isJudge attheCourtofFirst InstanceoftheEuropean outer Coussens*isaResearcher attheRoyal InstituteforInternationalRelations .. FP 26 29 23 21 18 22 27 8 5 7 14 15 10 14 4.7. Environment 4.6. Area offreedom,securityandjustice 4.5. CFSP 9 4.4. Defence 6 4.3. Socialpolicy 4.2. Taxation 4.1. EMU 12 3.2. The treatybaseoftheflexiblearrangement 3.1. The scopeofthecooperation athand 2.4. Experienceswithenhancedcooperation 2.3. …andpossiblyfurtherfine-tunedintheConstitutional Treaty 2.2. …facilitatedby the Treaty ofNice 2.1. An innovation ofthe Amsterdam Treaty… 1.4. EMU 1.3. SocialProtocol 1.2. Western EuropeanUnion(WEU) 1.1. Schengen FLEXIBLE INTEGRA By Franklin Dehousseand Wouter Coussens T BEOFCONTENTS ABLE TION : PO TENTIAL APPLIC A TIONS ? .Cnlso 62 60 49 46 38 42 52 45 48 50 Giovanni Grevi is Associate Director ofStudieswiththeEuropean Policy Centre 9. Conclusion 8. The endjustifies‘flexible’means 7. What shouldbedoneby ‘flexible’means? 6. Cohesion,coherence,efficiency andtransparency 5. Definingapoliticalproject 4. The debateonflexibility:threeproblems 3. The stalemateofintegration 2. The vocabulary offlexibility 1. The stateofthedebate K Executive Summary yrcmedtos 40 ey recommendations FLEXIBLE MEANS By Giovanni Grevi T O FUR THER INTEGRA TION

3 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 4 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 lessons (chapter 5). nal security, foreignpolicy anddefence. We willtry, finally, todefineafewpractical projects willconcernthemainareasoflastyears: economiccooperation, inter- tives (chapter 3)andtoexaminepossibleprojectsinthatcontext(chapter 4). These visions (chapter 2).Itthenbecomespossibletodefinedifferentcategories ofinitia- begin withareminderofthepreviousexperiences(chapter 1)andofthetreaty pro- cies. Itisconsequentlynecessarytodevelop aprogressive analysis.Onemustthus aspects arevery complex. There arealotofconnections withthepresentEUpoli- Examining thepossibleusesofflexibleintegration isnotatalleasy. The technical form amongothersofflexibleintegration. Enhanced cooperation, allowed conditionallyby article43 TEU, isthusonlyone States areinvolved forlack ofeitherpoliticalconsensusorcapacitytoparticipate. to allsortsofcollective actioninaspecificdomainwhich notallEUMember terminology. We willreferto‘flexibleintegration’ astheoverarching termreferring specific policy recommendations,itisthereforerecommendabletoclarifyfirstthe T but toanalysewhat couldbedonewiththem. analyse indetailthelegalnatureofdifferentflexibleintegration arrangements, examine what couldbedone sibilities openedby thetreatiesof Amsterdam andNice.Itthusseemedusefulto the enlargement,willcreateacontextinwhich itwillbedifficultnottousethepos- tally, thelimitedresultsofConvention, combinedwiththeinstitutionalimpactof to imposetheadoptionofConvention’s Constitutional Treaty. Morefundamen- future ofEurope. At theendofyear, itwas mentionedasakindofthreatmeant During 2003,flexibleintegration hasbeenregularlyevoked inspeeches aboutthe v Schoutheete, G. Durand, G.Grevi,Prof.J.V. LouisandE.Philippart for theirvaluable comments onearlier to which theybelong. The authorswould liketothankS.Biscop,H.Bribosia,Crossick, B. Crum,P. de 1 The views expressedherebelongexclusively totheauthorsandtheycannotbeascribed totheinstitutions ersions ofthisworking paper. his debateiscomplicatedby aconsiderable conceptualconfusion.Beforemaking WHAT COULDBE THE POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS ? By Franklin Dehousseand Wouter Coussens LXBEITGAIN: FLEXIBLE INTEGRATION in concreto . The objective ofthispaperisthereforenot 1 the ‘corebusiness’ofUnion,i.e.internalmarket. were neithertemporary norbasedonobjective reasons. This even occurredwithin formity,’ some formsofmicro-flexibilityclearlyoccurredinspecificcaseswhich willing (e.g.theUKopt-outofSocialCharter)toparticipateincertainpolicies. level forMemberStateswhich werenotable(e.g.theEMUconvergence criteria)or stituted aturningpointinthisrespect,by providing forderogationsattheprimarylaw on intra-EU flexibleintegration hasgradually beenlifted. The Treaty ofMaastricht con- W Schengen (1.1)andthe WEU (1.2)here. ples exist: WEU, Eurocorps,EMSetc.For reasonsofbrevity, weonlyconsider framework which involved onlyalimitednumberofMemberStates.Several exam- remained ataboo. w economic differenceinsituation(e.g.outermostregions). Apart fromtheseformsof limited periodoftime(e.g.transition periods)orrespondingtoanobjective socio- ential regimes. Yet, theseregimeswereconsideredexemptions,allowed onlyfora them. Admittedly, theinitial Treaties didcontainsome provisions establishingdiffer- do thesamethingattime,withrightsandobligationsforallof It haslongbeenamatterofCommunityorthodoxythatallitsMemberStatesshould :experiences sofar 1. Flexibility as wellmeasures tocombatterrorismand organised crime. involved anenhanced coordinationbetween thepolice,customsand judiciary dom ofmovement was accompaniedby so-called“compensatory”measures. This external borderwithcommon asylumandimmigration checks. Moreover, thisfree- Schengen abolishedtheinternalborders ofthesignatorystatesandcreatedasingle ders, which becameknown asthe“.” andtheBeneluxdecidedin 1985 tocreateaterritorywithoutinternalbor- altogether. SincetheMemberStateswere unabletoreach anagreement,, of freemovement foreveryone, which would meananendtointernalborderchecks order todistinguishbetweencitizensandnon-EUnationals. Others arguedinfavour apply toEUcitizensonly, which would involve keepinginternalborderchecks in concept of‘freemovement ofpersons.’ SomeMemberStatesfeltthatthisshould T 1.1. Schengen framework, notablyinthedomainsofsocialpolicy (1.3)andEMU(1.4). Accordingly, theMaastricht Treaty increasedthelevel offlexibility EU MemberStateshowever embarkeduponseveral experiments he originsofSchengen lieinthedisagreementbetweenMember Statesonthe hat issometimescalled‘micro-flexibility,’ theissueof‘flexibleintegration’ largely ith theexpansionofUnion’s membershipaswellitsscopeofaction,this‘taboo’ 2 Nonetheless, itshouldbeunderlinedthatunderthis‘veil ofuni- 3 within outside the Treaty the EU 4

5 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 6 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 of aneventual integration ofthe WEU intotheEU framework. w the Union”andallowed theEUtoavail itselfofthe WEU toimplement decisions Maastricht and Amsterdam madethe WEU an“integral partofthedevelopment of organisation. Itwas reactivated somewhat duringthe1980s. The Treaties of Given thepredominantroleofNATO, the WEU remainedessentiallya‘dormant’ observer status. The candidatecountrieshave aspecialstatus. EU countriesexceptforDenmark,, , andSweden,which have defence andsecurity. The membership ofthe WEU expandedtoincludeallcurrent the WEU. The WEU isaEuropeanorganisationforthepurposesofcooperation on 1954, theBrussels Treaty was modified toincludeGermany andItaly, thuscreating defence andeconomic,socialcultural collaboration betweenitssignatories.In Brussels Treaty Organisation –asitwas thencalled–provided forcollective self- In 1948,France, UKandtheBenelux-countriessigned Treaty ofBrussels. The 1.2. Western (WEU) Schengen dependentonafavourable solutionofthe Gibraltar issue. government madeitsdecisionontheparticipationofUKincertainaspects ‘outs’ thatwishtojointhecooperation. This happenedwhen in1999theSpanish set thebasicrulesthemselves. Moreover, the‘ins’may betemptedtoblackmail the others was intentionally frozenby thefive initiators,soastoensurethattheycould relationship betweenMemberStates.For example,thequestionofmembershipfor complicate policy-making intheEU.Ithasillustrated thatflexibilitymay troublethe T into EUlaw. sions takenby theSchengen groupmembersandtheassociatedworking structures d three MemberStatesarenotfullyinvolved: theUK,IrelandandDenmark. This ‘Schengen’ hasbeencharacterised by astrongcentripetaldynamic. Currently, only explain tothepublic. are involved. Inturn,thiscomplicates policy-making andrenders itmoredifficultto times unclearwhether aspecificsubject-matterconcernsSchengen andwhat states become somewhat morecomplicatedinanareaofflexibleintegration. Itissome- Schengen moreover illustrates thatlaw-making, implementationandmanagement the administrative structuresset uptothateffect,intotheEUframework. Schengen alsoillustrates thedifficultyofintegrating anextra-EU cooperation, and shows thattheconditionalityandprocedureforjoiningshouldbeclearlylaiddown. pute delayed thedecisionandanagreementcouldonlybereached in2000. This he Schengen experienceisillustrative inmany ways ofhow flexibleintegration may ynamic alsoopenedthedoorfor toincorporate thedeci- hich have defence implications. The Amsterdam Treaty alsoraised theperspective 5 T he latterdis- door fortheUnionitselftotakeondefensive tasks. associated toit. The Treaty-based linkbetweentheEUand WEU hasopenedthe c bers sharethesamepoliticalwill(i.e.regardingdefence). The WEU hasalsobeen ed numberofMemberStatescanbeaviablesolutionincaseswhere notallmem- T responsibility totheUnionhasnotyet takenplace. V. responsibility isthecollective defenceprovidedThe forin Article transfer ofthat P Amsterdam Treaty. Rather, thosefunctionsthatthe WEU assumedinthefieldof tional framework was notnecessary, despitethefactthatitwas foreseeninthe European Councilconsideredthattheintegration ofthe WEU intotheEUinstitu- process ofstrengtheningtheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy (ESDP). The lishing itsown militarycapabilitiesandplacedthePetersberg tasksatthecoreof At the1999EuropeanCouncilinCologne,EUtookamajorsteptoward estab- Delors. This led Delors. This F EU socialpolicy received afreshimpetusinthe1980sunderinstigationof social securitysystemsformigrant workers andtheequalpay principle. as anadjuncttoeconomicpolicy. The ECfocusedmainlyonthecoordinationof In theearlyyears ofEuropeanintegration, socialpolicy was essentiallyconsidered 1.3. SocialProtocol tocol inthe Treaties. In 1997,theBritishgovernment finallyagreedtothe incorporation ofthesocialpro- the UKderived anunfaircompetitive advantage by having optedoutoftheProtocol. relations withtheparticipating MemberStates.Several MemberStatesbelieved that States sharethesamepolitical beliefs. The opt-outoftheUKhowever alsostrained T itself andaseparate agreementfromwhich theUnitedKingdomhadoptedout. there wereinfacttwo distinctlegalbasesforsocialpolicy measures:theEC Treaty social mattersbetweenthese11MemberStates. This meantthatfrom1993onwards on socialpolicy’ was thusconcluded,which cateredforaclosercooperation on grate theCharterin Treaties, but thiswas rebukedby theUK. A separate ‘Protocol Charter’). DuringthenegotiationsonMaastricht Treaty, callsweremadetointe- the CommunityCharteronFundamentalSocialRights of Workers (or‘Social rench socialists,PresidentFrançois Mitterand andCommissionPresidentJacques haracterised by an inclusive trendinthatever moreMemberStateshave become he experienceofthe WEU highlightsthefactthatflexibleintegration withalimit- etersberg taskswould betransferred totheEU. The WEU’s mainremainingareaof his illustrates thatflexibilitycanprovide asolutiontocaseswhere notallMember inter alia 6 to thesigningby alltheMemberStates-save Britain-of

7 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 8 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 Moreover, someformsof flexibility, such asUKopt-out ontheSocialCharter, may tion outsidethe EUframework, theprerogatives ofthe‘outs’ may wellbeaffected. ‘outs’ andthe‘ins’ inevitablybecomesvery complicated. Incaseofdeeperintegra- T countries inthecontextofEMU. hide theexistenceof(important) exceptions,likethepersisting“opt-outs”ofvarious ping stonetowards furthercommunitarisationforallMember States. tripetal effects. Thus, flexibilityhasnotalways been theend-stagebutoftenastep- have beenquitesuccessfulandhave inmany casesbeenaccompaniedby cen- Previous experienceswithflexibility, which aimedatfosteringdeeperintegration, 1.5. Lessonstobedrawn from previous experiences essary majoritieswithinECOFIN. turn, thiswillmakeitmoredifficultfortheEurozonemembers toachieve the nec- ed by enlargement,sinceitwillleadtoabiggergroupof‘outs’within ECOFIN.In w sions, which regardmainlytheEurozone-membersareinfacttakenby ECOFINasa T Flexibility inEMUalsoledtoacomplicatedrelationshipbetween‘outs’and‘ins.’ costs etc.)andpoliticalones(influencingpolicy-making). participate, bothforeconomicreasons(lower interestrates, abolitionoftransaction Most ofthe‘outs’aswellcandidatecountrieshave declaredtheirintentionto T eration hasbegun. need forstrongmechanisms ofsurveillance andcoordination,even afterthecoop- strong duringtherun-uptothirdstage,buthasfadedsince. This underlinesthe T ing themfromtherequirementtomove tostagethree. political will. Thus, the Treaty granted anopt-outtotheUKandDenmark,exempt- T granted aderogation. gence criteria.MemberStateswhich wereunabletofulfilthesecriteriawould be degree ofdurable convergence, measuredonthebasisofMaastricht conver- the thirdstageofacommoncurrency was subjecttotheachievement ofahigh bility. The Treaty provided thatEMUwas tobeachieved inthreestages. Transition to T 1.4. EMU he previousexperiencesalso illustrate certain dangers. The relationbetweenthe his problemisparticularlymanifestintheinstitutionalframework, sincesomedeci- he functioningoftheEurozonehasprovoked arather strongcentripetaldynamic. he useofconvergence criteriahasbeenrather successful.Indeed,convergence was he Treaty notonlyprovided forflexibilityintermsofcapacity, butalsointermsof he development ofEMUby theMaastricht Treaty furtherexpandedintra-EU flexi- hole, giving non-membersasay onEuro-matters. This problemwill beexacerbat- 7 T his mustnot Maastricht intoaconstitutionalprinciple. w allowing agroupofMemberStatestousetheEUframework todevelop policies eral mechanism of‘closercooperation’ (sinceNicecalled‘enhancedcooperation’) these contradictory wishesledtotheintroductionin Amsterdam Treaty ofagen- in thispillar(Art.23§1 TEU). In itsstead,the Amsterdam Treaty foresaw the possibility of‘constructive abstention’ excluded. lars. Enhancedcooperation intheareaof commonforeignandsecuritypolicy was Member Statescouldonlymake useofthemechanism inthefirstandthirdpil- still bemadetoapplyevenly toarange ofsuch varied members. will bring,ledmany toquerywhether asingleframework ofrulesandpoliciescould T 2.1. An innovation ofthe Amsterdam Treaty… 2. Enhancedcooperation inthe Treaty terised by aByzantinecomplexity. agement, bothexternallyandinternally. Someflexibleregimesareindeedcharac- damental lesson,flexibilitygreatlyincreasesthecomplexityoflaw-making andman- be perceived asunfairby theothersMember States.Finally, andthisisthemostfun- Amsterdam provided, however, foralimited 2.1.1. it asapoliticallymoreexpedientalternative toafederal Union. minded countriesthatwanted tolimitthetendency forextra-EU cooperation orsaw for QMVandausefuladditionalmanagementtool,butalso fromlessintegration- not onlystemmedfrom‘integrationist’ countrieswhich saw itasapossiblesubstitute Notably, thesecallsweremadefordisparate andeven contradictory reasons. They the ‘outs.’ blocked by theothers,whilst ensuringtherightsandinterestsofboth‘ins’ and abletoembarkuponadeeperintegration incertaindomainswithoutbeing in the Treaties ofageneral enablingclause,allowing MemberStatesthatarewilling T tutional framework, furtheraddedtothesedoubts. the EU’s actionscopeintoareasof‘highpolitics,’ togetherwiththeill-adaptedinsti- not obligedtoapply thedecision,butaccepts thatthedecisioncommits Union. qualify itsabstention by makingaformaldeclaration, inwhich casethememberis on threerules. Firstly, when abstaining inavote, any memberoftheCouncil may he revolution intermsofnumbersandheterogeneitywhich Easternenlargement hus, duringtherun-upto Amsterdam, many callsweremadefortheincorporation hich would onlybebindingforthem. Thus, Amsterdam turnedthe‘exception’of A limitedscope 11 T he mechanism ofconstructive abstentionisbased 10 scope of enhancedcooperation. 9 T he convergence of 8 T he extensionof

9 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 10 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 course easy, inothersmuch lessobvious. foreign policy initiatives which have nomilitaryimplications. Insomecases,itisof or defenceimplications. Moreover, Niceexcludedtheuseofenhanced cooperation forissueshaving military ting newpolicies,which continuetobedecidedby theCouncil by unanimity. ond pillarremainslimitedtomeasures implementingagreedpolicies,rather thanset- or acommonposition(Art.27b TEU). Inthatway, enhancedcooperation inthesec- tion inthesecondpillarcouldonlybeusedfor enhanced cooperation intheareaofCFSP(Art.27b TEU). Still,enhancedcoopera- T 2.2.1. 2.2. …facilitatedby the Treaty ofNice Nice IGC. enhanced cooperation inpractice. Hencethecalltoreviseitsprovisions duringthe implementing procedureswereoverly strict,andthereforeexcludedtheuseof At thattime,many observers consideredthatitsscope,conditionsaswell cooperation. Furthermore, amajorityofMemberStateswas requiredtolaunch anenhanced every MemberStatethatopposedenhancedcooperation (the‘emergency brake’). T 2.1.3. that itshouldnotaffectthe cooperation couldonlybeusedasalastresort. Amsterdam furthermoreprovided T 2.1.2. taken inthesecondpillar, includingmilitaryones. ed. The scopeofconstructive abstentionincludesallunanimousCouncildecisions represent morethanonethirdoftheweightedvotes, thedecisionshallnotbeadopt- flict withorimpedeUnionaction. Thirdly, ifthemembersqualifyingtheirabstention Secondly, theMemberStatesconcernedshallrefrain fromany actionlikelytocon- between nationalsofMemberStates. is forinstancedifficulttothinkthatanenhancedcooperation couldnotdiscriminate interpretation ofthecompliancewiththeseconditionsisrather difficulttomake.It pating MemberStates,nordiscriminatebetweennationalsofStates. The he Treaty ofNicemadeasubstantial leapforward by introducingthe possibilityfor he Amsterdam Treaty he conditions An increasedscope Hea Strict conditions 12 vy procedures triggering enhancedcooperation werealsorather strict.Enhanced procedures 14 T his createdalargeproblem,since itisnoteasytodefine acquis were very heavy. They provided foraveto rightfor and thecompetencesrightsofnon-partici- 13 implementation of ajointaction may notdiscriminatebetween nationalsofMemberStateswas abolished. they shouldbe non-participating MemberStatesshouldnotbe Moreover, theconditionsthatacquisaswellcompetencesandrightsof tion ofthisstipulationlefttothepoliticaldiscretionCouncil(Art.43a TEU). (unspecified) timelimitisprovided ( enhanced cooperation may onlybe used asalastresortismaintained,butcertain On theotherhand,someconditionshave beenmadelessstrict. The conditionthat tained (Art.43(f) TEU). between theMemberStatesnordistortcompetitionthemhasbeenmain- enhanced cooperation may notconstitute abarriertoordiscriminationintrade Other strictconditionshave been maintained. For instance,theconditionthat enhanced cooperation mustcontributetoenhancingtheprocessofintegration. unclear, afortioriinareaswhere theacquisisalready substantiallydeveloped. Notably, TEU). What scopethisarticleleaves forenhancedcooperation inthefirstpillaris shall notunderminetheinternalmarketandeconomicsocialcohesion(Art.43(e) use. Indeed,animportantconditionhasbeenadded,whereby enhancedcooperation enhanced cooperation. Insomeaspects,Niceactuallyeven furthercircumscribed its Nice didnotreallymanagetoloosenthegeneral conditionalityimposedupon 2.2.2. brake” ismaintained. The onlyhastheright tobeinformed. Council afterreceiving theopinionofCommission, butherethe“emergency In thesecond pillar, the authorisationforenhanced cooperation isgiven by the the EuropeanParliament ismerelyconsulted. codecision process,theassent of theEuropeanParliament isrequired.Inotherareas, Furthermore, when enhancedcooperation concernsan areawhich comesunder the ified majorityonany proposalfor enhancedcooperation (“ralentisseur”). been raised beforetheEuropeanCouncil, theCouncilmay nevertheless actby qual- Member StatetotakeupthematterwithEuropeanCouncil. After thatmatterhas “emergency brake”) hasbeenremoved. Ithasbeenreplacedby thepossibilityfora In thefirstandthirdpillar, thepossibility ofopposingenhancedcooperation (the cessive enlargementsoftheEU. States neededtoestablishanenhancedcooperation willbereduced withthesuc- majority ofMemberStateswas needed(Art.43(g) TEU). Thus, theratio ofMember cooperation was setateight,whereas the Amsterdam Treaty stipulatedthatthe eration. The minimumnumberofMemberStatesrequired toestablishenhanced T 2.2.3. he Nice Treaty hasloosened theprocedureforsettinginmotionanenhancedcoop- Revised conditions Simplified procedures respected (Art. 43(h) TEU). The conditionthatenhancedcooperation “within areasonableperiod”), affected are loosenedby saying that with theverifica- 11 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 12 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 tary tasks,toestablishastructuredcooperation. w and MilitaryCapabilities Agency. the creationby theCouncil,actingby QMV, ofaEuropean Armaments, Research cific provisions onstructuredcooperation. priate provisions ofenhancedcooperation areapplicable,notwithstandingthespe- er cooperation onmutualdefence wishing tobepartofit.Fourth, untiltheestablishmentofacommondefence,clos- a limitedgroupofMemberStates. F kinds offlexiblearrangements. The textremainssomewhat ambiguous onthispoint. enhanced cooperation visions ofenhancedcooperation applytothesemechanisms. Itisdoubtfulwhether ation inthefieldofdefence.Itisstilltobedeterminedwhat extentthegeneral pro- It isworth notingthattheConvention envisages somespecificmechanisms ofcooper- v ation willapplyacrosstheboardforbothforeignanddefencepolicy. The possibilityto ing defenceormilitaryimplicationsisnolongerexcluded.Hence,enhancedcooper- action oracommonposition. Also, anenhancedcooperation concerningmattershav- cooperation inthisareaisnolongerrestrictedtothemereimplementationofajoint A bigstepforward hasbeentakenintheareaofCFSP, by providing thatenhanced 2.3.1. but limitourselves tosomeimportantreforms. T 2.3. …andpossibly furtherfine-tunedintheConstitutional Treaty these deficiencies. it ever tobeused. The Convention presenteditselfastheperfectarenaforcorrecting treaty reformsconcerningitsscope,proceduresandconditionalityarerequiredfor enhanced cooperation remainsseverely restrictedinmany aspectsandsubstantial At firstsight,theNicechanges may appearpositive. Nevertheless, theuseof have beensubstantiallyreformed. We willnotfullyanalysethedifferentchanges ditionality ofenhancedcooperation much. The procedural provisions anditsscope defence policy. lish multinationalforces may alsomakethemavailable tothecommonsecurityand it. Finally, thedraft Treaty provides thatthoseMemberStateswhich togetherestab- cooperation withNATO. ItshallbeopentoallMemberStateswishing tobepartof eto anenhancedcooperation inthisdomainhasbeenabolished. irst, theConvention proposesthattheUnioncanentrustexecutionofataskto he Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty hich fulfilhighermilitarycriteriaandwishtoengageuponmoredemanding mili- Extension ofitsscopetotheentireforeignanddefencepolic 25 15 sensu stricto 23 24 20 could alsobeusedtosetinmotionthesespecific T shall beestablishedwithinthe Union,inclose he agency shallbeopentoallMemberStates Second, provision ismadeforMemberStates, 22 16 T does notmodifythesubstantive con- hird, theConvention alsoenvisages 21 Somewhat obscurely, theappro- 819 18 y 17 imacy oftheenhancedcooperation athand. relevant policy field. This shouldimprove thepolicy-making effectiveness andlegit- thus allows theparticipatingMemberStatestoresortQMVandcodecision inthe Moreover, itmay meanthat afternewenlargementsan enhancedcooperation which rise inaUnion of28andmore.Inturn,this willrenderitsusemore difficult. tion afteritscreation. deciding onthedemandsofMemberStatestoparticipatein anenhancedcoopera- in thediscretionarypower oftheCommission,orCouncilinareaCFSP, in that way, thepossibleinsertion of objective conditionsforinitialparticipationreins ticipate initiallyintheenhancedcooperation andforthosewhich joinafterwards. In T also ontheircapacitytoparticipate. ticipation would nolongermerelydependonthesimplewillofMemberStates,but 2.3.3. except thoseintheareaofCFSP. ished. The EuropeanParliament mustnow give itsconsenttoallcooperation efforts, and oneforalltheotherdomains. The specialprocedureforthethirdpillarisabol- two differentprocedures:onefortheCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP), mechanism, thanksmainlytotheabolitionofpillarsystem. There arenow only Another improvement intheConvention’s draft isthe substantialsimplificationofthe 2.3.2. as intheNice Treaty. motion anenhancedcooperation isnow setatone-third insteadof8MemberStates step backwards. Indeed,theminimumnumberof Member Statesrequiredtosetin In oneareaconcerningenhanced cooperation, theConvention’s draft doesmarka 2.3.5. as tocodecisionoftheEuropeanParliament inareaswhere this isnotforeseen. mode. This allows forashifttoQMVinareas where unanimitystillappliesaswell cooperation todecideunanimouslychange theapplicabledecision-making T 2.3.4. thus, toexcludethoseStates,which donotfulfillthem. account objective differences duringtheinitiationofenhancedcooperation and can besubjectedtocertainconditions. This novelty willmakeitpossibletotakeinto sequent participationofMemberStatesafterthecooperation hasbeenestablished ditions ofinitialparticipationtotheenhancedcooperation. At present,onlythesub- A novelty consistsinforeseeingthattheauthorizingdecisioncannow lay down con- he conditionsofparticipationwillbethesameforMemberStateswhich par- he Convention alsoforeseesthepossibilityforparticipantsofanenhanced Conditional initialparticipation Reduction ofthenumberprocedures A higherthresholdforsetting inmotionanenhancedcooper A passerelleclauseforc 30 T his willmeanthat theminimumthresholdwill continually 26 hanging thedecision-makingmode 29 27 In thatway, theinitialpar- ation 28 It 13 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 14 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 implement aprogram ofaction, comprehendingawhole setofmeasures, inonespe- second level covers thehypothesis where a limitedgroupofMemberStates tryto always setathresholdintheirauthorisationdecisionifnecessary. tual decision T ferent levels. Itisvery importanttodistinguishthem. scope oftheflexiblearrangement. Broadly speaking,webelieve theretobethreedif- A firstway ofdistinguishingdifferentvariants istocategorisethemaccordingthe 3.1. The scopeofthecooperation athand of theflexiblearrangement athand(3.2). ing thescopeofcooperation (3.1),andthesecondonerelatingto treatybase make adistinctiononthebasisoftwo axesofdifferentiation,thefirstone concern- wa Any categorisationwillinevitablybefluidandopenforinterpretation. Onepossible cons ofthedifferentvariants. forms offlexibleintegration. Inturn,thiswillmakeiteasiertoassess the prosand the debateonit.Hence,itisimportanttosetoutacleartypology ofthedifferent Flexible integration comesinmany formsandundermany names. This complicates 3. Typology offlexible integration the EuropeanCompany statute. or inunblocking astalemateattheEuropeanlevel, asforinstancewas thecasefor such as the Italiangovernment’s oppositiontotheEuropean Arrest Warrant in2001, proven instrumentalinunderminingtheoppositionofarecalcitrant MemberState, y Here wecanbeshort. There aretodatenoexperienceswithenhancedcooperation 2.4. Experienceswithenhancedcooperation competing cores tive opennessofenhanced cooperation aresufficienttoavoid theemergenceof European Parliament andtheCouncilinauthorisationproceduresrela- will dependonsubject-matter. The gatekeeperrolesoftheCommission, T ticipants. w et. Still,itsestablishmenthasbeenenvisaged onseveral occasions,andhasoften he lowest level would concernalimitedgroupofMemberStates adoptinga he needforsuch afixedthresholdisquestionable,asthe‘criticalmass’required as already setinmotionmay nolongerbringtogethertherequirednumberofpar- y ofcategorisation,which webelieve tobeinstrumentalforourpurposes,is 31 , possiblymotivated by theobstructionofoneortwo MemberStates 32 and limitthecostofsuch initiatives. These institutionscould 34 33 punc . A - gration takingplaceinsidethetreaties. Arguably, It ishowever necessarytofurtherspecifythedifferentpossibleformsofflexibleinte- different areasatthesametime. We willcallsuch agroupan r with adifferentscope. This gives usthefollowing matrix: the secondarylaw level. Obviously, thedifferentformsdescribedabove couldcome T mentioned below. not becovered inthepresentanalysis,which willdealwiththefourhypotheses wa T cific domain. We willspeakhereof treaties comesinthreesub arrangement takesplace ment athand. A majordistinctionlineisobviously thequestionwhether theflexible T 3.2. The treaty baseoftheflexible arrangement some kindofcollective managementofitsrelationswiththeEuropeanUnion. modify someelementsoftheconstitutionalsystemitsmembersand/ortodefine reverse cangenerate alotoflegalproblems,especiallyifthisavant-garde decidesto T Av Ad hocgroup decision Punctual ations where agroupofMemberStateswithfixedcompositionwould proceedin he firstvariant takesplaceattheprimarylaw level. The othertwo willtakeplaceat hough thisperspective hassometimesbeenmentionedinafleetingandallusive he secondaxisofdifferentiationrelatestothetreatybaseflexiblearrange- he firstlevel doesnotcreatemany technical problems. The thirdlevel onthe y by some speeches, itdoesnotseemrealisticinthepresentcontext.Itwillthus ant garde constructive abstention. the enhancedcooperation mechanism; a pre-determinedflexiblearrangement; inside oroutsidethetreaties usd Inside Outside v ariants : ad hocgroups Pre-determined . A thirdlevel relatestoconfigu- flexible integr . oprto abstention cooperation Enhanced Constr. a v ant garde ation insidethe . 35 15 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 16 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 agreements orconventions betweenthem. Here also,thescopecouldvary. proceed tofurtherintegration outsidethetreatiesindifferentareasatsametime. Occar). A broaderscopeisobviously alsoconceivable. An avant gardecouldindeed domain. There existmany examplesofthis,notablyintheareadefence(e.g. punctual decisionorundertaking. Ad hocgroupscouldbesetupinaspecific Extra-EU flexibleintegration couldcomewithavariable scope.Itmay concerna impede theattainmentofobjectives ofthe Treaty. the Treaty. Therefore, theyshouldnottakemeasureswhich couldconflictwithor to respecttheprimacy ofEUlaw aswell as thedutyofsincerecooperation under EU membershiponsuch cooperations isthatindoingso,theseMemberStateshave for instancedecisions takenby QMV. able tousethis mechanism in otherdomainsaswellandfor othersortsofdecisions, lar (includingmilitary ones). The questionariseshowever whether itwould beadvis- Its scopeiscurrentlylimitedto unanimousCouncildecisionstakeninthesecondpil- of adhocgroups. Member States.Obviously, thisform offlexibleintegration couldalsotaketheform ers togoahead.Itisanexpedient instrumenttoavoid theblockage by oneor two States todecidenotparticipate inasingledecisionoraction,while allowing oth- Constructive abstentionisavariant offlexibleintegration, which allows Member 3.2.4. ceivable thatanavant gardeproceedsindifferentdomainsby meansofthismechanism. T 3.2.3. ‘structured cooperation’ visions regardingtheUK,IrelandandDenmark. The Convention’s draft provision on such arrangements areEMU,Schengen (after Amsterdam) andthe Title IV TEC pro- lays down thespecificproceduresand theparticipatingMemberStates.Examplesof T 3.2.2. petence, selves. As ageneral rule,MemberStatesmay, inmatterscomingwithintheircom- Flexible integration arrangements outsidethetreatiesareasoldthem- 3.2.1. entering intosuch cooperation outsidethe Treaties. provisions on‘enhancedcooperation’ doesnotprecludetheMemberStatesfrom he enhancedcooperation provisions couldconcerndifferentadhocgroups.It isalsocon- his variant concernscaseswhere the Treaty itselfsetsupaflexiblearrangement and Constructi Enhanced cooper Predetermined flexibility Flexible integr 36 exercise theirpowers individually orcollectively andmay conclude v e abstention ation outsidethe 39 ation contains alotofelementspre-determinedflexibility. 40 142 41 T T 37 reaties he usefulnessof thisinstrumentoutside T he introductioninthe Treaty ofthe 38 T he onlyconstraint imposedby us beyond the scopeofthecurrentpaper. assessment oftherightsandobligations‘outs’‘ins.’ This would lead the realmsofCFSPwould meritcloserattentionandinany caserequiresacareful 17 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 18 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 as aninformal discussion-forum inaprotocol. Convention hasfollowed theFranco-German proposalofrecognising theEurogroup Commissioner, shouldbeexplicitlyrecognisedinthe Treaty. Inthisrespect,the ed andconfidentialmeetings, togetherwiththeECBPresidentandresponsible the ECBandCommission. Still,therightforEurozoneministerstoholdrestrict- T 4.1.1.1. RecognisingtheEurogroupasaninformaldiscussion forum wa interests. The cooperation betweenthe‘ins’should thus bestrengthenedinvarious T 4.1.1. these challenges. T of representationandsinglelinescommunication. Moreover, theexternalandinternalcredibilityofEurorequiresclearmechanisms remains lacking (which explains atleastpartlytheweakgrowth ofthelastyears). always beenthecoordinatedapproach ofthe . Butthe‘E’ofEMU must beunderpinnedby acoherentandcoordinatedeconomicpolicy. This has established. Still,forthesakeoflong-termviabilityEMU,monetarypolicy and thesuccessfullaunch oftheEuro,‘M’EMUindeedseemsprettymuch potentialities andrequirementsofEMU. This isamistake. With theset-upofECB One couldhave theimpressionthat theintroductionofEurohasexhausted 4.1. EMU ly dependuponthenatureofflexibleexperimentathand. tripetal orcentrifugaleffectoftheflexiblearrangements inthesedomainswillgreat- (4.5), theareaoffreedom,securityandjustice(4.6),environment (4.7). The cen- domains: EMU(4.1),taxation(4.2),socialpolicy (4.3),defence(4.4),foreignpolicy gration couldbeused.For reasonsofbrevity, wehave limitedourselves toseven In what follows, wewill identifycasesinwhich thedifferentformsofflexibleinte- 4. Potential applicationsofflexible integration (4.1.1) aswellastrongercooperation outsidetheEMU Treaty provisions (4.1.2). both astrengtheningofthecurrentpre-determinedflexibility provisions onEMU ment ofcooperation inthefieldofEMUisthereforerequired. This couldinvolve mental approach toeconomicgovernance isheavily deficient.Clearly, areinforce- he Eurogrouphasbeenuseful asan he currentEMUarrangements donotallow the‘ins’tofullyensuretheircommon he unfinishedstateoftheinstitutionalframework ofEMUmakesitdifficulttomeet ys. Someofthesereformswillrequire Treaty change. Strengthening thepre-determinedflexibilitypro 44 T he experiencesofarshows thatthedecentralised intergovern- informal 46 forum fordebatebetweenministers, visions onEMU 43 45 in severe difficulties(art.100 TEC). stemming from the economicsituationortoassist aMemberStatefromtheEurozone could alsobeentitledtotake measures which areintended tocopewithdifficulties 4.1.1.2. FurtherrecognisingtheEuroareaspecificityinECOFINprocedures torate, which theyareunabletoinfluence. also easethefearsof‘outs’thatEurogroupwould becomesomekindofdirec- been bettertohave theresponsibleCommissioner chairing theEurogroup. This could about furthercomplication.For reasonsoftransparency andefficiency, itwould have idency willthusnotnecessarilyoverlap withthatoftheECOFIN-chair. This willbring a majorityoftheministersMemberStateshaving adoptedtheEuro. This pres- Convention’s draft provides fortheelection ofapresidentfortwo-and-a-half years by T the EuroareainECOFIN. tion ofthegroupduringnextyears, andontherecognitionofspecificities (cf. 4.1.1.2). The needtoformalizefurthertheEurogroupwilldependonevolu- decisions takenby theEcofin-CouncilinitsformatrestrictedtoEurozone-members atic surveillance oftheexchange rate andtheappropriatebody forpreparingthe w ening oftherolesCommissionandECBaclearerdescriptionits is aneedtostrengthenthefunctioningofEurogroup. This couldimplyastrength- In any case,intheperspective ofaminorityEurogroupinanenlargedUnion,there Guidelines (BEPGs) concern thedecisiononEurozonesectionofBroad EconomicPolicy T aged. ber ofdecisionstakenby theEcofin-Councilinitsrestrictedformat couldbeenvis- w more intoaccount. Today, the Treaty provides foralimitednumberofdecisions with thenecessarymeanstotakeincreasedinterdependence oftheirpolicies Calls arethereforemadeforthosecountriessharingasinglecurrency tobeequipped membersneed. procedures may nolonger adequatelyprovide fortheclosecoordinationwhich the dramatically changed infavour oftheouts. As aresult,thecurrentdecision-making After enlargement,therelationsbetween‘ins’and‘outs’ofEurozonewillbe tional measurestostrengthen economicandbudgetarycoordination. members), andaccessionofnew memberstotheEurozone. bers (decisionsonexcessive deficits,earlywarnings, recommendations forEurozone process. This couldconcernmattersregardingtheStabilityPact forEurozonemem- area specificitycouldbefurther acknowledged within theECOFINdecisionmaking he questionofthepresidency oftheEurogroupmeritscloseattention. The he Convention hasonlyvery partiallytakenupthischallenge. The onlyextensions here onlytheEurozone-membersareentitledtovote (art.122 TEC). A largernum- orking methods. 47 50 As such, theEurogroupcouldbecome‘arena’forasystem- and theclauseallowing theEurozonestatestoadoptaddi- 48 52 T he restrictedEcofin 51 T he 49 19 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 20 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 It couldthereforebeenvisaged tosetup a stabilisationfund with theSGPlimits. shock orwithaneedtopursuepainful structural reformswhilst having tocomply provide additionalleeway incaseaMemberStateisconfrontedwithanasymmetric space islimitedby theStabilityandGrowth Pact (SGP). since monetary-exchange rate policieshave beengiven upandthefiscalmanoeuvre T absorbers’ (i.e.priceandwage flexibility, labourmobility, and budget redistribution). of asymmetricshocks (esp.inanenlargedEMU)andtherelative absenceof‘shock EMU createsaneedforaneconomicstabilisationmechanism, given thepossibility Ecofin-Council couldendorsean ferent coordinationmechanisms aresetinplacefortheEurozone. Thus, theEuro- T 4.1.2.1. recourse tootherformsofflexibleintegration which donotrequiretreatyreforms. At thesametime,economicpolicy cooperation couldbeimproved by having 4.1.2. latter hasdeterminedthataparticularsituationrequirescommonpolicy response. ed therighttoadoptpolicy guidelinesby QMVuponaCommissionproposal,when the Commission orby anumberofMemberStates.Moreover, thisCouncilcouldbegrant- autonomously itsown rulesofprocedure,subjecttoa‘call-back’ procedureby the A morefar-reaching reformwould betoallow this“Euro-EcofinCouncil”toadapt 4.1.2.2. Eurozone members. its. The charter couldalsocontainsomekindofrainy-day-fund arrangement forthe the approval oftheEuro-Ecofin-councilwould berequiredforexceedingtheselim- also setupperlimitstotaxcutswhich arenotcompensatedby expenditurecuts,and as aguidelineforthenationalstabilityprogrammes. This fiscalpolicy stanceshould of itsmembers.Itcouldmoreover include and foreseetheavailable instrumentstorespond toshocks affectingtheareaorsome a codeofconductguidingtheeconomicandemployment policiesintheEurozone and theECB, afterconsultationofthesocialpartners. with theCommission,Employment andSocial Affairs Councilin‘Euro-format’ States inquestion. shocks, itcouldpartially replacethecontributionto theEUbudgetofMember financed by meansof the ‘seigniorage’-revenues oftheECB. Incaseof economic GDP growth differentialcomparedwith the EUaverage trend. The fundcouldbe members, which would beactivated when a MemberStatesexhibitsanexcessive he EUshouldassistitsMemberStatestoabsorbasymmetric shocks, especially he increasedinterdependence,broughtaboutby monetaryUnion,justifiesthatdif- Impro An economicpolic A stabilisationfund v e cooper ation outsidethe y c harter oftheEurozone ‘economic policy charter,’ an overall fiscalpolicy stance T reaty-pro 55 visions onEMU 56 T his charter would serve as Such amechanism could 57 54 among theEurozone drawn uptogether , which acts 53 porate taxation. We donotcallfortheUniontoestablish top-down asingle ising thetaxbase ofcertaincompanies(e.g.SMEs, theEuropeanCompany etc.). enhanced cooperation couldbeusedby someMemberStates asabasisforharmon- and protectionist regulations.Ifthisproves impossible toachieve intheEU-25, European industryby lowering highcompliance costsandavoiding double taxation A harmonisationof Concerning used forafurtherharmonisation ofexciseduties. the areaofenvironmental andenergytaxation(see3.5.1).Itcouldpossibly alsobe As regards provide apossibleway forward. and development, areas, such astaxation(see4.2),socialpolicy (see4.3),entrepreneurship,research ambitious structural reformsinseveral domains. ceivable thatalimitednumber ofMemberStatestaketheleadandembarkupon If progresswithstructural reformsfalters(which seemstobethecasenow), itiscon- macro-economic stance. stimulate demandandmay thusleadtheECBtotakeonamoreaccommodating of theMemberStates. Tackling such supply-sideproblemscreatestheconfidenceto making itlessvulnerable toeconomicshocks. This willbetheprimeresponsibility EMU alsoentailsincreasingtheflexibilityofmarkets(labour, capitalandgoods),thus 4.1.2.3. Flexiblecooper system couldprovide forgreatersimplicityandefficiency. and thusanobstacletothefunctioningofsinglemarket. A moreharmonisedtax remains amajorimpedimenttothefreemovement ofcapital,servicesandlabour, internal market. The forestof25andmore differentsetsofnationaltaxsystems maintained. Intime,thiscouldhave adetrimentalimpactonthefunctioningof systems, progresswillbesimplyimpossibleincasetheunanimityrequirementis domain. InaUnionof25MemberStates,withaneven greaterheterogeneityoftax T 4.2. Taxation binding coordinationmethodsifsuch methodsprove ineffective. set upanOpenMethodofCoordinationamongstthemselves, ormove towards more petence isless(ornot)developed, itcouldbeenvisaged thatcertainMemberStates of enhancedcooperation incertaindomains.Inotherdomains,where theEU’s com- domain ernisation oflegislation. As theConvention failedtomakeleeway forQMVinthis economic andtechnical change thereisalsoaneedforswift adoptionandmod- he requirementofunanimityhasbeenatremendousobstaclefortheEU-15inthis 61 , enhancedcooperation betweenalimitednumberofMemberStatesmay indirect taxation direct taxation 59 education, tax bases ation onstructur , someprogresscouldpossibly bemadeinthefieldofcor- , enhancedcooperation couldprovide away forward in 60 innovation policy, etc. This couldbedoneby means however couldimprove thecompetitiveness of al economicreforms 58 T his couldtouch uponseveral 62 In thecontextofrapid tax rate 63 . 21 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 22 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 all theMember Stateswant to participate,aftertheapproval of theCommission. in motionanOpenMethodof Coordination(OMC)onspecificsubjects,even ifnot certain MemberStates.Itshould alsobepossibleforalimitedgroupofstatestoset ‘European work contract’ orthefullcross-borderportability ofpensionrightsamong tive Europeanisationofsocialpolicy. Possible examplesare thecreationofa Enhanced cooperation canalsoprovide thefoundations foramore‘positive,’ proac- dards forsystemsofmeans-testedbasicincomesupport. ulations ofinvestment options,andyet othercountriescouldagreeoncommonstan- sidering thepartialprivatisation ofpublicpensionsystemscouldharmonisetheirreg- regulations forthelicensingandremuneration ofserviceproviders; countriescon- financing healthcarethroughcompulsoryinsurance couldharmonise their instrument insuch a‘defensive’ Europeanisationofsocialpolicy. As such, countries in thelegislative measuresthemselves. Enhancedcooperation may alsobeauseful T economic andinstitutionalconditionstheirunderstanding ofsocialsolidarity. countries tomaintainanddevelop theirown solutionsinresponsetotheirspecific T social field. ferentiation intermsofboththeregulatoryframework andtheproceduresin prospect ofanenlargedandsociallymorediverse Unionwillrequireeven moredif- compatible withexistingindustrialrelationsandwelfarestateinstitutions. The standards mustnotonlybeeconomicallyviableinless-wealthy countries,butalso European socialmodelonwhich toconverge. The adoptionofminimalEuropean Given Europe’s bigdiversity inwelfare statestructures,thereisadmittedlynosingle softer formsofflexibilityhave long been testedinthesocialfield. It isimportanttorealisethat,even beforetheUKopt-outfromSocialCharter, 4.3. Socialpolicy opposite. improve thefunctioningofinternalmarket,couldinfacteven leadtoexactlythe flexible integration arrangements inthisfield.Such initiatives, totheextentthatthey tortion ofcompetitionbetweenMemberStatesneednotnecessarilybecontrary to T fare stateinstitutionsaswelltheirnormative socialbeliefs. stem fromimportantdifferencesbetweenMemberStateswithrespecttotheirwel- within thelegislative measuresthemselves. mum standards,softlaw processes)andthemethodsofimplementation,butalso has notonlycomeaboutinthechoice ofinstruments(directives settingonlymini- his obviously callsforcontinuingflexibilityinthechoice ofinstrumentsandwith- herefore, any ‘’ofsocialpolicy shouldallow differentgroupsof he conditionsprohibitingany barriertoordiscriminationintrade aswellany dis- 64 66 T he reasonsforthisflexibleintegration 68 67 65 T his flexibility as well. instead beextendedtonon-participantsaswell,giving themanincentive tosignup by riences withtheEuropean Works Council(EWC)directive show, measuresadopted currently confrontedwithmany differentnationalsystems.Furthermore,astheexpe- some countriescouldsimplifygreatlythelifeofenterprisesinUnion,which are at similarlevels ofeconomicdevelopment. Moreover, flexibleintegration between be allthatbig,sinceeconomiccompetitiontendstomostacuteamongcountries level-playing fieldintheUnion.Still, thedistortionoflevel-playing fieldmay not Some fearthatflexibleintegration inthisfieldcouldleadtothedistortionof erally bindingontheirterritoriesonly. States) todeclaresocialagreements,which theCouncilitselfdoesnotapprove, gen- could beenvisaged toallow theEurozone-members(oracertainnumberofMember ported by anEmployment andSocial Affairs Councilin‘Euro-format.’ Moreover, it could bemadeforanextendedsocialdialogueamongtheEurozone-members,sup- the Eurozone. The Cologneprocessturnedouttobeafudgeinthisrespect.Provision partners, inparticularordertocoordinatethecollective bargainingprocessesin EMU alsorequiresastrengtheningofthemacro-economicdialoguewithsocial multilateral order. strengthen the executive armofthe UN,thereby beefingupthecredibility of the (much-needed) reinvigoration ofNATO. Finally, aEuropeandefenceforce couldalso responsibility forEurope’s security. Such progresscouldalsoprovide thebasisfora Progress inthisareaseemsimperative, sincetheUSisnolonger likelytoassumethe the value addedmay notbeallthatbig. arrangements remainboundby thecurrentstrongly intergovernmental procedures, budgetary solutionsforcommonpolicies.Still,totheextent thatsuch flexible common institutionalframework andcouldbehelpfulinfindingmoreeffective cohesion. Anchoring itinthetreatymay alsoprevent itfromtakingshapeoutsidethe the Union’s external‘identity’inthisarea,withoutnecessarily undermininginternal A selective andintelligentuseofflexibleintegration may bringsignificantbenefitsto of theConvention. in thisarea.Openinguppossibilityhasbeenoneofthe primaryachievements Unfortunately, the Treaty ofNiceexcludesthepossibilityforenhancedcooperation Indeed, bothmilitarycapacityandpoliticalwilltouseitdiffer greatlyinthisdomain. Defence isprobablytheareawhere flexibleintegration isthemostprobable. 4.4. Defence divisive insomecases. area. Nonetheless,theuseofflexibleintegration inthisfieldcouldstillprove tobe

a fewMemberStateswillnotnecessarilybeconfinedtonationalbordersbut 70 T his exemplifiesthepossiblecentripetaleffectofflexibleintegration inthis 71 73 69 72 23 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 24 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 set outinaprotocol raises difficultrevisionandaccession problems. 4) The ‘bottom-upapproach’ seemsincapableofdelivering sufficientconvergence. 3) Asshown by EMU,anexternalconstraint, embeddedwithinacommonEuropean 2) Inturn,thiscouldallay fearsofadirectoireandprovide greaterlegitimacy. 1) The useof convergence criteriacould give aformaltouch tothe cooperation in Several argumentspleadinfavour ofsettingsuch convergence criteria: GDP, theproportionofequipmentandresearch expenditureinthedefence budget). ment capabilities)and cle onstructuredcooperation. T 5) The potentialforfree-ridingwould bereduced. of amixednature,both convergence indefencecapabilitiesmay therefore beuseful.Such criteriacouldbe Setting and R&Dexpenditureinthedefencebudgetismuch toolow. armies drain thebulkoflimiteddefencebudgets. As aresult,theshareofequipment sive manpower requirements. The bloatedforce structuresassociatedwithmass European countriesstillhave force structuresgearedtoterritorialdefence,withmas- i.e. theway inwhich MemberStatesallocatetheirlimitedresources. Indeed,many States. The mainproblemlieshowever inthequalityofEuropeandefencespending, itary spendinghasdecreasedconstantlyover thelastdecadeinalmostallMember largely insufficientfortheambitioustasksithassetitself.Inquantitative terms,mil- defence budget.BoththequantityandqualityofEurope’s defencespendingare Europe currentlylacks thenecessarycapabilitiesand,linkedtothat,required 4.4.2. security anddefencepolicy. States may makethemulti-national forces theyestablishavailable tothecommon for themoment.Inthisrespect,Convention’s draft Treaty provides thatMember instances ofpragmatic defencecooperation outsideEUstructuresisnotquiteclear T 4.4.1. gy. better tolay down the convergence criteria inadeclaration orinacommonstrate- these criteriatobesetvery low sothattheirentryis facilitated.Itwould have been w attached tothe Treaties. Therefore, itwillrequire theapproval ofevery MemberState, he Convention’s textprovides foranembryo ofsuch adefenceEurogroupinits arti- he character ofmultilateral troops like hich may berather difficult. Also, itentailstheriskthat certainMemberStateswant endeavour, may behelpfulinenforcing controversial reformsdomestically. this field. 79 Moreover, thefactthatthese criteriaandtheparticipating MemberStatesare Capabilities: aEuro-defencegroup Integr con v ergence criteria, ation ofmultinationalfor economic military 74 75 78 as was done for EMU,inordertogenerate policy Still, thecriteriawould belaiddown inaprotocol (e.g. force preparedness,interoperability, deploy- (e.g. proportionofdefencebudgetinrelationto ces intheEUfr Eurocorps, Eurofor, Euromarfor 77 amew ork 80 and other 76 ited sofar. Several intergovernmental initiatives have beenunfolded,butprogresshaslim- w financial means. The EUisthereforeindireneedofacommoncoordinatingframe- sary duplicationofindustrialcapacitiesandequipmentadispersionscarce defence procurementisfragmented andnationallyfocused,leadingtoanunneces- Another reasonforthepoorqualityofdefencespendingstemsfromfactthat 4.4.3. Defenceequipments:aEuropeanarmamentsagenc these countries shouldbeexplored.Exchanges ofofficersshould bepromoted. monised. Indue time,thepossibilityforsetting upajointmilitarycollege between be runjointlyby alimitednumberof Member Statesandqualificationstandardshar- resources management. Training programmes forcertainformsofintervention could Flexible integration couldalsobeuseful in thefieldoftraining andgeneral human 4.4.5. decided infavour ofacommondefence. defence opentoallMemberStates,untilsuch timeastheEuropean Councilhas the defencefield. The Convention proposesa‘closercooperation’ on mutual A collective defenceclauseconstitutesanotherpossibilityforflexibleintegration in 4.4.4. arrangements forputtinginpractice such amutualdefence. does notspelloutconditionsforparticipationnoritlay down clearworking w to the Treaty shalllist theparticipatingMemberStates.Participating atalaterstage WEAG (Western European Armaments Group). with Occar(OrganisationforJoint Armament Cooperation), LoI(LetterofIntent)& Member Statescanparticipateinthe Agency. Itisnotclearwhat itsrelationwillbe w T States. Pooled resources couldbeputatthedispositionofEU(andeven NATO). and alimited‘rolespecialisation,’ ascribingspecificfunctionalrolestocertainMember equipment (transport, communication).Itcouldmoreover caterforapoolingofresources T shall alsoevaluate theMemberStates’militarycapabilities. research, andtostrengthen theindustrialbaseofdefencesector. Importantly, it of theagency istopromoteeffective procurement, tosupportdefencetechnology established by QMVandopentoallMemberStateswishingbepartofit. The task his agency shouldpromoteinter-operability andhelpinfillingthegaptermsofstrategic here areseveral questionswhich arestillopenconcerningthe Agency. Itisunclear hat theCommission’s rolewillbe.Itisalsoanopenquestionhow exactlythe ork fordefenceindustries,andaunificationofprocurementpolicies. ould simplyrequirethedeclaration ofthatintenttotheEuropeanCouncil. The draft T Collecti r aining &HRmanagement 81 T he Convention proposesthecreationofanarmamentsagency v e defenceclause 83 A declaration (notaprotocol!)attached 84 y 82 to be 25 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 26 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 projects inthedomainofforeignpolicy. bound tohave lesspoliticalimpact. Hencetheneedtolookformore“operational” this fieldwillremainlimited. An initiative decidedwithconstructive abstentionis Nonetheless, itmustbeemphasizedthattheperspectives ofclosercooperation in Council decisions. abstention. Finally, theuseofconstructive abstentioncouldbeextendedtoEuropean abstaining MemberStatesintheimplementationofdecisiontakenfollowing its having declareditsconstructive abstention,thereshouldnolongerbearoleforthe (Mediterranean, Central-Africa, Baltics) aswellcertainsubjectmatters (landmines, implementation incertaindomains. This could concern bothgeographical areas Such “pilotgroups”would bein charge ofpolicy preparation, elaboration and policy towards specific topics,underthesupervisionofCouncil. of MemberStatescouldbeauthorised totaketheleadindeveloping apro-active leaving inany casethefinalword totheEUitself.Moreconcretely, a limitedgroup of MemberStatesdevelop differentexternal accentsundertheumbrellaofEU, interests ensured. Therefore, the Treaty couldmakeitpossiblethatdifferentgroups T the ,andexternally representtheUnion. the Convention’s draft provision, theForeign MinisterwillconducttheCFSP, chair that certainsalientforeignpolicy issuesareput(back) ontheagenda. According to policy vary. Inthatway, therotatingpresidency hasbeeninstrumentalinensuring partly stemsfromthefactthatinterestsofMemberStates intermsofexternal T 4.5.2. obliged toapplythedecisionandwould remainunboundby it. envisaged. The resultwould bethattheabstainingMemberStateswould notbe T (art. 23§1).Somemeasuresshouldbeconsideredtofacilitatetheuseofthismechanism. instead provided forthepossibilityofconstructive abstentionincaseofunanimousdecisions T 4.5.1. a stronglyintergovernmental framework. Still,somereformscouldbeenvisaged. supported by alltheMemberStates.Flexibleintegration would stilltakeplaceinside the Union’s CFSPmay benegatively affected ifacommonactionorpositionisnot Flexible integration intheareaofCFSPisrather unlikely. Indeed,thecredibilityof 4.5. CFSP he Amsterdam Treaty excludedtheuseofenhancedcooperation inthesecondpillar, but his mightmakeitmoredifficultfortheMemberStatestohave theirforeignpolicy he rotatingPresidency isoftensaidtofailintermsofpolicy continuity. Still,this hus, thepossibilityforconstructive abstentioninQMV-decisions shouldalsobe Pilot Groups Constructi v e abstention 86 85 Furthermore, after arrangements inthisfieldareclearlyneedofarationalisation. international institutions. In duetime,theseMemberStatescouldalsoproceedtocommonseatsincertain amongst theMemberStates. stantial budgetarysavings andstrengthenthe‘Europeanreflex’inforeignaffairs academy betweenthemcouldbeenvisaged. Notably, allthiscouldallow forsub- er cooperation (e.g.defence,monetarypolicy). The set-upofacommondiplomatic ly concerningdomainswhere theseMemberStatesalready have embarkedondeep- their nationaldiplomaticservicesandwiththeCommission’s delegations,especial- Member Statestoproceedontheirown by strengtheningthecooperation between If theseproposalsarenotendorsedby allMemberStates,nothingprevents theother ic servicesoftheMemberStates. the Commission,CouncilSecretariatandsecondedmembersfromdiplomat- T T 4.5.3. F cooperation, etc).Each pilotgroupwould includeatleastthreeMemberStates. The groups couldpooltheirassets(financialresources, mediationefforts,development disarmament, fightagainstterrorism,etc.).For this,theMemberStatesofpilots T 4.6.2. gations andarationalisation oftheprocedures arerequired. are terriblycomplexandhamper policy-making. A criticalreappraisal ofthesedero- T 4.6.1. cy impossible toreconcilewiththeincreasedheterogeneityin both capacityandpoli- If thecurrentburdensomedecision-makingandimplementation proceduresprove 4.6. Area offreedom, securityand justice w intelligence networks. border controlteams,jointpoliceforces, aEuropeanjudicialareaand common order tobringintegration further. Four formsinparticular meritcloserattention:joint oreign Ministerwould becloselyinvolved. DecisionsconcerningtheEUasawhole he Commission’s delegationswould becomeEUembassies,staffedby officialsfrom he recommendationsoftheConvention includetheestablishmentofEUembassies. he Commission hasproposedtosupporttheMember StateswithaEuropean Corps he differentexemptionsgoverning thepositionsof the UK,IrelandandDenmark ould stillbetakenby theCouncil.

orientation intheenlargedUnion,thenenhancedcooperation could beusedin Closer diplomaticcooper J Rationalisation ofthepre-determined flexiblearr oint bordercontrol teams 788 87 At thesametime,currentpre-determinedflexibility ation angements 27 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 28 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 could setupa common prosecutor’s office, which would beabletoinvestigate and safety valve hereto circumvent recalcitrant members. Hence,willingMemberStates cation ofsuch anenhancedcooperation. coast patrolforces ofcertainMediterranean countriesalready provides afirstindi- sharing mechanisms obviously meritcloseattention. The increasedcooperation of the relationwithSchengen provisions, theout-countriesaswellburden- lishment must occur by unanimity. T sion. may alsobeameanstoallow MemberStatestoopt-outfromacertain actionordeci- their procedures,andapermanent exchange ofinformation.Enhancedcooperation a greaterharmonisationofthe definitions ofincriminationsandsanctionsaswell a way forward. This would implythattheparticipatingMemberStatesembarkupon Member Statesrefusetogofurtherinthisarea,enhancedcooperation could provide T 4.6.4. in theEUcivil force. ing), butcouldalsobecharged withexternaltasks,possiblythroughitsintegration T tigation teams’composedby officialsfromalimitednumberofMember States. w with Europolwould obviously bevery much desirable. The setupofsuch jointforces Belgo--German policeofficecouldbeaprecursorinthisrespect. A link right tohave armsanduseforce whenever necessary. The recentinitiative fora could move freelywithinthearea(notablyincaseof‘hotpursuit’)andhave the powers intheterritoryofallparticipatingMemberStates.Policemen ofthiscorps tasks. Membersofthecorpswould have thesame enforcement andinvestigation could makeitpossibleforsomeMemberStatestocreateapolicecorpsspecific draft hasnotsubstantiallystrengthenedEuropol’s powers. Enhancedcooperation some investigation powers butwithoutenforcement capabilities. The Convention’s currentlylacks operational powers. Itismoreaninformationcentrewith 4.6.3. by der corpsforspecifictasksoremergency situations. This couldbeaccompanied to anenhancedcooperation betweenthemselves, possiblyby meansofajointbor- too ambitious,nothingprevents alimitedgroupofMemberStatesfromproceeding If theestablishmentofagenuineborderagency turnsouttobetoocontentiousor fairly limitedrole. The Convention’s textcontainsavague referencetosuch abody. of BorderGuards. Work isunderway toestablishsuch anagency, butitisgiven a he Convention hasproposedthecreationofaEuropean Prosecutor, butthisestab- he Convention hasmadesomeusefulproposalsinthisrespect.Still,casecertain his force would notonlybedealingwithinternalmatters(e.g.crossborderpolic- ould notbeallthatrevolutionary, asprovision isnow already madefor‘jointinves-

a commoninstructionmanualandeven jointtraining. Ifthisisputinplace,then European judicialarea J oint policefor ces 91 Enhanced cooperation could alsocaterfora 90 89 the sameaspirations. ly amongMemberStatesintheenlargedUnionandnotallwillshare to tial economiesofscale. mation, themorevaluable theresultsareforeach ofthem. There arealsosubstan- w A closercooperation betweentheintelligenceforces ofseveral MemberStates 4.6.5. petent nationaljurisdictions. prosecute specifiedcrimesarisingintherelevant areaandbringthemtothecom- for thestatus-quo. TEC). This hasfrustrated any efforttoproceedinthisarea. The Convention’s draft opts nature. Currently, such measuresstillrequireunanimityinthe Council(art.175§2 Enhanced cooperation couldbeusefulfortakingenvironmental measuresofafiscal 4.7.1. derogations incaseofobjective differencesinsituation. between theMemberStatesinfieldofenvironment, by cateringfor(temporary) Provision isalready madefortheUniontotakeintoaccountobjective differences 4.7. Environment for exchanging informationonterroristsinthepre-criminalinvestigative phase. upon theCouncilrecommendationof26 April 2002onmulti-nationalad-hocteams seems desirable inany case. An enhancedcooperation inthisrespectcouldbuild of MemberStatesareinvolved. A linkwith(common)policeforces andEuropol information may beeasier tobringaboutinacontextwhere onlyalimitednumber derogations couldbeintensifiedinthefuture. Several possibilitiesforflexibleintegration existinthisfield the internalmarket. acceptability. Insomecases,such measurescouldalsoimprove thefunctioningof ould entailmany benefits.Indeed,themoreintelligenceservicessharetheirinfor- may stillturnouttobenecessary, sinceenvironmental conditionswilldiffergreat- Common intelligencenetw En vironmental taxes carbon tax taxation an extendedEuro-vignette,accompanied by appropriatereformsincar pesticides emissions trading fuel taxesoncivil aviation excises onenergyproducts(diesel, kerosene…) 95 Ky oto makesprogressinthisfieldanecessityandenhancesits 92 Moreover, theconfidencerequiredforexchange of orks 94 Y et, flexibleintegration 93 Obviously, theuseofsuch 96 : sensu stric- 29 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 30 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 dards doesnotexceedaneconomicallysupportablelevel. probably onlybeembarkeduponiftheexpectedeconomicimpactofnewstan- countries would probablynotopposeenhancedco-operation. Such cooperation will operation would notsufferadisadvantage (theymay even have anadvantage), these national regulations.Sincetheenterprisesofcountriesnotinvolved insuch aco- co-operation. The ‘outs’would onlyhave tocomplywiththerelevant EU-wideor dards would have tobelimitedtheMember States participatingintheenhanced Given therequirement ofnon-discrimination,theapplicationthesehigherstan- monised areas. existing directive more stringent,ortoadoptcertainregulatorynormsinnotyet har- higher standardintheirterritories.Moreconcretely, itcouldbeusedtorenderan Enhanced cooperation couldofferenvironmental ‘leaders’theopportunitytoseta 4.7.2. Setting higheren vironmental standards 97 7. Flexible integration –sometimesundertheformofenhanced cooperation -will 6. A lotofpeoplenow makespeeches thatdonotidentify thekindofenhanced 5. The legalcomplexitiesgenerated by flexibleintegration canbequitehigh. They The decisionprocesstolaunch aflexibleintegration projectwillbemademore 4. 3. The treatiespresentlydefinecomplicatedproceduresforflexibleintegration inside 2. This beingsaid,theexperiencesofpasthave limitedrelevancy. The context 1. Flexible integration hasbeenapositive elementintheEuropeanintegration 5. The tencommandmentsofflexible integration quickly faceanimplementation gap. grammes willsoonexpose thelimitsofbudgetarysolidarity. Softlaw methodswill recalcitrant MemberStatesoreliminating diversity through assistancepro- Other instrumentstoaccommodate theincreaseddiversity willnotdo.Buyingoff has notbeenpreparedby seriousinstitutional reformsduringthelast10years. because itwillbeinevitableto surmounttheparalysis ofanenlargedEuropethat happen eventually. Notasameans to exertpressure,orasapoliticallesson,but it blursthestakeswhilst stimulatingtheoppositions. T action, andthatdonotexamineseriouslytheconditionsimposed by thetreaties. cooperation which isenvisaged, thatdonotcontemplateaprecisedomainof for aninsufficientextensionofqualifiedmajorityvoting. a compensationforaninsufficientreformoftheinstitutional system, andafortiori beconsideredas Consequently, thepossibleuseofenhancedcooperation cannot also tendtoincrease,accordingthelevel ofambitiontheinvolved project. decided by the Nicetreaty. Member Stateswillnotbeeasy, especiallywiththeraising ofthedecisionceiling difficult, inany case,by enlargement.Even reaching aqualifiedmajoritywith25 more complex. ciently remembered,bothby advocates andadversaries. Italsomakesthedebate the Treaties. They donotprecludeitoutsidethe Treaties. This elementisnotsuffi- Union willgive another politicalmeaningtotheconcept. T has changed. There arenow detailedtreatyprovisions. The acquishasdeveloped. tional process. important drawbacks, duetothesometimesextremecomplexityofinstitu- w the treaties(EMU,socialprotocol),orincaseofoccasionalobstruction(arrest process. This istrueforinitiatives takenoutsidethetreaties(Schengen) orinside his typeofrhetoricwillbecounterproductive inalongtermperspective, because he EUnow dealswithnewdomainsofcompetence. The enlargementofthe arrant). This mustalways be remembered. The conceptnevertheless presents 31 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 32 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 .Enhancedcooperation willbeeasierina context inwhich the 9. 8. For thesakeofclarity, itisabsolutelyessentialtodistinguishfive differentproj- 10 . Flexible integration willhave a limited impactinforeignpolicy anddefence.In framework. defined by thetreaty. The secondoneconsistsinanewinitiative outsidethis policy, oratleast asetofinitiatives, intheframework ofenhancedcooperation useful forthenearfuture. The firstoneenvisages theimplementationofanew relying onanautonomousinstitutionalregime. After analysis,two ofthemremain ad hocgroup,avant garde(inthepresentsetting ofthe Treaties), andavant garde ects (seechapter 3):flexibleintegration outsidethe Treaties, punctualdecision, ority. tence sharingoneortwo ofthesecharacteristics shouldbeconsideredasapri- police units,ortheorganisationofintegrated militaryelements. Areas ofcompe- example abettercoordinationofeconomicpolicies,thecreationcommon limited. Itwillalsobeeasierifitismeanttolargelyexecutive. This covers for cooperation, especiallyforoperational initiatives. near future,thoughtherearealsopotentialitiesinthefieldof policeandjustice eration remainsprobablythemostlikelydomainforasignificantinitiative inthe v quite limited. An analysisofthelegalconstraints, thepoliticalcontextand mental inthatdomain. The addedvalue ofsuch anintegration becomesthus treaties representslittle,becausethisframework remainsstronglyintergovern- defence, theintegration ofmoreambitiousinitiatives insidetheframework ofthe Member Stateswillstronglyreducetheimpactofany initiative. Inthefieldof the fieldofforeignpolicy, which isessentially declaratory, theabsenceofsome arious opportunitiessuggestthatthedevelopment ofeconomicandsocialcoop- acquis remains Studia Diplomatica (forthcoming) BURCA, J.SCOTT, Constitutionalc in question.” than themaintenanceofacompetitive advantage orafundamentalrejectionofpartthepolicy measure periods oftime,fromcommonpoliciesintheinternalmarketsphere,forreasonswhich seemlikelittlemore 3 As G.De Burca putsit:“ nement, delarecherche etdéveloppement, del’éducationetlapolitiquesociale.In:Rapportdu 6 B. RACINE, E.PHILIPPART, RapportsurlesCoopérations Restreintesdanslesdomainesdel’environ- Europe orseveral’ Programme working paper07/00. Rethinking theEuropeanUnion.IGC2000andbey 12 For anoverview ofthedebate: A. STUBB, DealingwithflexibilityintheIGC,E.BESTetal.(eds.), the newvoting system(1/3ofMember Statesrepresenting1/3ofthepopulation). 11 The Convention’s draft (articleIII-201)merelychanges thethreshold,which isalogicalconsequenceof F. P 14 T. JAEGER, Enhancedcooperation in the Treaty ofNiceandflexibilityintheCommonForeign andSecurity 207-238. plified’ treaty. In:CMLR enlargement oftheEuropeanUnion.Opportunitiesandthreats.In:StudiaDiplomatica 8 For acriticalanalysisoftheimplicationsenlargementforEU:F. DEHOUSSE, W. COUSSENS, The 7 F. TUYTSCHAEVER, op.cit. française, 2004(forthcoming).C.-D. EHLERMANN,op.cit. C.-D. EHLERMANN,Increaseddifferentiationorstrongeruniformity? and A. WIENER (eds.), European integr European (eds.), and A.WIENER 10 SeeH. WALLACE, Flexibility :atoolofintegration orarestraint ondisintegration ?,inK.NEUNREITHER 4 H. WALLACE, W. WALLACE, Flyingtogetherinalargerandmoredi maintain abroaderdefinitionofcigarsandcigarettesfortaxpurposesetc. pharmacists underdirective 85/433,thepermissiongiven indirective 79/32toGermany andDenmarkto ples: theexemptiongiven toGreecefromtheobligationsecurefreedomofestablishmentself-employed 2 For ananalysis:F. TUYTSCHAEVER, DifferentiationinEuropeanUnionla tion fortheenlargedEuropeanUnion (eds.), T SHAW, Enhancingcooperation afterNice:willthetreatydotrick ?In:M. ANDENAS, andJ.USHER tional balance:acontinentalperspective. http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010101.html. J. RMCUE, no.444,janvier 2001.X. YATAGANAS, The Treaty ofNice:thesharingpower andtheinstitu- 13 S.RODRIGUES,Letraité deNiceetlescoopérations renforcées auseindel’UnionEuropéenne.In: democr Commissariat Génér l’Europe: unnouveau paspourl’intégration européenne? In:CourrierHebdomadaire the Convention’s results:F. DEHOUSSE, W. COUSSENS,Le Traité Constitutionnel delaConvention pour 16 Draft Treaty establishingaConstitutionforEurope.CONV850/03(18 July 2003).For aglobalanalysisof 15 For apossiblereformofthetreatyprovisions: E. PHILIPPART, Anewmec 5 J.MONAR, J Coping withFlexibilityandLegitimac 9 L.METCALFE, Flexibleintegration inandafterthe Amsterdam Treaty. In:M.DENBOER,etal.(eds.), olicy, EuropeanF

DEHOUSSE, W. COUSSENS, The Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty. Oldwineinanewbottle? In: ac he treatyofNiceandbey y , Oxford,OxfordUniv. Press,2000,pp.153-174. G. DEBURCA, DifferentiationwithintheCore:caseofCommonMarket.In:G.DE ustice andhomeaffairsinawiderUnion:thed oreign al duPlansurl’Unioneuropéenneetlescoopér , Vol. 40,No.2,2003. Affairs Review (...) MemberStateshave optedout,sometimesforlongerandrepeatedlyrenewed ong -enlargementandconstitutionalreform . hange intheEU.F , NotreEurope,2003.J.SHAW, Flexibilityina‘re-organised’ and‘sim- y after , Autumn 2002,pp.297-316. ation after Amsterdam ond. Amsterdam -Institutionald rom uniformitytoflexibility? . EIPA, 1998. Maastricht :EIPA, 2000. ynamics ofinclusionandexclusion EUI Working Paper RSCno.95/21. ations renfor v erse EuropeanUnion w hanism forenhancedcooper . Oxford,HartPubl.,2003,pp. . HartPublishing,1999. ynamics andprospectsfor Hart, 2000. A fewexam- cées , no.1808-1809,2003. , Vol. LIV, 2001,No.4. , LaDocumentation . WRR, 1995. . WRR, . ESRC‘One a - 33 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 34 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 Nederland endeEuropesegrond Flexibility andthenewConstitutional Treaty oftheEuropeanUnion.In:J.PELKMANS,etal.(eds.), 35 This would approach the‘enhancedUnion’-scenarioasdescribedin:E.PHILIPPART, M.SIEDHIANHO, PART, M. PART, of diversity anditsimpactontheEUsystemofgovernance. In:G.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT, op.cit.E.PHILIP- 34 For asimilarexercise: E.PHILIPPART, M.SIEDHIANHO, From uniformitytoflexibility. The management ommendations cise’ thatneedssometidying upofitsown. F 17 For aconciseoverview: M.DOUGAN, The Convention’s draft Constitutional Treaty : A ‘tidying-up exer- 37 K.LENAERTS, Cooper between MemberStatesoftheUnion.In:G.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT, op.cit. pre-empted thatoftheMemberStates.See:B. DE WITTE, Old-fashionedflexibility:International Agreements also excludedinareasofconcurrentcompetencewhere theexercise ofthiscompetence by theUnionhas 36 Hence,such cooperation isexcludedinareasfallingundertheexclusive competences oftheUnion.Itis 38 The current Treaties contain someexplicitrecognitionsofthisfact.Article17 ‘Models ofcooperation withinanenlargedUnion.’ Brussels,January 282003 loquium organisedby theRoyal InstituteforInternationalRelationsandtheNational BankofBelgiumon 33 E.PHILIPPART, Anewmec enhanced cooperation areconsistentwitheach otherandwiththepoliciesofUnion. vides thattheCouncilandCommissionshallensureactivities undertakeninthecontextof 32 Inthisrespect,itshouldnotbeforgottenthatarticle45 TEU (articleIII-329oftheConvention’s draft) pro- 31 Still,theminimumparticipationthresholdonlyseemstoapplyatmomentofauthorisation. 43. 30 Article Naples MinisterialConclave (CIG582/03 Add 1,25November 2003)envisage thesuppressionofthisclause. 29 Heretoo,theIGClookssettomarkastepbackwards. Indeed,theItalianPresidency proposalsforthe III-328. 28 Article III-324. 27 Article 26 Articles 43,III-325andIII-326. 25 Article 40§3. 24 Articles 40§7III-214.For thefateoftheseclausesinIGC,see4.4.4. III-212. 23 Article 22 Article III-213§5. III-213. 21 Article III-211. 20 Article decide unanimouslyonenhancedcooperation intheCFSPfield. the NaplesMinisterialConclave (CIG582/03 Add 1,25November 2003)provide thattheCouncilshall 19 The IGClookssettomarkastepbackwards inthisrespect.Indeed,theItalianPresidency proposalsfor under theConstitution..Notethatthiswould beastepbackwards ascomparedtotheNice Treaty. the decisiontoembarkuponanenhancedcooperation intheareaofCFSPneedstobetakenunanimously 18 Yet, thisinterpretationiscontestedby someMemberStates.Indeed,accordingtointerpretations, 39 Article III-213. 39 Article preted acontrario thatsuch cooperation isnow precluded. the Union’s CFSP. This clause doesnolongerfigureintheConvention’s draft, butthisshould notbeinter- level, intheframework ofthe WEU andNATO, provided such cooperation doesnotruncountertoor impede does notprevent thedevelopment ofclosercooperation betweentwo ormoreMemberStatesonabilateral

SIE DHIANHO, T . WRR Working Paper 104,2000. ation inthesecondandthirdpillarsof EuropeanUnion he ProsandConsofclosercooper hanism ofenhancedcooper wet . Wetenschappelijke Raad voor hetRegeringsbeleid, Amsterdam, 2003. eder al T rust Constitutionalonlineessa ation fortheEuropeanUnion ation withintheEU. TEU ys . Introductiontothecol- Argumentation andrec no. 27/03(2003). . NotreEurope,2003. holds thatthe Treaty - 47 L.BINISMAGHI, G. TABELLINI, Ho 46 ProtocolontheEurogroup. POLICY, Effecti excellent analysisofpossiblereforms: THE NETHERLANDSSCIENTIFICCOUNCILFORGOVERNMENT er cooper P European Union.In:J.PELKMANS,etal.(eds.),NederlandendeEuropesegrond 40 For ananalysis:E.PHILIPPART, M.SIEDHIANHO, FlexibilityandthenewConstitutional Treaty ofthe 62 K.LANNOO, M.LEVIN,AnEU-compan 61 Articles III-62,III-63andIII-130. RACINE, E.PHILIPPART, op. cit. 60 For asurvey offlexibleintegration intheareaofenvironment, R§D, educationandsocialpolicy :B. not proven very successful. several MemberStatesoutsidetheEUframework. The experiencewiththeseformsofflexible integration has more provides thattheCommunity may makeprovision forparticipationinR&Dprogrammes undertakenby States only, which shallfinancethemsubjecttopossiblyCommunity participation. Article 169 TEC further- program, supplementaryprogrammes may bedecidedoninvolving theparticipationofcertainMember 59 Itshouldbenotedthatarticle168 TEC already provides thatinimplementingthemulti-annualframework nomic policiesinEurope l’Union européenneetlescoopér 43 For ageneral analysiswiththeoreticalbackground: F. MILNER, A. KOELLIKER, Ho What shouldbedone?CEREssa 54 P. JACQUET, J.PISANI-FERRY, EconomicPolicy coordinationintheEurozone:what hasbeenachieved? 53 COMMISSARIAT GENERALDUPLAN,op.cit. 52 SeealsoCommissionCommunication.For theEuropeanUnion.Peace, freedom,solidarity, COM(2002)728. III-88. 51 Article III-91. 50 Article not participatethereinmustberespected. extension, especiallygiven theconditionalitythatrightsandinterestsofthoseMemberStateswhich do 49 Itisdoubtfulwhether recoursecouldbehadtotheprovisions onenhancedcooperation forsuch an 48 See1.1.2. économique etmonétaire,présidéparJean Pisani-Ferry. In:RapportduCommissariatGénér et lescoopérations renforcées. Rapportdel’ateliersurlescoopérations renforcées danslesdomaines 45 For anambitiousapproach: COMMISSARIAT GENERALDU PLAN, Autour del’Euroetau-delà:l’UEM three years ofEMU.NotreEuropeEuropeanIssuesNo.9 44 For anexcellentoverview :L.NAVARRO, As theEuropreparesfortake-off:acriticalreviewoffirst F 42 F. SCHARPF, Problem-solvingeffectiveness anddemocratic accountabilityintheEU.PFIfG 41 The 1/3thresholdcouldthusprovide foranIoninna-likecompromisetakingsalientdecisions. Raad voor hetRegeringsbeleid, Amsterdam, 2003. 56 For athoroughanalysis:B. ARDY, The EUbudgetandEMU.SouthBankEuropeanpapers 55 Infact,the‘enablingclause’inarticleIII-88ofConvention’s draft couldprovide such alegalbase. 58 J. W. OOSTERWIJK, Europaineenhogereversnelling. Economisc European Economy, 1993,no.5. 57 For ageneral overview: EUROPEANCOMMISSION, The EconomicsofCommunitypublicfinance. orward StudiesUnit, Working Paper,1999. aper 03/1. ation? v e policiesinthepan-EuropeanUnion T he Amsterdam clausesandthed . Aspen EuropeandialogueRedesigningEurope.Rome28February 2003. y ations renfor J anuary 2001. w toimpro y withoutanEU-tax? cées v , LaDocumentationfrançaise, 2004(forthcoming).For an e economicgo ynamic ofEuropeanintegr . Reportno.65(2003). , October2001. A corpor v ernance? h-Statistisc ate taxactionplan for ad T he coordinationofmacroeco ation he Beric . EuropeanCommission wet w tomakeuseofclos . Wetenschappelijke hten , 9-1-2004. no. 1/2001. al duPlansur W v ancing orking - - 35 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 36 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 de lasécuritéetdéfense.In:RapportduCommissariatGénér Renforcées dansl’UnionEuropéenne.Rapportdel’ateliersurlescoopérations renforcées danslesdomaines gration intheareaofdefence:COMMISSARIAT GENERALDUPLAN,Perspectives delaCoopération 63 Seealso:EUROPEANPARLIAMENT, Directorate-General forResearch, T 75 A. MISSIROLI,EuropeansecurityandDefence:thecaseforsettingconvergence criteria.In:European 74 Article 40§3. defensiebeleid. In:InternationaleSpectator see: S.BISCOP, RebellenindeNavo, voortrekkers indeEU?Eenpost-Irak regimevoor hetveiligheids- en Relations (IRRI-KIIB))forhisvaluable helpwiththischapter. For informationaboutthemini-defencesummit 71 The authorswould liketothankDr. Sven Biscop(SecurityDepartment -Royal InstituteforInternational a directive itdidnotadoptnornegotiate.C.Barnard,op.cit. were obligedtosetupEWCsonthecontinent. Thus, theUKcouldnotfullyinsulate itselffromtheeffectsof 70 Indeed,many foreigncompanieshave extendedthisdirective totheirUKemployees, while BritishMNOs 139 69 Art. TEC. rity matters:assetsofliabilities?ISSOccasionalP 73 For amoregeneral overview: A. MISSIROLI(ed.),Flexibilityandenhancedcooperation inEuropeansecu- 72 For anexcellentanalysis: A. MISSIROLI,CFSP, defenceandflexibility. ISSChaillotpapers F coopér Science P opments the Lisbonprocess as onapossiblesuspension ofaMemberState. All otherdecisionswillbetaken unanimously. Notably, non- in itsrestrictedformat shalldecideby QMVonthesubsequent participationofnewMember States,aswell in threemonthsdecide by QMVonitsestablishment and thelistofparticipatingMemberStates. The Council willing andabletoparticipateinthiscooperation shallnotifytheirinteresttotheCouncil, which shallwith- c ation. Indeed,theItalianPresidency initsfinaldocument (CIG60/03 ADD 1)proposessomeimportant 80 ItshouldbenotedthattheIGCmay comeupwithasubstantiallymodifiedclauseon structural cooper- 79 A. MISSIROLI,op. cit.2000. III-213. 78 Article 77 A. MISSIROLI,op.cit.2000. given attheconferenceonESDPorganisedinParis on13-15December2001by theCiceroFoundation. 76 A. MISSIROLI,DefencespendinginEurope:is prepared topa J 68 F. SCHARPF, Legitimatediversity: thenewchallenge ofEuropeanintegration. Cahierseuropéensde BURCA, J.SCOTT (eds.), op. cit. 67 M.RODRIQUEZ-PINEROROYO, FlexibilityandEuropeanLaw: alabourlawyer’s view. In:G.DE collective agreementsbetweensocialactorsimplementingthedirective couldderogatefromitsstandards. an individual opt-outonthemaximum48-hourworking weekprovided certainconditionsaresatisfied. Also, T ment was already inexistenceby acertainmomentintime,theobligationsunderdirective donotapply. 66 For instance,theCouncilDirective 94/95/EConEuropean Works Councilsprovides thatwhere anagree- 65 See:C.BARNARD, Flexibilityandsocialpolicy. In:G.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT (eds.),op.cit. 64 B. RACINE, E.PHILIPPART, op.cit. une 1999. oreign hanges. Thus, thestructuredcooperation willnolongerbeestablishedby the Treaty. Instead,MemberStates he Working Time Directive 93/104/ECprovides furtherexamples.For instance,MemberStatescanobtain ations renfor Affairs Review . Economic Affairs Series131,2003. o 1, 2002. . CEPSresearch report, April 2002. cées , 4/1999.F. HEISBOURG, The EUneedsdefenceconvergence criteria,CER Bulletin , LaDocumentationfrançaise, 2004(forthcoming). , June 2003.For ageneral appraisal oftheissueflexibleinte- aper 6, 1999. al duPlansurl’Unioneuropéenneetles y forimpro axation inEurope:recentdev v ed capabilities? 38, 2000. P aper el - , als remedievoor hetGBVB?In:InternationaleSpectator mental policy? EIOP 97 This sectionisbasedon:S.BAER, etal.,Closer cooperation, anewinstrumentforEuropeanenviron- tice etd’affairesintérieures. Y. LEJEUNE(ed.),Le dimensions incertaines.Quelquesréflexionssurlerecoursauxcoopérations renforcées enmatièredejus- 88 For ananalysisofpotentialrisks:G.DEKERCHKOVE, Unespacedeliberté,sécuritéetjusticeaux also : The NetherlandsScientificCouncilforGovernment Policy, op.cit. 96 K.SCHLEGELMILCH,Energy III-130. 95 Article 94 For ananalysis:B. RACINE, E.PHILIPPART, op.cit. ities ofaMemberState,theCouncilmay grant thatstateatemporary derogation. 93 Article 175 TEC §5holdsthatifameasureinvolves costsdeemed disproportionateforthepublicauthor- 92 F. MILNER, A. KOELLIKER, op.cit. III-175. 91 Article Spectator 81 M.NONES, A test-bedforenhancedcooperation: theEuropeandefenceindustry. In:T only containsthemilitarycriteria,which arehowever ofamainlyqualitative nature. participating willnolongerbeexcludedfromthedeliberations inthisrestricted Council. The Protocolnow dev ahead l’Union européenneetlescoopér AT 87 For ageneral appraisal ofenhancedcooperation intheareaofJustice andHome Affairs: COMMISSARI- d’intégration. Rapportdel’atelierprésidéparG.Canivet. In:RapportduCommissariatGénér européen. StudiaDiplomatica MARTINEZ, Lacoopération policièreetjudiciaireeuropéenne:leslents progrès d’unnouveau projet 90 Framework DecisionJAI/2002/465, OJL162,20June 2002. For anoverview: F. DEHOUSSE,J.GARCIA III-166. 89 Article p. 289. agement groups.’ In:EuropeanF 86 S.KEUKELEIRE,Directorates intheCFSP/CESDPofEuropeanUnion:apleafor‘restrictedcrisisman- 85 THE NETHERLANDSSCIENTIFICCOUNCILFORGOVERNMENT POLICY, op.cit. seems widenedinscopebutreducedsignificance. for itsimplementation. The languagehasalsobeenrenderedsomewhat lessobligatory. Hence,theprinciple a NATO-member, thelattershallremainfoundationoftheircollective defenceandthebody responsible nature ofthedefencepoliciescertainMemberStatesshallbeunaffected.For EU-memberswho arealso clause nolongerseemslimitedtowillingMemberStates,butapplicableall.However, thespecific tion. The ItalianPresidency proposessomeimportantchanges initsfinaldocument(CIG60/03 ADD 1). The 84 ItlookslikelythattheIGCwillreviseprovisions intheConvention’s draft Treaty onclosercoopera- III-214. 83 Article III-212. 82 Article

GENERAL DUPLAN,Lescoopérations renforcées enmatièredejusticeetaffairesintérieures:unoutil elopments intoolsforintegr . Heinrich BöllFoundation, 1999.EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, En , Vol. XXXV, No.3,2000. , vol. 4,2000,no.13. o.L,N 4. LV,, Vol. N° ation oreign T axation intheEUandsomeMember States:Lookingforopportunities ations renfor , November 2000. Affairs Review cées T r aité d’Amsterdam:espoirsetdéceptions , LaDocumentationfrançaise, 2004(forthcoming).See , 2001/1.For acriticalanalysis: T. SAUER, Directoria , December2002. vironmental taxes:recent . Bruylant,1999, he International al duPlansur 37 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 38 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 ing thepowers oftheEuro-Ecofin Council.Itis,however, essentialthatdecision- can stillhelpprogress inthedomainofdefence, forexample,aswellin extend- mined formsof flexibility, such asEMU,played avery importantrole inthepast,and economic competitiveness, environment, socialpolicy, CFSPandJHA.Pre-deter- allowing forconstructive abstention,canbeoccasionallyuseful insuch domainsas within theUnion.Micro-forms offlexibility, anchoring exemptionsinEUlaw or stalemate, butisnotthemost appropriatemeanstoeasecurrentpoliticaltensions Closer cooperation outsidethe Treaty remainsa‘safetyvalve’ incaseofprolonged ity andenhancedcooperation arefourbasic modelsofdifferentiatedintegration. Cooperation outsidethe Treaty framework, micro-flexibility, pre-determinedflexibil- done, andwhat initiatives shouldbeundertaken. Union, andpolicy coherence. This paperexploresways inwhich thisshouldbe T outlines proposalsonwhat shouldbedonethrough‘flexible’means. debate. The paperthenmoves ontoassessdifferentformsofflexibleintegration and sistent andconfused. This papercallsforanimprovement inthequalityofthis ‘second-class’ members.Moregenerally, thedebateonflexibleintegration isincon- have reactednegatively totheseproposalsfearingthattheycouldbeleftbehindas pioneer groupandleadtheothersby furtheringintegration. Many MemberStates have calledforatwo-speed Europe,where moreambitiouscountrieswould forma constructive dialogue onsharedpriorities.Inthiscontext,somenationalleaders stalemate. Seriouscontroversy betweenMemberStateshasunderminedthebasisfor On theeve ofenlargement,theprocessEuropeanintegration risksrunninginto Executive Summary ny integration, where necessary, by differentmeansonissues,underthescruti- a groupofcountriesiswillingtoformone.MemberStates shouldpursueflexible T a singlepoliticalandinstitutionalframework inapragmatic, butnotcasual,fashion. at differentspeeds,onsubjects.Itisamatterofaccommodating diversity in should advance inthesame,broaddirection.However, theyshouldbeabletodoso position. Inthisperspective, flexibilityshouldbeameanstoanend. All countries and decision-makers.Itisessentialthatnationalgovernments endorseacommon unlock the currentblockage, outlinesharedobjectives andmobilisepublicopinion however, arguesthattheUnionurgentlyneedsanew, thriving politicalprojectto Conference (IGC),duringtheIrishPresidency, areencouraging signs. This paper, Constitutional Treaty andthedesireforanearlyconclusionofIntergovernmental he Uniondoesnotneed,atthisstage,a‘hardcore,’ andthereisno evidencethat he expectedresumptionofinter-governmental negotiationsonthedraft

of thecommoninstitutions,soasnottounderminepolitical cohesionofthe FLEXIBLE MEANS TO FURTHER INTEGRATION By Giovanni Grevi 1 this new, ambitiousprocess. a newprojectfortheUnion. This paperofferssomesuggestionsonhow totrigger Member Statesshouldtakepart,togetherwiththecommoninstitutions,inshaping implementing acommonpoliticalproject,reflectingrenewedcohesion. the Treaty, which shouldremainaremedy ofvery lastresort T ensuring thatthecommoninstitutionsarefullyinvolved. progress inanumberofareas,fromcorporate taxationtopolicecooperation, while ed forby enabling clausesinthetreaties,isavery usefulmechanism formaking making remainstransparent andinclusive. Enhancedcooperation, finally, asprovid- hese differentformsofflexibleintegration, withtheexceptionofflexibilityoutside , should beusedin 39 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 40 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 8. Members oftheEconomicandMonetaryUnion(EMU)shouldimprove the Micro-flexibility shouldbeused, underthesupervisionofCommissionand 7. 6. Member Statesshouldusecloser cooperation outsidethe Treaty framework only 5. Flexibility shouldnotunderminethesinglepoliticalandinstitutional framework Once commonobjectives areagreed, nationalgovernments4. shoulddeterminethe 3. Member StatesandtheEUinstitutionsshouldtakeondrafting anewproject 2. Cooperation betweentheEUinstitutions,notablyCommission,andnational National leadersshouldimprove thequalityofdebateonfutureEurope, 1. Ke 9. Willing andableMemberStatesshouldfulfil the objective criteriaestablished to by scope ofthedecisionsthat Euro-Ecofincanadopt. This shouldbe doneeither arrangements fortheeconomicgovernance oftheEurozoneby broadeningthe Security Policy (CFSP)andJustice andHome Affairs (JHA),among others. of economiccompetitiveness, environment, socialpolicy, CommonForeign and acts, orinpoliticaldecisions.Micro-flexibilityshouldenable progressinthefields the EuropeanCourtofJustice (ECJ),toaccommodatediversity inspecificlegal ical crisis. as thevery lastresort–a‘safetyvalve’ toenableprogressincaseofseriouspolit- of theenlargedUnion,ortransparency andefficiency ofdecision-making the samedirection. issues onwhich theywishtointegrate faster, usingflexiblemeanstoadvance in mon project. together withaconcreteactionplan. All EUcountriesshouldendorsethiscom- for Europe–apoliticalprojectsettingouttheprioritiesofEuropeanintegration, posal onfuturesharedpoliticalpriorities. governments shouldbethebasicstartingpointfortablingofany crediblepro- adoption ofthedraft Constitutional Treaty by theendofJune. sible dialogueonsharedpriorities. The firststepinthisdirectionshouldbethe should give way totrust.ConfidenceamongMemberStatesisessential forasen- and flexibleintegration inparticular. Mutualaccusationsshouldstop;suspicion divisions andpromote the internationalprofileof entireUnion. pursue theircooperation in aninclusive andtransparent fashion, toasminimize enter structuredcooperation inthedomain ofdefence. These countriesshould suing enhancedcooperation initiatives. y recommendations

amending current Treaty provisions inthefinalstagesof(IGC), orby pur- 10. Enhanced cooperation shouldbecomethepreferentialinstrumentforimple- tion, andsocialpolicy. for example,corporate taxation,policecooperation, criminaljusticecoopera- forces. MemberStatesshoulduseenhancedcooperation tomakeprogresson, cedural guarantees willminimisedivisive effectsandwillmaximisecentripetal menting flexibility. The involvement ofthecommoninstitutionsandotherpro- 41 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 42 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 ‘ EMU, CFSPanddefencepolicy andinternalsecurity. This paperenvisaged a tries preparedtohave closerlinksin thefieldsintroducedby theMaastricht Treaty: authors advocated greatercooperation between agroupofintegration-minded coun- Lamers, publishedon1September1994,outlinedavery differentperspective. The Confederacy toFederation - Thoughts onthefinalityof Europeanintegration Minister, Joschka Fischer, delivered inBerlin on12May 2000entitled “ eration tookonnewpublicmomentum with thespeech thattheGermanForeign A fewyears later, in therunuptoIGC2000,discussiononclosercoop- further politicalcooperation frombeingblocked. Itisclearlyadouble-edged sword. Others, however, saw someformofdifferentiatedintegration astheonlyway toprevent each couldchoose what suitedhimandabandonedthepolicieswhich didnotsuithim.” between particularCommunitypolicies;…theriskoflack ofcoherence would grow if called intoquestion“ Belgian PrimeMinister, Jean-Luc Dehaene,wentfurther, observingthattheconcept Some foresaw aEurope well beforethemajorinstitutionaldevelopments ofthe1990s. debate onhow besttoaccommodatediversity inasinglelegalframework started ferent groupsofcountrieswithinoroutsidetheUnion–hasalonghistory. The Flexible integration –entailingavariety offormsclosercooperation amongdif- Fr 1. The stateofthedebate ment. circumstances, thepolicy areasinwhich theyintendedtostepuptheirinvolve- à lacarte w Many variations onthetheme of flexibility, ordifferentiatedintegration, wereputfor- ferent speeds,oratvariable geometries. agreements outsidethe Treaties. The questionwas how todevelop aEuropeatdif- w with newwaves ofenlargementapproaching, thedebate becamemorevigourous.It Maastricht, however, following theinclusionofMonetaryUnionin Treaties and sharing acoresetofpoliciesandinstitutions. Europe organisedin‘concentriccircles’ withdifferentdegreesofintegration but made theperspective ofahard-coremorepalatableby puttingforward theideaofa w and deepening lay inenhancedcooperation insome areas.Furtherdifferentiation and wentonto questionwhether theanswer tothetwinchallenges ofenlargement irrefutable challenge posedby easternenlargement was either erosionorintegration, F K ischer expresseddeepconcernthat thealternative for theEU,facedwith ard afterMaastricht. The thenBritishPrimeMinister, John Major, preferredaEurope as nolongermerelyamatterofallowing forlimitedexemptionsorepisodic ould beinevitable inamoreheterogeneousUnion and erngruppe om Maastricht toNice 3 A GermanChristianDemocrat paper, writtenby Wolfgang Schäuble andKarl in which theMemberStateswould befreetochoose, dependingonthe ’ , or ‘coregroup.’ a numberofglobalbalanceswhich have beenstruck over time à lacarte 4 as arecipeforweakeningpoliticalintegration. The then T he thenFrench PrimeMinisterEduardBalladur, 5 “(t)o facilitatethis process 2 After the Treaty of .” .” 7 F In it, rom 6 edged, itispossible todefinethemostsuitable way to organiseflexibility. market, regional policy andcompetition. Oncedifferencesareexplicitly acknowl- nomic policy orsecuritypolicy, butalsoshouldaddress thefutureofinternal Barnier wentfurther, arguingthatthisquestionshouldnotonlybe posedforeco- basis forfurtherintegration, orwhether differentprojects couldco-exist.Michel w October 2001:‘Whatdowewant todotogether?’ the otherhand,pointedlyraised thefundamental questionbehindflexibilityin Fr could beenvisaged, talksofahard-corewould prove divisive fortheUnion. October 2000that,while someinitiatives of Treaty based‘enhancedcooperation’ group, which would beco-ordinatedby aSecretariat. Tony Blairrespondedin he seemedtoforeseeanintergovernmental modelofcooperation forthepioneer concept ofa‘pioneer’group. While Chirac didnotexplainthedetailsofhisproject, States wishingtogofurtherinintegration mustbeallowed todoso,introducingthe his speech beforetheBundestagon27June 2000,sharedtheviewthatMember a clearpoliticalchoice neededtobemade.Jacques Chirac, theFrench President,in facts andtheshortcomingsofMonnetMethod. means nothingmorethanincreaseintergovernmentalisation underpressurefromthe to fullintegration: itisanincrementalprocess.“ political integration? staunchly committedtotheEuropeanidealandareinapositionpushaheadwith garde, i.e.willacentreofgravity emergecomprisingafewMemberStateswhich are gration …(or)…willasmallergroupofMemberStatestakethisrouteasanavant ed withthisalternative: “w F making far-reaching reformsoftheEuropeaninstitutions. eration ofnation-states” enlarged Union.Former CommissionPresidentJacques Delorssuggestedthata“ alone instressingtherelevance offlexibilityforthesuccessintegration inan is thusoneoftheprioritiesintergovernmental conference ments totheprovisions onenhancedcooperation, F Nice, theConvention andtheIGC tional aswellatapolicy level. Fr Lamy andanumberofFrench politicianswerethefirst to callforanexplicitly stage, althoughtwo statementsdeserve mention.InJune 2001,CommissionerPascal 2002. Nonewmajormodelsofflexibilitywereintroduced intothedebateatthis Europe was launched topave theway fortheConvention to besetupinFebruary although theyplacedtheEuro-12atcentre. F ollowing themeagreachievements ofthe Treaty ofNice,withonly limitedimprove- rench leaders, HelmutSchmidt andGiscardD’Estaingexpressedsimilarviews, ischer argued that,sometimewithinthenexttenyears, theEUwould beconfront- ould bepossibletoassesswhether a common politicalprojectcouldprovide the anco-German tandematthecentre ofthecore.CommissionerMichel Barnier, on anco-German coretoleadtheUnion,structuringtheircooperation at an institu- ” Inhisvision,closercooperation doesnotautomaticallylead should conclude ill amajorityofMemberStatestaketheleapintofullinte- 12 Other countrieswould subsequentlyjointhe “a treatywithinthetreaty” 9 11 13 ” Fischer, therefore,stressedthat Initially, a newdebateontheFutureof Depending ontheresponse,it 8 e nhanced cooperation F ormer Germanand .”

F ischer was not with aviewto 10 fed- 43 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 44 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 F T effort toeithermaximisetheir influence ortolimittheirperceived marginalisation. tive. Now, asenlargementapproaches, allcountriesare positioningthemselves inan the pressureofenlargementwas growing butremained asomewhat futureperspec- the IGCin2003,debateonflexibleintegration remainedlargelytheoretical, as is obvious thatthepoliticalclimatehaschanged. From Maastricht up totheendof and thereisnoneedtoformaliseany neaterdistinctionbetweenMember States.It Spanish PrimeMinister, observed that“ eration betweenthreekey countries, withnowillingness totakeover therunning of While theprotagonist ofthetrilateral summitplayed itdown asconstructive coop- the way national leaders seeanddefineflexible integration initiatives differswidely. the ideaofatwo-speed Europeas“ the growing riftbetweenadvocates ofan Irish PrimeMinisterBertie Ahern, the newPresidentoftheUnion,triedtominimise seeable future,atwo-speed Europewillemerge. particularly stronglanguagearguingthat“ ed tothe Treaty framework throughaProtocol. advocated thecreationofapioneer groupindefencepolicy, somewhat looselyrelat- defence policy. A well-known Franco-German contributioninNovember 2002 ber ofcallsweremadetoextendsomeformflexibilitythefieldssecurityand institutional framework fortheUnionwas sought.Inthiscontext,however, anum- w the Convention, butleadersattheEuropeanandnationallevel clearlyfeltthatit Debate onflexibleintegration continued‘inthecorridors’duringproceedingsof Europe togofaster, furtherandbetter. al reform,apioneergroup“ off. Jacques Chirac commentedthat,intheabsenceofanagreementoninstitution- repeated thesamepoints,butmuch moreforcefully thaninthepast:gloves were and declarations ontheneedforflexibleintegration. Essentially, thesamepeople the BrusselsSummitlastDecembersparkedanew, powerful streamofstatements on thetextofaConstitutionforEurope. The suddeninterruptionofnegotiationsat gration andmultiplespeedshelduntiltheendofIGC,withfailuretoagree All inall,the‘politicallycorrect’reluctancetospeakopenlyofdifferentiatedinte- to theformulationof‘structuredcooperation’ intheConstitutional Treaty. pens. unable totakeacommonposition,somebody mustgive exampleasalways hap- Europe cannotalways goatthespeedofavery slow wagon ...Someday, ifweare some day themomentinwhich somebody ...mustgive exampletogoon,because reached acertaindegreeofexasperation: “ from thetraditional Communitymodelofuniformintegration -seemedtohave Romano Prodi-understandablyquitecautiousinopeningavenues fordepartures ebruary 2004isthemostprominent exampleofthesetacticalmoves. Onceagain, he meetinginBerlinbetween theleadersofFrance, Germany andtheUKon18 ould have beeninappropriatetoopenly discussdifferentiationwhen acommon ” 17 will provide anengine,examplethatwillallow fundamentally wrong. ” 15 there isalready aEuropewithseveral speeds German ChancellorGerhardSchröder used if wedonotreach aconsensusinthefore- We av ant garde

can’t stopEuropeandtherewillcome 14 T his designwould eventually lead ” 16 and theothersby dismissing Even CommissionPresident ” José María Aznar, former ” Member States. of differentiationinthepaceordomainintegration between different groupsof tions thatencompassallthemorespecificmodelslistedbelow, entailingsomeform open andinclusive formsofflexibility. hearted pleaforaUnionabletoadvance at25,envisaging onlyalimitedscopefor of aEurope25. The French President,even moresurprisingly, madeawhole- closer cooperation couldbeusedoccasionally, butshouldnotunderminetheunity Union withtheresources itneedstobecomeastronginternationalactor. Forms of ity’ formulahechampioned fouryears agowould notbeadequatetoprovide the ing athreattoEuropeanintegration. be adirectoire. There cannotbeadecisive nucleuswhich would runtheriskofpos- the Union,ItalianForeign MinisterFranco Frattini respondedthat“ Structured cooperation tained. or unwillingtojoininitially, withthepossibleentryoflatecomersalways main- Member Statescanwork togetherinaparticular fieldeven iftheothersareunable Enhanced cooperation T Europe àlacarte T Flexible Integration ference ofspecificproposals. loosely usedinspeeches andothercontributionsseemsusefultomeasurethedif- context ofsuch adebateontheeve ofenlargement,aguidetotheterminology taken many directionsandhasgrown moreconfused.Beforeassessingthepolitical T 2. The vocabulary offlexibility different priorities,withorwithoutoverlap. V to choose thepolicy areasinwhich theywould liketocooperate moreclosely. British PrimeMinisterJohn Major, describesaUnion inwhich Member Statesarefree “ U-turn withrespecttohisfamousHumboldtspeech, feltthattheUnionneedsto governments seemedtofavour two monthsago. The GermanForeign Minister, ina J oschka Fischer command acontinentalweight welve years afterthe Treaty ofMaastricht, thedebateonflexibleintegration has ariable geometry he Treaty-based approachhe Treaty-based he casualapproach 20 : theculinarymetaphorofaEurope explicitly ruledouttheoptionofatwo-speed Europe,which their : thesimultaneouspursuitby differentgroupsofMemberStates , Differentiated Integration : the Treaty arrangement whereby agroupofatleasteight : introducedby theConvention onthefuture ofEurope,it 21 ” tomatterontheglobalscale. The ‘centreofgrav- ” 18 T he lateststatementsby Jacques Chirac , Closer Cooperation à lacarte , asfavoured by former : broaddefini- T here cannot 19 and 45 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 46 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 elections, awindow ofopportunity seemstohave openedupfor aquick resumption. Institutional negotiations arestillblocked although, following the resultsofSpanish current politicalcontext,andperspectives forflexible integration, neednotwait. others. The juryisstilloutonthefinaloutputofIGC,butan assessmentofthe of appeasingfearsexclusion by some,and ofrespectingtheredlinesdrawn by F 3. The stalemateofintegration in 2000. Centre ofGravity constitute a“hardcore”withthegoalofadvancing integration. w Hard core retariat, builtaroundaFranco-German motor, which would forgedeeperintegration. Pioneer group that would mapouttheway toEuropeanintegration anddrive theprocessforward. Av Édouard Balladur. with differinglevels ofintegration, asadvocated by formerFrench PrimeMinister Concentric circles States may decidetomove fasterthanothersdown thepath ofintegration. Tw T the securityanddefencedomain. made acommitmenttomilitarycapabilities,establishpermanentcooperation in enables MemberStatesthatfulfilthecriteriasetoutinaseparate Protocol,andhave w gration inboththesedomains,butprogress isstilllimitedandtherecentIGChas considerable opposition. The Convention has broadenedthescopeforflexibleinte- European securityanddefencepolicy andeconomicgovernance, have metwith to introduceprovisions fordifferentiatedintegration inkeypolicy domains,such as Constitutional Treaty produced by the Convention), have never beenapplied.Efforts Amsterdam andamendedby the Treaty ofNice(andnow againby thedraft usual. The provisions onenhancedcooperation, enshrined inthe Treaty of undertake groundbreakingpolicy initiatives, followed by areturntobusinessas or toolongthedebateonflexibleintegration hasbeenpunctuated withcallsto he multi-pacedapproach hich the MemberStatesparticipatinginthethirdstageofmonetaryunionwould atered down someoftheConvention’s achievements. ant garde o-speed : the or : thetermusedby Jacques DelorstoindicateagroupofMemberStates : introducedby Jacques Chirac, itdescribes agroupwithitsown sec- Multi-speed K ernueuropa : theupdatedversion of : indicatesaUnionstructuredoutofsubsetsMemberStates : thepossibilitythataparticularcoregroupofMember proposed by Wolfgang Schäuble andKarlLamers,in K erneuropa 22 proposed by Joschka Fischer T his was doneforthesake and preferences,withfurtherintegration. T the enlargedUnion,whose long-termviabilitywould insuch casebeinquestion. dense, andtense,politicalconjuncture,donotbecome astructural featureof What reallymattersisthattheseshocks remaincircumscribed toaparticularly wide margin.Inthiscontext,someshock of‘tectonic’adaptationistobeexpected. Union of25willbemorediverse andheterogeneousthanever inthepast,andby a locutors areasmany as25,ifnot28intheConvention. Itisafactoflifethatthe mon institutions,war andpeace,moneyareintertwined,when theinter- It isunderstandablethatsensitivities areexacerbatedwhen discussionsonthecom- T those oflargercountries. mix ofirritationandindifferenceby anumberofnationalgovernments, notably Communication onthenewfinancialperspectives 2007-2013,werereceived witha Court fortheallegedbreach oftheStabilityPact, aswelltheCommission’s Commission, ontheother. The resolve oftheCommissiontotakegovernments to ities amongMemberStates,ontheonehand,andEUinstitutions,notably Of even greaterconcernisthewideninggapbetweenpolicy perceptions andprior- the greaterimportanceplacedonvotes. the BrusselsSummit,lesserdegreeoftrustthatexistsbetweenMemberStates, cient mutualtrustbetweenthesoon-to-be25MemberStates. As correctlystatedafter ing thebiggestchallenge initshistorywithlittleconfidencefutureandinsuffi- free circulation ofpeoplewithinthelargerUnion.Overall, theUnionisapproach- management oftheirpublicfinances.Barriershave beenputuptoslow down the on theinterpretationandapplicationofStabilityGrowth Pact, andonthe et afterenlargement,anditsoverall amount.MembersoftheEuro-zonearedivided Member Stateshave expresseddivergent positionsontheprioritiesofEUbudg- meet citizens’expectations. groups ofcountrieswithintheEUframework, todeliver effective policy optionsand T states mightmove fasterthanothersraises considerable suspicion,andtensions. and fewwould criticiseitintheabstract. Politically, however, suggestions thatsome ferent paceofintegration indifferentpolicy domains. This isasensibleperspective, he challenge ishow toreconcilethelegitimatediversity ofcapabilities,interests he heatedexchanges ofthelastfewmonths,however, shouldbeputinperspective. hese concernsshouldbeovercome withaviewtoenablingtheUnion,orsub- 25 24 T 23 he solutionis,accordingtomany, adif- 47 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 48 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 the Czech Republiconerepliestheydon’t want atwo-speed Europe. Even Jacques Delorsrecentlyobserved that:“ terms entailsomeformofdifferentiatedintegration. This isnotalways appreciated. example, callingfora‘core-group’orenhancedcooperation, althoughboth therefore soundpoliticalreasoning. There isaworld ofdifferencebetween,for T ing threebasicproblems,namely:language,substance,andcredibility. flexibility, andindicatewhat shouldbedone,andhow. This requiresopenlyaddress- are notseriousaboutthisdiscussion.Itisnow timetohave aseriousdebateabout w ate barriers. The keyreasonforthecompletemismatch oftheargumentsthose or several-speed Europewould underminetheequalityofMemberStates,andcre- after decadesofenforced separation. Intheiropinion,theperspective ofatwo-speed low, andrespondedthatitisnotthetimetodivide Europejustwhen itisre-uniting show theway totheothers. The ‘others’,however, have declinedtheinvitation tofol- European integration andhave calledforanew startby afewvirtuouscountriesto A numberofnationalleadershave implicitlyacknowledged thecriticalstateof 4. The debateonflexibility: three problems one callsforan however, Franco-German rhetoricdoes notstandthetestofreality. First, themore at theoriginofasmany blockages asadvancements. Turning totheUnionoftoday, is historicallycorrect,although itwould be fairtoacknowledge thatFrance hasbeen es therhetoricofFranco-German axisastheengineofEuropeanintegration. That gration atdifferentspeeds. The strongestadvocate of such ascenario,France, abus- Credibility is,infact,thethirdbigproblemwhen itcomestopushingforfurther inte- Member Statestopursueclosercooperation. agenda, itishardtodetectany credibleinitiative onthepartofwillingandable Furthermore, defenceisacaseapart:onallothermajorissues ontheEUpolicy ficult toassessthedegreeofactualpoliticalcohesion behindthesemoves. planning celland,mostrecently, jointbattlegroups.On theotherhand,itisstilldif- of thethreemajorpowers intheEU–UK,France andGermany –tosetupajoint undertheformulaof‘structuredcooperation,’ andby theagreement the Convention defence policy, asproven by theconsiderable institutionalprogressbroughtaboutby taken, andwho couldbeinvolved. An exceptiontosuch vagueness ispossibly integration have outlinedthepolicy areaswhere closercooperation couldbeunder- Secondly, thereisaproblemofsubstance.Nonetheadvocates ofdifferentiated of any meaningful conversation. tial thatinterlocutorsattributethesamemeaningtowords: thisisthebasis a growing large-smalldivide among EUcountries.Fears of anemerging Germany, have alienated mostofthepotentialsupporters by fuellingspeculationof real, thelesscredible thatadvocacy is. he firstproblemislinguistics.Languageagoodtestofintellectualcoherence,and ho want tolead,andofthosereluctantfollow, isthatthemajorityofcontenders av ant garde without takingany majorconcreteinitiative tomakeit 27 Second, France and, toalesserdegree, I say differentiationandin and ” 26 directoire It isessen- of ‘flexible’ means. debate shouldbeimproved, toexplorewhat initiatives shouldbeundertakenby tiatives shouldbespelt outclearly. Credibilityshouldberestored. The qualityofthe Language andconceptsshouldbeusedinamorepreciseway. The substanceofini- and Germany toatwo-speed Europewerenottobetakentooseriously. and Joschka Fischer, recalledabove, demonstrate thatpreviousreferencesby France less -division betweenEUMemberStates. The lateststatementsby Jacques Chirac of Iraq andontheapplicationofStabilityGrowth Pact resultedinmore-not the meritsofspecificdecisions,attitudetwo governments onthequestion countries outsideoftheConvention didnotwinthemmany friends.Regardlessof Germany duringtheproceedingsofConvention madesense,actionby thetwo in easingtensions. Third, althoughmany oftheproposalssubmittedby France and standpoint, therecent‘trilateral’ meetinginBerlin,involving theUK,doesnothelp big powers have narrowed thescopeforopenandconstructive debate.From this ment. design, certaintyandconsensus, butby contingency, ambiguity anddisagree- of accommodationsnewgeopolitical forces. Itscompositionismarkednotby gic negotiationsandgambits,of policy-driven initiatives withindiscretesectors,and single fixedoreven evolving vision.Ratherithas unfoldedinasequenceofstrate- and stressedthat“ device which canserve quitedifferent–even diametricallyopposed–end-games demic Neil Walker argued that“ In commentingontheevolution offlexibilityover previousdecades,Britishaca- mentation, bothinthepoliticsandlegalorderofUnion. national governments have exposedtherealpossiblescenarioofincreasingfrag- should bethecentral concern.Recent,sometimesoverplayed, divisions between F introduced by theConvention. w taken withinthe Treaty framework, oroutsideit. The authorsoutlinedthescopeof enable theadoptionofspecificmeasures,itisanegotiatingtool,andcanbeunder- Dehousse and Wouter Coussensinthis Working Paper, flexibleintegration can As outlinedinthecomprehensive anddetailedanalysisdeveloped by Franklin Flexibility canbeenvisaged inmany differentforms,andonmany differentissues. 5. Definingapoliticalproject inspiring theestablishment ofMonetaryUnion inthe Treaty ofMaastricht. ble integration. Take, forexample, thevery clear andfar-sighted politicalvision rom apoliticalstandpoint,however, thefalteringpaceofEuropean integration hat islegallypossible,onthebasisofexistingprovisions andoftheinnovations ” 28 It isquestionablewhether thisanalysis canbeappliedtoallcasesofflexi- Flexibility, therefore,isa“non-project.” Itisnottheproduct of a flexibility isnotanendinitself,butubiquitous ” 49 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 50 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 parency. mentation, requireoverall politicalcohesion,policy coherence,efficiency andtrans- tion ofasustainablepoliticalprojectfortheenlargedEurope,anditsflexibleimple- cal projectinthe interestoftheUnion,andnot ofsomeitsmostpowerful mem- impractical. Itshoulddevelop inaninclusive mannerand itshouldreflectapoliti- considered aviable solutionifotheroptions have been exploredandhave proven eration amongtheBig Three shouldberuledout.Flexibility, however, shouldbe es seriousreservations. Ofcourse,thisisnottosay thatthisscenarioofcloser coop- meetings atthetoplevel includingtheUnited Kingdom,France andGermany, rais- the perspective ofa‘trilateral’ carteltoguidetheUnion,evoked by the frequent of theharmfulcleavage betweenlargeandsmallcountries. This isthereasonwhy F consist ofenhancingcohesion,atleastinthemedium-term. broadly supported,butalsooneoftheexplicitobjectives ofdifferentiationshould should undermineEUcohesion.Notonlycanflexibleintegration onlysucceedif guarded againstany furtherunravelling. Noinitiative ofdifferentiatedintegration ly questioned,mutualtrustandsolidarityaresupremepublic goodstobejealously At atimewhen thepoliticaland,inturn,economiccohesionofUnion isopen- P 6. Cohesion,coherence, efficiency andtransparency tunities, notshuttingdoors,inhibitingpartnersordrawing faultlines. its many forms,when itisappliedtoadesignwiththeaimofdisclosingnewoppor- In aUnionof25,flexibilityshouldbemeanstoanend.Flexibilityworks well,in willing andabletointegrate further, onspecificsubjectsorbroaderpolicy domains. tion andpurposesofthispoliticalproject,shouldacceptthatsomecountriesare faster pacethanitwould bepossibleat25.MemberStatesshouldagreeonthedirec- probably berequiredtotranslate thisprojectintopractice andmakeprogressata ties, andtobringtogetherasetofkeyinitiatives toachieve them.Flexibilitywill States andEuropeaninstitutionsisbadlyneededtoidentifynewlong-termpriori- What theUnionneedsisanewpoliticalproject.Political leadershipby theMember replace politicalvision. But, althoughexpediency mightdothetrick fromalegalstandpoint,itcannot interests: thatbecamealmostcustomarypractice inbuildingtheSingleMarket. developing along-termprojectand,atthesametime,accommodatingspecific measures. Within limits,thereisnothingwrongwithfindingpragmatic solutionsto those takenatthemicro-level, consistingoftheadoptiononeormorespecific mined thevast majorityofdifferentiatedintegration initiatives, andparticularly On theotherhand,considerable casualnessandshort-termpressureshave deter- rom thisstandpoint,oneofthe litmustestsofpoliticalleadershipwillbetodispose olitical cohesion 30 T he elabora- 29 Tr cussion. Itotherwords, itshouldbeaboutdecisionshapingandnotdecision-taking. form ofamuch widerpoliticalprojectsubmittedtoallpartnersforfully-fledgeddis- sion, meetingsbetweentheBig Three couldbeacceptedonlyiftheyformedtheplat- mote thecommoninterest.From thepointofviewpan-Europeanpoliticalcohe- sideline thecommoninstitutionsandtheirproposalssubmittedinattempttopro- steady flow oflettersbetweenissue-based‘gangs’nationalgovernments seemsto nel ofthecommoninstitutions,andby involving allplayers. Onthecontrary, the many political fronts,butfollows littleattempttobridgethegapsthroughchan- bers. Inthecaseinpoint,trilateral the principleof . and theiroverall coherence, alongthelinesofreport ontheimplementationof to produceona yearly basisanannualreportonthe progressofdifferentinitiatives, ble formsofcooperation willbeusedextensively, there isacasefortheCommission policies, shouldplay apivotal roleinscrutinisingdifferentiatedintegration. Ifflexi- ensuring theconsistency betweeninitiatives ofclosercooperation andcommon P Central totheoverall efficiency oftheUnionis coordinationofdifferentpolicies. P Tr w could enhancepublicdebateonthecourseofintegration, andraise awareness of States tojointhefront-runners.Infact,dynamics triggeredby differentiation this would putadditionalpressureonthegovernments ofnon-participatingMember loss ofpopularconfidence.People would beabletoendorseshared objectives, and tives tore-launch theprocessofintegration couldcircumscribe theriskofafurther low any ‘flexible’initiative, butoutliningaclearandpossiblypreciseplanofinitia- of theEuropeanUnion.Complicationfunctioning Unionislikelytofol- w that direction.Developing simultaneousbutseparate pathsofclosercooperation amount tomakingthemmoreunderstandable,althoughitissurelyausefulstepin It shouldbereckoned thatmakingprocedurestransparent foroutsidersdoesnot T undertaking closercooperation, sincerelevant decisionswillapplytothemonly. er cooperation. Decisiontaking,ontheotherhand,onlyconcernscountries T Members Statesshouldbeinvolved, tosomeextent,inshapingimportantdecisions. ed. Again, thedistinctionbetweendecisionshapingandtakingmatters. All be ensuredunderallcircumstances inbodieswhere formaldecisionscanbeadopt- on differentforms,butthetransparency andinclusiveness ofdecision-makingshould olicy coherenceandefficiency arecloselylinked. The Commission, responsiblefor his isthelogicunderpinningenhancedcooperation asenvisaged by thetreaties. his would enableoutsiderstomaketheirviewsclearcountriesengagedinclos- olicy coherence hat isatstakeindifferentdomains. ould nothelpthepublicandexternalpartnerstobetterunderstand thefunctioning ansparency isanimportantpre-requisiteofpoliticalcohesion.Flexibilitycantake ansparent decision-making entente is aby-product ofcontroversy on 51 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 52 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 ments orconventions betweenthem. petence, exercise theirpowers individually orcollectively andmay concludeagree- selves. As ageneral rule,Member Statesmay, inmatters comingwithintheircom- Flexible integration arrangements outsidethetreatiesareasoldthem- Flexible integration outsidethe Treaty tice. differentiation areequallysuitablefortranslating anoverall politicalprojectintoprac- One hastobeflexibleaboutflexibility. Ontheotherhand,however, notallformsof and uniformparadigms when tryingtopromotemoreflexibleformsofintegration. Flexibility cantakemany differentforms.Itwould beparadoxical toimposestiffrules 7. What shouldbedoneby ‘flexible’ means? ity andsuccessofflexibleintegration. cy To in thetextofConstitutional Treaty when IGCnegotiationsareresumed. passerelle moting efficientanddemocratically legitimatedecision-making. The so-called move towards majorityvoting andtheapplicationofco-decision,withaviewtopro- envisaged by theConvention text,Member Statesinvolved inclosercooperation can of any decision inthedomainofclosercooperation. Itisofgreatimportancethat,as abandoning unanimitybetweenthem,andapplyingmajorityvoting totheadoption groups. Inthisperspective, countrieswillingtomakerealprogressshouldaccept the efficiency oftheUnionitself,oncemoreMemberStatesjoinadvanced to moreeffective policy-making amongthose involved. Intime,thiswould enhance Progress ofdifferentgroupscountriestowards closercooperation shouldalsolead Efficient procedures impede theattainment oftheobjectives ofthe Treaty. T respect theprimacy ofEUlaw aswellthedutyof sincerecooperation underthe membership onsuch cooperation isthatinsodoing, theseMemberStateshave to examples, where relevant, fromthepreviouscontributiontothisworking paper. launched by MemberStatestofurtherEuropeanintegration, by drawing concrete same time,somesuggestionsareprovided astowhat ‘flexible’initiatives shouldbe Union. Four broadcategoriesofflexibilitycanbereviewed inthisperspective. At the v right mixofinstrumentsandprocedurestoadjustanambitious politicalprojecttoa ing intosuch cooperation outsidethe Treaties. sions on‘enhancedcooperation’ doesnot precludetheMemberStatesfromenter- reaty. Therefore, they shouldnottakemeasures which could conflictwithor ery diverse reality, withoutoverstretching thepoliticalandlegalframework ofthe

of decision-makingarethefourkeypre-conditionsforlong-termsustainabil- sum up,politicalcohesion,policy coherence,theefficiency andthetransparen- 32 Member States,incooperation withthecommoninstitutions,should findthe procedure, allowing forthistransition, shouldbepromptlyre-introduced 33 T he introductionintothe Treaty oftheprovi- 34 T he onlyconstraint imposedby EU 31 proceed inthis direction,andusethisextreme formofdifferentiationtogive shape have notbeenexhausted. For thetimebeing, anyway, thepolitical willtoseriously tion. ButMember Statesshouldnottakeadvantage ofthisoption ifallalternatives and discredited Treaty framework, intheintentionofre-launching politicalintegra- might indeedentailtheneed for someformofdifferentiationoutsideaweakened integration outsidethe Treaty onlyasa‘safetyvalve.’ The failureofenlargement Under thecurrentpoliticalcircumstances, MemberStatesshouldconceive flexible safest recipefordisaster, runningstraight intostructural crisis. ously weakened.InaUnionof25,sideliningthecommoninstitutions furtheristhe if notmutuallyreinforcing. Democratic andjudicialcontrolmechanism would beseri- play inoverseeing thatdifferentstrands offlexibleintegration areatleastcompatible, coherence couldalsobedamaged,given theessentialrolethatCommissionshould their equalrights,wereexcludedanddecision-makingwould besecretive. Policy institutional structurestofostertheirintegration acrosstheboard. a fully-fledged‘UnionwithintheUnion’,where someMemberStatessetupnew such as R&D, environment, education,socialpolicy orarmamentcooperation, T by Summit inBerlinwerelargelydeterminednotsomuch by substantialdisagreementbut scenario, withpredictableconsequences. Again, therecriminationsinrunupto coordination, maybe supportedby alightsecretariat,would beamuch morelikely tures betweensomeMemberStates.Somesortofloose,basically intergovernmental it ishardtodetectastrongpushtowards settingupquasi-federal, accountablestruc- efficiency andtransparency ofdecision-makingwould belikelytofollow suit.Infact, P tions tothefamoustrilateral meetinginBerlinon18February prove thesamepoint. the caseunderstandard Treaty rulesof‘enhancedcooperation’. Resentfulreac- w stressed thatstructuredcooperation was noteven placedoutsidethe Treaty frame- cooperation’ inthedomainofdefence,shows thattensionsarehigh.Itshouldbe original formulationproducedby theConvention, ofthemechanism of‘structured of futureintegration. The rather emotionalreactionby anumberofcountriestothe source ofdivision, motivated by mutualresentment,and notasauseful‘laboratory’ initiatives outsidethe Treaty framework. These would inevitablybeperceived asa In thecurrentpoliticalclimate,however, MemberStatesshouldnotundertakemajor pronounced rolefortheUnioninmilitaryaffairs. including differentgroupsofMemberStates,have alsoclearedthepathforamore of the Western EuropeanUnion,andtheestablishmentofmulti-nationalforces case withtheSocialCharterandSchengen bordercooperation. The experience proving theprogressive andcentrifugal potentialofflexibility. This was notablythe developed by afew countrieswas eventually translated intothe Treaties, thereby form offlexibleintegration hasperformedaconstructive roleinthepast: olitical cohesionwould bethefirstcasualtyofinitiatives outsidethe Treaty, andthe he scopeofflexibleintegration outsidethe Treaty canvary fromaspecificdomain, ork, butsimplyinsinuatedmoreseparation betweenthe‘ins’and‘outs’thanis

the impressionthatvast majorityofcountries,andEUinstitutionsguaranteeing 36 Overall, this acquis 35 to 53 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 54 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 situation ofacountry. lation, when exceptions couldbemotivated withtheparticulareconomicandsocial wise uniformobligationshasbeenstandardpractice forbuildingdiversity intolegis- decision thatwillnever applytoit. exemptions areenshrined,whereas theabstainingcountrydoesnottakepartina abstention’ isthatallMemberStatestakepartintheadoptionofmeasurewhere lator andunderitsscrutiny. European laws orframework laws, withinclearlyestablishedlimits set by the legis- it isentrustedwiththedefinitionoramendmentofsomenon-essential elementsof included intheConstitutional Treaty, mightboosttheroleofCommission,since pushed tothelimits. The newlyenvisaged instruments of‘delegatedregulations,’ this, buttheirabilitytomonitorincreasinglydiversified legislationshouldnotbe and understandable. The Commissionand theCourtofJustice willplay a keyrolein istic forthefuture.Itishowever, aquestionofmakingdifferentiation manageable absolute legaluniformity, which hasbeenlargelyamyth inthepast,andisnotreal- tries, orsosoftthatitwould notbetakenseriously. Itisnotamatter ofdefending by T ity inshapingcommonrules,andaccountingforexistingdifferences. simply leadtoalooserlegalframework, theiradoptionreflectstheneedforflexibil- Although theselegaltoolsdonotnecessarilyentailtypesofflexiblecooperation, but and softlaw, avoiding bindingcommitments infavour ofbenchmarking practices. of adoptingframework legislation,settingminimumstandardsforharmonisation, A differentlegaltechnique toaccommodatediversity inEUdecision-makingconsists the common areas toaccommodatespecificnationalinterestswithoutpreventing theprogressof As previouslynoted,‘flexible’legislationhasbeenadoptedinanumberofpolicy through constructive abstentionfromcontroversial decisionsinthedomainofCFSP. integration. Flexibilityisincludedinspecificlegislative measuresorisexpressed T Micro-flexibility w – importantthoughmorelimitedinscopecanbelaunched withinthe Treaty frame- to anambitiouspoliticalproject,seemsvery distant.Prettymuch allotherinitiatives cy T and legalcoherenceunderthe responsibilityofthePresident. making, theCommissionshould perhapsestablishaspecialunittolookafterpolicy of flexibility. If‘flexible’ legislationwillbecomearegularfeatureofEUdecision- modating diversity inEUlaw, andperhapsavoiding recoursetomoredivisive forms he problemwithmicro-flexibilityisthepotential‘Swiss-cheese-syndrome,’ where- his formofflexibilitytouches theoppositeendofspectrumdifferentiated he acceptance of micro-flexibilityinevitably entails apriceintermsoftransparen- ork soastoenhanceasenseofcommonalityandinvolvement. , butthatcould beworthwhile ifstalematesituationsare avoided andadditional

an increasingshareofEUlaw would becomeeitherinapplicabletosomecoun- acquis . 37 38 T T he inclusionofspecifictemporary exemptionsfromother- he differencebetweentheseexemptionsand‘constructive 41 T his couldprove tobeausefulmechanism foraccom- 39 40 ronment, consumerprotection,socialpolicy, CFSPandJHA,amongothers. of micro-flexibilitytoenableprogressinthefieldeconomiccompetitiveness, envi- ‘management’ toolinspecificcircumstances. MemberStatesshouldenshrineforms prehensive political projectforthefutureofEurope,butcouldbecomeapractical form offlexibleintegration cannotbethesole,ormain,basisforimplementingacom- flexibility mighthelpovercoming stalemateswithoutanall-outconfrontation. This it, andthusforce someMemberStatesintouncomfortableminorities.Forms ofmicro- w decisions willcontinuetorequiretheagreementofall.Moreover, inthosecases recognised thatthiswillbeanincrementalprocess,andanumberofsensitive unanimity isdesirable forfacilitatingdecision-makinginaUnionof25,itshouldbe excuse forhinderingtheextensionofmajorityvoting. Although theeliminationof ter would notberequired. Additionally, enablingflexibilityshouldnotbecomean qualified majorityvoting andtheneedforflexibility:where theformerapplies,lat- standpoint, many have envisaged inthepastatrade offbetweentheapplicationof account diverse needsandpriorities,couldhelpdefuseconfrontation.From this bility. Onthecontrary, thesmoothrunningoflegislative activity, takingintofull political tensions.Infact,cohesionisnotdirectlythreatenedby micro-flexi- T outs fromentirepolicy areas,andtheseopt-outsareformallyrecognisedby the to includethosecasesinwhich someMemberStatesbenefitfrompermanentopt- tion, however, itseemsusefultoextendthedefinitionofpre-determined flexibility event thatallcountriesdecidetojointhe Agency. For thepurposes ofthisclassifica- Armaments Agency amountstoaformofpre-determined flexibilitytoo,exceptinthe lowing IGC.Futurecooperation inthecontextofnewlyestablishedEuropean flexibility aswell,althoughthatprovision hasbeensubstantiallyamended by the fol- cooperation’ indefence,asenvisaged by theConvention, belongstothiscategoryof wa ria forjoiningit,areenshrinedinthe Treaties. MonetaryUnionhasbeensetupthis w T Pre-determined flexibility already divided nationalgovernments onimportantissues.Political differences, Differentiation is envisaged by the Treaties when adeeppoliticalfault linehas is notamatter ofdissentingononespecific measureinthisorthat respect. quite aseriousdifferencebetween MemberStatesonpolicy prioritiesandtargets.It Pre-determined flexibilitycan be healthy fortheUnion,althoughitclearly reflects measures entailingmicro-differentiation atthelevel ofsecondarylaw, EUlegislation. tion inprimary, Treaty-level -EUlaw -thusmarkingaturningpointinrelationto differentiation. Boththeseopt-outs andtheMonetaryUnionintroduceddifferentia- the Amsterdam Treaty), andfrom Title IV TEC, arethemainexamplesofthis formof Irish andDanishopt-outsfromtheSchengen reaties. The 1993-1997UKopt-outfrom theSocialChapter his broaddefinitioncovers various formsofflexibleintegration. Itincludescases here majorityvoting applies,itisnotalways politicallyadvisable tomakefulluseof here therulesdelimitingpolicy substanceofclosercooperation, andthecrite- y,

building onthe Treaty ofMaastricht. The originalformulation of‘structured acquis (following itsincorporation in 42 as welltheUK, 55 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 56 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 countries were expected toquasi‘self-appoint’ themselves tobepartofthiscooper- lies withtheexceedingly exclusive character ofthis formofdifferentiation:some T smaller countries. economic governance ofMonetaryUniontoregain – over time-theconfidence of should show truewillingnesstoovercome previouscontroversies, strengthenthe in expenditure.Membersofthe Eurozone,andinparticularFrance andGermany, adopt afiscalpolicy stanceestablishingupperlimits to taxcutsunparalleled by cuts the economicgovernance oftheEuro-area.Eurozone membersshould,forexample, Euro-Ecofin shouldbeexpandedtocover awiderrange ofdecisionspertainingto tiative andusetherulesof Treaty-based enhancedcooperation. The powers ofthe agreement ofallMemberStates. Alternatively, Eurozone memberscantaketheini- amendment ofcurrent Treaty provisions would of courserequiretheunanimous Ecofin Councilbuildinguponthecurrentformofpre-determined flexibility. The In thisperspective, membersoftheEurozoneshouldenhancerole Euro- a given setofdecisions,ex-post. informally consultintheEuro-group,ex-ante,andareonly onesentitledtotake policy shapingintheCouncilremainsopentoall,althoughEurozonememberscan dition forthedesirable extensionofthepowers oftheEuro-Ecofinis,therefore,that the decisionstousecoercive meansundertheexcessive deficitprocedure. The con- appointment ofthemembersEuropeanCentral Bank(ECB)executive boardor issues ofspecialrelevance forthemanagementofMonetaryUnion,such asthe T sion takingpowers, which involves allMemberStateswithinthe Ecofin Council. define commonpoliticalguidelines. The Euro-Group,however, isdeprived ofdeci- F countries areexcludedfromthedeliberations oftheinformalEuro-Group,where the join EMUcandoso,anddecision-makingissufficientlytransparent. Non-EMU Monetary Union:any countrywillingandabletomatch theMaastricht criteriato ation throughpre-determinedflexibility. Bothrequirementsarematched by include theopennessandtransparency oftheinitiatives aimedatclosercooper- determined flexibility, ifitabidesby certainconditions. These conditionschiefly Notwithstanding thesedownsides, EUpoliticalcohesionisnotunderminedby pre- sub-optimal policy set-ups. w undertaken by the‘insiders.’ Also, Treaty revisionproceduresrequire unanimity, and difficulttomanage. This, inturn,risksunderminingtheefficiency ofactions different interestsrenderarrangements forpre-determinedflexibilityvery complex desire ofotherstoadvance. Still,theheavy proceduresrequiredtoaccommodate all policy domainshave freelydecidedtostay out,andhave acceptedthelegitimate T EMU, aswellontheoccasionofinclusionSchengen however, donotnecessarilyentailorfollow, hostileconfrontation.Inthecaseof reaties, thosecountrieswishingnottobeinvolved inclosercooperation inthese inance MinistersofcountriesbelongingtotheEuro-areameet,inattempt he problemwith ‘structuredcooperation’ ondefence,as framed by theConvention, his, althoughonlyEurozonememberscantakepartinvoting onalimitedrange of hich may wellhamperadjustmenttoevolving circumstances andthecorrectionof acquis in the (ESDP) by leadingthem. ority, andstrengthentheUnion’s CFSPandEuropeanSecurityDefencePolicy and ableMemberStatesshouldundertakestructuredcooperation asamatterofpri- standard formofenhancedcooperation thantopre-determinedflexibility. Willing following theseradical changes, structuredcooperation isnow much closertoa in monitoringtherespectofcriteriasetoutaseparate Protocol.Itseemsthat, entail, accordingtothelatestdraft, thefullinvolvement oftheEuropeaninstitutions cooperation. Also, thedevelopment andevolution ofstructuredcooperation would sion takingisquitesensiblyreserved forthosecountriestakingpartinstructured opens updecisionshaping-thephaseofdeliberation intheCouncil-althoughdeci- ing theIGC. The lastversion of Article III–213,producedby theItalianPresidency, sion cooperation addedthe‘exclusivity’ ofdecision taining to‘structuredcooperation,’ butalsofromrelevant deliberations. Structured ation, andothercountrieswould have beenexcludednotonlyfromdecisionsper- effects offlexibility. of progressive expansionofaleadinggroup,with aviewtoenhancingthecentripetal requirements. The roleofthecommon institutionsshouldbecentral totheprocess to joinflexibleintegration atalaterstage,butrequiringassistance to meetthe including agreementsonopt-outs,withcatch-up mechanisms forcountrieswilling In future,itwillbeimportanttomatch provisions onpre-determinedflexibility, and ofthesustainabilitylegalframework. be usedsparinglyandwithgreatcare,infullconsideration ofthe commoninterest against free-riding. All inall,opt-outs cannotandshouldnotberuledout,but temic complication. There islittle ‘objectivity’ inopt-outs,andfewguarantees scant consideration fortheimpactonlegalframework oftheUnion,andsys- ments, opt-outsoftendependonlast-minutepoliticaldealsat thehighestlevel, with serious reservations. QuitedifferentlyfromEMUorstructuredcooperation arrange- of opt-outsforcoherenceand-morebroadlypoliticalcohesion,however, raise icy decisions,andprevents abusetothedisadvantage ofoutsiders. The implications ity andtodeterminetheconditionsforaccessionenhancespredictabilityofpol- Member States. Also, thepresenceofobjective criteriatosetupthisformofflexibil- of aguarantee againstinitiatives aimedatintroducingunduediscriminationbetween required forthistypeofarrangement tobeinsertedinthe Treaty. That seemsenough countries aregenuinelycommittedtotherules. After all,unanimousagreementis Pre-determined flexibilityshouldnot,inprinciple,threatenpolicy coherence,if taking . That was notacceptabletoanumberofcountries,andwas rejecteddur- 43 shaping to the‘exclusivity’ ofdeci- 57 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 58 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 exclusive competence oftheUnion. framework ofexistingtreaties,excludingpolicy domainsbelongingtothesphereof clause empowering agroupofMemberStatestodeepentheircooperation withinthe T Enhanced cooperation Constitutional Treaty. cooperation have beenloosenedby the Treaty ofNiceandby thenewdraft W and MemberStates’ partinenhancedcooperation aresupposed toencourage and gations ofnon-participating countriesmustbe respected.Moreover, theCommission to ensurethatthe interestsofallaresafeguarded. The competences,rightsand obli- ties. The entire Treaty-based legalframework ofenhancedcooperation isconceived mentation intodifferentgroups ofcountriespursuingcompetingordiverging priori- EU policies. The involvement oftheEU institutions shouldexcludetheriskoffrag- text ofenhancedcooperation, andtheconsistency ofthosemeasures with common well, ensuringtheoverall consistency ofdifferentinitiatives undertakeninthecon- T introduced. of this the Parliament isnotgiven equalrightstotheCouncil). As notedabove, the removal w them, majorityvoting andtheordinarylegislative procedure(formerlyco-decision) w cy enhanced cooperation. As itisoftenthecase,transparency, efficiency andlegitima- open toallcountries,while decisiontakingonlyinvolves thoseparticipatinginthe European Parliament oftheevolution ofenhancedcooperation. Decisionshaping is Member StatesintheIGC)arealsoresponsibleforinforming allcountriesandthe the MinisterforForeign Affairs (whose fatedependsonthefinalagreementof of CFSP, ontheotherhand,thisisCouncil’s responsibility. The Commissionand accession ofnewcountriestothegrouppursuingdeeperintegration. Inthedomain enhanced cooperation. The Commissionalsoperformsagate-keepingroleonthe Council, ortoreject,arequestfromMemberStateswillinglaunch aninitiative of part inclosercooperation. The Commissionhastheresponsibilitytosubmit tees oftransparency andaccountabilitywithrespecttothosecountriesnottaking Enhanced cooperation isavery inclusive formofflexibility, andofferssolidguaran- ters forwhich the Treaty doesnotalready provide alegalbasis. scope ofthe Treaty framework. Enhancedcooperation doesnotenableactioninmat- same time,however, such awindow onlyincludesopportunitiesthatfallwithinthe window ofopportunityisnow openforengaginginenhancedcooperation. At the nomic, socialandterritorialcohesionoftheUnion,itissafetoarguethatalarger example when itcomestoassessingwhether agiven measurethreatenstheeco- reaty provisions onenhancedcooperation constituteanopen-endedenabling he CommissionandtheCouncil aremandatedtolookafterpolicy coherenceas here the Treaty stillenvisaged unanimity andspeciallegislative procedures(where hereby countriesundertakingenhancedcooperation canestablish,toapplyamong outer Coussens,theinitiallytightconditionsattached tothelaunch ofenhanced

go handinhand. The Convention hasintroducedanew, importantprovision passerelle clause by theIGCshouldbeswiftly redressed,andtheprovision re- 45 Although theirlegalinterpretationremainsquestionable,for 44 As describedby Franklin Dehousseand tion intheareaofJustice andHome Affairs. Enhanced cooperation alsoseemsthemost appropriatetooltoallow fordifferentia- Member States. should establishthefullcross-borderportabilityofpension rightsacrossdifferent same istrueasfarsocialpolicy isconcerned.For example,someMember States can addresstheirconcernsandbringtangibleresultsinterms ofqualitylife. The w ments willingtocommitthemselves inresponsetostrongpopulardemand. This new perspectives insettinguphigherenvironmental thresholdsforthosegovern- ov forthcoming Commissionrecommendationenvisaging enhancedcooperation to base. According toCommissioner Bolkestein, thelattermightbesubjectofa domain oftheenvironment andenergy, orharmonisationofthe corporation tax cooperation onimportantissues,such asharmonisationofindirecttaxationin the Looking atthepoliticalagendaofUnion,MemberStates should applyenhanced ambitious measuresincreasinglydifficult. increase witheach enlargementoftheUnion. This willmakeagreementonasetof number ofcountriesrequiredtolaunch enhancedcooperation –onethirdwill one oftheleastconvincing aspectsofthework oftheConvention onflexibility, the seem much morelikelytotakeshapethanwide-ranging projects.Finally, andthisis While thescopeforenhancedcooperation isnotpredefined,issue-basedinitiatives progress acrosstheboardby somecountries,withtheothersactingasspectators. fact, itishardtoimaginetheCommissionandCouncilcomfortablyauthorising Member States’initiatives areopentodifferentinterpretations. Also, asamatterof Although morerelaxed,conditionalityisstillquiterestrictive andboundariesto breakthrough, entailingdeepercooperation inoneormorebroadpolicy domains. however, enhancedcooperation isunlikelytobethebasisforamajorpolitical marks outlinedabove toassessvarious optionsfordifferentiation.Ontheotherhand, On theonehand,asremarked,thismechanism scoreswellagainstallthebench- T therefore, thesoleformofflexibilityendowed withastrongnormative dimension. fledged European Intelligence Agency couldbe set up. This would appear particu- mandate withthe participationofonlyalimited numberofnationalplayers, afully- Europol activities. Inparallel tothis, orby way ofupgrading Europol’s structuresand police cooperation tosupportanddevelop the‘hard-security’ endoftherange of cooperation tosetupacorpsofEuropean BorderGuards,aswelltoenhance by Enhanced cooperation isexpresslydirectedatstrengtheningtheintegration process judicial controlmechanisms. making proceduresapply, enhancedcooperation catersforbetterdemocratic and of deep-runningseparation betweentwo ormoregroups.Sincenormaldecision- facilitate theparticipationoflargestnumbercountries,soastoprevent therisk his is,atthesametime,strengthandlimitationofenhancedcooperation. ould concretelydemonstrate toEUcitizensthatcooperation attheEuropeanlevel ercome theoppositionofIrelandandUK.

achieving EUobjectives andpreservingitsinterests. 48 Member Statesshoulduseenhanced 47 Enhanced cooperation couldopen 46 Enhanced cooperation is, 59 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 60 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 document’ presented atthe Thessalonica SummitinJune 2003 becametheexisting fortable withits work. Inclose cooperation withnationalgovernments, the‘Solana and strategic cultureswere reflectedinthistaskforce, andMember Statesfeltcom- es headedby Javier Solanaproducedadraft intwo months.Differentsensitivities proved tobeaconsiderable success. A small groupofkeyplayers withintheservic- An innovative process was launched todraft aEuropean SecurityStrategy, which tives. needed topromotecohesion,coherence andefficiency, andtoidentifysharedobjec- itative quantumleapwas needed. A commonplatformfordecision-making was T ful insightsintohow toshapeacommonpoliticalplatformforvery diverse Union. achievements inonevery importantpolicy domain-externalsecurity–provide use- T of theneedforcohesion,ambitionanddetermination scope foroptimism. The terroristattack in Madrid isyet anotherpowerful reminder in thelightofrecentfragmentation andcontroversy amongMemberStates,thereis to shapeanewvision,andplaninitiatives. Although thatappearsvery difficult cal, economicandsecuritychallenges, findstheinspiration andthecollective will w lining sharedpriorities. Admittedly, thisismoreeasilysaidthandone.However, it integration, attheserviceofapoliticalprojectsupportedby allMemberStates,out- approach toenvisaging futureformsofflexibility. Flexibilitymustbecomeatoolfor cooperation. This was animportantsignal,sinceitindicatedthemostconstructive level, withthe Treaty ofNicein Article 43 TEU, underthechapter onenhanced It isnotby chance thattheword ‘integration’ madeitsfirstentryatprimaryEUlaw 8. The endjustifies ‘flexible’ means different systemsofrightsandguarantees forthosesubjecttoinvestigation orarrest. closer cooperation. That shouldofcoursegohand-in-handwithaclosescrutiny of investigations andintervene operatively acrosstheterritoryofstates participatingin case forconstitutingabody ofEuropeanpublicprosecutorsabletopursuetheir is anothernatural candidateforenhancedcooperation: thereseemstobeaclear stitute asortof‘security’ are immediatelyready togodown thisroute. These countrieswould thereforecon- to boosttheircommonpoliceandintelligencecapacities,ifnotallMemberStates tured cooperation’ inESDPsetupsomeformofenhancedcooperation amongthem In thisperspective, itwould be advisable thatthesame countriesinvolved in‘struc- ernments, andtheinevitablelinkbetweeninternalexternalsecurity. ing thehighprioritygiven toanti-terrorismoperations by publicopinionandgov- larly appropriate(and,following recentterroristattacks inMadrid,urgent)consider- he very seriousturmoilover theIraq crisisproducedgrowing awareness thataqual- he questionishow togoabouttheelaboration ofacommonproject.Recent ould notbethefirsttimeinwhich theUnion,confrontedwithvery seriouspoliti- av ant garde across theboard.Criminaljusticecooperation F viduals abletoreflectthebroadrange ofdifferentnationalandpoliticalsensitivities. essential: limitedsizeofthegroupdrafters, andinclusioninsuch groupofindi- across differentpolicy domains.Lookingatthisprecedent,two prerequisitesare European SecurityStrategy, withaviewtooutliningsharedobjectives fortheUnion Some lessonscanbedrawn fromthesuccessfulprocedure‘invented’ topreparethe EU SecurityStrategy, approved attheDecemberEuropeanCouncilinBrussels. decide tostay outofoneormoreinitiatives. governments would beabletofine-tunetheirpositionpragmatically, andpossibly shared objectives, and thesetofrelevant implementingmeasures,areagreed,all ers. A very heavy burdenofproofwould inevitablyweighontheirshoulders.Once Member States,orsmallminoritiesofcountries,toradically opposeprogressby oth- an agreedpoliticalframework, itwould bemuch moredifficultforindividual specific nationalsensitivities arethestrongest. Arguably, againstthebackground of for progressinpolicy domainswhere thedirectionofintegration iscontested,and crete actionplan,various formsofflexibilityshouldbeenvisaged topave the way T Commission shouldbefilled. This initiative mightprove avery usefulbridge. at thedisposalofthisprocess. The wideninggapbetweenMemberStatesandthe experience andmotivation, accumulated by thecommoninstitutionsshouldbeput Community institutionalframework, withtheCommissionatitscore. The capitalof there isnocohesion,coherence,efficiency andtransparency withoutthework ofthe Europe withoutthesupportofnationalgovernments, butitisequallyobvious that the participationofcommoninstitutions,notablyCommission. There isno or thepurposesofthisinitiative, however, athirdrequirementshouldbestressed: he projectshouldbeaccompaniedby adetailedactionplan.Indrafting thiscon- 49 61 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 62 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 the benefitofalargeandstrongEurope. the spanofafewyears, acohesive andinclusive w coupled withsocialcohesion, strengthening theeconomicgovernance oftheUnion,boostingsustainablegrowth a smallernumberofcountries. This projectshouldincludeinitiatives directedat implement thisprojectat25ifpossible,or, asafallback, adoptinitiatives thatinvolve tutions, tofulfiltheoften-citedambitionsofalargerEurope.MemberStatesshould sive. MemberStates shoulddiscussasharedpoliticalprojectwiththecommoninsti- integration, theUniondoesnotneedahard-coreeither:thatwould prove toodivi- Is ahard-coreinsight?Notreally-forthetimebeing. At thisstageoftheprocess 9. Conclusion will thenhave an of Europeanintegration, underthescrutiny ofthecommoninstitutions. The Union discrete andconsensualfashion,theywillhave won the righttositatthefront-seat have freelydecidedtobepartofavast majorityofinitiatives, acrosstheboard.Ina injection offlexibilityanddifferentiation,therewillbeagroupMemberStatesthat A closerlookattheUnionintenyears timemightreveal that,afteraconsiderable make progressindifferentdomains. cooperation shouldbecomethebasicproceduretoallow forgroupsofcountriesto speaking, moredifferentiationislikelytobeenshrinedinEUlaw, andenhanced Union. These initiatives willvary inscope,instruments,andprocedures.Broadly across thesinglemarket,andguaranteeing theinternalandexternalsecurityof on thefield,withconcreteinitiatives such astheonessuggestedabove. If,in av ant garde . Statementsarenolongerenough:medalshave tobe 50 ensuring afiscallevel playing field for companies av ant garde emerges itwillbeto 5 E.BALLADUR, P Documents, 1865/96,7September1994. 4 DocumentofCDU/CSUgroupatGermanBundestag,Réflexionssurlapolitiqueeuropéenne 3 William &MaryLecture,University ofLeiden,7September1994 of Michigan, 1984 Community Law? An Unusual Approach totheConceptof“Two Speeds””,Michigan Law Review, University International Affairs, London1985and,foralegalapproach, C.D. EHLERMANN,“How Flexibleis 2 SeeH. WALLACE, “Europe: The ChallengeofDiversity”, ChathamHousePaper, 29,Royal Instituteof sions ofthisworking paper. G. DURAND, S.GOULARD, A. HALLIGAN,andJ.PALMER fortheirvaluable commentsonthedraft ver- 1 The authorwould liketothankH.BRIBOSIA, W. COUSSENS,F. CAMERON, S.CROSSICK,F. DEHOUSSE, 23 WOLFGANG MUNCHAU, “Mistrustatthe heartofthecrisis”,Financial Times, 14December2004 in Brussels,seeCIG 60/03and ADD 1,9December2003. 22 For theconsolidatedtext oftheamendmentssubmittedby theItalianPresidency totheEuropeanCouncil A. HALLIGANforherimportantcontribution tothischapter. Differentiated Integration”, Journal ofCommonMarket Studies(JCMS),34,2,1996. The authorisgrateful to 21 For avery comprehensive overview of definitionsofflexibility, see A. STUBB, “A Categorisationof 20 J.FISCHER,interviewtoBerlinerZeitung, 27February 2004 19 J.CHIRAC, speech attheHungarianParliament, 24February 2004 18 F. FRATTINI, “Exclusive summitswilldeepenEurope’s divisions”, Financial Times, 18February 2004 17 The Irish Times, 7January 2004. 16 The Guardian,15December2003. 15 The Washington Times, 14December2003. Convention in thefieldofEuropeansecurityanddefencepolicy”, CONV422/02,22November 2002. 14 DOMINIQUEDE VILLEPIN andJOSCHKAFISCHER,“Joint Franco-German proposaltotheEuropean 13 M.BARNIER, “Why Europematters- Personal notefromMichel Barnier”,17October2001 20 June 2001. 12 J.N.JEANNENEY, P. LAMY, H.NALLET, D. STRAUSS-KAHN, “Europe:pourallerplusloin”, LeMonde, Beyond”, Palgrave, New York, 2002. and the2000IGCsee A. STUBB, “NegotiatingFlexibilityintheEuropeanUnion- Amsterdam, Niceand 1/01, NYUSchool ofLaw. For anexcellentanalysisofthenegotiationsonflexibilityduring1996/97IGC the InstitutionalBalanceinEuropeanUnion- A Continentalperspective”, Jean Monnet Working Paper Sheffield Academic Press,Sheffield,2001;andX. YATANGAS, “The Treaty ofNice:theSharingPower and tion seeD. GALLOWAY, “The Treaty ofNiceandBeyond: RealitiesandIllusionsofPower intheEU”, 11 For anoverview oftheinnovations introducedby the Treaty ofNicetoprovisions onenhancedcoopera- 10 Speech tothePolish Stock Exchange, 6October2001 International Herald Tribune, 11 April 2000. 9 H.SCHMIDTand V. GISCARD D’ESTAING, T 8 LeMonde,19January 2000 ing inSintra on14-15 April 2000,itwas finallyincludedwithinthescopeofconference. Council inHelsinkibut,thankstotheeffortsofPortuguese Presidency, culminatingintheinformal meet- cooperation. This issuewas excludedfromthenegotiationsonbasisof conclusionsoftheEuropean future oftheEuropeanUnion,agendaongoingIGChadalready beenextendedtocover enhanced 7 Beforethismajorspeech, introducingtheissueofdifferentiatedintegration intothewiderdebateon 6 Speech totheInstitutfrançais desrelationsinternationals,Paris, 26October1994 our unnouv eau tr aité del’Élysée ime toslo , LeMonde,30November 1994 w do wn andconsolidatearound‘Euro-Europe’ , Europe , 63 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 64 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 Union, whose degreeofintegration would remainlooser. cohesion andpolicy coherencebetween theenvisaged ‘Federation ofNationStates’ andthewiderEuropean 36 Jacques Delorshasbeen themainadvocate ofthisoption,while stressingtheneedtopreserve political RACINE, E. PHILIPPART, “RapportsurlesCoopér 35 For aspecificanalysisofnumberinitiatives outsidethe Treaties intheseandotherdomainsseeB. that such cooperation isnow precluded. CFSP. This clausenolongerfiguresintheConvention’s draft, butthis shouldnotbeinterpreted w development ofclosercooperation betweentwo ormoreMemberStatesonabilateral level, intheframe- 34 The current Treaties explicitlyrecognisethis. Article 17 TEU maintainsthatthe Treaty doesnotprevent the D. Member States.Differentiationby MeansofPartial andParallel International Agreements”, inB. DE WITTE, between MemberStatesoftheUnion”,inG.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT, cit.andB. De WITTE, “Chameleonic empted thatoftheMemberStates.See:B. DE WITTE, “Old-fashionedflexibility:International Agreements also excludedinareasofsharedcompetencewhere theexercise ofthiscompetence by theUnionhaspre- 33 Hence,such cooperation isexcludedinareasfallingundertheexclusive competences oftheUnion.Itis mendations”, WWR Working Paper 104,2000 M. SIEDIAHNHO, “The ProsandConsofclosercooperation withintheEU. Argumentation andrecom- 32 For adetailedaccountoftheprosandconsdifferentformsflexibleintergration, seeE.PHILIPPART, Article III-328oftheConstitutional Treaty. SeeCIG60/03 ADD 1, Annex 44. 31 The ItalianPresidency, underpressurefromamajorityofnationalgovernments, hasproposed tocancel University Press,2000. Beyond: InstitutionalDynamicsandProspectsforDemocracy intheEuropeanUnion”,Oxford,Oxford for Integration oraRestraint onDisintegration?” inK.NEUNREITHER, A. WIENER (eds),“Amsterdam and 30 Ontheinter-relation betweenflexibilityandEuropeanintegration seeH. WALLACE, “Flexibility: A Tool SCOTT, cit. 29 G.DEBURCA, “DifferentiationwithintheCore:CaseofCommonMarket”,inG.DEBURCA, J. “The Many Faces ofDifferentiationinEULaw”, Interstentia, Antwerp, Oxford,New York, 2001. Pa legal framework, encompassingtheproliferation offlexibility, seeD. CURTIN, “EmergingInstitutional in Europe”,G.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT, cit.For arelatedsetofreflectionsonthesustainability ofaunitary 28 N. WALKER, “FlexibilitywithinaMetaconstitutional Frame: ReflectionsonthefutureofLegal Authority Dev Europartenaires l’Allemagne dansl’UnionEuropéennededemain,“F 27 OntheneedforFrance andGermany torestoretheirleadership,seeGroupederéflexionsurlaF Riccardi. 26 BulletinQuotidienEurope,No.8636,3February 2004,JACQUES DELORSquotedby Ferdinando W tiveness anddemocratic accountabilityintheEU”,MaxPlanck institutefortheStudy ofSocieties(MPIfG), 25 Onthelinkbetweenflexibleintegration and‘output’legitimacy, seeF. SCHARPF, “Problem-solvingeffec- Flexibility?”, Hart,Oxford-Oregon,2000. Governance” inG.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT (eds)“ConstitutionalChangeintheEU-From Uniformityto “From Uniformity toFlexibility. The management ofDiversity anditsImpactontheEUSystemof 24 For acomprehensive overview ofways toadjustflexibility, seeE.PHILIPPART andM.SIEDIAHNHO, ork ofthe WEU andNATO, provided such cooperation doesnotruncountertoorimpedetheUnion’s orking Paper 03/01 r

ameters andOrganisedDifferenceintheEuropeanUnion”,B. DE WITTE, D. HANFandE. VOS (eds), HANF, E. VOS, cit. eloppement, del’éducationetlapolitique sociale , July 2003. ations Restreintesdanslesdomainsde laRec r ance et ”, CommissariatGénéral duPlan,September2003. Allemagne enEurope:laleadershipsemérite”, a contrario her r ance et ce & 48 Seethereportofatelierchaired by GUYCANIVET, “Lescoopér Committee onEconomicandMonetary Affairs, 16 March 2004. F 47 SeeinterviewofFRITSBOLKESTEINwithLeMonde,reportedinEuropean InformationService(EIS)24 46 Article 43 TEU, asamendedby the Treaty ofNice,and Article I-43oftheConstitutional Treaty. RSCAS/AEL, Florence,2003 ‘Simplified’ Treaty”, inB. De WITTE (ed),“Ten reflectionsontheConstitutional Treaty forEurope”,EUI, 45 OnthedebateonflexibilityinConvention, seeJ.SHAW, “Flexibilityina‘Reorganised’and the Amsterdam Treaty” inEuropeanLaw Journal, 4,1998. Amsterdam, seeC.D. EHLERMANN,“Differentiation,Flexibility, CloserCooperation: theNewProvisions of 44 For anearlyassessementofthenewprovisions onenhancedcooperation introducedby the Treaty of able, what desirable?”, 26January 2004. the InstituteofSecurityStudiesEuropeanUnionon“FlexibilityforESDP: what isfeasible,what accept- particular onarmamentscooperation, therecentnoteby A. MISSIROLIontheproceedingsofaseminarat P “Flexibility andenhancedcooperation inEuropeansecuritymatters:assetsorliabilities?”,ISSOccasional 43 For broaderreflectionsonthescopeofflexibilityindomainsecurityanddefencesee A. MISSIROLI, B provisions oftheSocialChapterwereenshrinedinanewsection Treaty of Amsterdam. SeeC. out. Following thevictoryofLabourpartyatBritishelectionsin1997,however, theUKoptedin,and and aSocialPolicy Agreement, would beattached tothe Treaty butwould notapplytotheUK,which opted 42 The then12MemberStatesagreedatMaastricht thattheSocialChapter, includingaSocialPolicy Protocol 41 See Article I-35oftheConstitutional Treaty. PRECHAL, “DifferentiationinandthroughCommunitySoftlaw”, inB:DE WITTE, D. HANF, E. VOS, cit. Governance intheEU”,G.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT, cit.Seealso,forawideroverview, L.SENDEN,S. P 40 For theapplicationofsoftlaw measuresinthefieldofsocialpolicy seeC.BARNARD, “FlexibilityandSocial cation inadecision-makingsystemalready understrain, withoutclearadvantages. constructive abstentionacrosstheboarddoesnotseemconvincing. This reformwould introducemorecompli- able andperhapsmoresuitableforthosewillingtoadvance. All inall,thecaseforextendingmechanism of tain measure,butinthepresenceofseriousdifferencesinstrumentenhancedcooperation would beavail- micro-opt-outs. Abstention would perhapshighlightastrongerwillofdifferentiationfromthedirectioncer- the generalisation ofconstructive abstentionwould bringwithrespecttoopen-endedexemptions,amounting tion tootherpolicy domains.Consideringthewiderange ofinstrumentsavailable, itisnotclearwhat addedvalue 39 F. SCHARPF(cit.)makesaninterestingcaseforthegeneralisation oftheapplicationconstructive absten- not fromobjective differences. w 38 For someoftheseflexiblemeasures,however, thelinkwith“ 37 SeeG.DEBURCA inG.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT, cit.andC.D. EHLERMANN,1984,cit. tice etaffairesentérieures:unoutild’intégr set ofrelevant measures. Text reproducedinBulletin QuotidienEurope,No.2361-2362, 27February 2004. the ‘SpinelliGroup’ foraPES(Party oftheEuropeanSocialists) programme, 11February 2004,outlininga 50 For aviewonhow toimprove theeconomicandsocialgovernance oftheUnion,seeproposals Tr 49 For anassessmentofthisdocument,seeF. CAMERON, “The EU’s SecurityStrategy”, InternationalePolitik, ebruary 2004,and,morerecently, the statementofCommissionerBolkensteinattheEuropeanParliament aper, 6,1999and A. MISSIROLI,“CFSP, defenceand flexibility”,ISSChaillotPaper, 38,2000.Seealso,in olicy”, inG.DEBURCA, J.SCOTT, cit.SeealsoJ.SCOTT, “Flexibility, ‘Proceduralisation’ andEnvironmental ARNARD inG.DEBURCA andJ.SCOTT, cit. hat spurious.Onsomeoccasions,exemptionsseemedtooriginatefromdiverging nationalinterests,and ansatlantic Edition, Vol. 5,Spring2004. ation ”, CommisariatGénéral duPlan,2003. objective differencesinsituation ations renfor cèes enmatièredejus ” was some- - 65 IWP - Political Europe - April 2004 The EPC is an independent, not-for-profit think-tank committed to making European integration work. It aims to promote a balanced dialogue between all the different stakeholders represented in its membership.

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